The Ukrainian Week International edition With (131) January 2019

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The Ukrainian Week

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Hell hath no fury

Ihor Losiev

BRIEFING Ukraine did it! The tomos from the Ecumenical Patriarch acknowledging the autonomy of the Orthodox Church of Ukraine is a fact. All of the Moscow Patriarchate's intrigues and multipurpose moves in the world of orthodoxy have ended in failure at this point. All the standard KGB technologies have so far proved powerless. All of Moscow's efforts to reshape the thousand-year-old institution of the Ecumenical Orthodox Church to its own benefit have collapsed. All the recent moves by the Moscow Patriarchate now look not so much like its own style as the style of Vladimir Putin – arrogant and brazen. Weeping and

gnashing of teeth can be heard all over Russia's capital.

N

It's hard to believe that Kirill (Hundiayev) would have taken the initiative on his own to obstruct the Ecumenical Sobor in Crete or to organize a dirty propaganda campaign against Patriarch Bartholomew in the Russian press and elsewhere. Patriarch Kirill is quite an erudite theologian and ecclesiastic politician. By contrast, brutal actions are entirely natural and typical for Putin.

There is reason to believe that the Kremlin, having gotten the ROC's leader and his organization involved, will now try to arrange a "terrible revenge" against Constantinople, Ukraine and their supporters. Just in recent days, the ROC leadership issued a very aggressive statement declaring that Patriarch Bartholomew had broken with world Orthodoxy in granting Ukraine the tomos. Who gave Moscow the right to speak in the name of world Orthodoxy is not clear, but what is clear is that Putin is preparing for an all-out war among churches against Phanar, the site of the Ecumenical Patriarch's residence in Istanbul, in order to isolate the Orthodox leader from all his churches and to discredit him as the "first among equals" of all Orthodoxy.

Moscow is clearly determined to start a massive religious schism, which could lead to unpredictable and unexpected consequences. Historically, the Great Schism of 1054, when the Roman Pope and the Constantinople Patriarch declared anathema against each other, instead of ending with one, holy, catholic and apostolic church, two emerged: the new Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church. What could happen now? The modern-day Russian Orthodox Church could end up as a completely

QUOTE, UNQUOTE



"To prevent this crisis from escalating, the Serbian and Antioch patriarchs appeal to the Ecumenical Patriarch with a plea to restore fraternal dialog with the Russian Orthodox

Church in order to... resolve the conflict... and restore the unity of the Orthodox Church."

Joint Statement from Antioch Patriarch Ioan X and Serbian Patriarch Irenei



"We support the need for dialog and call on all local Orthodox Churches to resolve the current crisis with Ukraine by calling an Ecumenical Council. We are prepared to participate in such fraternal discussions." <u>Archbishop of Washington, Metropolitan</u>

of All the United States and Canada Tikhon, of the Orthodox Church of America (not one of the recognized churches)



"Given that there are several schismatic groups in Ukraine, they should first do penance and return to the bosom of the canonical Church. Only then can discussion begin about granting autocephaly. Autocephaly in and of itself, in accordance

with the tenets of the Local Orthodox Churches, is granted upon the application to the Mother Church after consultations with all leaders of Local Orthodox Churches. "

Metropolitan of Warsaw and All Poland Savva

separate religious phenomenon, something like the Russian Old Believer Church, whose dogma and rituals are essentially orthodox but which has operate for several centuries as an entity apart from world Orthodoxy.

Next, Moscow, meaning firstly Putin and only secondly Hundiayev, will get very busy working hard on the Orthodox Churches. Today there are 14 independent churches. There is also a 15th, the American Autocephalous Orthodox Church, which was formed by the Moscow Patriarchate, is largely unrecognized and is not included among Ecumenical Orthodox churches.

Second on this ecumenical list is the Alexandrian Church. There were times in the distant past when it fought with Constantinople for primacy and in the 19th century it was in very close contact with the Moscow Patriarchate. These days, Moscow continues to have considerable influence with Alexandria, while the African church's relations with Constantinople remain strained. In recent times, the Alexandrian patriarch was known to make pro-Putin statements about how Russians and Ukrainians are "one people." Still, whether the patriarch would risk contributing to the ruination of the millennial institution of the Orthodox Church is not so clear.

The Antioch Orthodox Church is located in Syria and Lebanon for the most part. Today, a good chunk of its canonical territory is occupied by Russian Federation forces, which could quite possibly affect the position of the leader of the Antioch Church.

The Jerusalem Orthodox Church is more oriented towards the Ecumenical Patriarch than most Eastern churches.

The Serbian Orthodox Church is one of the most pro-Russian. Patriarch Irenei has already managed to declare himself against Ukraine's autocephaly and against the Ecumenical Patriarch. Most likely it will continue to act as a client of the Moscow Patriarchate.

There is reason to believe that the Romanian Orthodox Church will support both Ukraine and Constantinople.

Most likely the Hellenic churches, the Churches of Greece and of Cyprus, will support both Bartholomew and Ukraine. There will be considerable pressure from Moscow on the Bulgarian Church. The Georgian Church is likely to face blackmail threats: Tbilisi is afraid that Moscow will subordinate the Georgian Orthodox Eparchies in occupied Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

The Polish Orthodox Church is really just a satellite of Moscow, as is the Orthodox Church of Czechia and Slovakia.

In short, the Jerusalem, the Greek, Cypriot, Romanian, and Albanian churches are likely to stand by Ukraine and Constantinople. The Georgian and Bulgarian churches could go either way. And so it's easy to see two ecclesiastic coalitions forming: one pro-Constantinople and one pro-Moscow.

Other than getting busy in the world arena, Moscow will obviously not play dead in Ukraine, either. It's quite possible that it will organize some bloody provocations to fill the Russian and world press.

In terms of its strategy of increasing chaos, the ROC could go for some really non-standard, bold moves, including granting autocephaly to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate. This would, of course, be a completely illusory autocephaly, but it would create a total mess in the religious environment in Ukraine, with two formally equal churches that are at war.

