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
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# Under two presidents

Roman Malko

The second round of the presidential election turned into a cold shower on the head of Ukrainian society. Standing at the edge of an abyss into which they will now have to leap, Ukrainians are somewhat subdued now, because they're not so sure if they'll be able to fly off as they dreamed or will end up crashing.

PHOTO: UNIAN



Moreover, they haven't had to live under two presidents for quite some time now: the incumbent who is slowly coming to the end of his term and the newly-elected one who still doesn't have the power. Moreover, it won't be possible to get rid of him, either. After the inauguration, a new epoch starts. Some may already be regretting their choice, others' nerves are frazzled with hopelessness, and others are still wildly celebrating victory. Yet, all those who care even a little about what will happen down the road are amusing themselves playing "let's compare," compelled to weigh today's steps of both key players, looking at them for some kind of logic and signs that they can decipher and explain as they may. It all looks like a lot like reading tea leaves, but it's interesting.

Running a bit ahead, it's noteworthy that, compared to his opponent, Petro Poroshenko has stronger positions – which is quite understandable. He has plenty of skills and experience, which certainly cannot be said of Volodymyr Zelenskiy, and, most importantly, he knows what he wants. Zelenskiy comes across more like a naughty schoolboy who has suddenly been pushed on stage to represent the whole school and is trying, as usual, to hide behind the backs of other smarter classmates. But he can no longer get away with this kind of trickery. He keeps looking around with frightened eyes, looking for signs of support, ears pricked back, catching hints from the room around him, but his being unbearably runs into reality and the thought that the joke has gone on too long and things are getting scary. This

### THE ZE-TEAM IS HOPING TO GET THE INAUGURATION SCHEDULED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE TO MEET THE TIMEFRAME WITHIN WHICH THE LEGISLATURE CAN BE DISMISSED AND A SNAP ELECTION CALLED, IN THE HOPE TO GAIN A MAJORITY IN THE NEW RADA, MEANING AN OBEDIENT CABINET.

IF ELECTIONS TAKE PLACE AT THE REGULAR SCHEDULED TIME, THIS FALL, IT WILL BE CRITICAL THAT ZELENSKIY'S POLITICAL CAPITAL IS NOT FRITTERED AWAY BEFORE OCTOBER

can even be seen in photographs taken when Zelenskiy shows up in person and has to talk with real people. There's nothing strange that his first, albeit unofficial visit as newly-elected president was not to the voters who elected him, not to the officials with whom he will have to work, and not even to the foreign leaders of partner countries for closer acquaintance, but to a Turkish resort, where he absolutely needed to rest and be in the family circle.

This gesture of the good family man is worth respect and understanding, although a fairly convincing version is that the vacation was only a cover for a private presentation of the new president to his main sponsors and business colleagues. In any case, this entire story somehow doesn't fit at all with building up the serial image that was so carefully advertised to voters – and leads to some serious second thoughts. While the president is still working out the terms of his employment, his retinue is busy generating real chaos in the minds of Ze supporters, rejecting the possibility that just about all of those things they faithfully believed in, in the breaks between episodes of the Holoborodko serial and voting, might actually come to pass.

To be fair, it's important to note that Zelenskiy almost immediately managed to smooth out the rougher edges of misunderstanding and, possibly, to do things that no one expected of him. He wrote in Facebook what the Chornobyl tragedy had taught Ukrainians, he disappointed Kremlin And after that he began a round of visits to get to know people. He met with religious leaders and with the VR speaker, and talked to representatives of the parliamentary factions. This pro-activeness after the prolonged playing dead during the election campaign is truly impressive, but this, too, has an explanation. Having made it to the big league and the top seat in the land, the player, whether he wants to or not, will draw universal attention to himself. People will want to get to know him, assuring him that they will be of use. Ultimately, he himself understands that he doesn't have a lot of time to establish himself without stepping on too many toes.

To avoid an awkward and very untheatrical break, the Ze-team is hoping to get the inauguration scheduled as soon as possible to meet the timeframe within which the legislature can be dismissed and a snap election called, in the hope – opinion polls give reasons for optimism here – to gain a majority in the new Rada, meaning an obedient Cabinet. If elections take place at the regular scheduled time, this fall, it will be critical that Zelenskiy's political capital is not frittered away before October. There's very little room at all for maneuvering, so every single step has to be carefully planned and pushed, and his messages have to be pushed, too, while the Rada and voters haven't started forming a real anti-Ze coalition.

Meanwhile, what is still-President Petro Poroshenko doing all this time? He's still doing his presidential job and doing so both creatively and with zest. Receiving thanks, thanking others, awarding military divisions honorary names. Promising to return soon. There's no longer any reason for him to be stressed, but it's still too early to relax. The remaining time in his term is worth using not just for symbolic gestures and he seems to understand that. So he goes to night-time services at various churches on Easter Sunday; he visits Lviv to thank voters for their support, as they gave him the biggest proportion of the vote; he promises to sign into effect the law on language; he honors fallen heroes and meets with students; he awards titles and honors, appoints new judges, and talks with foreign leaders; and he confirms the members of delegations to participate in court hearings in Ukraine's suits against the Russian Federation regarding Ukrainian sailors who were taken prisoner. Yet again, he travels to the front, not just to meet with soldiers, but to honor the dead, to award a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature from Avdivivka the title "Merited Teacher of Ukraine," and also to pass on to his successor, from the front, the duty to care about building up the army: because "a strong army will defend Ukraine, no matter what."

The most interesting thing, though, is an active shuffling of personnel whose underlying logic isn't always apparent. Why would he dismiss people at the last moment is something that can be guessed, but what's the point of appointing new people such as judges, diplomats and members of the NSC to the vacated places is not clear at all. Is he expecting that the new president won't bother with them for awhile because he'll be short-staffed anyway? Have there been some amicable agreements, either directly or through international intermediaries? Anything is possible. But that's not the main point. In fact, the main question that is bothering many in Ukraine, and beyond, is what can be done so that when power is transferred, the country won't fall apart. And maybe this is an answer worth looking for. If there is one, of course.

# Awesome Ukraine

Philippe de Lara, Paris

Despite the special situation of Ukraine – a post-Soviet country still struggling for its independence and confronting a large-scale war - the ongoing presidential election displays unfortunate similarities with political life in "old" democracies. The concept of populism is not fit to grasp this global trend, and much less its unique Ukrainian brand. Ukraine has mad huge steps toward European democracy, yet

threshold between democratic sovereignty it is still on the and the legacy of the Soviet empire, that is not only the so called hybrid war waged by Russia, but also the pervasiveness of Soviet forms of life: paternalism, corruption, persistence of Soviet myths in culture and historical consciousness. The presidential competition reveals so to speak a third Ukraine: neither the Euromaidan Ukraine, nor the part of the country living still on Moscow time, but a country at the forefront of the most fashionable flaws of mature democracies: distrust of politics, preference for showmen instead of statesmen, blind indifference to the consistency and feasibility of one's political agenda and, on the top of it, self-defeating if not disastrous reactions to the perceived problems and threats. This could be named the trumpization of Western societies. Donald Trump began his political career and Nigel Farage (the leader of the Brexit campaign) ends his as TV stars. Zelensky do better than his peers: he is at the same time a TV star and a "real" politician. He even managed to merge TV and reality in his person. In various ways, these leaders as well as the French Yellow Vests are of the same kind: they do not present a program, they express feelings: anger, fear, sometimes hatred. What people value in them is not what they expect them to achieve - efficiency plays no role here. They just want to rock the boat, to destroy what they dislike without bothering about what should be done instead: fuck EU, fuck international trade, fuck migrations, fuck digital economy, fuck political representation, let's go back to coal and autarchy.

Or rather they pretend: ultimately, what this is about is to get rid of reality. Therefore the tremendous influence of fake news, therefore the inconsistent aspirations to direct democracy and to authoritarian rulers among Trumpized citizens all over the world. Since 2016, reasonable people expect that voters will soon realize that Trump is a dangerous crook, that Brexit is a disaster for UK, that the populist coalition in Italy is unable to fulfill its promises and is deteriorating Italy's financial and social situation. But until now, this expectation is constantly frustrated. Trump's reelection is more than ever plausible, UK cannot or does not want to escape the Brexit's trap, Berlusconi might make a come-back, and the Yellow Vests, whose program boils down to "Fuck Macron" and "let us fire government and decide on everything by referendums", have still the favor of 30% to 40% of French electorate. Zelensky's breakthrough is a festive and friendly version of the angers and fears of Trump and his likes.

"Your anger is legitimate", said president Macron, without in the least calming down the wrath of Yellow Vests. Whatever the explanations and good reasons of this attitude of the electorate – damages of globalization, powerlessness of governments it is difficult not to recognize here a kind of childishness, by easy-going children in Ukraine, by angry children elsewhere. In Freudian terms, it is the overflow of the "reality principle" by the 'pleasure principle", a process Freud called sometimes the "death drive". "Childish" may seem unpolitical and dismissive, but I find no other word to point at the current state of the political mind. It is the ultimate stage of democratic individualism: the individualization of politics. People are increasingly narrowing the scope and scale of legitimate politics: from country to region, from region to neighborhood or other small communities. A French politician, Jean-Louis Bourlanges, gives a perceptive description of this trend: Ultimately the only political authority is the self, Myself cannot accept that decisions concerning me could be made by somebody else than myself. So to speak, Zelensky is popular because his voters believes he is each of them. I do not claim that this is the only dimension of the crisis of Western democracies, which has many causes and many meanings. I just claim that this dimension must be taken seriously.

DONALD TRUMP BEGAN HIS POLITICAL CAREER AND NIGEL FARAGE (THE LEADER OF THE BREXIT CAMPAIGN) ENDS HIS AS TV STARS. ZELENSKIY DO BETTER THAN HIS PEERS: HE IS AT THE SAME TIME A TV STAR AND A "REAL" POLITICIAN. HE EVEN MANAGED TO MERGE TV AND REALITY IN HIS PERSON

That Ukraine is so strongly affected by the disruptive individualization of politics is both appalling and illuminating. Precisely because the usual explanations of this disruption cannot (or not vet) be applied to Ukraine: further integration in globalized economy is more a wish than a threat. Ukraine is completely foreign to the tension between multiculturalism and national identity; it is an emigration not an immigration country; existential threat comes from Russia, not Islamism; issues about employment and purchasing power are mitigated by war and Russian occupation. Now these issues are often mentioned as the main source of populist reactions: EU would be rejected for the sake of national sovereignty and protection of national culture and welfare state, Trump voters, as well as Yellow Vests, would take their revenge against multiculturalist selfish elites. Populism would be the revolt of the rooted "somewhere" against the globalized "anywhere". I wish Ukrainians understood better their situation, and the rest of the world understood better Ukraine. What is at stake is the freedom and flourishing of our nations threatened by hegemonic empires, Russia, China and, in its non-territorial based way, Islamism. Schemes of cooperation like EU and NATO are not the enemy but the shields of nations. In Europe, Russia is the only beneficiary of the crisis of EU and has more than his share in making it worse. Putin rubs its hands in delight because of our childish blindness.

# **Brian Whitmore:**

# "Putin wants to party like it is 1815"

Interviewed by **Yuriy Lapayev** 

During the 12<sup>th</sup> Kyiv Security Forum *The Ukrainian Week* met with the American publicist and researcher of Russian policy, Brian Whitmore, to discuss the future steps of Moscow in Ukraine and in the world as well as details of the Kremlin's strategy for the West.

#### What is current position of Russian government toward Western countries, do you see any changes in last year? Which goals has Kremlin?

 I think Russian policy toward West is remarkably consistent. To put it in simplest terms, Russia wants to break the European Union, Russia wants to break up NATO. In toward this they are weaponizing everything effort disposal whether it is corruption to create network of influence in the West, whether it is via support for far-right and far-left parties in Europe and North America. But the goal is very clear – the European Union represents, in the eyes of the Kremlin, as an existential threat. It has this model of horizontal integration, where all the countries are coequal, and they are choosing to integrate. This is offensive to the Russians, they don't think this is how world is supposed to work. By their opinion the world is supposed to work as a great powers tell small countries what to do. A strong vertical. That is the world they want to see. Putin wants to party like it is 1815, he wants to return to this XIX century world of great powers. And the EU, its model is very

strange to them and frightening. It stands as the sharp contrast to the kind of kleptocratic, authoritarian corrupted regime you see in the Kremlin. And as the result it is a magnet for Russian neighbors, you know this here in Ukraine. But also for more progressive elements inside the Russian society, so it represents kind of domestic threat to Putin. So for this reason they made a decision, that they need do everything in their power to undermine or break the European Union. The same holds true for NATO. They want to separate the United States from Europe, separate North America from Western Europe, break up the North Atlantic Alliance. They want to return to world, where there is no big alliances, governed by rules and values. The Russian don't like things like that. This is the policy toward the West and it remains unchanged, I don't expect it to change. I think we need to gear ourselves for a long conflict with a revanchist Russia.

#### A new Cold War?

- It is not a Cold War in the classical sense. In the Cold War we have two systems, hermetically sealed from each other, two blocks, locked into their own systems. This is different, it is a struggle between two normative systems. You have West, which is based on the rule of law, the rights of individual, the sanctity of contracts, the accountability of power. And you have East, based on kleptocracy, patron-client relationships, the marriage of money and power, the subordination of law to power. Unlike the Cold War, they are integrated into each other, competing in this kind of integrated globalized world. The sense what you have in the East, is what emigrated Russian political scientist Alena Ledeneva has called "Systema". Systema is this whole network, always governed Russia from the great Dutchee of Moskovia through the Russian Empire and Soviet Union to the post Soviet Union times. And what we see under Putin right now, is only a Putin's version of Systema. But what Putin has done with Systema is he is externalized it. During the Soviet time Systema was contained inside the Iron Curtain. Now in this globalized post-Soviet world he spreads this all around the world. All around you can spread corrupted network, you can spread Systema. You can spread it all the way in the North America. And this is the danger. I mean in lot of ways corruption is a new communism. The Kremlin's black cash is a new Red Menace. Systema is a new Leninism. Communism had its faults and we don't have to go in to these faults at least with playing to higher human ideals. Corruption is very powerful, because it plays to most basic human instinct – greed. Therefore it is very powerful and dangerous. We have to look at corruption now as a national security issue. I'm trying to push this in the West, we have to really think about it. When we, westerners, come here and saying: "Ukrainians, do something with corruption" I say it in a different way, like we all need to do something with corruption. We are all Ukrainians in this fight. Because corruption is a security issue and it is damaging your security and our security too. It is really the struggle of our time. So this is Russian approach to West. And it remains unchanged and it is gonna be a problem after Putin is gone as well. Because Putin will go, but Systema will remain. If Putin's regime falls, it will be replaced with something very similar. What Ukraine is trying to do right now is actually really important, because it is trying to break out from Systema. And Systema is fighting back, trying to keep you back inside. If you can get out of this into the western Rule of law-based system it will be a huge geopolitical development.

#### During Cold War the West has given all power to fight against communism. Why we don't see same level of efforts to fight corruption?

- It is harder to get people. The communism you can present as maniac in the battle between forces of Light and forces of Darkness. That was an easier sell to the publics. A lot of us are doing our best to make this point. When I'm saying that corruption is a new communism, I'm trying in a sense brand this, to make people think about it this way. Ukraine wouldn't have corruption here if the West didn't enable it. If Western banks would not laundering dirty money, you wouldn't have these problems. We are complicit in the corruption in Ukraine, because first we have to clean up our own system, these things like shell companies, money laundering, offshores. All things, which are enabling corruption, they are in the West.

### If we look to other side of the globe – what is Russian approach to Eastern countries, like China and Japan?

– I find the Sino-Russian relationship interesting. There are never been really a lasting Sino-Russian alliance. It

**Brian Whitmore** is a Senior Fellow & Director of the Russia Program at the Center for European Policy Analysis. Before joining CEPA he was Senior Russia Analyst at Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty. He also worked as a foreign correspondent for The Boston Globe in Moscow and Prague; as a graduate instructor in the Department of Government and International Studies at the University of South Carolina; and as a visiting lecturer in the History Faculty at Mechnikov National University in Odesa.

is always running to problems. There is a very simple reason for that. Neither Russia, nor China is going to agree to be a junior partner in a relationship. So right now, due to Russian conflict with the West, it is running to China. But let's face it, Russia is a junior partner in that case. The Chinese are not making it sound that way, because they are clever and they wanna be careful about insulting the Russians. Russia has a GDP which is smaller than state of Texas, China has a second largest GDP in the world. Their military power is incomparable too. It clear who is a senior partner. If you look on what is actually going on in a Sino-Russian relationship - the Chinese are buying Russian gas and oil at very cheap price, because Cinese know that they can dictate the price. China is using Russia as a supplier of very cheap raw materials. Sooner or later you gonna have this backlash among the Russians toward this relationship, because they not getting the good end of the deal. And we already starting to see that the public is getting angry about this. Chinese bottling plant near lake Baykal could be an example. The production had to stop, because of serious demonstrations. There was a website, where locals were seriously proposing throwing garbage into lake Baykal to prevent the Chinese from taking water from it. So we can see the beginning of this backlash. I don't see this relationship lasting, but right now Moscow needs an ally and need to sell gas somewhere.

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With Japan I see some kind of traditional efforts to drive a wadge between the Western allies in any way possible and they are trying to play that. The Russia-Japan relationships can only go so far, because the Japan wants the Northern Islands back and Kremlin is not gonna giving up territory. There was lot of excitement during last meeting of Prime Minister Abe and President Putin, but I was skeptical. Because Russia will not give up their territory and Japan will not drop this issue.

## Which developments of security situation could be possible in Middle East?

- When Russia first got involved in Syria, what I thought they were doing was basically creating a bargaining chip. That was something important to the West, they going to be make a problems by themselves and hope to bargain that for a freehand in Ukraine, for example. It **n**  turns out, that they had much bigger plans, than I have initially suspected. What I see now is Russia attempting to regain its influence in parts of the world, where the Soviet Union had its power. They are trying to put back together their alliances in the Middle East. And we see them now expand their influence in Lybia. With the Saudis there is an attempt to keep the oil prices high, I don't see their interest is going beyond that. And they are also trying to trolls America, because they deal with traditional security and defence partner of USA in the region. These developments in the Middle East are also a part of Putin's general strategy of creating this alliance of rogues around the world. Whether we are talking about Venezuela, North Korea, Syria all this is kind of alliance of rogue states, that Putin is pulling together.

### WHEN WE, WESTERNERS, COME HERE AND SAYING: "UKRAINIANS, DO SOMETHING WITH CORRUPTION" I SAY IT IN A DIFFERENT WAY, LIKE WE ALL NEED TO DO SOMETHING WITH CORRUPTION. WE ARE ALL UKRAINIANS IN THIS FIGHT

We see that developments in the Middle East, but also in the Latin America as well. When you look at propaganda that Russia is using in Venezuela it is very interesting. Part of it is a traditional Russian playbook: the West is sponsoring colour revolutions, West is destabilizing the country with colour revolution. On my opinion we should be able to fight back against that very easily. Lets get some Ukrainians to explain the Venezuelans, ves, the Americans were supporting colour revolutions and we are very thankful for that. But Kremlin plays also about the very real history of American intervention in Latin America. This region is tough for US, because there is this history. And unlike this part of the world, in Eastern Europe, where American involvement is seen as largely as a bennoying, in Latin America it is not. So in pushing back against this propaganda in Latin America we have to be very mindful of this history. Also what we see from Russian side it is basically showing to the United States – we can play around in your backyard. We can play around in Ukraine, now we can do this also in Venezuela. They don't even suggest, that this two cases are equal. Because the way I see the Western influence in Ukraine – it is to support the democratic will of the Ukrainian people. In Venezuela we see Putin supporting a dictator, who the people wanna overthrow. I think that will be a losing game in the end.

### Do you think the military intervention by Kremlin is possible?

- It could be some Latin America equivalent of "little green men". Russia is sending this special operation teams into countries, which are experienced in popular uprising. This teams are training locals for put down colour revolutions. We can call them anti-colour revolution spetznaz. They are in Syria, they are in Venezuela as well. So I think we will see thing like this. Some kind of full-scale military intervention is less possible, also because of logistic issues. Proximity does mean a lot. Russia can project power further than they could do ten years ago, but still it is difficult. I'm confident that in Venezuela, Moscow is on the wrong side of history. It is similar to situation here, in Ukraine. They are supporting a dictator, when people have clearly made a choice of what they want. But that fact don't mean that they can not damage in the short run.

### You have mentioned Ukraine, can we expect some changes in Russian policy after the elections?

 Russian strategic goal remains unchanged regardless of the results. Russia wants to keep your country in its sphere of influence to prevent Ukraine from kind of realizing its Euro-Atlantic choice, that the society has clearly made. They don't really seem to understand that this country has made a choice and that choice is final. They will continue to put the pressure on Ukraine in the number of different ways. They can turn the war up or turn down if they need this. They can use their influence trough oligarchic channels, trough non-kinetic means, like corruption and disinformation and I think they will continue to do this. I'm very curious to see, how they will react to a Zelenskiy presidency, what kind of actions you gonna see. What I'm confident in is a trajectory of the society. Since the independence it is toward West, sometimes two steps ahead, and then one point nine back, but the direction is clear. And I believe this remains unchanged, regardless who the president of Ukraine is or what Russia does. Any Russian imperial project always begins with Ukraine, but not ends with Ukraine.

