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
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Uncertainty mode

Roman Malko

The next half year of the Verkhovna Rada will be in election mode, as can be expected. And there's nothing new in that. The long distance run that began with the opening of the 10th session of the legislature demonstrated clearly that Ukraine's MPs are unlikely to engage in any constructive work between now and their fall election. Of course, they will continue to babble about economic growth, strengthening the country's defensive capabilities and reinforcing its strategic course, but Ukrainians might as well forget about real work. Lawmakers have already switched to campaign mode and are busy promoting themselves and wooing voters. If we add the number of them who are also running for president this spring, this is trend irreversible.

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Normally, the opening of the session has been accompanied by plenty of brouhaha: the balconies are bursting with visitors and reporters, the session hall is awash with inspiration, and the corridors are wall-to-wall with MPs and their entourages. Not this time. During the singing of the national anthem, the nation's highest legislative body was half empty. How things will continue to unfold was evident from the fact that the agenda was filled with issues of a purely political nature. And that's how it will be until the end of this convocation. No matter how VR Speaker Andriy Paru-biy tried to introduce something constructive from the very beginning, threatening to turn off microphones for anyone openly agitating during the debate of a bill, it was as effective as a poultice on a corpse. Oleh Li-ashko's boys started off by blocking the tribunal and demanding that the price for natural gas be reduced, effectively paralyzing the work of the Rada.

Nor is this hysteria likely to die down and the VR to work more productively after the presidential election March 31. If anything, the situation will get worse. Deputies will be under pressure, knowing that not only is this their last full-fledged session, but also that it is their last chance to show themselves in all their glory. By September, when the summer recess is over and the final waltz begins, no one will be working at all. But worse, the election could overturn the political situation, depending on who wins the presidential election, the incumbent or someone new (old).

EVEN AMONG POLITICIANS WHO ARE TIED BY SOME AGREEMENT SUCH A COALITION, TRUST HAS NEVER BEEN HIGH IN UKRAINE.
IN THE RUN-UP TO AN ELECTION, THIS ONLY GETS WORSE: EVERY STEP IS PERCEIVED TO BE AN INSIDIOUS MOVE BY RIVALS HOPING TO LEAP AHEAD OF THEM IN THE PRESIDENTIAL AND LEGISLATIVE ELECTIONS

So it's anybody's guess whether Ukraine's voters can expect at least something positive in the work of their MPs. The draft agenda has a whopping 2,817 bills and other items that need to be reviewed, but on the first day, MPs weren't even able to approve the agenda itself.

There are obviously some issues that they will not be able to avoid, such as amending the Constitution to state that Ukraine is aiming for membership in NATO and the EU, for which the president has been lobbying, or the bill on the Ukrainian language. Although everyone understands that these will be feathers in Poroshenko's campaign cap and that he will use them to the maximum in his campaign, support for both bills will likely be found in the Rada.

Firstly, to vote these particular bills down just as the country is exercising its democratic rights would be bad for the image of all those running, except perhaps for politicians counting on the pro-Russia vote. Secondly, these accomplishments won't do much for the president's rating. For those who dislike Poroshenko, joining NATO is not an especially powerful argument in his favor, while the fact that his own party's faction almost voted the language bill down in first reading has not been forgotten.

A much bigger challenge will be getting lawmakers to focus on other important issues that need to be settled: passing second reading of the Electoral Code, lifting immunity for MPs, and setting up a committee to

oversee the work of the security services. Everything will depend on how high the tensions rise in the ward and in the hospital itself and whether it will be possible to agree on anything at all — or with anybody. Even among politicians who are tied by some agreement such a coalition, trust has never been high in Ukraine. In the run-up to an election, this only gets worse: every step is perceived to be an insidious move by rivals hoping to leap ahead of them in the presidential and legislative elections.

There is growing opinion that changes to the election law will never e passed, but the situation is not so obvious. On one hand, this is a slippery issue that not many will be prepared to resolve during an election season. It could be dangerous and even backfire. On the other, if it's put off for the next legislature to resolve, why not? The vote can always be cancelled, while having yet another accomplishment to flaunt and get praised for won't hurt anyone. The same is true of immunity. But here PR plays an even bigger role with even less to offer MPs, so its prospects are even more doubtful. The situation should be a bit simpler with the package of economic legislation and legislation necessary to implement the Association Agreement with the EU. Perhaps a security services oversight committee will be set up, decommunization completed, and Dnipropetrovsk and Kirovohrad Oblasts renamed.

The coalition will most likely survive, but it's not so clear that a visit by the Head of State to the chamber at this point will be seen as a win-win proposition for all concerned. MPs tend to be governed by a more primitive logic right now than in quieter times: Why should a lame-duck president be telling us what to adopt? Everything will depend strictly on the position of a given faction, and sometimes even the positions of minor groups within these factions, and their electoral interests. If these little groups think it's important to support a given bill, the will. If not, then not. Based on the pace at which the first day progressed, anything is possible.

The bottom line is that it's impossible to predict the fate of any given bill in the Rada right now. The work of MPs during a heating up election season coupled with a war and all its hybrid manifestations can be affected by just about anything at this point — even the court decision to remove the acting Minister of Health from her duties, which both the initiators and any bystanders who want to, will take advantage of. In fact, that's precisely why these things are done. Liashko calculated the time for the provocation to suit those who sponsored it. There's one thing he didn't take into account, however. This entire scenario could suddenly turn and bite him, and then haunt him for his entire election campaign, because it's clearly intended to cause a furore. And that's wherein the danger lies. What can be expected in the final sprint and who will prove the winner, no one knows.

Even if this is just one of many steps about to be unleashed as part of a grand gambit, it's always good to remember that there's not just one director running this show. There are others as well. And it's a fight to the death between them. The cost of victory this time is too high. Without exaggeration, no one has come up with a computer program that can help any one candidate to figure out all the risks. For now, the situation continues to be unpredictable. ■

PHOTO: GENEVA CALL

Marie Lequin:

"It is a war, and in war there are always violations of the laws"

Interviewed by **Yuriy Lapayev**

The Ukrainian Week talked with a representative of the Swiss humanitarian organization Geneva Call on the contemporary conflicts, the features of the search for justice and the application of international humanitarian law in an armed conflict.

What do you see as the most problematic issue in avoiding mass crimes against civilians in international context according to your experience?

— What has changed from past decades is that conflicts used to involve two or more state armed forces fighting one another on battlefields, which is no longer the case. Now states are often fighting with armed groups, armed groups are fighting among themselves, and very often this fighting takes place in urban settings. Excessivecollateral damage is therefore significant and civilians are paying the price. There is no sufficient consideration of civilian protection.

Public infrastructure is being destroyed and the long-term consequences of this are bad for health, education and the development of countries undergoing armed conflicts.

Is it actually possible to find the truth and justice in conditions of ongoing armed conflict as we have in Ukraine?

— All those who fight, at the state or non-state level, should keep in mind that everything that takes place will eventually come to light and, because there are lot of organizations monitoring the situation, everything is being documented. The idea is to get closer to the truth. We can never really agree on what exactly the truth is, but we try to get as close as possible to seeking justice, after the conflict. So even if justice is not served now, it will be in the future. Everyone should therefore be aware of that fact and behave in the best way to avoid criminal prosecution and unnecessary civilian suffering.

Why it is still important to continue searching for the truth if justice can be achieved only in the distant future?
— I think there are two answers. The first is that by trying to find out what is happening we also put pressure on those fighting to behave in agreement with the law. Secondly, justice is a path to reconciliation and, if justice is not achieved, peace deals can become very fragile.

Are there any examples of success in that field?
— One of the most prominent examples is the case of the former Yugoslavia. There were many people convicted for violations of International Humanitarian Law by national courts. It is very important to keep in mind that domestic jurisdiction must do its job first. All countries have their own talented lawyers, prosecutors and judges, who can hear these cases and try anyone committing violations. For the purpose of achieving peace, domestic law should apply if it can be done in compliance with international standards. This is important for future reconciliation and could be applied in the Ukrainian context. But justice is not something that can be accomplished quickly; it can take years. In the case of the former Yugoslavia, the conflict took place in the early 90s, but those who committed violations are still being convicted for acts carried out twenty years ago. Just a few months ago, the first verdict convicting two individuals of genocide in Cambodia for violations committed in the 70s was delivered. In this sense, IHL violations trigger individual criminal responsibility. If you are a commander, and it is you who gives an unlawful order, it is not the entire state that takes the responsibility, it is you as an individual.

Do you see any differences in conflict in Ukraine compared to other countries?
— I think every conflict is different. Ukraine is a medium-income country with a high level of education among the population. The armed forces, civilian servants, and communities are highly educated, so they can understand what International Humanitarian Law (IHL) is. They also realize how many of their rights are being violated. In other conflicts, people don't necessarily know their rights. I would say that this makes our work easier in Ukraine, because people are aware of it and can support our work more easily than in other countries. What is also very positive is that the government of Ukraine recognizes the importance of applying IHL. This is therefore a very positive way to protect the civilian population.

But at the same time, that could create some kind of a gap. The Russia-backed terrorists from DPR/LPR are not a recognized state, so they are not obliged to apply IHL.
— In an armed conflict everyone has to respect IHL regardless of their status; this applies to all parties to conflict. This is not an argument to say they are legitimized or not legitimized. Everyone has obligations under IHL.

Who is responsible for violations of IHL in Eastern Ukraine?
— Many organizations are monitoring the situation and this is being done quite well. We are not here to identify who is breaching the law. It is a war, and in war there are always violations of the laws. Rather than naming the perpetrators, let's try to focus on finding the way to avoid future violations. Our role is not to name and shame. We just talk to the armed entities and we explain and remind

Ms Marie Lequin, Head of Region, Geneva Call, for the Eurasia. She currently has the overall responsibilities for the operations of Geneva Call in Afghanistan, Myanmar, the Philippines and Ukraine. Prior to join Geneva Call in 2014, she worked as country manager non-governmental and international organizations in Central and West Africa and the Middle East. Her thematic experience covers the prevention of mass-violence and promotion of human rights and International Humanitarian Law in conflict affected- and transitioning countries. She held various positions, among others Head of Communications for UNICEF in Central African Republic, and Country Director for Search for Common Ground in the Democratic Republic of Congo for several years. She holds a post-graduate diploma in broadcast journalism from Westminster University, UK.

them what the rules mandate and how they can enforce the law without them thinking that by doing so they are weaker or are losing something. We tell them why the law is important for the civilian population, for the armed fighters, for prisoners and the wounded. The added value for that is that they then amend their practices and follow the law. They need to understand that respecting the law doesn't make them weaker or look bad, on the contrary it actually gives them more pride, honor and shows professionalism.

Do you see understanding of that in the Ukrainian army?
— Yes, definitely.

ALL THOSE WHO FIGHT, AT THE STATE OR NON-STATE LEVEL, SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT EVERYTHING THAT TAKES PLACE WILL EVENTUALLY COME TO LIGHT. SO EVEN IF JUSTICE IS NOT SERVED NOW, IT WILL BE IN THE FUTURE

And on the other side?
— I think that if you take the time to explain what IHL is about, any person who has been fighting could benefit from this, in terms of acknowledging the right to self-defense, the protection of civilians, and future criminal procedures. Everyone can understand why IHL matters.

Civilians in occupied territories of Donetsk and Luhansk regions are often forced to take part in different political events like demonstrations or elections to create nice picture for local media. Sometimes they have no permission to leave the occupied territories. The same goes for occupied Crimea, where the Russian FSB is harassing Crimean Tatars. How can we classify such actions?
— Basic human rights apply even in a situation of armed conflict. All these fundamental rights are still valid. No one should be forced to participate in meetings, be displaced or forced to stay, unless it is for justified security reasons. But I'm not in a position to qualify these actions. There are many international organizations, international tribunals, academics and lawyers, among others, which are assessing these specific cases. Of course, all those cases are subjects of long debates and as a neutral and impartial international organization we will not enter into these discussions. This is quite a political issue and I'm here only for impartial humanitarian purposes. ⱦ

On the brink of the abyss

What is the current situation of Brexit in the United Kingdom

Michael Binyon, London

They would deserve Churchill. PM's failure of trust due to Brexit is comparable with that of Chambarlain's times, there is now no alternative of Theresa May at Westminster, though

PHOTO: REUTERS

Britain's attempt to leave the European Union has now caused a full-blown political and economic crisis. Last week the deal negotiated with the European Union by Theresa May was rejected by Parliament by a massive 230 votes — the biggest defeat suffered by a prime minister in modern British history. Her political authority has all but vanished. Her cabinet is openly split on what should now happen and further resignations are likely. Her attempt to seek a compromise with opposition parties has failed, with the Labour party leader calling it merely a public relations deception. The country is in uproar and members of parliament are plotting to seize the initiative from the government in an unprecedented attempt to change the constitutional balance of power in Britain.

Unless a compromise can be found within the next few weeks, Britain will crash out of the European Union on 29th March without any deal to regulate its relations with its former partners. British business leaders and European politicians say this would be disastrous. It would immediately halt all free trade between Britain and its neighbours, with long queues building up at Britain's ports as all trucks have to wait for extra customs checks. There would be an immediate shortage of medicines, of spare parts for British industry and of vital imports such as nuclear materials and fuel. Aircraft might not be able to land as the air regulations would no longer be in force. Britons might need visas to travel to France or Germany.

A "no-deal" Brexit would also embitter all future relations between Britain and its EU neighbours. Britain

would renege on its promise to pay more than £30 billion to cover its obligations to fund EU pensions and projects agreed when Britain was part of the EU. London would have to negotiate emergency agreements so that police co-operation could continue and common anti-terrorist legislation could remain in force. Political friendships would be broken, and Britain would be seen as an untrustworthy partner in the future.

The worst and most immediate effects would be felt in Ireland. The agreement that ended more than 30 years of violence in Northern Ireland, signed in 1997 by London and Dublin, led to the removal of any land border between the two parts of Ireland, and this has been important is normalising relations and bringing the two sides together. A no-deal Brexit would mean the immediate reimposition of customs and police inspections on the border, to stop smuggling and to control any illegal immigrants. Many people in Ireland, in the north and in the Republic, say new frontier controls would be used by IRA terrorists and extremists to resume their violent campaign.

The issue of the Irish border is one of the biggest obstacles to any Brexit agreement. Mrs May negotiated a so-called "backstop" — an insurance policy that meant that if no new trade deal between Britain and the EU could be negotiated in the next few years, the current regulations would continue, and Northern Ireland would have to remain inside the EU customs union, unlike the rest of Britain. This has been vigorously rejected by the ruling Democratic Unionist Party in Northern Ireland, which says it would split the province from the rest of the United Kingdom, and push Ulster into a united Ireland, which the Protestant majority has always opposed.

Without the support of the 12 Northern Irish DUP members of Parliament, the ruling Conservatives would lose their majority in the Westminster parliament and would be unable to continue to govern. So May promised Parliament that she would try to get legal guarantees from Brussels that this "backstop" would not last more than a few years. But Dublin and the rest of the EU refuse to change this, saying that without this insurance policy, the EU could not guarantee the security of its external frontiers.

Many members of Parliament are in despair at what they see as the prime minister's obstinacy and refusal to change the main parts of the deal she reached with Brussels in December. So some Conservative rebels, supported by many other opposition members of parliament, have now taken matters into their own hands. They are likely to win two votes in the next few days on crucial steps that are opposed by the government. The first would be to make it illegal for Britain to leave the EU without a deal — meaning that the Brexit leaving date would have to be postponed. The second would be for Parliament to suggest its own Brexit plan, whether the prime minister likes it or not.

Already there are at least two different scenarios being discussed. One, which is supported by the Labour party, would keep Britain within the customs union permanently. This gets round the problem of the Irish border. But it will infuriate the Brexiteers, who say that it would tie Britain permanently to Brussels and will not deliver true independence from Europe. Another proposal would be to join Britain to Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein in a free trade area, so that Britain stays in the customs union and also in the single market. British business would love this. But those opposing Brexit hate the idea, be-cause Britain would have to obey all the EU rules without having any say in Brussels in formulating the regulations. Those wanting to remain say that Britain would be in a far worse position than if it simply stayed in the EU and cancelled Brexit.

There is also growing support in Parliament for a second referendum. Members of Parliament say it is clear that no solution will win a majority, and so it is better to ask the entire nation to vote again. Those opposed to Brexit love this idea, as they hope it would reverse the result of the 2016 referendum. Public opinion polls now show that around 56 per cent of voters oppose Brexit and would rather stay in the EU.

But a second referendum is very risky. First, it is not clear what the questions on the ballot should be. Should there be three questions: leave without a deal, accept the May proposal or remain in the EU? What would happen if no question won a majority? Secondly, any referendum that overturned the result of the 2016 vote would infuri-ate all the 17 million Britons who voted to leave and would feel cheated. They say it would be undemocratic. They have threatened violence if Brexit is cancelled. The third problem is that a second referendum would take at least a year to organise.

UNLESS A COMPROMISE CAN BE FOUND WITHIN THE NEXT FEW WEEKS, BRITAIN WILL CRASH OUT OF THE EUROPEAN UNION ON 29TH MARCH WITHOUT ANY DEAL TO REGULATE ITS RELATIONS WITH ITS FORMER PARTNERS. BRITISH BUSINESS LEADERS AND EUROPEAN POLITICIANS SAY THIS WOULD BE DISASTROUS

The Labour party opposition is itself deeply split on what to do. Its leader, Jeremy Corbyn, wants a new general election. But he failed to bring down the government in a vote of no confidence last week. No Conservatives, either Leavers or Remainers, want a new election as Labour is likely to win it. The DUP also does not want a Labour government in Westminster.

Many Labour parliamentarians now want a second referendum. But the left wing of the party, including Corbyn, opposes this, as he says it would alienate traditional working-class Labour supporters who mostly voted to leave in 2016.

The government appears powerless to stop Parliament hijacking the government's authority and making the new rules itself. This is an unprecedented constitutional challenge to the power of the Prime Minister, and reminds many Britons of the struggle between Parliament and King Charles I in 1649 which led to civil war, the execution of the King and a republic in Britain that lasted 11 years. But May has lost all authority, the unity of her cabinet and much respect in the country. She refuses to resign and remains in power only because no other senior Conservative minister has enough support to mount a coup against her.

Meanwhile all other political life in Britain is paralysed. It is a constitutional crisis without precedent, and reminds many people of the start of the Second World War when Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, lost a vote of confidence in 1940 but refused to resign. The country had to wait a week until its saviour, Winston Churchill, replaced him. Unfortunately there is no politician like Churchill now alive who could rescue Britain from the mess. ⧉

The Ukrainian manifesto

What should lie at the foundation of Ukraine's integration into a united Europe so that later on there isn't an Ukrexit?

Oleksandr Kramar

The history of how Europe was united is well-known, from its start as the European Common Market in 1957, to its current form as the European Union of 28 countries.

Over time, the purely economic union moved beyond economic integration based on a common market for goods and services, to other areas of integration, such as European citizenship, a single currency, common foreign and security policy, and cooperation in justice and internal affairs.

SIMMERING DISSATISFACTION

In time, this deeper integration, which began more and more to look like a movement towards a federated state, took on a forced pace. In June 2004, the text of a European Union Constitution was formulated and in October it was supported by the heads of Government of all 25 members. However, the entire process suddenly ground to a halt when national referenda over the Constitution failed to carry in both France and the Netherlands in early 2005. The 2009 Lisbon Treaty was intended to replace the failed Constitution and eased the decision-making process in the EU: in a slew of cases, only a simple majority of member countries was now required to pass.

In the face of new challenges such as a debt crunch in the weaker economies and a growing inflow of migrants, often to the very countries who could least absorb them, contradictions began to surface within the EU and euroskepticism began to greet the very notion of further integration into the Union. From the dream of a common home for many countries, the EU began to seem more like a threat to what was unique, traditional and national. Euroskepticism, which was there all along, even as a united Europe was being formed, is about to reach its apex with Brexit, the withdrawal of one of its largest members.

In less than half a century, Great Britain has become a visible guide to how aspirations can change, from a difficult integration in the face of ongoing opposition from a France that was one of the key founding nations and was seen by Britain as an agent of American influence in the 1960s, to an equally complicated determination to leave the Union. But the UK is hardly the only EU member to be disillusioned: dissatisfaction can be seen to a greater or lesser extent in nearly all members of the European community. And it is growing in those countries that sense that belonging to the EU leads to more problems and restrictions than opportunities and advantages for their national aspirations.

A Parlameter 2018 survey on a hypothetical referendum over EU membership showed that support for leaving the EU ranges from 44% to 60% in another seven members—five of them countries that joined the Union not that long ago, with even greater enthusiasm than the British in the 1960s: Czechia, Slovakia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, and Croatia. What's more, only 44% of Italians would vote to keep their country, one of the original founding members, within the Union.

> IN THE PROCESS OF MAKING MEMBERSHIP IN THE EUROPEAN UNION A NATIONAL ASPIRATION, UKRAINIANS SHOULD ASK THEMSELVES SOME HARD QUESTIONS ABOUT WHAT EXACTLY THEY EXPECT FROM MEMBERSHIP IN THIS COMMUNITY AND WHAT KINDS OF SACRIFICES THEY ARE PREPARED TO MAKE SO THAT DISENCHANTMENT AND A SENSE OF HAVING SOMEHOW BEEN DECEIVED DON'T SET IN LATER

Meanwhile, staunch support for the EU, where 75% and more of the population would vote to remain, can be found in only six countries: Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark, and Ireland. Among the post-soviet neophytes, only Poland, Lithuania and Estonia have a two-thirds majority of supporters.

