# The Ukrainian Week

International edition

‡3 (133) March 2019

2019 Ukrainian presidential election: faces, parties and maps

5 years after the Revolution of Dignity Interview with Telnyuk Sisters about modernity of classics and the lessons of the Maidan

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In contrast to Ukraine's voters, who have been tossed more than 40 candidates from among which they should choose, the task for politicians is much more straightforward. They understand perfectly well that the final choice will only be among three names that can realistically make it to the second round. And they are the three on whom bets are now being made. Of course, not always visibly or publicly, but then openness is really not required – all the more so when it comes to players in the top league who typically place their eggs in various baskets.

Yet it's becoming harder and harder for them to do this. Access to Yulia Tymoshenko is relatively easy because she herself stated in so many words that she's "ready to talk with everyone." The president is also open to communication because he's interested, like no other, in the best allies possible or, failing that, at least a non-aggression pact. But getting a feel for Person-Ze, who is only present in virtual reality and could prove to be a real comic surprise for everyone, is possible only through the intermediation of his patron, Ihor Kolomoyskiy.

RIGHT NOW, PARLIAMENTARIANS ARE SITTING TIGHT AND THE DEFECTIONS AMONG PARTIES THAT WERE ONCE SUCH A PREDICTABLE FEATURE ARE NOWHERE TO BE SEEN. EVERYONE HAS ALREADY DECLARED FOR ONE CANDIDATE OR ANOTHER, AND THOSE WHO SAY "NONE OF THE ABOVE" ARE ALREADY BUSY PUTTING TOGETHER THEIR OWN PROJECTS

Right now, parliamentarians are sitting tight and the defections among parties that were once such a predictable feature are nowhere to be seen. Everyone has already declared for one candidate or another. And those who say "None of the above" are already busy putting together their own projects. With the exception of UDAR splinter groups, BPP is confident that its boss, Petro Poroshenko, will be inaugurated. There are no other options. UDAR seems to be sitting on its hands and not getting involved because it doesn't believe, or even really want, to see the incumbent extend his career for another five years. Apparently this is the reason why, The Ukrainian Week's sources say, UDAR's boss, Kyiv Mayor Vitaliy Klitschko did not participate in the forum where Poroshenko declared his candidacy. He sent a video greeting, but did not come in person, supposedly on the advice of political spin doctors. What was behind this is not hard to guess, given that Klitschko and his allies have been linked to exiled chemicals tycoon Dmytro Firtash, who is being sued for money-laundering by the US, and former Yanukovych Chief-of-Staff Serhiy Lyovochkin, who has been connected to the Mueller investigation. If Poroshenko is re-elected, UDAR could well remain in the Poroshenko Bloc and continue to play its role as the white crow. If not, UDAR will go into the VR election as a separate team and so it's obviously better to wait and see before making a move.

Volya Narodu, meaning the Will of the People, is on Poroshenko's side for now, and has moved significantly to the right, judging by its rhetoric. For their level of patriotic messages, these MPs will soon be competing with Svoboda, but that should not fool anyone. The incumbent also enjoys the support of a small splinter group in Vidrodzhennia, or Renaissance, which gravitates towards scandalous Kharkiv Mayor Ghennadiy Kernes. Whether or not this situational support is really there is not clear, knowing the political character of the mayor. However, judging by certain points in his life, he could well owe Poroshenko one or two, just like the odious Odesa Mayor, Ghennadiy Trukhanov.

After everything it has gone through in the coalition with BPP, Narodniv Front is also now in waiting mode, having set as their goal to do the best they can in the VR elections this fall. What form this will take will depend on who wins the current election. However, despite fairly polarized views among the party allies - Oleksandr Turchynov, Andriy Parubiy, Serhiy Pashynskiy and their team gravitate towards the president, while Arsen Avakov and his supporters are more inclined towards Tymoshenko - the party does seem, if only pro forma, to be a unified entity and the conflicts that once raged between the two candidates don't seem to bother NF at all. Indeed, whoever becomes president, Tymoshenko or Poroshenko, it will not have a fatal impact on Arseniy Yatseniuk's project. He might lose a little ballast, but that's all. Things will be worse if Zelenskiy wins. Then the entire playing field will change radically and the party will have to reorganize in order to survive.

In terms of party discipline, Samopomich, whose leader withdrew in favor of a fellow candidate, will now support Anatoliy Hrytsenko. Knowing his chances of winning are very slim at best, it's unlikely that Andriy Sadoviy will throw himself into the thankless job of campaigning for Hrytsenko. Instead, he will also focus on the Rada elections this fall. So far, it's not clear whether Samopomich will actually form a coalition with Hrytsenko's Civic Platform, as they have not announced any formal agreement yet. Even if they do, it will likely be only after the election of the president – if that.

Batkivshchyna stands behind its "roly-poly doll" leader. Tymoshenko herself doesn't have many allies, but she has a solid base of support. And until the results of the first round are clear, it's unlikely that any "new friends" will appear. Whoever she could persuade and draw to her side, she has already persuaded and drawn to her side. Everybody else is watching the ratings and is in no hurry to embrace her and being left holding the bag. Among Tymoshenko's allies there are obviously the majority of Vidrodzhennia, whose "shareholders" include Ihor Kolomoyskiy. His main and ideal protégé is, of course, Zelenskiy, but a Tymoshenko presidency would suit him, too. His persistent twin goals of removing Poroshenko and getting his hands back on PrivatBank would be equally well reached with either candidate. However, the former will be considerably cheaper and easier.

In terms of solidarity against a Poroshenko victory, Tymoshenko can also count on the "radical" Oleh Liashko. His party members pretend that they believe in their leader's victory, but are mainly focused on the Rada elections, working on the mission of their main sponsor, oligarch Rinat Akhmetov.

The substance of the name Opposition Bloc seems to have come down to the process of dividing up fractions, with the result that this once-monolithic faction now has on its roster a number of candidates that despise each other. This kind of "multi-vectoral" approach is a real boon to all the frontrunners, and for some it's even a bonus in the form of several percentage points in their ratings.

In the end, the main intrigue for both the majority of political parties and for the oligarchs will be less the presidential race than the VR one. After all, Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic and, important as the role of the Head of Sate is, it's the Rada that makes laws and forms the Government. Whoever is lucky enough to get a seat in the legislature and its ultimate configuration will determine a lot more than who of the current three frontrunners is in the presidential seat. Of course, the result will affect the later election, leading to a centrifugal or centripetal reaction, but that will be later on. Moreover, voter behavior is different in the two ballots, and that cannot be ignored.  $\blacksquare$ 

### Backlash of problems

What measures Europe can apply to former ISIS militants

Michael Binyon,



**Maternal instinct.** The only reason for the former British citizen, now ISIS jihadist Shamima Begum's coming back home was the intent to save her own child's life

What should be done with more than 800 extremist foreign fighters who have fled or been captured after the fall of the last town still held by the so-called Islamic State of Syria and Iraq (Isis)?

President Trump wants those who made their way to Syria from Europe to join Isis to be returned to their home countries. They should all be put on trial, he said in recent tweet. Otherwise, he warned, they would "permeate Europe". And this would put European countries at risk of further terrorist activity, his officials said.

Trump has already announced that he is soon going to pull all American forces out of Syria. He said that unless Europe assumed responsibility for dealing with its citizens who joined Isis, the US would no longer be able to hold them prisoners. The issue has caused a huge political controversy in Europe, especially in Britain, where more than 400 fighters came from. The British government has announced that it will not allow most of them to return home and would deprive them of their British citizenship. The head of British intelligence said they would pose a serious and continuing threat to British security if they came back with what he called their "dangerous skills" and carried on their terrorist activities. But recently one of three young girls from east London who went to Syria in 2015 to join the fighters was found by a reporter for The Times newspaper hiding in a refugee camp. Shamima Begum, a Londoner of Bangladeshi origin, abandoned her family in 2015 at the age of only 15 and secretly made her way with two other girls to Syria. She married a Dutch Muslim convert fighting with Isis and had two children - both of whom had died from starvation and disease - and was about to give birth to a third child. She expressed no regret at joining the extremists, and said she had not been upset by the Isis atrocities, including the sight of a severed head thrown into a bin. But she wanted to return to London to save the life of her third child. The baby, a boy, was born on Saturday, and her case has split British public opinion. Many people agree with the British home secretary - himself a Muslim - who announced that he would not allow her to return. They said that she was just as guilty as the male fighters and had willingly supported Isis. But others argue that the wives and children should not be treated in the same way as the men who had fought against western forces in Syria and Iraq. They say that Shamima's new baby should not suffer for what his mother did. Instead, they want her to be brought home and put on trial for her role in supporting extremism. The baby should be given to the teenager's parents to look after. Taking back all the extremists who fought in Syria will be difficult and costly for all their home governments. Altogether, around 6,000 people from across Europe were recruited by Isis. Many have clandestinely tried to return, sneaking out of the besieged cities to make their way to Turkey and back home. Intelligence authorities say that about a third of Belgian and German nationals have returned, but France has a return rate of only 12 per cent. Each country has announced that it intends to put the fighters on trial for terrorism. But it will be very difficult

to gather enough evidence of what each individual did when he or she were in Syria, and hard to prove in a court of law that they were directly involved in atrocities. It is even more difficult to know what charges should be brought against the women who were married to jihadists.

The first big challenge will be to force the last fighters to return. Many of those who remained in Baghuz, the Syrian village on the Iraqi border where the so-called caliphate put up the final resistance against the US-backed Kurdish forces, surrendered. Others were killed in the final battle. Those extremists who escaped Baghuz will probably try to flee to other parts of the Middle East or to hide their real citizenship so that they can avoid being imprisoned in their home countries. It will need a large group of western soldiers to guard them and it will be costly to send planes to bring them back. There is also the tricky problem of how to change their ideas and extremist ideology. "Deindoctrination" programmes in the West have so far had little success in persuading Islamist fanatics to renounce their beliefs or settle down peacefully with their families at home. And those who have been imprisoned have often spent their time radicalising other prisoners and spreading the virus of Islamist extremism to prisoners who were not Muslims. There is little time left to debate what to do. Trump has made it clear that he thinks America has spent enough money and lost too many American lives in the Middle East, and he is determined to bring all US forces home. He says the Europeans should now shoulder responsibility for what their citizens have done. The British government's wish to remove citizenship from all those who went to Syria is popular with voters. But it is technically illegal – under United Nations laws, unless a person holds dual nationality, he cannot have his citizenship removed if that would leave him stateless.

France, Germany and Belgium, where the bulk of the Isis recruits came from, are already preparing measures to deal with those returning. France intends to repatriate as many as possible and prosecute them – providing individuals are afforded a fair trial. Those returning to Germany are already subject to criminal investigation. At first Germany said it would treat men and women extremists differently, but in 2017 it announced that all those suspected of belonging to Isis would be treated the same. But the threshold for prosecution seems to be much higher in Germany than elsewhere, and simply being in Syria and Iraq will not necessarily lead to an individual being detained. In Belgium, where there have been numerous terrorist attacks by Islamist extremists, all those suspected of having fought in Syria are arrested and sent before a judge. Those suspected of being involved in radicalisation can be sent to specialist units, where they are separated from other inmates. Conditions are more lenient in Denmark – returning fighters may be offered access to employment, education, housing and psychological counselling. So far, only about 1,800 fighters have returned to western Europe. Many, however, came from eastern Europe, and they can expect harsher treatment on their return - especially in Russia. Many Isis recruits came from Chechnya and other Muslim regions of Russia and they will be seen as especially dangerous.

The bulk of Isis fighters are from the Middle East itself – with between 14,000 and 18,000 in Syria and Iraq. Some have melted back into their communities. Many are expected to go underground and regroup in cities such as Mosul. When the Americans leave, the Kurds now holding many Isis prisoners fear an attack by Turkey, which sees the Kurdish forces as a threat to Turkey itself. Most of these prisoners will probably then be released. It is a nightmare now worrying all Europe. Will these fighters become a new underground terrorist threat to all the West? For Trump, this is no longer an American issue: it is up to Europe to defend itself in future, he has suggested.  $\blacksquare$ 

Gas clinch Why government oversight over big business is just as important as privatization

Maksym Vikhrov



Oligarchic schemes. Dmytro Firtash's monopoly on the domestic gas market has created one of the most tangled knots in Ukraine's energy sector

The systemic flaws of the privatization that took place in the 1990s and 2000s, and even more so their economic impact shaped a permanent sense of wariness among ordinary Ukrainians about selling off public assets. With time, however, paternalistic attitudes faded as the state proved to be an extremely ineffective owner. Today, this is talked about not only by specialists but also by the country's leadership. "The state is an ineffective owner," said President Poroshenko in March 2018. "Its management tends to mostly lead to losses." It's hard not to agree with him and the Government's intention to continue privatizing, but on a transparent basis at this point, can only be welcomed.

The "spirit of capitalism" really does push the private owner to fight for a profit and to maintain a competitive edge. However, the country has an interest, not just in the profitability of a business, but in its integrity as well. State oversight need not be total, but it should be effective. Otherwise business risks becoming a generator of economic, social and political problems rather than the source of a society's well-being.

The Cabinet decided this year to privatize a number of oblast power companies or oblenergos, the Odesa Port Plant, and a series of other major assets. But the issue is not just how clean the process will be. It's equally important whether the government will be able to make the new owners operate these businesses with integrity. As can be seen with the natural gas delivery sector these days, there's not much reason to feel optimistic.

In the gas delivery sector, things also started with major privatizations, as the old soviet gas companies were auctioned off. Although the larger part of gas pipelines remains in government hands, the actual operators, called oblgaz or oblast gas company and miskgaz, or municipal gas company, are attractive items. Their profits may be relatively small, because natural gas rates are set by the state through NCREPU, the regulator. However, the oblgazes, like the smaller-scale enterprises, are monopolists because only one operator can service the network in any given territory. Moreover, such companies are guaranteed multimillion clients, given that Ukraine was a gas-dependent country and is likely to remain so for a long time to come.

Not long after being privatized, this natural monopoly became a monopoly squared as 70% of the operators, including 16 oblgazes, now belong to oligarch Dmytro Firtash. In order

to buy up these companies, the tycoon took advantage of the full-bore support of the Viktor Yanukovych regime. It looks like that was the point when Ukraine was expected to inject the Russian gas needle as strongly as possible, and the business nozzle attached to this needle was supposed to be Firtash's holding company. In time, of course, the Yanukovych regime collapsed, the one-time Regional lost his political clout, and Firtash found himself facing a mess of court cases. Meanwhile, the state has tried to intervene in the situation, but has so far not enjoyed any notable success.

And reasons to intervene are plenty, starting with debts. As of today, NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy boss Andriy Kobolyev says Firtash's operators owe the national pipeline UAH 30.4 billion and his gas extraction companies owe UAH 29.3bn, for a total of nearly UAH 60bn altogether, or US \$2.2bn. Meanwhile, the operators that are part of Firtash's group of companies, Regional Gas Company, regularly report that they are losing money. For instance, last September, they mentioned UAH 8.3bn, explaining that the-then rates were too low, too many customers owed them, and so on. In April 2017, the Cabinet began requiring the oblgazes to pay for using the gas distribution system, which the Azarov Government had transferred to them for free use, based on commercial management contracts. But even this was not very smooth going.

"Firtash's oblgazes don't pay the state for the use of the pipeline network, yet they are using them and are withdrawing some of them from state ownership," says MP Tetiana Chornovol. In response to her enquiry, it became known that as of June 20, 20198, the state budget had only received 0.07% of planned annual fees for the use of pipelines. How these operators manage to survive in the face of colossal debts is a separate epic. But the fact remains that even with profitability taken into account, at least in terms of contributing to the national budget, the gas supply sector remains extremely problematic.

The government also hasn't been able to do anything about the monopolized nature of this sector. Back in 2015, a new Law "On the natural gas market" stated that one and the same company could not operate the pipeline network and sell gas to households. This rule was supposed to ease the access to customers for alternative suppliers and launch a market competitiveness mechanism. But operators got around this rule easily enough, spinning off parallel companies that sell the gas: all the oblgazes and miskgazes now had "gazzbut" or gas sales companies attached to them.

The next danger signal came at the end of 2018. In November, news began to come out that in various regions of Ukraine customers were unexpectedly getting warning notices that they had incurred debts. The oblgazes insisted that the debt was due to a recalculation of the volumes of gas used between December 1, 2015 and September 30, 2018. Supposedly, the volume of natural gas goes down during the cold season and meters understated consumption. In this kind of situation, the supplier uses a certain boosting coefficient, "bringing in line with standard conditions," which resulted in customer bills reflecting sudden debts. What's more the sums involved were substantial, from a few hundred to several thousand hryvnias. And although the gas companies explained that the notices of debts outstanding were merely "informative," the public didn't respond quite so laconically – especially since gas rates were raised just before this.

In response, NCREPU reminded the operators that their production and technical losses in the pipeline network were already included in the calculation of the customer rates and issued a resolution that prohibited this kind of additional charges. Some government officials reacted quite emotionally: "I want to let the whole country know: pay only for the gas you use," said PM Volodymyr Hroisman in December 2018. "Don't

pay any more than UAH 8.55 per cubic meter. Anything else is swindling on the part of the supplying organization."

The Government also turned to the National Commission with a request to check whether all oblgazes were operating within the law. "We have to be strict with monopolies so that they don't go beyond what is normal and legal," said Hroisman. How this review might affect the situation will become clear in time, but so far everything seems to be in a clinch: having allowed a monopoly to be established, the government was unable to effectively oversee it and now seems unable to tame the monster. A review will probably be too little to effect change.

It's also entirely possible that these unexpected debts were added on in order to shore up the monopoly status of the gazzbuts in case alternate providers show up. If consumers decide to end their relationship with a given oblgaz, this virtual debt could be laid at their feet and give them a simple choice: either stay with us or pay off your debt. For an individual household, this is not a particularly strong argument, but individual households also do not typically change suppliers. But it means that entire population centers would have to pay a significant "buyout fee." In this situation, it looks like oblgazes are preparing for the next round in the fight with the state, which is in a position to encroach on the monopoly in gas distribution.

Already last year, Naftogaz established three subsidiaries that are supposed to supply gas to households, cogeneration plants and commercial consumers without going through the oblgazes. Naftogaz officials are making no bones about the fact that they are doing this in order to break up the monopoly position of Firtash's organization. The company makes no bones about the situation: "The Government can and should change the organization of gas supplies to household so that there isn't any more special treatment for Firtash's oblgazes and monopolist intermediaries, and Naftogaz could deliver gas directly to households," Naftogaz tweeted in September 2018.

It's quite possible that this strategy could reach the desired

As of today, NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy boss Andriy Kobolyev says Firtash's operators owe the national pipeline **UAH 30.4 billion** and his gas extraction companies owe **UAH 29.3bn**, for a total of nearly **UAH 60bn** altogether, or **US \$2.2bn** 

goal. However, how much of a victory will it be? Over Firtash and his business partners, yes. But it's questionable whether this will demonstrate the state's capacity to establish effective oversight over private owners, and in this case, the owners of oblgazes. Because this entire story comes down to the fact that the government at first allowed these pathological processes with the oblgazes to develop and now wants to simply amputate, like a limb infested with gangrene.

Let's assume that this is the only possible response and that Naftogaz's subsidiaries will carry out the functions of the current operators far more effectively. At least, in contrast to oblgazes that are constantly posting losses, Naftogaz is a profitable corporation today. Nonetheless, such an approach cannot be treated as universal, because overcoming the negative consequences of privatization by expanding the government sector is basically swapping a stitching awl for a scratching one. The logical outcome of this approach will be building state capitalism or some such monstrosity.

In the end, learning to tame big business and carrying out privatization will just have to go on simultaneously, along with all the inevitable side-effects. 

■



# The spirit of protest

What makes it so hard to assess the impact of the Revolution of Dignity on Ukrainian society today

**Andriy Holub** 

In the winter of 2013, a group of sociologists decided to put together a general portrait of those who participated in the Euromaidan. Over the course of two days, December 7 and 8, 2013, they talked to protesters in the centers of Kyiv and Lviv. On Sunday, December 8, the largest rally took place after the night-time beating up of students that had taken place a week earlier. In two days, the pollsters talked to 443 people.