At that point, the Moscow Patriarch would begin claiming that he had always intended to grant autocephaly in Ukraine but the "unlawful acts" of Phanar spoiled everything.



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Joel Lion:

"You don't have to afraid the conflict, just go and do the business"

Interviewed by Yuriy Lapayev

During the Discussion Club "Open World" organised by Open Ukraine Foundation *The Ukrainian Week* talks with the Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Ambassador of the State of Israel to Ukraine on the conflict in Syria, the free trade between our countries and business in the conditions of uncertain security situation.

Starting from international political situation, can you share current views by State of Israel on development of situation in Syria. Do you see any possible ways to solve the conflict and the role of Israel in this process?

- The conflict in Syria is very dangerous for us in one reason, because it brings Iran closer to our borders. Iran openly wishes to destroy the State of Israel. We were living with Syria for almost forty years without any incidents. The problem begins when Iran and Iranian Shiits militia are taken positions in Syria. Because if you have a weak regime, then they are coming in from the outside and we have Iran and Hezbollah near our borders. How do we know, that they want to destroy us? First of all we know this from the press, they are saying this days and nights without any problems. Secondly, we have discovered now four tunnels, coming from Lebanon into the territory of Israel, dug by Hezbollah with the part of Iranian regime in order to enter our territory and make terroristic acts against our citizens. The hope that we have is that if there is a way to solve the conflict, Iran may not stay in Syria. Israel can not involve itself into internal Arab conflict, it's impossible.

We see the fear of possible uncontrolled development and usage of Artificial Intelligence is growing in the world. Some experts propose to create some kind of agreements or convention (like for chemical weapon) to control AI-development. Could you share the views of your country as a recognized leader in IT-business on that issue?

— I don't think that we have an official view on that issue. The only thing that I know is that when you controlling and censoring things, they will not progress anymore. If there is a regime of censorship on IT, the IT will stand. The only reason why IT is progressing and discovering and creating something really new is because it is free.

There are some countries, which recognized Jerusalem as a capitol of Israel. Why is it important?

— The importance is to be on a right side of history. To rectify things which are wrong. The capitol of Israel was Jerusalem, is Jerusalem and it will be Jerusalem, a united Jerusalem. And the world needs to accommodate to this. And I hope that someday Ukraine will be also on a right side of history in that issue.

Coming closer to Ukraine, how can you evaluate current state of bilateral cooperation between Ukraine and Israel? Are there any unsolved questions or problems?

– We see our bilateral relations as friendly relations. We are not keeping unsolved questions under the table, we are talking about everything. And I think that it is a way in which friends should act. To be able to talk about everything, even if it hurts. Our relations are very good, we are cooperating in a lot of fields. For example in international organizations, in the field of agriculture, medicine, education, hi-tech. We are about to sign a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between our two countries. We have many hi-level meetings between our leaders. All this are signs of healthy relationships. Also I think that both our countries share the European way of thinking, the wish of democracy. I see Ukraine is trying to bring more democracy to country through all the reforms, to have more rule of law. It is hard. If you have a big ship, you can not change its course in one night, it take time. I think the genuine wish of the Ukrainians is to change things here in your country and they have the European values in mind. And we share the same values like freedom and democracy.

You have mentioned FTA, which hopes and plans have State of Israel on that agreement?

- We wish to export more. We wish that Ukrainian market will open for our exporters. For example in agricultural sector we can sell wine to Ukraine. It is a way to promote the free trade between two countries.

What can it give to Ukrainian producers?

— Again, new markets. You will have a new market, where you can send your products without taxes. Also by having the FTA, by having exchange between our businessmen coming closer one to another could mean, we can have growing cooperation not only in fields, listed in FTA, but in all other sectors. We can share not only the products, but the ideas.

Do you have some advises for Ukraine on how to doing business in conditions of uncertain security situation?

- We have an ongoing conflict for seventy years already and we still are doing business. So you don't have to Joel Lion. He was born in 1964 in France and raised in Esch-sur-Alzette in Luxembourg. He earned his B.A. in Political Sciences from Hebrew University in 1988, and received his M.A. in History from the University of Latvia in 1998. Currently he is a PhD candidate at the Martin (Szusz) Department of Land of Israel Studies and Archaeology of Bar Ilan University. In 1999, he became the first Israeli official to partake in the mission of election monitoring with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. During operation "Cast Lead" in 2008, he worked as director in charge of the MFA Press Center in Sderot. He also served as Deputy Chief of Mission Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania at the Israeli Embassy in Riga. From 2011 to 2014, Lion served Consul-General of the State of Israel in Montreal. From 2014 to 2016, he was Director of the Public & Academic Affairs Department at the Media and Public Affairs Division of the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jerusalem. From 2016 to 2017 he served as the Special envoy for Holocaust issues and the return of Jewish assets from the Holocaust era. From 2017 to 2018, he served as the Chief of Diplomatic Staff of the Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs. From August 2018 — Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the State of Israel to Ukraine. Lion served in the Israel Defense Forces and attained the rank of Sergeant-Major in the Artillery Corps. Author of multiple publications in fields of culture and history.

afraid the conflict, just go and do the business. If you have a good idea, it will be done. You have to think and to look forward. To take and develop your ideas, then you will achieve the results. Sometimes, for investors the problem is not in the conflict, but more in the regulation and the laws. If you will have a free market, if you have good laws, then I think investors will come.

WE SEE OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS AS FRIENDLY RELATIONS. WE ARE NOT KEEPING UNSOLVED QUESTIONS UNDER THE TABLE, WE ARE TALKING ABOUT EVERYTHING. AND I THINK THAT IT IS A WAY IN WHICH FRIENDS SHOULD ACT. TO BE ABLE TO TALK ABOUT EVERYTHING, EVEN IF IT HURTS

It could be useful for Ukraine to learn Israel's experience on how to consolidate the society in conditions of ongoing long-term conflict. What could be that lessons?