HEALTHY EUROSKEPTICISM

And so, in the process of making membership in the European Union a national aspiration, Ukrainians should ask themselves some hard questions about what exactly they expect from membership in this community and what kinds of sacrifices they are prepared to make so that disenchantment and a sense of having somehow been deceived don't set in later, the way the citizens of a whole slew of EU countries feel today. This is not to question Ukraine's integral place in Western civilization or that the country should continue to develop in line with established western economic models. But a healthy dollop of euro- »

skepticism needs to be developed among Ukrainians today, so that later they don't find themselves wanting to leave the very community they aspire to join today.

Contradictory as it might sound, this kind of constructive euroskepticism is extremely important. If Ukraine continues to negotiate with the EU on the principle "whatever you say" and to demonstrate an inability or unwillingness to stand up for key national priorities, it will be just more grist for the mill not only of anti-EU sentiments, but anti-West voices criticizing the country's geopolitical and civilization choices. In the face of the permanent threat represented by Russia, this is much more important than just membership in the EU.

Underlying a critical approach to the terms of integration with the European Union, Ukrainians need to place two components that are extremely critical to the country's future: maintaining national identity and attaining economic success.

> IF UKRAINE CONTINUES TO NEGOTIATE WITH THE EU ON THE PRINCIPLE "WHATEVER YOU SAY" AND TO DEMONSTRATE AN INABILITY OR UNWILLINGNESS TO STAND UP FOR KEY NATIONAL PRIORITIES, IT WILL BE JUST MORE GRIST FOR THE MILL NOT ONLY OF ANTI-EU SENTIMENTS, BUT ANTI-WEST VOICES CRITICIZING THE COUNTRY'S GEOPOLITICAL AND CIVILIZATION CHOICES

Where the straw that broke the EU camel's back was a massive inflow of migrants for many EU members, for Ukraine the risk of being drawn into a modern-day massive resettlement of peoples in the process of integrating into the EU is an even worse threat. The country could end up with the same problems as other Central European countries that don't want to see their own people, who have gone in search of a better fate further west, replaced by people from completely unrelated cultures in Asia or Africa. And so their leaderships are ever more openly resisting EU migration policies.

Still, the migration of Ukrainians to wealthier countries, most of them EU members at this point, and their replacement by foreigners from Asia and Africa is an even greater cultural and civilizational challenge. And so an important element of Ukrainian euroskepticism has to be the reservation that integration into the EU should happen in parallel with the decolonization and ukrainianization of Ukraine itself. Yet this is not at all guaranteed. For the EU and its current universalist and overly liberal policy could insist that it is perfectly acceptable to integrate Ukraine just like any other spin-off of the former USSR.

For Ukraine, however, to turn into an alternative, more democratic, more liberal and more market-oriented or europeanized other Russia is not merely inconvenient, it is critically dangerous. What use will a eurointegrated Ukraine that is Russian-speaking or even bilingual but tending towards gradual russification as it becomes more urbanized and suburbanized be to Ukrainians? The ever-growing number of Ukrainians moving from villages and small towns, generally irreversibly, are the key reserve bearing Ukrainian linguistic and cultural identity. Meanwhile, the country's Russian-speaking, europeanized but not ukrainianized cities are seeing an influx of migrants from Asian and African countries who are more likely to merge with the general mass that has been internationalized on a Russian cultural foundation that is foreign to Ukrainians. How is this better for Ukraine than being Little Russia in the Kremlin's neoimperialist projects?

DECOLONIZATION FOREVER

Nor do Ukrainians need their country to turn into an economic province of the EU, where it will remain just a territory that financial groups from Old Europe take advantage of, rather than another full-fledged EU member. For instance, Ukraine could be pushed to become economically specialized in line with the interests of other countries and find development blocked in those sectors that could compete with the metropole. The country experienced this kind of anti-Ukraine policy on the part of Russia for the entire nearly 30 years that the two countries have ostensibly been independent. For countries like Ukraine that were colonized in the past and have not completely undergone de-colonization, this problem is especially serious, because one form of dependence is simply replaced by another.

Changing one metropole for another cannot be the goal for Ukraine and its socio-economic policies should not simply prioritize a mechanical increase in GDP, average wages or budget revenues. It's important that the quality of these indicators improve and a healthy socio-economic web be maintained through the growth of SMEs.

One condition for integrating into the EU should be maintaining the dominant position of Ukrainian businesses in key sectors of the domestic economy. The access of foreign suppliers to the domestic market, especially state procurements, should be accompanied by mutual and proportional access to markets and public procurements in EU countries.

Importantly, Ukraine must maintain a position that growing household incomes, the creation of new jobs and preservation of existing ones that will lead to increasing capacity for the Ukrainian market to absorb European goods should not be based on the acquisition of key segments of the domestic economy by big business from the EU. That's what happened in CEE countries. Access to and the acquisition of the banking and financial system by foreign financial institutions should also not be allowed.

As long as Ukraine's EU partners don't accept all these conditions, it makes no sense to continue to pedal in the integration process. On the contrary, Kyiv should consistently and persistently require that integration be accompanied by maintaining the country's self-identity. After all, Ukraine can already increase its exports of goods to European markets.

In 2018, exports of domestic goods to the EU reached a record high of over US $20.1bn. By comparison, in 2008, 2011, and 2013-14, the previous peak years, it was never higher than US $17-18bn.

The only issue is to have something worth exporting and that this something have a high added value. Raw materials and unfinished products continue to dominate Ukraine's exports to this day, which limits the prospects for improving both the quantity and quality of the domestic economy as it stands. Ukraine's consumer market is also fairly limited for European suppliers today. And so economic integration with the EU needs to be seen as an instrument for shaping a strong national economy, transforming the country into a powerful trade, commerce and investment partner. ∎

Born or becoming Ukrainian?

National identity in the 21st century from a sociological perspective

Danylo Sudyn, PhD in Sociology, Associate Professor of Sociology at the Ukrainian Catholic University

Ukrainians are once again facing the question: what is the essence of Ukrainian identity? In other words, what characteristics can one use to understand whether an individual is Ukrainian. Are these conventional elements, such as language, traditions or symbols? Or are these elements no longer enough, especially after the Revolution of Dignity and the war in Eastern Ukraine have made other criteria important?

Having some external characteristics is no longer sufficient. What defines Ukrainianness is how an individual perceives Ukraine, how he or she acts towards Ukraine and its citizens. Ukrainian identity should not be perceived as something homogenous. There are several concepts of what it means to be Ukrainian in society today, and they morph constantly. What are these transformations?

The question of Ukrainian identity has become especially important with the start of the war in Eastern Ukraine. Earlier, too, there were debates on whether Russian-speakers in Ukraine can be identified as Ukrainians, and what the pantheon of the Ukrainian nation's heroes should look like. But they were often fed by politicians trying to use this for political dividends and a victory in yet another election. Overall, Ukrainian society had not been too concerned with identity as more pressing issues dominated the agenda. Russia's aggression suddenly showed that "who are Ukrainians?" is a vital question. Who is one of your own, and who is not? Are Ukrainian Russian-speakers Russians, and do they entitle Russia to "protect" them? Is language the only factor of Ukrainianness?

HRUSHEVSKY'S QUESTION

Ironically, Ukrainian society faced the same question exactly a century ago. In 1917, historian and statesman Mykhailo Hrushevsky published a bulletin titled "Who are Ukrainians and what they want" explaining the origins of Ukrainians, the essence of Ukrainian identity and the tasks of the national movement in the context of building new relations with Russia to the residents of Ukraine and the supporters of the Ukrainian movement. The declaration of independence in 1991 seemed to eliminate Hrushevsky's question. But the Revolution of Dignity and the war in the Donbas showed that Ukrainians need to seek an answer once again. This answer may define the future of Ukraine.

A correct answer can only come from a correct question. This means looking at the concepts of personal and collective identity separately. Identity is oneness, similarity of two objects. The Polish language defines it with

Types of national identity

Calculation by the author

the word *tożsamość*, or sameness. It has travelled into Ukrainian as *tozhsamist*. In personal identity, the individual is the two objects in different timeframes. In other words, personal identity ensures awareness of its continuity and answers the following question: am I of today the same person as I was several years ago? This identity enables us to change and be aware of that change while preserving our integrity.

Collective identity helps recognize similarity with other people and build a social group with them. We are similar, so we are a group. Collective identity thus covers two processes. Firstly, an individual has to be aware of his or her similarity with a certain group of people. Secondly, this individual has to act as a "typical representative" of this group to confirm that he or she is part of it. Importantly, this "typical representative" is a stereotype, a concept of what a member of the group should be. A discussion of Ukrainian identity is thus about collective identity, i.e. the awareness of belonging to a certain social group. An individual can have many collective identities, including national, religious, professional, family and more. Sometimes they clash and affect personal identity. For instance, a neophyte will build a completely

new identity after conversion, so some collective identities important in the past will be replaced by others.

ETHNIC NATION VS POLITICAL NATION

How do individuals become aware of belonging to a certain nation? Obviously, they need some criteria on which basis they can say that they have certain characteristics, therefore they belong to a certain nation. Overall, these characteristics fall into two groups based on the type of nations — *ethnic* or *cultural* and *political* or *territorial* models of national identity. The key characteristics of ethnic or cultural identity are ethnic. This includes culture and origin. An individual proves his or her national identity through the language of a certain ethnic group, the knowledge of its culture, and the respective ethnic origin. The key characteristics of a political nation include civil loyalty to a national state. An individual with a certain citizenship can be considered representative of a certain nation.

OVERALL, UKRAINIAN SOCIETY HAD NOT BEEN TOO CONCERNED WITH IDENTITY AS MORE PRESSING ISSUES DOMINATED THE AGENDA. RUSSIA'S AGGRESSION SUDDENLY SHOWED THAT "WHO ARE UKRAINIANS?" IS A VITAL QUESTION

For a long time, these two models have been perceived as polar and mutually excluding. They were even linked with two nations in Europe. German identity classically qualified as the ethnic model, while French identity was perceived as political. There was no unified German state between the late 18th and early 19th centuries, but the Germans were aware of their national identity because they belonged to one culture. By contrast, the French Revolution ultimately shaped the unitary French state, with French citizenship as the criterion of Frenchness regardless of the individual's ethnic origin. The French and the German models spread to other countries. Nation building in Central and Eastern Europe mostly followed the German model, while Western Europe followed the French one. Apart from France, Switzerland is often mentioned as a model of a country with four official languages and one national identity. But the next wave of historical research revealed that purely political nations do not exist because they are always rooted in an ethnic nation. Switzerland was initially exclusively comprised of German-speaking cantons. French- and Italian-speaking ones joined later. The Swiss identity had built on ethnic foundation before it transformed into a political nation. The nation France built was, too, far from political. Just recall the struggle against patois, the local dialects which one literary French language had to replace. Up until the early 20th century, a belief was strong in France that only someone of French ethnic origin and Catholic faith could be truly French. This triggered a discussion about the two Frances of a political and an ethnic nation.

ACQUIRE OR WIN?

Another counterproductive element of contrasting ethnic and political models of a nation is its failure to take into account an individual's *proactiveness* aimed at acquiring or confirming their national identity. Criteria, such as ethnic origin or citizenship, are antagonists to this model. None of them comes through proactiveness: an individual receives ethnic origin without taking any effort to that end. Citizenship mostly follows the same pattern as something given at birth. Moreover, these two criteria can merge because there is no logical contradiction between them. One can perfectly demand the issuance of citizenship to individuals of "proper" ethnic origin. In some cases, obtaining citizenship means integrating with an ethnic culture. The procedure of acquiring citizenship in the US provides a good illustration with its requirements, such as the knowledge of English and American history.

Another situation is possible where ethnic and political criteria of identity intertwine. For example, an individual learns a language intentionally because he or she believes that it's impossible to be a decent citizen without it. Or an individual has a proactive civic position in addition to merely remembering his or her citizenship. In both cases, individuals have to demonstrate their proactiveness in order to confirm their national identity. Whether this proactiveness refers to ethnic or political component is less relevant.

How does an individual obtain identity? Does this happen effortlessly and unintentionally? Is identity a product of intentional choice and activity? Sociology uses two terms, *ascriptive* and *acquired*, to define these polar notions. Ascriptive is a social status obtained regardless of personal will and activity. Gender is an ascriptive feature as we are born with a certain gender. Acquired are characteristics that require will or certain actions. The difference between them is quite obscure. An ascriptive feature can become acquired, and an acquired one can turn ascriptive with time. But this distinction helps better understand the Ukrainian situation.

The share of people primarily identifying as citizens of Ukraine

Year	Value
2000	41%
2002	41%
2004	44.2%
2005	54.6%
2006	51.6%
2008	51.7%
2010	51.2%
2012	48.4%
2013	50.6%
2014	64.6%
2017	57%

Source: Institute of Sociology, National Academy of Sciences

Ascriptive characteristics of its identity include the following ones:

1) being born in Ukraine;
2) having Ukrainian citizenship;
3) living most of one's life in Ukraine; and
4) being Ukrainian by nationality.

Acquired characteristics are as follows:

1) respecting Ukrainian laws and form of government;
2) identifying oneself as Ukrainian;
3) feeling responsible for Ukraine; and
4) being a Christian believer.

Both groups include ethnic and political components.

An attentive reader will note that that the list does not include the *knowledge of Ukrainian*. This feature can be both ascriptive and acquired. For someone raised in a Ukrainian-speaking environment the knowledge of Ukrainian is an ascriptive feature as the learning was not an intentional choice. For someone raised in an environment speaking a different language, the knowledge of Ukrainian is a result of intentional activity, i.e. an acquired feature.

TYPES OF UKRAINIAN IDENTITY

For now, these look like hypotheses. But sociologists have been studying identity in Ukraine since the declaration of independence in 1991. In a slew of surveys, respondents were asked to rank certain criteria of being Ukrainian by importance. The list described above is from a nationwide survey of 2006 held by the Sociology Institute of the National Academy of Sciences in Ukraine. Similar methodology was used in 2013 and 2015 studies by the Region, Nation and Beyond project by the University of St. Gallen in Switzerland.

I have used mutlidimensional statistical analysis to explore that the characteristics of identity fall into two big categories that fit within ascriptive/acquired rather than ethnic/political. This pattern shows in the data from 2006, 2013 and 2015.

Yet, there are more types of identity. Apparently, two pure types exist where an individual identifies as Ukrainian based solely on ascriptive or acquired characteristics. We can refer to them as *ascriptive* and *voluntarist*. Where there are pure types, there are mixed types as well. This is when both ascriptive and acquired characteristics matter for an individual. This type can be referred to as *intensive* because it sets the highest requirements for representation of a nation. A fourth type is possible, where respondents list criteria that are important for someone identifying themselves as Ukrainian, even though they personally identify themselves as the Ukrainians (see **Types of national identity**).

The data from 2006-2015 allows for a number of conclusions. Firstly, the intensive type of identity dominates in Ukraine. At least 75% of those polled in Ukraine believe that both ascriptive and acquired criteria define Ukrainianness. Secondly, the share of the voluntarist type has increased from 14% to 21% since the Maidan and the start of the war, stealing primarily from ascriptive identity. The latter's share has plummeted from 5.5% to 0.4%. The unidentified group has shrunk from 4.4% to 1%.

Importantly, the survey did not take into account Crimea and the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts. Therefore, one should compare the 2015 data with any other data set with great caution. The easiest thing to do is to exclude respondents from Crimea,

Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts collected before 2014. That will reveal that the share of intensive identity type has hardly changed, while the share of voluntarist type will go from 12.6% to 20.7%. The greatest growth is from 10.5% in 2013 to 53.7% in 2015 in Zaporizhzhia Oblast from 21.1% to 44.5% in Odesa Oblast. The voluntarist group also grows by stealing from the intensive identity type.

This leads us to the third important conclusion. The Revolution of Dignity and the war have pushed a part of Ukrainians to reconsider their identity. Acquired characteristics grow more important to them while the role of ascriptive ones declines. This means that their definition of Ukrainian identity is based on the individual's *actions* with regard to their country rather than on the possession of certain characteristics. Changes in the frontline regions illustrate this. In addition to Zaporizhzhia Oblast, the share of voluntarist group has grown in Kharkiv and Dnipro oblasts from 17.2% to 27.5% and from 14% to 23.1% respectively.

> Until 2005, the share of respondents primarily identifying themselves as citizens of Ukraine had been below **50%**. It grew to **54.6%** in 2005 and did not plunge to the pre-Orange Revolution level after that. The next leap came in 2014 when the share of those primarily identifying themselves as citizens of Ukraine grew to **64.6%**

Why did the 2013-14 developments have to trigger the change in identity awareness? On its own, collective identity is not an objective, but an *intersubjective* phenomenon. It exists only because a large number of people believe that others are also aware that this identity exists. It's this shared belief in phenomena or processes that makes them real in a social sense, i.e. with a realistic impact.

How does this affect Ukrainian identity? Strengthening a sense of identity requires collective events showing to people that their group exists. For Ukrainians, such events are the Orange Revolution and the Revolution of Dignity. These social movements have made the Ukrainian nation visible. Monitoring of Ukrainian society from the National Academy of Sciences' Institute of Sociology since 1992 shows the following trend between 2000 and 2017 (see **The share of people primarily identifying as citizens of Ukraine**).

Until 2005, the share of respondents primarily identifying themselves as citizens of Ukraine had been below 50%. It grew to 54.6% in 2005 and did not plunge to the pre-Orange Revolution level after that. The next leap came in 2014 when the share of those primarily identifying themselves as citizens of Ukraine grew to 64.6%. This went down to 57% by 2017. Still, it is higher than the pre-Revolution of Dignity figure. Both revolutions have thus boosted the share of people identifying primarily as citizens of Ukraine.

To sum this up, we can suggest that Ukrainian identity is undergoing slow change as acquired criteria play an increasingly greater role. As a result, Ukrainianness is no longer a characteristic perceived as given. It is increasingly seen as a result of conscious action and proactive civic position. Ethnic criteria remain important but are becoming secondary. ⚎

"Can't get no satisfaction..."

Why Ukrainians think the situation in their country is worse than it really is and what can be done about this

Maksym Vikhrov

The mood amplitude

Social Well-Being Index

35.1	34.7	33.7	34.8	34.8	37.3	38.3	39.4	38.6	37.4	39.5	38.9	39.3	40.7
1995	1997	1998	2000	2002	2004	2006	2008	2010	2012	2014	2016	2017	2018

Source: NAS Institute of Sociology

Index of Personal Well-Being

2012	2013	2014	2016	2017	2018
1	5	8	−8	−4	6

Societal Well-Being Perception Index

| −41 | −39 | −40 | −53 | −50 | −46 |

Source: KIIS

Today's Ukrainians can, without exaggeration, be called a society of the dissatisfied. Last year, 70% of them were certain that things were moving in the wrong direction in their country and only 18% thought that things were generally going well. Moreover, this is a stable trend. The level of dissatisfaction was on the upswing long before the Euromaidan: in 2010, 51% expressed dissatisfaction with the government, but by mid-2013 that had grown to 66%, according to a Razumkov poll. In 2014, on a wave of post-revolutionary euphoria, dissatisfaction rolled back a little, to 58%, but the belief that the country was moving in the wrong direction started to grow again, going from 67% in 2015 to 74% by 2017, according to a DIF poll.

For politicians, these kinds of numbers come in handy to use against incumbents, implying that those in power are not capable of doing what's necessary and it's time for a change. That a country's political leadership needs to rotate from time to time in order for the society to develop is clear, but the question is how this takes place and what principles underlie the decision to change it. For one thing, voter dissatisfaction is not an entirely reliable criterion, given the catastrophic lack of satisfied individuals across the globe. Indeed, an Ipsos study of data from 25 countries on different continents in 2016 showed that 62% of voters were convinced that their countries are moving in the wrong direction. What's more, western countries demonstrated far more dissatisfaction: 88% in France, 73% in Sweden and 71% in Germany. But the other point is that a more careful look at public opinion shows that the dissatisfaction of Ukrainians is a very controversial indicator.

Based on what sociologists say, Ukrainians are certain that the situation is getting worse every year. For instance, 67% of them thought the results for 2018 were negative, noting a relative improvement only in the country's defense capabilities and its international image. Everything else, from the state of healthcare to crime levels, people think is only getting worse. In 2017, 69% of the population was pessimistic, whereas in 2016, 73% were according to DIF. If we trust public opinion, then it appears that Ukraine has been rapidly rolling toward an abyss for many years now and is now about as bad as it was in the ruinous 1990s, if not worse.

Fortunately, Ukrainian sociologists have a variety of instruments at their disposal that allow a more in-depth look at the public mood. The first of these is the Social Well-Being Index, which has been tracked in Ukraine since 1995. This index is calculated on the basis of a comprehensive survey dedicated to how sufficient the individual respondent finds one aspect or another, starting with money, food and clothing and ending with self-realization, social recognition and so on. The more the respondent feels that these elements are insufficient, the lower their index. 40 points equals a 0 index: anything lower suggests that the person generally feels bad, while anything higher suggests that they feel generally good.

Since the mid 2000s, this index has fluctuated around 35 points, which sociologists consider a highly unsatisfactory level. The worst level, 33.7, was recorded during the first big financial crisis in 1998. The index began improving starting in 2004, when the first wave of revolutionary euphoria the index hit 37.3, rising to 38.3 in 2006 and 39.4 in 2008. At that point, the index began to slip again, but in 2014, on the second wave of revolutionary euphoria, Ukrainians once again drew nearer to the level of normalcy, 39.5, according to the NAS Institute of Sociology. It would seem that, between the war, inflation and political instability, Ukrainians should have fallen into dark despair, but that was not the case. Despite everything,

in 2016, the Social Well-Being Index dipped just a bit, leveled off in 2017, and began to inch upwards in 2018. In fact, 2018, was the first time since independence that this index reached a positive 40.7.