"The survey was carried out by an enterprising group of young sociologists," recalls Iryna Bekeshkina, director of the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Fund. "A their basis, they used methods designed to identify values. It turned out that participants in protests are very different from the rest of the population because they are the 'Europeanest' in all of Europe. Values such as self-realization and helping others were very clearly expressed."

The results of this study were later published on the *Ukrainska Pravda* site by one of its authors, Oleksiy Shestakovskiy. As he explained it, the survey used the methods of the European Social Survey, which made it possible to compare the values of Euromaidan folks with the values of the rest of the population of Ukraine and of other countries where surveys are carried out using this same method. The priorities the protesters themselves expressed were universalism and goodwill, as well as independence and security. The lowest on the scale for them were personal power and wealth, as well as conformism and hedonism. The survey reveals that the values of the Euromaidan protesters were far closer to the residents of Northern Europe than to most of their fellow-citizens.

"On a map measuring general values, Euromaidan participants were closest to Norwegians and Finns," Shestakovskiy wrote in his article. "The values profile for the general population of Ukraine is on average somewhere on the path from Bulgaria to Slovakia. Even compared to other post-soviet countries, the conservative values of preserving things are a priority for most Ukrainians."

Over the following two months, many an event took place that would completely overshadow the viche or massive town hall of early December. The first attempt to storm began during the night of December 12, in late January the first protesters were killed, and the entire Maidan ended in the mass shooting of protesters almost exactly a month later. To portray the values profile of those who kept climbing Instytutska under the bullets of the Alfa sniper team on the morning of February 20 is no longer possible. Similarly, we cannot determine exactly how much they had shifted from the Europtimists in early December. The 2013 survey is possibly the only attempt to generalize how those who participated in the Euromaidan differ from the rest of the population in terms of values. And it did point to some significant differences. It's another question, though, how much the people of the Maidan were able to influence the rest

of Ukrainian society over the following five years. This is also extremely hard to determine as, right after the Maidan came the war.

"The problem is that it's hard to separate out which changes are linked to the Maidan and which to the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas," says Volodymyr Paniotto, director of the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS). "We are seeing real changes in people's attitudes, but it's not clear what has caused them. I can talk more easily about the overall impact of the Maidan and the war with Russia."

Still, in evaluating the specific impact of the Maidan, what *The Ukrainian Week*'s interlocutors focus on is the activation of civil society.

"The difference between the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity is that the protest in the earlier Maidan was organized by politicians and they ran it as well," Bekeshkina notes. "After Viktor Yushchenko won,

In 2015, the Maidan was called a "struggle for power of anti-Russian, nationalist forces with the support of western special forces." by 22% of Ukrainians, while nearly 59% saw it as a "a grassroots protest in support of a European development path."

the Maidan dispersed and civil society effectively demobilized and waited for its demands to be fulfilled. The second Maidan was organized far more spontaneously. The most active organizers were people from the civil society sector. Horizontal links were very powerful, while vertical ones were not. For instance, the attempt to elect a Maidan Council didn't work. I myself happened to be there when this was going on, but the attempt failed. The most curious thing is that Ukrainians organize horizontally really well, but we are no good at setting up a top-down chain of command."

Bekeshkina says that all those years, the government had to take into account the presence of the civil society that arose during the first Maidan. Quite a few changes actually took place in Ukraine thanks to its activity. The pollster brings up the example of mandatory e-declarations or the current judiciary reforms taking place under the supervision of the Civic Integrity Council.

"It's another question just how this takes place," Bekeshkina adds and notes that, over the last two years, a counterattack has been launched by the remnants of the old system and it's been aimed directly at civil society – clear proof that it's having an impact. "This was never the case before, and it wasn't because nobody paid much attention to civil society. That doesn't work any more."

Her colleague at KIIS, Paniotto, notes that the strengthening of civil society can be seen in polls on trust in different institutions. The top places go to the volunteers, the church and the army. Next come civil society organizations, in whom the trust level has grown in the last few years. According to Paniotto, these changes are clearly one of the outcomes of the Euromaidan and the war. Prior to 2014, the top two were the church and the press, with civil society trailing a distant third.

At the same time, broad swaths of the population may recognize the merits and achievements of the activists, but they don't bother to change themselves. In any case, this is true of civic engagement. In 2015, DIF asked respondents to answer two questions: one about society in general and one about themselves.

For instance, when asked "Do you think ordinary Ukrainians have become more inclined to join public organizations and initiatives in the last two years?" more than 50% saw positive change, but less than 18% felt such a shift in themselves. More than 40% saw growing focus on civil action in society, but only 13% felt this in themselves. Indeed, the pollsters recorded the same gap between perceptions of society around them and themselves for almost all questions in the section on civic activity.

In the 2017 survey, "public passivity and indifference" was the response, even among representatives of CSOs and in face of the most urgent problems. This response garnered only slightly less support than "reluctance of government to meet halfway" or "the corrupt government."



Test of strength. The first years after the Revolution were marked by the growing role of civil society, but it is now under attack by the old elite, abetted by the apathy of the majority of Ukrainians

Paniotto notes a growing trend towards fatigue even among the most active part of the population. "Right now we are being asked to do surveys, including by international companies, about burn-out," he says. "After all, volunteers can't replace the state. They burn out and the impression is that the level of volunteer activity is beginning to slowly go down."

The main changes that are noticeable in the public mood are mainly connected to the country's foreign policy vector: attitudes towards the EU, NATO and Russia. The *Ukrainian Week*'s interlocutors point out that there are a number of important nuances on this issue.

According to Bekeshkina, the Euromaidan itself actually split Ukrainian society even more than it had been before. The later consolidation came with the war and Russia's invasion. "The eastern vector collapsed and changes largely took place in the eastern and southern oblasts,' she says. "Today, the division into the nominal southeast and northwest remains, but the pro-Russian element has gone down to 20-25%."

Paniotto also points out that changes in attitudes depend on where a survey is carried out: "We don't do polls in Crimea and very rarely in occupied Donbas. One of the main changes we see is in attitudes towards joining the EU and NATO. Our survey results suggest that about a third of this is tied to change of territory." He adds that if there were a referendum on accession to the EU today, then about 80% of those who turned out to vote would favor joining. Similarly, Ukrainians would support joining NATO, but with a much smaller margin.

In the case of the latter, Paniotto cautions against rushed and ill-conceived moves. "Most of the South and East are against joining," he points out. "I have written more than once that President Poroshenko's idea of running a referendum is worrisome. It's dangerous because just a small mobilization of opponents in the South and East could bring the whole enterprise down. Yet for Ukraine, joining NATO is important for reasons that we all understand.

Paniotto believes that the number of Ukrainians who have a negative opinion of the Maidan remains pretty stable. In some regions, this number is even growing. This could well reflect the impact of Russian propaganda. KIIS periodically measures the Russian Propaganda Impact Index. In the survey, respondents are asked to express their attitudes towards various theses proposed by Russia, including what the Maidan was. In 2015, the Maidan was called a "struggle for power of anti-Russian, nationalist forces with the support of western special forces." by 22% of Ukrainians, while nearly 59% saw it as a "a grassroots protest in support of a European development path."

Today, Paniotto says, the latest results of this survey are available. On the whole, the situation seems to be staying generally stable, but in some areas it is worsening. For instance, in Kharkiv and Odesa Oblasts, nearly half the respondents support Russian propagandist statements. Bekeshkina confirms this, acknowledging that a large part of the public actually blames the Maidan for what came after – the annexation of Crimea and the war in the Donbas. According to her, this is even true of people who previously supported the protest.

But it's early to draw final conclusions about the impact of these events on Ukrainian society - at least until the surveys include those who in February 2014 were still going to kindergarten or sitting at their desks in public schools.



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#### Chronicle of victims

The Ukrainian Week publishes general information about the victims and those killed during the Maidan for the entire time of the protests. These are persons whose injuries have been officially documented. Information correctly displays the number of casualties. As for the wounded, one should take into consideration that in a number of confirmed cases some protestants at Maidan avoided official documentation because of the fear of being punished for participating in clashes.

The total number of casualties (in particular, with gunshot wounds)

Of them died

Forces

25 November

**Protestants** Forces

26 November

Forces

30 November

**Protestants** 

Forces

**Protestants** Forces

144

9 December

Forces

10 December

Forces

11 December

**Protestants** Forces

**37** 24 7 January

Protestants Forces

**10 January** 

Protestants Forces

14

**Protestants** Forces

14 Januarv

**Protestants** 

**Protestants** 

**18 January** 

**Protestants** 

6

**19 January** 

Protestants **Forces** 

95 102

20 January

**Protestants** 

Forces

56

21 January

**Protestants** 

**Forces** 

22 January


**Forces** 

**25** 

Protestants

23 January

Protestants **Forces** 



## Candidates with compass

Electoral preferences according to the map

**Roman Malko** 

If the latest polls are to be taken at face value, the frontrunners in the presidential election are easy enough to identify. It's probably safe to assume that Ukrainians will be choosing among three candidates with the highest ratings: Volodymyr Zelenskiy, Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko. A few other candidates are breathing down their necks, but whether any of them can break into the top is not evident from their ratings.

But the ratings are not showing a lot more that is interesting, including elements that could shed some light on the subtler aspects of the process, such as the geographic profile of voter preferences. The Ukrainian Week decided to look into this fairly straightforward question and discovered that the polling data being published is quite superficial, painted in broad brushstrokes based on macro-regions – and even that is the best case. Let's take the survey called "Ukraine in the Run-Up to the 2019 Presidential Election," which was jointly run by three pollsters – the SOCIS Center for Social and Marketing Studies, the Kyiv International Institute for Sociology or KIIS, and the Razumkov

According to a survey by KIIS, **78.6%** of respondents reported that their main source of information about the candidates is television, while **35.0%** also get information from online news sources, and **9.3%** from social nets, where Facebook dominates by **82.4%** 

Center – on January 16-29, 2019. No geographical information about the candidates was published at all. In three other polls – from the Rating Sociological Group's "Monitoring the Electoral mood among Ukrainians: January 2019," and KIIS's "The Socio-political Mood among Ukrainians: January-February 2019, to the Razumkov Center's "Trust in Public Institutions and the Electoral Orientation of Ukrainian Citizens" – information is only presented by macro-regions, which does not offer a complete in-depth picture.

What's a macro-region? The Razumkov Center considers the "western macro-region" to be Volyn, Rivne, Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk, Ternopil, and Zakarpattia Oblasts; KIIS adds Khmelnytsk Oblast to this mix. Yet voter preferences in these oblasts sometimes differ so radically that it makes no sense to lump them all together. For instance, Zakarpattia or Bukovyna have never voted the same as Lviv or Ternopil Oblasts. The same is true with the figures from Rating, but at least there's a bit more specificity. The Western Region is separate from Halychyna, while the Center does not include the capital or the North.

Obviously more detailed data is available and perhaps it is made available for an additional fee. But then again, maybe it's completely non-representative. For instance, a given poll does not capture all of Ukraine, only the major cities or individual oblasts, and that's why it isn't being published. In

any case, generalizations always have room to maneuver in and to reduce the value of the data.

So, the leaders in the first round are Zelenskiy with nationwide support over 20%. Next is President Poroshenko, in the high teens. Third is Tymoshenko, not far behind Poroshenko but now trailing well behind Zelenskiy. Differences among the second echelon candidates are not especially significant: Yuriy Boyko leads in the mid-high single digits, with Anatoliy Hrytsenko close on his heels. Oleh Liashko is in the mid-to-low single digits and Andriy Sadoviy has now withdrawn his candidacy in support of Hrytsenko.


Let's take a look at the picture geographically. The biggest support for Zelenskiy is in the South macro-region, in the mid 20s, with mid-high teens in the Center and the East. Even less support is coming from the West, where only one in seven would vote for him. Ironically, support for the comedian is lowest in the Donbas, which has been separated from the East macro-region, where only one in eight would cast their ballot for him.

In the West, Poroshenko is the frontrunner in the polls, with nearly one in six prepared to vote for him. He has the least support in the South, the East and the Donbas, where only one in 15-20 would vote for him.

Tymoshenko's results are interesting, with one poll showing most of her support in the center and, somewhat less, in the West, with one in 6-9 ready to vote for her, down from a high of one in four, and least of all in the East, where only one in 13 support her. Strikingly, she has the least support in the Donbas, where only about one in 66 would vote for her, suggesting just how little love is lost for the gas princess in the war-battered region. Indeed, as Zelenskiy's star has risen in the last month, Tymoshenko's has slipped into third place.

Unfortunately, there is no information about whether the polls were run only in urban areas or whether rural voters were also tapped, as seems unlikely. And so it's also hard to say who's crazy about Zelenskiy in the South and East, whether its city votes or villagers who watch his show nonstop on 1+1 – or about Poroshenko in the West. But if we take a look at the history of all the previous presidential and even VR elections in Ukraine for the past quarter-century, the situation is actually a lot more predictable: no matter how much candidates claim that their support demonstrates demand for new faces in politics, it's simply not true. The issue is rather different.

For voters in the East and South, Zelenskiy today is a bit like Leonid Kuchma in 1994, Communist leader Petro Symonenko in 1999, and Viktor Yanukovych in 2004 and 2010. He's the comic reincarnation of the sovok, aka homo sovieticus. And his electorate is those who combine a soviet infantilism with post-bolshevism, people who haven't adjusted to the rapid course of decommunization and still want to see a comeback for their primitive values. It may not even be clearly expressed "hammer&sickleness," but a worldview based on "who cares what language" and "grandad fought in the war."



Why does Zelenskiy have so little support in Western Ukraine? Because he's a foreigner to them, in every sense possible. For one thing, the spirit of the kolhosp never was especially strong or ingrained in the region, people were less poisoned with it, and it has already been largely dispersed. The support for Poroshenko in this region is greater than anwhere else. Yet it's not so much a matter that people there respect and adulate him, but that they don't feel a need for "new faces." Possibly even to the contrary. There was no love lost for Kravchuk 25 years ago, either, as a party ideologue, but they supported him against the threat that "Red Director" Kuchma represented, and later voted for Kuchma to prevent Communist Symonenko from winning. Indeed, however sentimental it might sound, Ukrainians in the western region, especially in Halvchyna, always liked to see themelves as the country's saviors. And they continue to sincerely fulfill this role.

As to the second-rank candidates, Boyko is best loved in the East, where one in 7-11 would vote for him. A whopping one in five voters are prepared to cast for him in the Donbas, yet less than even one in 100 in the West. In the West, Hrytsenko enjoys the support of one in 14, but he is disliked most in the East, where only one in 25 would vote for him, and in the Donbas, where the survey reported not a single vote of support. Liashko is a different case again: some polls give him about one in 20 votes in the East and the West – incidentally suggesting fruitful cooperation with Akhmetov – but only one in 30 in the South, while others show him most popular in the south, with one in 18 ready to plump for him, and least popular in the East, where only one in 35 would vote for him. Perhaps unsurprisingly, that same poll also showed Zelenskiy as

the most popular in the South, suggesting that clowns will always find their fans there.

According to a survey by KIIS, 78.6% of respondents reported that their main source of information about the candidates is television, while 35.0% also get information from online news sources, and 9.3% from social nets, where Facebook dominates by 82.4%. This actually provides a pretty good explanation of how ratings in this race are being shaped. Given that 1+1 was in second or third place for popularity among viewers in most regions over 2018, it's easy enough to guess the secret of Zelenskiy's success, after playing a fictitious president on this channel since November 2015, and why his rating is skyrocketing compared to other candidates. Similarly, most of the other channels, which regularly took potshots at the incumbent, whether deserved or not, but have now stopped presenting everything he does in a negative light, which has also contributed to some improvement in his rating. The internet and social nets are not so significant in this particular situation, but they do have a definite influence over voters. Moreover, this influence tends to be more destructive than constructive, given the informational chaos they tend to generate and the well-recorded tendency for people to live in "echo chambers" in social nets.

But the main thing that must be understand is that the immense flood of inconsistent data that is being poured into the ears of Ukrainian voters from all sources leaves them with a serious lack of unpolluted information. Access to the real situation is effectively blocked by garbage that makes it very hard to discover the truth. This makes it very easy to create myths and good people are covered in trash and turned into monsters, while the manipulators become heroes, stars and public favorites.


## New ways to solve the old problems

Why we cannot allow the newly introduced electricity trade market to turn into a handy tool of concealing deep problems in the sector?

**Oleksandr Kramar** 

#### The failure of energy diversification

Efforts to decrease dependency of Ukrainian energy market on Russia fuel supplies have proven to be ineffective and slow























Gas consumption, billions M3

on thermal power plants, millions tons

Consumption of imported anthracite coal Electricity generated by nuclear power plant, billions, kWt per hour

Import of nuclear fuel supplied by Westinghouse, tons

Sources: Derzhstat data, Ministry of Energy and Coal, author calculations

In 2019, five years after the Revolution of Dignity, reforms in the Ukrainian energy sector and all the remaining national matters related to it, seem very far from being complete. Goals, which were presented in the 2014 parliamentary collation agreement, were never reached. Thus the country is still rather far from its initial aim - improving energy self-sufficiency, securing the energy independence and reaching effectiveness of the energy sector, improving quality of the services, provided by the energy enterprises and brining this industry up to date. Failure of the gas sector reforms was the most evident. This issue became especially distressing bearing in mind the so-called 'problem of 2020', the year when current gas transit contracts with Russia will come to an end. Ukraine, however, is hardly prepared for an aftermath of such scenario.

Ukraine faces further problems with the planned transition into electricity market, which is due to commence on 1 July 2019. When it comes to the electricity market, the main issue is not the market itself, which in theory may easily become very competitive in supplying energy to consumers, but the problems of the deep economic monopolies and vulnerability of Ukraine's energy sector. Recently, however, various energy experts and commentators have been focusing on the different ways to sell or the electricity as well as issues related to the electricity trade itself, rather than the problems related to the way this electricity is generated.

#### **GAS FAILURE**

In spring 2016, when the former prime-minister of Ukraine, Arseniv Yatsenvuk, and his government, were replaced by team led by Volodymyr Hroysman, it appeared that the solid reform of the gas sector is under way. Three years have passed and it now seems even further away. Three years ago Ukraine finally balanced the gas prices for different consumers on a level similar to the European market. Further, the government initiated a program which was aimed at increasing output of Ukraine's own gas, hoping that these capabilities would fully satisfy Ukraine's needs by 2020. Additionally, at that time the issue of reforming Naftogaz, Ukraine's national oil and gas company, and its separation from the transit gas system seemed to be solvable by early 2019. Once the country's gas sector was restructured this way, it would be effective and functioning even in the event of complete cut off of the Russian gas supplies, and ensuing complications of the reverse gas flow from the EU countries.

If successfully implemented, Ukrainian '2020 program' would increase country's own gas output by at least 27 billion m3, and would eliminate possible Gazprom's threats to terminate its transit agreements with Ukraine and use the pipelines in Baltic and Black seas instead. Additionally, if Ukraine succeeded to effectively balance out its gas output and the subsequent consumption, this could lead to price decrease for local consumers. In this case the "European hubs plus transportation costs" formula would be replaced by

"European hubs minus transportation costs". Unfortunately, at the moment the program has proven to be an absolute failure.

Ukrainian government showed a disappointing lack of political will when it comes to adhering to market price formation process and reform of Naftogaz. Local corrupt administrative authorities across Ukraine have remained the key obstruction to the planned reforms. These authorities repeatedly sabotaged discovery and development of the new wells. These disruptions were especially obvious in Poltava region. At the same time, no new legal mechanisms were implemented to stimulate businesses to balance out the levels of profits to the levels of output.

Furthermore, Ukrainian government has not undertaken any steps to encourage both the private consumers and the large businesses to reduce its gas consumption. State funds, allocated to the energy saving program were minimal and amounted to UAH several billion, while the state gas subsidies were worth UAH hundreds of billions. Additionally, government's subsidy incentive itself was completely demotivating when it came to upgrading energy saving equipment in the buildings – because in addition to increased spending, the owner of the house would also get his subsidies cut. Thus an average consumer would not experience any financial relief as a result of adopting gas saving system in their home.