- Democracy and freedom. Let the people speak free. That is what we are doing in Israel. Maybe it is annoying, some people don't like this. But when you have free speech you will have a society which is consolidating. Free speech means that you see that the other is your brother and he has something to say.

But how to divide free speech from hostile disinformation and propaganda?

- It is logical. But I think it is not up to the government, it is up to the people to understand the difference. I believe that the people are intelligent enough to see what is propaganda. Of course spreading of information should be ruled, it is ruled in Israel. You can not spread hate speech or ask to kill somebody or make defamation, for example. There are laws for those cases, which are protecting people, allowing them to speak freely but in the framework.

Evil legitimized

Who benefits and who loses from US troops withdrawal from Syria

Michael Binyon, London

Donald Trump's decision to withdraw all 2,000 American troops from eastern Syria has provoked a scramble for advantage by Russia, Turkey and Syria. It has decisively changed the balance of power in the region — with the big losers being the Kurds and the West. Has the American president now given carte blanche to Moscow to become the dominant power in the Middle East? Does it signal an American retreat from the world's trouble spots and the start of an isolationist, go-it-alone US foreign policy? The first big casualty of the Trump's decision, announced last month, was Jim Mattis, the US secretary of defence, who was appalled by what he saw as a hasty move and quit. Shortly afterwards, Brett McGurk, the American special envoy to the global coalition fighting Islamic State militants, also resigned, throwing into turmoil Western attempts to stop a resurgence of Islamist extremism and help to frame a peaceful settlement of the Syrian civil war. President Trump has since an-



Woe to the vanquished. After US troops withdrawal fate of Syria and especially kurds and opposition is in hands of Iran, Turkey and Russia

nounced that the pull-out of forces might be delayed a little. But no one doubts his determination to bring the soldiers home, or his belief that America has no further interest in a region that has cost the US thousands of casualties over the past 20 years.

When the US troops leave, the small British and French units, part of the coalition that defeated Islamic State fighters on the ground and ended the so-called Islamic caliphate, may also soon be quietly withdrawn. Britain announced that it remains committed to its obligations to its Kurdish allies and to preventing any regrouping of the defeated fighters. But there is no illusion in London that the small British force, a fraction of the US contingent, can hold the line or deter an attack by Turkey on the Syrian Democratic Forces, largely comprising YPG Kurdish militias. President Erdogan says this group is linked to the Turkish PKK separatists, and has vowed to clear all of them from Turkey's southern border.

Within days of Trump's announcement, Turkey sent its tanks to surround Manbij, a strategic town in northern Syria that has been a base for the US troops. As long as the Americans were there, Turkey hesitated to attack militias who are closely allied to the Americans. The Kurds were armed by the US and have done the bulk of the fighting against Isis. They now feel betrayed by Washington. They immediately appealed to President Assad to protect them against the threatened Turkish attack, and Syrian forces then moved up to the suburbs of Manbij for the first time in six years.

It looks like the end game in the Syrian imbroglio. It leaves Assad in brutal command of almost all his country, with the Russians and his Iranian allies firmly entrenched to help him "mop up" his remaining opponents. Turkey, no longer fearing a clash with its US Nato ally, looks poised to strike hard against the Kurdish militias. Russia, no longer needing to worry that its airstrikes might bring it into conflict with US fighter jets in the region, now has a free hand to help Assad wipe out the last safe haven for Syrian rebels, pushed into a neutral enclave in north-west Syria next to the Turkish border.

Turkey now finds itself in a pivotal position. Erdogan has the forces and the determination to "cleanse" his border region of Kurdish "terrorists" — a useful political boost to his popularity at home in the run-up to local elections in Turkey in March. But in marching into Manbij, he risks a direct clash with the Assad government. As one of the three sponsors of the Syrian peace talks being held in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan, together with Russia and Iran, he will be wary of a direct confrontation with the Syrian army and its Russian backers. But he need no longer worry about American opposition to such a move: Trump has washed his hands of the whole Syrian civil war.

To ensure a satisfactory division of the spoils, a Turkish delegation flew to Moscow to finesse Moscow's offer to mediate between Damascus and the Syrian Kurds in the northeast. Almost certainly, the Kurds will now be forced to withdraw all along Turkey's southern border.

The immediate danger is that this will allow many of the Isis fighters, captured by the Kurds and held in prisons guarded by the Kurdish militias, will be allowed to go free. With their Kurdish captors gone, there will be no one left with any interest in keeping them in jail. The Islamist fighters will be able to slip back into their villages and plot either a new military assault to restore their former caliphate, or, more likely, regroup as an underground terrorist force, ready to infiltrate the west where many of the fighters came from — and plot terrorist actions across Europe and the Middle East.

The Russians now have what they want. President Assad is firmly back in charge. Indeed, this has been recognised by his Arab neighbors, which, one by one, have been sending their ambassadors back to Damascus and preparing to resume normal diplomatic relations with Damascus. Moscow now sees no threat to its important naval base at Tartus, on the Mediterranean, or any further challenge to Assad's alliance with Russia. The Syrian leader is utterly dependent on the Russians' support and on their weapons, and the other powers and leaders in the Middle East are acknowledging Moscow's dominant role in the region.

Iran, too, need not worry in future about international pressure to withdraw its brigades from Syria even if many Iranians at home want their government to bring back their troops and cut the huge expense of supporting Assad. Trump's decision, instead of underlining the isolation of Iran, has played straight into Tehran's hands.

> IT LOOKS LIKE THE END GAME IN THE SYRIAN IMBROGLIO. IT LEAVES ASSAD IN BRUTAL COMMAND OF ALMOST ALL HIS COUNTRY, WITH THE RUSSIANS AND HIS IRANIAN ALLIES FIRMLY ENTRENCHED TO HELP HIM "MOP UP" HIS REMAINING OPPONENTS

A collapse of the multinational force on the Syrian-Iraqi border that was largely staffed by the Americans would essentially cede control of all Syria to Assad. It would leave the West with no say in any final political settlement or any way to limit Iranian influence in the country.