#### What can we expect from Russian ally, Belarus?

- The Russian-Belarusian relationship is very interesting. It is kind of dysfunctional marriage. Because Lukashenko sees that relationship as transactional - you pay me, and I am your ally. Russia sees this relationship as an imperial – I'm the big brother, you are the little and you do as I told you. This kind of tension is actual for the entire Putin's presidency. Putin and Lukashenko reportedly do not like each other one bit. We are getting to the point now, where this dysfunctional marriage is reaching crisis point. Russia would like to turn Belarus into an extension of Western military district, while Lukashenko is resisting. He does not want Belarusian soil to be used as a staging ground to attack ant third country. And there is a lot of talks in Russian media and on Telegram channels, that are famous for the Kremlins leaks about the possibility of an "Anschluss". Does this mean, that this is gonna happen – no. Same time such scenario would be a security nightmare for the West, because it brings Russian military power right up to the borders of NATO. With not to mention what it does to Ukraine security. Si it is something we need to keep our eye on and treating very seriously. In many wargames the first step is a coup in Belarus to replace Lukashenko with a KGB general, who invites Russian troops. That is not an accident. And that could be kind of indicator. And it also potentially could help Putin to solve domestic political problems. Lukashenko is not into this, he doesn't want to do this. So he has been playing this game between Russia and West, very clever up till now. And I'm getting the sense, that Russians are getting tired of this game. Putin is know to consider Ukraine and Belarus to be fake states. He is wrong, but this is how he sees the world, he finds independence of both of the states as an offensive. Other big question here - what the West can do, how much influence we have. The situation is tricky. Lukashenko is never gonna be a friend. So it is a dilemma for the West. 🖬

# Traps everywhere

Why the Zelenskiy's team needs to be careful not to torpedo the processes of economic and political emancipation from Russia

### **Oleksandr Kramar**

Right after exit polls began to publish numbers that confirmed a victory for Volodymyr Zelenskiy, pro-Russian politicians and experts from the Medvedchuk pool and the so-called OPZZ or Opposition Platform of Za Zhyttia began to triumphantly celebrate. They saw the upcoming transfer of power mainly as a chance for their own comeback, a reversal of the country's foreign policy course, and a return of Kyiv to Moscow's control. Lately, the geopolitical course has been more important for them than socio-economic or anti-corruption populism, which now clearly plays a secondary role. OPZZ is betting on the Verkhovna Rada election although it is the president who carries out foreign policy in Ukraine. And so it will depend on the policies of the new Administration whether the process of Ukraine's full emancipation from Russia, both economically and informationally, will continue or be slowly rolled back. As inconsistent as they may have been, there have been considerable positive shifts in this area in the last few years.

Although foreign policy is a key sphere that the president is responsible for, Zelenskiy's electoral platform paid very little attention to it. His own comments and those of members of his team regarding this were also few and far between, which leaves him plenty of room to maneouvre in this area. Statements along the lines of 'betraying national interests and territory is non-negotiable" are in a form that can be given any content that suits. One of Zelenskiy's main spokespersons, Dmytro Razumkov, is confident that worries about protecting the European vector are misplaced, saying "With the development line it's pretty clear that it's the path to Europe for the country and he Ukraine has made its final decision."

### **STAY ON COURSE**

Despite assurances from Zelenskiy himself and his team that they have no intention of adjusting the foreign policy course, the risk that something like this might happen remains unusually high. After all, Viktor Yanukovych himself also promise to keep the course towards Eurointegration when he was elected in 2010, and spent the next few years persuading Ukrainians that he was preparing to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. Despite a slew of reservations about the details of Ukraine's western integration and what mutually beneficial cooperation with different organizations should look like, its role as a prevention against returning to Russia's orbit was and remains indisputable. Fortunately, preventive measures were wisely incorporated into the Constitution to make a geopolitical comeback impossible since the Basic Law was amended this past winter to enshrine Ukraine's intentions to join the EU and NATO.

The "irreversible European and Euroatlantic course of Ukraine" is established in the preanble and presented in greater detail in articles governing the activities of all the main government actors in the country: the Verkhovna Rada in Art. 85, the President in Art. 102, which states that the "President of Ukraine is the guarantor that the country's strategic course to gain Ukraine's full-fledged membership in the European Union and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization is carried out," and the Cabinet in Art. 116. Enshrined in the Constitution, the course towards NATO and the EU is not subject to reconsideration. The country is supposed to continue move in this direction and any other variation is the sign of a comeback of anti forces.

The mood in Ukrainian society made it impossible for a politician or political force that openly favors a return to Moscow's orbit to come to power. This is also true of Zelenskiy's supporters. A poll by KIIS just before the first round of the election showed that among his electorate 53.3% were in favor of eurointegration and 39.7% were against, while 45.4% said they would vote in favor of

EVERYTHING WILL DEPEND ON THE CAPACITY OF ACTIVE FORCES IN UKRAINIAN SOCIETY TO RESIST ANY INITIATIVES BY THE NEW PRESIDENT THAT MIGHT BE AIMED AT THE LEAST DEVIATION FROM THE POLICY OF SEPARATION FROM RUSSIA IN ALL SPHERES, AND THE MOVEMENT TO EUROPEAN AND EUROATLANTIC COMMUNITIES INSTEAD

NATO membership in a referendum, whereas only 32.6% were against, one way or the other. Still, that doesn't mean that lulled by the right kind of rhetoric, it might not turn out that way. The risk is not so much that the course towards the EU and NATO will be obviously reversed, but that it will be simply sabotaged. After all, when the country is not ready to insist on achieving accession to the EU, its relations with the Union slip into a phase of declarative and ritualistic dances instead of specific steps that would actually make the process of integration with European structures irreversible.

In this way, everything will depend on the capacity of active forces in Ukrainian society to resist any initiatives by the new president that might be aimed at the least deviation from the policy of separation from Russia in all spheres, and the movement to European and Euroatlantic communities instead.

### **"JUST BUSINESS" DOESN'T WORK**

However, continuing the course towards emancipation from Russia is not limited to maintaining the course towards membership in the EU and NATO, and a lack of efforts to sabotage or halt the process. According to a KIIS poll of those who voted for Zelenskiy, aside from the 32-39% who expect things that are simply not realis-



Icebreaker? Medvedchuk's OPZZ crowd sees the upcoming transfer of power mainly as a chance for their own comeback, a reversal of the country's foreign policy course, and a return of Kyiv to Moscow's control

tic and not part of the president's remit - "reducing utility rates," "removing immunity," and "investigating corruption crimes" - the next item is "begin negotiating with Russia," which 23.3% of those polled expect, and this is largely those who form Zelenskiy's electorate.

This means that the threat of a Kharkiv Accords 2.0 in one form or another remains quite real. The variations are endless, from carrying out Russia's vision of the Minsk Accords to "renewing cooperation in the economic sphere," among others, by Ukraine capitulating in the gas war under the pretext of avoiding the threat of losing transit gas or getting some temporary, ephemeral reduction in exchange for direct supplies and returning Ukraine to the monopoly of Gazprom. The appeal is enormous, as would supposedly give Zelenskiy the opportunity to demonstrate his readiness to justify the expectations of his electorate that utility rates would go down.

Directly before the second round, Moscow laid out its latest series of trumps in the form of blackmail in the supply of petroleum, petroleum products and even heating coal. From now on, Russian supplies to Ukraine are either prohibited or restricted by the requirement for special permits. Who will receive them now is fairly obvious: possibly only entities that have passed the loyalty test, firstly out of the pool of Viktor Medvedchuk and his OPZZ allies. In this fashion, Moscow will be able to both restrict the delivery of fuels and to raise prices for the Ukrainian market, which will force the new Ukrainian leadership to be more willing to compromise in order to avoid the next crisis on various segments of the energy market.

Aside from this, the point would be to establish the necessary financial resources to support pro-Russian forces through monopolist profits from licensed deliveries to Ukraine and prolong the political and informational war in Ukraine. As The Ukrainian Week warned in the past, as of April 23 the export of gasoline and diesel

fuels to Ukraine were stopped by the supposedly main "alternative" to Russia as a source for these fuels in recent vears – its satellite Belarus. The reason was supposedly problems with delivery and the quality of Russian petroleum. Replacing these volumes quickly and painlessly will be difficult: as of the end of QI 2019, Belarusian diesel fuel covered 34.5% of the Ukrainian market.

### **MYTH-BUSTING 101**

Over the last few years, the media have been actively promoting the notion that the war with Russia and the curtailing of trade with this neighbor have led to the sharply worse socio-economic situation in Ukraine. The panacea that is offered is to turn the clock back and "return to traditional markets." The key element of this propagandist vision is concentrating attention on the worsening socio-economic indicators in Ukraine" without comparing them to what's been happening in Vladimir Putin's Russia at the same time.

Yet such a comparison quickly dispels the myth about "collapse because of the break with Russia," and reveals that Russia's economy in recent years has demonstrated an even worse - sometimes considerably so - dynamic than Ukraine's. Economically, Russia is a very poor and unpromising model, while the proposed renewal of ties with it can in no wise ensure the promised positive effect. When looking at such key indicators as change in GDP, industrial and agricultural production, investments in basic capital or real household incomes, Russia turns out to have a far worse track record on all these accounts than Ukraine.

The long-standing realities of Russo-Ukrainian relations show that the classic logic of mutually beneficial economic cooperation in the "business as usual" vein can't work for long - at least, not as long as Moscow figures that it will absorb Ukrainian and sees economic interactions as a lever for political control. Under these conditions, any justification of well-intended initiatives

to "improve relations with Russia" will simply mean a roll-back in the process of emancipating Ukraine from Russian influence, a process finally went into full swing in recent years.

While this may have little economic sense, activating economic cooperation will inevitably turn into political dependence and compromises with the Kremlin, both in the subjugation of key areas of Ukraine's economy and in the political sphere. Yet, the level of emancipation of Ukraine's economy from Russia's has moved far enough that the response to any attempts by Moscow to use economic issues to pressure Kyiv can be a complete withdrawal from any form of cooperation.

Since the beginning of 2019, Russia has constituted less than 6.2% of Ukraine's export, based on current figures from the State Fiscal Service for QI, while the total hard currency value of deliveries to the Russian market was US \$760.0 million of the US \$12.3 billion going all over the world over this same period. Deliveries to those countries that involve transit through Russia – Central Asia and, to a lesser extent, Mongolia – constituted only 1.29% of Ukrainian exports in QI. Either way, we're talking about no more than 8% of all of Ukraine's exports, which is actually less than the average pace of growth of exports of Ukrainian goods.

In short, the situation on the world market is more significant for Ukraine's economy than the Russian market, or even countries that depend on transit through Russia for deliveries. With the world market situation positive, annual growth of Ukraine's exports is considerably higher than deliveries to Russia. This means that, even if Kyiv were to decide to completely stop deliveries, this would only slow down the pace of the total export of goods from Ukraine – hardly a catastrophe. Conversely, even if Ukraine's deliveries to Russia were to double or triple over a few years, it would not represent any panacea for the domestic economy.

### **GO WHERE THE GOING IS GOOD**

Incidentally, the situation with deliveries to western markets, such as NATO and EU countries, couldn't be more different, with fully 50.5% of all domestic exports going there in QI 2019. This means that any serious turbulence with deliveries to these countries, including de to a shift in geopolitical orientation, that could lead to a reduction in the export of domestic goods there of even just 15-20% of the current levels will be far more damaging to Ukraine's economy, not to mention dangerous for the stability in the forex and budget spheres. Even a complete halt to trade with Russia and those countries whose imports have to transit through Russia would not cause comparable pain.

On the other hand, Russian imports remain at over 13% of all imports brought into Ukraine and, as **The Ukrainian Week** has taken pains to point out more than once, this represents a serious economic and energy security threat in a slew of positions. Indeed, Ukraine remains critically over-dependent on supplies of certain groups of goods. That Moscow intends to take advantage of any such dependence was illustrated for the umpteenth time by its announcement of restrictions on the delivery of petroleum and petroproducts as of June 1. This is only the latest signal that confirms that what trade with Russia needs is not "normalization" but termination in all areas where it might become a tool for political blackmail against Kyiv. Zelenskiy will have to demonstrate pretty quickly, basically during his first few weeks in office, which of these two paths he chooses.

The resolution of this problem is fairly obvious. With all strategic energy sources and industrial raw materials, where any sudden politically-motivated disruption of monopolist Russian deliveries could be a serious threat to Ukraine's national security, paralyzing or disrupting the stable provision of power and gas to households or industry, or lead to a shutdown of heavy industry, restrictions need to be instituted to keep the share of imports of those kinds of products from the Russian Federation at no more than 25-30%.

# SOVEREIGNTY IS MORE IMPORTANT THAN JUST TERRITORY

In the end, the imperative will be, for the next while, to very carefully monitor the situation so that the sacred cow of "territorial integrity" and the medvedchukian formula of "returning the Donbas to Ukraine and Ukraine to the Donbas" are not used to install some variation of the doctrine of "limited sovereignty." Any attempt to graft onto Ukraine the territories currently under Russian occupation without the real ability to control the situation there is completely impermissible.

Nor is their return to Ukraine if it comes with any limitations on Ukraine's ability to independently develop and carry out its domestic and foreign policy without having to keep an eye to the Kremlin or to its puppets on the occupied territories. Otherwise, *de jure* independent Ukraine could well find itself *de facto* completely under Russia's sway – even without a direct large-scale war.

IT WILL DEPEND ON THE POLICIES OF THE NEW ADMINISTRATION WHETHER THE PROCESS OF UKRAINE'S FULL EMANCIPATION FROM RUSSIA, BOTH ECONOMICALLY AND INFORMATIONALLY, WILL CONTINUE OR BE SLOWLY ROLLED BACK. AS INCONSISTENT AS THEY MAY HAVE BEEN, THERE HAVE BEEN CONSIDERABLE POSITIVE SHIFTS IN THIS AREA IN THE LAST FEW YEARS

One idea that has been broadly popularized more recently is the idea of "finlandization" or "switzerlanding" Ukraine as a way to normalize relations with Russia and negotiate with its proxies in ORDiLO is completely unviable because it does not match the interests of any of the sides. First, this is because such variations will not satisfy Moscow for long. The motives of Russia's current elite are largely irrational, dominated as they are by the conviction that "Ukrainians and Russians are, for all intents and purposes, one people" and Ukraine is "not even a country."

Moreover, the "bone in the craw" is the misunderstanding that led to the "break-up of states" and "an artificial project of geopolitical enemies." This is why Ukraine can never be a buffer or a neutral territory for today's political elite in Russia. For Moscow, finlandization and other intermediate options could be of interest only on a temporary basis, until it's able to "solve the Ukrainian question" once and for all. The Kremlin is only interested in those scenarios that will weaken Ukraine over time and make it easier to absorb the country at a later date. This state of affairs will be accepted for as long as they see that it's working to discredit Ukraine as a failed state or brings it closer to the comeback by a pro-Russian puppet regime.

# Don't cross the bouys

There are limits to the possible in domestic politics and Volodymyr Zelenskiy should not stretch them

**Maksym Vikhrov** 



**The end of euphoria.** Even before his inauguration, Volodymyr Zelenskiy has to seriously respond to a growing list of challenges

As in the past five years, preserving its integrity remains an absolute priority for Ukraine. The key threat undoubtedly comes from Russia. Yet, Ukraine has internal challenges, too, that Volodymyr Zelenskiy and his team will have to face.

Nominally, Ukraine is a unitary state, which gives powerful leverage to the central authorities in governing the country. In reality, "omnipotent Kyiv" is more of a popular media cliché. Ukraine has undergone a shadow "federalization" driven by the local elites, that is, local clans and mafia. While Kyiv experiences permanent political turbulence, the status quo in some regions has remained unchanged for decades. As a result, every president is forced to arrange tacit mutual non-aggression pacts with regional barons, guaranteeing non-interference in local affairs in exchange for loyalty to the center. The Donbas clan offers the most illustrative case. Even Viktor Yushchenko was forced into a concordat with Donetsk, despite having defeated its main man, Viktor Yanukovych, in 2004.

After the Euromaidan, social appetite for government reset was extremely high both in Kyiv, and locally – especially in places where local elites actively supported the Yanukovych regime and flirted with separatism. Petro Poroshenko, too, was interested in restoring the disrupted chain-of-command by reinforcing it with loyal staff. But no offensive against regional elites ensued. It was impossible to fight both Russia's aggression externally and entrenched local bosses internally.

Once they were granted their political "amnesty," the local elites became bold enough to start openly terrorizing local communities. The murder of Kateryna Handziuk and dozens of other incidents were more than just an attack against civil society. They were a show of force, too. Local elites will probably flex their muscles before the new president as well, pushing him to a compromise in exchange for five years of relative calm. In practice, however, this strategy eventually hurts those governing in Kyiv. Petro Poroshenko's presidency proves this.

How well Zelenskiy's team manages to tame local barons and to bring real substance to the notional unitary order seems questionable right now. If the new administration opts to rely on spoiled local elites rather than the country's frustrated civil society, the president will soon find himself "red carded." The same goes for federalization, a concept promoted by pro-Russian forces. Many successful countries are federations. In Ukraine, however, this will effectively legitimize local clans and provide local bosses with even more political and economic clout. This, in turn, will set in motion processes that could eventually lead to the collapse of Ukraine as a state.

Luckily, Zelenskiy did not mention any plans to overhaul Ukraine's unitary order in his campaign. But his statement that NATO membership should be decided via referendum is quite disturbing. This is in the spirit of his election campaign: even his platform was supposedly drafted together with "average people." Yet, the widespread use of referenda risks serious negative consequences for Ukraine. In 2016, 52% supported the UK's exit from the EU. In a 2019 YouGov poll, the proportion of Brexit supporters and opponents was 38% to 48%. A referendum is a necessary procedure in some cases, such as accession to the EU. But building domestic and foreign policy on referenda is impossible. If the country's leadership is not convinced that its decisions will be legitimate in the eyes of the public, this immediately suggests a crisis of legitimacy for those in power. The solution to this problem is early elections, not referenda. Introducing local referenda would likely be even more destructive.

This can easily turn into a technique that can be used like Russia did to legitimize occupation in the Donbas and Crimea. If the insurgents had a law on local referenda to use, it would be much harder for Ukraine to provide hard evidence Russia's occupation to the world. Moreover, local referenda can be a powerful tool in the hands of local elites. Clearly, the new administration will not be able to abandon populism – nor could any of its predecessors. But "serving the people" needs to take place within the established institutional framework. Democratically elected authorities should not shift the burden of making government decisions onto its citizens, let alone promoting poorly thought-out legislative and constitutional changes.

The Donbas presents yet another red line for the future president. The new leadership is likely to face pressure from Russia and feel tempted to take unexpected steps with respect to the occupied parts of Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts known as ORDILO. There can and should be communication with OR-DiLO residents through appeals, the press and even one-to-one contact, at crossing points along the line of contact. But any direct communication between Ukraine's leadership with those in charge in DNR and LNR is unacceptable. First of all, this makes no sense, as the leaders of the "republics" are not legitimate in any shape or form. The "governments," "parliaments," "ministries" and "NGOs" in ORDiLO are just a mask sloppily thrown

### Volodymyr Vasylenko, JD, lawyer and professor

Ukraine has never overcome its many divisions. No Ukrainian president or government has conducted a consistent Ukrainocentric humanitarian policy. If the new president wants to be successful, he should focus on this and conduct policies that reflect the fact that Ukraine has to develop systemic measures to counter Russia's hy-

brid war. He should also remember that this is not just about armed aggression. Russia is carrying out its hybrid war in four nonphysical areas: language and culture, information and propaganda, historical memory, and religion. The goal of its war is to destroy Ukrainian identity and statehood.

The only way to counter this is through a strong, consistent Ukrainocentric humanitarian policy. This is not Ukraine's invention. Every successful European state conducts nation-centric domestic and foreign policy. If Ukraine wants to be successful, it should prioritize national interests in every area, from humanitarian to economic and so on. Being centered on the nation is the development standard in every successful European state. Ukrainocentrism is the norm whose violation has led to the losses Ukraine has been facing over the years and may continue to face in the future.

Below are 10 red lines that cannot be crossed under any circumstance. To ignore them will constitute a threat to Ukraine's statehood. If any of these are crossed, there will be internal conflict, chaos and, finally, the destruction of the Ukrainian state: 1. Ukraine must not reject its European and Euro-Atlantic civilizational choice and its movement towards full membership in the EU and NATO.

Ukraine must not amend its Constitution or pass the laws rejecting its unitary order in any way.

3. Ukraine must not to introduce any national-cultural territorial autonomies.

4. Ukraine must not introduce a two-chamber legislature or a federal structure. It must also not be divided into several large administrative units that elect their leaders via regional referenda.

5. Ukraine must not grant special status to any regions.

6. Ukraine must not abolish the institution of presidency.

7. Ukraine must not elect the president through parliament rather than through nationwide elections.

8. Ukraine must not be turned into a parliamentary republic.

9. Ukraine must not introduce dual citizenship.

10. Ukraine must not take any actions undermining the status of Ukrainian as the only state language, such as granting Russian or other minority languages the status of state languages or any other official status.

An independent, successful and democratic Ukraine can only be Ukrainian. The Ukrainian language is the only tool for building that country. Experience shows that any attempts to create a multilingual or multicultural state have generally led to serious loss of territory. Ukraine has lost the regions where the local elite and the central government endorsed a complete purge of all things Ukrainian. Unless a Ukrainian Ukraine is built, it will simply turn into a part of Russkiy Mir.

over these occupying forces' entities. Most Ukrainians and the international community are aware of this today.

Secondly, for Kyiv to start any direct dialog with the occupied territories will affect Ukraine negatively. Among other things, Russia will use this to demolish the system of international sanctions, because that system is based on the recognition that Russia is an occupying force and the "republics" are illegitimate. One possible outcome might be that ORDiLO returns to Ukraine without Kyiv recovering any real control over the territory. This would essentially be capitulation in exchange for the illusion of a quick resolution.