Ukraine is yet to explore a number of opportunities to decrease big enterprises' gas consumption, which were not made use of before. For instance, several thermal power plants in Ukraine still consume huge amounts of gas, used a fuel - for instance it reached 3.9 billion m3 in 2018. Kyivteploenergo, Ukrainian enterprise supplying electricity and hot water to the capital, and Darnytsia thermal power plant, used 2.03 billion m³ in Kyiv, two thermal power plants in Kharkiv used 0.56 billion m3, several thermal power plants in Kremenchuk, Kryvyy Rig, Bila Tserkva and Lviv used another 100-250 million m<sup>3</sup>. If all of those plants switched to bioenergy, it would potentially reduce Ukraine's current needs in imported gas by at least one third. Nevertheless, nothing has been done over the course of the past five years.

This way, corruption and monopoly in the government as well as among current key gas business players have completely blocked Ukraine's efforts to become self-sufficient and fully rely on its own gas production. As a result, reducing the prices for the internal market consumers has also not been an easy task.

#### AN ILLUSION OF COMPETITION

First steps of on the way to reform power engineering industry in Ukraine were taken on 1 January 2019. State energy enterprises, also known to consumers in Ukraine as oblenergo, were replaced by two others types of companies: first, operator of the distribution network, a unit which was set up to solely transport the electricity, and second, the companies, which were designed to sell it to the final consumers. At the present time, there were over 300 of such electricity traders registered in Ukraine, and this amount will potentially increase for further few thousands. In July this year Ukraine expects to officially open the market of electricity wholesale. This market will consist of three different features. Bilateral agreements will enable ar-

ranging of the long-term contracts between the buyer and the seller. The "one day upfront" trade agreement will facilitate the purchase and the sale of the electricity within a day after the contract conclusion. The "24 hour" market will allow selling and purchasing the electricity within the 24 hour period of time. From now on Ukraine's National Regulatory Commission for Energy and Utilities (NKREKP), which currently controls 100% of the price formation for both product and the service, will only control the transportation costs, because those are regulated by the natural monopolies.

It may seem that a range of available options and consumer choices as well as the market competition are now at its best. This has only been the case for the final consumer, though. In point of fact, once this matter is studied more carefully, it turns out that introduction of the electricity trade market has concurred with numerous pre-existing problems in the energy sector, faced by Ukraine before – monopolies and the influence of the oligarchic lobby in the government. At first glance, one may think that the circumstances on the electricity market differ significantly from the ones in a gas sector, because not only Ukraine can fully satisfy its needs in electricity, but it also exports the remaining surplus. However, Ukraine's electricity market and power engineering is heavily dependent on the import

WITHOUT SOLVING THE LONG EXISTING PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY ON ELECTRICITY MARKET IN UKRAINE, AND PROBLEMS RELATING TO THE CURRENT ELECTRICITY GENERATION IN PARTICULAR, ALL POSITIVE EFFECTS OF RECENTLY INTRODUCED ELECTRICITY TRADE WILL FIZZLE OUT

of fuel, necessary to operate power plants generating the electricity. Further, Ukraine imports almost entirety of its nuclear fuel needed to operate nuclear power plants (NPP). Those NPP satisfy nearly half of the country's need in electricity. Additionally, Ukraine is forced to import anthracite coal (also known as hard coal), which still has no alternative on several thermal power plants. Production of the coal type "G" ('gas coal') is entirely monopolised by DTEK, a private strategic coal and energy holding in Ukraine, owned and controlled by the Ukrainian oligarch Rinat Akhmetov. According to the data provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Coal, out of 27.5 million tonnes of coal produced in Ukraine in 2018, nearly 23.9 million tons were produced by the DTEK-owned mines. Additionally, DTEK's power stations currently consume 80% of the gas coal in Ukraine.

How can we talk about healthy competition on internal Ukrainian market, if Akhmetov's DTEK not only controls 87% of the energy coal production in the country, but also consumes majority of this coal to produce electricity? In the above-mentioned circumstances oligarchs' ability to dictate their own terms, when it comes to electricity prices, hardly comes as a surprise. Companies, which will purchase this electricity to then sell it to private and business consumers, will be left with little leverage and will have no choice, but to agree to these terms. As a result, whether one likes it or not, intermediaries and electricity distributors will not be able to influence monopolistic prices set by DTEK.

On its lengthy journey from a coal mine to a power plant or the distribution company, Ukrainian coal passes through an endless chain of various offshore companies, which were designed to withhold and conceal immense profits. Currently, only imported fuel can compete with DTEK's production in Ukraine, but it will naturally inflate the price of the final product, and, more importantly, will undermine any attempts to develop and grow coal and mining industry in the country. DTEK is not interested in production levels surge, since it will lead to market oversupply, and will reduce the prices as a result. The sole hypothetical alternative. presented in the "Law on electricity market in Ukraine", is electricity import. It is not feasible due to several factors, such as political (imports from Russia would hardly be possible), or economic and technical (for instance, it is not economically sustainable to import electricity from the EU, since its more expensive, limited and it's not always logistically easy to transport it to Ukraine).

According to the data provided by the Ukrainian Ministry of Energy and Coal, out of **27.5 million tonnes** of coal produced in Ukraine in 2018, nearly **23.9 million** tons were produced by the DTEK-owned mines. Additionally, DTEK's power stations currently consume **80%** of the gas coal in Ukraine

Therefore the future of Ukrainian coal industry lies in complete de-monopolisation of the local output through compulsory division of DTEK's coal and mining assets into three or four truly independent companies with independent owners, who would compete with one another. Should this happen, prices of coal, and later the electricity produced at thermal power plants, will be remarkably reduced. Additionally, the state should impose higher tariffs on coal production in order to put an end to the current schemes when vast majority of the profit remain in offshore accounts.

Having said that, it should be noted that monopolies on internal Ukrainian market is nothing compared to Ukraine's unprecedented dependency on fuel, supplied by Russia, a wartime aggressor. Replacement of Russian nuclear fuel used by Ukrainian nuclear power stations has proven to be a very slow process. Moreover, in 2018 the share of Rosatom, Russian state nuclear energy corporation, on Ukrainian market grew up to 12%, while the share of an alternative provider, Westinghouse, American electrical corporation, has decreased. While in 2018 Westinghouse has supplied as much fuel as in 2017, its share, compared to the Russian one, has decreased.

According to the Ukrainian Statistics Bureau, out of 3.87 million tons of anthracite coal, which remains the only alternative fuel for several thermal and nuclear power plants and which is heavily imported from abroad, 3.62 million were supplied by Russia and only 0.25 million were imported from South Africa. We are talking about 92% dependency on Russian supplies, a number, which even outweighs the scale of DTEK monopoly.

In all honesty, it is worth saying that consumption of anthracite coal, and as a result its import, has recently decreased. While in 2017 Ukrainian thermal power plants consumed 4.95 million tons of this fuel, in 2018 this amount dropped to 4.11 million tons. This change

was a result of refurbishment of several blocks at Zmiyivska and Trypilska thermal power plants, owned by the state Tsentrenergo, as well as Prydniprovska thermal power plant, owned by DTEK. Ultimately, in 2018 all thermal power plants owned by DTEK outside of the temporary occupied territories in Luhansk oblast, consumed some 1.42 million of anthracite coal, while the Luhansk thermal plant itself – 1.02 million tons. It also seems that Slovyansk thermal power plant has become a major black hole of corruption, burning nearly 1.63 million tons of Russian anthracite coal in 2018, despite that fact that this plant's facilities weren't that necessary and its output wasn't very beneficial. Furthermore, it is also unclear who the real owners behind this plant are. From March until April 2017 Slovyansk thermal power plant was not operating and its output capacity was successfully replaced by Zaporizhzhya nuclear power plant.

In fact, it seems like the logic behind initial efforts to fight Akhmetov's monopoly on internal Ukrainian market only facilitated to lobby fuel importers from Russia and caused further dependency on Russian anthracite coal. For example, numerous efforts of the Ministry of Coal and Energy to impose legal restrictions on importing fuel and prioritising local Ukrainian fuel were met with criticism and dismissed as "Akhmetov's lobbyism". Those critics' arguments are quite weak, nevertheless. DTEK is indeed a monopolist on Ukrainian market, as was described above, and this company's influence has to be dealt with in a right manner in order to remove an obstacle to the growth of Ukrainian coal industry. However, it is highly unwise to do it by simply increasing Ukraine's dependency on Russian supplies, such as importing anthracite coal, especially when in the current circumstances this dependency may become absolutely pivotal.

Article 68 of the Ukrainian "Law on electrical power energy market" still says that "suppliers have to be chosen after considering minimal spending in relation to the output and consumption of electrical energy". This naturally logical and financially feasible approach, does not, however, consider potential complications, which may appear without proper regulation of grave dependency on Russian fuel. One potential alternative may be either full ban on Russian anthracite or the gradual decrease of its consumption, for instance limiting its import to 2 million tons first year, then 1.5 million tons the second year, and then 1 million and 0.5 million tons in the next consecutive years.

Without solving the long existing problem of monopoly on electricity market in Ukraine, and problems relating to the current electricity generation in particular, all positive effects of recently introduced electricity trade will fizzle out. The sale of energy to the final consumer must be built on a solid ground – a highly competitive market of energy production and diversified fuel supply. If Ukraine's internal market is monopolised by Akhmetov's DTEK, and anthracite coal or nuclear fuel are imported from Russia, efforts to develop a new self-sufficient energy market and a sale of the electricity will be a fiction, aimed at only preserving monopoly as a phenomenon. This phenomenon will subsequently drive a decision or, potentially, indecision, to deal with the long existing issues, such as the will of oligarchy or energy dependency on Russia. 🖬

## The mirror of development

What the structure of investments in the economy of Ukraine signals about

Liubomyr Shavaliuk

The presidential campaign is in full swing. To win over the Ukrainian people, candidates often appeal to economic facts. Poroshenko focuses on the positive changes in the economy, as if all of them, without exception, are the result of his team's work. The competitors focus on economic failures and problems, so it may seem as if he is to blame for all the troubles of the country. It is difficult for the voter to pick the wheat from the chaff. But we really want to make our choice easily, efficiently and effortlessly.

As is often the case, the truth is somewhere in the middle. It is that, apart from the government, which "does everything correctly," and the opposition, which always "knows how it should be," there is still a third force – economic laws. They act regardless of what the government or the opposition wants. And the result of this action often speaks of the situation in the country more than any of the politicians.


One of these laws can be formulated like this: businessmen always hunt for profit and do it in sectors where they can get the most effective output. Virtually that's true in every country under any authority. To have a profit, you must first invest. Before doing this, every businessman carefully weighs up the pros and cons.

Investing is alike an election: businessmen seem to vote in dollars for those industries, projects, countries that are able to provide the greatest amount of profit at the least risk, and are not inclined to invest in where they can lose. Therefore, all investments are a kind of "rating" of the most attractive sectors of the economy. Unlike political ratings, it is based not on the irrational preferences of voters, but on the cold, sober approach of people who consider every penny and risk their own capital. Such a "rating" very well shows in which areas there is potential, additional opportunities appear or various barriers are reduced. And analyzed in dynamics, this "rating" gives us a good idea of which way the country is changing, and indicates reforms or their absence better than any of the politicians.

#### THREE STAGES

The best way of comparing investments is over several years and at least over one political or economic cycle. Because during such a period of time any country experiences a vast amount of changes that are quite well covered by statistics. In Ukraine, during the last three political cycles, there occurred two deep economic crises; that's why, by comparing investment figures in 2007, 2012, and 2018, you can see where we were and where we are going.

In 2018, the volume of capital investments in Ukraine amounted to UAH 526 billion. In dollar equivalent, this is 40% less than in 2012. But in real terms, this is 11% more. That is, today investments are cheaper than they were then, but there are more of them in volume. This means that now businessmen believe in Ukraine more than in 2012, which was the most successful year during Yanukovych rule in terms of investment. In 2013, investors realized who was who and how bleak the prospects for Ukraine were, so over the course of that year, in-



vestment fell by 11%, although there was no official crisis reported. Then, the fall continued as a result of the war and deep crisis, but over the course of 2016-2018, Ukraine by far made up for losses in terms of the volume of investments. And this is evidence that ahead of us there are changes for the better. Because today's investment will benefit in the development of the economy and GDP growth tomorrow.

Total, billion UAH

However, in real terms, the volume of capital investments is still 19% lower than in 2007. Back then it was a record one in the history of independent Ukraine. What was the reason for this? Excessive faith in Ukraine due to the victory of the Orange Revolution or the global peak of economic development? Perhaps, both. However, each of the factors over time ceased to operate, that is, the figures for 2007 were somewhat divorced from reality, to which the country eventually returned.

#### **AGRIBUSINESS ON THE MOVE**

■ Hotels and restaurants
■ Other

A comparison of the structure of capital investments in each of these periods gives several interesting results (see Structure of investments in the economy). First of all, over the past 6-11 years, the share of investment in agriculture has more than doubled. This corresponds to the current value of the industry for the economy of Ukraine. Neither war nor deep economic crisis prevented the rapid development of agricultural production. It is still in progress, despite the fact that the land reform is not completed, and the state is not helping agribusiness and sometimes even hampers. This suggests that in the long run there are practically no obstacles to the development of the industry with its unique potential. No matter how bad the investment climate and economic situation are, the capital will always find a way to where it is going to substantially increase its value. Politicians have nothing to do with it; neither those who support this development, nor those who hinder it.

Another important nuance: over the past decade, agriculture has actually been developing only thanks to a large, mainly oligarchic capital. In the face of chronic problems in the banking system and the lack of a land market that could be used as collateral, a permanent financial resource was available only to oligarchs. Therefore, today in agro-production there is a high degree of concentration, and many politicians are sounding the alarm, advocating the need to restore the importance of small and medium-sized farming and making it a prerequisite for launching a land market.

In any case, we can state the rapid development of Ukrainian agriculture over the past 6-11 years. Is it good or bad? Neither one thing, nor the other. Yes, on its own, the development solves many problems, but as a result a number of other issues arise. For example, in the case of agribusiness, Ukraine now has significantly higher rates of agricultural production, agricultural exports and foreign exchange earnings from it. But there are also negative side effects: the strengthening of a number of oligarchs who are already trying to negatively influence the state, the reduction of jobs that have become unnecessary after the introduction of new, more efficient technologies. And most importantly: the rapid growth of agricultural production


In 2018, the volume of capital investments in Ukraine amounted to UAH **526 billion**. In dollar equivalent, this is **40%** less than in 2012. But in real terms, this is **11%** more

has attracted the attention of criminals to the sector, so there have been widespread cases of agricultural raiding, stealing of crops from fields and the like. That is, with the development of agriculture, the country has got ahead, but new problems have appeared, perhaps no less complex and acute than they were before.

#### **CONSTRUCTION AND REAL ESTATE**

One can observe interesting dynamics of investment in construction. In 2007, we had a real investment boom. But it was not fully realized in terms of construction (and, accordingly, investment in the industry), because there were huge obstacles to obtaining land for building construction and all the necessary permits. Therefore, for example, the indicators of housing development sector in 2012 and 2018 exceeded those

#### The structure of investment in industry



\* Until 2010, these industries were not identified, so there was no statistics specifically for them.

of 2007. Investment in the industry is quite consistent with this trend. Due to inadequate construction, housing prices grew rapidly, so it was an attractive investment vehicle at that time, so real estate transactions in 2007 accounted for the lion's share of capital investments and pointed to a price bubble that eventually burst.

In 2012, the country was preparing for the European Football Championship, therefore, in addition to housing construction, that of infrastructure was in full swing. Considering that all this was accompanied by huge embezzlement of budget funds, the share of investment in construction was perhaps the highest in the entire history of Ukraine. But very few people invested in real estate operations, since the prices for it during the crisis of 2008–2009 collapsed and remained at about the same level for a number of years.

In 2018, obtaining a building permit is already easier than in 2007 (which is also evidence of changes for the better), so its volume is larger than before. Last year, new housing construction standards were introduced in Ukraine, and now housing and social infrastructure next to it will be of higher quality. In addition, the state is investing heavily in the construction and repair of roads, while the scope for embezzlement is much less than in 2012, thanks to transparent tenders and the ProZorro public procurement system. Therefore, the share of investment in the industry is more than in 2007, but so far less than in 2012. Does this indicate that the country is moving forward? Perhaps yes.

#### **TIME-DRIVEN TRENDS**

In some industries, the dynamics of investment is very revealing. For example, investments in trade gradually lost their significance, and now it is being restored. Before the crisis of 2008–2009 under the conditions of a rapid increase in retail lending, this industry was one of those that developed most rapidly. But after the crisis, as a result of falling aggregate demand, trade lost its attractiveness, which affected investment in it. Now incomes of the population are growing for a good 10 quarters in a row. As a result, trade again becomes attractive for investment, capital returns to the industry.

Today, the situation in public administration and defense has changed dramatically. Over 11 years, the share of investment in the industry has increased more than nine times. It is clear that war is the objective reason for this. But current investments are directed not only to the needs of the army, but also to the development of the military-industrial complex and the actual reform of national administration. It is possible that the results in all areas where the funds are invested are not yet visible, but in some of them, for example, in logistic support of the armed forces, we have had titanic changes. Does this indicate progress in the country? Sure.

Much the same can be said about education and health. Under Yanukovych rule they were led by the brilliant kleptocrats Tabachnik and Bohatyryova. Then these sectors accounted for the smallest share of investment. Obviously, they were underfinanced for a long time, but until recently there have been no structural, market prerequisites for monetary investments either at the state level or at the level of private investors. Today such prerequisites appear as a result of reforms. That is, despite the entire public response caused by all metamorphoses in the educational and medical sectors, the numbers speak for themselves: over the past six years, the volume of investment in them has grown almost one and a half times in relative terms (from 0.5% to 0.8% in education and from 1.0% to 1.5% in medicine) and almost tripled in absolute terms. If the changes did not create the right opportunities, no one would put their hard-earned money into these sectors.

#### **LITMUS INDUSTRY**

In general, the share of investment in industry for 10 years has not changed. But its dynamics differs significantly in sectors. Before the crisis of 2008–2009, investments in the extractive industries accounted for less than one fifth of industrial investment. But under Yanukovych rule, and now this industry attracts almost a third of industrial investment. However, there are some nuances. During Yanukovich's term, mining was the economic basis of the regime, and the state worked to ensure that oligarchs such as Kurchenko, Yanukovych Jr., Zlochevskiy or Stavitskiv would build up assets as soon as possible. Today, the main reason for the intensive investment is the introduction of market rules of the game, in particular, bringing energy prices to market levels and an increased need for fuel resources as a result of refusing to import Russian gas and losing control over part of the Donbas mines. Investments are already yielding results: over the past few years, a long-term trend towards a decrease in its volumes has occurred in the natural gas extraction. Is this a positive change? Without a doubt.

Another example is consumer goods industry. The low cost of labor, established after the crisis of 2014-2015, stimulated the flow of investment in the industry, so over six years, its share increased 2.5 times. In absolute terms, investment in consumer goods industry increased almost fivefold. The industry has not yet become the cornerstone of Ukrainian industry, but has already given more than one hundred new jobs. The trend is positive, but it is due solely to the actions of economic laws, and not the actions of any of the officials.

It is important to note that investments in traditionally oligarchic sectors, for example, chemical and metallurgical, have not recovered after the crisis of 2008–2009. Then the oligarchs had a lot of money and constant access to government resources, so they no doubt invested in industries with limited prospects from a business point of view. Now the situation is different; access to state resources is much smaller, there is not so much money, so you have to think carefully before investing in this or that project. The result is obvious: in 11 years, the share of capital investments in the chemical industry has decreased from 3.7% to 1.4%, and in the metallurgical sector - from 17.5% to 14.2%. This is definitely a positive trend. Because if we consider the development of a country in the context of economic growth, then the more successful investment projects that society chooses (oligarchs, the state, small and medium businesses), the faster the country develops. So, wastefulness and meaningless of capital investments are a deterrent. It should be understood that the money of the oligarchs is not only their private capital, but also the capital of the country. Proper use of it accelerates the development of Ukraine, and the wrong one, on the contrary, slows down. Therefore, if oligarchs lack patriotism and social consciousness in order to invest their money qualitatively, then the state should create systemic prerequisites for them to be forced to do so, so that they have no other choice. Actually, the last few years have confirmed that the comprehensive introduction of market mechanisms makes the oligarchs manage the capital more rationally, directing it to where it gives the country much more benefit than before. Of course, this is good for Ukraine, regardless of your attitude to the oligarchs.