In announcing that he was taking US forces out of Syria, Trump claimed that the job was done: Isis was beaten and the US should not be wasting money on further operations. But Isis is far from beaten, as the Europeans and many fearful Arab governments know. It has simply been driven underground. The West has few options left, however. Last week Jeremy Hunt, the British foreign secretary, admitted that Assad was likely to remain in power for the foreseeable future. In effect, he announced that Britain had given up all attempts to force him to leave office. Similar decisions, based on "realpolitik", are likely to be taken in Paris and other European Union capitals. And the Europeans may also now be looking at the chances to take part in the massive rebuilding of the country that Assad has reduced to ruins. They may also be hoping that many of the refugees, resigned to living under an Assad-Russian regime, will now quietly return home.

The West may hope to breathe new life into the moribund Geneva peace talks. But Assad now holds all the cards, and has no interest in any compromise. In any case, the only talks going on are those in Astana, which will simply ratify Assad's victory. It looks as though any peace will come on Russian and Iranian terms. Is that really what Trump intended when announcing his pullout?

The keys to NATO What test Ukraine has to pass to get into NATO and what could get in the way

Roman Malko

The Verkhovna Rada passed the historic Law "On national security" in time for the July 2018 NATO Summit, where Ukraine hoped to be given its Membership Action Plan, 10 years after its original hopes were dashed. At the time, the law was referred to as a milestone of national security reform that would bring Ukraine closer to NATO. Passing the National Security Law was one of the key requirements of integration.

Drafting the bill took considerable time and effort, and had the support of NATO, EU and US experts. Still, Ukraine's president was unable to attend the Summit as a full-fledged participant and report about the homework his country had completed because Hungary blocked the Ukrainian delegation over Ukraine's new law on education. So Petro Poroshenko ended up visiting Brussels as a tourist. Despite productive meetings outside the Summit, the granting of the MAP was postponed indefinitely. The day will surely come, provided that the Ukrainian government completes everything it and promised its loyal partners and even included in the final provisions of the law on national security.

FOR SUCH AGENCIES TO PRESERVE DEMOCRACY SUCCESSFULLY, THEY HAVE TO BE POLITICALLY NEUTRAL, UNBIASED AND ACCOUNTABLE, WHICH MEANS UPHOLDING PROFESSIONAL ETHICS AND WORKING WITHIN THE LIMITS OF THE POWERS DEFINED BY LAW AND THE CONSTITUTION

The fact is that, for the law to be implemented, the Rada needs to pass a few more bills. The Cabinet of Ministers has been given six months after this law comes into effect to draft a bill on the purpose and powers of the committee that will oversee the work of the country's special services. The SBU, in that same timeframe, has to amend the law on the Security Bureau of Ukraine and submit it to the president who will present it to the Rada for review. Holos Ukrainy, the official Government bulletin, published the Law "On national security" on July 7, 2018, so January 8 marked end of the six-month period for preparing the bills needed for the national security law to be implemented.

According to **The Ukrainian Week's** sources, neither the Cabinet nor the SBU drafted the bills by late December. Moreover, the SBU seemed suspicious about such a partnership initiative and attempted to cut it out even as the Rada was debating the national security law.

Why the SBU dislikes the initiative is easy enough to understand. Right now, the Bureau is de facto neither accountable nor subject to oversight and faces minimal interference from officials, which makes its work a lot easier. In fact, requiring such an agency to operate transparently will simply reduce its effectiveness, especially given that Ukraine is currently at war. In fact, the SBU's key arguments are about the war and the questionable reliability of any MPs who would exercise oversight. The Rada is full of agents, so how can they possibly be given access to state secrets? Who can guarantee that the oversight committee will be staffed with professionals who understand all the nuances of special services operations, and not a bunch of amateurs who will only use their position for self-promotion?

Still, the documents Ukraine promised will have to be passed. Firstly, a high level of secrecy for the country's special services is not a major component of democratic values. For such agencies to preserve democracy successfully, they have to be politically neutral, unbiased and accountable, which means upholding professional ethics and working within the limits of the powers defined by law and the Constitution. Secondly, civilian and parliamentary oversight over security forces and all agencies in charge of policing and investigating is a top priority for Ukraine's western partners, who believe that those with this kind of power need to be checked and an oversight committee will do that. This is one of the fundamental principles for NATO, whose members all have such a system and it works. Ukraine needs to also set up this kind of system if it wants to join this community.

To hope that its partners will close their eyes to this is pointless. The problem is not just the inevitable criticism, but about the possibility that Ukraine's partners give up on the country. Since Ukraine does not have the MAP now means that NATO has no commitment to Ukraine. If Ukraine ignores one of NATO's fundamental requirements, the Alliance will simply roll back cooperation to a minimum and no amount of diplomatic flourishes will make a difference. Besides, this is not what President Poroshenko needs if he wants to promote himself as a pro-Western candidate.

What's more, these were not the only bills that had to be passed as part of the NATO deal. According to **The Ukrainian Week's** sources, the bill on intelligence drafted by the foreign intelligence department and the Main Intelligence Directorate is ready, which is also needed in order to implement the security law. Western partners do have some qualms about it, but it has been drafted. Another important bill, #9122 on direct imports of weapons, finally passed first reading. It was not put on the agenda for a long time because MPs argued that it would be better to adopt it together with the defense procurement order so that here would be a better picture of the market situation. Only the procurement order was never completed while the chance to get far more military assistance from the US is too important to pass up.