What's interesting that this developed to the accompaniment of complaints about life growing worse on all sides, the country's "wrong" direction, and so on. It turns out that Ukrainians keep complaining year after year about decline while their own sense of their lives has been slowly improving.

Of course, it's not a matter of mass insincerity or the inaccuracy of polls. These same polls show that people tend to evaluate the state of their country as worse than their personal state would suggest. An even more obvious confirmation of this comes from two indicators: the Personal Well-Being Index and the Societal Well-Being Perception Index. The first index reflects how people assess their own material, health, moral, emotional and so on state, while the second one reflects how they assess the overall situation in the country. The methodology allows the two indices to range from -100 to +100 points as the upper and lower limits. The latest results, from a KIIS poll in May 2018, also showed considerable inconsistency between these two indices. Where people assessed their own well-being as a not-high, but nevertheless positive 6 points, they assessed the situation in the country as a whole as a highly negative -46 points. Nor can this discrepancy be written off as an effect of the war, as it was evident well before the war. For instance, in February 2014, Ukrainians gave their personal well-being 8 points whereas they gave the state of the country -40. What's more, changes in personal well-being don't necessarily reflect in the assessment of the state of the country. For instance, in 2012, 2013, and 2014, the individual index rose substantially, from 1 to 8 points, while the country index improved only marginally: -41, -40 and -39. Of course, there is a correlation, but the overall assessments have a huge gap: where the personal index of well-being improved by 14 points over 2016-2018, the national index rose only 7 points in the KIIS polls.

As to the reasons for this discrepancy, the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology has cautiously theorized that the "predominantly negative balance of reporting on the situation in Ukraine in the press" may have a serious impact. It's hard not to agree with such an assessment because a significant part of the domestic media really does "sin with spin", whether it's the result of political bias or the drive to gain audience with exaggerated headlines. Without any doubt, the hybrid war against Ukraine is also having a serious impact, where disinformation and spin are used to destabilize Ukrainian society and to sow distrust and pessimism.

But media is equally clearly not the only influence to blame. The fact that Ukrainians tend to see the glass as half-empty rather than half-full is also the result objective historical realities. It's more than just a matter of the overly high expectations that inevitably arise after a revolution and are equally inevitably disappointed. In 2014, Ukraine entered a period of high turbulence: war, loss of territory, sudden economic decline, and other familiar circumstances forged in the minds of Ukrainians an overall impression that colossal threats hang over their country. Moreover, the scale of these threats is such that any improvement in personal well-being seems insignificant, accidental—and completely unrelated to an improvement in the overall situation in the country. In this sense, Ukrainians seem to be living simultaneously in two worlds: on one hand, there's their daily lives, and on the other, a dangerous world "out there" that most of them hear about only on the news.

In addition, the tendentiousness of public opinion is also influenced by the reform process taking place in the country. The declared course towards change in Ukraine has run against the fact that change takes time and so is happening more slowly than expected. The difference between demand for changes and their actual pace is enough to bring up an entire spectrum of strongly negative feelings. But within the country, there's also a serious struggle going on between forces that are either incapable of or uninterested in completing reforms and those who want to be drivers of change. In their search for support among ordinary Ukrainians, reformist forces communicate with voters in a radically mobilized style. It's no secret that, in additional to detailed information about problems, a certain level of alarmism and radical rhetoric, even open demagoguery, are used — in short, everything so as not to let public attention slip. In general, this is a completely appropriate battle strategy, and really the only possible one. And it has led to results: at least oligarchs and corruption always top the lists of threats that Ukrainians consider important, according to DIF and Razumkov polls.

But one side effect of this mobilizing strategy is a distortion of public impressions about the scale and depth of various problems. For instance, although there is broad concern over corruption, the number of Ukrainians who have run into it at least once a year has declined substantially over the last decade, from 67% to 41%. What's more, according to the KIIS poll, it's largely concentrated these days in healthcare, which is still in the process of being restructured and reformed.

In this sense, when Ukrainians complain about wide-

> THE TENDENTIOUSNESS OF PUBLIC OPINION IS ALSO INFLUENCED BY THE REFORM PROCESS TAKING PLACE IN THE COUNTRY.
> THE DECLARED COURSE TOWARDS CHANGE IN UKRAINE HAS RUN AGAINST THE FACT THAT CHANGE TAKES TIME AND SO IS HAPPENING MORE SLOWLY THAN EXPECTED

spread decline, they are largely repeating general impressions that do not necessarily correspond to their personal feelings and experience. The level of information that the average Ukrainian has about the state of affairs in the country is mediocre — at best. For instance, polls have shown that 55% of the population has an idea of the dollar exchange rate, about 20% are aware of the average salary in their oblast and across the country, only 11% know what the inflation rate is, and only 9% the level of joblessness. Indeed, other than the exchange rate, the quality of informedness is extremely low and people's ideas have barely any relation to the real numbers, according to Social Monitoring and the Yaremenko Ukrainian Institute of Social Research (UICD) polls from 2017. All this offers a huge space for pessimistic fantasies.

None of this is especially catastrophic. A population that is ill-informed and makes confused estimations, that believes in stereotypes and is influenced by political slogans such as "genocidal utility rates," "crushing poverty," and so on — all this is typical of most societies. The question is what the consequences might be when this dissatisfaction is used for political aims. Ideally, the energy of mass outrage should be used to resolve the most pressing problems and to eradicate the most unacceptable phenomena. However, as history has shown repeatedly, the energy of just anger can be used not just by reformers but also by those who have completely opposite goals in mind.

Nuclear energy in Ukraine

Ukraine has never given up on idea to develop its own nuclear energy facilities. Before long, the country will have to make a choice — follow its principles or follow an economic common sense

Andriy Holub

Ukraine's "Energy strategy-2035", the government's energy development strategy plan adopted in 2017, has been widely criticised while it was still being drafted. Some experts were put off by the unsatisfactory indicators of the renewable energy sources' performance, while others noted that potential economic crises were not really considered by the authors of this legislation. The long list of professional objections did not prevent the final bill from being passed by the Rada, Ukrainian parliament. The key idea of the proposed legislation was to replace such unsustainable energy sources as coal and gas with renewable sources as well as preserve well as develop nuclear power plants (NPP).

NPPs are likely to remain the principle source of electricity in Ukraine for the next couple of decades. According to the afore-mentioned legislation, throughout the coming year all active energy plants in Ukraine are expected to produce 85 billion of kWh of energy, or up to 52% of the overall country's production. Until 2035 this proportion is not likely to change, although overall production levels are expected to increase up to 94 billion kWh. Authors of the bill proposed two options to reach this goal: extending the lifespan of the old energy generators and building the new ones. Very little details are being shared right now, however according to the proposed bill "the opening of the 1 Gigawatt NPP" is the matter of the next 6 years. Authors of the above-mentioned legislation are talking about the completion of the facilities in Khmelnytska NPP, a nuclear power plant based in the city of Netishyn, in Khmelnytsk Oblast in Ukraine. This plant is currently operating two active reactors, while two more — reactors KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 — are planned to be put into operation in the future. Energoatom, Ukrainian state-owned enterprise operating nuclear power stations across the country, announced that it is anticipating to put KhAES-3 into practice by 2025. Energoatom has very few candidates to fill in the vacancy for the contractor, who would undertake such project. This lack of choice, however, raises more questions than answers when it comes to political, economic and safety consequences of the project.

THERE IS NOT END TO CONSTRUCTION

On 8 August 2004 Ukrainian government officials, headed by then-president Leonid Kuchma, arrived in Khmelnytska Oblast to oversee the opening of the second, new reactor in Khmelnytska NPP. An ongoing presidential election campaign would subsequently culminate in Orange Revolution in autumn later that year.

In his speech, then-president Kuchma criticized "the West", claiming that the western countries had promised to financially support construction of the new reactor in return for Ukraine's agreement to shut down its ill-famed Chornobyl NPP. Kuchma insisted that the "government had only managed to finalise the second reactor of KhAES and fourth generator of Rivne NPP owing to enormous efforts of the current government and [then] prime-minister Viktor Yanukovych".

Ukraine has not put into operation a single new reactor ever since that day. There are currently 15 active reactors working on four different NPPs in Ukraine. Despite not being able to build any new facilities from scratch after regaining its independence in 1991, Ukraine did complete three different nuclear plant projects, which were initiated by the Soviet government. Ukrainian authorities have been actively developing KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 since 2005. Three years after, the country's Ministry of Energy and Fuel announced a tender to select the type of reactor, necessary to complete the project. Energoatom invited five companies to participate, however only three of them agreed to take part in the process — American "Westinghouse", Korean "KEPCO" and Russian "Atomstroyeksport".

"The so-called 'competition' was held instead of a full-scale tender. The documentation was prepared in a way, that the winner was made obvious. Yes, undoubtedly it would be Atomenergostroy. This topic appeared to have been closed, but Ukrainian parliament has taken very long to approve the legislation regulating the reactor's completion. Russia offered a state-guaranteed loan at a very low interest, however, when the parliament has finally passed the bill, they have suddenly drawn back and suggested to use one the commercial banks instead. That's a typical Russian attitude — all talk and no action", — explains Olha Kosharna. She is the head of the public relations at the Ukrainian nuclear industry professionals, "Ukrainian Nuclear Forum" and the member of the public council advising the State Nuclear Regulatory Inspectorate of Ukraine (SNRIU). Earlier in her career, Kosharna worked in the organisation herself.

The Ukrainian Week had contacted Energoatom on this issue. According to Energoatom's response, Russians and Koreans were competing in the final stage of the afore-mentioned tender. The former agreed to build two generators at the cost of USD 3.8 billion, while the latter offered a price of USD 4.5 billion. At the same time Koreans suggested to use empty grounds,

Top-10 countries according to the amount of active nuclear reactors

Source: IAEA data, 2019

United States	France	China	Japan
98	58	46	42

initially intended for KhAES-5 and KhAES-6, to build KhAES-3 and KhAES-4, instead of using uncompleted Soviet construction frames. Additionally, overall costs of Korean generators would end up being lower as a result of reactor's higher capacity.

Despite all this, the sole idea of KhAES-3 and KhAES-4's completion did not anticipate high competition and Russians' victory in the 2008 tender hardly came as a surprise.

COMPLETE OR BUILD FROM SCRATCH?

All 15 of the active reactors in Ukraine belong to the water-water energetic reactor (WWER), a type of pressurised water reactor originally designed in Soviet Union. Incidentally, Chornobyl NPP was using the other type of reactors, 'high power channel-type reactor' (RBMK), but after the plant was closed down in 2000, Ukraine has never been back to using these types of reactors. WWER is not a unique technology and has been occasionally presented by various nuclear equipment suppliers. For instance, 'Westinghouse' presented the AP-1000 generator at the 2008 tender, while the Korean company mentioned above, presented its KEPCO APR-1400 — both of these generators belonged to the same type as WWER. The digits in the name of these generators indicate its capacity in kilowatts. It is important to note that reactor is only a component of the very complex NPP. In 2008 Russians presented WWER-1000, the one that Ukrainians were already familiar with, since this type was used in 13 out of 15 currently active reactors. Unsurprisingly, since this was the only reactor type compatible with KhAES-3 and KhAES-4, it was clear from the beginning that the tender was a set up.

Nevertheless, the fate would not let Russian Atomstroyeskport implement KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 either. Permission to build new nuclear reactor may only be issued the Ukrainian parliament, and the relevant legislation was only passed in 2012. Two years later the war between Ukraine and Russian began and in 2015 the parliament decided to terminate agreement with the Russians. The current speaker of Ukrainian parliament, Andriy Parubiy, called this decision symbolic. Ukrainian nuclear scientists have not abandoned the hopes to complete the KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 projects and expressed eagerness to continue completion with different contractor.

Interest shown by the Ukrainian government and Energoatom in completion of the two afore-mentioned reactors, is easy to explain. Construction of a brand new reactor is a very costly undertaking and success is by no means guaranteed. Opponents of the project always refer to "Olkiluoto" nuclear power plant in Finland, which was commissioned to AREVA, a French contractor. The Finnish reactor was meant to turn a new page in the history of NPP — French were the first to introduce the new type of reactor, European Pressurised Reactor (EPR). However this venture ended up being an economic disaster. "Finnish EPR in Olkiluoto was meant to be the first reactor of the third generation — safe, accessible and evidently planned for the mass production. However, currently contractors are three years behind their initial plan, the budget had been exceed by billions of pounds after constructor had caused more than 3 thousands technical errors", — commented Meirion Jones, the BBC journalist, in 2009. He was also critical of British government's plans to build EPRs in the UK. The situation has not changed much over the past 10 years and the opening

of Finnish generator is still being postponed. The last due date set was June 2019. Partially, the high costs of the new NPPs are explained by the high measures of safety, which were implemented after nuclear disasters at Chornobyl and Fukusima.

The era of the gigantic NPP is over, and even the people who work in the nuclear industry admit to that. "I think, that the completed third and the fourth generator at KhAES should be the last high power reactors ever built in Ukraine", claimed Yuriy Nedashkovskyy, the chairman of Energoatom, during the meeting with students at OSA club. He has primarily quoted economic rationality as a main reason. It is also economically unsustainable to rebuild KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 to work with the different types of a reactor, and there are little examples of such practice. One of them is Bushehr NPP in Iran. Here construction works were carried out by Siemens, German industrial manufacturing company, in 1970s, however as the 1979 Islamic revolution in Iran was followed by immediate international sanctions, the project was eventually frozen. In 1990s it was reopened by Russians, who tried to adjust Russian WWER-1000 to German-built facilities, however the result turned out to be unprofitable.

SEVERAL PUBLIC HEARINGS ARE SET TO BE HELD ACROSS UKRAINE, INCLUDING THE ONE IN KYIV, IN RELATION TO THE RECONSTRUCTION OF KHAES'S REACTORS. UKRAINIAN PARLIAMENT WILL NEVERTHELESS HAVE THE FINAL SAY IN THE MATTER — AND UKRAINIAN MPS WILL FULLY BEAR THE RESPONSIBILITY FOR THEIR DECISION

Representatives of Energoatom claimed that if KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 were meant to be completed using any other reactors instead of WWER-1000, it would "lead to substantial additional costs", if the Soviet construction framings were left unused. Apart from the need to clear up the space and deploy already present constructions, there are also logistics problems and the lack of new fuel providers. In case of WWER-1000, Energoatom promised to localize the ner's cacapity in Ukraine on 60-70% level.

THE CZECH COMPANY AND THE RUSSIAN SANCTIONS

In July 2018 Ukrainian government, led by Volodymyr Groysman, approved revised technical plan for KhAES-3 and KhAES-4. Reactor, named in the bill was the WWER-1000 type. According to revised project budget, the overall costs of construction for both reactors would reach UAH 72 billion (approximately EUR 2.3 billion according to the current exchange rate). Thus, only one generator would end costing more than EUR 1 billion. This is 4 to 10 times cheaper than some of the analogue reactors discussed above. Even if the costs increase once the project progresses, it is still highly unlikely that it would reach the costs of the brand-new reactor. According to the Energoatom's estimations, the cheapest new reactor operating on the low-cost Chinese HPR-1000 generator would end up costing UAH 160 billion (EUR 5.2 billion).

The lower costs are not the only advantage of continuing construction of KhAES-3 and KhAES-4. These projects are also closed tied to "Ukraine-EU Energy Bridge", a project currently actively supported by the Ukrainian government. The main idea of the project is to start exporting Ukrainian energy from the KhAES's ›

| 37	24	22	19	15	15
Russia	**South Korea**	**India**	**Canada**	**United Kingdom**	**Ukraine**

Anticipated amounts of energy production in Ukraine, billions of cwt.

According to Energy Strategy-2035

- **Nuclear Power Plant**
- **Hydro power**

2020: 85, 60, 10, 9
2025: 91, 64, 12, 12
2035: 94, 63, 13, 25

second reactor to the EU countries using the "Khmelnytska NPP-Rzeszow (Poland)" power transmission lines. The revenues, anticipated by Energoatom, are planned to be used for the KhAES-3 and KhAES-4's development. Additionally, participation of European partners in the project may also facilitate acquisition of loans necessary for construction.

However, one vital factor is obstructing this plan. In the current energy market, there are only two companies, which have an experience building the WWER-1000 reactors. These are Russian "Atomstroyeksport" and Czech "Skoda J.S.". Czechs have earlier built similar reactor plant for their own Temelin NPP. Quoting the government's technical strategy plan referenced above, "State Owned Enterprise Energoatom should only contract third parties in accordance to Ukrainian legal framework set to regulate current sanctions regime and the laws on state policy necessary to maintain Ukraine's state sovereignty on temporary occupied territories in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts". In other words, the government has made it clear — cooperation with Russians will not be welcome. The problem is, the ultimate beneficial owner of the Czech Skoda S.J. is Russian holding company, OMZ, also known as "United Heavy Machinery" or "Uralmash-Izhora Group", which, in turn is ultimately controlled by Russian Gazprom. Both of these companies are currently subject to Ukrainian sanctions against Russia. While Skoda S.J. is not the subject to sanctions itself, it automatically de-facto becomes one, being a fully-owned subsidiary of the sanctioned entity, and Ukraine will face a choice — either hold off construction of KhAES-3 and KhAES-4, or include Russian-owned European subsidiary into the process.

"When I hear objections against the Russian money, I always reply, that Czech Republic is the member of the European Union and it does comply with the European laws. There is also European Atomic Energy Community (Euroatom), an organization which is supposed to exercise certain measures of restrain and control. Additionally, we buy the nuclear fuel from Russians. If we try to buy the fuel from Americans, we will create another monopoly, and we have already had this experience with Russians earlier on and we simply cannot afford to let this happen again. The circumstances forced us to buy the fuel from the Russians. Fuel is not a gas, it is a unique product and it is not possible to purchase it from European storing facilities. Of course, I agree, it's a very sensitive topic", — explains Olha Kosharna.

Iryna Holovko, a colleague of Kosharna in SNRIU, begs to differ. She is the head of the energy department of an NGO called "Ekodiya". Holovko does not deny that her organisation would fully support the government's potential decision to completely give up the nuclear and coal energy sources and employ renewable energy sources instead. Ekodiya is currently leading campaign aimed against completion of KhAES-3 and KhAES-4. One of the main problems, underlined by the activists — cooperation

with the Russian-affiliated company. "WWER-1000 can only be built by two companies in the world. Atomstroyeksport and Skoda J.S. Nobody else has experience in leading these projects. How can we talk about energy independence if we are partnering with Russians again?", — asks Holovko.

Energoatom denies that there is no alternative to Skoda J.S. Representatives of the company claim that the winner will be selected in accordance with Ukrainian tender laws. As one possible option they name Korean KEPCO, Chinese CNNC and Japanese Mitsubishi. However, Energoatom's representatives agreed that this may put their plans on hold for at least next 8 years and cause significant cost increase.

PARLIAMENT'S DECISION
Strong presence of the Russia-affiliated companies is not the only problem underlined by the ecologists. Skoda J.S.'s involvement in the project has not been unanticipated. Specialists and representatives of ÚJV Řež, a. s., a Czech research institute specialising in security systems developed for nuclear reactors, had visited construction sites in Khmelnystk for inspection. Czechs suggested that Ukraine adopts newly developed security measures for WWER-1000 and applies them at the planned KhAES's reactors. Interestingly enough, Skoda J.S. partially owns ÚJV Řež, a. s. (majority shares are, nevertheless, held by the big Czech state-owned energy company).

"Skoda J.S. suggested some additional safety measures, which, they claim, can already be implemented, despite the fact that none of the existent WWER-1000 reactors have tested these measures yet", — says Holovko. Her opponents' response is simple — only ultra-modern technologies are going to be used and it will only assist the project. Another worrying issue is the need for complex inspection of reactors' frame construction, which has to be done after the final project is ratified. According to Holovko, Energoatom had already been holding tenders to find a contractor to supervise and inspect KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 framing. She insists that it has to be made clear that potential operating period of those two reactors may end up being much longer than initially anticipated in 1980s.

Several public hearings are set to be held across Ukraine, including the one in Kyiv, in relation to the reconstruction of KhAES's reactors. Ukrainian parliament will nevertheless have the final say in the matter — and Ukrainian MPs will fully bear the responsibility for their decision. Disagreements surrounding the building of the two generators may only lead to further drawbacks in the energy industry in Ukraine. Government's energy strategy anticipates deferring the exploitation of already built energy reactors — some of them for a period of up to 20 years.

According to the Energy Strategy bill, Ukraine will have over-supply of energy-generating facilities by 2025 and will face the need to renovate its existent facilities. Additionally, once most reactors are fully utilised by 2030, Ukraine will have to replace the whole generation of these facilities. Assuming that the official stance of Ukrainian government remains unchanged, this will be the time when the main battle between proponents and opponents of the nuclear energy will unfold. If reliance of nuclear energy prevails, Ukraine will have to think of a way to renounce its dependency on Russian technologies. Some steps in the right direction have already been made. In December Nedashkovskyy, Energoatom's chairman, announced that KhAES-3 and KhAES-4 will be the last high-power channel-type reactors in Ukraine, and claimed that the future belongs to small modular reactors (SMR). This was an obvious gesture towards Holtec International, an American supplier of equipment and systems for the energy industry. Last year, in February 2018, Ukrainian and American companies signed an agreement to build an SMR-160 factory in Ukraine. Who knows — maybe by the mid-century they will replace the Soviet giants, which haven't got much left. ⊓

Trade in a time of war

How true is it that trade with Russia is on the rise again and that is causing this?