As a result, the dynamics of the investment structure shows that in the last 6-11 years many changes have taken place in Ukraine. In many cases, the investors' conduct has radically changed, which in turn changes the structure of the economy and the list of sectors that determine its development. In most cases, these transformations are positive. They indicate that the country has begun to move in the right direction. So, in this movement there is not enough consistency and pace, but no one can say that we are marking time or rolling back.



# Where's brotherly Russia when you need it?

Economic decline is destroying occupied Donbas even faster than the armed conflict at this point

**Denys Kazanskiy** 

In ORDiLO, people are saying this winter is the worst in recent years and are comparing it to the first winter of the war, 2014-2015. But this time, it's not about the intensity of the fighting but the overall state of the economy and public services. Since the beginning of 2019, everything has somehow gone down the tubes in the two "people's republics."

Heavy snowfall in the first days of January suddenly turned into a real natural disaster as it drove municipal services off track for the entire month. Trash was collected only sporadically and streets were not being cleaned all through January and into early February. One after another, the roofs of old factory shops began to collapse as no one bothered to clear the snow off them, even killing two people, one in Horlivka and one in Debaltseve, during January. Not one major snowfall had had such a damaging and tragic impact in Donbas in pre-war times.

DESPITE COUNTLESS EXAMPLES OF PEOPLE AND PRODUCTION FLEEING FROM SUPPOSEDLY "FREE DONBAS" TO TERRITORY CONTROLLED BY "FASCISTS AND PUNISHERS," THE MILITANTS IN THE EAST CONTINUE TO WAGE WAR.

OF COURSE, IT'S NOT CLEAR TO MOST OF THEM WHAT IT'S ALL FOR, AT THIS POINT

Social nets filled with angry commentary and photographs of overflowing garbage bins and uncleared roads that were impossible to drive. The scale of the problems was so huge that even one of the top Donetsk separatists, Andriy Purghin, was critical of things. Speaking about the city of Donetsk, he admitted that the catastrophic state of municipal services was the result of lack of funding—as well as the bad attitude of the "DNR government" towards the people.

"Today, the attitude of those in power to the rest of the population is disgusting," wrote Purghin. "And that's what's getting in the way of those people who maintain our metropolis working properly You can see how badly trash is being collected: mountains of it, covered in snow. Yet there are tons of vacancies: 200 just for tram and trolley-bus drivers. It's time to figure out why no one is applying for these jobs. It's not just the miserable pay, but the way people are treated by those in power. Half the city is jobless but no one's willing to apply for jobs at those wages and those working conditions"

The same situation can be seen all across the "republic." But you won't find any proper analysis of the situation with industry in ORDiLO: censorship will prevent anything from being written about that. Still, bits and pieces of information manage to get into the press, which offers at least some general picture. It's depressing and wretched.

On February 1, the official DNR press published an interview with Denys Pushylin in which he admitted that all their plans to relaunch the Stirol plant in Horlivka, ORDi-LO's biggest chemical plant, had fallen through. For several years, the militant leaders had been assuring everybody that they would be able to relaunch the giant, which had stopped operating in 2014. Announcements of that production was about to be revived at Stirol came in 2017 and 2018. The person responsible for the project at that point was Oleksandr Zakharchenko ally and the second in command in DNR, Oleksandr Tymofeyev. After the former was assassinated and the latter fled to Russia, all talk of relaunching the plant died as well. And so Pushylin finally admitted that the plant would not start operations for the foreseeable future.

"Yes, there really were plans to launch Stirol," Pushylin told the press. "But given the escalation of conflict, the chances of a man-made catastrophe due to artillery fire or a terrorist act are too high as it would likely lead to a large-scale ammonia leak and a cloud of dangerous chemicals that could affect hundreds of hectares of territory. That's why we decided to stop preparations to launch large-scale production of ammonium nitrate and urea. There is a slew of other difficulties tied to the delivery of sufficient volumes of gas and the lack of a reliable source of electrical power."

In reality, Stirol has not been in the way of fire for quite some time. The factory is located in a part of Horlivka that is relatively far from the front and shells do not reach that area. What's really making it difficult to restore operations are, in fact, the problems with natural gas deliveries and a reliable power supply that Pushylin mentioned in passing. Yet these are issues that could easily have been resolved in the four years since the signing of the second Minsk ceasefire. Only someone either didn't want to or could not do it.

Given that Stirol depended on gas from Russia prior to the war, it's not entirely clear what is stopping the Russians from organizing supplies to the plant today, given that Russia is pretty in charge of the occupied territories. The same is true for electricity, which could come to Stirol from the DNR power station—the occupied territory has two powerful cogeneration plants or thermal energy stations: the Zuyivska TES and the Starobeshivska TES — or even directly from the RF. Not only that, but there has been more than enough time to install some high-voltage lines — only no one thought it necessary. Russia has wasted billions of dollars on the war in Syria but somehow never found the budget to help "fraternal Donbas."

For Horlivka, relaunching the plant would be a major event as it was a company town. Instead, the company went into idle mode while jobs were cut in large numbers. All that



Under indefinite conservation. Even the occupying leadership has no plans to relaunch the Stirol plant in Horlivka

remain today are essential workers to keep the equipment and the workshops intact.

Lack of support from Russia makes it impossible to get production up and running on LNR as well. Not long ago, LNR militant leader Leonid Pasichnyk met with "administrator of Antratsyt and Antratsyt County" Serhiy Sayenko, during which they talked about reviving the Slavsant piping plant, which hasn't been operating for quite some time already. According to Sayenko, production was halted because they have no markets to sell their product on.

"We have a piping plant, but it's idle," the self-declared mayor complained to Pasichnyk. "It could be producing plastic and metal pipes. The plant is completely functional, but there's a problem with sales markets."

To hear this kind of statement from LNR leadership is strange, indeed, given that Antratsyt is about 50 km from the Russian border, beyond which a huge market of 147 million resides. Precisely this nearness to the Russian Federation's borders was given as the main reason why the local powers-that-be and oligarchs did not want to sign an Association Agreement with the EU back in 2013. In the spring of 2014, the separatist leaders brought locals out for rallies, persuading them that their goods were not needed in Europe, but fraternal Russia was eager to buy them. And so when the militants got things their way and traded Ukrainian flags for Russian ones in ORDiLO, suddenly it turned out that Russia had no interest in helping anyone there and products made in the "people's republics" was not really needed, after all. The only exports that keep moving actively across the Russian border are coal and metals, that is, cheap raw materials that Russia buys at depressed prices. Finished product from Donbas nobody needs.

The irony is that, despite the dire predictions of pro-Russian politicians, the last four years have seen many new com-

panies launched in Ukraine that are focused on EU markets. In Lviv Oblast alone, several factories making spare parts for cars have been greenfielded. By contrast in the Russia-controlled parts of Donbas, not only have no new plants been built in the last five years, but even the facilities that were operating well outside the immediate conflict area have not been put back on track.

In this kind of situation, everyone who can is trying to bring their manufacturing facilities out of the grey zone – but it clearly isn't always possible. An industrial giant can't simply be picked up and moved anywhere else, although smaller facilities sometimes can and do move. For instance, it recently became known that the Metals & Polymers plant that was operating in Alchevsk until 2014 has moved production to Pervomaisk in Mykolayiv Oblast. Director Denys Rysukhin announced that operations would be launched in the spring under its new name, TOV Metipol. Moreover, the same team that was operating in Alchevsk will be servicing production at the new location. Thus, for the sake of the protectors of the Russian-speaking population," Alchevsk lost specialists, taxes and jobs. Now people will be producing goods and paying taxes in Mykolayiv Oblast, in so-called that "fascist Ukraine" so despised by the fans of LNR and DNR.

Despite countless examples of people and production fleeing from supposedly "free Donbas" to territory controlled by "fascists and punishers," the militants in the east continue to wage war. Of course, it's not clear to most of them what it's all for, at this point. This meaningless conflict will only lead to the further degradation and decay of the region. As long as certain counties of Donbas remain under the control of the Russian proxies who call themselves "separatists," there's little reason to believe that anything will improve.  $\blacksquare$ 

# What's in a campaign platform?

What are the main candidates for president proposing in their platforms and how have these changed from what they proposed five years ago

**Andriy Holub** 

As predicted by pundits and journalists alike, the upcoming election has already broken a record: the Central Electoral Commission has registered a whopping 44 individuals. The next largest field was back in 2004, when 26 candidates were registered and 24 ended up on the ballots in the end. In the very first election for president, back in 1991, there were only seven running. What has caused this huge number of people to decide to participate in the race is hard to say. Moreover, 44 is only those whose applications passed muster. All told, 90 people applied. Maybe it's time to raise the registration fee that applicants have to hand over to the budget, UAH 2.5 million or around US \$90,000. The last time it was raised was nearly 10 years ago. Then it was equivalent to \$315,000, but the hryvnia has lost nearly 70% of its value since 2014. The Committee of Voters of Ukraine has recommended raising the fee to UAH 10mn.

Only the two individuals who emerge from the first round as winners will see their money again, and those who are likely to do so are not many. The latest opinion polls show that the frontrunners are currently neck and neck, making it hard to determine which two will make it into the second round. At the same time, the group of candidates who are likely to get at least 5% of the vote has also remained pretty stable: the six include the current president, Petro Poroshenko, former premier and gas princess Yulia Tymoshenko, producer and comedian Volodymyr Zelenskiy, MP and former boss of Naftogaz Ukrainy Yuriy Boyko, former Defense Minister Anatoliy Hrytsenko, and the chief "radical" in the Rada Oleh Liashko. All but Zelenskiy ran in the 2014 election. *The Ukrainian Week has* decided to compare the platforms of the leaders then and now.

#### **PLENTY OF WATER**

An election platform is not exactly a freely creative effort on the part of a presidential candidate. The law on the election of the head of state specifies that the documents submitted to the CEC need to be prepared in the state language and it is not to be longer than 12,000 printed characters. That's somewhat less than the size of the text that the reader is now reading. In addition, the election platform can be one of the reasons for rejecting an application if it calls for the country to abandon its independence, for its constitutional order to be violently overthrown, for its sovereignty and territorial integrity to be violated and its security undermined, for an illegal overthrow of the government, if it propagates war, violence, stirs up interethnic, racial or religious conflict, or if it threatens the civil rights and freedoms or health of the general population.

Finding open and specific promises in platforms is actually not that easy. Although the Constitution says that the president is responsible primarily for foreign policy, and security and defense, none of the six leading candidates has ignored socio-economic issues. With some, these take up the majority of their platforms. Given this, Ukrainian Week tried to compare only those planks that are very specific: name a proposed bill, present percentage indicators or at least offer some clear proposals regarding a specific aspect of a broader problem or issue. Any indicator is measured in terms of "fairness," "worthiness," "honesty," "acceptability," or "reliability," they were left outside this analysis. For instance, some candidates promised to ensure voters "accessible" loans. But what is "accessible" will be different for different people. Not that such vague planks are anything surprising or new. Unspecific promises offer candidates the broadest space within which to not fulfill them once they become president. Platforms based on mostly promises of this nature were the first common feature of all candidates in the 2014 election and this year's is no different.

#### **PETRO POROSHENKO**

Five years ago, Poroshenko's platform was headlined by the slogan, "Living in a new way." This time, he proposes moving "on our own path to a grand goal." His 2014 platform is the easiest to evaluate and all its promises can grouped as fulfilled, partly fulfilled or just words.

Those planks of Poroshenko's platform that were completely fulfilled include signing the DCFTA Agreement with the European Union, instituting two-round mayoral elections, increasing defense spending and renewing the Armed Forces. Tax breaks for SMEs were preserved. Ukraine also managed to maintain its energy independence and to diversify natural gas suppliers, which included another obvious achievement: refusing to buy fuel from Russia and winning the Stockholm

Arbitration against Gazprom. The final point was establishing Public Television.

Other promises were only partly fulfilled: Poroshenko promised and achieved a visa-free regime with the EU, which Ukrainians got, but he also promised to start negotiations about joining the EU during his first term, which has not happened. In his 2014 platform, Poroshenko promise to "preserve the current status quo on the language issue." But there is still no new law on language: the Rada has passed first reading and the president has indicated he supports it. Other than that, he promised that the farm sector would become the "breakthrough sector" for the Ukrainian economy. In 2015, farm exports really

did outdo metallurgical exports for the first time in independent Ukrainian history to become the leader. However, so far, there has been no "breakthrough" in Ukraine's economy in the last five

The set of issues around justice are a separate topic. The president committed himself to reforming the law enforcement system. The soviet *militsia* was formally replaced by the police, the prosecutorial system was reformed, new investigative bodies were established, and the National Anti-Corruption Agency was set up. The reform of judges continues to this day. However, it's not easy to assess the real effect of these changes. According to public opinion polls trust in government institutions remains extremely low and the issue of corruption is one of the most burning. Scandals come up time and again over how difficult it is to bring to justice the guilty parties. Among the promises that were not fulfilled at all: approving a law on the opposition, setting a new and key role for the Anti-Monopoly Committee (AMC) in the government system, "closing all offshore hidey-holes," and transferring executive power at the local level from governors to local councils. In the last case, decentralization reform has been launched, but the Constitution has not been amended to reflect it. Last but not least in the list of promises not carried out was the very unrealistic one to "avoid war and preserve peace, and find an acceptable way to cooperate with Russia, primarily economically."

Five years later, unlike other candidates, Poroshenko is no longer promising peace. In his 2018 program, he talks about "continuing to work on restoring the territorial integrity of Ukraine," adding a little later "by political and diplomatic means." The remainder of his unfulfilled promises are nowhere to be seen: nothing about the role of the AMC or a law on the opposition. Nor are there any specific initiatives regarding decentralization, only a mention that it will continue. In contrast to the other five candidates in the top six, Poroshenko's platform is very specific about how the Armed Forces: consolidate air defense and

modernize the Air Force and Navy. Poroshenko is also the only one who mentions the need to return Kremlin captives and hostages from the occupied territories. He does not mention any new initiatives in the justice area.

> The notion that the farm sector can be the driver of the domestic economy comes up again. However, this time, five strategic areas are mentioned: the IT sector, transport, a new industrialization, and tourism in addition to farming. Poroshenko promises "billion-dollar investments" in all these sectors. But the main promises are applying for EU membership, and getting and implementing the NATO Membership Action Plan (MAP) in 2023.

#### **YULIA TYMOSHENKO**

In 2014, the Batkivshchyna leader brought her application to the CEC with the heading "Time to establish justice." This time, the title was "A new course."

Some of what Tymoshenko promised in 2014 has been carried out. This includes increasing defense spending to 5% of GDP, signing the Association Agreement and passing a new law on state procurements. Moreover, a big chunk of her promises remain pertinent. "Releasing Crimea from Russian occupation," "ratifying the Rome Statute of the ICC," "establishing full-cycle domestic nuclear fuel production," "introducing the

mechanism of private prosecution," "withdrawing immunity from MPs, judges and the president of Ukraine and introducing an effective presidential impeachment mechanism." This list goes on. However, even among the planks in Tymoshenko's 2019 platform, only the withdrawal of immunity and the return of Crimea remain. She promises to get the peninsula and eastern Donbas de-occupied using "military and diplomatic channels" and calls for the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to be fulfilled. The Batkivshchyna leader is not the only one who has not kept track of the fate of her own previous promises. This is a common trait among five of the six front-runners, given that Zelenskiy is running for the first time. The platforms of all the candidates have been radically upgraded and the general themes remain largely simply headlines: the Constitution, the economy, social policy, etc.

In her 2019 program, Tymoshenko talks about completely upgrading the Armed Forces to NATO standards, reducing the Rada to 350 MPs from the current 450, and directly changing central and local governments at any time simply through a referendum. She promises elections of justices of the peace and local court judges, the legal right for citizens to legislate via petitions. and all local governments to be run by local councils through executive committees. In the energy sector, Tymoshenko no longer mentions nuclear fuel, but commits herself to the rapid development of renewables and "trading all energy resources on exchanges."

In the economic and social spheres, Tymoshenko guarantees salary levels as high as in Poland within the next five years, private pension accounts that will be accumulated through payroll deductions, and no more single social contribution. Her most famous top promise is to reduce the household natural gas rate by half "in the first month of the new presidency." The Batkivshchyna leader's platform also mentions micro-credits worth up to US \$100,000 for business without collateral and only 3% interest. For this purpose, she announced a new bill that would force banks to issue such loans. Tymoshenko also promises a UAH 50,000 maternity benefit for the first child, UAH

#### YURIY BOYKO

fewer numbers...

In 2014, the former energy minister's platform had no title, which only emphasized the haste with which those who were top officials under Yanukovych prepare for the May 25 election. Five years later, Boyko has a "Plan for the peaceful development of Ukraine." His recent decision to join forces with Viktor Medvedchuk can be felt in the difference between this candidate's two platforms.

As before, Boyko is oriented towards the nominally pro-Russian voter. In 2014, he called for Russian to be recognized as the second state language, but his old platform was considerably more modest and vague in a slew of other areas.

Boyko is the only candidate who openly proposes protecting the interests of Big Business in his platform – as well as the SMEs, about which his rivals talk all the time. Boyko calls for Ukraine to cooperate economically with all countries, for laws to be rational when they guarantee



social benefits, and for the energy sector to be modernized. But there are few specifics.

In his 2019 platform, Boyko states in his first paragraph: "Our state should be independent and neutral," He suggests that Ukraine is moving away from the foundations of its Declaration of Independence. Further, he proposes implementing "all international commitments" Ukraine has taken on to establish peace in Donbas and "direct negotiations with all parties to the conflict." In the next section, he talks about direct elections of local leadership and "economic independence" for the regions. All this is combined with setting up a local municipal police. His economic and social planks are close to what he proposed during his previous run. Boyko promises that the economy will grow 5-7% annually, which is slightly less than other candidates who name numbers. But his maternity benefit is higher than Tymoshenko's: UAH 100,000 for the first child, UAH 200,000 for the second one, and UAH 400,000 for all subsequent ones. He also proposes cancelling the "inhuman" medical reforms and restoring the 10-year public school system.

#### **ANATOLIY HRYTSENKO**

In the previous election, Hrytsenko's platform was extremely short. Initially, he stated that he would carry out the Civic Position party's platform and added a link to the party's website, where people could read it. Later, he added some general and unspecific promises such as: "I will clean the state of corruption and force officials to uphold the law." At the end, the candidates personal phone number was posted.

In 2019, Hrytsenko's platform is very long. He prom-

ises a law on impeaching the president and the return of Donbas within five years. Crimea will also "be Ukrainian," but here there's no timeframe. He promises to appoint only officers with battle experience to the top positions in the military and to reduce the number of generals. In addition to this, Hrytsenko is the only

one among the top six who raises the issue of private ownership of weapons "Weapons will be legalized and tracked while the state, whom people will be able to trust, will restore its monopoly on using force within the law," says his platform. He proposes a new electoral system and a ban on political advertising. Hrytsenko also takes over one of Poroshenko's unfulfilled promises from 2014: "The Anti-Monopoly Committee will become a more powerful entity than the Prosecutor General's Office, in the interests of the economy." He also forecasts 10% economic growth and salaries over €700 - "...and pensions will grow commensurately," he says - and he supports a continuing ban on exporting timber. The candidate promises to introduce a land market, but only after a series of vague conditions are met, such as "strengthening the financial capacities of farmers." Hrytsenko also promises to reduce utility rates without being specific. Among his more interesting and original promises is to give those who patronize educational institutions a complete tax holiday and life sentences for judges found taking bribes. Hrytsenko also promises not to run for a second term.

#### **OLEH LIASHKO**

form was "The Liashko Plan: Liberating Ukraine from the occupant. Order in our own land." His current platform makes no mention of Crimea at all. Whereas his platform five years ago was largely dedicated to foreign matters, the current one is almost entirely focused on domestic issues. The lion's share of planks goes to socio-economic issues. Liashko promises economic growth of 8-10% more than US \$100bn in investments, and 2 million new jobs. In order to get there, his team's reform plan has to be carried out. Utility services will be no more than 15% of household incomes and rural residents will get subsidies of up to UAH 5,000 per head of livestock. Of course, Liashko is against instituting a land market.