Once the VR National Security and Defense Committee realized that the Cabinet was dragging its feet on drafting the new committee bill, it started the process on its own. According to Andriy Levus, chair of the state security subcommittee and one of the authors of the bill, the text of the bill on parliamentary oversight of special services compliance with laws is ready and had good feedback from the EU, US and NATO when the Ukrainian delegation presented it at the working group in Brussels December 14. All the stakeholders were invited to join the drafting process, which took several months. The drafters studied and adapted the practice of similar committees in NATO countries and took into account 90% of the recommendations of experts from the international advisory group. Ukraine's

Improving parliamentary control over the security and defense sector

Why Ukraine needs a special law on the Rada oversight committee

- Integration with NATO and Ukraine's international commitments
- The Law «On national security»

Analysis and oversight

- Bringing the role of the Verkhovna Rada in line with the Constitution
- Protecting human rights in relation to special services and intelligence agency activities

Committee objectives



Enforcement of parliamentary control over compliance with the Constitution and laws

Compliance with personal and civil rights, freedoms and interests during operations and investigations

Anticipated results

- Greater respect for civil rights and freedoms during special operations
- Stronger national security
- Truly independent and professional intelligence services

- Implementation of Euroatlantic norms on special services activities, greater transparency, and growing public trust

Source: Subcommittee on State Security, Verkhovna Rada's Committee on National Security and Defense

intelligence agency was involved in the process as well. According to Levus, the authors were ready to hand the document over to the Government or President for submission to the Rada.

Despite the fears of the special services, the new committee should not cause them much moral or physical harm if it's set up as prescribed. Aside from some burdens, it will also deliver some bonuses. The special services will effectively have their parliamentary body to carry out — in addition to oversight — all the functions that other committees handle: budgeting and legislating. It will review current laws, proposed legislation and international commitments. In a nutshell, it will facilitate the systemic reform and strengthening of the country's special services — something they certainly need.

The bill contains a key measure to protect against traitors and fools in the committee: any MPs applying to the committee and its secretariat will have to get top security clearance. In addition, no official will be able to access active materials or databases on their own initiative. Access to such files will be granted or denied to a give group after the committee has been provided with a list of questions and a detailed list of documents being requested. If the committee denies access, it will have to explain its decision. Also, certain materials can be requested but without the right to disclose them. The procedural officer will have the power to decide whether MPs can see case files on national security operations, provided that they comply with the secrecy rules.

The bill also has a procedure for filing and reviewing complaints, as well as the option of inviting the leaders and participants of events to a committee meeting. The committee is to look at cases where there is evidence of crime in the actions of law enforcers that has been reported, especially in serious cases that require its intervention. Twice a year, the special services will have to report on how they have exercised their duties under law, and the committee will then report to the Rada on this. The committee is to submit a full report to the speaker, president and premier. Closed committee hearings must take place no less than twice a year to work on recommendations and proposals for removing any shortcomings that have been revealed. The committee also has to report to the public about its work at least twice a year.

Whether the bill from MPs and international experts is passed or not depends primarily on the position of the Presidential Administration. In theory, the Administration should be interested in getting the bill through. In practice, strengthening the role of the Rada means yet another headache. While the Constitution assigns oversight functions to the Verkhovna Rada, there is no toolkit for exercising it, nor can it oversee the executive branch that it itself forms. The Rada has even less power over the special services that are the president's remit. Top officials are clearly happy with this set-up and would not want to change it, which means there could be efforts to dilute things by amending current laws, rather than writing a new bill, as Ukraine's partners call for. The Cabinet of Ministers could toss in some last-minute amendments to expand the functions of the existing security committee and nothing more. The question is how Ukraine's international partners will look at it.

A rough take-off? What security challenges face Ukraine in the upcoming year?

Yuriy Lapayev

Pilots refer to a "hard landing," when they have been forced to land their plane under extreme conditions. Ukraine, too, has been forced to go through a very hard period of preflight preparations in the last five years. In a very short timeframe, it began rebuilding its engines, reforming the economy, refueling from the IMF and international partners, and taxiing out on its chosen Euroatlantic runway. Now all the passengers are watching carefully to see how the take-off goes and which direction the aircraft will fly in.

For this to happen, Ukraine needs reach a series of security objectives, not all of which are exclusively the remit of the enforcement agencies. A number of positive trends can already be seen in this sector, which is no less than should be expected, given that Ukraine has been facing sustained aggression. Still, a substantial challenge remains ahead. Reforms in the Armed Forces and Defense Ministry should be reaching their final stages and bringing results. This means, among others, revising the legislative base, a process that is ongoing, although not all the necessary bills have been debated in the Verkhovna Rada so far. The way martial law was voted on demonstrated clearly that security issues are not a top priority for those sitting in the legislature today, which means that one of Ukraine's goals has to be forming a new group of lawmakers that understands how important and urgent military issues are. The point is not just to change the names of military ranks or social benefits to soldiers, but also large-scale issue such as the option of procuring weapons abroad.

UKRAINE NEEDS REACH A SERIES OF SECURITY OBJECTIVES, NOT ALL OF WHICH ARE EXCLUSIVELY THE REMIT OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. A NUMBER OF POSITIVE TRENDS CAN ALREADY BE SEEN IN THIS SECTOR, WHICH IS NO LESS THAN SHOULD BE EXPECTED, GIVEN THAT UKRAINE HAS BEEN FACING SUSTAINED AGGRESSION. STILL, A SUBSTANTIAL CHALLENGE REMAINS AHEAD

No less important is reforming the National Police and increasing public trust in its activities. Maintaining internal security in the face of external aggression is a matter of survival for the country. The same is true of the Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU). It remains the only unreformed agency in this entire sector. On one hand, the SBU has managed to demonstrate a considerable positive breakthrough in its abilities over the last few years. Quashing attempts at an "Odesa National Republic" or ONR and the faked assassination of Arkadiy Babchenko alone were operations worthy of high marks. On the other hand, as long as the SBU has officials with dual Ukrainian and Russian passports and dubious business interests, it's too early to talk about its overall performance. What's more, the process of instituting effective parliamentary oversight of the agency is far from finished, although it is part of the national security strategy and a requirement for cooperating with NATO.