Oleksandr Kramar

About a year ago, *The Ukrainian Week* wrote about the rise in trade with Russia and the fact that a slew of Ukrainian sectors had grown more, not less, dependent on the Russia market. But at the end of 2018, claims that there was a "sharp increase in bilateral trade" began to be used as a propaganda tool by a variety of politicians who claim to be from the "party of peace." Indeed, this was the main argument to "prove" that Ukraine could not grow without cooperating with Russia, even with the war, and that it was time to refocus on "traditional markets" once more. The question is, what is really going on in trade between Russia and Ukraine now. We decided to find out.

Which export goods are on the rise and which are declining? What kind of change is there in the dynamic of Ukrainian goods going to Russian markets and Russian goods coming to Ukraine? What kind of impact on the impression of "steep growth" in trade volumes with the enemy has the fact that prices for energy and raw materials have sharply gone up had, given that these commodities traditionally dominated in Ukrainian imports from the Russian Federation and have lately taken over a growing share of those imports?

Bucking trends. Ukrainian goods whose Russia deliveries are growing even as other exports decline*

	total exports for 2018, us $mn
Alcoholic and non-alcoholic beverages	21.2 +50.1
Essential oils	15.2 +32.5
Electrical machinery	172.3 +18.0
Cocoa products	25.6 +18.0
Salt and rock salt	90.3 +14.3
Alumina	428.2 +9.2
Paper and cardboard	161.4 +5.9
Glassware	13.5 +4.4
Toys	17.4 +3.4
Stone, gypsum and cement products	25.9 +2.7
Plastic and polymer materials	144.6 +1.1
ALL Exports from Ukraine to Russia	-8.1 3030.4

● total exports for 2018, us $mn

● % growth, 10M of 2018 vs 10M 12017
* includes only goods worth more than $10 million

Sources: Derzhstat data, author calculations

A CONTINUING DECLINE

Exports of Ukrainian goods to the RF hit the bottom, US $3.59bn, in 2016, which was about one sixth of what it had been at its peak in 2011, US $19.80bn. In 2017, a correctional rollback could be seen: although the share of trade with Russia, now at 9.1%, continues to shrink, the actual value of these exports has risen to US $3.94bn. Moreover, this adjustment did not alter the underlying dynamic and quickly faded. In 2018, trade continued to be curtailed: according to the State Fiscal Services actual data on customs statistics, exports of domestic goods to Russia fell 7.7% from 2017 to 2018, bringing in US $3.65bn, very close to what it had been in 2016.

Just about the only major item in Ukraine's exports to Russia that showed growth in deliveries in 2018 was alumina from the Mykolayiv Aluminum Plant, which is in fact a subsidiary of the vertically integrated Russian company Rusal, founded by Roman Abramovich and run by CEO Oleg Deripaska. The value of these exports grew 9.2%, from US $392mn to US $428mn. However, the volumes barely changed in the first 10 months of 2018 compared to the first 10 months of 2017: 1.40mn t vs 1.37mn t. The reason for the growth in value was a rise in the global price for a tonne of alumina from US $286 to $307.

The biggest items in Ukraine's exports to the Russian Federation remain domestic machinery and equipment. For the first 10 months of 2018, they accounted for nearly 27.0% of all domestic exports to Russia. At this point, however, they amount to a mere shadow of their former multi-billion dollar turnover. As before, absolute numbers in most positions have been in a steady decline, even as the cost of a unit has gone up.

Derzhstat data for this period shows that, compared to the same period of 2017, the only growth has been in deliveries of electrical equipment, up 18.0%. Exports of ships and related items shrank another 7.8%, exports of locomotive engines were down 10.3%, optical instruments and apparatuses were down 20.9%, other heavy machinery — mostly mechanical and industrial equipment — was down 21.6%, vehicles and spare parts were down 30.0%, and deliveries of aircraft and parts have pretty much stopped.

As before, nearly a quarter of Ukraine's exports to the RF remain ferrous metals and steel products, posting at 23.8% in the first 10 months of 2018. But overall volumes have also fallen: ferrous metals are down 9.0% and steel products are down 6.6%.

Moreover, this has happened despite a substantial increase in prices for the main types of Ukrainian-made steel products that are shipped to Russia. For instance, uncoated hot rolled carbon steel sheet over 0.6 m wide was up on average at US $555/t in 2018 compared to US

$484 in 2017, while cold-rolled product was up at US $562 vs US $534, coated product was up at US $667 vs US $567, and so on.

It appears, then, that the decline in trade among Ukrainian suppliers is the result of volumes shrinking faster than prices are rising — in some cases 50% and more. Shipments of coated steel product shrank from 108,500 t in 2017 to 71,700 t in the same period of 2008, while deliveries of angles and other profiled steel went from 314,100 t in 2017 to 184,600 t in 2018. The price for one tonne of seamless steel piping jumped from US $1,036 in 2017 to US $1,540 in 2018, but export volumes to Russia were down from 70,000 t in 2017 to 47,700 t in 2018.

In short, the volume of deliveries of Ukraine's main export commodities to Russia not only has not grown, but has for the most part declined significantly in the last year. The main exports that bucked this trend were mainly secondary product groups (see **Bucking trends**) whose share of overall Ukrainian deliveries to Russia and of production volumes in their respective sectors is not significant.

> Ukraine's economy has also grown more dependent on anthracite from Russia. For the first 10 months of 2018, **2,920,000 t** were delivered for US **$313.4mn** when during the same period of 2017 only **1,880,000 t** worth US **$184.2mn** were delivered. What's more, alternate deliveries from South Africa have also collapsed, from **456,000 t** to **118,900 t,** even though the price from RSA is US **$101.80/t,** while the price from RF is US **$107.30**

All told, 2018 saw a further reduction in the dependence of Ukrainian manufacturers on Russian markets. Of course, some diehards continue to play Russian roulette, focusing on an uncertain market in a country with which Ukraine is at war. They could find themselves holding the short end of the stick if trade is officially stopped. However, the current volumes of trade do not represent a serious threat to the domestic economy as a whole, and so it comes down to a matter of private risk as business owners.

THE NATURE OF RUSSIAN IMPORTS

In contrast to Ukraine's exports to Russia, Russian imports to Ukraine continued to grow strongly in terms of value, reaching US $8.1bn, which was almost 60% up from its low point in 2016. This trend is about to end. Whereas in 2017, Russian deliveries to Ukraine grew over US $2bn, in 2018 they grew only US $0.9bn. Moreover imports from all other countries to Ukraine are growing at a much faster pace, so the share of Russian imports is also slowly shrinking, from 14.6% in 2017 to 14.2% in 2018. The same is happening with the share of exports of Ukrainian goods to the RF.

Once again, a more detailed look at Russian imports to Ukraine shows that there, too, most goods are rising not in volumes but simply because prices per unit have gone up (see **charts**). The exception is energy, where growing dependence is really reaching a dangerous scale.

The most noticeable contribution to the growth of Russian imports was petroleum products, coking coal and anthracite. If we leave these three items out, Russian imports were actually down in 2018 compared to 2017. Although total deliveries of Russian goods to Ukraine grew US $0.9bn, petroleum products accounted for more than US $0.7bn of that and were up nearly double, from US $890.1mn to $1,616.57mn. This was because the cost of a tonne was up nearly 33% and volumes grew from 1.8mn t to 2.5mn t. The result was that the already extremely high share of Russian supplies of petroleum products grew even more noticeably: fully 38.4% of all such imports came from the RF. If Belarus is added, since it effectively exports Russian products, then Russian petroleum products account for nearly 80% of all such imports.

Second place for increased value of imports from the RF goes to coking coal, the raw material for preparing metallurgical coke, which is a critically important fuel for the domestic steel industry. Imports grew US $200mn, from US $1.01bn to US $1.21bn while the price remained almost unchanged, going from US $122.80/t to US $127.00/t. Meanwhile deliveries of ready met coke went down from 608,000 t to 505,000 t and its price also did not change. However, the share of Russian imports of coke to Ukraine jumped to 69% because alternative deliveries from Poland collapsed from 474,000 t in 2017 to 62,300 t in 2018.

Ukraine's economy has also grown more dependent on anthracite from Russia. For the first 10 months of 2018, 2,920,000 t were delivered for US $313.4mn when during the same period of 2017 only 1,880,000 t worth US $184.24mn were delivered. What's more, alternate deliveries from South Africa have also collapsed, from 456,000 t to 118,900 t, even though the price from RSA is US $101.80/t, while the price from RF is US $107.30.

Imports of nuclear fuel from Russia for Ukraine's AESs also grew from US $244mn to US $292mn. Not long ago, the press reported that the contract for these deliveries was secretly prolonged. Meanwhile, procurements of alternate fuel rods from Westinghouse slipped from US $137mn to US $121mn, despite assurances from the Cabinet that the share of US fuel was supposed to be increased while Rosatom's was to be cut. It's clear that lately the diversification of nuclear fuel suppliers has been put on hold — as well as efforts to reduce Ukraine's dependence on Russian anthracite.

Meanwhile, some types of Russian energy raw materials are slowly being squeezed out by American ones. Although an overly large share of all imported coking coal still comes from Russia (9,550,000 t of a total of 14,060,000 t), volumes have actually grown 16.1%. But imports from the US and Canada grew 42.8% from 2,920,000 t in 2017 to 4,170,000 t in 2018 as the price for quality American materials went don 6.7%/ t, in contrast to Russian prices, which went up more than 3%. Alternative deliveries of met coke from the US grew sharply to 79,700 t in 2018 from nothing in 2017, as did deliveries from Colombia, which were up from 28,600 t in 2017 to 49,400 t in 2018, thanks to the much cheaper cost of coke from those two countries: the US price was US $311/t.

Meanwhile Ukraine's supposed growing dependence in 2018 on deliveries of a slew of strategic energy resources from Russia under other items turned out to be mostly caused by higher prices in 2018. This was the case with Russian deliveries of LNG, which grew in value because the unit price jumped from US $396 to US $498, while volumes actually declined from 465,000 t to 421,000 t.

Russian imports to Ukraine that have grown fastest**

	total exports for 2018, US $mn	% growth, 10M of 2018 vs 10M 12017
Petroproducts	1616.6	+81.6
Organic chemical compounds	137.8	+68.3
Anthracite	313.4	+66.5
Ferrous metal products	79.8	+29.8
Electrical machines	127.7	+28.5
Aluminum and aluminum products	79.8	+27.0
Nickel and nickel products	59.9	+21.4
ALL imports from the RF	6628.9	+20.1
Coking coal	1211	+19.9
Nuclear fuel rods	292.1	+19.6
Ferrous metals	317.6	+17.5
Paper and cardboard	127.8	+16.8
LNG	210.1	+14.2

** This shows only goods whose import value was over US $mn.
Sources: Derzhstat data, author calculations

The same is true of Russian deliveries of hot rolled sheet steel, where the value went from US $60.9mn to US $65.3mn because the price per ton went from US $535 to US $602, while deliveries contracted from 113,800 t to 108,400 t. This was also the case with unprocessed aluminum, where the same volumes were delivered both years, but the cost rose from US $2,150 to US $2,400/t. Similarly, the value of nickel imports went up nearly 50% although the volumes shipped from Russia remained the same.

WHAT'S COMING?

It seems that the short-term corrective growth in trade with Russia that was especially pronounced in 2017 is rapidly coming to an end. Ukrainian suppliers are dropping Russian markets faster than Russian ones are dropping Ukraine. Still, the growth that did take place was mostly the result of significant rises in commodity prices, while physical volumes grew only in exceptional cases. With the exception of a number of genuinely vulnerable sectors that represent a potential security threat for Ukraine, interactions between the two countries' economies continue to go down.

Notably, Ukraine's economy is in recovery mode, especially in the "growth belt" connected primarily to positive trends over recent years with the country's EU neighbors. Meanwhile, the economic situation in the RF has grown steadily worse over 2014-2018, with 2017 GDP actually 0.6% smaller than in 2013. Since early 2018, Russia's economy is also growing half as fast as Ukraine's: according to Rosstat, H118 saw only 1.6% growth, whereas Ukraine's GDP grew 3.4% and neighboring EU countries saw 4-5% growth.

This suggests that exports from Ukraine to the RF have fallen off less because of mutual sanctions and the war, than because of Russia's own domestic economic problems. Rosstat reports that total imports to Russia fell from US $315bn in 2013 to US $227bn in 2017 and only grew 7.3% in the first 10 months of 2018. Those Ukrainian companies, sectors and regions that have not so successfully shifted to other markets have been suffering and will continue to suffer even more.

Where Ukraine needs urgent and decisive state intervention is in the risky trend towards growing dependence on Russia for critical imports of petroleum products, LNG, anthracite, and coking coal. Moscow has shown more than once that it is very happy to take advantage of any weakness in its hybrid war against Ukraine. Examples include the crisis on the gasoline market in 2017, interruptions to deliveries of anthracite including fall 2018 for the Ladyzhynska TES, a key co-generation plant in Vinnytsia Oblast, which nearly caused the entire system to come to a standstill. The government still doesn't seem to have drawn the necessary conclusions.

Moreover, those in power seem to be criminally inactive and even playing up the situation. Possibly it's for the mercantile reasons of those at the top. Back in April 2017, MinEnergo submitted a draft resolution to the Cabinet to ban the import of heating coal from Russia, but the Government to this day has not approved the necessary decision. Later on, the Anti-Monopoly Committee blocked a decision intended to restrict the use of Russian anthracite in favor of using gas coal, which is extracted in Ukraine — without any appropriate response on the part of the higher ups.

UKRAINE'S ECONOMY IS IN RECOVERY MODE, ESPECIALLY IN THE "GROWTH BELT" CONNECTED PRIMARILY TO POSITIVE TRENDS OVER RECENT YEARS WITH THE COUNTRY'S EU NEIGHBORS. MEANWHILE, THE ECONOMIC SITUATION IN THE RF HAS GROWN STEADILY WORSE OVER 2014-2018

With no proper response from the National Security Council or the Presidential Administration, Russian imports continue to completely dominate Ukraine's petroleum product, LNG, coking coal, and non-ferrous metals markets. What's more, the complete dependence on the Kremlin of the Russian business groups that control these deliveries and how easily this could be used in the hybrid war against Ukraine are completely being ignored. Should Russia stop delivering most of these goods, most of them can be found through other suppliers. However, when Ukraine is dependent 60-80% on deliveries from Russia, this is not something that can be done quickly. So preparations need to start today.

The path to resolving this problem is pretty obvious. All the Russian deliveries of strategic energy resources and industrial raw materials that could be stopped on a dime for political reasons constitute a serious threat to Ukraine's national security: they can paralyze or disrupt stable energy supplies to Ukraine's households and industries, and stop operations in major industrial sectors. This means that restrictions must be placed on the import of these critical items from Russia, to a maximum of 25-30%. In the meantime, the real, not nominal, source of imports must be taken into account. For instance it's obvious that petroleum products and LNG from Belarus should be treated as imported from Russia, which is the sole source of all raw materials for its neighbors manufacturers.

The 3% Saga

What is a realistic pace that Ukraine's economy might grow?

Liubomyr Shavaliuk

In 2016, Ukraine's economy grew 2.4%, rising to 2.5% in 2017. This past year, President Poroshenko says it grew 3.4% and the Government has projected 3.0% growth in 2019. The NBU is less optimistic, forecasting 2.5% growth in 2019. A popular folk saying is that stability is a sign of excellence. But public reaction to this kind of stability is mixed. On one hand, Ukraine's entire government proudly reported in unison that the country's GDP was picking up pace as one of its achievements. On the other, the premier keeps saying that this is too little that Ukraine's economy needs to grown 7-8% annually in order to not just recover but to move up. Finally, those who feed on bad news see the actual pace of growth as the final collapse of the Revolution of Dignity and of all those whom it brought to power.

> Over the last four years, **207** new factories opened their doors in Ukraine. Most of them are ventures by foreign investors. So far, the facilities are not large, hiring several hundred workers and altogether creating a few dozen thousand new jobs, and this is less than **1%** of the labor market in Ukraine

This kind of situation makes it hard for ordinary people to understand who's right and what these rates of growth actually signify, so *The Ukrainian Week* has tried to figure it out.

If GDP growth is looked at in the abstract, 3% growth is a middling rate globally. According to the IMF's October assessment and forecasts, the world economy grew faster in 2017 and 2018, at 3.7%, and should grow the same in 2019. Given that wealthier economies generally grow more slowly, the average pace of growth of developing economies is about 50% higher, or 4.7% according to the IMF. This means that Ukraine is not only not catching up to its wealthier neighbors, such as Poland and Turkey, but falling behind more and more. If this fact is removed from its circumstances, the situation comes across as even less cheering. But an in-depth look at the components presents a more ambiguous picture.

EXPORTS AS LITMUS PAPER

Take exports. They constitute more than half of GDP, so they are a key factor in economic growth. Over 2014-2016, exports went down nearly 50% (see **Weakening factors**), mainly because of the ruination caused by the war in the Donbas, which caused Ukraine to irreversibly use considerable economic capacity and a lion's share of its export potential. All this is clear from economic indicators. During the 2008-2009 financial crisis, there was a similar collapse in exports, but things picked up again within three years, when GDP was growing 4-5% a year. This time, there is no way to recover to previous levels again. Yes, the export of goods keeps growing, but this growth is coming from completely different companies and sectors than prior to the crisis: three years after the crisis ended, indicators are still only 67% of their pre-crisis peak.

Another important factor is at play here, too. In theory, export is one of the economic powerhouses that has the strength to self-regulate. If the volume of goods being shipped out goes down for whatever reason, a trade deficit appears. This, in turn, drives the national currency down, making prices for domestic goods and services that were not previously being exported, more attractive on foreign markets. This leads to export growth and compensates a good part of start-up costs. In short, a decline in exports eventually ensures its rise in another area. A similar kind of self-regulation should take place whenever there are large-scale losses at an individual enterprise: demand for its goods did not go anywhere and the ensuing shortage causes prices to slowly rise again, making investment in restoring ruined manufacturing facilities and one-time production output levels. In Ukraine, however, there was no sharp increase in export volumes or significant capitalization in restoring the ruined enterprises in the Donbas, or their transfer to non-occupied territory. What does this suggest?

First of all, it reflects a lack of business acumen. The hryvnia went down to less than a third of its previous value. Foreign tourists find the country unbelievably inexpensive. Even the Big Mac Index produced by *The Economist* indicates that the hryvnia should be three times higher and the dollar should cost only about UAH 9.80 in Ukraine. This means that after exports declined during the 2014-2016 crisis, enormous export potential appeared again — and this needs to be taken advantage of. Ukrainians should be making just about anything or buying it domestically and selling it in Poland and elsewhere. If Ukraine had enough savvy entrepreneurial types, half the country would be busy doing precisely this. Exports would be on the rise like yeast and the dynamic of the GDP would be far more lively than the current 3%.

For some reason, this isn't happening. We could try blaming it on Ukraine's loss of the Russian market, or Ukraine needing time to adjust to the demands of the EU market. Except that the hryvnia is extremely cheap for four years and a bit, which means also the cost of

Weakening factors

Legend:
- Exports of goods and services, $ bn (RS)
- Real GDP Index, with 100 = 2005 indicator
- Gross accmulated capital, with100 = 2005 indicator

* Figures for 2018 = author estimate based on indicators for 9-11 months

Sources: NBU, Derzhstat

manufacturing located in Ukraine. In other words, there's been more than enough time to adjust to the new conditions and the economy has been responding, but far too little. If Ukraine had enough entrepreneurial folks, manufacturing and exports would be growing a lot faster. Instead, their growth is weak and Ukrainians themselves are choosing to emigrate rather than to try manufacturing something on their own at home.

BREAKTHROUGHS AND OBSTACLES

Secondly, the reality is that there is no technological capacity or economic sense to trying to restore the majority of the industry destroyed in the Donbas. Those facilities were anyway inherited from soviet times. The oligarchs managed to squeeze some juice out of them somehow, paying people very little and driving them like animals in a herd, but building a piping or steel plant from the ground up is more than any of them are capable of. Indeed, the number of technological breakthroughs since Ukraine became independent can be counted on the fingers of one hand and the people responsible for them are treated almost like gods in Ukrainian business circles. That's the whole point: in order for the country's economy to grow, Ukrainians have to build it — and that means knowing how to do that — but not all of Ukraine's billionaires are capable of this.

The feasibility of restoring what was ruined is also extremely doubtful. Most of the facilities belonged to the third, and partly the fourth technological generation. The goods that they produced have many equivalents around the world and their markets are extremely competitive. Their disappearance from the global economic map has gone unnoticed. When the level of breakdowns with which these factories operated is factored in, investing in them is clearly a waste of money.

Thirdly, conditions for doing business in Ukraine also need to be kept in mind. In general, they probably got better during the Yanukovych Administration, but most of the economic capacities lost in the Donbas belonged to oligarchs who always enjoyed special conditions that they agreed with whoever was in power. Meanwhile, the exports that are just emerging today

are generally being produced by SMEs that are not protected against the abuse of enforcement, tax or customs officials. That makes it very hard for them to enjoy the kind of success that oligarchic businesses had under hothouse conditions. And so, although exports are far more diversified today than they used to be, they are growing more slowly as well. The main conclusion that can be drawn is that if obstacles to doing business were removed for SMEs, manufacturing and export both would grow much more noticeably. But those in power need to understand that, so far, governments have been more inclined to create obstacles to commercial activity than to help business grow.