The long version of the Radical Party leader's 2014 plat-

Among others, he wants to cut down the Rada to 250 MPs, reduce ministries to 10, and eliminate the post of premier. Liashko also wants to see judges elected. In the international arena, he demands that the 1994 Budapest Memorandum be honored and that the US and Ukraine sign a bilateral military agreement. The return of Crimea is not the only promise from 2014 that has disappeared from Liashko's platform. Then he promised to prohibit the Party of the Regions through the courts and "public trials by jury that would include journalists, experts and civic organization, to control the government at all levels."

#### **VOLODYMYR ZELENSKIY**

Zelenskiy is the only frontrunner today who did not run for president in 2014. Like Hrytsenko, he promises to remain in office for

only one term. His first bill will be "On democracy," in which he proposes formalizing the question of referenda and other forms of direct democracy in Ukraine. He also promises to remove immunity from the president, MPs and judges. The next bill will regulate the matter of impeaching the head of state and stripping MPs of their mandates. Elected justices of the peace will regulate simple disputes. Criminal cases will be handled through jury trials. In addition to this, Zelenskiy promises to pay service personnel at NATO levels, calls for the 1994 Budapest Memorandum to be honored, and notes that "the abdication of national interests and territory is not subject to negotiation." Among Zelenskiy's more original promises is "a zero declaration" for businesses: "For 5%, all business owners will be able to declare and legalize their income," says the text of his platform, effectively offering a cheap amnesty deal. He was also the only frontrunner to propose forming a land market without any conditions attached. On social issues, Zelenskiy proposes the principle that "money follows talented students" in education, basic medical insurance paid by the state for the poor and mandatory annual checkups. The pension system should be cumulative rather than paygo, according to his platform. Like the incumbent, Zelenskiy proposes changing the corporate profit tax to a capital gains tax and he thinks that the SBU needs to stop handling financial crimes.

When it comes to decentralization, however, Zelenskiy has little to say other than to mention that government

agencies should be shifted from Kyiv to the regions.

### The nomadic state

What is unique about Ukrainian migration and how it impacts national identity

Svitlana Odynets, social anthropologist, PhD in History

Mobility could be one of the fundamental social experiences that might help Ukrainian society better understand its collective identity and implement its modern political project. In her article titled A Big Migrant Family in the Krytyka magazine, Is. 7-8 from 2015, Svitlana Filonova listed all "voluntary" migrations experienced by millions of Ukrainians in the 20th century alone, including the removal of kurkuls, the soviet label for peasants owning land or property, deportations, mass replacement migration, exiles, expulsions and special replacement to industrial areas in the Soviet Union. The death of Joseph Stalin hardly stopped this perpetuum mobile. Other important waves of Ukrainian migration date back to the period between the 1890s and the beginning of World War I, the interwar period and World War II, when many were political migrants, including Ukrainian nationalists. Then came the post-1991 migration.

The beginning of the 1990s saw physical dismantling of the borders against the freshly post-soviet states and the rise of globalization discourse in the Western world. Movement and mobility gained special value in it, becoming an exclusive symbolic asset: tell me how much you travel, and I will tell you who you are.

Philosopher Zygmunt Bauman believes that traveling has become an item of consumption similar to fancy cars, nice clothing and good food. People are now into mass consumption of emotions, landscapes and experiences gained through traveling. As a result, the ability to travel the world and to choose the routes increasingly becomes a new factor of inequality between who can travel freely and those who have no resources to do so, or no resources to travel freely, safely, with a comfortable amount of food and sleep. According to Bauman, all active travellers of today fall into "tourists" or "vagabonds". Tourists can travel freely, their presence desirable and expected. According to Bauman, these include what we refer to as the global elite, i.e. journalists, writers, software developers, academics and scientists, and managers in international companies. I would add the entire nominal middle and upper middle class in different parts of the world to this cohort. Vagabonds travel too, but they often do so against their will, forced out of the places where they would prefer to stay.

Bauman points out that most tourists don't really know which status they will find themselves in the next day, while today's privilege is in no way guaranteed for them tomorrow. However nominal these metaphors, they lead to an interesting conclusion: the movement of today, including all types of migration, is closely tied with the reformatting of identities and values. Migration can be both cause and consequence

in these transformations. As the discourse of individuality evolves, people move in space as well as within their own understanding of self regardless of the quality of their migration. In a broader sense, migrations are linked to the dynamics of subjectivity and development of agency - both individually and as a group. Isn't it important to reflect on this in Ukraine's context as 5.8 million of Ukrainians have left the country since 1991, including nearly 3 million as labor migrants, and another 1.6 million migrating within the country after 2014?

How does this historical experience of mobility affect Ukrainians - primarily in a positive sense - and how could we reconsider it today, in the new context of globalization as it affects Ukraine, because going to live somewhere far for a long time injects many senses and consequences into an individual and his or her environment, rather than being just an escape, treason

EMIGRATION IS OFTEN A SUSPENSION OF SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH THE STATE, OR TERMINATION OF IT IN EXTREME SCENARIOS.

> THIS IS FOOT VOTING, AN OPEN MESSAGE OF DISSENT, PROTEST AND A PRIVATE WAR AGAINST THOSE IN POWER IN SOME CASES

or the survival strategy of the last resort. What kinds of cultural and social capital do the travellers of today exchange, and who stays waiting for them in Ukraine? How many diasporas does Ukraine have, and who are the people we deal with across our border? Where exactly is across?

#### SHAPED BY COLLECTIVE MEMORY

The first most interesting thing is that mass migration was the fastest voluntary reaction of society to the economic and social crisis of the 1990s. The collapse of the Soviet Union was almost immediately followed by the labor migration of many people who took little to no time to mobilize, find the necessary means, ways and labor markets when mass access to internet wasn't yet there. Initially came the shuttle migration with several border crossings in a day to resell cigarettes. This was followed by summer migration to harvest berries in the neighbour countries. After Eastern Europe, Ukrainians discovered the labor markets in Southern and Western Europe where they ended up working many years. Nordic countries are an exception with no mass labor migration from beyond the EU. That longterm migration in which people maintain very close relations with the family back home, spend regular vacations in Ukraine and build several-bedroom houses n "for retirement" is a new type of migration, a new type of cross-border social relations and a new type of identity that contribute to Ukraine's development and will do so in the future.

The pioneers crossed the borders to the countries with no Ukrainian diasporas or Russian-speaking post-soviet diasporas which they often saw as "ours". The newcomers could not even expect to get a place to sleep when they first arrived. In those markets where no-body really welcomed them, they took positions along-side the third or fourth-generation migrants within a matter of years. For example, the Ukrainian community in Italy is now the largest community of emigrant women, ahead of women from the Philippines and African countries that started emigrating to Italy over 50

THIS MEANS THAT WE ARE FACING MILLIONS OF PEOPLE WHO, WILLINGLY OR NOT, ARE BEYOND THEIR USUAL AND ESTABLISHED MATRIX AND PATTERNS OF COMMUNICATION AND CONDUCT, AND SEEK TO REDISCOVER THEMSELVES. HOW MUCH INNOVATION AND SOCIAL TRAUMA IS THERE IN THAT CAPITAL, AND WHICH OF THE TWO DOMINATES IN IT?

years ago. I will dare assume that such fast build-up of Ukrainian communities in Portugal, Italy, Spain and Greece is a unique phenomenon. I have personally not encountered similar cases in research of other migrations in the world.

Paul Collier, a heavily quoted researcher of migration, and many others believe that the presence of old diaspora is one of the three key factors in the development of migration flows to a country, and an important factor of integration for the newcomers. This was the case of the post-2004 mass Polish migration to the UK and Nordic countries among others. Old Polish di-



**Predecessors of present-day migrants.** According to sociological studies, many Ukrainian labor migrants had family members who left Ukraine to seek better life abroad 100 years ago

aspora structures were awaiting and EU membership with its free access to the labor market helped. Collier claims that the movement of new migrants in economically poor countries is often enhanced by banks, special organizations that fund the trips, or diasporas in the destination countries. None of these factors worked collectively in Ukraine's migration after 1991.

Ukrainian migration stands out as an exception that may well question the consensus of Western migration theories. How did these transnational migrations evolve within very short timeframes without intermediaries, and how did those who risked the move manage to organize themselves so quickly without any help from social institutions in Ukraine or from the destination countries in the EU? In fact, the only supporting institutions were the Roman Catholic Church acting through the Caritas network in Southern Europe and the Greek Catholic Church that quickly established parishes in new countries. They supported Ukrainian migrants from the Christian perspective. That self-organization of people coming from a society with very low social trust and little experience of daily grassroots civic activity - up until the fall of 2013 at least - is a distinct phenomenon in the post-soviet Ukrainian realm on a par with both revolutions and the volunteer movement now.

My hypothesis and attempt to explain this phenomenon based on interviews with migrants, — which still makes it a hypothesis as this phenomenon has not really been researched in Ukraine or abroad — is that the migration happened under the umbrella of collective memory. Most of my interviewees who work as labor migrants in EU member-states today had labor migrants in their families, mostly in the first and the second waves. They used to read their letters and knew their life trajectories.

In a country where the movement of grandparents across borders was so intense and large-scale, and so was the movement of borders over people to paraphrase Rogers Brubaker, mobility may have become one of the most important collective traits and experiences of a community. It may now be shared via air or genes as the main way to earn one's living, especially when there is no longer a field you grow food for that. Owning a field where wheat grows as an opportunity to be yourself and to take back your own subjectivity – could these be the main drivers for the grand exodus that began a long time ago and continues to this day?

#### **SOCIAL CONTRACT ON PAUSE**

Those who decide to emigrate do so not only to build a new house or pay for their children's education. Emigration is often a suspension of social contract with the state, or termination of it in extreme scenarios. This is foot voting, an open message of dissent, protest and a private war against those in power in some cases. Those who stay are mostly critical about those who emigrate although physical movement does not imply – and never did – a refusal to fight that war. Quite on the contrary, it often implies the intensification of the fight. Emigration as a protest, regardless of whether this is how the reason for emigration is articulated, is often a reaction to insufficient opposition to injustice within the society the person leaves.

The same can be relevant for those who stay. Staying may also imply struggle or a private war against injus-

tice, and protest against social norms and values. This is a barely researched phenomenon: Western universities and foundations are far less interested in looking at the changes resulting from mass migrations in the countries of origin, even though there are far more non-migrants in the world as 97% of people on the planet live in the countries of their birth.

There is a permanent hidden conflict between the people who stay and people who leave, and it manifests itself quite strongly in the public discourse. This is because mobility has become new symbolic capital. This is also because the traumatic memory of life in the socialist camp, its imagined barbed wires stronger than the real ones, is still very much alive. But there is freedom to stay in addition to freedom to move. One is free to not leave his or her country. Both choices, as well as their underlying values and identities, can be a resource for the country provided that the agents of these choices cooperate as partners. They can start with respecting the choice of the other.

After so many migrations Ukrainians experienced in the 20th century, today's Ukraine seems to have very few families with no experience of traveling as labor migrants or as IDPs according to the bureaucratic definition. This means that we are facing millions of people who, willingly or not, are beyond their usual and established matrix and patterns of communication and conduct, and seek to rediscover themselves. How much innovation and social trauma is there in that capital, and which of the two dominates in it?

Given the lack of research and broader reflections about this, we still talk about migration within the same categories and intonations as for the first waves of migration, even though modern transnational movements generate a completely different migration experience. Most migrants do not treat that movement as leaving Ukraine for good.

The migrants in the EU return to Ukraine regularly, once or several times a year, and invest into their families. They prepare to retire in Ukraine as they build big houses that stay empty so far. They are very much tied to their country. I assume that most will ultimately return to Ukraine. That return, however, will happen once they overcome the shock and the great internal anxiety of settling the conflict between the memory of the environment they left and their experience of the environment they return to several decades later, which can never be the same. For now, they could be Ukraine's best cultural diplomats if they knew that the government and society would appreciate that.

#### IN NEED OF DECOMPRESSION

In addition to the millions of Ukrainian migrants across Europe and the US, Ukraine's society today has over a million people moved within the country. While they remain in the same climate, language and overall cultural experience, they still have to comprehend a generally familiar, yet different social environment. Therefore, in addition to the traditional diasporas abroad of which Ukrainian society always remembers, it has a diaspora of sorts within the country as the borders have moved over people, accidental diasporas according to Brubaker. This group also encompasses all those who openly or silently identify themselves as part of the political Ukrainian national project and play a special role in the shaping of it, even when they



The distant rear. Ukrainian diaspora got actively engaged in the civic life of their homeland after 2014

do not liveon the territory controlled by Kyiv. Crimean Tatars provide one example. These groups require special policy from Kyiv and special individual approach to attempts to comprehend their internal history.

Ukraine is facing many questions in this respect. They are about the ties between the diasporas and their country of origin in the future; and whether society actually benefits from the multi-billion financial transfers the migrants send from abroad, possibly offsetting social protest against corrupt systems that would be inevitable without these financial cushions. More important is a discussion about the circulation of cultural capitals: can we benefit from communication with those who have lived in the West for many years, and how values change within that migration project? Could Ukrainian society embrace back the millions of Ukrainians who have migrated over the past 30 years, and what would it change?

The answers probably lie in the decompression of complex collective experiences. This means that we should stop thinking about modern movement of people as flows and masses, and focus instead on the diversity of live human experiences with curiosity about others. The experience of mobility could be our next Pandora box, but we could hardly avoid opening it.

## Betting on zero How the current and former leadership of the self-declared republics in occupied Dorbas see the upcoming elections for

**Denys Kazanskiy** 

Donbas see the upcoming elections for President of Ukraine

It's no secret that elections in Ukraine, like all other events. if it comes to that, are a matter of careful scrutiny in the country's eastern neighbor. Just taking a look at Russia's national television channels, you would think that the Russian Federation was occupied by Ukraine. Ukraine is the main headline-grabber. Talk-shows often dedicate 60-70% of their air time to events in Ukraine. No other neighbor of Russia's has merited this much attention. And there's a level at which it's easy to understand Russians. After all, they don't have elections of their own, just like Belarus and Kazakhstan don't. So what's left to gossip and speculate about

One of the main topics that Russians return to again and again, like a loose tooth, is the future of the Minsk Accords and LNR/DNR. Will there be a new team after the election? If so, how conciliatory will it be? Will it agree to legitimize the occupied territories and give them special status as a part of Ukraine? Or, on the contrary, will it continue the confrontation with the militants? And of course, against this background, the topic that is most hotly discussed now is who in Ukraine would be the optimal candidate for Russia and its satellites.

The same issue is being raised in ORDiLO as well. The nominal leaders and official spokespersons for the "republics" have almost stopped talking about joining Russia, although in 2014 they called on the people of the Donbas to take up arms and come to the referendum for this very purpose. Now, there

are earnest voiced instructions from Russia whose message is that DNR and LNR want to implement the Minsk Accords. meaning to rejoin Ukraine as counties with special status.

Not long ago, Leonid Pasichnyk and Denys Pushylin made basically the same speech simultaneously, whose essence boiled down to saying that the leaders of the two "republics" were prepared for direct talks with Kyiv. This is all strikingly different from declarations of the militants in the early stages of the war about "we aren't talking to any junta." Of course, all those who made such statements are today either dead or were forced to return to Russia.

'For my part, I'm ready to openly and directly talk with Kyiy, with the current leadership or whatever leadership replaces it, for the sake of peace on our land, for the sake of our children and their future," says the latest statement from Pasichnyk, which was posted on his official site on February 21. In it, the LNR warlord also calls on Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel to use their influence with Petro Poroshenko and force him to negotiate directly with representatives of LNR and DNR.

That same day, Pushylin's statement was posted. Unlike Pasichnyk, he not only announced his readiness to negotiate but also made positive references to pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine, who also insist on direct talks with DNR/LNR. "The Donbas has consistently proposed continuing the negotiations of the Minsk process, supporting in every way possible the initiatives of Ukraine's opposition politicians to intensify negotia-



Ready to talk? ORDILO leaders openly say that they're ready for dialog with the new president of Ukraine – as long as it isn't Petro Poroshenko

tions and the implementation of the Minsk Accords," Pushylin's statement reads. "We are ready for direct dialog with Kyiv."

Which specific "Ukrainian opposition politicians" he has in mind is fairly easy to guess. First of all, they are Viktor Medvedchuk and Yuriy Boyko, who have publicly called for negotiating directly with the militants and giving ORDiLO the status of an autonomous region. Akhmetov's people in the Opposition Bloc have made similar statements, albeit more cautiously. In this way, the situation in eastern Ukraine is slowly drawing closer to the point from which it started. Where in 2014 the "separatists" rose up against the local Regionals at some point, slipped out of their control and declared that the Donbas would no longer belong to them, right now they are already openly saying that they are ready to return to some form of cooperation with them. Pro-Russian parties and separatist armed groups are now talking the same language again. The current leadership of DNR/LNR shows no trace of yesterday's radicalism.

Yet the one-time field commanders of the militants whom the handlers have sidelined continue to push their line, insisting that ORDiLO can never return to Ukraine. Of course, the only place where they can make their radical statements these days is on their personal pages in social nets. For instance, the former commander of the Vostok battalion, Oleksandr Khodakovskiy, recently announced that even if a more pro-Russian politician comes to power in Ukraine, the militants would not agree to reintegrate.

"Think about it: people whom Russia considers a more flexible lot come to power in Ukraine, Tymoshenko & Co.," wrote Khodakovskiy. "Then they bring their people to the Rada and pass a package of bills about some kind of status for the current territories of DNR/LNR, and Russia is supposed to make a friendly gesture in return. What could that possibly be? At a minimum giving up our symbols and switching to Ukrainian? Logical? Otherwise, how will Europe believe in progress and upholding anything whatsoever? Then what? Even if everything stays the same locally: Pushylin, Pasichnyk, the councils,

and the civic movements... let's see just one Ukrainian flag appear on the streets and you'll see what happens. There'll be an explosion."

In fact, the problem Khodakovskiy talks about is very real. And it's not clear how it can be resolved if the Minsk Accords start to be implemented properly. Thousands of armed militants will become extraneous if events unfold this way, not needed by either side, not Ukraine and not Russia. And what to do with them if the conflict comes to an end is also not obvious.

It seems that the folks in DNR and LNR are the least aware of what should come next. Integration into Russia is no longer on the table. The Kremlin has ordered them to maintain a course towards a return to Ukraine, but no one knows how it should be organized, technically. It's extremely unlikely that Boyko and Medvedchuk will win in the election Obviously the main battle will be between Yulia Tymoshenko, Petro Poroshenko and Volodymyr Zelenskiy. What each of these candidates might bring, even Moscow isn't entirely sure right now.

THE GENERAL FEELING AROUND THE UPCOMING UKRAINIAN ELECTION IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES CAN BE DESCRIBED APPROXIMATELY AS "ANYBODY BUT POROSHENKO." IN LINE WITH THIS COMMUNICATION STRATEGY, THE MILITANT PRESS IS BUSY TODAY QUOTING ALL THE OPPOSITION CANDIDATES WHO ARE CRITICAL OF THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT

The general feeling around the upcoming Ukrainian election in the occupied territories can be described approximately as "anybody but Poroshenko." In line with this communication strategy, the militant press is busy today quoting all the opposition candidates who are critical of the current government, including Tymoshenko and Zelenskiy, in a neutral key.

Still, these same pro-Russian media sometimes also opine that Zelenskiy is Kolomoyskiy's boy – the same Ihor Kolomoyskiy who sponsored "nationalist battalions" and "the murder of residents of the Donbas," while Tymoshenko is no different from Poroshenko. For instance, after Tymoshenko spoke against offering autonomy to ORDiLO on February 8, her statement was quoted in the militant press very negatively, while radical bloggers and the militants' spokespersons emphasized that there was really no good candidate in Ukraine for them. For instance, Konstantin Dolgov, a DNR supporter who lives in Moscow today, wrote that the only thing that could make Ukraine completely pro-Russian would be Russian occupation and that Russia needn't count on any of Ukraine's politicians.