Indeed, partnership with the Alliance needs to continue although Ukraine still hasn't been granted the MAP and is unlikely to do so in the near future. The Armed Forces need to be maximally engaged in as many exercises with NATO as possible and to become interoperable with NATO forces, given that this is with whom Ukraine will most likely fight shoulder-to-shoulder over the next 3-5 years. After all, the Russian Federation has precisely these objectives for planning and reforming: in 2018 alone, 10 new military formations and units were formed, with another 11 expected in 2019 — and we're only talking about land forces. That doesn't mean that the minute this is done, Moscow will automatically go on the attack, but it will be ready for such a move and, given the right circumstances, will ensure the necessary casus belli.

In addition to responding to the external, more visible threat, those governing Ukraine will have to determine where the flames of separatism might be smouldering internally over the next five years. The problem will not be a "Russian Spring 2.0" but Carpathian Rusyns, Hungarian meddling and Romania's appetites in Bukovyna. Today, it's hard to imagine any realistic scenarios of losing control over specific territories, but given enough political chaos in Kyiv, there could be attempts that the Kremlin would indubitably take advantage of.

To overcome any possible security threats, the country needs a properly equipped army and special services. Given very limited supplies from Ukraine's foreign partners, Kyiv will mostly have to count on its own resources — for starters, by developing the domestic defense industry. Artem DAHK, a state-owned holding company, has begun producing NATOstandard large-caliber shells. Vinnytsia-based Forti has finally launched closed-cycle production of small arms, although so far it's only making bullets for pistols because larger caliber will require expanding to new equipment. After a series of explosions at ammunition depots, these manufacturers need to raise their output to full capacity in order to provide for all the needs of the various forces.

Equally importantly, serial production of ammunition for newer missile systems like the Vilkha or the Neptune needs to get underway. Until this goes large-scale, their innovativeness and effectiveness won't mean much. The same is true of other innovations in Ukraine's defense industry. While some of them may be equal to or even better than foreign analogs in some parameters, they are available to the military in limited quantities so far. This reflects not only on the production capacities of defense companies but more than anything on the capacity of the government to pay for the cost of development and testing. And so, last but far from least, national security comes down to the state of the national economy and how much the country is prepared to spend on its own defense.

Nevertheless, this sector is capable not only of becoming a driver for the domestic economy, but also a source of serious revenues for state coffers. Historically, Ukraine has been a serious player on the world arms market. Unfortunately, it gained this status largely by selling off old soviet stock and servicing it. It's high time for the coun-



Vital production. Ukraine is finally beginning its own production of artillery shells and ammunition for small arms

try to move to a new level, proposing innovative solution and competing for rich buyers. The manufacture of the modern Hrim-2 tactical missile complex commissioned by Saudi Arabia could be just the successful launch and example that Ukraine needs.

Kyiv also needs to keep in mind that Russia will do everything possible to remove Ukraine as a competitor from this market. This could be covert lobbying for unilateral tenders, such as what happened with the repair of Bulgarian MiG bombers, and spoiling the reputation of its rivals in order to take over orders. Moscow has already run more than one dirty tricks campaign to discredit Ukraine as a reliable supplier of arms and military equipment. The Kolchuga scandal involving Iraq during Kuchma's presidency, the supposed sale of missiles to North Korea, and the most recent story, about the alleged supply of weapons to Southern Sudan, are just a few examples. Nor should Ukraine count on anything changing for the better in Russia's behavior. The battle for precious hard-currency exports will only get nastier as sanctions squeeze the Russian economy more.

In this kind of situation, security becomes even more dependent on diplomacy than ever. Moreover, conflicts on diplomatic fronts can be no less bitter and violent than those on the battlefront. Lately, Ukraine has enjoyed a number of victories: Russia was not able to return to PACE or to change its voting principles; Russia's candidate was not elected to run Interpol; and the UN continues to vote resolution after resolution in support of Ukraine, despite all the hostile efforts of the hard-core group of "friends of the Kremlin." Ukraine's diplomats now have to figure out a way to build relations with these 27 — based on the last vote — countries and to persuade them of Ukraine's position. Diplomacy is also a way to offer an asymmetrical re-

sponse to Russia's claims to the Azov Sea, say, by agreeing on the regular passage of ships from western countries. A further issue is regulating relations with two of Ukraine's closest neighbors: Poland and Hungary, regardless of how ambiguous their leaders and policies are towards Ukraine.

Despite their official remoteness from secular problems, the influence of churches on national security should also not be underestimated. And so the publicity around gaining world recognition of the newly-formed Orthodox Church of Ukraine also belongs among top priorities for both diplomats and the clergy. The formation of a unified national church could become another factor consolidating Ukrainian society, and that also has security implications. The goal of the country's leadership should be to find more such factors.

Establishing independent, objective media outlets that the public can trust and bringing order to the information arena mean no less than buying new weaponry for the military. A media awareness campaign would help people distinguish factual news from propaganda and disinformation. The country's cyber-security system also needs to evolve, especially around critical infrastructure. This means not only importing modern equipment from foreign partners but also establishing an operational system for exchanging information about incidents and organizing joint responses on the part of both state agencies and the private sector. Today, Ukraine's CERT and individual cyber security bases at the SBU and Defense Ministry are involved in this, but their options are very limited.

In reality, there's no take-off version of the term "hard landing," although a rough take-off is probably the most dangerous point in the entire flight. Let's hope that those who are in the pilot's seat understand the importance of this moment. \blacksquare

NATO and Ukraine in 2019

Building relations on solid ground

Alexander Vinnikov, Head of the NATO Representation to Ukraine and Director of the NATO Liaison Office in Ukraine

NATO will mark 70 years since its foundation on April 4. The North Atlantic Treaty defined the key security tasks of the Alliance, collective prevention of threats and protection of all members being the main one (Art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty). The fundamental values and principles marked in the Treaty helped us create the most successful military and political union in history.