INVESTING IN MANUFACTURING

Investment is the other key factor to economic growth. Here, a number of interesting facts emerge. For instance, in the last three years, the gross fixed capital formation or net investment has grown nearly 60% (see **Weakening factors**). Moreover, this indicator was higher in 2018 than in 2012, the best year between the previous two financial crises. Apparently, investors weren't investing then because they were aware of all the risks connected to the Yanukovych regime. Now, they are investing capital, despite the war, which testifies to some key improvements. The level of investment is still too small to spur economic growth, but it already offers hope that the situation in Ukraine will change for the better.

Over the last four years, 207 new factories opened their doors in Ukraine. Most of them are ventures by foreign investors. So far, the facilities are not large, hiring several hundred workers and altogether creating a few dozen thousand new jobs. This is less than 1% of the labor market in Ukraine, so their contribution to GDP growth is not very big for now. What's important about this today is that the country is already being seen as potentially a full-fledged component of the European market, which is why the owners are trying

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to get in while wages are still low and the manufacturing facilities here can pay for themselves within a few years. The minute this trend becomes large-scale, the domestic economy is guaranteed to start growing at a good clip. The main thing is for this to be a qualitative growth in real jobs. The more foreign manufacturers build facilities in Ukraine, the more developed countries in Europe and elsewhere will have a stake in Ukraine's security. This kind of partnership is win-win for all involved.

SHIFTING DEMAND

Another key factor, one that few people talk about, is the change in aggregate demand as structural reforms progress. Schematically, it can be described thus: as reforms take place, demand grows for new goods and services in considerably larger volumes that the econ- ›

Money out of circulation

billions UAH

- Certificates of Deposit
- Cash and deposits
- Domestic government bonds

* Figures for November 2018

Source: NBU

omy did not experience earlier. Supplies need time to adapt to new structural demand, to get the technology and labor necessary, to win tenders, sign contracts and establish market infrastructure. And demand needs time to find the right supply. This means that there can sometimes be a temporary manufacturing vacuum, where the buyer wants to buy something and has the financial resources, but the seller can't sell enough of it. This can make it seem like the economy is slipping, but in fact it's getting the resources together that are necessary for the next leap. And as soon as manufacturing adapts to the new conditions, the given market for goods and services begins to grow strongly,

Local governments have huge surpluses of unused budget funds that lying around doing nothing in bank accounts. Over 2018, this surplus was often more than **UAH 15bn**

There are several good examples of this, such as road construction. In 2013, UAH 15.5bn was allocated and 625 km of roadways were restored and resurfaced. In 2019, more than UAH 49.0bn will be spend just from the public purse, plus money from international donors for individual projects — and more than 4,000 km of roadways are slated to be redone. The point is not just that the budget for road building has tripled and the amount of roadway sextupled, but that this scale of roadworks requires that the process itself be properly organized and the manufacturing capacities prepared: ProZorro has been established and launched, all tenders are now going through the system, and both buyers and contractors are using this new platform. Meanwhile, equipment has been purchased, people hired, foreign builders invited to get involved and bring their own equipment, and so on. Once this system is running smoothly, it will be possible to redo even 10,000 km of roadway a year. Moreover, the impact on GDP growth will be proportionally affected as well.

The same is true of decentralization. Just a few years ago, how many local government agencies had the skills and experience necessary to prepare busi-

ness plans and grant proposals to get financing to, say, change all the windows in a school or to buy school buses? Even fewer probably had the budget to do so. Now the money is available but experience is lacking. And so local governments have huge surpluses of unused budget funds that lying around doing nothing in bank accounts. Over 2018, this surplus was often more than UAH 15bn. By the end of November, it was UAH 12.6bn. Obviously, if this money were working, they could be turned over several times over the course of a year and have a considerable impact on GDP growth. But this did not happen for objective reasons.

A similar situation was taking place in the banking sector. As a result of widespread reforms, domestic banks became highly liquid (see **Money out of circulation**). But the selection of borrowers became very limited because financial institutions were forced to stop lending to related parties and engaging in other risky practices, while finding a suitable number of creditworthy borrowers on the market proved easier said than done.

The result was that, over the last four years, banks have held considerable liquidity in NBU certificates of deposit and even more in government bonds. In the former case, the money wasn't working at all because it had been taken out of circulation. In the later case it went largely to consumption and even to pay for populist government whims. It will take time for everyone to adapt to the new requirements of banking institutions and their borrowers. But lending is already picking up pace again, which is very necessary to keep investment dynamics up. Still, a few years were lost and that is what we see in the GDP growth dynamic being reported.

THE GOOD NEWS-BAD NEWS OF MIGRATION

Last, but not least, is migrating labor. The country's economy cannot grow quickly if it's losing labor rapidly, especially highly qualified specialists. It's not just that more workers mean higher volumes of output. A labor shortage pushes wages up. This is good for the workers themselves, and it stimulates business owners to increase productivity and to invest in growing their business — which, in and of itself, can have a positive impact on economic growth.

But there is a definite limit beyond which high wages will begin to have a harmful impact on business. As it becomes less profitable to produce goods and services, companies begin to cut back production or shut down altogether. At that point, GDP is likely to go into decline. And so labor migration needs to be kept at a minimum before things get to this point.

In short, what we have is a situation that is not straightforward. On one hand, there are factors that are holding back economic growth and their effect is disheartening. On the other, there are positive trends that give cause for hope. And then there are those factors that have no impact either way on GDP growth but they can shore it up over time. So, 3% GDP growth is the reality Ukraine faces today. In this situation, the country cannot afford another deep economic crisis under any circumstances, to lose in a year what it has achieved through gargantuan effort. If it manages to avoid this, the economic bottlenecks that are getting in the way of 7-8% growth will eventually be worked out.

Touring country

How the war has changed the cultural landscape of the Donbas

Yelyzaveta Honcharova, Bakhmut

Visible phenomena. A space for art has appeared in most frontline towns

Art probably doesn't really need any kind of special conditions. For many centuries it appeared in the strangest places and under a wide range of circumstances. Geniuses and their works played their tricks in distant villages and provincial towns, in the midst of those who could never have been suspected of the "sin" of creating images of the world with a paintbrush, a note or a word. Art simply arose there where it was needed, born both thanks to and in spite of. Culture in the Donbas was also shaped by difficult historical processes: whatever was there gave birth to it. But we're talking about the true steppe culture of eastern Ukraine, not the borrowed or artificially russified.

If we seep away the soviet "kokoshnik[1]" layer that still shines brightly through sheer inertia, for instance, in folk celebrations in the region, then it becomes clear that this culture was always and will continue to be, as it is in every other corner of Ukraine, with its unique features, its talents and special treasures, and even its prophets. And so when people talk about having to "bring Ukrainian culture to Donbas right now," the question arises: How? Like high-quality hothouse tomatoes, and then wait for a good harvest, regardless of the composition of the soil?

Or is it better to just find something particular, something that those who live in this industrial belt understand, and deck it out in embroidery and blue-and-yellow colors? To show them how it should be, to interest them in something new, to revive the forgotten? The myriad ways that art activists have been using to reach their goal in ever-more frequent appearances in the Donbas are impressive. Today, landing parties and even entire trains are bringing Art to the East. Sometimes it's just an amateur concert, and sometimes it's little more than spending money with a cultural twist. But it's all the more valued when it impresses because it genuinely touches its audiences and stirs no feelings of inferiority or second-classness among listeners and viewers from the "uncultured" East. Instead, it challenges them once again for strength and depth, just like it does other audiences, regardless of the geographic location. So people go in droves, but do they understand?

"When people ask me why I go to the East, I'm amazed," admits Olha Mykhailiuk, the ArtPole producer and director of a slew of performances. "I'm not doing this because this is the latest trend or because I can get a grant for it. And definitely not for the rush that lots of folks often hint at, given the context. My projects were happening long before the war. I do there to create art together." In contrast to many of those who think that the only thing that should be coming to the frontlines is tradition, preferably in its simplest forms, so that the dry Donbas soil might absorb as much as possible of what is Ukrainian, the ArtPole people aren't afraid to experiment and bring the exciting, the fashionable and the emotional to their audiences. A wide range of art projects have toured many cities in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts: RozdIlovI, a play on the words divide and capture, with Serhiy Zhadan, an original performance called Miata, and the Polish band, Volosi. And they always play to full houses – even in the smallest eastern towns.

Not long ago, they brought to life an interesting song project called Mozaika, which combines the singing of children and teens from Lviv – the Zhaivir Choir – and Stanytsia Luhanska, the site of fierce fighting in winter 2014. Together the two groups performed koliady, Ukrainian Christmas carols, and shchedrivky from various parts of Ukraine, and ancient Christmas texts. After rehearsing for six months, they performed twice: in the Klymentiy Sheptytskiy Cathedral and in the performance hall in Stanytsia Luhanska. Mykhailiuk recalls how exciting it was to discover enormous natural talent among ordinary teens in a small frontline town. She admits that, instead of talking about the horrors of war, they simply sang. But there were some bad moments as well, such as when someone from Lviv said, "Oh, look, these katsaps[2] even know Ukrainian!" In the end, art is more effective than just socializing because it doesn't drive apart but brings together. Afterwards the children and carolers mostly did not even mention who was from what part of Ukraine, because they no longer wanted there to be some kind of handicap because they were easterners. They just wanted people to be amazed by the singing, and not by where someone was from.

"Of course, these kids have been traumatized by war," says Mykhailiuk firmly, "but we have all been hurt by it, everyone in their own way. And that makes us all equal in art. The Donbas least of all needs to be treated like a victim to whom art is extending the hand salvation."

These days, ArtPole is launching "A Never-ending Journey, or Eneida" with Yuriy Andrukhovych, who is well known and anticipated in Donbas for the heated debates that his harsh and even rude judgments tend to stir, as well. Of course, the organizers are hoping that the power of art will help not to get bogged down in squabbles but to set a creative atmosphere with the help of all the irony and humor in Kotliarevskiy's Eneida. Before the tour gets underway, the artists will offer some introductory lectures on the theory of combining aural and visual perception, performance, and interesting world trends in art. The lecture audience will include students from various post-secondary institutions who are interested in modern art.

"We have to give people a chance to listen and choose," say the artists. "It doesn't matter whether it's in Sloviansk or Ternopil."

[1] The "kokoshnik" is the pointy, bejeweled headdress of Russian tradition. It was not a folk-costume, but on the contrary, was worn by women of the boyar class and higher.

[2] Katsap is a pejorative Ukrainian term for Russians, just as khokhol is the Russian term for Ukrainians.

Andreas Haggman:
"Humans could be viewed as a first line of defense"

Interviewed by
Yuriy Lapayev

During the 28th Economic Forum in Krynica-Zdrój (Poland) *The Ukrainian Week* talked with the British cyber security expert on the rules of cyber hygiene and the methods of defense of the most vulnerable category of computer users

What challenges or threats do you see in the field of cybersecurity?

– Cybersecurity is such a broad field, so you can see multiple challenges. Looking from a tactical angle maybe it would be a possible introduction of quantum computing, which may fundamentally undermine many cryptographic principles on which the current systems are built. Other technologies, that are underway, could be also disruptive. On the other hand, it is not only technology, it is also geopolitical events that can impact cybersecurity. They are not necessary predictable, but still we have to react to them, and this can range from international conflict to simple things like a civil servant leaving their laptop with some sensitive data. The challenges can also vary from a technology point of view and from a policy point of view. You have to design solutions that are flexible and try to take all these unknowns into account without being too burdensome on someone's current resources. So I think the challenges in cyber sphere are definitely multi-faceted and pointing out a single one always depends on who you are talking to, in what sector they're involved, and what problems they try to solve. They will be different for someone who works in critical infrastructure, to someone who works in education, to someone who is in non-profit.

Are humans really the weakest element of cyber system?

– I think it is both yes and no. Because sometimes humans are very soft targets, they are easy to compromise. There are plenty examples of that. But the same time, humans could also be viewed as a first line of defense, and if you train and educate them properly, they potentially could be more effective than any technological solution you can implement. Technological defenses are useful, but the same time they often are viewed as a hindrance to productivity. Technology must be designed for human use. You can't just focus on one or the other. To make sure the human isn't the weakest element you must enable the human to be the strongest. You have to equip them both with knowledge and understanding why cybersecurity is so important and with some best practices. But also give them user-friendly technologies they can work with, not hinder them. Too often technology developers don't keep user experience in mind and end up designing something not user-friendly. In cybersecurity this often seems to be a case. The classic example is PGP-encrypted e-mail – if you ever have used the PGP-encryption for mail – it is not user-friendly at all.

Is that our price for progress?

– All new technologies come with benefits and disadvantages and some even come with direct threats. We just have to adapt and try to foresee which challenges will come and how they will impact what we currently do. In some cases this is a radical shift. The internet is a fairly radical shift in scale, for example, in communications. But ultimately the digital world is just doing the same things we have always done, just faster with more transactions.

Which methods or approaches can be useful related to cybersecurity?

– Again this is too wide a question because of the whole spectrum of what cybersecurity means. But if we talk about people protecting themselves as individuals – that is useful starting point. The first thing you always have to do is to ask who am I protecting myself from, what are my threats or what am I try to avoid or mitigate against. As a private person you would probably be most concerned about compromise of personal accounts, not necessarily social media accounts, but bank accounts. Luckily, the way security culture is currently set up is that banks take a lot of the hit if an account is compromised; banks will pay for damages happened or reimburse your money. To stop this happening, banks make you carry out some security services, such as giving us some two-factorial identification devices, which is great.

One controversial aspect is that if you want to force people to improve their personal security, you need to make them responsible for the damage that could happen. Because they can't outsource their security to other people, they have to be secure themselves, or otherwise to pay the costs when something goes wrong. Insurance is another interesting mechanism for that. You can encourage people to be more secure through adoption of cyber insurance – better security practices drive down insurance premiums. The insurance industry been tackling this for the past few years and time will tell whether it will lead to improvements in security.

From a personal point of view, little simple things might be obvious but useful. For example: use strong passwords. Passwords are a terrible mechanism, but unfortunately we are stuck with them. One solution is to use a password manager, which means you have to remember one strong password and everything else would be automated for the other websites you plan to visit. Another example is to be sensible with the things you post on the internet, especially if it is a public forum, and consider differences between "public" and "friends only" settings on social media. A few more examples might be:

• To use a passcode on your phone or fingerprint sensor
• Don't plug in any USB devices that you don't know where they are from
• Not opening attachments in e-mail. This is a contentious one, because that's what email was built for – to send each other links or attachments. But the key is if you don't know the sender – be aware.
• Be sure you have turned off macros in Microsoft Office software.

These steps are simple and can be called a "cyber hygiene". In the medical context such small steps add up. You wash your hands when you go to the bathroom – the same way you need to lock your PC when you leave it. Little habits can make a big difference.

How to deal with older generation, especially if we talk about those, who work in sensible government organizations?
– Lot of stuff that we discussed in the previous question is very applicable here. There are of course technological solutions, so you can limit the potential damage the users can cause. If they click on a harmful attachment or a suspicious link – these solutions will open them in sandbox, so malware does not spread throughout your network. But this is a technical solution for human problem. You need human solutions. The users don't have to be technical experts, they don't have to understand what is going on the background, but they have to understand the risks associated with their behavior. For government organizations you need a team for user assistance, for example to check attachments in e-mails. The main thing is that you need to reinforce good behavior. If you find that your users are flagging e-mails, and do this correctly, you have to give them some kind of reward. It's a carrot and stick scenario. Stimulating good behavior is more effective than punishing mistakes.

Coming to another vulnerable category – how to protect kids? How to teach them cybersecurity?
– It is not too different from the previous answer. Kids have the same problems, but come from different directions. Where is the older generation maybe don't understand the technology, because the technology is too new, the younger generation understand how to use the technology, but only on the top layer, the application layer if you will. They are experts in using Instagram, Facebook and Snapchat, but they don't know how it actually works. If you understand the underline technology, you understand how something can be secure or insecure. But not everybody wants to be a computer scientist, not everybody should.

When is a proper time to teach them?
– I would say, even before they get their hands on a digital device. You don't get to drive a car before knowing the principles of the road, you need to have done some kind of theory and practice before. We don't need to mandate all people to learn all principles and laws in cybersecurity, this would be counter-productive. But it could be really useful if kids could be introduced to cybersecurity at an early age. If you are parents I would absolutely encourage you to say a word or two about what is safe behavior if you putting a smartphone or tablet in your kid's hands. It is a matter of parental responsibility. Security is perhaps not the right concept for that age group, we can instead frame it in terms of safety.

ALL NEW TECHNOLOGIES COME WITH BENE TS AND DISADVANTAGES AND SOME EVEN COME WITH DIRECT THREATS. WE JUST HAVE TO ADAPT AND TRY TO FORESEE WHICH CHALLENGES WILL COME AND HOW THEY WILL IMPACT WHAT WE CURRENTLY DO

Who can be an example for kids?
– Pop-stars, or even cartoon heroes. It would be great to have, for example, Justin Bieber for that. They don't even have to say anything on the topic, but need to project the right kind of behavior. Kids copy role models, whether that be parents, celebrities or friends. If they see them behave in a certain way, they will try to copy that. So it is really about setting good examples, via cartoons for younger kids, or with the help of celebrities for teenagers. But I'm skeptical that anyone would want to watch a special cybersafety cartoon on a Friday evening. This needs to be built-in to existing movies or cartoons. Same for pop-stars; it might don't work if they just come up on the stage saying "come on, let's be cybersecure". The message only works if the people who saying the message are also doing it. You've got to practice what you preach, and that is not only for celebrities, but also for parents.

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Generation "D"

How children in occupied Donbas are being worked on psychologically and informationally

Yuriy Lapayev

PHOTO: REUTERS

A "happy" childhood. For the militants running the self-proclaimed republics, children are nothing more than an endless military resource

What's actually going on in the occupied parts of the Donbas is often only evident in a fragmentary manner and incomplete data. What can be tracked in social nets and video clips is mostly about the lives of adults: the latest squabbles among warlords, new military equipment that has been recorded there, prices for goods in the "young republics," or problems with going back and forth through the military checkpoints. The one important point that is rarely brought up in the press is how children live in DNR and LNR – or, rather, how Russia's propaganda machine is affecting them

Why kids? Should the conflict in the region remain frozen or at least unresolved for some time, the children are the hope of the "republican" leadership and their handlers in Moscow. The pensioners who have stayed behind will not be working to contribute to the already small local budgets. They can't take up arms although in the recruitment centers, they are officially considered a mobilization resource. Those who are already adults today are also a limited resource given the distinct success of the Ukrainian army and the number of those who are keen to move to Russia. The flow of mercenaries and volunteers from Russia is gradually slowing down, fewer and fewer are ready to come back from Donbas with a serious disability in lieu of money to pay off loans, and the recent "victories" of the Wagnerites in Syria have not added to the prestige of this work.

At the same time, it's quite common for separatist parents recognize the worthlessness of a DNR diploma and send their children to study at post-secondary institutions in Crimea, Moscow or St. Petersburg or even to hateful Kyiv where their offspring end up staying on. The two "republics" risk turning into something like Transnistria, where the end of the conflict simply led to even more depopulation. So the Kremlin's main challenge is to make sure these kids grow up to favor DNR/LNR so that they can be forced to stay in the occupied territories. The youngest have already forgotten their childhood in Ukraine, as most of their short lives have passed under the two-headed eagles, some have lost family members, friends or even just neighbors, which makes it easier to get them to hate "ukrops," the pejorative nickname for Ukrainians since the start of the war. What's more, a child's psyche is not very resistant to informational and psychological influences and quickly succumbs to the avalanche of "good advice" from adults.

This is actually somewhat in contrast to the takeover of Crimea, where there is at least some effort to appear objective in teaching the young, in line with the standards established in Russian law and its school curricula. Even there, though, it's possible to see all

kinds of "festivals of military and applied martial arts" with cossacks, tricolors and toddlers in camouflage. Textbooks, of course, offer only the Russian interpretation of events in the country.

Meanwhile, enjoying their free flight, those running the self-declared republics began their work almost immediately after the start of the conflict. Working with children and teens became just one component of their psychological and informational efforts to "rebrand" local residents. Their weapons include well-known Russian practices and theses, but often hyperbolized with an added touch of local color, which results in what might be called informational Frankensteins. The best-known example was the children's magazine called "Polite Little Men," a reference to the "green men" who invaded Crimea, of which several issues were published in LNR in 2016. According to the publishers, it was supposed to encourage "spiritual and patriotic upbringing" and raise a future generation of "boy-Kibalchiches," named after a Russian revolutionary who was born in Brussels. The magazine included everything that a future separatist needed to know: Faschiston, who printed greenbacks; Gnuland, who brought magic cookies to Charyvary Land and turned everyone into various Sectors; the evil dill shooting seeds on innocent Hill Country, "dill" being a play on the name "Ukrop;" and people in striped tees and uniforms. And, of course, the magazine had a good, wise Daddy who teaches judo throws and is obviously modeled on Vladimir Putin.

A fresher and more interesting example was recently found by activists from the Ukrainian Cyber Alliance (UCA): the current curricula for public schools in the occupied territories. Among others, UCA provided a "citizenship lesson" plan, which is an hour of class time for 5th through 7th grades, on of the topics being "Who started the war in Ukraine." The stated purpose of this kind of lesson is "to form in children the conviction that Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians are fraternal nations, they always lived, live and should continue to live in peace, friendship and accord," which is all a repeat of the basic themes of Russian propaganda. At the same time, as on the RF's national channels, DNR pupils are supposed to understand that there's a big difference between Ukrainians and "banderites," to be persuaded that the Ukrainian people were always brotherly, and to point out to them just how much positive good Russia has done for Ukraine. Somewhat contradictorily, the Moscow handlers also bring up nationalism as a negative factor that has brought destruction and evil. And this supposedly caused the discord among nations that led to "the collapse of one of the most powerful states in the world." It was nationalism, and not Moscow's interference, of course, that started the conflicts in Nagorno-Karabakh, Northern Ossetia, and lawlessness in the Fergana valley – and it was all done in the interests of the United States and its allies.