Both direct talks and the restoration of economic ties with ORDiLO risk such an outcome. When it comes to pensions for the residents of the occupied parts of the Donbas, human rights organizations very much favor this idea. It is important to note, however, that many local pensioners already receive their pensions thanks to "pension tourism." By tolerating this widespread quasi-legal practice, Ukraine's authorities solve two important tasks in one move: they provide means for survival to a segment of Ukrainian citizens who have found themselves under occupation, while also keeping the payment of these pensions under control. This option is far from perfect, but Ukraine has no better option, for now. If it pays pensions through the occupation "authorities" – the only ones that exist in ORDiLO – it cannot guarantee that the money will reach the beneficiaries. What might be a nice gesture in theory could, in practice, turn into a new source of funding for the terrorists while withholding the benefits from those who have a right to them. Ukraine's new leadership needs to understand that the only real solution to the problems cited by the residents of the occupied territory is to de-occupy ORDiLO while returning Ukraine's sovereignty over them.

The Zelenskiy team's position on humanitarian policy is the biggest concern. "Anything that can divide Ukrainians, including faith, language, territory, some historical leaders, should be left outside until we end the war," Zelenskiy's spokesperson Dmytro Razumkov said. Pro-Russian forces were using similar rhetoric just 15 years ago, accusing the initiators of ukrainianization of "creating artificial divides" and "speculating on secondary issues." Obviously, this rhetoric finds resonance with the pro-Russian segment of society, and average folks irritated by the renaming of streets, language quotas in broadcasting, and so on. Still, the direction chosen in 2014 is impossible to change now, from the perspective of national interests.

It seems that the Zelenskiy team has realized that undermining the legal status of the Ukrainian language will be an act of political suicide for them. Equally unacceptable are overturning language quotas, slowing down decommunization, terminating support for Ukrainian filmmaking, and so on. While the effectiveness of some measures is debatable, their importance is not up for debate, simply because the cultivation of a national identity in Ukraine's situation is a matter of both culture and national security. Such statements used to be seen as nationalist alarmism in the past. 2014 proved how real the threats were when Russia's aggression unfolded in military, economic and humanitarian dimensions. This means that the humanitarian dimension of decolonization is strategically as important to Ukraine's survival as military resistance and economic resilience.

Why part of Ukrainian society fails to understand this is a matter for some study. It's difficult to say whether the new leadership and Zelenskiy himself recognize the importance of sticking to the current line. This is true for other areas, including policies regarding the occupied territories, attitudes towards Ukraine's unitary nature, methods of governance, and more. The task of civil society and the responsible segment of the political establishment is to draw the lines that cannot be crossed.

The pro-Russian camp is undoubtedly drawing its own domestic policy roadmap for Zelenskiy. But the "tug-o-war for the president" is hardly a new phenomenon in Ukrainian politics. **■** 



# Zelenskiy's "We"

Volodymyr Zelenskiy won the election but he's still being mysterious about his team, promising "new faces." This is nothing new in Ukraine's history, and new hasn't always meant better

#### **Andriy Holub**

Ukraine's newly-elected president Volodymyr Zelenskiy has already demonstrated one typical trait: in public speeches, he often refers to himself in the plural. "We will work in the Normandy Format..." or "We would like very much to reduce the Presidential Administration.' These are statements that he made the evening after the second round of voting. Of course, this mannerism could be simply a rhetorical flourish. After all, Zelenskiy has made it clear that he depends on a strong team. At the same time, when journalists have asked about his first appointments, he has so far remained silent and keeps moving the timeframe back. At first, he promise to name potential candidates prior to the second round. Now Zelenskiy has suggested that proposed a major press briefing where he will "answer everything." However, he hasn't specified a date for that, either. He is surrounded by many individuals, but their responsibilities and status are often vague, so his mysterious "we" has begun to take on an almost mystical meaning.

Way back in 2006, Leonid Chernovetskiy sensationally won the mayoral election in Kyiv. He outdid boxercum-politician Vitaliy Klitschko and the long-term previous boss of the capital, Oleksandr Omelchenko. At the time, the little-known Chernovetskiy won his campaign using an innovative approach. Instead of the kinds of promises that his opponents were offering, he organized the mass distribution of baskets of food. He was hardly the inventor of vote-buying politics, but no one had ever done it on a mass scale in a city of several million. His mayorship became memorable mainly for two memes the "Chernovetskiy Grannies" and "My young team and I" – and ended in disgrace. Chernovetskiy ended up resigning from office when the Party of the Regions came to power. This ignominious end was preceded by years of abuse with the allocation of land parcels and land use on a scale not yet seen in the country's capital.

Zelenskiy outdid the former mayor of Kyiv, jumping into the presidential seat right off the bat. However, they do seem to have a lot in common. Like Chernovetskiy, Zelenskiy won because voters were tired of old faces and because he ran a smart, untypical campaign. Where Chernovetskiy thought pensioners were behind his victory, Zelenskiy's opponents blame his victory on young people. Obviously this is hardly the whole story in either of these victories. The second thing that they have in common is their announcements about their teams. "We will appoint new faces," said the winner on April 21. He should take a good look at Chernovetskiy's young team to make sure that his "new faces" don't turn into just another meme. At the same time, there's nothing to take offense at in the future president's statements. Ukrainians really are ready for new faces in politics, so this kind of wish is understandable. The problem lies in the criteria that will be guiding the selection of candidates for various key posts. Based on the reactions in the candidate's campaign headquarters to the many questions put forth by reporters, two conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, Zelenskiy will be guided by the reputation of potential appointees. In other words, any person who wants to work with the new president will have to be someone whose past deeds or misdeeds will not harm Zelenskiy's ratings. Secondly, there is only one path to the first requirement in Ukraine: future appointees can never have held a Category A government post.

THE THING IS THAT UKRAINE COULD VERY WELL FIND ITSELF WITH A PRESIDENTIAL TEAM "FOR SHOW" AND ANOTHER OPERATING IN THE SHADOWS. THE FIRST ONE WILL INCLUDE THE ADVISERS AND APPOINTEES TO KEY POSTS THAT BELONG TO THE PRESIDENT: THE FM, THE DM AND THE CHIEF-OF-STAFF. THE SECOND ONE WILL BE THOSE WHO HAVE NO OFFICIAL POST BUT WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ALL THE BACKROOM HORSE-TRADING

For that reason, it's unlikely that people from Viktor Yanukovych's circles will return to power any time soon, although the press has already managed to scare plenty of voters with this possibility. During the campaign, some of these individuals expressed their personal support for Zelenskiy, with the most vocal of these being former Justice Minister Olena Lukash and former Chief-of-Staff Andriy Portnov. However, it's hard to imagine that they might return to power, even from the point of practicality. The input of Yanukovych's former minions is not worth the reputational losses they would bring Zelenskiy were they to join his team. What's more, the impossibility of an overt collaboration was obvious in the swift reaction of the Ze-HQ to the congratulations of Viktor Yanukovych himself. They responded that they did not need the support of people from the inner circles of a fugitive president and hinted that this was inspired by their opponents.

Similarly, any open cooperation with current politicians is also unlikely, at least until the Verkhovna Rada election this fall. Zelenskiy absolutely needs to maintain his image as an anti-establishment politician. Any alliance he forms now will immediately reduce his chances of gaining the biggest possible parliamentary faction, especially as the field of anti-establishment players is likely to grow significantly more competitive. Never- **n** 



Façade. The public faces of Zelenskiy's team were presented to voters during the "Pravo na vladu" [Right to govern] talk show on the friendly 1+1 channel. However, the future of the individuals next to Zelenskiy is still unclear

theless, Zelenskiy will have to communicate with both the Rada and the Government in order to make those policies that are necessary for him, as he most certainly cannot survive until the fall without making any policy decisions. And here is where the main risks lie — not so much for Zelenskiy as for the country itself.

The thing is that Ukraine could very well find itself with a presidential team "for show" and another operating in the shadows. The first one will include the advisers and appointees to key posts that belong to the president: the FM, the DM and the Chief-of-Staff. The second one will be those who have no official post but will be responsible for all the backroom horse-trading. This can easily be formulated as what matters is not the office but the influence, a situation that is very typical in a country like Ukraine where weak institutions are compensated for by force of verbal agreements. This was often the case with the current Head of State, Petro Poroshenko who, despite the limitations of his constitutional powers as president was able to influence nearly all political processes because of personal connections. Zelenskiy has neither the influence nor the necessary connections and so he may decide to depend on someone more experienced.

There was some indication of this kind of behavior even before the election. Zelenskiy stubbornly denied any relationship with Ihor Kolomoyskiy, other than business ones. But his HQ avoided mentioning the presence of Andriy Bohdan, a lawyer who once worked as a consultant for the oligarch and one-time Governor of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. Bohdan insists that he and Zelenskiy have been friends for years and he himself is nothing more than a legal consultant. Still, his frequent presence at closed meetings of the staff and his constant support of Zelenskiy during key moments of the campaign testify to his substantial role. Journalists suspect that this means there is constant contact with Kolomoyskiy.

Yet another, similar story appeared just before the election. According to the publication *Liviy Bereh*, an MP from the *Vidrodzhennia* group, Valeriy Pysarenko, announced among colleagues that he was going to be the future presidential representative in the Rada. Officially, neither his staff nor Zelenskiy himself have confirmed this, but neither have they directly denied it. Pysarenko is linked to Portnov and was considered the overseer of the court system under Yanukovych. Their purpose could be to collaborate to arrange a snap VR election. Immediately after the election, Pysarenko raised the question of dismissing Speaker Andriy Parubiy.

The issue of lawyers in Zelenskiy's circle is another subject altogether. In addition to Bohdan, the law firm of Hillmont Partners seems to have considerable influence. It has seconded at least three individuals to the future president's team: Serhiy Nyzhniy, who Ze-staff leader Ivan Bakanov says took part in writing the platform; Vadym Halaichuk, Zelenskiy's proxy at the CEC; and Serhiy Kalchenko, an export on electoral law and European human rights standards in the public Zelenskiy team. Hillmont Partners are open about the fact that they are the 95 Kvartal law firm and supposedly there's nothing wrong with that. Zelenskiy is surrounding himself with people whom he trust, and truthfully none of them have been known for graft or embezzlement.

The problem is with unforeseeable behavior after the election. Companies like Hillmont are closely affiliated with other businesses and that raises the temptation to primarily promote their clients' interests. For instance, the third partner, together with Nyzhniy and Halaichuk is James Hart, whose clients include UKbased Farston Energy. Dnipro Mayor Borys Filatov said this company was a possible contractor to build a waste recycling plant in the city, although the company was established not that long ago. The director of the Ukrainian subsidiary, TOV Farston Energy, is the same James Hart. Of course, this could be some kind of legal strategy to protect the British investors. Hart is also connected to the business of two other British citizens Neil Smith and Jonathan Wale, the owner and the general manager of the Crimean Vodka Company, with assets on the occupied peninsula. The point is not these connections themselves, but the fact that lawyers who work for commercial entities will always be tempted to promote the interests of their clients through their access to the president. And this is the weakest link in the legal chainmail that Zelenskiy has securely wrapped himself in.

The "façade" team of the future president looks a lot more attractive. They were named individually prior to the election on the show *Pravo na vladu*, on Kolomoyskiy's 1+1 channel. Most of them are people who have earned a reputation as anti-corruption reformers, teachers and experts. Still, the likelihood is that most of them will end up being outside advisors to the president or headliners in the future party lists of *Sluha Narody* [Servant of the People] in the fall elections, which will also need a "façade." The position of the highest-profile individual in the group, Oleksandr Danyliuk, testifies to this probability. The press was busy calling him the future Foreign Minister but the day of the election, Danyliuk himself denied that he was likely to be appointed.

Another example is Mykhailo Fedorov, the declared digital expert. This is one of the key components of the Zelenskiy platform. The politician's entire image was build around the idea of the "smartphone country." However, Fedorov himself has not been able to clearly state what his role in the future team will be. "As Volodymyr said nothing has been decided about who will work where," he told reporters on April 21. "That's why it's hard for me to talk about this. I know that I will do everything I can to make sure the digital strategy that we have developed becomes a reality. But whether I will do this somewhere in the civil service? Unlikely as that's my business... We have people who are running major IT companies with thousands of employees. They are prepared to leave their operations component and begin to institute this at the national level. There are others who have been working on iGov for a long time already. We are launching social elevators and we have to think how we should do it so that it all works. More than likely, I will consult and assist."

Launching the social elevators that Fedorov talked about would be a real achievement for President Zelenskiy — with one caveat: potentially important. In his time, Chernovetskiy also used social lifts to raise up people who turned around and destroyed faith in the very idea of changing faces in government. So it's time for Zelenskiy to establish this mechanism through concrete steps and properly weighed policies. While keeping mum helped him during the election campaign after April 21 the situation is the opposite. Every new day increases the number of rumors, problems deferred, and, most likely, jockeying for position among his partners. Time to start thinking a little more quickly, Mr. Zelenskiy.

# Тиждень



# Value and build up

Ukrainians must recognize the achievements of the last five years and not give into backsliding

**Maksym Vikhrov** 



Fateful decision. On June 27, 2014, Ukraine signs an Association Agreement with the EU

All too often you can hear people opine that the last five years have been a complete loss for Ukraine. The current administration is accused of taking advantage of the window of opportunity that the Euromaidan presented but did not live up to its demands, hiding the old rotten system under a facade of decorative and half-hearted reforms. This point of view is based on a lot of serious arguments – and where there aren't any, serious collective emotions.

Nevertheless, the final balance for this period is impossible to consider negative. Yes, there are plenty of objectives that were not reached, but in other strategic areas, Ukraine progressed far more over 2014-2019 than in all the previous 23 years of independence. Indeed, there are areas where even the most ambitious goals were surpassed. When it comes to Petro Poroshenko's actions, it's harder to summarize the impact of his term of office than might seem, because the result will vary based on the worldview being applied. In any case, Ukrainian society has drawn its own conclusions, with a result that was very evident in the April 21 vote. Regardless, it's very important for Ukrainians to recognize the achievements of the

last five years in order to prevent any kind of rollback. And if such backsliding were to begin, they will have to react to it in time.

Whatever anyone might say, the main demand of the Euromaidan was not only fulfilled, but even over-subscribed. In case people forgot, it was about signing an Association Agreement with the European Union, the political portion of which was signed in March 2014, and the economic part in June 2014. Since May 2017, Ukraine has also had a visa-free regime with the EU. Yet, closer ties with the West weren't even limited to this. True, Ukraine is still not a member of NATO and has only associate membership in the EU, but we have become one of the key elements in restraining Russia. This country, which just yesterday was referred to as a "transit territory" and a suburb of Russki Mir, is now being noticed by both Washington and Brussels.

Of course, the situation with Ukraine has to be viewed realistically: in large part, the West's attention to Ukraine is the result of worries that Moscow is systematically undermining the foundations of the post-WWII world order. Given its relatively low geopolitical caliber Ukraine is not and cannot become the architect of international sanctions against Russia and its economic weakness means it depends very much on its allies for assistance. To a large extent, in the operation to get Russia to knuckle under, Ukraine's role is a fairly passive one, even though the main burden of resisting Russia militarily falls to it.

But in 2014, the alternative was a national catastrophe: Ukraine could well have been dismembered and lost its statehood. The country was able to avoid this fate not only because of the determination of Ukraine's volunteers and soldiers, but also because of effective international communication with the country's leadership. In this way, Ukraine was able to achieve two objectives at the same tine: it withstood Russia's attack and it established constructive relations with the West that today are far deeper than associate membership in the EU.

Moreover, over 2014-2019, the decolonization process went very far in Ukraine. The necessary impulse provided at the Euromaidan was reinforced considerably by Russia's military aggressions. Still, Ukraine's leadership went far further than elementary security measures. The reduction of economic, diplomatic and informational ties to Russia to a minimum was forced by its attacks. However, this was not what led to decommunization, autocephaly, or language quotas, never mind the revival of Ukraine's movie industry and other initiatives exclusively intended to establish a series of ongoing institutions: the Book Institute, the Ukrainian Institute and so on. Moreover, the president himself was the initiator and promoter of many of these measures, some of which, like lobbying for the tomos, were not part of his direct duties.

Of course, the process of decolonization began in Ukraine not in 2014, and not even in 1991, but earlier. But in the last five years, Ukrainians have come much farther than in the previous two or three decades. What's more, this time the humanitarian initiatives were accompanied by the resurrection of the armed forces, which is key to the continuing existence of Ukraine as a state. In this sense, raising battle-readiness has been the main decolonization measure. The functions of the president are not equivalent to the functions of the Defense Minister or the Cabinet, but given what was going on in Ukraine, the revival of the military would have been impossible without the support of allies. And for this, Ukrainians have to thank the effective diplomatic work, part of which was carried out by Petro Poroshenko. Could he have chosen a different course and are the results achieved the most that could have been done are rhetorical questions. That the president made an overall positive contribution is incontrovertible - certainly in terms of carrying out the demand "Away from Moscow!"

With the election over, tension is still high. Will the new president maintain the previous course? If so, how effective will he be? And if not, will he be the president who drives a rollback in key achievements that the country needs as a state? Such questions are already pushing people to offer radical propositions: from eliminating the post of president altogether to preparing for massive protest demonstrations. Given the circumstances, radicalization may be a natural reaction, but it's anything but constructive.

First of all, attitudes towards state institutions should not be based on attitudes towards the individual in a given position. The country's leadership is always shaped by situational conditions and is not equivalent to the state itself, which is the common historical attainment of Ukrainian society. The people in high posts are variable, whereas the state is constant.

Secondly, effective state institutions, especially the system of central government, are no less important foundations of independence than an army. No matter how evolved civil society is – and it's still relatively weak in Ukraine - it cannot replace either a regular army or a government. Theoretically, the functions of president can be taken over by the legislature, but in the current conditions in Ukraine, this will only lead to even greater chaos, possibly even to complete paralysis in the central government. That, in turn, could lead to a disruption in the processes of decolonization and eurointegration. The purpose of people's actions often does not coincide with their real consequences. And so we need to take into account whether a rebellion against a supposedly "anti-Ukrainian" central government under the right circumstances could bring damage national statehood far more than sabotage by that same government.

Under certain circumstances, of course, open resistance to the central government can become the only chance for salvation for the nation. Still, the alarmist slogan "internal occupation regime" can be attached to any reality someone wishes. In order to understand the political reality that will begin to take real shape after the inauguration, Ukrainian society needs to formulate fairly clear criteria to determine what red line the future president may not overstep. After all, the task of citizens is not just passive observation. Those who are active in a society can influence the trajectory of both domestic and foreign policy. Indeed, this is their civil duty. In practice, influencing those in power requires the will to fight for this right with considerable effort and positive results aren't always guaranteed.

And so, the short-term objective today should be to mobilize patriotic forces, from low-profile intellectuals to politicians, from street activists to members of the spiritual class. The short-term goal is to monitor the actions of the government and keep it under constant pressure to hold the country on course and reject any initiatives that could endanger its statehood. How effective this pressure will be is not obvious right now. It's quite possible that the ratings of the newly elected president will begin to slip much more quickly than those of his predecessor and the public mood could turn explosive. There could be enormous temptation to use this for a premature change of government, because a nation that is not capable of rebelling is not viable. However, a society that used rebellion as a cure-all for any historical circumstance whatsoever will also not be successful. Ukrainians have mastered the art of the Maidan. Now it's time to master more subtle forms of influence over their government.

UKRAINE WAS ABLE TO ACHIEVE TWO OBJECTIVES AT THE SAME TINE: IT WITHSTOOD RUSSIA'S ATTACK AND IT ESTABLISHED CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONS WITH THE WEST THAT TODAY ARE FAR DEEPER THAN ASSOCIATE MEMBERSHIP IN THE EU

In the longer term, the task facing Ukrainians is to foster a new national elite. The current political situation shows that the old elites of the late- and post-soviet era have exhausted themselves. Modern Ukraine, with all its achievements and lost opportunities, its virtues and its neuroses, bears the stamp of their imaginations and they, in turn, are the product of the Ukrainian people. In the last few years, the maturation of Ukrainian society, especially of its active minority, has accelerated considerably under the impact of historical circumstances. Even the nationally-oriented part of the current elite is no longer capable of satisfying the demand for change. Even when they have been on a common course, the country's leaders and its ordinary citizens have been moving at different speeds and so the gap between them has become charged with the resentment of the latter. As the events of the last few months have convincingly shown, the decline of the old elite has not only made Ukraine vulnerable to external threats, but has actually opened the door to internally destructive forces. That's why nurturing a new national elite is a matter of survival for the state of Ukraine.

Over the last few years, Ukrainians have dealt effectively with a slew of important challenges, but, historically speaking, this was all due to the unlearned lessons of the more distant past. What Ukraine needs to do starting today is beyond the capacity of the current elite. To keep moving along the country's chosen path, the country need a new leadership, one that is capable of dealing with current challenges. If Ukrainians don't manage to take on this task, Ukraine will become the plaything of anti-Ukrainian forces, at best. At worst, it will lose its sovereignty. Guidebooks to civic activism offer no readymade recipes for establishing a national elite, but Ukraine needs one in order to reach its historic goals.

# Threats and hopes Reactions to Zelenskiy's victory in Russia Denys Kazanskiy

Volodymyr Zelenskiy's victory in the 2019 presidential election got mixed reactions, not only in Ukraine, but in its eastern neighbors as well, where the election was being followed no less attentively than in the West. Russia and its satellites monitored and commented on just about every episode in the election campaign. And when the results of the vote became obvious, they rushed to write analyses and to predict what might be expected from the new Ukrainian president. Moreover, the tone of these articles varied from enthusiastic to sharply hostile.