For seven decades, NATO has aspired to ensuring resilient peace in the Euro-Atlantic region. This task was never easy as military political environments evolve permanently. Still, mutual security and defense remain the two pillars of NATO. During the Cold War, NATO focused on collective protection of its member-states from the potential threats emanating from the Soviet Union. The collapse of the Soviet Union was followed by the emergence and growth of non-state actors influencing international security. NATO adapted thanks to common defense, management of the crises situations that affected all allies, and the encouragement of cooperative security through special programs for political dialogue and practical cooperation with various partners.

These changes helped the first countries of the former Warsaw Pact – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland – join NATO in 1999. These countries will mark the 20th



Ukraine will mark the 10th anniversary of the Annual National Program in 2019 as the key instrument of its integration with NATO

anniversary of their NATO membership in 2019. It is easy to forget that some intense debate preceded that historic expansion of NATO. Many experts were not convinced about the benefits of former socialist states. They had different views on the way potential expansion would affect NATO's unity and solidarity, and on relations with Russia. A NATO study on the issue published in 1995 concluded that the acceptance of new members would strengthen its capability in enhancing European and global security.

That conclusion is still valid today, reinforcing NATO's open door policy based on Art. 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty. Any European country wishing to join NATO has to demonstrate its compliance with certain requirements. These include having a democratic political system based on a stable market economy; treating minorities fairly; aiming at peaceful conflict resolution; demonstrating the capability and readiness to participate in NATO operations; and last but not least, being in favor of democratic relations between civilian, military and institutional entities.

This leads us to another important date to be remembered. Ukraine is marking the 10th anniversary of the Annual National Program (ANP) as the key instrument of its integration with NATO. Allies provide recommendations and help Ukraine on its path to reforms under the ANP. Ukrainian Government's recent steps to improve the efficiency of this instrument are welcome. The goals of reforms should be clearly defined, coordinated, funded and measurable. In this context, 2019 will see the main steps to implement the Law on National Security passed in June 2018. It was the result of Ukraine's close cooperation with its international partners and an important stage in bringing it closer to EU and Euro-Atlantic standards and principles. The Law defines the basis for the reform of the security and defense sector. Other important acts need to be passed after it.

The Law entails comprehensive changes in the Armed Forces command and management structure, security and defense planning, security and intelligence services, and in defense industry. Strengthening democratic oversight over security and defense institutions is one of its important elements. This is a key Euro-Atlantic norm. The Verkhovna Rada is to create a new committee for this purpose, while NATO is prepared to provide further consultations and share experience with Ukraine in this area.

Also, the Law entails reform of the Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU). A new law on the SBU should ensure a transfer of some law enforcement functions, including action against corruption and economic crimes, to the law enforcement entities in charge. A clear division of competencies and obligations between these entities and the intelligence sector in Ukraine will be an important step to help the SBU become a trusted partner in the EU and the Euro-Atlantic security and intelligence community.

2019 will be the turning year for the defense reform. A number of Ukrainian planning documents, including the Strategic Defense Bulletin (SDB), set ambitious goals to be accomplished by the end of 2020. The implementation of the reform goals specified in the SDB and the Law on National Security requires further efforts and continuity in going from theory to practice.

NATO members recognize that the Armed Forces of Ukraine have gone a long way under this process. Their tactical and technical capabilities have grown, they still receive support under bilateral training and equipment programs, and participate in NATO-led missions and operations. Their accomplishments include combat effectiveness, the development of the sergeant and senior staff, the planning based on capabilities and the unified medical command. The Defense Ministry has done laudable work on practical issues that required quick decisions.

In order to strengthen its security, however, Ukraine needs to focus mainly on systemic, comprehensive and institutional approaches that are essential for sustainable irreversible reforms.

NATO is prepared to provide Ukraine with practical assistance in this area based on extensive expertise of NATO members. Ahead are over 40 adapted measures that are part of the Comprehensive Assistance Package (CAP) adopted by NATO at the Warsaw Summit in 2016. It covers several trust funds, capability strengthening programs and consultative support. The trust fund for medical rehabilitation provides necessary treatment to the wounded military and supports rehabilitation facilities in Ukraine with modern equipment. The cybersecurity trust fund provides equipment to strengthen Ukraine's resilience against cyberattacks. We also support the Regional Airspace Security Program (RASP) under the C4 Trust Fund (command, control, communications and computers) to help Ukraine better deal with incidents in this area. We share experience to strengthen resilience against complex threats and challenges we face collectively through the NATO-Ukraine Platform.

IN ORDER TO STRENGTHEN ITS SECURITY, HOWEVER, UKRAINE NEEDS TO FOCUS MAINLY ON SYSTEMIC, COMPREHENSIVE AND INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES THAT ARE ESSENTIAL FOR SUSTAINABLE IRREVERSIBLE REFORMS

CAP has allowed us to adjust NATO's consultative support with Ukraine's reform goals to make it stronger, more resilient and more capable of guaranteeing its security. NATO advisors work closely with their Ukrainian colleagues while the main group of advisors of the NATO Representation in Ukraine provides significant help in coordinating the efforts of NATO and the international community in a wider context.

Last but not least, 2019 will see another important date as the NATO Liaison Office celebrates its 20th anniversary in Ukraine. Founded in April 1999 in Kyiv, it aimed at supporting Ukraine's participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace and its efforts in defense reform. The Liaison Office and the Information and Documentation Center have been part of the NATO Representation in Ukraine since 2016. Over two decades, the scale of the Liaison Office's work has seriously expanded, and so has its staff. It is now covering the entire spectrum of the Ukraine-NATO military and political dialogue and practical cooperation. What remains unchanged is our belief that an independent, sovereign and stable country firmly committed to democracy and rule of law is a guarantee of Euro-Atlantic security. This belief is in the foundation of everything we do.

2019 will be a difficult year for Ukraine. But challenges bring forth new opportunities to strengthen state institutions, rule of law, economic competitiveness, and security and defense. As Ukraine's long-time and reliable partner, NATO aims at further supporting it on its way forward.