"Fighting against ourselves." That's what teachers have to stuff into kids' heads in order for them to absorb the Kremlin media's persistent claims that it's a "civil war" in Ukraine, where men from some of the furthest corners of Russia are somehow dying. Of course, this kind of formulation leaves any possible Russian regulars outside the conflict altogether. Teachers are recommended to use the phrase "someone somehow started a conflict between Ukrainians and Russians" over and over again so that Moscow's role in the war is shifted to the shoulders of the insidious "banderites" who are of course supported by the US and the EU. What's more, Western "handlers" supposedly stimulated the Ukrainian movement after the USSR collapsed and directed all the colored revolutions. The image of Stepan Bandera still disturbs Moscow and Donetsk, which means teachers in the occupied territories have to blame Bandera and his followers for actively cooperating with Hitler, engaging in "unbelievable atrocities," the burning down of the village of Khatyn in Belarus, and serving in the German police. Pupils are supposed to conclude

that "banderites" are supposed to be called "fascists," following the well-known practice of associative labeling, typically a combination of words that have very negative emotional connotations with roots in history. DNR teachers are supposed to emphasize that nationalism started out as pride in one's nation but gradually became distorted and radical, such as in Germany and Ukraine.

Interestingly, the lessons themselves are supposed to be quite modern in the way that material is presented: in addition to their own explanations, teachers are encouraged to support their teachings with video clips to increase the psychological impact. Thus, the cooperation of "banderites" with the Nazi regime is supposed to be illustrated by a film featuring Vladimir Visotskiy's "Soldiers of the Center group." The active recruitment of Ukrainian nationalists is supposed to be artistically represented by the court jester Feliks Yasnievskiy. To embed the study materials, a special exam question was even put together: "Which of the following doesn't belong: Russian, Belarusian, Ukrainian, banderite."

THE TWO "REPUBLICS" RISK TURNING INTO SOMETHING LIKE TRANSNISTRIA, WHERE THE END OF THE CONFLICT SIMPLY LED TO EVEN MORE DEPOPULATION. SO THE KREMLIN'S MAIN CHALLENGE IS TO MAKE SURE THESE KIDS GROW UP TO FAVOR DNR/LNR SO THAT THEY CAN BE FORCED TO STAY IN THE OCCUPIED TERRITORIES

Not surprisingly, that after these kinds of lessons, very tiny kids show up that don't understand the essence of the matter but are blindly ready to "kill Ukrops," about whom there are dozens of films on YouTube. The actual involvement of children in illegal military formations is no longer an exotic phenomenon from the African continent. Reports about minors participating in armed conflict in the Donbas began circulating already in 2016 in a special report by the US State Department on human trafficking around the world. The document stated that pro-Russian militants in the Donbas were using children to serve in their units as scouts or simply as human shields. In the Donetsk Military Academy, 14-16 year-old cadets are being trained through a program that gives them the opportunity to be commanders of general infantry divisions. Excessive militarization and brainwashing starts at an even earlier age. The photographs of "parades" in occupied Donetsk on May 9 and Republic Day show parents with two and three year-old toddlers dressed in military uniforms. The celebrations themselves turn into some kind of crazy hodge-podge: red flags and Lenin, icons with Nicholas II, in the same spot where a McDonalds once stood, and in the middle of it all, kids doing gymnastic turns with portraits of "fighting grandpas" that are sold at the supermarket around the corner and separatists under a variety of tricolors. The youth wing of the Oplot Donbasu, sings songs about "I don't know any other father, Zakharchenko is the only one." This is probably the biggest contrast with celebrations in Ukraine proper: despite the war, you don't see any children in uniform, only embroidered shirts. And no one sings paeans to the president or the ministers.

Despite all its surrealism, it's not possible to disdain this active informational and psychological work. If Ukraine doesn't start using counter-measures at all levels, it risks finding itself very soon with Generation "D" on its hands: a generation of extremely aggressive and hostile people. This will manifest as resistance at the front, if the war goes on, and possible sabotage in the rest of the country. The decline of occupied Donbas and the further marginalization of its residents will only make the situation worse. Turning them into law-abiding Ukrainians at a mature age will be extremely challenging: journals and songs will definitely not do the trick at that point. ▪▪

Hybrid hegemony

The rationale of Russia's revisionist strategy against Ukraine, Belarus and the "Near Abroad"

Mark Voyger

Ever since Russia launched its overt aggression against Ukraine in February 2014, the politicians, media and analysts worldwide have been struggling to grasp the logic of Russian actions in Ukraine, especially the rationale behind the Kremlin's long-term strategy vis-à-vis what it perceives as the "Near Abroad". Many explanations, models and scenarios have been proposed, ranging from naively optimistic to pessimistic, even catastrophic ones, involving full-scale Russian conventional attacks against its neighbors, including NATO member-states, or attempts to occupy Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Central Asia. Russia's preferred method of 21st century warfare has officially been dubbed "hybrid warfare" by NATO, as even the Russian leadership has adopted this term while accusing the West in aggressive intentions in a typical mirror-imaging fashion.

THE ULTIMATE STRATEGIC GOAL FOR RUSSIA IS TO HAVE RINGS OF PUPPET STATES ALONG ITS PERIPHERY THAT FACE MOSCOW OUT OF FEAR FOR THEIR SURVIVAL, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME SERVING BOTH AS BUFFER ZONES BETWEEN RUSSIA AND NATO, AND AS CONVENIENT LAUNCHING PADS FOR POTENTIAL RUSSIAN AGGRESSIVE CROSS-BORDER MOVES AGAINST THE WEST

The rationale of Russia's ongoing aggressive moves — overt or covert, hybrid ones — against the countries along its periphery can best be understood through the following analytical lenses: Russia simply cannot tolerate the existence in its neighborhood of a former Soviet republic that is both strong (with strength being defined as politically stable, militarily modernized, economically viable and socially cohesive) and at the same time pro-Western (that is belonging to, or aspiring toward membership in the EU and NATO). Thus, relative power and orientation are the two basic variables of the "hybrid hegemony" equation that Russia is desperately tying to solve in its favor in the former Soviet space.

The ideal desired outcome for Russia would be to have a neighboring state that is ruled by a pro-Russian regime, which were the cases of both Ukraine and Georgia prior to the 2004 and 2013 revolutions there. If this equation changes and one of Russia's neighbors chooses a different path leading it toward deeper integration with the West while being governed by a pro-Western elite, then the second best choice for Russia is to have that country divided through a hybrid aggression and annexation of portions of its territory, and keeping it internally divided and weakened, which has been the logic of Russian actions against both Ukraine and Georgia for over a decade now.

The ultimate strategic goal for Russia is to have rings of puppet states along its periphery that face Moscow out of fear for their survival, while at the same time serving both as buffer zones between Russia and NATO, and as convenient launching pads for potential Russian aggressive cross-border moves against the West, hybrid, whenever possible, and even conventional, if absolutely necessary. Russia's rationale in that regard is based on the lesson that the Kremlin learned twice from the popular revolutions in Georgia and Ukraine, and it is brutally simple and logical: Governments and their rulers can fall and change overnight, but state cohesion (political and social); state power (military and economic), and strategic orientation (popular attitudes, cultural preferences for the EU or Eurasian integration models) are built over years, if not decades.

## RUSSIA'S PREFERRED STRATEGIC OUTCOMES IN THE "NEAR ABROAD"

The Kremlin hybrid hegemony strategy can be expressed through a "One-Through-Five" model, whereby Russia has one most desired outcome — to establish uncontested hegemony over Ukraine and the former Soviet space, meaning exerting full control and having the final say in defining all those countries' foreign and security policies. This objective can be achieved by influencing the two major target audiences in the former Soviet space — the political elites and the populations, by means of hybrid tools — from military to political, diplomatic, legal, economic, infrastructure, information, cyber, intelligence and crime - at the domestic, regional and international levels. The four combinations of the relative power and foreign policy orientation of those countries range from weak and dependent on Russia, to strong and independent ones. The Russian efforts to divide and partition states like Ukraine and Georgia that are trying to escape its rule, result in the fifth strategic outcome — neighboring nations that are becoming stronger and more cohesive and turning to the West, are punished by having portions of their territories annexed in the hope that this will deprive them of their sovereignty and will prevent their integration with NATO and the EU. This particular outcome was recognized by Army Gen. Valery Gerasimov, the Chief of the General Staff of the RF Armed Forces, who in his briefing to the Russian Academy of Military Sciences postulated that: "Hybrid Warfare allows the aggressor to deprive its target-nation of its sovereignty without having to occupy its entire territory" (Gerasimov, 2017).

Ultimately, the strategic outcomes for Russia in order of preference begin with having a weak and dependent neighbor that is controllable through a pro-Russian satrap — the model of Ukraine under Yanukovich and Georgia under Shevarnadze. The Kremlin's hopes that this would also be the case of Belarus have faced certain resistance from President Lukasehnko after 2014, as he continues to send mixed signals about both Eurasian integration and rapprochement with the West.

When some of those previously dependent nations reject their pro-Russian leadership and choose to turn to the West in a decisive manner, Russia goes for the "partition" model - through direct invasion and annexation of some of their territories, or by providing covert support to one of the parties to an ethnic war. The wars in Yugoslavia in the 1990s provided an excellent testing ground for Russia, as the massive systemic problems they created for the post-Yugoslav successor-states and the entire region, are still being exploited by Russia to this day. They also provide a model for the Kremlin's constant attempts to destabilize the countries in its own neighborhood, especially those ❯❯

Russian hybrid hegemony model

1. Russian Strategic objective

Russia

West

Baltic states   **Ukraine**   **Belarus**

2. Target groups

Elites

Population

3. Levels of influence

International   **Regional**   **Internal**

4. Alternating forces/directions

| Strong | Pro-western |
| Weak | Pro-Russian |

5. Strategic results

Strong/Independent

Strong/Dependent

Weak/Independent

Weak/Dependent

Split apart

Internal level: internal contradictions (Jugoslavia war model); regional level: "Frozen conflict", potential annexation (South Ossetia, Abkhazia, Transnistria); international: blockade of pro-western reforms and association (Bosnia)

Supervised state through the offices of pro-Russian satrap (Yanukovych model)

Craving for western alliances to counteract influence of the Russian Federation (Baltic states, Georgia)

Governments and development trajectory may rapidly change, state authority had been building up for decades (Ukraine before denuclearization)

Invited to participate in western alliances as an important ally (Poland, Romania)

in the Caucasus. This is done through the so-called "frozen conflicts", some of which are actually quite "hot", and allow for the creeping annexation of Russia-occupied territories, such as South Ossetia and Abkhazia, and potentially Transnistria.

Even having a strong and dependent neighbor is not a preferred option for Russia, based on the same logic as above, namely that governments and orientations change overnight, but state power is built over decades. Following the Soviet collapse, Ukraine had a strong army, a nuclear arsenal, and a powerful industry. Russia was not happy to have Ukraine as a strong regional ally, neither in the period before until 2006, nor during the Yanukovich era. Instead, it opted for debilitating Ukraine in any way it could — by pushing for its de-nuclearization, subverting its political and economic reforms, weakening its army, infiltrating its security apparatus with Russian operative and spies, and filling its political system, legislature and economy with Russian agents of influence. The fate of Ukraine in that period must serve as a stark example to any Russian neighbor who might consider disarming and surrendering their foreign and security policy choices to the Kremlin, as well as a dire warning to anyone in the West who might seriously consider the option of leaving Ukraine, Belarus and others in the Russian orbit, in the naïve hope that they will serve as legitimate "buffer states" between Russia and NATO. They won't — Russia's hybrid hegemony will result in them being devoid of their sovereign statehood in all possible ways, until Russia turns them into smaller, weaker, dependent version of itself, to ultimately use them as launching pads for spreading its influence further outside its former Soviet borders.

Even having a militarily weaker, but independents state neighboring Russia is not a preferred option for the Kremlin as such a state will inevitably seek to join the Western alliances in order to balance its power deficiencies. This was the case of the Baltic States — following the Soviet collapse they were militarily weak and were pushing to enter NATO in order to guarantee their security. While Russia did not initially express strong objections to their NATO integration in 2004, the Kremlin quickly changed its attitude when they began having their own independent foreign and domestic policy choices — from asking NATO to provide air patrolling of their borders, to removing Soviet monuments. In response, Russia launched a non-military hybrid effort against Estonia in 2007, that included a massive cyber attack that took down the country's financial system and organized violent protests of ethnic Russians. The Kremlin's behavior in the case of the Baltic States provides the best explanation of why Russia objects to the expanded NATO presence and to the EU integration of the other former Soviet republics. When a nation enters the Western security and political alliances, no matter how small or militarily weak, its national security calculus changes, their confidence on the international scene increases, they are more likely to withstand the Kremlin's pressure, and ultimately - they are no longer so malleable and vulnerable to Russian political, economic, energy and military blackmail. As a result, the Kremlin loses important elements of its "hybrid hegemony" over what is perceives as former colonies.

Ultimately, the worst of all outcomes for Russia is, of course, having a strong and independent state on its borders, as such states are inevitably courted by the West, NATO in particular, as valuable allies. This is the case of both Poland and Romania, and it should be no surprise that their increased confidence in resisting to Russia's hybrid hegemony — by pushing against Russia's energy projects to hosting US ballistic missile defense systems and advanced forward presence of NATO headquarters and troops — are causing Russia to issue direct military threats to both nations on a regular basis.

Therefore, when it comes to Ukraine, and to a certain extent Belarus if President Lukashenko continues to assert its independence from Russia by turning to the West, the best outcomes for Russia would be to have a divided country - ethno-linguistically, politically, and territorially; or one that Russia keeps weak and dependent, even if ruled by pro-Russian government. In that regard, the only two possible models of Russian behavior toward Ukraine in the future are: the 'Satrap' model (limited sovereignty by controlling the state); or the 'Spoiler' model (contested sovereignty by partitioning the state). In more specific terms, those two models can extend from Russian control over Ukraine's politics, especially in its Russian-speaking territories, to the incorporation of the occupied territories in the Donbas, to potentially claiming the entire Azov Sea as a "Russian lake" by expanding out of Crimea to open a land corridor. The nature of this "zero-sum" game is such that under both Russia-desired outcomes the Western political and security architecture is denied access to most European territories of former Soviet space, first and foremost Ukraine and Belarus, as both countries are too important for the Kremlin to give up — politically historically, culturally, economically and militarily.

THE ROLES OF NATO AND THE EU IN REVERSING RUSSIA'S "HYBRID HEGEMONY" PROJECT IN EURASIA

Given Russia's ongoing aggressive rhetoric and actions, the West and NATO are perfectly justified in worrying about potential future Russian aggressive moves against their member-states in the East, and they should constantly increase the readiness and interoperability of NATO's forces, while improving military mobility along the eastern border of the Alliance. However, their focus, geographical and functional, should go beyond the purely military threats, and they should be even more involved in the stability of the nations east of the borders of NATO that are targeted by Russia, in the first place Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova, but also the other PfP nations. The strategic risk is that masked amidst all the saber-rattling, demonstrations of power and aggressive rhetoric toward the West, the Kremlin is gradually trying to subvert those nations, one by one, and in order to impose its geopolitical will upon them. The new type of domination that Moscow strives to exert in the 21st century over its former Soviet colonies will likely not take the form of multi-million-strong armies conquering everything and everyone between the eastern periphery of the Baltics to the Caucasus and Central Asia, like it happened during the Bolshevik and Stalinist periods. Russia simply does not have the manpower and economic resources to maintain such a war effort and hold perpetually such large territories by force. Still, Russia's new hybrid hegemony will not be less challenging and dangerous for the West and NATO, as if successfully implemented, it will allow Moscow to stifle, on the cheap, the pro-Western democratic orientation of nation after nation, further and further in the East, until it reconstitutes its former imperial self in a sort of USSR 2.0 "Light" format. If successfully implemented, regardless of the inevitable ups and downs, that would reverse the logic of almost three decades of independent nation-building in the former Soviet space and would fulfill the geopolitical dreams of Vladimir Putin, who in 2005 called the collapse of the Soviet Union "The greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the 21st century". Independent Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia and Moldova still form the best bulwark against this geopolitical nightmare, but many others in the region are at risk of slipping back beyond the "event horizon" of the Eurasian "black hole" that is actively being built by the Kremlin. The West — NATO and the EU — can and therefore must do more to help them resist Kremlin's "hybrid hegemony" and survive as sovereign nations in the current century. ⛩

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
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RIVNE
vul. Korolenka 2

VOLODYMYR-VOLYNSKIY
vul. Kovelska 6

KHMELNYTSKYI
vul. Proskurivska 2

SUMY
vul. Soborna 44

KYIV
vul. Lysenka 3A
vul. Khreshchatyk 46
vul. Spaska 5
Povitroflotskiy prospekt 33/2
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Boulevard Lesi Ukrayinky 24
Prospekt Mykoly Bazhana 16D
vul. Vadyma Hetmana 1
vul. Vasylkivska 34
vul. Yevhena Sverstiuka 2A
vul. Andriy Malyshko, 2d

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vul. Sumska 3

TERNOPIL
vul. Valova 5/9

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The anatomy of provocations

How Russia is using foreigners to spark conflict in Zakarpattia

Denys Kazanskiy

At the beginning of 2018, Zakarpattia Oblast suddenly began to make the headlines in Ukraine's press. One incident after another pointed to a sudden rise in tensions between the Ukrainian community and the Hungarian minority. Unknown individuals attacked the office of the Hungarian Cultural Society in Uzhhorod twice, on February 4 and 27, setting the premises on fire and leaving Nazi-style insults on the walls. On March 16, nine cars with Hungarian plates were damaged in Berehove, a town some 30 km south of Mukachevo. This was clearly intended to coincide with March 15, the anniversary of the 1939 declaration of a short-lived autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine within Czechoslovakia.

Needless to say, these incidents triggered a reaction from Hungary's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which summoned the Ukrainian ambassador after the Hungarian cultural center was set on fire. Hungary's ambassador to Ukraine also called on the OSCE to open a mission in Zakarpattia. The incident in Berehove only seemed to reinforce the rhetoric.

INTERESTINGLY, FOREIGNERS HAVE COMMITTED CRIMES THAT MOSCOW AND ITS AGENTS TRIED TO PIN ON UKRAINIAN NATIONALISTS. THE "BLOODTHIRSTY BANDERITES" ARE EVIDENTLY NOT BLOODTHIRSTY ENOUGH, SO POLES HAD TO STAND IN FOR THEM THIS TIME

"This action is an open provocation against Hungarians in Zakarpattia," said Hungarian officials. "It is part and parcel with anti-Hungarian actions in recent weeks." Hungary's Minister of Foreign Affairs Péter Szijjártó complained that Hungarians had to "live with a permanent sense of fear in their Zakarpattian homeland." Russia happily rode on the wave of negative news, blaming everything on Ukrainian radicals and nationalists.

It did not take long to find and detain the men behind the arson. They turned out to be Poles and are now on trial for their actions. The court files make clear that what happened a provocation carried out by foreigners on Russia's behalf. A Polish website covering the trial, tvp.info, reported that the arsonists were paid 1,000 zloty – nearly UAH 7,000 or about US $250 – for the attack on the Hungarian cultural center.

The two men belong to Falanga and Zmiana, two Polish ultra-right parties known to be Putin and Russia sympathizers. Zmiana's leader Mateusz Piskorski has been on trial for several years now, for cooperating with Russia's secret service. Official files from Polish prosecutors do not provide the names of those charged with arson in Zakarpattia, but Zakarpattia Governor Hennadiy Moskal dis-

closed them shortly after the attack: Adrian Marglewski, 22, from Krakow, and Tomasz Rafał Szymkowiak, 25, from Bydgoszcz. The press later mentioned a third provocateur, Michał Prokopowicz, a 28-year old member of Zmiana.

Like the two GRU men in the Salisbury attack, the arsonists were not too smart. They stayed at a hostel in Uzhhorod where they registered in their real names. And they bought the gasoline they used to set fire to the cultural center at a local gas station where CCTV captured them on tape.

"This provocation was to further damage Ukrainian-Hungarian relations," the Polish Internal Security Agency (ABW) officer in charge of the case told tvp.info. "It was done in the interest of Russia, which wants to destabilize a western neighbor that is already facing a hybrid war. Hiring Polish radicals worked, because this would also ramp up tensions between Poles and Ukrainians, even if the action failed."

The case then took a new twist. In court, the frightened arsonists broke their silence and named the person who had paid them for the sabotage: Manuel Ochsenreiter, a notorious German journalist and a well-known Russia sympathizer. A supporter of the Donetsk and Luhansk pseudo-republics, Ochsenreiter is a frequent guest on Russian television. Moreover, he is an advisor to Markus Frohnmaier, an AfD MP who is openly pro-Russian, just like the Polish radical right parties.

"Our actions were carried out with clear instructions from Ochsenreiter," Prokopowicz told the court. "I had no initiative in this. The main goal was to compromise 'Ukrainian Banderites,' not to stir up ethnic hostilities."

This removed any doubts that Russia was behind the Zakarpattia incidents. While the adventures of Polish radicals could be interpreted as their personal initiative over grievances with Ukraine, the involvement of German politicians and journalists linked to Russia made it clear whose fingerprints it was.