IT LOOKS AS THOUGH THE KREMLIN, LIKE MANY UKRAINIANS, HAS ONLY A VAGUE IDEA WHAT THIS NEW LEADERSHIP WILL LOOK LIKE WHO WILL BE IN ZELENSKIY'S TEAM, AND WHAT KIND OF POLICY HE WILL FOLLOW. BUT OLD HABITS DIE HARD AND SO THE ONLY WAY RUSSIA KNOWS HOW TO RESPOND IS THROUGH THREATS AND BLACKMAIL

Zelenskiy's first interviews where he talked about his political position completely vaguely, saying that it was necessary to "come to agreement somewhere in the middle," were perceived by many in Russia as optimism. Yet on the Ukraina.ru site, which reports on events in Ukraine from the Russian viewpoint, even this restrained interview without any radical statements was given an openly negative assessment. Immediately after it appeared in this source, an article came out with the comment: "Nothing funny here. Everything's sad and pathetic. We aren't being offered anything, other than a new version of Poroshenko-2014 adjusted to be a showman, à la Trump-2016."

From there, the negative tone in the Russian press only grew stronger. After Zelenskiy announced that he would run for president, Russians and their minions in ORDiLO immediately remembered his concerts in support of the volunteers fighting in the ATO and the donations his 95 Kvartal team made in support of the army. They were especially riled over Zelenskiy's performance before the Armed Forces of Ukraine, where he thanked the soldiers from the stage for "defending the country against all kinds of abominations." This fragment was clipped and shown repeatedly on all the nationalistic Russian media back in 2014 with calls to ban Zelenskiy from entering Russia.

Understandably, this performance was brought up again now. He was generally quoted on various nationalistic and openly black-hundredist sources that have been promoting one position for many years: that Ukraine has no right to exist, so any Ukrainian politician is by definition an enemy of Russia. In this kind of environment, the new Ukrainian president is regarded as a russophobe and fascist. Just like supporters of Poroshenko are combing old 95 Kvartal skits for anti-Ukrainian sentiments, Russians are looking for quotes demonstrating anti-Russian sentiments.

Correspondingly, any attempts to cheer someone in Russia about Zelenskiy's victory in nationalist circles are seen as a betrayal and support for "banderites." The best example of this is Igor "Strelkov" Ghirkin, the GRU operator who started the conflict in the Donbas. Strelkov had harsh words for Russian Patriarch Kirill and stars of Russian show-business for greeting the new Ukrainian president. Zelenskiy's victory and all of Russia's policies in recent years regarding Ukraine are described by this camp as a "geopolitical Tsushima."<sup>1</sup>

The official Russian press so far has not expressed a clear position on Zelenskiy. For instance, the notorious TV presenter Olga Skabeyeva initially referred to Zelenskiy as a "banderite," and then praised him for referring to the LNR/DNR militants as "rebels." "Zelenskiy is a banderite and a copy of Poroshenko! The candidate called Bandera a hero and said this was normal and cool. Let's see when he shows up with the same the same label 'cynical Bandera'! For Zelenskiy, Putin is the enemy! For Zelenskiy, NATO is a friend! Donbas doesn't get any special status!" she railed on the program 60 Minut on April 18. But on April 19, her tone changed entirely. "Vladimir, you're great because you're the first person who has said that they're not terrorists, they're rebels after all, and that's a very fundamental point," said Skabeyeva after the debates.

Other popular talk shows on Russian federal channels also flipped between praising and condemning Zelenskiy. For instance, Russia's #1 propagandist, Dmitry Kiseliov openly cheered that during the debate, as he put it, "Zelenskiy managed to bring Poroshenko to his knees, both literally and figuratively," conveniently ignoring the fact that Zelenskiy himself also knelt. His colleague Vladimir Soloviov said gravely that there was no point in rejoicing over Zelenskiy's victory: "When you ask what kind of team the guy who's been elected has, they can't answer. And what first steps he plans to take? They can't answer. And all of Ukraine is wildly happy. Why?"

Pro-Kremlin politicos, pundits and experts have also assessed the new president wildly differently. Some are hopeful of restoring dialog with Russia and stopping the "drift to radical nationalism." Others think that there's no difference between Zelenskiy and Poroshenko and figure he'll continue in the same direction.

Russian Duma Deputy Natalia Poklonskaya, the notorious one-time Crimean "prosecutor," cheerily congratulated Zelenskiy on his victory: "I want to greet the people of Ukraine with the appearance of hope for a change in their destructive course. Your president-elect Volodymyr Zelenskiy has said that one of his priority objectives in relations with Russia is returning Ukraine's sailors, the same one that Poroshenko sent to a certain death, like lambs to the slaughter. We remember about the SBU's kidnapping of Crimeans Baranov, Odintsov, and other Russian citizens who are languishing in Ukrainian prisons. Congratulations, Volodymyr Oleksandrovych. I wish you the wisdom and the strength to send this bloody regime into history and unravel all the misunderstandings. First of all, to return peace to the Donbas and to return the citizens of both countries who are currently imprisoned."

Political commentator Armen Gasparyan declared that the new president would not be able to return the Donbas

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Tsushima is a Japanese island that imperial Russia tried to take over in 1861 and was defeated then, and again in 1905. Later Korea made claims on the territory but eventually dropped them



**The newly-elected 'fascist:'** Among Russian politicians and journalists there are quite a few who have already decided that Volodymyr Zelenskiy is the enemy. But there are others who see him as Russia's friend

because the "republics" would no longer want to be part of Ukraine: "The Donbas has nothing to look forward to from Zelenskiy. Not only because in 2014 he called the defenders of the two republics 'abominations,' and not just because Kyiv's entire policy does not conceive of such a dialog. But because of a very simple and obvious factor: the Donbas republics have built up their own state independent of whether a clown or a confectioner runs Ukraine."

Meanwhile, former Ukrainian political commentator and supporter of DNR Kostiantyn Dolhov, who emigrated to Russia, now reminds Russians how they vainly celebrated Trump's victory and warns them that there will be even less to rejoice over in Zelenskiy's win: "Euphoria over the 'victory over Poroshenko' will disappear very quickly. As soon as the excited sheep understand that Zelenskiy will continue Petya's course, only 100 times more so than Petya himself.

As regards the Russian government, it's overall tone has been quite chill. Putin Spokesperson Dmitry Peskov announced that the Kremlin had no intention of congratulating Volodymyr Zelenskiy on his victory and underscored that it was early to talk about joint efforts with Ukraine's new leadership.

PM Dmitry Medvedev noted that there was a chance that relations might get better under the new Ukrainian leader. However, he made this statement in the most vague and ambiguous manner possible: "Ukraine's election took place. The results have showm a clear demand for new approaches to resolving the country's problems. Obviously, the new president will face the task of consolidating the country given the realities of the last few years. I have no doubt that the new leader will continue to use the same rhetoric towards Russia as he did during his election campaign. He'll repeat the familiar ideological formulas oriented towards different groups of the population. I have no illusions on that count. Still, the chance to improve relations with our country is there. What will it require? Honesty. And a pragmatic and responsible approach. An approach that takes into account all the political realities that have taken shape in Ukraine, first and foremost the situation in the country's east."

Still, the best indication of the Kremlin's reaction to Zelenskiy's election, as always, was shown in deeds, not words. Before the second round of the election, when it was pretty well clear who would win, Moscow suddenly decided to institute new sanctions against Kyiv. They restricted exports of petroleum products and coal to Ukraine and banned imports of certain Ukrainian products. It would be hard to call this move 'friendly,' and it was clearly aimed against Zelenskiy. Moreover, it was preventive as the president-to-be was in no position to make any anti-Russian moves since he had hadn't even been elected yet, never mind inaugurated.

It looks as though the Kremlin, like many Ukrainians, has only a vague idea what this new leadership will look like who will be in Zelenskiy's team, and what kind of policy he will follow. But old habits die hard and so the only way Russia knows how to respond is through threats and blackmail. Whether Zelenskiy will be able to withstand the pressure and not give in is the main question for the next five years. Obviously, not even the newly elected president knows the answer to that right now

# Andrew Wilson:

### "Russia has many other options for destabilizing Ukraine, that do not involve grabbing actual territory" Interviewed bv Yuriv Lapayev

During the 12th Kyiv Security Forum The Ukrainian Week met with the British historian and political scientist to discuss the electoral situation in Ukraine as well as the policy of deterring Russia.

#### One of your books has a title "The Ukrainians: Unexpected Nation". It was written actually in 2000, almost twenty years ago. But now Ukraine faced some changes in its political situation. Do you find them also unexpected, or this is only a part of broader global trend?

 Well, I will try to answer this question in two points. Sorry about the long answer. Firstly, a little bit about the book itself. It could have been called "... The unexpected state". Part of the story was about how Ukraine achieved independence, which came in a rush – not very much more than year and a half of very accelerated events in 1990-91. A lot of which by definition was a surprise to a lot of people. But I also meant that the cultural reality of a separate Ukrainian nation was a surprise to many, at least in the West. While here in Ukraine, there were many layers of identity within newly-independent Ukraine. And the institutions of a state were then consolidated more quickly than a sense of a nation. So the second part of the answer could be the argument that Ukrainian nation-building began again in 2014. Although a lot had happened between 1991 and 2014, revolution and war are great accelerators of nation building. And this war is lasting longer than the First World War in the West, which was famous for its consolidating effect on French or even British identity. So you can definitely look on all events from 2014 in that frame. But a lot has changed in Russia also since 1991. Back then, Yeltsin's Democratic Russia was in at least par-

tial situational alliance with other Soviet republican nationalisms, despite post-imperial spasms like in August 1991. Russia was also relatively weak. Now Ukraine is facing a very different type of Russia,.

Then what is happening in Ukraine right now is both global and specific to Ukraine. There is a global populist trend, but I don't think that Zelenskiy is a populist. He is an anti-politician. One of his political slogans is "No political slogans".

#### But this is also a global anti-establishment, anti-elite trend, like the yellow wests movement, Brexit...

- Definitely, ves. But what is different about Zelenskiy is his second slogan "No promises, no excuses", which isn't the same as the normal populist recipe of promising everything. Brexit is all about promising. Unicorns, as we say - promising things that are actually impossible, magical. The second thing that is unique in Zelenskiy's case is obviously the extent to which he is playing his character, Holoborodko. You could argue that Trump was also playing his character, called "Donald Trump The successful businessman", which is a more radical fake than Holoborodko. So Zeleskiv is more of an anti-politician than he is a populist; but is an anti-establishment figure, of course. Appealing relatively to the East, but with strong support throughout all Ukraine. So what he feels about national consolidation it is very interesting. We saw a high turnout overall in the first round of the election, but that was particularly concentrated in the big cities of East and South. Arguably Zelenskiy is the kind of figure who is a better fit for the new identity politics in eastern and southern Ukraine since 2014. From that point of view, Zelenskiy might be

non-accidental. He is a part of the changing mosaic of the Ukrainian regional and national identity culture.

#### In your opinion how will the political situation develop after the elections?

- It is hard to answer. We are talking between the rounds. The opinion polls are predicting that Zelenskiy will win and they were pretty accurate about the first round. What kind of president will he be – I don't know. There are some clues. He is starting to form a disparate team around himself, but this process isn't yet complete. So we need to find a little bit more about his team. His policies are sketchy. He will be defined to some extent by his team, which is currently a coalition of old friends, people from Kvartal, some figures linked to Ihor Kolomoyskiy, but also possible to other oligarchs, media professionals, political technologists like Razumkov. After his strong win in the first round, more people will want to join his team. Too many Western commentators are only looking at the trio of Danilyuk-Abromavicius-Leschenko. Hopefully there will be broader team of reformers joining the team as a whole, but we don't know yet.

But a more interesting basic question is "Do Zelenskiy's voters want him to turn into a politician?" Perhaps President Zelenskiy will actually be a little bit like Trump – in the sense that Trump has not really been an executive president. Trump is lazy. His percentage of time spent actively in White House is amazingly low. He does a lot of doing nothing, or carrying on his own campaign, which he clearly enjoys. Zelenskiy is not lazy, but maybe he will also prefer to carry on with his show. So the question will be how much time he will spend acting as an executive president.

#### But USA has strong state institutions, which can operate even without president, not like in Ukraine.

– Obviously in a comparative sense that is true. Though Trump is testing the existing system of checks and balances, and is leaving lots of the bureaucracy empty and inactive. What could happen if Zelenskiy is primarily a showman president – we don't know. Poroshenko has been the opposite, a very active president in all areas. And that will be a dramatic change. So we don't know and we will see. None of us know the full story here; we have not being told much about Zelenskiy – we know more about Holoborodko. It is hard to predict what might happen. Two key things are: the nature of coalition or team he builds around himself and the extent to which he becomes his own man, to which he grows into the job of president. Unlike Trump, he might actually enjoy it.

### Do you think the Crimea scenario with some occupation as a result of government crisis is possible after these elections?

– Well, Ukrainians are right to always worry about this. Post-election protests are entirely possible, especially if Poroshenko continues to frame Zelenskiy in such a negative light. But the bigger the gap will be, the less protest we will see.

If your question is about particular regions of Ukraine, we should remember exactly what happened back in 2014. There were two famous opinion polls about Crimea, where only 40% were for some kind of union or closer relations with Russia, and the Donbas (about 30%), and much lower throughout the rest of the country. So that was the baseline back then, but of course turning that into the actual annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas — all the steps of escalation came from Russia. Russia was much less successful in other parts of the country. So there is nowhere in Ukraine today with that kind of baseline. So Russia can try to make trouble, like they try in Zakarpattya, but without much success. Plus another aspect of what happened in 2014 — in Crimea Russia was lucky. Putin patronizingly congrat-

Andrew Wilson was born in 1961 in Cumbria, United Kingdom. British historian and political scientist, professor in Ukrainian studies at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies at University College London. He is also a Senior Policy Fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. Author of several books about Ukraine and political situation in Eastern Europe.

ulated Ukrainians on not fighting, because he was quite worried that they might. And if the West from the beginning had had a better understanding of what was actually happening, the story would have been very different. So anything that Russia in 2019 tried would be much riskier than in 2014. But of course Russia has many other options for destabilizing Ukraine, that do not involve grabbing actual territory.

### Talking about European vector of Ukraine. There is wide discussion of two options – to join EU at any cost, and then develop our country with their help or develop the country as much as possible and only then join the union with stronger position. What is the best way, on your opinion?

– You set an abstract choice, but there are existing agreements the Association Agreement and DCFTA. We are currently in the implementation phase. If Ukraine was "building up its own strength independently" would it adopt the same rules and standards? Is there a way to build up economic strength without adopting a large proportion of EU requirements? Would this type of Ukraine be more protectionist, nurturing its "infant industries"? This is a controversial argument in economics. A lot of Ukraine's industries are old not infant. Growth sectors like IT need the EU.

But there is also a political aspect to this question. The one thing that Brexit teaches us is the opposite of what Brexit was supposed to achieve. Britain is not stronger on its own. Britain is weak and friendless and in danger of serious economic decline. And I think the same from the opposite perspective is true for Ukraine. Whatever label is put on a policy, Ukraine needs trade with Europe and needs to use this as a foundation for security and solidarity relationships. Ukraine on its own, politically, economically and military – it is not really an option. The more you are knitted in this network of trade and solidarity the better off you are. Britain is moving in the opposite direction and we are suffering. Ukraine is at war, and needs alliances and friends.

### What can force West to deal harder against Russia?


– What we would like to happen is far from what is likely to happen. After Russia's actions in the Sea of Azov, there was a weak push in the direction of extra sanctions, but without much result. In America skepticism about Russia is one thing that crosses party lines in Congress, but Trump seems likely to use the false claim that the Mueller Report exonerates him to take a softer line on Russia. In Europe we have EuroParliament elections coming up and a new European Commission as a result. Most probably, the new European Parliament will be a little more eurosceptical and softer on Russia. Though not as much as people think, again thanks to Brexit. Brexit has revived some pro-EU sentiment, even in Britain.

But there is also not enough force to push the sanctions back. Russia is well aware of the threshold that might encourage tougher western actions and they try to stay below it. And that threshold, as we can see unfortunately, is pretty high. Russia was able to get away with the de-facto militarization of the Sea of Azov. And we can see further steps possible coming elsewhere in the Black Sea. Which is a radical change of the military-strategic situation to Ukraine's disadvantage.

# Go West, young trader How Poland became the biggest market for Ukrainian goods

**Oleksandr Kramar** 

For years, statements that the Russian market was the biggest for Ukrainian goods were one of the cornerstones of Kremlin propaganda to keep Kyiv within Moscow's orbit. Unfortunately, the EU market is far more important for Ukrainian suppliers than the Russian Federation today. The notion that Ukraine couldn't survive without Russia even under wartime conditions because it continues to be in first place for exports of Ukrainian goods, so Ukrainians should think long and hard and move back to the past, to traditional markets, continues to float around to this day. In 2019, even this myth is doomed to failure. Trade figures from the beginning of 2019 showing that bilateral trends predicted that Poland would move into first place for volumes of sales of Ukrainian goods, as **The Ukrainian Week** wrote, and this has come to pass. The increase in Ukrainian exports on the Polish market were driven by its strong growth, one of the fastest in Europe with an average of 4% growth per year over 2014-



2018. And although not much of Ukraine's export was directed there, 6.5% of total exports, this proved enough for Ukraine's western neighbor to reach the #1 spot as the country continues to diversify its trade geographically. Next after Poland is Italy, which is only a few tenths of a percent behind, with Egypt third at 5.7% export. Russia is only in fourth place after these three, after having been first for years: only 5.5% of Ukraine's trade goes there, which is only a tad more than fifth-place Turkey.

Both growing exports of Ukrainian goods to Poland, which rose from US \$254mn in January 2018 to US \$266mn in January 2019, and declining exports to Russia, which fell from US \$264mn in January 2018 to US \$225mn in January 2019, pushed Poland into the top position. Nor was this just a one-month trend, but a sustained one. What's more, where exports to other Top 10 countries like Egypt, India and Italy are monospecialized and very dependent on seasonal fluctuations and prices on basic products, which leads to figures that can shift wildly from month to month, Poland and Russia get quite diversified exports from Ukraine, leading to relatively stable figures month after month.

Between 2013 and 2018, Poland's share grew from 4.0% to 6.9% while Russia's collapsed from 23.8% to 7.7%. Today, this steady trend has finally led to a clear shift from Ukraine's eastern aggressive neighbor to its western one, which is gradually taking on the role of a window to Europe in the face of constant speculation on the part of those who favor a return to Moscow's imperialist orbit. Poland's slightly smaller share in January 2019 compared to 2018 is deceptive, as January is typically the month when countries that buy mostly grain and oils temporarily overtake countries with whom Ukraine enjoys more diversified trade. When the main wave of trade in these goods to distant markets in Asia and Africa peters out, the share of European partners typically grows.

### WHAT'S BEHIND THE GROWTH

Looking at the shifts in Ukrainian exports to Poland over the last five years by category of goods, it's clear that, in addition to iron ore and ferrous products, quite a few finished goods with higher added value are also being shipped. For instance, electrical wiring, household appliances, furniture, a very wide range of wood products from carpentry and joinery details to chipboard, veneer and plywood, clothing and textiles, power, soy and rapeseed oils, preserved vegetables, and fruit juices. Compared to this, mining and extraction products, and agricultural products constitute a clear minority.

What's more, dynamic growth is taking place precisely in those positions that have a higher added value, while raw materials and semi-finished products are shipping in smaller quantities since 2013. For instance, food groups fell substantially, with oilseed going from US \$97.0mn in 2013 to US \$79.7mn, while processed oils more than doubled, from US \$60.5mn to US \$126.5mn. From negligible, meat products went to US \$3.8mn, cocoa products went to US \$6.3mn, while flours and groats went to US \$8.8mn. Exports of sugar and confectioneries grew from US \$3.8mn to US \$12.9mn, grain products went from **p** 



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US \$1.6mn to US \$7.3mn, processed vegetables from US \$3.9mn to US \$17.8mn, processed fruits and nuts from US \$14.0mn to US \$39.8mn, and various beverages went from US \$2.1mn to US \$9.6mn.

The same can be seen in other branches. For instance, between 2013 and 2018, deliveries of Ukrainian ores shrank from US \$ 391.9mn to US \$383.0mn and unprocessed ferrous metals fell from US \$610.3mn to US \$484.8mn, while finished ferrous products more than doubled, from US \$57.7mn to US \$125.8mn (see What's behind the growth).

Overall, the Top 20 Ukrainian goods that are sold to Poland, each of whom brings Ukrainian manufacturers at least UAH 1 billion every year, altogether account for more than half of all domestic exports to Ukraine's neighbor. No single product is more than 10-15% of total deliveries, and the absolute majority isn't even 1%, but this makes Ukraine's exports to Poland very diversified and barely vulnerable to changes in prices or demand for any given product.

In addition to the UAH 9-10bn worth of electrical wiring that Ukraine exports to it annually, Poland is also

DYNAMIC GROWTH IS TAKING PLACE PRECISELY IN THOSE POSITIONS THAT HAVE A HIGHER ADDED VALUE, WHILE RAW MATERIALS AND SEMI-FINISHED PRODUCTS ARE SHIPPING IN SMALLER QUANTITIES SINCE 2013

Ukraine's main foreign market for furniture. Annual sales of domestic furniture makers are close to UAH 6 billion. Moreover, another few billion hryvnia of high value-added processed wood products are sold in Poland every year. Last year, UAH 800mn worth of household appliances, from washing machines and air conditioners, to heaters, irons, lighting equipment and so on, were sold in Poland. Even batteries are a serious export these days, as is processed food, especially fruit juices, of which Ukraine sold UAH 400mn, plus UAH 300mn worth of confectioneries with sugar but without cocoa, and UAH 150mn worth of yeast. Ukraine also shipped nearly UAH 90mn worth of dairy products. Other exports that bring hundreds of millions of UAH in sales include plumbing equipment, ceramic tiles, clothing, footwear, baby carriages and strollers and spare parts, leather and paper products, detergents, and cosmetics. Last, but not least, Poland is a major market for electricity generated in Ukraine, taking nearly 25% of overall exports, UAH 2.2bn, in 2018.