"The closer we get to the Ukrainian election, the more discussion there is about possible changes in Ukraine after these elections," Dolgov wrote. "There's even serious talk about a possible improvement in Russian-Ukrainian relations. Give it up, folks! [...] The only thing that will cut the Ukrainian knot is a sword from the side. And you know what sword I'm talking about. All that's necessary is political will and decisiveness. Right now they are missing. Let's see what happens next..."

Whatever happens, Russia really cannot hope for some major shift in Ukraine's political course after the election. Openly pro-Russian forces have almost no chance of winning, while the rest will not dare to betray the national interest. Besides, Ukraine is a parliamentary-presidential republic and the layout of political forces is currently such that none can gain sole power. In this kind of situation, the likelihood of radical changes in the country's foreign policy course is extremely small. And that means that there's unlikely to be a swift resolution of the situation in the Donbas, no matter who wins.

# Essence and specificity of the Russian-Soviet power

What system they are trying to restore in Russia today

Stanislav Kulchitskiy





The long break. From the 1918 Constituent Assembly to the 1989 Congress, democracy in Soviet Russia was put on hold

It's not easy to understand the real essence of state power in Soviet Russia. Its power was shrouded in many myths and hidden under camouflage terminology. However, it is important to understand what kind of power Ukraine actually had to deal with over the course of decades being a part of the Russian-Soviet Empire and how this power has now changed.

### SOVIET POWER AS A PRODUCT OF THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTION.

Difficulties in determining the essence of the Soviet regime date back to the times of the Russian revolution. Until now, even among some specialists, it is still widely believed that in 1917 two revolutions took place in Russia: the February bourgeoisdemocratic revolution and the workersand-peasants' one in October. However, in reality, the integral Russian revolution began with the autocracy overthrowing and ended with the dispersal of the Constituent Assembly in January 1918. The decisive role in eliminating autocracy and overthrowing the government coalition of socialist and bourgeois parties was played by the revolutionary organizations of the "lower class" people - the Soviets (councils) of workers' and soldiers' (mostly peasantry by origin) deputies. Tsarism

had mobilized millions of peasants into the army, had equipped them with arms and taught them to use them. The peasants in their soldiers' uniforms were uncompromisingly disposed to put an end to the war that the ruling classes had unleashed, to destroy the landlords and share their estates among themselves. Also, many workers were eager to transfer the enterprises at which they worked into the ownership of labor collectives.

In the Russian revolution there were two coups: the failed Kornilov's one and the successful Lenin's. Successful implementation of the latter was due to the fact that the Bolsheviks temporarily abandoned their slogans and adopted the slogans of the "lower class" people: "Peace to the peoples!", "Factories to the workers!", "Land to the peasants!" When strengthened in power, they returned from time to time to their own slogans: "Let's turn an imperialist war into a civil one!", "Let's transfer enterprises into state ownership", "Let's collectivize peasantry means of production". The October coup was simultaneously the Soviet revolutionary act and the Bolshevik counter-revolutionary turn in the revolution. After all, the collective sovereignty that the tsar's subjects got after the autocracy overthrowing did not

last long. The first free elections after the Constituent Assembly were held in 1989 – at the Congress of People's Deputies of the USSR.

Let us consider the specifics of twochannel state power, which established itself as the final product of the Russian revolution. The boundless Bolshevik's populism led them to conquer most of the Soviets (councils) of workers-and-soldiers' deputies. The case was completed by the terrorist actions of urgently created state security bodies. After the destruction of competitive political parties, the Soviets (councils) consisted solely of the Bolsheviks and non-party deputies sympathizing with them, that is, turned into a single political force with Lenin's party. However, Lenin retained their organizational independence and built a commune state, as he called it in the April Theses of 1917, with two authoritative verticals: of the party and of the Soviets. The Bolshevik Party was based on the principles of "democratic centralism" with the unconditional subordination of the lower hierarchical units to the highest. This meant that the political dictatorship, equal to the former autocracy, which it had established under the outer shell of the "dictatorship of the proletariat", was concentrated in the hands of the leaders. One of its important tasks was to carefully monitor the elections to the Soviets (councils). Subject to the party, the Soviet vertical had weighty managerial powers. Therefore, the leaders could not allow undesired persons to leak into the Soviets (councils). Those who became undesirable for them after the elections fell into the clutches of state security - in fact, independent from the party committees and executive committees of the Soviets (councils) of the additional vertical of power.

Thus, the power closely connected with the "lower class" people, but independent of them was formed. They called it Workers-Peasants' and Soviet. In the first Russian Constitution of 1918, the Communist Party was not mentioned at all. Later, the leaders designated their strength in the Constitutions, but as an empty declaration. Mimicry also spread to the name of the restored multinational empire and state structure, which the Leninist party became. These names were denationalized.

#### **REVOLUTIONARY MARXISM IN THE** SERVICE OF THE RUSSIAN-SOVIET GOVERNMENT

The revolutions that had preceded the Russian ones were bourgeois. On the other hand, the social spectrum of the Russian revolutions of 1905 and 1917 expanded significantly as a result of the appearance of Soviets (councils) of workers-and-soldiers' deputies. United in the Soviets, "lower class" people did not follow the large owners, as at times of previous revolutions, but wanted to destroy them. This desire was actually superimposed on the key demand of Marxism of the mid-nineteenth century: to establish communism during the proletarian revolution through the abolition of private ownership of the means of production. As the inventor of a two-channel state that provided a political dictatorship, Lenin simultaneously relied on revolutionary Marxism, which enabled the establishment of an economic dictatorship by liquidating private property in society.

Marx and Engels linked their hopes for the triumph of communism in "The Communist Manifesto" (1847) with the proletariat, that is, people deprived of private property. In the process of revolution, these people were to establish a proletarian state, which Marx later called "the state of the dictatorship of the proletariat". The proletariat, however, being a community devoid of an internal hierarchical structure, could not exercise the dictatorship. Therefore, in the event of a successful revolution, this function should have remained with the state. During the revolution, the state was to establish a political dictatorship, and in the process of communist

transformations, that is, by expropriating society, to achieve an economic dictatorship. In an effort to show people the path to social equality and material well-being, the young German revolutionaries really led them to slavish dependence on an omnipotent state.

In Western Europe, there were no political parties willing to adopt the ideas of revolutionary Marxism. Marxists preferred to reconcile the interests of capitalists and workers and did not follow the course of the destruction of capital — an equal agent of the production process. They considered economic activity connected with the increase of capital to be no less important a sphere of application of intelligence than activity in the sphere of science, culture, and religion. At the turn of the 20th century, Europe began, albeit in slow motion, the processes for which, after the Second World War, the suitable name was found — the transformation of capitalist states into social ones.

Having rejected to be Communists, the Marxists called themselves Social Democrats, since they based their parliamentary activities on the slogan of class peace, not class war. However, part of the Russian Social Democrats.

which went down in history as the Bolsheviks, adopted the idea of the Manifesto.

The first step by Vladimir Lenin in the future communist construction was the expropriation of the party of the Social Democrats - the Bolsheviks - by its leaders. The second step by the leaders: the expropriation of the state-commune with the help of the party. Then they began to expropriate the whole of society through the state-commune. The property of commodity producers, which ensured the economic independence of society from the state and the dependence of the state on society, during the communist transformations became the private property of the state-commune under the hypocritical name of "public" property. Ownership, use and disposal of the means of production was in the hands of the Communist Party, more precisely, of its leaders. Of course, the members of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the AUCP (b) CPSU did not own the factories, banks, and steamboats. However, they (and only they) determined all the parameters of the all-Union economy: the ratio between consumption and accumulation, sectoral and regional investments, the level of wages and social benefits, and the like. The leaders of the party did not succeed in fully expropriating the private property of the multimillion peasantry. The peasants

managed to defend the right to own, use and dispose of the products produced in the household plot and received for workdays from the collective farm. This meant that in agriculture and in the economic turnover of the city and the village, commodity-money relations remained with the use of individual elements of the free market. Accordingly, the economy of the public sector, which received the camouflage name of "socialized", was based on economic accounting using commoditymoney relationships.

The failure of attempts to implement a system of economic management based on commodity exchange meant that in the USSR they built something that was different from the first phase of communism, as interpreted by the founders of Marxism. Should we really look for another term to refer to the socio-economic system created in Soviet Russia and extended to many other countries? We had rather not... Humanity got accustomed to the term "com-

THE BOUNDLESS BOLSHEVIK'S POPULISM LED THEM TO CONQUER MOST OF THE SOVIETS (COUNCILS) OF WORKERS-AND-SOLDIERS' DEPUTIES.

THE CASE WAS COMPLETED BY THE TERRORIST ACTIONS OF URGENTLY CREATED STATE SECURITY BODIES

> munism", coined long before Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels by the same utopians. We can only point out that the leaders of Russian Bolshevism, in contrast to the founders of Marxism, did not have noble intentions when they were building communal socialism. The expropriation of society was accompanied by a brutal civil war and mass purges — up to genocide.

> The maximum possible centralization of material and labor resources helped the Soviet Union to make a major contribution to the victory of the anti-Hitler coalition in Europe. With the course of time, it established itself as a superpower capable of imposing its development matrix on many countries. However, after the leading countries entered the post-industrial era, the Eurasian superpower began to collapse. The centralized economy of "coal and steel" could not withstand competition from countries that were at the forefront of the scientific and technological revolution.

#### STATE AND SOCIETY IN THE CONTEXT OF COMMUNOSOCIALISM

The idea of communism was used by Lenin to justify the expropriation of society by the state. Neither Marx, whose mind bore a detached from reality picture of an ideal economy without a market and commodity-money relations, neither 11



**Levers of influence.** The action "Immortal regiment" is one of the most effective manifestations of Russian soft power in the post-Soviet countries

Lenin, who had tried to implement these recommendations of the Manifesto, but after three years of economic crisis, returned to the free market, nor Stalin, who started a second attack with the return of a free market ban and a disguised rejection of commodity-money relations none of them understood that private property could not be destroyed. In the end, Stalin referred the replacement of commodity circulation by product exchange and the elimination of money turnover to the second phase of communism with the distribution of material goods according to needs. The main thing he achieved: the expropriation of society by the state.

The Soviet state was not rising above the society, like any other, but launched into it its skeleton. In each horizontal section of society, the party vertical submerged with the committees of the multimillion party (with its subordinate veterans', national and women's organizations) and the committees of an even more numerous Komsomol (with its subordinate organizations of the Young Pioneers and Little Octobrists); Soviet vertical submerged with state, trade union, cooperative, public bodies and organizations; state security vertical did it with millions of recruited informants. Horizontal organizations, independent from the authorities, on the basis of which the civil society should have developed, were eliminated or verticalized. The Soviet society merged with the state into a single whole.

Countries in which society determines its leaders in free elections are called democratic. The countries in which the state represented by its leaders does not depend on the will of their people are called totalitarian. The Soviet state-society should have been called cubed totalitarian then.

The main feature of the citizens, formed by communal socialism, was absolute economic helplessness. They connected all their thoughts with the state. The paternalism brought up by the latter was due to the fact that there was no private property in society. After all, only privately owned means of production provided citizens with economic independence from the state and, accordingly, created economic dependence of the state on them. Under communal socialism, all became proletarians. The working class, which was called the "hegemon of the proletarian revolution", became a two-fold proletarian. In the market economy, they were deprived of their own means of production, but remained the owners of their labor and were interested in selling it more expensive, as a result of which they saw the point in increasing productivity. Under the conditions of communosocialism, their work force actually belonged to the state. The working class could not rely on the national trade unions in confrontation with the aggregate business owner, that is, the state, and was denied the right to strike, because, they say, it owned the company for which it worked.

The most clearly estrangement from the means of production was manifested in the collective farmers. They worked negligently on the collective farm fields using machinery. But on the backyard plot that they had won back from Stalin, which became their private property (under a different name), they worked without any technologies with full dedication. As a result, collective farms could not meet the country's food needs, but collective farm markets met consumer's demand for meat, dairy, and garden products from home gardens.

### POST-SOVIET POWER IN MODERN RUSSIA

The constitutional reform of 1988 removed the dictatorial Communist Party vertical (but not the party elite) from power, which eventually led to the collapse of the CPSU and the ruin of the USSR. "Public ownership" was left without an owner and was divided between financial and industrial groups. During the 1990s, the post-Soviet vertical of power remained unstable. It stabilized only after it was filled with people from the security forces. New rulers of the Russia's fate are trying to restore the dictatorship in the absence of a two-channel building of the state. The stability of the political regime is now ensured not by institutions, as in the USSR, but by the will of the voters. The authorities are trying to achieve the desired results of voting in the presidential and parliamentary elections by maintaining the relative well-being of the population, which for three generations has adapted to state paternalism, television "zombieing" and large-scale use of administrative resource.

In an effort to restore superpower status, the ruling circles of the Russian Federation are pursuing an offensive policy in the international arena and its armament expenditures are a disproportionately large share of GDP. The arms race and enormous corruption at the pinnacle of power affect the well-being of the population. It threatens with a social explosion, the collapse of a multinational state and the spread of nuclear missiles. Western countries do not want such a prospect for Russia, which is economically dependent on them, and therefore refrain from crushing sanctions.

The targets of the offensive policy of the Putin regime are primarily the former national republics of the USSR and the countries of "Yalta" Europe. The task is to revive the Soviet empire by means of political, economic and even, as shown by the invasion of Georgia and Ukraine, military pressure.

From the middle of the 17th century, Moscow "digested" the Ukrainian people in various ways, trying to deprive it of their own identity. In the current situation, the birthplace of world communosocialism went all-in, trying to resist the Euro-Atlantic choice of Ukraine with the help of internal agents and relying on the still significant share of those with Soviet mentality among the Ukrainian society. 100 years ago they succeeded. Ukrainian citizens could not then break out of Moscow "fraternal" embrace. Now they have every chance to put a barrier between themselves and their northern neighbor.

# Punitive psychiatry and its victims

How dissidents were punished in an era of a "real socialism"

**Liubov Krupnyk** 



1977, protests on Trafalgar square in London against the usage of 'punitive psychiatry' in Soviet Union. Leonid Plyushch, and Bohdan Nahaylo, representative of the Amnesty International (centre). Photo is taken from the personal archive of Bohdan Nahaylo

In Soviet Union some dissidents were not worried about being imprisoned or sent to a labor camp. But they would fill with fear at the near opportunity of being recognized mentally impaired and forcefully placed to a psychiatric hospital. While one could still be released and return from a prison or a labour camp, staying in the psychiatric hospitals could be indefinite.

This cruel practice of using psychiatric medicine as a tool to control and isolate dangerous dissidents was formed in the Soviet Union in late 1950s and early 1960s. Khrushchev's "Thaw", as it was called, woke up society and scared the authorities. In order to control social activism Soviet government began using the so called "punitive psychiatry".

Chair of the Soviet KGB Yuriy Andropov (1967-1982), played a key role in establishing the practice. In April 1969 he sent a project proposal to the central committee of the communist party, suggesting enlarging and improving an extensive network of psychiatric wards as a mean to "safeguard the interests of the state and society". In addition to maybe a dozen of 'special psychiatric wards' (those were also called 'prison psychiatric wards' until 1961), even regular Soviet psychiatric hospitals had separate special units. A simple copy of the court order was enough to admit anyone into psychiatric ward for compulsory treatment (and quite often patients were transferred into psychiatric facilities even without court order). Out of dozen

psychiatric wards supervised by the Soviet Ministry of Interior, Ukraine had one such facility, which has been located in Dnipropetrovsk since 1968. These facilities have once hosted numerous dissidents, including Leonid Plyushch, Mykola Plakhotnyuk, Anatoliy Lupynis, Volodymyr Klebanov, Yosyp Terelya, Yaroslav Kravchuk and many others.

Soviet general Petro Hryhorenko became one the tragically famous victim of the psychiatrists in those days. He was an important figure of the human rights movement as well as a Soviet army general and such dissent authorities tried to explain as insanity. As a result, Hryhorenko spent nearly six and a half years in psychiatric wards.

The first psychiatrist, who offered an independent professional opinion on Petro Hryhorenko's court materials, was Kyiv-born Semen Hluzman. He concluded that Hryhorenko was sane and healthy and proved that methods of repressive psychiatric medicine were illegal. Soon after, Hluzman was incarcerated himself, spending seven years in labour camps, following by the three years in exile. Despite the fact that Hluzman's medical conclusion was not official, it was an incredibly important step for the public and the society. Hluzman's medical verdict was later presented in the West.

KGB demanded that Hluzman refutes his medical conclusion. In one of the letters, sent from the camp, Hluzman wrote: "In September 1973 I was visited by an employee of the central KGB office, Hryhoriy Trofymovych Dyhas. I was taken to the meeting place ITK-36 in complete secret, where without any witnesses I was questioned and psychologically abused for three days. There was no deal – I declined, but it was very obvious that someone on top needs my help. Say, imagine suddenly Hluzman agrees to dismiss West's 'fairy tales' about Soviet practices of transferring sane people into psychiatric wards. And the price they offered was enormous."

Compulsive treatment usually caused a vast damage to people's health. In his autobiographical story, "Carnival" of history", Leonid Plyushch described in a great details his "treatment" in Dnipropetrovsk special psychiatric ward.

"Neuroleptic drugs and daily scenes have broken me morally, intellectually and emotionally. Treatment in psikhushka, in my personal experience, was designed in a way to destroy human will and ruin people's ability to resist. I was trying to spit out the pills, but they have taken away my desire to read or think: first I lost interest in political affairs, then in academic matters, and then eventually I could not even care to think about my wife and children. I had memory loss; my speech became short and disrupted. All I could think of was smoking and bribes to nurses, who would let me out to the bathroom on one more extra time. I did not even want any of those meetings to see my loved ones. despite the fact that recently it was all I dreamed of. I was afraid that my mental degradation became so visible and incurable, that it would only aid my torturers in their efforts to destroy me. Feeling of hopelessness, indefinite and prolonged stay in this hell forced many sane patients to consider suicide. I have also lost my will to live. But I only kept repeating myself: do not get angry, do not forget, do not give up!".

Leonid Plyushch is a Ukrainian mathematician and publicist. There is a witness testimony about his court hearings: "The process was held in the empty court room. Defendant's lawyer was his only representative, and yet he was refused to see the defendant before the hearing. This lawyer only saw him after everything was over. The court has only listened to the witnesses who testified against the defendant. Dyshel, the judge in his case, claimed that since the court considers compulsive medical treatment, it would not need our [witnesses'] additional testimonies. since we are not qualified medical professionals. The most terrifying was the fact, the decision has already been made prior the hearings, and even prior to announcing the results of the medical expertise. Some witnesses were told - 'he is insane, he is crazy [...] he doesn't even recognises what awaits for him anyway".

Human rights activists, including those from Amnesty International, organised protests in support of Leonid Plyushch in London and Paris. Heads of communist parties in France, Britain and Italy demanded his release. Plyush was eventually released and allowed to travel to France, where the western doctors confirmed his mental sanity. Following West's pressure, Soviet authorities agreed to release the above-

### Alexander Podrabinek

Human rights activist, journalist and one of the founders of the Commission for Investigating the Use of Psychiatry as a Political Tool in 1977. He is the author of the "Punitive Medicine" (1977). Parts of this book were confiscated by the KGB and the rest was published through samvydav . Punitive medicine was written using the sources and evidence which Podrabinek has been collecting during three years, using the evidence of more than 200 victims of the Soviet punitive

psychiatry. This book was also presented at the World Psychiatric Association congress in Honolulu and was published in the US in 1980. Owing to the Podrabinek's efforts, some victims of the specialised psychiatric wards were freed. He himself was also once imprisoned for his activism.

"Punitive psychiatry in the Soviet Union was a universal tool of political persecution and was used against any dissident, regardless of their social, religious or national differences. Every soviet republic had their own psychiatrists who betrayed their profession and agreed to serve the lawless actions of the totalitarian regime".