Whose interests Ochsenreiter was working for when he gave instructions to burn down the Hungarian cultural center in Uzhhorod is no secret, nor has he tried hard to hide this. Ochsenreiter regularly visits Donetsk and Luhansk, supports "L/DNR" militants and Russia's occupation of Crimea, and propagandizes in anti-Ukrainian media. A search of his name in Google will show him speaking at Novorossiya and Oplot TV, both broadcasters in occupied Donetsk. His most recent visit to the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts was in November 2018, as an "observer" in the illegal election of the new DNR leader. Whenever he visits the occupied territories, Ochsenreiter makes a point of insisting that Ukraine is in violation of the Minsk accords, that it shells civilians, and that it oppresses its Russian-speaking population. While lamenting about "the victims of the bloody junta" on camera, he is simultaneously stoking hostility and violence at the other end of

Berlin – Donetsk – Zakarpattia. Attacks against Hungarian cultural institutions in Ukraine were organized by an aide to a German ultra-right MP

Ukraine, all while perfectly aware that his actions could lead to the same result in western Ukraine.

The AfD MP he advises, is also a friend of Russia. Frohnmaier has a Russian wife, Daria Tsoi, and has visited occupied Crimea several times. He has been pushing to have Russia sanctions lifted and for Crimea to be recognized as part of Russia.

Ochsenreiter has denied his involvement in the arson when speaking to various journalists, but Polish prosecutors are certain that he organized the attack and have proof of his engagement. However this story ends, it is obvious that people linked to Russia have been caught out committing crimes. Supporting Russia and Donbas militants while acting like a naive fool who is clueless about what's going on is one thing. Deliberately organizing arson attacks and stoking a conflict on the EU's borders is something completely different.

The arson attack at the Hungarian cultural center was not just random hooliganism, nor was the burning of nine cars. Many a bloody ethnic clash has started with such seemingly "minor" events and provocations that snowballed into a full-out war with countless victims in the end. It is obvious that the intention here was to spark a clash among ethnic groups in Zakarpattia with the hope of provoking Hungarians into similar radical actions, and start an ethnic conflict that could potentially lead to an insurgency, killings and even military action.

While insisting that it is working for peace in Ukraine, Moscow is clearly interested in continuing the bloodshed and killing of Ukrainians. The incident in Zakarpattia is a perfect reflection of what has been going on in Eastern Ukraine for years, where Russia is now running a full-scale war.

Interestingly, foreigners have committed crimes that Moscow and its agents tried to pin on Ukrainian nationalists. The "bloodthirsty banderites" are evidently not bloodthirsty enough, so Poles had to stand in for them this time. What about other incidents that have been blamed on "banderites"? How many were actually committed by agents from abroad?

An obvious historic comparison is the 1940s, when NKVD officers operated in Volyn and Halychyna, disguising themselves as banderites and engaged in brutal incidents to discredit "nationalist gangs." More recently, there was the shelling of civilian districts in Luhansk and Donetsk in 2014 and 2015. These, too, were blamed on "elusive banderite subversives" who supposedly moved freely around the city in garbage trucks and went out of their way to murder Donbas civilians. Yet not a single diversionary group has ever been caught or shown to the public in more than four years since the war began. Eventually, some witnesses were able to confirm that the "republic" mercenaries from the Yuriy Safonenko and Ihor Plotnistskiy gangs were behind the shelling.

The Zakarpattia arson story is far from over. Most likely more facts will come to light to reveal the nature of Russia's "brotherly love" and "help." For now, Ukraine should use this as a strong case in international organizations and courts, provided that the country's leaders want to and can do it properly. ⬛

A noble identity

Who were the gentry that lived on the Ukrainian lands in the 14th-16th centuries?

Vitaliy Mykhailovskiy

A witness to majesty. Lutsk Castle hosted a congress of monarchs in 1429

The nobility, a privileged social class, were an indispensable element of any pre-modern society. In the late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period on the Ukrainian lands, it was divided into many groups. In general, if we try to describe these *bellatores*, or people of war, in the categories of the Middle Ages, then we fall into the trap of the sources that we use, which, in turn, provokes strong associations that have gained a firm foothold in not only the historiographical canon, but also the perception of our distant history.

The positivist habit of historians to categorise everything has played a cruel joke on the gentry. The requirements of grand national narratives to make it clear who is "ours" and who is "foreign" have led to categorical but completely unwarranted notions about the nobility that lived on the Ukrainian lands in the 14th-16th centuries. Below, I will try to illustrate how complex — and sometimes impossible — it is to characterise it using the definitions contained in textbooks and most works by Ukrainian histori-

ans. The time in question is between the middle of the 14th century and the Union of Lublin, which took place in 1569. The territory concerned is the Ukrainian lands within the Polish kingdom: Galician Ruthenia (the Ruthenian and Belz Voivodeships) and Western Podillya (the Podolian Voivodeship). The protagonists are the gentry that lived on this land.

CLASSIFICATION DIFFICULTIES

Let's start with the Ukrainian word for "gentry" — shliakhta, a loan word from the Polish (szlachta) and Czech (šlechta) languages, into which it was borrowed from German a good 100 years before it reached us. This is enough to ensure that on merely hearing the word, the first reaction is that it is Polish and therefore foreign — not "ours". We can find a way to deal with this by agreeing that we have no other term to define the privileged social class of the 14th-16th centuries and that we will use it even after that period — until the descendants of the gentry on both banks of the Dnieper became

Russian nobility at the end of the 18th century. But that was already the era of an empire that had its own terms for defining this class.

If we try to make some sort of classification of the nobility in the Ukrainian lands, we will immediately face the problem of how to describe them. Of course, the easiest thing is to do this according to the simple principle of "us and them", where "us" means Ukrainian nobility and "them" are foreigners, i.e. those that came to our land. Despite the simplicity and clarity of such a division for the modern Ukrainian reader, one fundamental dilemma remains unanswered. If we should consider the old Ukrainian elite — the descendants of the boyars and the dukes' retainers — to be "our" gentry, who except the Poles could be the "foreigners"? Finding an answer to such simple questions brings great difficulties, even for the small group of professional researchers. We will return to these traps below.

An important criterion for intra-class divisions is property status, which

is quite simple: there are the wealthy, petty, poor and landless gentry. The only thing that can be discussed is the exact parameters for "wealth" and "poverty", which a historian sets according to the year and region. For example, a nobleman that owned 50 villages in the Halych Land in the 15th century would be considered wealthy, but this figure can be reduced to 20 or 30 for the Belz Land at the same time. This difference is due only to the fact that these two areas are not comparable in size and climatic conditions. Not to mention the lack of prosperity in the Podolian Voivodeship, where no one at all reached 50 villages in the 15th century, and the profitability of farming was probably very low due to constant attacks from the Tatars.

However, all these numbers are arbitrary without looking at what they actually meant for the gentry. After all, it is one thing when you own 50 villages that are home to many peasants, have well-developed local trades and are located on lively transport routes, which all brings the owner considerable profit. The wealth of someone who owns the same number of villages in the mountains, where there are not so many people, the land is not so fertile, and the roads are in almost the same state as they are now, is another thing entirely. Nevertheless, these quantities directly affect wealth, so should not be discounted, as they also influenced the position of a nobleman in the society of the time.

If we try to see who received land from the kings in the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown, the picture is not as clear as it may seem at first glance. Almost none of the rulers gave any special preferences to the gentry that came from outside these lands. Such assertions are based on detailed study of land assignment policy in the Lviv Land of the Ruthenian Voivodeship, as well as the Belz and Podolian Voivodeships. The fact that higher offices were mainly held by non-locals who had large land holdings was not the result of a purposeful policy by the kings to grant land to gentry from Lesser Poland, Mazovia or even outside the Kingdom of Poland.

ACCORDING TO RANK

The next criterion to draw attention to is which position a nobleman held in society, which was then measured by the office that he held. It could be at the district, borough or even crown level. When it comes to the latter, it is necessary to distinguish between the offices of the monarch's court and those of the wealthy gentry that sought to reproduce the trappings of a royal entourage within their own estate. With these criteria, it is easy: if you hold an office, you belong to the official class of the gentry, if you do not — you are one of the rest that tries to get into any position possible. After all, there were few offices in general. And even less that actually meant something and had influence.

For example, take any voivodeship. Each has one voivode — the governor of this territory. This office had a great influence on the society of the time as soon as it emerged in the Ukrainian lands. After all, whoever held it was brought into the state's elite, allowing him to speak with the king more often, which — combined with the ability to serve and connections to others in power — helped significantly increase the prestige of his own family. Subsequently, the holder of this office or that of castellan was given a seat in the Senate, the upper house of the Sejm. Let's look at one of the first Podolian voivodes in the Ruthenian lands, Hrytsko Kirdei. He held this position from 1439 until 1462 — almost a quarter of a century. If we try to define him according to criteria that are clear to the modern reader, we get a strange combination of everything we know about the 15th century. Hrytsko Kirdei is a Ruthenised descendant of immigrants from the Golden Horde, a Catholic by religion, the owner of a vast estate in the Podolian and Ruthenian Voivodeships, which makes it much harder to put him in a regional community, and a sincere supporter of the Polish king and the kingdom as a whole. We will return to him and those similar to him. If we try to classify him by his nickname/surname, he will be a Tatar (despite the arbitrariness of this word), by name a Ruthenian and by faith a Catholic, so... who is he?

Another Kirdei, Vanka from Kvasyliv, who was the castellan of Chełm, is known to historians as the initiator of the translation of the Wiślica Statute — the main source of the kingdom's law at the time — into the Ruthenian language. And unlike Hrytsko, he was Orthodox.

The next office after the voivode is that of castellan. There were more castellans in Ruthenian lands than there were voivodeships. This is due to the fact that individual lands and counties in the Ruthenian and Belz Voivodeships had their own castellans, while there was only one for the entire Podolian region. This comes to three voivodes and nine castellans. In total, 12 officials. In other words, very few for satisfying the ambitions of all those who sought to hold these posts.

Next, it is worthwhile to look at the group of officials linked to the courts, which there are a lot of. There is the district court, made up of three people — a judge, a subjudge and a clerk, the chamberlain court, where formally there is only a chamberlain, and the borough court, headed by a starosta (mayor), who is assisted by at least a substarosta and a clerk. If we count the number of courts, there are 8 district,

AN OFFICE MADE A NOBLEMAN STAND OUT AND, IF IT DID NOT BRING HIM IMMEDIATE MATERIAL WEALTH, AT LEAST SERVED AS A MORAL OR HONOURABLE DISTINCTION IN THE LOCAL COMMUNITY

15 borough and 7 chamberlain. A total of 30. If there are at least three officials in each district and borough, this is a total of 69 people, to which we can add seven chamberlains for a total of 76 court officials. These calculations are very arbitrary, given that the starosta was a representative of the crown and could appoint his own servants and clients to the court, in contrast with the offices at the county and chamberlain courts, for which local nobility would submit 4 candidates to the king. Consequently, there were 88 voivodes, castellans, borough starostas and court officials. Not very many when compared to the entire brotherhood of knights.

Among the other offices, it is worth drawing attention to the standard-bearer, who was responsible for the local banner, and the wojski, who organised local gentry during periods of mass mobilisation. The rest of the offices were completely arbitrary or titular in nature. It is difficult to imagine the duties of a Sword-bearer, Cupbearer, Pantler or Master of the Hunt. But such a decoration was still very important to a nobleman, since even their grandsons were allowed to use a title related to their grandfather's office. Not to mention the sons of voivodes and castellans. An office made a nobleman stand out and, if it did not bring him immediate material wealth, at least served as a moral or honourable distinction in the local community.

If we try to answer the question of who occupied these positions in

the Ukrainian lands in the 14th-16th centuries, then the absolute majority were noblemen that came from outside these lands. There is again the dilemma, or the curse, of classification. If we are dealing with noblemen who held offices in the second half of the 14th century and first part of the 15th in places they did not come from, we can call them the foreign gentry. No buts about it. What about their descendants who received their offices from the king after 1434? They were the second or third generation of those families in these lands. The Przemyśl and Chełm Lands did not become their homes — they already were. Here is an important clarification for our classification: for a nobleman of the time, belonging

ALL THE GENTRY THAT LIVED ON THE UKRAINIAN LANDS OF THE KINGDOM OF POLAND AT THE SPECIFIED TIME WAS RUTHENIAN, WHERE WE UNDERSTAND "RUTHENIAN" TO MEAN THE RUTHENIAN LANDS OF THE POLISH CROWN. FURTHER STRATIFICATION TOOK PLACE ALONG TERRITORIAL LINES

to the gentry was essential and he associated this with a certain territory or kingdom. In those markers there was not yet a place for national characteristics, which would appear much later. We will see their first manifestations only in the seventeenth century, when rigid confessionalisation became to some extent an equivalent of the future nationality.

IDENTIFY THE CONFESSION
Almost all people in the late Middle Ages and Early Modern Period believed in God. Each in their own way. If you look at the gentry from this perspective, everything is more or less simple until Protestant "novelties" found their way to the Ukrainian lands. In general, all nobles are Christians. Some followed the Eastern Rite, others the Western. "Who was there more of?" is a simple but very irritating question for Ukrainian historiography. At first glance, there are more outsiders, if one takes a superficial look at 15th century sources. But when we open those from the 16th century, when a massive amount of taxation documents and better preserved registers are at our disposal, we see a huge number of petty and poor gentry, most likely of local origin.

It is rather difficult to respond to these assumptions about ethno-confessional affiliation, since questionnaires where the gentry would indicate this had not been invented yet and we do not have access to their own reflections

from that time. Let's try to look at it differently. How many Catholic churches were there to meet the weekly religious needs of Catholics? It looks like there were not so many churches, despite the presence of the Lviv Catholic Metropolitanate and three episcopal sees in Przemyśl, Kamyanets and Chełm. Indeed, in the Podolian Voivodeship, the number of Catholic churches did not exceed ten until the end of the 15th century (Kamyanets, Smotrych, Yahilnytsia, Chervonohrod, Yazlovets, Horodok, Letychiv, Medzhybizh, Zinkiv and Orynyn). If we take away the capital city, Kamyanets, the geographical spread is pretty predictable: all urban settlements — cities and towns. Consequently, they did not meet the religious needs of the Catholics of Podillya, which, looking at the available sources (land assignments to people from Mazovia, Lesser Poland, Moravia and Silesia), there were quite a few of. And they all lived outside of these towns.

In the Belz Land — after 1462 a voivodeship — the situation was even more interesting. Since this territory was ruled by the Mazovian Piasts from 1388, the lion's share of land was assigned to Mazovians. It is difficult to doubt their religious affiliation at that time — they were Catholics, but there were very few places of worship for them. This situation gave rise to an interesting phenomenon, the so-called county parishes, which there were also very few of — no more than ten. Finally I will give an example from the history of the Żółkiewski family, who came from Mazovia and used the Lubicz coat of arms. Finding themselves in the unfamiliar surroundings of the Chełm Land, they professed Orthodoxy for some time for one very simple reason. The nearest Catholic church was almost 2 days away.

The aforementioned tax documents from the sixteenth century allow us to reconstruct the network of Orthodox parishes on these lands, and they dwarf the solitary Catholic churches there in number.

All these reflections on the religious affiliation of the nobility living on Ukrainian lands in the 14th-16th centuries can not be interpreted unambiguously. We will never find out their perceived origin first-hand. Indeed, there was probably some sort of ancestral memory regarding the region or even village that a family hailed from. Even in the second half of the sixteenth cen-

tury, when the first roll of arms — The Nest of Virtues — was made by Bartosz Paprocki in 1578, the gentry was only beginning to think about its origins and construct family legends about it. However, their fantastic nature brings modern researchers nothing more than a smile. Did they ascribe as much importance to this as they did to faith? This question will remain without the categorical answer that traditional positivist-oriented history would like to hear so much. There are more questions than answers, and they mostly relate not to faith, but to such aspects as religiousness, religious consciousness and religious discipline, i.e. individual manifestations of faith. But for this there is a lack of sources and thoughtful analysis of them.

THE "NATIONALITY" LABEL
Finally, let us examine the criterion that is gladly used in all national narratives — ethnicity. It brings us back to the simple classification of "us and them". Although at the same time it is so speculative that it is even hard to find any specific arguments against its use. All right, let's try to clear one thing up: how can we prove the ethnic origin of a nobleman? Again, we have to set certain criteria to be able to say what is "ours" (Ruthenian, Ukrainian), and what is "not ours" (Pole, German, Lithuanian, Czech, Hungarian, Polish).

To begin, we will consider our possibilities for classification and interpretation. Each nobleman is indicated in sources by a name, nickname and very rarely a coat of arms, which we can find when he attached his seal to a document. Traditionally, the gentry was designated in documents by having the following words in front of their names: *nobiles* (noble), *terrigena* (landowner) or, for the lowest stratum, *boyaryn* or *boyarones* (boyar). The latter should be simplest, because the phenomenon of the boyars was exclusively linked to ancient Ruthenian heritage and therefore we should be able to count all the boyars as ethnic Ruthenians. But not all of those who, for example, lived in the vicinity of Bar in the middle of the 16th century were of Ruthenian origin. Among them, we encounter boyars of Tatar and Wallachian (Moldavian) origin.

Let's go back to the name. For most, it seems to be the best criterion for determining ethnicity. After all, if a source mentions an Ivan, Ivashko or Ivanko, this automatically indicates his Ruthenian origin. At first glance, it is difficult to argue with this, especially when dealing with Ruthenian-

Intellectual ability. The publishing of the Ostroh Bible was an important humanitarian project of the Ostroh dukes

language documents from the second half of the 14th century. When we start to deal with Latin, our confidence is eroded very quickly. An Ivan, Jan, Johann and Yoan can all "hide" behind the names Ioann, Iohan or Ian. For example, the starosta of Przemyśl, Halych and Sniatyn in 1375-1401 was equally comfortable writing his name in the Ruthenian language or in French as "Benko de Zabokruky". But the coat of arms that used clearly confirms his Silesian or Saxon origin, suggesting he belonged to the Biberstein family.

It is equally difficult to deny the Ruthenian origin of Danylo Dazhbohovych Zaderevtskyi, a loyal supporter of Duke Švitrigaila and starosta of Halych and Zhydachiv in the first quarter of the fifteenth century whose estates were located in the counties of Halych and Zhydachiv, but he used the Korczak coat of arms. Researchers consider this to be one of the specifically Ruthenian coats of arms that depicts three parallel lines placed one above the other. Everything seems to indicate his Ruthenian origin: name, nickname, the village from which he chose to write and his coat of arms, which is typically Ruthenian. But in one document he is designated as "lord Danylo the Wallachian, owner of Zaderevchi, known as Milevkovych" (dominus Danilo heres Zadarzewsko Wolosko dictus Milewkowic). This at one time gave reason to consider him a native of Wallachia, where rapid Ruthenisation was by facilitated by the common Orthodox faith and the Ruthenian language used

for administrative purposes (it was the main language in the Principality of Moldavia until the start of the 16th century).

Historians themselves bring even more confusion when they try to modernise the names of the subjects they study. Examples of this can often be seen in catalogues of medieval documents, where Andrzej and Piotr of Sprowa Odrowąż become Andriy and Petro respectively, while Marty Romanovskyi is known as Marcin in Polish. There are no grounds for such transformations and they only mislead the reader.

SELF-DETERMINATION

If we try to answer the question of what was decisive for identifying a nobleman at that time, it would be simple: which social category and regional community he belonged to. After all, only as a nobleman could he realise his potential in the social circumstances of the time. The regional community was the basis around which his entire life revolved. Only land ownership made it possible to get an office and its powers only applied to this land. It was also only possible to participate in court sessions and sejmiks (local parliaments) when the community recognised you as one of their own. Moreover, on the demand of the king, a nobleman had to join the *pospolite ruszenie* (mass mobilisation) under the banner of his voivodeship or land. All this alongside land ownership made him a representative of the local regional community — the Lviv, Przemyśl, Halych, Sanok,

Chełm, Podillya or Belz gentry. If we look at the list of those who signed the 1464 act of the Lviv Confederation protesting the abuses of general Ruthenian starosta and Ruthenian voivode Andrzej of Sprowa Odrowąż, we find both Ruthenians from the Lviv land and those whose ancestors came to these lands from Lesser Poland, Mazovia and Wallachia. These and similar examples show, above all, the importance of state and territorial identity, not ethnic or religious.

The latter markers will become important and fundamental at a different time, when society had to make a choice regarding its faith due to religious upheaval at the end of the 16th and first half of the 17th centuries. Everyone was faced with the dilemma of deciding who to be.

So who were the gentry that lived on the Ukrainian lands in the 14th-16th centuries? We are still not ready to answer this question if we are going to raise the issue of ethnic origin or religious preferences. At the moment, little has been done about this in Ukraine — the be more precise, we have not even investigated the sources on the genealogy of the gentry from the 14th-15th centuries that are available to us. But if we try to give a general answer, then all the gentry that lived on the Ukrainian lands of the Kingdom of Poland at the specified time was Ruthenian, where we understand "Ruthenian" to mean the Ruthenian lands of the Polish Crown. Further stratification took place along territorial lines, giving us the Podillya, Halych, Lviv, Przemyśl, Sanok, Chełm and Belz gentry. This division would be decisive in the future for forming the local parliaments, or sejmiks. The next division, which took these circumstances into account, divided the nobility into those lucky enough to hold offices and the rest.

All subsequent divisions will be related to property: wealthy, petty nobility, poor and landless. In each of the regions, the level of prosperity or poverty is correlated with geographical and economic factors.