Indeed, the Polish market it the main export market for an entire series of Ukrainian products: 94% of all baby carriages and strollers go there for nearly UAH 180mn, 83% of all rubber and plastic footwear, nearly 80% of all aluminum products for UAH 630mn, 63% of cucumbers, nearly 58% of all ceramic plumbing equipment for UAH 350mn, 58% of all particleboard, 56% of air conditioners, 55% of seating furniture, 48% of canned tomatoes, 38% of cloth footwear, more than 33% of detergents, 30% of washing machines, and 32.5% of carpentry and joinery details.

For Ukrainian SMEs, delivering to this solid neighboring market is the easiest, especially if compared to the distant markets of Asia and Africa, let alone the Americas. Moreover, Polish companies have long been interested in various forms of joint ventures with Ukrainian partners. Domestic firms are also actively making money on the export of services to Poland, although this indicator, unlike goods, puts Poland at a considerably lower level compared to other EU countries, like Germany and the UK. Overall annual turnover is currently US \$343mn, while the profile is strikingly different from exports to other countries: nearly 50%, US \$160mn, is income from the processing of Polish materials by Ukrainian companies on a tolling basis.

However, even the cumulative income from the export of goods and services to the Polish market is lower than the export of Ukraine's labor force. Here, Poland has also overtaken Russia for first place in providing jobs to Ukrainian migrant workers and for repatriated earnings. In 2017, Ukrainians working in Poland sent home more than US \$3.1bn, while the first quarter of 2018 was up 45% over the same period of 2017. Clearly, repatriated earnings far outstripped what Ukrainian exporters made on the Polish market. 2019 is likely to continue the trend.

### WHAT'S NEXT

The steep rise in the weight of the Polish market for Ukrainian producers, which led to that market surpassing the once-largest Russian one early this year, could pose a number of risks in the longer term. Already Polish businesses are complaining. During last year's Europe-Ukraine forum, the vice president of the Ukrainian-Polish Chamber of Commerce reported that Polish agribusiness is already calling for special restrictions on Ukrainian suppliers. If Ukraine's SMEs, in particular, continue to focus on trade with Poland, they could develop a dangerous dependency, similar to Ukraine's onetime reliance on Russia, the consequences of which Ukraine is still trying to overcome.

No one should dismiss the possibility that Warsaw could try to use Kyiv's trade dependence to put pressure on Ukraine, both economically and politically down the line. Given the unhappy experience of historical and ideological confrontations over the past few years, trade wars and the possibility of using bilateral trade as a way of "putting Kyiv in its place" is not nearly as hypothetical as one might hope. Should this come to pass, any overdependence on the Polish market could make Ukraine's business unacceptably vulnerable.

Fortunately, there is some indication that Poland will not remain in the #1 position as a market for Ukrainian goods for long. For one thing, Italy is already breathing down its neck. But the biggest threat to Poland's primacy is the growth in the overall value of trade with Germany, which is slowly closing the gap, once the Association Agreement comes into effect. Since 2013, exports to Poland have jumped 60% more than exports to Germany. However, by 2018 the gap was already down to 47%: last year, trade with Poland grew 19.6%, while trade with Germany grew 25.9%. In January 2019, Ukrainian exports to Germany grew nearly twice the rate of exports to Poland, compared to January 2018.

The German market is potentially a far larger one for Ukrainian goods and German business is a much more powerful trading partner for Ukrainian manufacturers than Polish business. Moreover, exports to Germany are quite diversified as to both goods and services. Moreover, lately sales are up of products that were either not provided in Germany at all or were provided in very insignificant amounts until recently. And so Poland could turn out to be just an experimental site for a large-scale entry of Ukrainian producers into stronger European markets.



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# Gordon Ramsay: "It could take years to establish the effect of media literacy programs"

Interviewed by Yuriy Lapayev



**The Ukrainian Week** talked with British researcher of Russian propaganda to find out what topics the Kremlin tries to promote in the English-language media, whether there is a recipe for countering the negative informational impact and how extensive the network of Russian false information is.

### You are one of the authors of "Weaponising news" research. Could you tell some highlights of this research?

 This analysis shows how Russian news outlets inserted over 130 competing and often contradictory narratives into their extensive coverage of the March 2018 Salisbury poisoning incident. The study shows how statelinked news outlets operate in a 'crisis management' situation, mobilising a 'parallel commentariat' to air dozens of narratives explaining events and the motivations of Western actors, as well as amplifying provocative statements from senior Russian government officials. We have analyzed, in total, 151,809 online articles published by UK national news outlets and 11,819 articles on the English-language sites of RT and Sputnik.

### Which narratives of Russian propaganda are the most powerful now in United Kingdom?

- It is a very difficult question to answer. Probably, because we are able to see what Russia and its news sources are publishing. But what we have not seen in that exact research - is the results of it. We know that in some cases it means to be significant. It is very difficult to measure the success of a narrative. We have only rough ideas of what this news sources are reaches on their daily, weekly and monthly basis. We can say only that there is a lot of information being published in English on Russian sources. All those news outlets have relatively small audiences. We know that thy can attract readers via social media. They publish the same attractive content as the traditional news organizations in UK, which have large audiences. We don't know what readers do with all these information, we don't know the effect. But we know that they are in our information space and people can access them. What is interesting - it is the consistence of some of the narratives. There are many opportunities for people to see them

### Are these narratives targeting only UK or other countries as well?

- As part of the project we looked at how several countries were portrayed in Russian media in English language. What was Russian media telling to English audience? And one of those countries was Ukraine. What we have found with content analysis - there were eleven different frames looking at issues of political and social dysfunction, which were created in terms of social conflict, political conflict, institutional failure or alienation of democracy, corruption, political failure, governmental failure, undemocratical practices. We have only eight weeks to look at, we have found 101 articles about Ukraine and 70 of them were on more or less famous sources. The most common were on governmental failure, on sample which presents the conflict on East as a result of political failure. Some of them criticize the decision to block Russian social networks. Others focusing more on undemocratical practices, which denying Ukraine as a state. Those were sorts of a standard subject for media outlets.

### Do you see any difference in topics comparing with the EU and USA?

- We saw some differences. In not the same analysis, but we looked at the USA and some Western Europe coun**Dr Gordon Ramsay** has been conducting and publishing media and communication research for the past decade. He holds a PhD in Political Communication from the University of Glasgow (2011) and and is the co-author, with Dr Martin Moore, of UK Media Coverage of the 2016 EU Referendum Campaign and Monopolising Local News. He has co-developed the content analysis research tool Steno with the developer Ben Campbell, and has previously published research on media regulation and policy at the Media Standards Trust.

tries. In western Union focus was more on migration and problems, which are results of migration and institutional failure. Violence as a result of terrorism. In the US focus was much more on governmental and institutional failures, particularly the police, on large amount of the gun crimes and violent crimes. So it seems to be much more focused on migration and integration in the EU and more on violence and structural failure in the US.

### Do you see any shifts in Russian rhetoric? What could be the reasons for that?

- That is difficult to say, because we have only two fourweek samples from May-June 2017 and March 2018 and because the second sample that was immediately after Skripal poisoning in Salisbury, so that event had really dominated the coverage. This is such an unusual case, so it is really hard to compare. What we did see is a strong focus on geopolitical division of Russia versus West.

### Do you think there is something like special British division for spreading propaganda in UK, or it is just a part of European network or agenda?

- What we did notice when we looked through who were the external sources, which viewing the news – we saw is a certain small number of people, are viewing quite often, and I saw that they are affiliate in some French news organizations, some of what I have never seen before. And we have taken a closer look just to find who those people were, we find same organizations operating in UK. We spotted a small network, but it can be larger. We did see that there were some very small news organizations, that seems to publish almost nothing except Russia-related stories from pro-Russian angle. So I can suspect it goes beyond UK if these organizations are linked across the countries. We need to investigate that.

### Which European and British actors (like media, politicians, activists, bloggers) are helping Kremlin to spread propaganda?

- I don't really want to name the names. What we really found in the research, that the certain news web-sites, attached to legacy media, to tabloid newspapers seemed to be vulnerable to packing eye-catching content in articles and publish them nation-wide. These articles in military cases have very detailed information about new weapons with photos and even videos, what is a very eyecatching. And we saw that some of the sites, which are not involved in game to attract the audience, seemed to be happy to take these articles and make their own stories. This is more for the journalism aspect of the project. I think that could be fixed so easily, editorial filters could perhaps prevent that happened. Social media are obviously a very effective tool for spreading. And there is a small number of independent journalists, some French former politicians, who either appears often a sources for Sputnik or RT, or themselves take part in this conversation over defending meanings of events from Russian angle.

#### Do you have a signs that Russian authorities helped someone in spreading propaganda?

- We didn't see the evidence of that. All we know is that RT and Sputnik provide a platform for sources and their approach. Some of the sources, for example, appear only once.

### Do you know something about British countermeasures? Are they effective and what could make them more effective on your opinion?

- At the moment there is a lot of talk. There are some parliament enquires on fake news. There are some investigations against RT. I believe some of them will result against this platform. We have ways of monitoring but we have no counter solutions. It also extremely difficult to deal with a good journalism, just because it has a very consistent view on some topic and some of the newspapers done that. When someone says "I'm a journalist and

SOCIAL MEDIA ARE OBVIOUSLY A VERY EFFECTIVE TOOL FOR SPREADING. AND THERE IS A SMALL NUMBER OF INDEPENDENT JOURNALISTS, SOME FRENCH FORMER POLITICIANS, WHO EITHER APPEARS OFTEN A SOURCES FOR SPUTNIK OR RT, OR THEMSELVES TAKE PART IN THIS CONVERSATION OVER DEFENDING MEANINGS OF EVENTS FROM RUSSIAN ANGLE

I'm publishing some journalism in good faith" it becomes extremely difficult for someone to say "No, you aren't. We need some fresh thinking to deal with nonregulated journalism in the future.

#### Where is the border line between freedom of press and necessary countering the negative information influence?

- I think that is the key issue. I don't know where this border line is. It is a very philosophical issue. When someone says openly "I'm a journalist, I'm reporting in good faith, I have an audience ", what kind of the mechanism would be there for someone to disprove that. One way to deal potentially with that issue is a whitelisting, but I don't know how effective that could be. For now, blacklisting or banning is very problematic. I think you are talking of most important and philosophical conceptual question on what to do for media in next 10-20 years.

### Which tools or methods could be effective for countering propaganda?

- Fact-checking can help and also a media literacy. You need to positively enforce and encourage standards. These are positive and beneficial things. But in the news environment where people lean more to emotional content it is not necessary be effective. It could take years to establish the effect of media literacy programs. I'm slightly pessimistic, because as long the information exists, there is aim to attract attention, it is designed to appeal to emotions. And it is actively not intending to be truthful and accurate.

# Sunny alternatives

Electrical coops are the way to really get oligarchs out of the power sector

**Denys Kazanskiy** 



Breaking through the clouds? Slavutych could become the first city in Ukraine to start the movement towards energy independence for the country's communities

As in the rest of the world, demand for alternative energy sources has been growing in Ukraine. Technological progress has substantially reduced the costs of both solar and wind generation. The construction of solar energy stations, wind energy stations and biogas facilities has begun to pay off within just a few years, thanks to the high "green" tariff that was established in law. The result has been a substantial inflow of investment in the industry.

But right now, the benefits of Ukraine's green tariff are mainly going to oligarchs and Big Business. Of course, the owners of private homes are also installing solar panels, the their share of the green energy sector remains microscopic. Meanwhile, big capital is going great guns. In February, Rinat Akhmetov's energy giant, DTEK, launched the largest solar power station in Europe, the Nikopol SES, which has a power capacity of 246 MW enough power to provide electricity to a city of 100,000.

But things could shift considerably on this market in the future. Ordinary Ukrainians have the opportunity to squeeze the major players and participate more broadly in developing alternative energy. All they have to do is look to what's going on elsewhere in Europe: home-owners are setting up electrical co-ops and generating green electricity on an industrial scale that is equivalent to a large corporation. This instrument is in its nascent stage in Ukraine right now, but it's clear already what enormous potential it represents. The cooperative movement, which is growing not only in alternative energy but also in other areas, could change Ukrainian society and its economic situation by teaching people to cooperate and to become full-fledged participants in the economic process of their country. To have an idea how far Ukraine has fallen behind other developed countries, a few numbers offer a sobering image: Germany claims more than 1,000 various energy cooperatives that supply an entire range of resources and service both to their members and to third parties. Ukraine, by contrast, is only in the process of setting up the first such cooperative.


Energy co-ops have become the key instrument that has made it possible to combine the financial resources of thousands of German citizens to put up power stations that produce energy from renewable sources. According to the Agora think-tank, 47% of installed SES capacities in Germany belonged to ordinary Germans and cooperatives in 2012. Moreover, not just private individuals may be members of energy co-ops in Germany: enterprises and businesses are also allowed. For instance, farmers and agricultural companies sometimes join forces to set up joint biogas power stations. In addition to these energy co-ops, there are also community co-ops that involve private citizens, community enterprises and the energy cooperatives established by local citizens.

For Ukraine, these are inconceivable numbers, but practice has shown that they could become real if ordinary Ukrainians understand the benefits that become available by joining forces in a cooperative. Germany's example proves that this process can have an explosive impact. The country saw explosive growth in the number of cooperatives after 2008: where numbers went from 66 to 136 between 2001 and 2008, over 2008–2015 they skyrocketed from 136 to 1,000. Germans began to join co-ops on a mass scale in order to put their money into promising technologies and use the capital to build power stations. Today, German energy co-ops have involved hundreds of thousands of individuals. One typical example is Friedrich-Wilhelm Raiffeisen Energie in Bavaria, founded in 2008. It began by constructing and bringing on line a 270 MW solar power station. Today, it generates around 270,000 kWh of electricity a year.

The first Ukrainian energy cooperative, called *Sonyachne Misto* or Sunny City, is supposed to launch shortly in Slavutych, the same town that emerged in 1986 after the Chornobyl accident, to which the workforce at the AES was relocated. This city is very well suited to a project based on its features. First of all, the local population is predominantly power engineers and technically savvy specialists who understand the value and importance of planning. Secondly, Slavutych buildings are largely soviet-style, with flat roofs, which makes them very suitable for solar panels. Soon all these roofs will begin to generate electricity.

According to Greencubator founder and one of the originators of the idea of an energy cooperative in Slavutych, Andriy Zinchenko, he was inspired to set up *Sonyachne Misto* by what he had seen in Germany and the US. In smaller cities and towns in those countries, it's quite normal to participate in such an association while the cooperatives themselves have long been strong market players. For instance, rural American energy co-ops generate nearly 5% of all the power produced in the US. What's more they provide jobs for around 72,000 Americans.

"The solar energy station is ideal for setting up such an energy cooperative," explains Zinchenko, "because its very nature makes it possible to easily distribute the current among the participants. We plan for the price of a share, the smallest contribution a person must make to become a member of the cooperative, to be around US \$500. Of course, anyone can buy more shares and contribute more money. The profitability of the enterprise



2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015

will depend on a lot of factors, but on average, we've calculated, every participant in the co-op will get an annual profit of around 20%, which means their investment will pay off within five years."

The concept behind the project is for residents of Slavutych to have first dibs on shares in the energy co-op. Only after that will shares be open to buyer from other areas. This practice is also common in western countries, where local residents have the advantage in buying shares when the local cooperative is being set up. So far 30 individuals have already indicated interest in joining the cooperative although shares have not yet been put up for sale.

In general, setting up such energy co-ops has so many positive benefits that it's a wonder that this movement hasn't become a mass-scale phenomenon in Ukraine. In addition to developing alternative, green energy, cooperatives will make it possible to engage tens and even hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens in business activity, bring their incomes and savings out of the shadows, and make this capital work to expand the economy and not rot under mattresses. After the recent banking crisis, trust in Ukraine's banks was considerably undermined and today Ukrainians are extremely reluctant to put their money into deposits, seeing it as safer to keep it at home in dollars or euros. Buying a share in an energy co-op could be a great alternative to keeping money in a bank. Given that that numerous banks went bust in Ukraine but not a single solar power station has, the reliability of this investment seems unquestionable.

Rural American energy co-ops generate nearly **5%** of all the power produced in the US. What's more they provide jobs for around **72,000** Americans

The main thing, however, is that setting up and expanding energy co-ops represents a real and not just nominal reduction of the power of the oligarchy in Ukraine. With the help of this instrument, ordinary Ukrainians will be able to squeeze oligarchs out of this particular market and gain some of their profits for themselves. The opportunities are endless, as energy co-ops in the West are not only engaged in power generation, but also in delivering electricity to consumers. For this purpose, they often build their own parallel distribution grids, which all belong to major corporations in Ukraine. This offers another market on which associations of individuals can squeeze out the bigger players.

In short, an instrument that can give individuals the opportunity to join efforts and make money is already here. According to Zinchenko, even if it needs some tweaking, Ukraine's legislation does allow individuals to set up energy cooperatives. Why don't Ukrainians take advantage of this situation? Obviously most people simply aren't even aware of it and have no real idea what kinds of advantages this model offers. Yet in this industry, as in any other innovative sphere, it's high time to get going. The first positive result should give energy co-ops a real boost and help Ukraine wake up to this dormant potential.


# Russia's hybrid expansionism in the Arctic:

How are the Arctic Ocean, the Black and the Azov Seas interrelated in Russia's strategic military thinking?

Mark Voyger, Estonian National Defence College, Tartu

When in September 2014 the Russian authorities detained the Lithuanian fishing vessel "Juras Vilkas" (Sea Wolf) and its crew in the Barents Sea and towed the vessel to the Russian port of Murmansk, the European Union protested over this forced apprehension and stated that the ship had been sailing "on the high seas", that is, in international waters, when it was seized. The Russian Foreign Ministry promptly published a statement claiming that the Russian border guards had detained the ship because it was fishing in Russia's exclusive economic waters. At that time, Russia's relations with the EU and NATO were already quite strained as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea and its hybrid invasion of the Donbass. The Baltic States had been among the most vociferous critics of the Kremlin's actions (as they are to this day), so the logical assumption in the West was that Russia was trying to harass and punish one those states, Lithuania.

Territorial disputes between Russia and the West in the High North had existed for almost a century, in particular over the Norwegian island of Svalbard, denoted on the Russian maps as Spitzbergen, as the tensions there have always carried a certain potential risk of conflict between Russia and NATO even in the pre-Crimea period. In April 2015, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Dimitry



Rogozin, who was by then under EU sanctions, landed on Svalbard on his way to a Russian ice base near the North Pole, followed exactly a year later by Chechen special forces instructors, which was in a direct violation of the Svalbard Treaty prohibiting to use the island for military purposes.

Regardless of that long history of maritime competition in the area, most observers likely viewed the capture of the Lithuanian ship as an isolated incident. Five years later, following a growing number of ever more aggressive such incidents it has become obvious that the evens of September 2014 were merely the first exploratory "shot" in a long-term global maritime conflict that is meant to test the resilience of Russia's neighbors against Russian hybrid attacks in the sea, as well as the resolve of the West to protect the freedom of navigation in the World Ocean.

The next phase of Russia's maritime onslaught was launched in November 2018, when the Russian navy openly attacked Ukrainian vessels in the Kerch Strait, in an aggressive, premeditated and coordinated fashion, and arrested their crew of 26 sailors, as they are now imprisoned in Moscow and facing an unfair politically motivated trial. Coupled with the building by Russia of a bridge across the Kerch Strait that effectively prevents the larger commercial ships from sailing in and out of the Azov Sea, these Russian actions have effectively put a stranglehold on the Ukrainian ports of Mariupol and Berdyansk, with the clear goal of not only stifling a large portion of Ukraine's industrial output, but of turning the Azov Sea itself into a "Russian lake". Although strongly critical of Russia's actions, the initial statements and actions of the Western leadership indicated that this attack was also largely viewed as a geographically isolated case, an element of Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine, albeit this time using mostly overt conventional, rather than covert tools.

The global aggressive outreach of Russia's hybrid maritime strategy was finally revealed for the whole world to see, on 06 March 2019, when the Russian government

THE CURRENT RUSSIAN ATTEMPTS TO DOMINATE THE ADJACENT SEAS – FROM THE ARCTIC, TO THE BLACK AND AZOV, IF LEFT UNCHALLENGED BY THE WEST, THREATEN TO DIVIDE THE WORLD OCEAN INTO ZONES DOMINATED BY POWERFUL COASTAL STATES (RUSSIA AND CHINA FIRST AND FOREMOST)

announced that it had developed new rules to control the Northern Sea Route, which passes along the country's northern coast in the Arctic under Article 234 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. In an article titled "The Cold Wave", the Russian newspaper Izvestiya stated that "Russia is taking the Northern Sea Route under its protection."

According to Vladimir Shamanov, Chairman of the State Duma's Defense Committee, who spoke on 11 March 2019 before the foreign military attaches "the situation in the world nowadays is comparable to 1935 when after the coming to power of Hitler conditions for large-scale ag- »



gression were created, followed by the start of WWII in 1939."

In the mirror-imaging fashion typical of the Russian political and military leadership, he laid the blame for Russia's increased military build-up on NATO's intensified activities along its northern "flank", including by launching large-scale exercises, such as "Trident Juncture 2018", the rotational presence of some 700 US marines in Norway, and the combat patrols of US nuclear submarines in the Barents and Norwegian Seas. He also explained Russia's "right to defend its interests in the region" by quoting unattributed comments by unspecified Western politicians who, according to him, had supposedly complained that Russia possesses "unjustifiably" large territory and the vastest natural resources, viewed as a "historical injustice".