## **Robert Van Voren**

During the Soviet

Dutch sovietologist, human rights defender, secretary general of the international organisation called "Global war in the psychiatry", lecture in the universities of Georgia, Lithuania and Ukraine, author of "Cold was in psychiatry". This book was published in Ukraine in 2017.

times, and especially in 1960s and 1970s, psychiatry was used and abused in every Soviet republic, but in Russia and Ukraine in particular. Psychiatric wards located here were the cruellest. In Dnipropetrovsk many patients were tortured and had medications tested on them. But only after the collapse of the

Soviet Union we have realised that it was not only the political prisoners, who suffered, it was also genuinely sick patients. The latter were absolutely destroyed by the system. Over the past 30 years many things have changed, but the legacy of the Soviet psychiatry unfortunately remains. We can only hope that the new generation will overcome these ghosts of the dreadful pasts.


mentioned general Petro Hryhorenko, as well as a Kharkiv-born psychiatrist Anatoliy Koryahin. Those were a few exceptions among countless victims of the Soviet punitive psychiatry. Some people were transferred to a psychiatric ward for wearing a cross or reading a Bible. The only way out was to acknowledge one's mental sickness, and even then, according to Plyushch memoirs, only "KGB would diagnose and treat the patient in question, and subsequently decide whether and when he can leave the psychiatric ward premises".

Mykola Plakhotnyuk, Ukrainian phthisiology specialist, became another victim of Soviet psychiatric machine, spending 12 years behind the hospital bars. He was arrested in 1972 for what was called anti-Soviet propaganda. Kyiv District Court and Institute of Research Psychiatry of V. P. Serbskyy ordered

compulsive treatment, which began in Dnipropetrovsk special psychiatric ward, and then Plakhotnyuk was transferred to Kazan. He was then moved to Cherkasy district general psychiatric hospital.

Description, provided by the court medical verdict, is equally eloquent: "Psychological state: the patient behaved exceptionally free and demonstrated a feeling of self-worth and dignity. He explicitly refused to hold a conversation in Russian, affirming that he can only fully express his thoughts in his native Ukrainian and he therefore insisted on having an official translator. When asked about the accusations, he became defensive and aggressive, stating that he had fought and will continue to fight against [Soviet] state injustice towards Ukraine; he repeatedly claimed that Ukraine has to be liberated and its russification is intolerable".

## В A A 1972 року, листопада, 13 дня, Судова колетія в кримінальних справах Київського облесного суду, в складі: головурчого-народних засідателів -Мацко Горячек, Фірециіної Кухарській при секретарі в участи прокурора з участи адволата Малого - Карпенка розганнувая у відкратому судовому засіданні в м.Києві справу ПЛАХОТНИКА Миксии Григоровича З травия 1936 року народжения народится в с.Фосфоркт Цигрів-ського разону Курської області, українця, громадинима СРСР, з винов освітов, безпартійного, не одружного, не судимого пра-невав дінарем-фтізіатром дитичого туберкульозного санаторів ім.Горького в селиці Куща-Водиця, праминав в селиці Димер Київ-ської області, но кул. Левченка, ж 35, -- про застосувания до нього принусових заходів медичного характеру. встановида: Плахот в в к, нід час навчання в Київському дер-жавному медичному інституті, а потім працкичи в дитичому са-наторії ім.Горького на протизі 1965-1972 років систематично займався виготогленням, зберіганням та розпововдженням доку-ментів, в яких містяться наклепницькі вигадим, що порочать радянський державний і суспільний дад. Зокрема в 1965 році він передав кителю м. Києва Пере-денкові Володимиру Івановичу статтю антирадинського характеру, в якій міститься наклепницькі вигалия про події, які нібито мали місце в 1938 році.



14 November 1972. Kyiv district court's decision on Mykola Plakhotnyuk case

As a result, Plakhotnyuk was diagnosed with "chronic schizophrenia". Usually, patients of the Soviet psychiatric wards were diagnosed with the so-called 'sluggish schizophrenia', as well as querulous paranoia or manic psychosis. Semen Hluzman spoke about these diagnoses: "General-mayor Morozov, director of Institute of Serbskyy and a leading psychiatrist, was holding a lecture, when suddenly one of the court medical experts asked him what sluggish schizophrenia was. Professor Morozov smiled, and replied "You understand, it is when you don't have hallucinations, you don't have a mania, but you have schizophrenia".

Commission for Investigating the Use of Psychiatry as a Political Tool was created on 5 January 1977 as a unit of Moscow Helsinki Group. Kharkiv psychiatrist Koryahin, who partnered with the group, provided independent medical opinion to a number of dissidents. Another volunteer, Yosyp Zisels from Chernivtsi, has a done a routine, but a very important job collecting and passing the information and court materials. One of the first evidence of his criminal investigation (1979) included psychiatric wards' patients' files and information leaflets No 8 and No 11. Witnesses confirmed that Zisels was informing them about the crimes committed by the Soviet psychiatric professionals.

Another representative at the Moscow Helsinki Group was the afore-mentioned Petro Hryhorenko, while his lawyer, Sofiya Kalistratova, was a consultant in legal matters. In 1977 Hryhorenko's case was made public on the World Psychiatric Association's congress in Honolulu. The congress passed a resolution recognizing abuse of psychiatric profession in the Soviet Union, created a Committee for Investigation of the Abuse of Psychiatric Practices in the Soviet Union and condemned such abuses. Additionally, on 31 January 1983 Soviet Academic Union of Neuropathologists and Psychiatrists was forced out of the World Psychiatric Association.

By 1988 some 16 specialised psychiatric wards were transferred from the Ministry of Interior of Soviet Union to the Ministry of Health, and later 6 out of them were shut down. 776,000 patients were released. In 1989 the so called 'anti-soviet propaganda' and 'defamation of the Soviet order' were taken out of the Soviet criminal code. Nevertheless, unfortunately, even nowadays this malpractice and attempts to abuse psychiatry as a tool to manipulate people and their political stance in the territories of the former Soviet Union have not ceased to exist.

# "Born in the great hour"

How Yevhen Konovalets managed the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists as it turned to follow the course of Halychyna youth

**Sviatoslav Lypovetskiy** 

Despite the desperate attempt of Ukrainians to recover their statehood, the first war of independence was defeated while the territory of Ukraine ended up being divided between four states. But the statehood faded slowly and different communities still harbored the last hopes for an insurgency in the Dnipro Ukraine or a compromise decision of the West on Halvchyna.

In the meantime, Ukrainian society changed significantly. The fact that Ukrainians acquired huge experience of war in Ukrainian military formations was a crucial one. This was especially visible in people from Halychyna where they had avoided professional military service at any cost before the war of independence.

THE REVOLUTIONARY ORGANIZATION INTO WHICH THE OUN HAD MORPHED MOVED ALONG THE TRAIL LAID BY THE LOCAL MEMBERS. THE RELATIONS OF THE EMIGRE AND LOCAL SECTIONS GOT BETTER. KONOVALETS WAS THE ONLY LARGELY KEEPING THAT BALANCE WITH HIS UNDENIABLE AUTHORITY AS AN ARBITER BETWEEN DIFFERENT SIDES

"Our public hated military uniforms as much as it hated prison rags," writer Andriy Chaikovsky wrote in his memoirs. "Mothers would throw a fit whenever their child ended up in the army." According to Austrian laws, an officer could only marry a rich bride. This meant that military service automatically withdrew a young man from his national group.

With the war of independence, even if short, over 100,000 people went through the Ukrainian Galician Army. A huge number of those eventually found themselves in Polish internment camps. An official report from the Polish Ministry of Military Affairs dating back to November 1920 mentioned 70,000 war prisoners. Ukrainians were not the only group but reports from different camps showed that they were the majority. A Decem-

ber statement mentioned the disarmament of up to 30,000 of "Petliura's people". Given those numbers and war experience one could expect that combat groups would emerge eventually, and they did.

#### THE CAUSE OF SPILKA, THE UNION

It was impossible to count how many underground structures the military set up. But one eventually grew into the large and effective Ukrainian Military Organization, known more informally as Spilka, the union in Ukrainian. The breaking point came on September 25, 1921, when UVO member Stepan Fedak attempted to assassin Polish Chief of State Jozef Pilsudski in Lviv.

The issue of where Halychyna would belong was not yet solved on the international arena by then. So virtually the entire Ukrainian population was in opposition to the Polish occupation regime. Fedak's shot, numerous arrests and the flow of sympathizers joining UVO turned it into the major revolutionary force in Western Ukraine.

One of the main factors in the popularity of UVO was its leader Yevhen Konovalets, an activist in the student movement of Halvchyna before the war and commander of the Kviv Sich Riflemen during the war. His Sich Riflemen friend Andriy Melnyk and Konovalets himself married the Fedak's sisters. At the time of Fedak's assassination attempt their father was one of the most respected Ukrainians in Lviv and chairman of the Committee of Ukrainian Residents, an entity representing Ukrainians in relations with the Polish authorities. The police wrote in its files that the marriage gave Konovalets "access to the political circles of the region". Shortly after the assassination attempt, the UVO leader emigrated.

The second attempt to assassinate the chief of state took place at the Eastern Trade Fair, an international expo in 1924. An UVO militant threw a bomb at the vehicle with Poland's president Stanislaw Wojciechowski. That attempt failed as well, but the Poles learned their lesson. When Ignacy Moscicki, the president of Lviv Polytechnic University, was elected head of state (1926–1939), he avoided visiting Lviv.

Meanwhile, Western states made the ultimate decision to transfer Halychyna to Poland in March 1923. Ukrainian politics changed: the West Ukrainian People's Republic (ZUNR) government in exile led by Yevhen Petrushevvch moved to a sovietphile position and political parties emerged in the "borderland", i.e. Western Ukraine. The former caused a slight divide in the UVO turning it into a militant group without political leadership. The latter allowed members of the underground movement to legalize themselves through party activity. This had been unthinkable just a year earlier. In 1922, politician Sydir Tverdokhlib was shot for his participation in the election campaign.

Now, the UVO Leadership Team believed that it would manage control or at least coordinate Ukrainian political life. That expectation was futile: many leading members distanced themselves from the revolutionary activity, opting for party work instead.

Young members could replace them to some extent. Two students – one was Roman Shukhevych – shot the curator of education in Lviv in 1926 in protest against Polonization. But the youth had limited access to the UVO, so the gymnasium students created their underground groups on their own. Experienced UVO members had influence on them, yet the emergence of new organizations expanded the range of revolutionary structures. The same developments were taking place in the rest of Europe.

"In addition to that, Ukrainian nationalist movement began to shape," UVO member Osyp Boidunyk stated.



Attendees of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists that founded the OUN. Vienna. February 3, 1929

"It could grow into a serious competitor for the UVO, especially abroad. The Dnipro Ukraine element began to stand out and dominate in it. It was not linked to the UVO organizationally and the UVO lacked any element of it. This absence of it in the UVO bothered Yevhen Konovalets, especially as his plans included intensification of the campaign across Ukraine under the Bolshevik Moscow occupation."

The idea to unite into the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists emerged in talks between the leaders of different structures.

## ON THE PATH TO VIENNA

In November 1927, the I Conference of Ukrainian Nationalists took place in Berlin where 15 people established the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists (LUN) led by Konovalets, followed by a decision to hold the Congress to unite all organizations.

"A body emerged beyond the existing nationalist groups that had to stand above us as the highest entity of the whole nationalist movement. The creation of it did not come from the grassroots level through elections, but

from the top without elections based on an agreement between several individuals," conference attendee Volodymyr Martynets described the establishment of LUN.


Not everyone welcomed that scenario. The II Conference took place in spring 1928 in Prague before the Congress where nationalists distanced themselves from the legal political movements: "The Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists distances itself from all Ukrainian political movements and does not enter into cooperation with them. All organizations of Ukrainian nationalists in Ukrainian lands and abroad must step on that path," the first resolution of the Prague conference stated.

The unifying Congress was scheduled to take place on September 1, 1928. Little time was left for organization, and the next date of December 1 was unrealistic. The ultimate decision was to have the Congress between January 28 and February 3, 1929, for the 10th anniversary of the Unification Act.

While Konovalets was heading to the Congress with an idea of uniting

with other organizations, his biggest problem was with his local UVO members and their conflicting opinions on the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN). While some wanted close cooperation with the political parties, the others together with the Union of Ukrainian Nationalist Youth (UUNY) decided to disrupt that scenario and demanded that Konovalets turned the organization into a military dictatorship.

The first list of invitees to the Congress had to be revised. Eventually, Ivan Kedryn, the political editor of Dilo newspaper and member of the Ukrainian National Democratic Alliance, was the only representative of the camp supporting legal activities. Invited as a guest, he joined the closed-door consultations with representatives of regional sections where Konovalets acted as a silent arbiter. "The entire meeting had to reveal to Col. Ye. Konovalets the confrontation of diverging views. Therefore, he did not share any conclusions with us, nor approbations or rejections of conflicting views," Stepan Lenkavsky from the UUNY mentioned in his memoirs. »



One of the two cards signed by the attendees of the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists (28.01–03.02.1929). One ended up in the hands of the police sending six Congress attendees to court in 1932. Five got four years in jail

"Col. Ye. Konovalets had the skill to respectfully diffuse deep conceptual differences in a way that left neither side with a sense of triumph or defeat."

The position of young representatives of regional sections won. "The Congress outlined the new organization framed along our interpretation of the nature of OUN. Col. Ye. Konovalets chaired the organization but did not agree to become a military dictator over us. We forgave him that very soon," Lenkavsky wrote in the memoirs.

But the situation seemed far more complex than that: once the position of "politicians" in the UVO was defeated, representatives of emigre

organizations were to be appointed before the revolution. These included people who had spent years away from Ukraine and felt perfectly comfortable in their new countries. The difference in their circumstances was illustrated by the Congress that took place under special security rules.

The delegates did not find out where the Congress would take place until right before it when they were told to come to Prague and sent to Vienna with fake documents. In Vienna, they settled in a small hotel where the meetings took place. They were banned from leaving the hotel or talking in the corridors in the first days. Suddenly, someone sent a greeting

card around the room asking attendees to sign it. "This is not right because we are not on a tour in the mountains from which we could send greetings. But once the Colonel signed it, maybe the card would not be sent by post and would end up in specific hands," an UVO member said in the discussion between representatives of regional sections. They did sign that card, and the next one. After the Congress, they took a photograph together.

Two years later, the signed card ended up in the police. Six members of the Congress ended up in court and got four years in jail for their participation in the Vienna meetings.

#### DICTAT OF THE YOUNG

The Congress opened a new page in the history of the nationalist movement. Yevhen Konovalets visited the United States that same year as the newly established organization could expect more support from Ukrainians there than a militant group like the UVO. Konovalets himself tried to change his image of a pro-German politician. He was criticized for living in Germany, the sinner of World War I.

He settled in Switzerland with his family while nationalists were receiving funds, passports and diplomatic support from the Lithuanian government. Surma, the main print outlet of the UVO, relocated from Lithuania to Germany. The Lithuanian funding from Kaunas and Ukrainian funding from the US allowed the OUN to get back on its feet. But the internal situation was far more complex than what it looked like to an external observer.

The youth in Ukraine was becoming uncontrollable and active beyond expectation. In the early 1932, OUN's outlet Rozbudova natsii (Building the Nation) published an official declaration of its emblem, a trident with a sword, and the anthem, We Were Born in the Great Hour (March of the New Army from 2018 - Ed.). Despite its militarist symbols, the leadership of nationalists was not so revolutionary. Part of it was outraged when it learned of the assassination of Emilian Chekhowsky, head of the U unit for Ukrainian affairs at the Lviv police in March 1932. In a long series of assassinations committed by the OUN, including of a soviet consul, a Polish minister and a director of Ukrainian gymnasium, the murder of the main policeman dealing with the underground movement was probably the most logical and easy to

explain. But it was that assassination that triggered a storm of discussions.

'The OUN does not use terror in politics or tactics. The leadership never authorized anyone to commit acts of terrorism. Now and before, Polish officials have been presenting the OUN as a terrorist organization which it isn't," said a draft statement of the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists on the murder of Chechowsky. It Konovalets who botched that statement. In his sharp letter to the Leadership, he dotted all i's about the position of young revolutionaries in Ukraine: "In your letter, you put yourself and the whole Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists on a pedestal of actual leadership which it is not in practice for different reasons. We initiated the organized nationalist movement, we helped it take shape, we are injecting it now but we are not leading it. I, too, start having doubts about whether we will succeed in leading it, despite our best intentions. It is possible that as the movement evolves, someone will take over leadership and lead it further on... In the Western Lands, this movement grows increasingly radical more than some of us wish. We cannot exclude a near prospect where we will find ourselves against that movement, in the role of parents, with no ultimate influence on its further development. Therefore, as people regarding ourselves as the Leadership, we should be aware that we might find ourselves in an unpleasant situation in the near future. The young nationalist movement in Western Lands does not tolerate us. But I'm sure that it will create its own leadership as it grows stronger and more organized internally unless we try to find a compromise.'

Konovalets learned his lesson from the experience of Yevhen Patrushevych. In Konovalets' words, Petrushevych "was sitting in Vienna and believing that he was the great dictator and that all of his orders had to be executed immediately". As the leader of the Ukrainian sections of the OUN, Konovalets had a far more sober mindset and avoided movements "that would only be mocked locally, by the local nationalists".

The revolutionary organization into which the OUN had morphed moved along the trail laid by the local members. The relations of the emigre and local sections got better. Konovalets was the only largely keeping that balance with his undeniable authority as an arbiter between different sides. "This was a paradox of sorts,



**The burial of Tadeusz Holowko in 1931.** He was a Polish politician known as a Ukrainophile killed in an attentat by a Truskavets unit of the OUN at a Ukrainian resort. Ukrainians were then pressing the League of Nations to hold Poland accountable for its pacifications. Neither the Leadership of Ukrainian Nationalists nor the local leaders probably knew about the assassination plans

that someone who was not extremist himself stood at the helm of an underground revolutionary organization," wrote Ivan Kedryn about Konovalets.

The OUN leader was patient about every aspect of his position. He was eventually evicted from Switzerland and he lived his last years in Rome. The role he played in the nationalist movement was obvious to both OUN members and to its bitter enemies.

When Pavlo Sudoplatov, the future assassin of Konovalets, met with Stalin, he wrote Stalin's words in his memoirs: "Our goal is to behead the movement of Ukrainian fascism ahead of the war and to force these bandits to eliminate each other in a struggle for power."

The murder of Konovalets in 1938 and a new geopolitical situation caused by World War II did provoke a split in the OUN along the divide between the local members and the emigre part. But in its first decade, the OUN was a relatively solid foundation on which both of its split-offs, the Banderite and Melnyk wings, established independent and self-sustaining organizations.

## Telnyuk Sisters: "It won't be easy, but we should always see light at the end of the tunnel"


Interviewed by Kateryna Hladka

Telnyuk Sisters have been performing in Ukraine and internationally for over two decades now. They work with the poetry of Taras Shevchenko, Vasyl Stus and Vasyl Symonenko, all prominent Ukrainian poets, and write their own lyrics. When the 2013-2014 revolution was in full swing, their partner and writer Oksana Zabuzhko initiated a book with posts of different people about the Maidan on social media. Titled The Chronicles of Eye-Witnesses. Nine Months of Ukrainian Resistance, the collection features live reactions and unretouched texts. It was then reincarnated on stage with music by Telnyuk sisters where they mixed songs and Shevchenko's poems, a choir and an orchestra of the Ukrainian Radio, and posts by social media users read by actors. The Path to Freedom project has been presented in Canada, France, Poland and Ukraine last year. This year, the musicians and artists have gathered again for the fifth anniversary of what took place at Hrushevsky Street to commemorate the fallen and to show how art can heal without pathos or pompousness.

The Ukrainian Week spoke to Halyna and Lesya Telnyuk about how contemporary Shevchenko and Stus are today, the artistic comprehension of the Maidan, and the lessons of the Revolution of Dignity.