Is it as simple as talking about an influx of Polish gentry and the Catholicisation of local nobles? In my opinion, no, it is not. After all, the sources at our disposal and the professional scepticism of a historian do not allow me to make such sweeping statements. Perhaps the most important thing in all these discussions and passions is the gentry. It seems that in the 14th-16th centuries they were not too bothered about the things that historians of the 20th-21st centuries are concerned with. ⊤

The forging of unity

How the idea of Ukraine crossed imperial borders from East to West

Sviatoslav Lypovetsky

Reburial of Markian Shashkevych in Lviv. 1893. Halychyna had not gained its status of a "Ukrainian Piemonte" until the late 19th century

"We united Halychyna and Bukovyna with Dnipro Ukraine as dictated by the idea of the unified national Ukraine and the logic of history," wrote Lonhyn Tsehelsky, the State Secretary and Minister of Foreign Affairs of the West Ukrainian People's Republic in his memoirs on January 22, 1919. "Before the world, before history and our people that has just awoken to life as a state, and before the future generations, we have committed an act on which the future of our people should build."

The Unification of Ukraine proclaimed in January 1919 was the working of history: Ukrainians had been supporting and developing the Ukrainian idea for a century before that, exporting it from one region to another.

EXPORTED FROM THE LEFT BANK

Modern Ukrainianness had a long path of evolution. This path stretched from East to West. The Left Bank Ukraine comprised of the Little Russian gubernia (former Hetmanate, i.e. Chernihiv and Poltava regions) and Sloboda Ukraine (Sumy and Kharkiv regions) was the harbour of the Ukrainian idea in the early 19th century. Unlike their peers in the Right-Bank Ukraine or Halychyna, the Left-Bank political elite was of the same national origin as the peasantry.

Therefore, it was no surprise that Ivan Kotliarevsky, a poet from Poltava region, used the local dialect as the foundation for the literary Ukrainian language, and that *History of the Rus People,* a book by an unknown author thought to be Bishop Konysky by its contemporaries, set the foundation for the romantic myth of the Cossacks and the distinct origins of Ukrainians. Distributed as a manuscript, *History of the Rus People* was the intellectual phenomenon of its time. German traveller and geographer Johann Georg Kohl wrote about "entire districts in Little Russia where almost every household has a copy of Konysky's History".

The era of universities that began in the Russian Empire in the early 19th century spread to the Left-Bank Ukraine, too. The local aristocracy opened the university in Kharkiv to continue the Ukrainian intellectual tradition.

By contrast, the Right-Bank Ukraine, once it ended up under Russian control following the partition of Poland, was included in the Vilnius education district with Polish Prince Adam Czartoryski as its patron. A lyceum opened in Kremenets, a town in Volyn, that later became known as the Volhynian Athens. The town turned into a popular winter destination for the Polish aristocracy. "Many noble families moved from Paris to Kremenets for the Butter Week," a Russian official wrote. In the end, the Kremenets Lyceum had as many students as ten gymnasiums in Moscow District.

According to the *Works of Ethnographic and Statistics Expedition to the West Ruthenian Land*, the sole Ruthenian intelligentsia of the region was then comprised of the Orthodox clergy of Volyn and Podillia. They spoke Polish at home because such was the "requirement of decency".

Meanwhile, Ukrainophile groups in the Right-Bank Ukraine emerged from the Polish community where empathy for the Cossacks gained popularity and the Ukrainian school emerged in the Polish literature.

The Western part of Ukraine was in no better shape under the Habsburg Empire. Ukrainianness was represented there by "priests and peasants". Antin Anhelovych, the first Lviv Greek Catholic Metropolitan in 1808-1814, was said to "publish his brochures and addresses in French, German, Latin and Polish but not in Ruthenian". In one popular account from the early 19th century, a peasant complained to the clergy about his priest's refusal to fill in his parenthood certificate. The priest justified his action by saying that he had stud-

ied Polish, German, Latin, Greek, Chaldean and Italian in schools and had certificates with good grades from all of them, but Ruthenian was not taught in the schools of Halychyna, so he really could not read a certificate written in Ruthenian.

Soon enough, the first signal of national revival came when seminary students founded *Ruska Triytsia*, or The Three of Rus society. In fact, this title came from a mocking name the seminary students used for their only three peers who spoke Ruthenian, a people's language.

While Sloboda Ukraine preserved the name Ukraine that later spread over its entire territory, the more nationally conscious young people in Halychyna were looking for the equivalents of a national name. They seriously considered the name Ruslans derived from the "tribe of the Roxolani", a term borrowed from the Ukrainian School in the Polish literature.

ACROSS THE DNIPRO AND THE ZBRUCH

"Warsaw was dancing, Krakow was praying, Lviv was falling in love, Vilnius was hunting, and the Old Kyiv was playing cards. It forgot before the revival of the university that it was destined by God and the people to be the capital of all Slavs," wrote Michal Czajkowski, a representative of the Right-Bank nobility and the founder of Cossack units as emigre in the Ottoman Empire.

The emergence of Kyiv on the intellectual map was largely linked to the 1830-1831 Polish November Uprising. It was then that the St. Volodymyr University in Kyiv was established on the basis of the closed Kremenets Lyceum. This failed to solve the "Polish issue" for Russia, so the tsarist regime had to close the university or suspend studies there several times.

Regardless of the context, the Right-Bank Ukrainians felt separate from both the Poles and the Russians whose influences clashed on their lands. Kotliarevsky's Aeneid and History of the Rus People played an important role in sharpening that feeling. "Shevchenko took entire episodes from *History of the Rus People*, and nothing apart from the Bible had more power over Shevchenko's system of ideas than *History of the Rus People* did," wrote Ukrainian intellectual Mykhailo Drahomanov.

Arrests cut short a brief spark of Ukrainian political thought generated by the Brotherhood of Saints Cyril and Methodius. Yet, the Ukrainian idea received unexpected support from one-time Polish nobility. A group of *chlopomans* from the Polish student corporation led by Volodymyr Antonovych and Tadeusz Rylsky fascinated with the culture of the peasants, *chlopy* in Polish, returned to their national roots and gave an impulse to the activity of the Kyiv Hromada community where they represented the Right-Bank group. When the Russian Empire attacked Ukrainianness through the Valuyev Ukaz and Ems Ukaz — "an intermission in the history of Ukrainophilia" in Drahomanov's words — this served as an impetus to Ukrainian book publishing in Halychyna. For people from the Dnipro Ukraine, this presented a chance to publish their texts and help the Ukrainians under "the Habsburgs".

Despite the successful upheaval of Ukrainian life in Halychyna during the 1848 Spring of Nations, subsequent developments were far from helpful to the Ukrainian cause. What happened to the founders of The Three of Rus society was illustrative: Ivan Vahylevych joined the Polish camp while Yakiv Holovatsky switched to the Moscowphiles. The latter posed a great threat as their pro-Moscow sentiments infected the Greek Catholic clergy, the only Ukrainian equivalent of the upper class at that time. This was a desperate response to the de facto transfer of Halychyna into Polish administration in the 1860s.

The symbols of 1848 started getting a Russian gleam. The Halychyna Star newspaper switched to *iazychie*, an artificial mix of the local language and the Church Slavonic used by the moscowphile clergy. The People's House, one of the most important cultural institutions, ended up in the hands of moscowphiles. Many leaders of the Ukrainian movement, including Ivan Hushalevych, the author of the first national anthem titled *Peace on You, Brothers*, became passionate moscowphiles. Soon enough, the term *moscowphiles* was replaced with *saint-georgians* after the Lviv St. George Cathedral, the main Greek Catholic church of the time. Society split into the hard and soft camps, the former supporting the official use of ethymological orthography used in the Russian language, and the latter opting for phonetic orthography that reflected the actual language spoken in that part of the country. »

Haidamaky at the Lviv University was the title of the article published in Nowości Illustrowane, a Polish newspaper, on February 2, 1907. Led by Pavlo Krat, originally from the Dnipro Ukraine, Ukrainian students took over the university premises and raised the blue and yellow flag over it

*(Image text: Rok IV. Kraków, 2 lutego 1907. Nr. 5. **Hajdamacy na lwowskim uniwersytecie.**)*

Children at the Ivan Franko School in Ustyluh, Volyn. 1917. Ukrainian Sich Riflemen opened this school and 80 more during World War I

As Ukrainian literature from the Dnipro Ukraine spilled across the Zbruch to Western Ukraine, it provided strong support to the embryonic Ukrainian forces opposing the moscowphiles. Some texts, including *Kobzar* by Taras Shevchenko were spread as manuscripts and learned by heart. More help came from both the right and the left banks of the Dnipro as the experience of organizing Hromadas, the national cultural groups of Ukrainian intelligentsia, was exported from Odesa to Halychyna. Hefty donations from Yelyzaveta Myloradovych and Vasyl Symyrenko, both descendants of old Ukrainian families, helped found the Shevchenko Society and Prosvita, the civic movement focusing on cultural and national revival, in Lviv. Soon enough, representatives of the Dnipro Ukraine joined these initiatives.

"People were coming from there, talented in elevated abstract debates, terrible freethinkers in theory, revolutionaries and atheists, barbarians in their manners. They did not acknowledge the manners of socialization accepted in Halychyna, brought axes with them, shouted loudly in public locales. Ladies came with short haircuts; they entered the apartments of gentlemen on their own, travelled to the distant Zurich for medicine unaccompanied, and did not care about their outfits or gloves; sometimes they did not even care about mere tidiness, boasting that they "loved going to pubs". In a nutshell, they were people from a different world," wrote poet Ivan Franko.

Still, he and his circle were seriously influenced by Mykhailo Drahomanov. He injected passion for political thought into the young generation in Halychyna.

Historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, too, moved from Kyiv to Lviv thanks to his teacher Volodymyr Antonovych. Antonovych made arrangements with the Polish peers to have Hrushevsky as professor of Eastern European history at the Lviv university. Hrushevsky helped rearrange the Taras Shevchenko Society into an academic one. It later functioned as the Academy of Sciences. Eventually, consensus between intellectuals from the Dnipro Ukraine and the Polish elite of Halychyna ended the "alphabet wars", making phonetic orthography official.

"UKRAINIAN PIEMONTE" AND REPAYMENT OF THE DEBT

Researchers still debate about the author of *Ukrainian Piemonte*, a phrase used for Halychyna as a starting point for the liberation of Ukraine. Many believe that Volodymyr Antonovych coined it, but both Drahomanov and Hrushevsky used it in their works too. Between the 19th and the 20th century, Halychyna was the only Ukrainian region that could unite and launch the national revival.

This is not to say that people in Halychyna stood firm on their feet. They had only started calling themselves Ukrainians in the 1890s. Not too long ago, Panteleimon Kulish, a landmark Ukrainian writer, had emotionally referred to Halychyna as "garbage left after the Polish flood". But Halychyna was undoubtedly starkly different from the part of Ukraine under Russia's control. Yevhen Chykalenko, another Ukrainian intellectual, wrote the following report after his visit to Lviv: "I am now certain that Ukraine will not die indeed; unlike here, it's not just Don Quixotes that fight for Ukraine in Halychyna — the streets do. Poles and Ukrainians compete even for the positions of gendarmes."

Before World War I, the key actors of what would later become the Ukrainian People's Republic were gaining experience from life and work in Halychyna. Lviv sheltered Mykhail Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vynnychenko and Symon Petliura from the tsarist regime and gave them work.

Before WWI, Halychyna residents were motivated to fight like no other part of the Ukrainian people. The first military formation known as the Ukrainian Riflemen actually emerged to "Liberate brothers Ukrainians from Moscow shackles." Eventually, the greatest contribution of the Riflemen into the cause of Ukrainian unity was the opening of over 80 Ukrainian schools in the Russia-controlled Volyn, rather than in the battlefield.

Brothers Ukrainians eventually liberated themselves and declared the Ukrainian People's Republic. But Halychyna did contribute seriously to their struggle. Many soldiers of the Austrian army, especially the Ukrainian Riflemen on their way back from the Russian captivity in 1917, founded the Sich Riflemen, one of the most efficient segments of the Ukrainian People's Republic Army. "Such army happens once in a thousand years," Volodymyr Vynnychenko is rumored to have said about the Riflemen.

Unsurprisingly, when the Ukrainian People's Republic delegation arrived for the Brest-Litovsk talks in

January 1918, its first condition after the recognition of the UPR was "the unification of Kholm and Podliachia regions with Ukraine, and a referendum in Eastern Halychyna, Northern *Bukovyna* and Zakarpattia Ukraine", according to the memoirs of the delegation leader Oleksandr Sevriuk.

The history of making the Unification Act official was not an easy one. It has to be signed, ratified and proclaimed four times between December 1, 1918, when the Pre-Introduction Treaty was signed in Fastiv, and January 23, 1919, when the Workers' Congress in Kyiv approved the Unification Act. Even that was not enough. The final unification of the West Ukrainian People's Republic and the Ukrainian People's Republic was to take place after the Convention of MPs of both republics, which never materialized.

The first liberation struggle ended with the partition of the Ukrainian land between four countries. Apart from the bigger parts — the Ukrainian SSR in the Soviet Union and Halychyna and Volyn in the Second Polish Republic, Bukovyna and Zakarpattia ended up in Romania and Czech Republic respectively. Still, the developments preceding that partition did leave a trace on these territories.

"Ukrainians and Ukrainian (language and newspaper), and these names were embraced in the few months of war as widely as one would hope to in several decades," wrote Bukovyna newspaper on May 7, 1915. Zakarpattia had a more difficult life. But the 1918 national upheaval revealed the aspiration of at least two centers there, Khust and Yasinia, to join the Ukrainian land.

Ukrainianness had much less time for building its national self-awareness in this part of the country. Zakarpattia's path was somewhat similar to what Halychyna had gone through earlier. Many migrants from the Ukrainian People's Republic Army and the Ukrainian Halychyna Army went there to teach, often competing with their former opponents, the Russian teachers and former officers of Denikin's army, on the education arena. In 1920, Prosvita was founded in Zakarpattia, wielding as much in-

> THE FIRST LIBERATION STRUGGLE ENDED WITH THE PARTITION OF THE UKRAINIAN LAND BETWEEN FOUR COUNTRIES (UKRAINIAN SSR IN THE SOVIET UNION, HALYCHYNA AND VOLYN IN THE SECOND POLISH REPUBLIC, BUKOVYNA AND ZAKARPATTIA IN ROMANIA AND CZECH REPUBLIC RESPECTIVELY)

fluence on the local population as its predecessor had in Halychyna.

"The sun of Ukrainian statehood rose in the West" two decades later with the proclamation of Carpathian Ukraine in Zakarpattia in 1939. Great solidarity and support of Ukrainians from all over the world, including the most immediate neighbors in Halychyna and the emigres in Europe and America, hugely contributed to this.

When walls talk

The subject of war and conflict has reached street art: more and more art of various scales and quality on this topic is appearing on the walls of buildings in various corners of Ukraine

Hanna Chabarai

PHOTO: IRYNA RYBAKOVA

The Teacher. In the fall of 2016, the portrait of a woman appeared on the walls of a damaged nine-story apartment building in frontline Avdiyivka. This was Maryna Marchenko, a teacher of Ukrainian language and literature who has worked in the local school for over 50 years. During the shelling of Avdiyivka in 2014, Marchenko's husband was wounded near this building. Artist: Australian muralist Guido van Helten

PHOTO: STANISLAV KOZLIUK

The Bridge at Sloviansk. During the summer of 2016, volunteers and soldiers painted the bridge across the Kasenniy Torets river near Sloviansk, which had been destroyed during fighting in 2014. A blooming poppy is portrayed on one section, while the other section has the phrase ''Russki Mir was here.'' By the end of 2016, the bridge was reconstructed. Concept: volunteer artist Chorniy Kit (Black Cat)

PHOTO: MURAL SOCIAL CLUB

Milana. In the spring of 2018, a mural of a girl with a teddy bear appeared on prospekt Myru or Peace Avenue in Mariupol. The little girl is Milana Abdurashytova, who survived the shelling of the city by Russian proxies in 2015. Milana lost her leg and wears a prosthetic to move around. Artist: Street artist Sasha Korban

PHOTO: KEISUKE ONO

The Mitten. A mural of the Mitten appeared in Mariupol in the summer of 2017 on the walls of a school that had been shelled. A Japanese artist worked on it together with children who had suffered because of the war in Donbas. According to the artists, the painting symbolizes the unity between the residents of Mariupol and IDPs who were forced to abandon their homes. Author: Kensuke Miyazaki

War Poems. Towards the end of 2015, activists began a project called "War Poems" in Lviv. They turned the walls of the city into art objects with poems from people who were involved in the war in Donbas. They even painted up the walls of a military barracks with poems. Author: Granit, a community association

The Paratrooper. On the walls of the Paratrooper Center for Patriotic Youth on prospekt Kurbasa 19D in Kyiv, an unknown artist painted the portrait of a soldier returning from the war in Donbas with his weapon down and head up. Behind the soldier is a mine over which the blue and yellow flag is flying. This is most likely Horlivka, Donetsk Oblast. Artist: Anonymous

The Broken Heart. On vul. Mechnykova 18A in Kyiv, a mural of a heart crashing into a building was painted by a French artist in 2016. As Leo Leros, the curator of the Art United Us project, explained, the painting represents the false love that Russia shows Ukraine. Author: French artist MTO

Time for Change. A six-handed kozak is portrayed fighting a snake on vul. Striletska 4-6 in the center of Kyiv. This mural, called "Time for Change" was painted in 2014 right after the annexation of Crimea and the start of the war in the Donbas. The mural has many interesting details, such as a monkey with a machine-gun, burning tires, and a blown-up tank marked "To Kyiv." Artists: Volodymyr Manzhos and Oleksiy Bordusov

The Treasure. At the end of 2018, the Osokorky Metro station in Kyiv was decorated with murals dedicated to the solidarity of Ukraine. One mural contains a portrait of Volodymyr Donos, a schoolteacher from Hadyach, Donetsk Oblast, and a hero of the war in the Donbas. He survived shelling, the loss of a leg and captivity, but today he is teaching once again in school. In the mural, a man is extending an apple, symbolizing knowledge, while across the mural is the phrase: "Knowledge is a treasure." Artist: Belgian painter Spear

Avdiyivka. Another mural in the Osokorky Metro station is based on photographs of damaged Avdiyivka, made to look like childish scribbles. It symbolizes the unrealized dreams of a child that left the city that war has destroyed. Artist: Belgian painter Matthew Dawn

February 13, 19:00

Placido Domingo
**Ukraina Performance Hall
(vul. Velyka Vasylkivska 103, Kyiv)**

The capital is waiting with bated breath for a very special guest: for the first time ever, renowned Spanish tenor Placido Domingo will perform in Ukraine. His legendary repertoire includes more than 148 leading opera roles, something no other tenor in history has performed. He has also recorded nearly 100 performances of entire operas, collections of arias and duets, more than 50 music videos, and a number of films of operas, including Carmen, La Traviata, and Othello. Domingo is also the founder of the International Operalia Vocal Competition, which sponsors young talent.

February 14 – March 31

Festival of Chinese Lanterns
(Spivoche Pole, Kyiv)

Dozens of huge lantern installations will add their light to nearly 30 thematic sites at Spivuche Pole. This festival of lights starts on Valentine's Day and will be the first Festival of Chinese Lanterns in Eastern Europe. Each of the installations will represent an ancient Chinese folk tale or legend. Visitors will be able to visit the garden of pandas and flamingos, to see Cinderella's coach, and walk through a forest with elks. The highlight of the festival and its main exhibit will be a 40-meter long dragon.

February 16, 20:00

All Star Jazz - Greatest Hits
**Budynok Arkhitektora
(vul. Borysa Hrinchenka 7, Kyiv)**

The world of jazz in its fullest variety: this is evening promises to bring listeners Ella Fitzgerald, Frank Sinatra, James Brown, Ray Charles, Shirley Bassey, and other greats performed by the virtuosi of the National Academic Brass Band of Ukraine. With timeless hits that everyone wants to hear over and over again, the program will include such favorites as Hit the Road, Jack (Percy Mayfield), Feeling Good (Newley), Can't buy me Love (John Lennon/Paul McCartney), I Know Why (Glenn Miller), and Sing, Sing, Sing (Louis Prima).

February 24

Retrospective
**Andrey Sheptytsky Museum
(prospekt Svobody 20, Lviv)**

How did Ukrainian impressionist Ivan Trush live? What inspired him and how did this master create his landscapes? What do his portraits tell us? All this and more will be offered to visitors of the Trush Retrospective, an exhibition of the artist's landscape, psychological portrait and other topical compositions. The exhibition includes museum pieces and works from private collections in Ukraine, some of which are being displayed in public for the first time. The exhibit includes a unique interactive biography of the artist illustrated by photographs and documents.

March 3, 21:00

Tiësto
**Stereo Plaza
(prospekt Lobanovskoho 119, Kyiv)**

Another world-class event is coming to Kyiv: the God of Electronic Dance will perform for a Ukrainian audience. Known around the world, the Dutch DJ, producer and composer of electronic music known by his stage name Tiësto needs little introduction. Music critics say Tiësto is not only one of the most famous modern DJs, but also one of the best-paid. As to his "nom de musique," Tiësto says it's his childhood nickname, Italian-style.

March 7, 19:00

Keiko Matsui
**International Center of Culture and the Arts
(aleya Heroyiv Nebesnoyi Sotni 1, Kyiv)**

For those who appreciate classical music, a real treat comes at the start of spring, when the Far Eastern winds bring talented pianist Keiko Matsui to town. The Japanese star of instrumental music and composer works in New Age and jazz styles, and has met with thunderous applause around the world. So far, Matsui has recorded 20 albums and given the gift of her virtuoso performances to millions of listeners. Unsurprisingly, the pianist is ranked among the top jazz artists today – and the only woman in the Top 10.