Shamanov also commented on the Russian government's decision to introduce new rules for the transit of military ships and vessels along the Northern Sear Route by saying that "the incident in the Kerch strait last year has taught us a lot. We do not intend to continue being passive observers of the naval activity of foreign states within Russian territorial waters, and near them". He also indicated that the Duma Defense Committee is ready to propose stricter measures by imposing limitations on the displacement of foreign navy ships sailing along the

RUSSIA'S ULTIMATE STRATEGIC GOAL IS TO ASSERTS ITS SOVEREIGN RIGHTS OVER THOSE MARITIME AREAS WHERE IT ENJOYS NAVAL DOMINANCE (THE ARCTIC AND THE BLACK SEA), OR WHERE A VACUUM OF INTERNATIONAL POWER EXISTS DUE TO SPECIFIC LEGAL AGREEMENTS OR OF NATO AND THE US BEING "OUT OF AREA" (THE AZOV SEA)

Northern Route, their armaments, etc.

These latest developments and official Russian comments should make it crystal clear already to even the most naïve observer, that Russia views all those maritime areas as interconnected, as part of its global strategy to exert control over the international shipping that passes through all seas bordering Russia - from those in the High North and the Far East, to the Black and the Azov Seas in the South. Russia's ultimate strategic goal is to asserts its sovereign rights over those maritime areas where it enjoys naval dominance (the Arctic and the Black Sea), or where a vacuum of international power exists due to specific legal agreements or of NATO and the US being "out of area" (the Azov Sea).

The existence of such a global strategy is revealed in a 2016 Russian Defense Ministry report discussing Russia's 2015 national security strategy. In its assessment of the status of global maritime activities, Russia expressed its strong displeasure with Norway due to its continued attempts to assert its national sovereignty over Svalbard and the 200-nautical mile maritime boundary around it. Svalbard is listed as one of the areas that may spark potential military conflict with NATO, based on Norway's declared intent to revise the agreement with Russia unilaterally. The other two areas of potential maritime conflict identified by the report were the Kuril Islands, and the Azov and Black Seas. The fact that the report was written almost three years before the seething tensions between Russia and Ukraine exploded into an open Russian aggression should serve as direct evidence that Russia has been anticipating those conflict scenarios for years, and

has taken special efforts to prepare to win them across all hybrid warfare domains, military and non-military alike.

For example, in all three cases, Russia has tried to assert the legality of its actions by employing the hybrid warfare domain of lawfare that aggressively twists and bends international maritime law, by claiming that: the apprehended vessels had been illegally into Russia's exclusive economic zone in the Barents Sea; that they had violated Russia's territorial waters in the Azov Sea, or in the latest Russian move in the Arctic - that their course would go through Russian territorial waters, thus proclaiming Russia's sovereign right to dictate the terms of their free passage.

According to the Russian military, the leading role in defending the Russian Arctic zone will be played by the RF Aerospace Forces. The national interests of the Russian Federation in the region are identified as four groups of factors – historical-geographical, economic, naturalenvironmental, political, and legal-normative. These directly correspond to the main domains of Russian hybrid warfare, clearly indicating that Russia uses its all-of-government multi-domain strategy better known as "hybrid warfare" to defend its interests and expand its influence in the Arctic, as another region of hybrid expansionism and confrontation with the West.

# HOW DO RUSSIA AND CHINA VIEW THE NEW ECONOMIC IMPORTANCE OF THE ARCTIC?

According to the Russian Ministry of Natural Resources, the Arctic holds up to one fourth of the untapped world oil and gas reserves, amounting to 15.5 billion tons of oil and 84.5 trillion cubic meters of natural gas. Russia is also perfectly aware that due to the receding ice cap the Norther Sea Route is becoming ever more attractive for commercial shipping due to the much shorter (up to 30 percent) distance between Europe and Japan from across the Arctic (9,300 nautical miles), compared with 12,500 nautical miles through the Suez and the Indian Ocean, thus cutting transit time by 10-15 days. In the summer of 2018, the Danish shipping giant Maersk became the first company to send a commercial container ship (the Venta Maersk, holding 3,600 containers) from the Pacific to the North Atlantic through Russia's Northern Sea Route, from Vladivostok to St. Petersburg.

Although China is not a littoral Arctic state, it has also shown strong interest in participating in the exploration and development of the region by the direct involvement of Chinese companies in various projects in the region, including the Yamal Liquified Natural Gas project. What is more, China and Russia have agreed to jointly build an 'Ice Silk Road' along the Northern Sea Route in the Arctic, after China formally included the Arctic Sea in its Belt and Road initiative, the giant trans-national Chinese governmental project that seeks to boost trade between East Asia and Europe.

### RUSSIAN MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS IN THE ARCTIC SINCE 2014

While the Russian government outwardly claims that it welcomes peaceful international cooperation in the Arctic, its official documents and the ongoing build-up of its military capabilities in the region, including nuclear forces, demonstrate exactly the opposite actual attitude. It clearly shows that Russia perceives the Arctic as an area of growing international competition, even conflict, and it is doing everything possible to defend aggressively and proactively what it views as its legitimate interests there. Russia's Naval Doctrine of 2015 clearly identified the Arctic Ocean as an area of primary strategic and military importance for Russia, the protection of which is the direct responsibility of the Russian Armed Forces.

The Russian national interests, goals, tasks and measures are defined in a strategic document titled "Foundations of the State Policies of the Russian Federation in the Arctic for the period until 2020 and beyond". It clearly states that one of the primary national interests of Russia in the Arctic region seas is "preventing the domination of individual states or military-political alliances [meaning NATO], in the regions of importance for the RF.

The Russian military considers possible the following scenarios for the breakout of a military conflict in the Arctic:

1. The transformation of a private economic contradiction into a local armed conflict without a follow-up escalation.

2. The transformation of an economic contradiction into a local armed conflict followed by an escalation leading to a large-scale war.

3. Sudden large-scale aggression by using conventional weapons.

4. Sudden large-scale aggression by using nuclear weapons.

Therefore, the list of tasks performed by the Russian forces grouping "North" is long and diverse, to include: monitoring of the situation in the Arctic; anti-aircraft combat duty and air traffic control; preventing violations and provocations in the air space; early warning of the RF political and military leadership of a sudden aerospace attack against Russia; the repelling of a sudden aerospace attack launched against the Russian Federation from the North; providing cover for the naval, ground-based and airborne strategic nuclear forces; interception of cruise missiles; protection of the federal, economic and military sites; tracking by the air-defense of sea vessels and convoys along the Northern Sea Route; providing cover against the air strikes of the enemy for the Russian forces and assets in the High North; targeting the seaborne, underwater and ground-based forces of the enemy by the Russian Air Force strike aviation; search and rescue operations in peace and wartime.

Driven by those multiple strategic considerations, Russia has sped up its military build-up in the Arctic since 2014 by creating new capabilities and improving existing ones, among which the creation of the Arctic Command in December 2014, the deployment of troops near the Finnish border, the overall modernization of the already existing forces, including by developing military hardware designed to operate in the harsh Arctic climatic conditions. These include a range of naval and ground-based assets, from an entire fleet of Russian icebreakers (nuclear and non-nuclear ones), compared with only one non-nuclear one operated by the US Navy to refurbished T-80 tanks with gas turbine engines that are able to start in extremely low temperatures. Arctic motorized rifle units are being actively created within Russia's Ground Forces, especially the 80th Arctic Brigade based in Alakurtti near the border with Finland. The plans include also the forming of an entire coastal defense division in Chukotka, while the Far Eastern Combined Arms Command School in Usuriysk is already preparing lieutenants to staff the increased numbers of future Arctic units.

Another important element of Russia's Arctic equation is the intensified construction of Arctic bases. The so-called "Arctic Trefoil" base has been built on Aleksander's Land island as an integrated complex with a fully closed cycle system to accommodate the service members in charge of the air defense rocket artillery sys-

tems "Panzir-S", the anti-ship systems "Bal", and the radiolocation stations – all of those stationed there for power-projection along Russia's Arctic coast.

Russia

In order to re-supply all those distant bases, even in the harshest winter conditions when planes and helicopters cannot reach them, the Russian military is developing military vehicles with thinner armor that are able to drive over the ice of the Laptev Sea. In that case, the emphasis is on speed rather protection or heavy weapons. On this account, the Russian calculations, although based on an exaggerated perception of the Western threat, are correct – there are no NATO heavy armored vehicles competing for those Arctic islands, while speed of movement and the ability to capture key terrain and hold ground following the rapid deployment of Russian troops across the entire region is the number one factor that can guarantee Russian control of the Arctic by denying those strategic areas to NATO and the US in a pre-emptive fashion.

Therefore, Russian military is expanding its capabilities in the Arctic not only in numerical terms, but qualitatively, by seeking creative solutions to the difficulties inherent in the harsh Arctic terrain and climate. In early 2017, the Russian military conducted a test march under the extreme conditions of the Laptev Sea, with experimental designs of Russian wheeled and tracked armored vehicles that were intended to cover 2,000 kilometers in the complex conditions of the Arctic. The route stretched from Tiksi in Yakutia to the Russian military base on Kotelny island, as it involved moving not only across the tundra, but also over the ice of the Laptev Sea. The declared intent of the Russian military is to turn such Arctic convoys into a routine business in order to re-establish and asserts its presence across the entire region. The march involved not only tracked and wheeled all-terrain vehicles, but also special containerized housing units, mobile repair workshops and inflatable rapid expanding tents that were tested in real conditions.

According to the March 2019 report by the RF Defense Minister Sergey Shoygu to the State Duma Defense Committee, "the building of military infrastructure takes place across the entire territory of the country, including the Arctic regions ... Altogether, over the last six year, 475 infrastructures sites have been built on the islands of Kotelny, Alexander's Land, Vrangel and Cape Schmidt. They are hosting service members, special weapons systems and military hardware."

The current Russian military build-up in the Arctic demonstrates that Russia is determined to reclaim any ground lost in the post-Soviet era, stay there and asserts its control over as much of the region, as possible, in a comprehensive and preemptive manner. This includes not only troop deployments, but also developing the entire infrastructure needed to support them. In that regard, the operational and tactical advantages of the Russian military units in the Arctic seeks to secure strategic gains for Russia in the global competition for control over resources and trading routes.

#### **RUSSIA'S GRAND STRATEGY IN THE ARCTIC:** MATCHING LETHAL WITH LEGAL

Russia has also been able to couple its increased lethal capabilities in the region by adding "lawfare" as the legal component of hybrid warfare, that is, matching "legal" with "lethal". Since 2005, the Russian state has launched a coordinated international campaign to legalize the extent of its sovereignty in the Arctic by submitting a legal claim before the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) to extend by one third the Russian exclusive economic zone in the Arctic Ocean. This is being done by exploiting a loophole in the UNCLOS, Provision 73, which stipulates that countries that can prove that the underwater shelf of the sea bordering their territories is a geological extension of their continental landmass, can claim as exclusive economic zones not only the standard 200 nautical miles, but instead, 320 miles. In the case of Russia that would mean granting it sovereign economic rights over almost a huge area extending additional 200 km deeper into the Arctic Ocean. Pursuant to its Article 77 of UNCLOS, the coastal State exercises "sovereign" and "exclusive" rights over its continental shelf "for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources." While waiting for the legal case to be adjudicated by the UN Russia has been gradually expanding its military presence in the Arctic in a clear attempt to combine legal with lethal arguments in its ongoing quest to dominate this strategic region of the world, too. The legal and of that Major transport routes through the fica-

scientific debates over the geological definition and chemical composition of that shelf threaten to have huge ramifications, as if the Russian claim ultimately succeeds, it would result in the accession of an area of more than 1.2 million square km with its vast hydrocarbon deposits to Russian Arctic sovereignty.

To support its claim, Russia has launched an enormous operation involving international law, geology, chemistry, oceanography and other scientific branches, to prove that the Lomonosov Ridge, a giant underwater mountain that stretches 1,800 nautical miles under the surface of the Arctic Ocean, and connects Eurasia with North America, is a geological extension of the Eurasian landmass controlled by Russia. The Russian legal claim, therefore, is highly complex, as it involves the collecting and presenting of rock samples from the bottom of the Arctic Ocean that seek to prove the validity of the Russian claim "scientifically". Unfortunately, this complex operation is not matched by similar comprehensive counter-claims by all other Arctic nations, at least not on this level of sophistication. As a result, the Russian state has all chances to have at least a portion of the claim approved by the UN. The fact that it is excessive in its territorial extent can only serve Russia's purposes, as it can then pretend it is giving up part of it, in order to claim legal control over the areas that are of real importance for it.

#### **RUSSIA'S NEW RULES OF THE GAME IN THE ARCTIC:** WILL RUSSIA TRIGGER THE FIRST ARCTIC WAR OF THE 21<sup>ST</sup> CENTURY?

Russia has already made clear statements that it regards the Arctic Ocean, at least the portion of it that forms the Northern Route (the sea lane that links Europe with Asia along the coast of Siberia), as part of its sovereign territory. In March 2019, Russia stated officially that it will require that all ships sailing along that route to notify Russia 45 days in advance of their exact route, destination and cargo, and accept Russian pilots on board for the duration of their trip. Such excessive claims of sovereign directly contravene the provisions of the international law of the sea and threaten the freedom of navigation in the world oceans. Still, the combination of Russian lawfare and military deployments in the Arctic, have boosted its confidence that it has legal sovereign rights over this area, and that it is able and willing to defend them by force, if necessary.

The new rules of navigation along the Northern Route that Russia has publicly announced are bound to trigger a strong international reaction, especially from NATO and the West, as a whole, as they deal with foreign military ship, which are considered sovereign immune vessels under international law, and therefore do not fall under the provisions of Art. 234 of the Law of the Sea. Regardless of that, Russia now demands that all such vessels provide 45 days advance notice to be granted permission to sail along that route. According to Russia, the foreign military vessels must declare their purpose, route, timetable, and

technical specifications, even details such as the rank and identity of their captains. In another blatant violation of international law. Russia now insists that such ships should also allow Russian pilots on board while sailing across the Arctic. Russia still reserves the right to deny access to such ships without the need to provide justification or explanation. A passage that has not received prior approval by Russia can lead to the vessel's arrest or even destruction.

These latest Russian claims of sovereignty over the passage of military ships similar Russian claims in the past, that the international straits that are part of the Northern Sea Route are Russian "internal waters", and that foreign commercial vessels must be granted permission by Russia to enter its exclusive economic zone.

All of the above constitute violations of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the very Article 234 that Russia claims to serve as the legal basis for its new egregious demands in the Arctic. The Article states that coastal states are allowed "to adopt and enforce non-discriminatory laws and regulations for the prevention, reduction and control of marine pollution from vessels in ice-covered areas within the limits of the exclusive economic zone", as obviously, it refers to completely different situation from those that Russia is trying to create. Ultimately, it all comes down to Russia's desire to control the passage of foreign military vessels, such as the French navy support vessel that sailed along the Northern Route in the Fall of 2018 without prior approval by Russia.

The new rules imposed by Russia directly violate UNC-LOS, as well as run contrary to the entire logic of the freedom of navigation on the high seas (in the World Ocean) that has been the cornerstone of the free trade worldwide for the last 200 years. During the 19th and early 20th century Great Britain was the guarantor of this international regime, as that responsibility passed on to the United States after WWII. Historically, the high seas became completely open to international navigation only after 1816, when the British navy launched a naval campaign and bombardment of the so-called "Barbary Regencies" of the Ottoman Empire in North Africa (Algiers, Tunisia and Libya) and finally removed the threat in the Mediterranean to European and American commercial and military vessels. Prior to that, for 300 years, the Ottoman corsairs of North Africa were blocking the passage of ships from most Christian nations of the West, demanding that they pay for the right to sail along the coast of North Africa under the threat of being captured or sunk. Viewed through the prism of history, Russia's new demands in the Arctic Ocean resemble those of the Barbary corsairs of old. Thus, they represent an attempt by Russia to push not only the Arctic region, but gradually also the entire world system of navigation and commerce into a new Dark Age. After all, Russia's hybrid aggression against Ukraine serves to show to the West that Russia has its privileged sphere of strategic interests, a notion that brings the international system 200 years back into a 18th or 19th century "Great Powers" model. In the same fashion, the current Russian attempts to dominate the adjacent seas - from the Arctic, to the Black and Azov, if left unchallenged by the West, threaten to divide the world ocean into zones dominated by powerful coastal states (Russia and China first and foremost) that would seek to exploit, control or obstruct the navigation of naval or commercial vessels, in order to seal off entire segments of the World Ocean for their own political and economic benefit within much enlarged spheres of sovereign jurisdiction. There is little doubt that the West, in particular NATO and the United States, will not leave this challenge unanswered in the long run. As a result. Russia's excessive demands and heavy-handed tactics might ultimately backfire by potentially triggering "The First Arctic War" of the 21st century in the coming decade.

# THE US AND NATO RESPONSES TO RUSSIA'S BUILD-UP IN THE ARCTIC

According to US Senator Sullivan, the United States is "slowly but surely finally beginning to wake up to the Arctic's growing geopolitical significance." These statements came as a direct result of the realization on the part of the US strategists in the post-Crimea era, that the ongoing attempts by the two authoritarian powers – Russia and China – seek to exert direct control over the Arctic.

Senator Sullivan introduced a number of provisions in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2019, aimed at strengthening the US positions in the Arctic region. Among these were the authorization to build 6 heavy Polar-class Icebreakers for the Coast Guard, and a requirement for each US military service – the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Marine Corps – to produce their own strategy for the Artic region. The document also calls on the US Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of State to assess the implications of Russian military activity in the Arctic, and the threats that it poses to the U.S. military deployed in the region.

Similarly, in early April 2019 the Commander of the US Sixth Fleet and the NATO Joint Force Command in Naples, Admiral Foggo, made statements linking for the first time the Russian activities in the Arctic with the freedom of passage of Ukrainian ships in and out of the Azov Sea. Thus, for the first time, a high-ranking US and NATO military leader directly recognized the critical importance of both the Arctic and the Azov for deterring Russia's attempt to interfere with the freedom of navigation in the world ocean, as a whole.

#### NATO'S NEW PLAN TO UPHOLD THE FREEDOM OF NAVIGATION IN THE BLACK AND AZOV SEAS

At its meeting in Washington, DC on 04 April 2019, commemorating the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the Alliance NATO announced its decision to support Ukraine and uphold the freedom of navigation in the Black and Azov Seas by sending more NATO ships, into the Black Sea on a regular basis. Coupled with improved surveillance assets and procedures, NATO is determined to protect the Ukrainian shipping in and out of the Azov Sea through the Kerch Strait. These measures will also serve to reassure the NATO member-states Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Georgia as a future NATO member; and they send a strong signal to Russia that it will not be allowed to turn the Black and the Azov Seas into Russian "lakes". Russia views these developments as hostile and aggressive acts on the part of NATO, as it insists on strict adherence to the Montreux Convention and the Russia-Ukraine Treaty on the Azov. The first one allows for the presence of foreign naval vessels in the Black Sea for only 21 days, and the second divides the Azov Sea between Russia and Ukraine, thus removing its status as international waters.

This is a dramatic turn of events for Russia, as it immediately accused NATO of violating the Montreux Convention, and of pushing Ukraine toward future provocations. It also vowed to respond to the increased future NATO presence in the Black Sea. This massive demonstration of support for Ukraine on the part of NATO represents a unique chance for the Alliance to show to Russia that its maritime attacks against Ukraine will not be viewed as separate bilateral incidents in a geographically isolated region of the world, and they won't be tolerated either. Instead, NATO is sending Russia a strong signal, that its aggressive behavior on the high seas will face strong response from the most successful alliance in the history of the world, and the determination of the entire West. The battle for the freedom of navigation in the World Ocean, one of the fundamental principles of the entire modern international system has already started in the Black and Azov Seas, and Ukraine is in its forefront.

# Virtual force

The role of social networks in the events of 2014 and of today

#### **Denys Kazanskiy**

A lot has already been written about the fact that the Russian government uses social networks to interfere in the elections of other states and provoke political conflicts. Journalists from different countries made a number of elaborate investigations of this subject and were able to establish that Yevgeny Prirozhin, manager of a whole troll factory, is the person from Putin coterie, who is responsible for working with social networks. But if the existence of Russian Internet trolls is no longer a secret, then the question of what to do with them and how to resist them is still open.

IN ORDER FOR PEOPLE TO CATCH THE INFORMATIONAL VIRUS; THE "NEWS" MUST BE APPROPRIATELY ADAPTED TO THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE AVERAGE PERSON: HAVE A GLARING HEADLINE, RESPOND TO COMMON FEARS AND PREJUDICES. TRUTHFULNESS IS COMPLETELY IRRELEVANT

With the development of social networks, mankind has faced such challenges that were not in our history before. One of them is an avalanche-like, viral dissemination of information. And often far from being useful. The spread of terrible rumors, which lead to outbreaks of violence, panic, bashing, of course, has been a frequent occurrence for long. But before the advent of Facebook and smartphones, such outbursts were usually on local scale and occurred within a single city or village. Now, technical progress allows information to quickly spread over vast territories and cover millions of people. This feature has made the social networks a formidable weapon, sometimes rather destructive than a machine gun or a cannon. Indeed, at the beginning of the XXI<sup>th</sup> century, terrible rumors no longer appear spontaneously, but purposefully invented by specially trained people.

Ukraine felt first-hand all the power of this weapon in 2014, when Russia had put forth all its energy to use social networks for inciting hostility within our country, as well as for mobilizing those who want to kill Ukrainians in the Russian Federation as well. Then many people, not only in Ukraine, but also abroad, realized that social networks are not just innocent entertainment, and that information is biased, that a properly spread fake information can provoke violence, kill and maim.