#### How did you come up with the idea of The Path to Freedom?

Halya: It grew like a baby, gradually. It didn't start as something mature, grand and thought-through. In fact, The Chronicles of Eye-Witnesses. Nine Months of Ukrainian Resistance appeared as an initiative of Oksana Zabuzhko. In parallel, Lesya was working on music for Taras Shevchenko's poems as lyrics. All this was in harmony with what Ukraine was going through. We first tried to do this joint project when we toured to the ATO zone with Oksana Zabuzhko. Lesya and I played the piano while Oksana presented the book and read posts from it. That grew into a large composition and we went to Canada where project director Oleh Repetsky compiled it into a great story. We engaged actors Hryhoriy Hladiy and Nazar Stryhun, musician Viktor Morozov and



Telnyuk Sisters are a duo of singers and songwriters. They started performing in 1986. Their repertoire includes songs with lyrics by Taras Shevchenko, Vasyl Stus, Pavlo Tychyna, Bohdan-Ihor Antonych. They sing and compose experimental music, including art rock, folk jazz, romance, blues and ballads. In 1997, they recorded Love in Vain with ex-Rolling Stones' Mick Taylor. That blues was performed in Ukrainian with an original section of bandura. Telnyuk Sisters have taken part in many art projects, including Antonych Fest, Stus' Circle and more. They have recorded 19 albums.

Crimean Tatar violinist Eskender Bekmambetov. By the way, Eskender joined our project after he heard Lesya's songs. He brought together the orchestra and composed his pieces. Two choirs from Toronto and Ukrainian Literature and Art Canda - LATCA joined us. Established by Ukrainian artists, LATCA took care of the organization. The artists created an exhibition for our project. It was a great performance!

Of course, the project cannot exist constantly as it is because it was created by many people from different countries. Some came from Ukraine, some from the US, and some from parts of Canada. The performance lasted three hours. It was the first time we revealed our work to the Canadian audience.

Lesya: The artists painted images on the Revolution of Dignity.

Halya: So many different people came up to us after the performance, from the audience to the stage light technicians. They were crying and saying "We're sorry we didn't know so deeply how it

happened in Ukraine". Our project focused on the Canadian audience, so the lyrics were done in English, Ukrainian with subtitles and French. Then the program expanded and became a performance of its own. We presented it in Ukraine.

Lesya: It played in Lviv, Kyiv and Kharkiv last year.

Halya: In 2018, we also presented The Path to Freedom in Paris and at the Council of Europe. Ukrainian Cultural Foundation later supported our performance in Strasbourg and Poznan. The project turned into a serious step of cultural diplomacy, revealing the truth about what Ukraine had experienced.

As Sviatlana Aleksievich wrote in the introduction to The Chronicles of Eye-Witnesses, it was a "lost story of human feelings". It's these human feelings that make history and us, and they can be lost in the flow of news on TV and social media. The Path to Freedom portrays human feelings as the most important thing.

# How did your personal memory of the Maidan change? You had to plunge into your experiences over and over again in order to share them with the audience, didn't you?

Lesya: I think this process is very interesting: it feels like comparing and testing yourself over and over again about what you have done, what you have become and what has changed in you. Have you lived up to the memory of the people who gave up their lives? I think of it as a test of resilience, truthfulness and integrity of one's heart and mind, for every person. Have you not frozen yet inside, are you still alive?

Halya: In my view, this cleanses you of the daily problems and depression. When you walk on stage with this project, you really feel pure, childlike, beautiful and courageous. When we are young, we are ready to give our life because we think that we still have a lot of it and nobody can take it from us. You find courage in yourself when you hear the voices of living people – their posts have no trace of doubt, despair, dirt or something meagre. In our daily life, we often wiggle in trash and leftovers of food and essence. Our project reveals the core of your essence, a realization of why you have come to this world. There is nothing show-off, pompous, official or political about it. It reflects the highest brand of human purity and essence. The voice of Shevchenko is, too, the highest brand of childlike human purity.

# Why did Shevchenko become so contemporary during the Revolution of Dignity, in your opinion? His poetry matches modernday posts of the protesters so well in your project. Yet, for many kids in schools, he is just "someone to study in the curriculum". What should we do about it?

Halya: School is an artificial institution. Whatever happens in collective studying is always artificial. That's why we can't trust it when it comes to high sacred things. In fact, any word, including the word of the Bible, can be diluted in a school textbook, turning Jesus from the Son of God into a historical figure. Just like that, Shevchenko can also be turned into merely a poet banned in the past. It all depends on how the person works on him or herself. Whoever blindly trusts the textbook is not yet mature, they need time.

It's a feat of sorts to define yourself as a human being that doesn't just have a physical body, but a soul too. It's the soul that embraces the words of prophet people who spoke to the entire nation. **Lesya:** With Shevchenko, enlightenment hits you at some point and that's when you start hearing the words you never noticed before. It's like finally hearing a foreign language you didn't speak before. I think that the events happening today are discovering Shevchenko's words with a new force.

#### The Path to Freedom features lyrics by people who have passed away. How did that fee!?

**Lesya:** For us, these people are present when we sing their poems and work with their texts. That's the mystery of art: human soul revives every time another soul touches it.

Halya: We will all meet at one place anyway where all souls will be together and will perfectly understand each other. The difference between earth and heaven, and our constant

earthly struggle overshadow perceptions and senses. Poetry and music are like a bridge where the souls of those who passed away speak to you personally. In fact, Vasyl Stus has spoken to you personally, and so has Taras Shevchenko. They speak to you as if you were part of their family.

Lesya: We have this interesting joint creative process with the Ukrainian Radio's orchestra conducted by Volodymyr Sheiko, its choir conducted by Yulia Tkach, the live texts and us. In fact, it was five years ago that we first sang Shevchenko's All My Hope at the Recording House with this orchestra. It is such a miraculous coincidence that the piece has grown into a great path of freedom for each of us over these five years. But that path continues, it is not yet completed.

## How do the military react to Shevchenko and this program?

**Lesya:** We have seen men crying to these songs. It's worth more than a thousand words.

Halya: We spoke to some people on the phone and they were gone several months later. We know men who went to battle with our songs and they are no longer alive. Their families were writing to us. These are tragic moments. I believe that they are listening to us from heaven. Many in the military realize after this program that their sacrifice is not in vain, that their heroism and courage are necessary. These words protect them.

**Lesya:** I remember a mother calling us at a radio interview – her son died on the frontline. She said that our songs still help her.

**Halva:** These are not just stories, not just a background for coffee drinking. We are responsible for what we give people, for every word. "Good words bring good rewards" people say. We experience this in our life. We try to overcome personal moods and depressions in order to live on and live up to these words. When you go on stage, you have to be pure. You can't come with bad thoughts and sing David's psalms. It makes sense to at least pray in the morning before you perform in front of the people because these are sacred things, not show business.

THE NOTION OF THE REVOLUTION OF DIGNITY WAS
MISINTERPRETED BY MANY PEOPLE. IT WASN'T A DRINKING
PARTY FOLLOWED BY A HANGOVER. WHAT HAPPENED IN
UKRAINE IN 2013-2014 WAS GIVING BIRTH TO UKRAINE

#### What were the lessons you learned after the Maidan? Some people in Ukraine are disappointed and tired. What do you think of that?

**Lesya:** The Revolution of Dignity continues every day for me. It's a test for every person: will you be strong enough to avoid despair? I think that it's extremely important to be able to accumulate good in yourself and see positive things, develop positive reactions.

Halva: I think that the notion of the Revolution of Dignity was misinterpreted by many people. It wasn't a drinking party followed by a hangover. What happened in Ukraine in 2013-2014 was giving birth to Ukraine. Now, we have to take care of it and bring it up. It can't just put on a white suit and go govern us, making everyone happy. The people who were on the Maidan do perceive those events like that. The disappointed are not those who came to the Maidan and faced the bullets. nor those who made Molotov cocktails. It's those who were sitting on the couch and want quick change now. We are a country with a new post-totalitarian mindset now. Our soviet skin has finally fallen off and we see ourselves as an independent country.

**Lesya:** I'd like to say that many things wouldn't have happened without the Revolution of Dignity. These include the tomos (autocephaly for the Ukrainian Orthodox Church − **Ed.**), visa-free travel to the EU etc. Changes are happening gradually, and we should pay attention to them. It won't be easy, but we should always see light at the end of the tunnel. **■** 

## Behind the camera

What is happening with documentaries during the revival of Ukrainian cinematography

Olesia Anastasieva



In the spotlight. Man with a Stool, the last film by director Leonid Kanter, has been playing since February

Dozens of documentaries are shot in Ukraine every year, but many a film never finds its audience. Why? Which subject do documentary filmmakers choose most often and which ones are they reluctant to touch?

2018 saw the release of over 40 Ukrainian films. Just two were documentaries: The Heart of Gongadze's Mother by Viacheslav Bihun and Myth by Leonid Kanter and Ivan Yasniy. Myth was widely screened in many theaters across Ukraine, earning over UAH 600,000, which was more than many Ukrainian feature films made. It's based on the story of Vasyl Slipak, a world-renowned Ukrainian opera singer with a unique voice. Born in Lviv, he moved to France where he had everything. When the war started in Ukraine, he decided to go to the frontline as a volunteer. He chose *Myth* for his nom de guerre, short for Mephistopheles, a role he sang in an opera by Charles Gounod. And there he was shot by a sniper. The film about him was a major event in Ukrainian documentary filmmaking in 2018. It was viewed and discussed even by those who generally pay little attention to domestic non-feature films.

It might be tempting to assume that few documentaries are shot in Ukraine, but that's simply not the case. Documentary filmmaking is a category that has enjoyed the most stable development in Ukraine: life as it is continued to be filmed even in the years when the production of feature and animated films went on hold. These days, international festivals eagerly include Ukrainian documentaries in their programs, and the

directors even win prizes, but few viewers seem to know about this.

This vacuum exists for several reasons. Firstly, non-feature films typically have lower box office sales in movie theaters than feature films for a mass audience. Secondly, Ukraine has hardly any distributors specializing in screening this category of films, so the directors often arrange screenings with movie theaters directly. While some documentaries are shown on TV, this is also a bit of a lottery. Some are lucky to make arrangements and fit the format, and some are not, while others do not even think about this. A central e-platform for Ukrainian documentaries could help solve the problem. But this requires people interested in such a project in the first place. For now, neither the state with its generOTO: KINOAFISHA.U

ous funding of films, nor the directors want to set it up. Some directors won't even upload their films on You-

Tube to avoid piracy.

The Ministry of Culture selected nearly 20 documentaries for funding in its first - and last - "patriotic pitch" in 2017. Over 30 non-feature films won the 2017 selection by the State Film Agency, which did not hold one in 2018. In addition to that, the Ministry of Information Policy and the Ukrainian Cultural Fund allocate funding for such films. TV channels and production studios also organize series of documentary projects. A lot of independent films are made by people with cameras shooting without any help. That's how Uliana Osovska and Denys Strashniy shot their Almost 10.000 Voters, a project interesting for its choice of subject modern politics. This is something most Ukrainian filmmakers avoid, perhaps due to personal disenchantment with the Revolution of Dignity, or worse, fear for their lives - or simply lack of interest in politics.

documentary Ukrainian makers avoid other topics, too, "We lack resources for quality independent documentaries on geography, natural resources or ethnic topics. says Yevhenia Kriegsheim, director of Kharkiv MeetDocs Eastern Ukrainian Film Festival, "There is little discussion of the farm sector, the environment, the production and

consumption of food in Ukraine. We don't have sci-fi. I'd like to see more high-profile, scandalous themes on corruption, the way resources are used, harmful technologies

used by major corporations, wholesale logging, etcetera. Courageous and independent journalism needs to return to Ukraine. It will help independent non-feature films spread

their wings.

In addition to watching the finished Ukrainian documentaries sent to her, Kriegsheim knows about a slew of projects at different stages of production, from ideas to editing, thanks to the pitching of Ukrainian documentaries in Kharkiv in 2018. The jury included Serhiv Bukovskiv. a well-known Ukrainian documentary director, and playwright and

screenwriter Natalia Vorozhbyt. At the presentations of these projects, it turned out that most were about the Donbas or the war in Eastern Ukraine. Indeed, Ukrainian documentary filmmakers have been shooting a lot on these two subjects.

WHILE DOCUMENTARY FILMMAKERS STILL TURN THEIR BACKS ON SOME SUBJECTS.

> THEY ARE NOT AFRAID OF SPEAKING ABOUT OTHERS. SEX AND SEXUAL MINORITIES ARE NO LONGER TABOO

Competitions for public funding have specific sections covering these subjects, and many films qualify for the 'patriotic" category.

Understandably, however, not every film about the Donbas or the war moves the experts on various juries. Many are reluctant to give the green light to projects aimed at showing random people rather than selected individuals. The Kyiv-War Train by Korniy Hrytsiuk has already been turned down by juries in two separate competitions for public funding. Originally from Eastern Ukraine, Hrytsiuk has not been to his



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**The truth of** *Myth.* The film was widely screened in many theaters across Ukraine, earning over UAH 600,000

native Donetsk for over five years. He now wants to film passengers on the Kyiv-Kostiantynivka train. "For me, it's very important to shoot this story because my film has a wide range of genuine characters. They travel from the capital to frontline Kostiantynivka. The train is Ukraine today, travelling between Peace and War with its residents as passengers. They are the characters of our film, their voice has to be heard," Hrytsiuk says.

What if one of the passengers says something unpatriotic? Who can guarantee what these people think

THESE DAYS, INTERNATIONAL FESTIVALS EAGERLY INCLUDE UKRAINIAN DOCUMENTARIES IN THEIR PROGRAMS,

AND THE DIRECTORS EVEN WIN PRIZES, BUT FEW VIEWERS SEEM TO KNOW ABOUT THI

or say? This fear of "what may happen" forces experts to favor more propaganda-like material that is "patriotic" but too often one-sided and uninteresting. It seems obvious that fear drives these juries based on an analysis of *The Hydra*, the winner of State Film Agency funding in 2017. It is now finished and has been submitted to the SFA. But it was changed significantly. The authors initially presented it as an investigation of drug smuggling and wanted to tell the story of Andrew, Andriy Halushchenko. According to earlier reports by *The* 

Ukrainian Week, a mobile group investigating drug trafficking in the war zone was attacked near Shchastia, a town in Luhansk Oblast, on September 2, 2015. Two people, including Andriy Halushchenko, were killed. Shortly before his death, he spoke about threats from the smugglers, including the Ukrainian military, in an interview with The Ukrainian Week (#35/2015). When the pitching began, some experts and head of the State Film Agency said that they could not attack Ukrainian military or, God forbid, portray them from an

unheroic perspective, especially when the taxpayers' money was being used for funding. And so the filmmakers dropped the storyline about Andrew at the very beginning.

By contrast, Ghennadiy Kofman does not see the

choice of themes in Ukrainian documentaries as problematic. "I don't think our documentary makers are afraid of anything or anyone today," he states. "At this year's Docudays UA, we are presenting the first films from last year's CIVIL PITCH competition that documentary directors, civic activists and human rights activists created together. They joined efforts to make films about important social issues that will appeal to the widest possible audience."

Kofman himself is producing a number of documentaries. He is also

a member of the State Film Agency expert commission and co-founder of Docudays UA, a festival of human rights documentaries and the most important event focused on non-feature films in Ukraine. The 2019 festival starts on March 22 for a week in Kyiv. The best films from the festival normally go on a tour across different regions in Ukraine where the organizers screen them for local audiences.

"I think that what matters for the director in choosing the subject for an upcoming film is to care enough about it so that they are willing to spend several years on it," says Kofman. "The film will then be genuine and honest. The audience can feel it from the screen. Filming about the subject-du-jour is merely opportunism. Such films can have strong production values but are rarely really creative."


While documentary filmmakers still turn their backs on some subjects, they are not afraid of speaking about others. Sex and sexual minorities are no longer taboo. In 2018, a study of lesbians in the Soviet Union titled Happy Years by Halyna Yarmanova and Svitlana Shvmko won a special award from the National Competition jury at the Molodist festival. Bound by Zhanna Ozirna was another non-feature film on non-heterosexual relations. In 2014, director Nadia Parfan shot Exarch, a film about an Orthodox priest preaching LGBTQ Christianity.

Ukrainian documentary making is alive and kicking, even if most Ukrainians do not watch documentaries. For those waiting to see a Ukrainian non-fiction film on big screens, Malevich is out, a film about the Ukrainian period in Kazimir Malevich's work. According to its makers, this period in the artist's life has been overlooked. Their main goal was to research his Ukrainian roots. They discovered the artist's actual birthplace in Kyiv in the process of shooting. Volodymyr Lutskiy directed the film, assisted by Ihor Malakhov. Made with the support of the State Film Agency and Italy's Ministry of Culture, the film came out February 28 and is showing in Kyiv, Kharkiv and Chernivtsi.

Don't miss *Man With a Stool*, the last film by Leonid Kanter. The team finished the production after Kanter committed suicide last year. Kanter spent several years working on the film, which features video he shot before killing himself. *Man with a Stool* came out February 21.



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


## March 14, 19:00——

## Ave Maria! Saxophone concert

## St. Catherine's Church (vul. Luteranska 22, Kyiv)

This year, spring comes in on a very special note, whose voice will be rendered by several saxophones. The Kyiv Saxophone Quartet will perform at the National Philharmonia of Ukraine together with the Iryna Malaniuk Philharmonic Hall's Saxophone Ensemble from Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast in a program featuring masterpieces of world classics. Among them will be the sacred Ave Maria, but in three versions: Schubert, Gound and Piazzolli. The unique program will include well-loved compositions by Tchaikovsky, Mozart, Vivaldi, Bach, and Handel. The soloist will be Iryna Kliuchkovska.



## Oleh Skrypka and the

## NAONI Orchestra The Officers' Building (ploshcha Peremohy 1, Vinnytsia)

-March 18, 19:00-----

Skrypka's concerts with the National Orchestra of Folk Instruments continue to fill music halls. The combination of Skrypka, the colorful hits of his band VV, and the amazing sound of 40 folk instruments is unbeatable. Yet, the best way to imagine it is to be there in person and hear it live. Old favorites are complemented by new compositions, well-known Ukrainian folk songs like Shchedryk and Ochi Chorniyi, bringing all to a new level. Skrypka's charisma combined with virtuoso playing and lavish orchestral arrangements promise an unforgettable evening and a nice energy-boost for a long time afterwards.



-March 30, 19:00———

## Name of the Change

-March 19, 19:00–

## **Myroslav Skoryk**

## The Tchaikovsky National Academy of Music of Ukraine (vul. Horodetskoho 1-3/11, Kyiv)

The "Year of Myroslav Skoryk" international project continues. Fans of the art of this great composer will have a unique opportunity to dive head-first into the world of his delectable melodies. The big event of this evening is 120 of the best musicians performing the famed Mykola Leontovych opera "On the Water Nymphs' Easter," in an adaptation by Skoryk conducted by the Maestro himself!. This is not the only surprise. For the first time, all three piano concertos of the legendary composer will be performed on one stage. Not to be missed!



## March 25, 19:00———

Lviv Opera and Ballet Theater

There's never too much good jazz, let alone

when it's performed by such a group of jazz

stars. The guilty parties at this jazz fest will be

world class saxophonist Eric Marienthal (US), virtuoso percussionist Yoel Del Sol (US), tal-

ented trumpet player Jamie Hovorka (Canada),

virtuoso bari sax player Igor Fedotoy (Australia).

trumpet legend Ray Cassar (Australia), and jazz

performer Emlilia Yagubova (Azerbaijan). The

musicians will be accompanied by Ukraine's

world-renowned Alex Fokin DJazz Band. This will

be a show with real pizzazz.

(prospekt Svobody 28, Lviv)

## DJazz Music Fest Vivienne Mort

## Rivne

Vivienne Mort's music is tender, deep, strong, yet very delicate. This Ukrainian band's lead is Daniela Zayushkina. As the composer of their lyrics and music, Zayushkina embeds a tiny bit of her soul in every song. This spring, Vivienne Mort will present a special program with a vocal quartet performing both well-known compositions and new works. Fans of VM are already tuned into the right frequency, but the event deserves excited anticipation even on those who have never heard them.



# JIS.


#### **KOVACS**

-April 6, 19:00-

## Dnipro Academic Theater of Opera and Ballet (prospekt Dmytra Yavornytskoho 72A, Dnipro)

The season of musical surprises continues with the upcoming performance of Dutch sensation Sharon Kovacs. Kovacs, as she is known, released her first single, My Love, in 2014 and instantly established herself among thousands of fans across the world. Her debut album, Shades of Black, led hit parade charts in 36 countries, made #1 in her native Holland, and reached the Top 10 in Germany. She is a performer whose concerts will fill halls in every city.









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