The Kremlin willingly and regularly uses fakes in the information war against its enemies in the West and in the neighboring countries. All means are used to launch the necessary messages: both the official media with huge budgets like RT, and anonymous communities in social networks. At the same time, work in social networks has one big advantage over traditional media. There are practically no restrictions. Unlike the media that are forced to comply with certain limits and rules of decency, on Facebook, Twitter, "VKontakte" with the help of bots you can spread any impudent lies and not worry about its plausibility. Knowing the principle of social network algorithms functioning and having the necessary financial and human resources at disposal, it is possible to convey practically any information to millions of people.

Unlike the media, where each story has specific authors or is voiced by a particular TV presenter who is responsible for its credibility with his or her reputation and authority, fakes from social networks often do not have an author or can be spread from the same fake accounts. After the information is reposted multiple times from one group to another, it is already extremely difficult to find the source. In addition, most people will never be engaged in such a search.

Everyone remembers well the sensational story about the "crucified boy" in Sloviansk. The deceitful plot of the Russian "Channel One" ("Pervyi Kanal") gained wide popularity and became a meme exactly because it was released on the main federal television channel of the Russian Federation. But there was no uniqueness in that story for social networks. During 2014, hundreds of similar stories were published there, most of which are longforgotten. Horrible stories about burned hospitals with wounded militiamen, blown up churches, and executed civilians then roamed from group to group. The plot about the "concentration camp for Russian-speaking residents of Donbas", which Ukraine allegedly built in Zhdanivka, became a real hit. Hundreds of thousands, and possibly millions of people, read these stories and believed them, reposted, and sent each other in instant messengers.

The mechanism of fake information dissemination is somewhat different depending on the specifics of a particular social network, but on the whole it is simple. The main condition is mass reposting. It is facilitated by bots, thousands of fake accounts that spread the needed information in the comments or post it in popular communities. To achieve such a massive participation is not difficult in case you have money. In order for people to catch the informational virus; the "news" must be appropriately adapted to the consciousness of the average person: have a glaring headline, respond to common fears and prejudices. Truthfulness is completely irrelevant. It is important that the information does not reflect reality, but coincides with the expectations of the man in the street. Insane and absurd fakes were easily taken for granted and went to the people just because they exactly corresponded to people's ideas about what was happening. Those who expected that Ukrainian soldiers would kill and rape the residents of Donbas believed any message on this topic. Even if there was no evidence, but anonymous comments on the internet.

This principle has also proved its effectiveness while working with citizens of other states. Fears and prejudices exist everywhere; the main thing is to properly exploit them. For example, in EU countries, Russian trolls often disperse the necessary messages about migrants, sexual



**Real aggression versus phantom threats.** Many participants of the separatist rebellion believed factoids about the NATO invasion and the prohibition of the Russian language which were spread in social networks

minorities and other similar topics to cause heated debates and schisms in society. The materials published in the Western media proved that in the EU and the US, accounts connected with Russia had pursued the same goals as in Ukraine: rousing enmity and hatred, strengthening destructive, anti-systemic sentiments, popularizing marginal political forces. After that, Twitter and Facebook began to delete pages detected in attempts to influence the election. For several years, tens of thousands of such accounts have been deleted. But still it is impossible to call this fight effective.

If the management of American social networks is still trying to fight the invasion of Russian bots, it is quite opposite with that of Russian. Popular among Ukrainian users, networks "Odnoklassniki" and "VKontakte" have become a haven for all those who are blocked on Facebook or Twitter for inciting hostility and aggression. In 2014, anti-Ukrainian communities were actively created and promoted in these social networks, provoking hatred and spreading fake news. The only possible way out for the Ukrainian authorities in this situation was to block the mentioned social networks on the territory of Ukraine, but such measures only reduced the attendance of the mentioned resources, but could not fully restrict access to them.

What to do in this situation is not very clear. Limiting the flow of information in the modern world is becoming increasingly difficult. Only the methods of North Korea can reliably do this; the internet is simply forbidden there. When access to the network is available, it is not difficult to bypass any blockages using special programs. The fight against propaganda accounts on Facebook and Twitter, too, has not yet yielded proper results. Deleted bots are being replaced by new ones. In addition, propagandists are also improving and trying to act in a rather sophisticated way. How to determine where the line between interference in elections and freedom of speech lies? How to prevent a person from expressing his opinion online if it does not formally violate the laws? In Europe, these issues remain acute and controversial.

Whether someone likes it or not, the realities of the 21st century are such that it becomes more and more difficult to impose any censorship and it shows less and less efficiency. Even in authoritarian Russia, where the government has almost unlimited possibilities and does not spare money for its own security, they have failed to block the Telegram messenger. What can we say about free and democratic countries, where the principle of freedom of speech is important for society? Given these realities, only one thing remains. It must be admitted that competition in the information space cannot be avoided and the only way to struggle against the spread of hostile and fake information is to give people an alternative and inform them about the real state of affairs. And most importantly, not to forget to ensure the rule of law in real life. It is important to remember that the decisive role in stirring up bloodshed in the East of Ukraine was not played by the sock puppets in social networks, but by the concrete actions of quite real people which the Ukrainian law enforcers failed to stop in time.

# A hotbed of physicists

The rise and fall of Kharkiv's school of physics under Josef Stalin

**Oleh Feya** 

In May 1934, one of the most renowned physicists in the world, the godfather of quantum mechanics and Nobel laureate Niels Bohr spent three weeks in Kharkiv. He came to the All-Union Theoretical Physics Conference, invited by his student Lev Landau, who was then head of the theoretical physics department at the Ukrainian Physico-Technical Institute. At that time, Kharkiv had turned into one of the world capitals of science and the Kharkiv school of theoretical physics was flourishing.

#### **A HOME FOR PHYSICISTS**

Founded in October 1928, UPTI - now known as the Kharkiv Institute of Physics and Technology - was a strong scientific institution from the very start. Then-director Ivan Obreimov believed that it could only develop in close contact with prominent world physicists. He invited Piotr Kapitsa and Paul Ehrenfest to become scientific advisors to the institute. Kapitsa, who went on to win a Nobel prize, was the young star of experimental physics and work with supercritical magnetic fields in the Cavendish Laboratory at Cambridge under the direction of the great Ernest Rutherford. Emigrating in 1921 from the USSR, Kapitsa maintained professional contacts with soviet physicists, but he rejected Obreimov's proposition to come back and work in Kharkiv. In 1934, the soviet government handled him differently: while on a visit to the USSR, he was prohibited from returning to England. For several years Kapitsa was completely cut off from scientific work and was seriously afraid for his life. Later, Kapitsa was to say that he was "like a violin that someone stole and instead of playing on it, used it to hammer nails into a concrete wall.<sup>2</sup>

Ehrenfest helped to set up UPTI's cryogenics lab, and thanks to his contacts among leading physicists like Albert Einstein and Niels Bohr, he became a major link in attracting foreign scientists to the Institute. Another Nobel prizewinner, Paul Dirac, visited Kharkiv three times and became an honorary member of the Institute's scientific



**Niels Bohr at the UPTI conference in 1934.** First row, left to right: Dmytro Ivanenko (arrested in 1935), Lev Rosenfeld (executed), Nils Bohr, Lev Landau (one year in jail), Yakiv Frenkel, American Robert Williams Wood, Igor Tamm. Back row: Matvei Bronshtein (executed), Yuri Rumer (labor camp), American Milton Plesset, Lev Shubnikov (executed), German Rudolf Peierls, Ivan Woller, Viktor Ambartsumian, Vladimir Fock (arrested in 1937)

council. Russian-American physicist Boris Podolsky, co-author of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) paradox that formed the basis for quantum teleportation, worked at the Institute for an entire year. Together with Vladimir Fock and Dirac, he developed the formalism of quantum electrodynamics. Austrian physicist Victor Weisskopf also worked at UPTI under contract. Later, he would move to the US and take part in the American nuclear project and become the director of CERN, the European Organization for Nuclear Research, which runs the Large Hadron Collider today. The Kharkiv conferences were also visited by future Nobel laureate Igor Tamm and famous soviet-American astrophysicist George Gamow.

By 1932, Kharkiv was undertaking experiments in the decomposition of lithium nucleus by protons just 18 months later than at Cambridge. The experiment caused some excitement among the country's leadership and the increase in funding made it possible for nuclear research to gain a prominent position at UPTI. In time, the Institute took part in the soviet nuclear project.

In 1934, the director of the cryogenics lab, Lev Shubnikov, and Yuriy Ryabinin discovered the gradual penetration of the magnetic field in some superconductors, which led to the discovery of type II superconductivity. The same phenomenon had been observed by German physicists Walter Meissner and Robert Ochsenfeld not long before. When magnets are raised to superconductors, electric currents are induced whose magnetic fields compensate for the magnet's field, so that the superconductor can levitate above the magnet. This phenomenon is the basis for maglev trains to run. Shubnikov's discovery of type II superconductivity was Nobelquality work.

Obreimov's staffing policies had a real breakthrough when they invited Lev Landau to head the department of theoretical physics. Over 1929-1931, Landau had interned in Europe, working with Niels Bohr, whom he considered his mentor. Landau bemoaned the fact that he had been born too late to be there at the foundation of quantum mechanics and to stand in the pantheon alongside Max Planck, Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg, and Erwin Shrödinger. Still, at the young age of 19, he came up with the density matrix, one of the key mathematical instruments in this field. From 1930 on, he developed quantum theory of diamagnetism and back in Kharkiv, he will build the domain theory of ferromagnetism with his student Evgeny Lifshitz. The work of Landau and Lifshitz explains why so many metals are magnetized. The magnetic moments of the atoms of such metals are arranged in parallel, which causes them to become magnetized. On the other hand, why is it that the magnetism of a large block of iron can disappear? Because iron is composed of sections or domains in which the magnetic moments of the atoms go in one direction but the aggregate magnetic moments of the domain are already directed opposite to each other. A middling size of iron will always be magnetized, whereas a very large piece will depend on the presence of an external magnetic field.

In Kharkiv, Landau devised the theory of phasal transitions to a second type. The phasal transitions of the first type are very observable in the melting of ice or the evaporation of water. They are tied to sudden changes in the specific volume and the amount of stored energy. The transitions to the second type are more subtle: they take place without absorbing or releasing heat, but the heat capacity of the material changes. the thermal coefficient changes, and so on. Landau linked this to the change of system symmetry, and after Kapitsa discovered the phenomenon of superconductivity in liquid helium, Landau was able to explain it based on his theory. In 1962. Landau received the Nobel prize for physics based on this work.

Such significant discoveries were made possible because of the intelligent way that the theoretical department worked. Landau set up his own scientific school and thought up the theoretical minimum: a cycle of exams in math and all branches of physics then known. Together with Lifshitz and Leonid Pyatigorsky, they began to write a 10-volume course of theoretical physics that remains a guide to physics in many universities to this day.

Landau believed that productive scientific work was possible only when the scientist had deep, comprehensive knowledge. He sought out talented students and worked with them. The first theoretical minimum was passed by a native of Ekaterynoslav, today the city of Dnipro, Oleksandr Kompaniets, who went on to become a major specialist in the physics of explosives and shock waves.

Because of his independent nature, his tendency to be forthright even if it bordered on rudeness, Landau had plenty of those who did not wish him well. After a clash with the rector of Kharkiv Sate University, where he headed the department of experimental physics starting in 1935, Landau was fired in 1937. In solidarity with him, quite a few colleagues organized a strike and left KSU as well.

At this time, Stalin's Great Purge was well underway and it became more dangerous for him to work. Already in 1936, the NKVD had begun to build a case against "a group of counterrevolutionary physicists at UPTI led by Professor Landau." The police interrogated Lev Rosenkevich, who was then the head of the radioactive measurement lab at the Institute. During this interrogation,

Rosenkevich supposedly confessed that back in 1930 Landau's "counterrevolutionary group " had already been active at UPTI, and included Shubnikov and the head of the x-ray laboratory, Vadim

Gorsky. The NKVD acted swiftly and in November 1937, Shubnikov Gorsky, Rosenkevich and nuclear physicist Valentin Fomin were shot.

Landau moved to Moscow to the Institute for Physical Problems and began to work at the superconductivity of liquid helium that had been discovered by Kapitsa. But the work that led to both getting the Nobel prize was stopped when Landau was arrested. On April 28, 1938, he was imprisoned in the dungeons of the NKVD, along with several colleagues.

During his training in Europe, the young scientist had boldly worn a red shirt and argued with everybody about communism. By the time he arrived in Kharkiv in 1932, he was a fanatic of the communist idea. But his views quickly changed in the face of the soviet realities. Possibly the Holodomor had its impact as well. Landau could not have seen the famished people on the streets of his city and not understood what was going on. Moreover, he went around the schools in the Kharkiv countryside with his colleague Moisei Korets to check the scientific knowledge of the pupils and was able to converse with people in smaller towns. He became an ideological opponent of the soviet government and in 1938 he and Korets wrote a letter calling

for the overthrow of the Stalin regime, comparing Stalin to Hitler and Mussolini. "Stalinist fascism survives only because we are disorganized," the letter said. "The proletariat of our country managed to overthrow the tsars and the capitalists. We can also overthrow the fascist dictator and his clique."

Landau ended up spending a year in prison. Bohr, Einstein and Kapitsa step forward to defend him. Kapitsa was ordered to keep an eye on Landau and the renowned theoreticist was finally released. His friends did not do so well: Korets and another colleague at the Institute, Yuri "Georg" Rumer, ended up serving their entire sentences.

Even foreign citizens working in Kharkiv were caught up in the purges. Dutch-German Friedrich "Fritz" Houtermans was engaged in pioneering work back in the 1920s in quantum tunneling and calculations of thermonuclear reactions inside stars. A member of the Communist Party in Germany, he emigrated

In the UPTI Affair, **16** physicists became victims, **5** of them shot by execution squads

to Great Britain after Hitler came to power, and then accepted an invitation to work at UPTI. In 1937 he was arrested for "spying on behalf of Germany." During the interrogation with his communications staff, he gave the names Messer, Gneisenau and Scharnhorst — who were at that point dead German generals in whose honor naval vessels had been named.

Ivan Obreimov himself, who had turned UPTI into a world-class institute by inviting top scientists and holding prestigious conferences, was also arrested for this in 1938. Conversing with foreigners and traveling abroad automatically meant he was a German spy. He was released from labor camp three years later " for lack of evidence of a crime."

In the UPTI Affair, 16 physicists became victims, 5 of them shot by execution squads. The remainder were given various sentences in prisons or camps. Two of them, Houtermans and Weissberg, were turned over to the Gestapo. The Kharkiv scientific school was effectively devastated. Seven of the Institute's eight department heads were prosecuted. If world famous physicists had not interceded, writing constantly to Comrade Stalin, the list of victims might have been much longer.

# Jazz Kolo in Ukraine's cultural space

What unites different generations of Ukrainian jazz musicians

#### **Ihor Zakus**

Jazz emerged as a product of a synthesis of African and European cultures on the verge of the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> centuries. Its typical features are improvisation and swing, the polyrhythmic pattern based on syncopated rhythms and a unique set of techniques used to play the rhythmic texture.

Musicians and composers across the world began to quickly master and develop the ideas of jazz rhythms and harmonies. This music art became trendy and elitist. Jazz has evolved remarkably, developing into different forms and a combination of several genres. It created different styles, including swing, big band, mainstream, stride, Cansas City, West Coast jazz, cool, hard bop, modal jazz, progres-

BECAUSE JAZZ HAS ITS ROOTS IN BLUES, THE FOLK MUSIC OF THE SLAVES BROUGHT TO AMERICA FROM AFRICA, IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT MUSICIANS AND COMPOSERS IN OTHER COUNTRIES STARTED PLAYING JAZZ AT HOME, APPLYING THEIR AUTHENTIC FEATURES, MENTALITY, TEMPERAMENT AND MELODIES TO IT

sive jazz, soul jazz, groove, free jazz, creative, fusion, post-bop, acid jazz, smooth jazz and jazz-manouche, also known as gypsy jazz.

Because jazz has its roots in blues, the folk music of the slaves brought to America from Africa, it is only natural that musicians and composers in other countries started playing jazz at home, applying their authentic features, mentality, temperament and melodies to it. As a result, jazz is international art today that brings together all cultures in the world and has enriched itself greatly through this.

Ukraine always had many talents. It's a place where creativity, art and music are always alive. One can hardly imagine a Ukrainian without all these. Folk music stands on a special level in Ukraine. It's diverse, deep and authentic. Ukrainians quickly and easily accept new global trends in culture. Jazz is no exception. It came to Ukraine in the 1950s largely thanks to musicians Volodymyr Symonenko, Volodymyr Molotkov, Yuriy Kuznetsov, Yevhen Derhunov and Yukhym Markov. When there was no such thing as the Internet and Ukrainians lived behind the curtain, Symonenko compiled and published the first soviet Real Book with jazz standards. Molotkov and Volodymyr Manilov wrote and published jazz guitar learning books. This inspired other performers and helped them to develop. Jazz thus settles in Ukraine too.

That was the first generation of Ukrainian jazz musicians who played jazz in gigs, clubs and restaurants, made records, published books, textbooks and collections of pieces. ATURES, Molotkov, Serhiy Shvirst, Yevhen Derhunov, Viacheslav Poliansky,

Artem Aleksanian, Yuriy Kuznetsov, Enver Izmailov, Yukhym Markov, Yuriy Yaremchuk, Volodymyr Solianyk, Oleksandr Saratsky and more. These musicians worked actively in the 1980s, leaving a lot of good music behind. Leonid Goldstein compiled a large collection of jazz tunes performed by Ukrainian jazzmen in 35 Minutes of Jazz, a popular radio show. Ukrainian radio played jazz too. Oleksiy Kohan promotes it there.

As Ukraine gained independence, young jazzmen started coming to Kyiv over the 1990s and 2000s. As the capital, Kyiv turned into a place with much better career opportunities for musicians. This shaped the second generation of Ukrainian jazz musicians, including Yuriy Shepeta, Maksym Hladetsky (Vinnytsia), Ihor Zakus (Chervonohrad), Serhiy Ovsiannykov (Kramatorsk), Serhiy Tabunshchyk (Mykolayiv), Volodymyr Volkov (Kherson), Rodion Ivanov, Mykhailo Bankovsky, Oleksandr Harkavyi, Vitaliy Savenko, Lana Merkulova (Donetsk), Vitaliy Ivanov, Natalia Lebedeva, Artem Mendelenko, Alik Fantayev, Oleksandr Murenko (Kyiv), Volodymyr Shabaltas, Dmytro Aleksandrov, Oleksandr Lebedenko, Denys Dudko, Oleksiy Saranchin (Kharkiv). This is an incomplete list.

2010 saw further concentration of jazz musicians in Kyiv. Some came to look for work and some came to study. They shaped the third generation: Illya Yeresko, Dennis Adu, Pavlo Lytvynenko, Kostiantyn Ionenko, Ihor Hnydyn, Pavlo Halytskyi, Oleksandr Yemets, Bohdan Humeniuk, Dmytro Kovalenko, Danylo Zverkhanovsky, Illya Alabuzhev, Oleksiy Boholiubov, Stanislav Chumakov, Olha Lukachova, Tamara Lukasheva, Yukhym Chupakhin, Dmytro Bondarev, Serhiy Balalayev, Oleksandr Poliakov and many more.

The fourth generation is emerging today with the 20-year olds. Some study in Ukraine and others study abroad. Their accomplishments are yet to come. Four generations are thus creating and developing Ukrainian improvised music. It's very diverse given all the conditions and specific reasons. Jazz festivals are a major location where Ukrainian jazz lives. They are not few but fewer than in the EU or the US. Kviv has Jazz in Kyiv, DoDzh, Yednist (Unity) and Jazz Kolo; Lviv has Jazz Bez; DoDzh comes from Donetsk; Kharkiv has Za Jazz Fest; Lutsk has Rivne, Odesa has Jazz Carnival, Dnipro and Vinnytsia have their own festivals. They all share two typical features:

1. Festival budgets are generally very small, so the performers are usually friends who can come and play for free, or bands that are not



Jazz Kolo's mission. The festival shapes the face of Ukrainian jazz

professional enough and will cover their own traveling costs just to get an appearance on the festival stage. This cannot be blamed on the organizers who mostly hold the festivals based on their enthusiasm and the love for jazz.

2. The biggest Ukrainian festivals, such as Jazz in Kyiv and DoDzh, have big sponsors and bring top-tier musicians. They deserve huge appreciation for that. Thanks to them, Ukrainians have a chance to listen to Al Jarreau, Marcus Miller, Tania Maria, Joe Zawinul, Chick Corea and many others live. But the organizers are forced to always put an accent on international celebrities, in order to accumulate enough funding to pay serious sums to the artists in advertising campaigns. Ukrainian musicians, who have also created good quality music, find themselves irrelevant.

It is because of this, or thanks to these negative and positive trends that composer Ihor Zakus and Yulia Oliynyk from the Tempora publishing house joined efforts in 2007 to create the Jazz Kolo project. Roman Nedzelskyi, musician and Director of Ukrayina Palace in Kyiv, joined the project shortly after. Each of these people have been creating and developing this Ukrainian jazz project for 10 years now.

Jazz Kolo emerged as a series of jazz concerts to support improvisation music in Ukraine. It has featured the best Ukrainian musicians and has so far held 70 concerts, released a collection of 15 DVDs and 16 CDs of original jazz music, compiled an anthology of Ukrainian instrumental music with 5 CD collections, created over 140 TV programs about Ukrainian jazz, and brought together a large audience of intellectual music supporters and fans. That turned Jazz Kolo into a reputable brand. The project keeps growing and progressing.

Over 2008-2010, it held nearly 20 live concerts and released 15 CDs with live concerts of original Ukrainian music. It released the first concert DVDs in Ukraine and compiled an extensive collection of Ukrainian improvisation music. These records feature in 140 shows in several nationwide TV channels as a way to introduce and promote original Ukrainian music in society.

Apart from that, Jazz Kolo has released five CDs of studio-recorded music by Ukrainian instrumentalists. Each represents an individual instrument, including piano, guitar, saxophone, bass guitar and drums. This collection helps to analyse trends in Ukrainian music performance between the 1980s and today. The Jazz Kolo series is an audio anthology of Ukrainian instrumentalists between 1980 and 2010. In a series of TV shows, Ukrainian musicians play different styles of jazz and talk about their details, features and secrets. Some jazz performers have hosted their own shows. All this shows the evolution of the face of Ukrainian jazz.

Ukrainian jazz musicians have become more mature, offering interesting pieces and ideas. It is very important for them to be represented in the European jazz space and to speak as equals with Europeans and Americans in the language of music and jazz. This is that concept of this years' Jazz Kolo. The project invites European jazz musicians to work jointly on music programs with Ukrainians, to speak and share ideas and impressions, and to play music together in Ukraine and beyond.

Apart from festivals, jazz lives in clubs and concert halls in Ukraine. These are becoming more active and Jazz Kolo is a frequent guest. Some of the project's key benefits include high technical quality, deep authentic ideas, putting the top-notch Ukrainian music products on audio and video, and support of its further evolution.

# History and stunts

The role of historical films in modern Ukrainian cinematography

#### Kateryna Horodnycha



The taste of a bitter epoch. Banned by Roman Brovko is a biopic about the life of Ukrainian dissident and poet Vasyl Stus. It will be out this year

Students gathered in a large auditorium at the History Department of the Kharkiv National University for a fourhour screening of four episodes of *Ogniem i mieczem* (With Fire and Sword), the Polish historical drama about the Cossack period, in the early 2000s. It was followed by a discussion where professors revealed distortions of historical facts by cinematographers. The discussion, however, barely stayed in memory. What it triggered was the unstoppable desire to rush back home and dig into a history book to find out what happened to Colonel Bohun, the protagonist. This is how heroes and interest in historical events are shaped, even if triggered by someone else – the Poles in this case.

I will not refer here to documentaries which are often more informative than academic research. Instead, we will reflect on the non-documentaries. This cinematography is entitled to imagination and artistic interpretation on the one hand, and is much better placed to influence the audience. It is for a reason that promotion through personal stories has been used as a key tool in advertising for a long time now. Likewise, films about the turns and twists of private life of prominent figures from any given epoch can bring them closer to the modern audience and spark interest in the developments of that epoch.

Ask those who read Dumas, Druon or Walter Scott as kids whether they know the chronology of French or English kings. You are likely to get a yes for an answer – the novels about love immersed us all into the given historical epoch. Films can do this even more effectively because they visualize things.

Director Oles Sanin recalls how his audience at an American university initiated a discussion about the ways in which historical films bring events and characters back to relevance. "Indeed, people perceive historical films as accurate history," he says. "Moreover, it's not just the audience, but professionals who treat films by their colleagues as reference points, rather than museums. 'We are going to shoot a film but here is another one about the same epoch, let's watch it and do something else', they say. This means that they view films as reconstruction of history. Yet, we know that the Americans, for example, made films about the ancient Rome in the mid-20<sup>th</sup> century, where they seriously changed details of costumes adjusting them to contemporary fashion."

So, what do we have in Ukrainian historical cinematography of the past 20 years and what should we expect to see in the near future?

#### THE COSSACK CYCLE AND THE LIBERATION STRUGGLE

Oles Sanin has directed two historic films and is now working on his third project. His film *Mamay* was made in 2003 on the basis of old Ukrainian and Crimean Tatar folklore and is not a conventional historical film. It is in the genre of ballad or epic film, which requires an entirely different approach.

Sanin categorizes historical cinematography into two major subtypes. One is biopics, i.e. the history that tells events and biographies of real people in an artistic manner. The other one is historical dramas. Apart from that, there are films that work with historic background. These are all different films with a similar structure. Mamay is one example of the second subtype. "I used reconstructed costumes, studied that epoch deeply and researched the legends," Sanin explains. "Tatar warriors portraved in my film existed in three different centuries. They turned out to be very authentic. The different people who worked on the images did their academic research in Crimea."

In 2001, Yuriy Illenko's *A Prayer* for *Hetman Mazepa* came out. This was the first historical film in the years of Ukraine's independence with a serious budget and costumes. Its purpose was to change the image of Mazepa as traitor, which Russian and soviet propaganda had spun for centuries. Pylyp Illenko, Yuriy's son and currently head of the State Film Agency of Ukraine, recalls his father "consulting with historians, studying sources, reading literature on the topic, both history and fic-



**War in the sea**. *Cherkasy* by Tymur Yashchenko is a film about Ukraine's recent history: the occupation of Crimea through the eyes of Ukrainian navy sailors

tion, and studying the image of Mazepa in European culture. He found many blank spots. Nobody really knows why one or another event actually happened.

To begin with, even the date of Ivan Mazepa's birth is unknown. Let alone semi-legendary things, like the story of his love for the daughter of Kochubei. But the director cannot leave an incomplete image of the protagonist on the screen. Therefore, he looks for ways to reveal the protagonist and saturates history with accurate facts and fiction where it fits. The result is mythology rather than a dry history textbook. By contrast to a textbook, you can't say 'We don't know why the character acted the way he did' in the film."

Ukrainian directors chose the Cossack theme most frequently in the first two decades of independence. It was also the most obvious one in the search of a national hero as the State was establishing itself. *Bohdan-Zynoviy Khmelnytsky* directed by Mykola Mashchenko contributed to the Cossack cycle in 2006, gaining 61,000 views on YouTube over three years of free access. Proper mass screening in movie theaters was an impossible option in that period.

Still, it was probably *With Fire* and *Sword* and Russian actor Aleksandr Domogarov who played Cossack colonel Ivan Bohun in that film that contributed the most to popularizing Ukrainian cossacks in the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. It was because the film was far more modern, its characters and their feelings much more relatable, and Domogarov much more handsome. It portrayed history from the Polish perspective where the Cossacks were not featured as the nicest people. But Domogarov's charisma still triggered more sympathy and admiration for his character than for the key positive protagonist. This is probably part of the secret of historical films.

The Cossacks were not the only theme which pre-Maidan directors chose to impress. That was also the period when the State Film Agency was not very helpful for cinematographers as it funded very few films. Oles Yanchuk's *Metropolitan Andrey* (2007) was the only one that year funded by the state. It got UAH 8mn or US \$1mn from the budget that year.

#### THE POST-MAIDAN CINEMATOGRAPHY

The Secret Diaries of Symon Petliura was another historical film by Yanchuk in the new post-Maidan environment that triggered rapid evolution of cinematography. A long-time head of the National Oleksandr Dovzhenko Film Studio, Yanchuk believes that MPs must reserve an untouchable amount for the studio in the sum allocated by the government to film making. That would allow the studio to produce more such films. The Secret Diaries of Symon Petliura is a historical assumption and interpretation of history by the author. Shot in the old-school theater play manner, it did not attract too many people to the cinemas. Historians criticized the author's interpretation of facts. But Yanchuk's film echoes the past where all historical films were shot at the Dovzhenko Studio, sticking to a somewhat soviet style - most certainly in visual solutions.

Every artist working on historical films has to seek a balance between responsibility for artistic quality of their work, which often depends on the ability to interpret events in a cautious **n** 



A precedent film. *Gareth Jones* by Agnieszka Holland is a real story of a British journalist who investigated the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine

manner, and the other responsibility before the audience that will see history through the artist's eyes.

Kruty 1918, a 2019 film by Oleksiy Shapoval, provides a recent example. The authors released the trailer last year. It featured an episode where the character of Symon Petliura sent young students to imminent death at the Kruty station in cold blood. Historian Kyrylo Halushko recalls that himself and his colleagues insisted at a roundtable at the Ministry of Culture that this fragment should not be in the movie. "We saved the authors from potential lawsuits from Petliura's descendants as this definitely tainted his figure and role in the tragic death of the Kruty heroes," Halushko wrote on his Facebook page after the film premiered in 2019. Many were still unhappy with the quality of the film – mostly because the story was inconsistent, especially as the important role of such purely historical films is to explain the order of events in a manner that is easy to understand.

In 2017, the film Red (Chervonyi) directed by Zaza Buadze based on the novel by Andriy Kokotiukha, was released. It focuses on the first rebellion in GULAG as a form of resistance of Ukrainians against the totalitarian soviet system. Lviv-based director Taras Khymych has released two history films - Alive (Zhyva) in 2016 and King Danylo (Korol Danylo) in 2018. He stands out from amongst his colleagues for never making films with state funding. He looked for funds independently for both films and found the money. Moreover, that funding was enough to pay for good-quality visuals with beautiful images, costumes and post-production. Clearly, historical films are always more expensive because costumes and props have to be made, and anything modern featured accidentally has to be removed in the post-production phase. Unfortunately, Khymych has not succeeded in constructing stories that attract the viewers. This was because of uneven quality of acting in some cases, confusing editing of the storyline in others, or because of bad sound. The ambition of success has failed.

#### **SUCCESS STORIES**

Still, Ukraine has some fairly successful history films. The first Ukrainianmade history film that earned over UAH 14mn in box office earnings was Oles Sanin's *The Guide* (Povodyr) in 2013. It's a story of a blind *kobzar* helping to rescue a son of a foreigner from the grip of the soviet authorities. He ends up being killed in a trap the soviets arranged for Ukrainian kobzars near Kharkiv.

That relative financial success (the record-breaking revenues still failed to cover the budget of the film making) was followed by *Cyborgs: Heroes Never Die*, a contemporary historical film released in 2017-2018 that earned over UAH 20mn in revenues.

Its director Akhtem Seitablayev has made three films about stories where eyewitnesses are still alive and can compare films and reality. These include *Khaytarma* (2013) and *Her Heart* (2017), in addition *to Cyborgs*. They feature the deportations of Crimean Tatars from Crimea by the soviets, the rescue of Jewish children from the Nazis in Crimea, and the defense of the Donetsk Airport by the Ukrainian military.

"It was extremely important for me to stick to the documentary side in each case," Seitablayev recalls. "There were several reasons for this. First of all, I realized that these films would be under much scrutiny, under the microscope for how close they are to facts and memories of evewitnesses. In *Khaytarma*, we understood that we would be between Crimean Tatars that experienced deportations and people of opposite views. This is what happened in the end. Every shot in the film was analyzed. Those who did this are now happy collaborators in Crimea. With *Cyborgs*, we were super cautious given how relevant the topic is. We got incredible help from those involved in that event. All the moments in the film took place in reality. We may have altered the chronology to streamline the story, but the accuracy of facts is undeniable.'

This proves that the closer history is to the present, the more the filmmaker is responsible for accuracy and less freedom of imagination they have.

#### WHAT'S NEW ON THE SCREENS?

Which history films are coming up in 2019 and in the upcoming years? One is Banned (Zaboronenyi), a biopic by Roman Broyko about the life of Ukrainian dissident poet Vasyl Stus. An interesting precedent made this film unique long before its official release. The authors stated from the beginning that they did not aim to relate the biography, but to describe the burning taste of Stus' epoch. The figure of Stus proved much more iconic, however, and the audience intervened in the filmmaking. It had been known from the beginning of the filmmaking process that it would not feature a real-life episode of the trial against Stus with Viktor Medvedchuk, the notorious pro-Russian politician, as the poet's pseudo lawyer. The authors decided to drop it in order to tell more about Stus himself. Six months later, that information reached social media and voices trying to influence the filmmakers were joined by top officials. The director did not resist; he simply shot the extra fragment. As a result, this film could perfectly count as something commissioned by the public.

Zakhar Berkut by Akhtem Zeitablayev is an international project shot in English with American and Ukrainian actors. Based on Ivan Franko's book, it represents a case where the authors work with the historical context while not reflecting historic events as such. "We all realize that Zakhar Berkut is not a chronicle," Seitablayev notes. "This book has little to do with real events. Yes, there was a Mongolian invasion but

it did not pass through that land (the Carpathians where the action is based – Ed.). No proof was ever found for this. It is reasonable to expect that an army of ten thousand passing somewhere will inevitably leave traces. Even if it's a fragment of an arrow. There is nothing like that there. Yet, nobody claims that it happened there, including our consultant, the grandson of Ivan Franko. It's just an excuse to talk about a broad geography of issues." Producer Yehor Olesov supports Seitablayev and does not claim historic accuracy: "For me personally, the drama and the emotional aspect of the story are the priorities, followed by historic accuracy. That was the scheme used in the legendary Braveheart, Gladiator and many other hit films. The most difficult thing in this genre is to find the right balance. We tend to focus on major events, dates and details as a carcass. Then the authors reinforce some storylines. But we should remember that the story we have inherited is not necessarily true. Moreover, different sources offer opposite evidence and thoughts on any given event."

*Gareth Jones* directed by Agnieszka Holland is another international project by a major Ukrainian film company. It is based on the real story of a British journalist who did his own investigation during the 1932-1933 Holodomor in Ukraine. This film offers another precedent. The name of the journalist appeared in the public discourse thanks to the script writers. This allowed the film authors to ask for a street in Kyiv to be named after Jones.

Cherkasy by Tymur Yashchenko is a film about the most recent history. This is another case where the authors will be under much scrutiny. Not only because of the theme (the film will focus on the 2014 developments when Russia's green men raided Ukrainian fleet in Crimea), but because the authors have had financial problems for three years now. As a result, the film has not reached the audience yet. The producers announced a crowdfunding campaign this winter to finally finish the film. President Poroshenko's PR team included it in his list of favorites, which means that the film is much awaited, even if nobody has seen it yet.

For now, these are all those willing to meet the audience in 2019. Still, this is not the end of historical filmmaking. Some projects are ongoing now.

One is Oleksa Dovbush by Oles Sanin. There was a movie about the legendary Carpathian insurgency leader on big screens. But only someone with a good sense of humor could watch it. Singers Valeriv Kharchvshvn and Maria Yaremchuk played the protagonists in a simple story without much confidence. This time, the theme is taken up by a director with a record of making audience-oriented films that can earn money in box offices. Sanin says that The Legend of the Carpathians that came out several years before does not bother him. "Our audience rather overlaps with the audience of Zakhar Ber*kut*, but we were aware of this. That's why we timed the premieres for different periods."

The Third Son of the Stonemason directed by Ihor Vysnevsky is a biopic about Petro Franko, the son

of Ukraine's great poet. Petro co-founded Plast, the Ukrainian scout movement, and was the very man who read the act of unifying Western Ukraine with the Ukrainian SSR. "Petro

took part in the so-called unification assembly," producer Dmytro Kravchenko says. "We never saw allegations of Petro selling out to the soviets. Quite on the contrary, everyone tends to think that he was forced to do this. We involved Franko experts, including his grandson Petro, and are still consulting with the family. The family accepts the fact that it will be a non-documentary film, they are ready to face the share of imagination added to the real facts. But we want to show a hero the country didn't know about first and foremost."

Anna of Kyiv is a project suspended for now, but planned to continue. It was thanks to the journalists that Ukrainian society and the State Film Agency as the funder have paid attention to the book of the French writer Jacqueline Dauxois, which will be used as the basis of the script. The book is openly pro-Russian. Still, the authors say that the script has been rewritten and improved for two years now. "This will surely be a historical film," pro-ducer Yehor Olesov says. "That's why we invited Ms. Tetiana Liuta, scientific director of the Kyiv History Museum, to join the project. It is a massive and complex project, so it requires a lot of responsibility. That's why we move slowly and cautiously. I can say for now that this is a story about a strong and outstanding woman in the epoch of outstanding men. It's a story of a young courageous girl, the daughter of a prince of Kyiv Rus, then one of the

most powerful states in Europe, goes to a far-away and unknown country of the Francs. Her marriage with Henry I brought thriving to the country. They defeat enemies with weapons and diplomacy, expand their land and accomplish peace and calm for that land."

Producer Dmytro Kravchenko is developing another feature film about the period of Kyiv Rus. This one is a generation before Anna of Kyiv. "We are now preparing for the film under the preliminary title *Ingegerd*. This is a story of a Swedish princess who was passionately in love with a Norwegian king but was forced to marry Kyiv prince Yaroslav. It is a story of a girl focused on feelings gradually evolved into a stateswoman. According to leg-

#### THE LAST NUANCE IN HISTORICAL CINEMATOGRAPHY IS THAT THE BEST HISTORICAL FILMS TODAY ARE SERIES. *THE VIKINGS, THE TUDORS, THE CROWN* OR *MEDICI*

ARE ALL VERY EXPENSIVE TO PRODUCE

ends and stories from different sources, a great share of Yaroslav the Wise's wisdom known through centuries owes to his wife, the Swedish princess *Ingegerd.*"

There are more historical projects in the making. But we can get excited once they are released. Good quality is not guaranteed yet.

The last nuance in historical cinematography is that the best historical films today are series. The Vikings, The Tudors, The Crown or Medici are all very expensive to produce. Ukrainian TV channels are not yet risking to produce something of that scale. 1+1 media is working on an ambitious international project. "We have long been planning several projects on Ukraine's old history, mostly on the medieval period and the Kyiv Rus," Director General Oleksandr Tkachenko shares. "This period was the one when international cooperation developed. The history of what are now separate European states was then common for all, including Kyiv Rus, Byzantium and Northern Europe. That's why 1+1 media, jointly with our Norwegian colleagues, have come up with the idea of a project called Kingdoms. It is based on real developments that took place in the territory of modern Europe between the 11th and the 20th centuries. We believe that this work will be appreciated both by the Ukrainian audience, and by the international community as it deals with the history of many European states."

#### May 13 – 17, 18:30—May 19, 19:00

#### May 15, 15.0

#### The International Tchaikovsky and von Meck Festival

#### Vinnytsia Oblast Philharmonic Hall (Khmelnytskiy shosse 7, Vinnytsia)

May evenings in Vinnytsia will be filled with the sound from the world of classical music as the Tchaikovsky festival comes to town. Every concert will aim, not only to reveal new aspects of the composer's creativity, but also to tell audiences, in one fashion or another, about his life. For instance, one evening under the title "Nadezhda and Tchaikovsky's Queen of Spades" will present a collection of portraits by Nadia Willems, a Dutch photographer whose great-great-great-great-grandmother, Nadezhda von Meck, was Tchaikovsky's patron and friend. The accompanying music will be complemented by excerpts from the composer's letters and journals.



#### May 25, 19:00-

#### Antitila Lviv Arena (vul. Striyska 199, Lviv)

Lviv, Poltava, Odesa, Kharkiv and Kyiv—these are the lucky cities that will be included in the grand tour of Antitila [Antibodies] this year. The Ukrainian band has been preparing for more than a year for this musical journey in honor of the debut of their new album, Hello. Since Antitila will also celebrate its 10th birthday, fans can expect an extra amazing program, lighting and sound. And of course, in addition to new songs, the evening will present some the band's best hits, including *TDMYe* and *Lovy Moment*.



#### Desiigner

#### Stereo Plaza (prospekt Valeria Lobanovskoho 119, Kyiv)

Desiigner is one of those musicians who can capture the hearts of music lovers the world over with just one single. The American rapper became famous with his first hit, Panda, which blew into town in 2015 and became #1 on charts all over the world. Desiigner's debut album may still be in the works, but the musician is eagerly awaited in concert halls everywhere. Kyiv's Stereo Plaza is no exception: the performance of this young talent promises to be the most impressive concert this May. All fans of modern rap and hip-hop are invited here on May 19!



#### -May 31 – June 9—

#### Children Film Fest 2019 Cinemas across Ukraine Kyiv, Lviv, Odesa, Mariupol, Vinnytsia, Lutsk, Mykolayiv, and more

The annual Children's Film Fest has become a nice tradition, coming for the fifth time to various corners of Ukraine. Over the course of 10 days, both new products from the movie industry and the best of world classics will be broadcast. Viewers will have a unique opportunity to vote for the 2019 best film and we guarantee there will be really something to choose from! The program includes a number of surprises, both family and animation films such as *The Stolen Princess, Zoo, Room 2013, Casper and Emma at the Theater*, and more.



### -May 20 – 24–

#### Springtime in Kyiv 2019 National Philharmonic Hall of Ukraine

#### (Volodymyrskiy uzviz 2, Kyiv)

Topping last year's concert program, this year's festival promises to please those who love classical music with something quite special. Five unforgettable concerts will bring together symphonic and chamber music with jazz, the classical and the contemporary, the heroic, the epic and the lyrical, presenting on a single stage both young musicians and mature artists. Be prepared to listen to music of the legendary Beethoven, Maurice Ravel, Jan Sibelius, and Antonin Dvorak, performed by one of the great violinists today, Gary Hoffman.



#### -June 7, 19:00—

# QUEEN SHOW starring MARC MARTEL

# Palats Ukraina National Palace of the Arts

(vul. Velyka Vasylkivska 103, Kyiv) The music of legendary Queen continues to live, not only in the hearts and memories of its fans, but also on the stage. No one will ever replace the charismatic Freddie Mercury, but Marc Martel is one of those performers who know how to convey the mood and personality of Queen's hits unusually well. It's not for nothing that he's called the vocal twin of the group's famed singer. Martel will perform such eternal hits as The Show must go on, We Will Rock You and Bohemian Rhapsody. In fact, Bohemian Rhapsody has been declared the most popular composition of the 20<sup>th</sup> century!







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