Content, not form

What model of European integration Ukraine needs

Oleksandr Kramar



Not our way. The size of Ukraine's market should grow, not as a kind of suburb of the EU, whose residents live on money earned by working in the EU, or loans and grants

Ukraine's economic reorientation on the West and on the EU more specifically is largely complete. The latest data shows that 49.7% of Ukraine's exported goods went to the EU, while 52.7% of its imports came from EU and NATO members in 11M 2018. Both overall trade and the West's share of trade are growing rapidly, and the latter could well hit 60% of all foreign trade in the next few years. Having left behind the once-key issue of choosing a direction for economic integration, Ukraine now needs to focus more carefully on just what kind of European integration it needs, what fundamental principles the country should pursue, including socio-economic ones, and under no circumstances be prepared to sacrifice.

What this amounts to is a healthy dollop of "euroscepticism." This does not at all imply rejecting the move towards the West, shifting eastward, or questioning Ukraine's prospects with the EU, as euroscepticism has been interpreted until recently. Rather, this means understanding the list of conditions essential to Ukraine's further integration with Western institutions, including economic integration. Unless these conditions can be met, the purpose of accession will remain questionable and potentially damaging to Ukraine.

Constructive euroscepticism, however strange this word may sound to a country with no acknowledged prospect of EU membership, is necessary, among other things, as a preventive vaccination against being infected with the populist anti-european and anti-west virus being actively promoted by Russia. Constructive euroscepticism needs to become a component both in public debate and in negotiations with the EU. Key priorities should focus on long-term development plans for the domestic economy, rather than on promoting narrow group or corporation interests, or the interests of business groups linked to the negotiating process.

If Ukraine continues to use the "whatever you say" approach in negotiations with the EU and fails to protect

critical national priorities, it will offer fertile ground for different actors to seed anti-EU and even more broadly anti-Western sentiments and encourage criticism of the country's geopolitical and civilizational choice. And this is about much more than just the economy: it guarantees the country's survival in the face of Russia's aggression and the constant threat of a full-scale attack, as well offering the most effective developmental model.

Ukraine's main priorities have been and remain military, political, informational, and ideological integration with the Western world. Socioeconomic rapprochement should be done cautiously so that Ukraine does not lose more than it gains in the process. This is especially important for the overall domestic economy, to prevent a situation where individuals enjoy personal benefits such as easier access to work in the EU, while the country as a whole suffers.

A PARTNER, NOT AN APPENDAGE

The task for Ukraine's political elite and negotiators is to link EU interest in the Ukrainian market to the idea that as the growth of Ukrainians' purchasing power is key to growing consumption of European goods. When Ukrainians complain about the duty-free EU tiny export quotas for certain Ukrainian goods, especially food, under the Association Agreement, they tend to forget that, for the EU the Ukrainian market is also a "tiny quota" for the huge economies in the EU and the West. EU countries imported slightly over €22 billion worth of goods to Ukraine in 2018 — about 1% of the nearly €2 trillion worth of goods the EU exported to third countries last year.

And so, it's important for Ukraine's political leadership to propose a Marshall Plan-like model for the country's further socioeconomic integration into the EU. At issue is not just the scale of financial assistance, as many see it in Ukraine lately, but the principles and the ultimate goals of such an investment program. Serious European or western funding to support Ukraine should come, not as a means of patching up holes but as a tool to help shape a strong domestic economy and grow into a major trade, economic and investment partner for the EU, as befits the country's potential scale.

Ukraine also needs to insist that the purchasing power of its consumers cannot and should not develop like a bedroom community of Europe, where residents live on the earnings from working as migrant labor in the EU, or on cheap loans and grants from European foundations.

An economically developed Ukraine with a strong middle class and numerous, resilient mid-sized and big non-oligarchic businesses can become a major market for EU goods in exchange for the EU buying similarly large amounts of goods with high added value made in Ukraine. Goods with low added value simply cannot provide the necessary volume of manufacturing and exports for a country the size of Ukraine to guarantee significant demand for finished EU goods here.

The EU has long become Ukraine's biggest trade partner, accounting for over half of its foreign trade. Ukraine's exports to the economic core of Germany, France, the Benelux countries and the UK, which account for over half of the EU's economic capacity and imports, and are home to over 45% of its population, are far smaller than its exports to the Visegrad Four with their far smaller economies. Most of what Ukraine exports goes to the EU periphery, partly because there is little demand for the goods Ukraine exports to the core economic markets. Most European economies still import very mono-specialized groups of goods from Ukraine. Spain and Ireland mostly buy Ukrainian grain, France and Belgium buy oilseed and products made of them, Italy, Greece and Bulgaria import unprocessed black metals, while Austria buys ore. It is important for Ukraine to bring more of its finished goods to the EU market.

With few exceptions, co-production between Ukraine and the EU is underdeveloped. Yet, this kind of cooperation mostly shapes mutual trade flows within the EU. For Ukraine, the share of co-production is substantial only in trade with Germany and the V4, where Ukraine exports the biggest share of electronic equipment and furniture.

The proportion of raw commodities and semi-processed goods with low added value is too high in Ukraine's exports to the EU. This is not exclusively a question of Ukraine's trade relations with the EU, but a flaw in the structure of Ukraine's economy and exports. Ukraine sells far more raw materials beyond the EU, too. And yet, the share of machinery and equipment in Ukraine's exports to the EU is already far higher than the share of this group in Ukraine's total exports.

KEEP YOUR EYE ON THE GOAL

Integration into the EU should not mean that Ukraine loses its own economic and entrepreneurial nature. Nor should the country turn into a joint stock company controlled by foreign owners, even if they were to make it modern and seemingly high-tech. What Ukraine needs is a policy for growing national champions from scratch or from the many embryonic, competitive non-oligarch businesses already operating in the country today. These are businesses that are ready focus on synergistic growth and the growth of their country, and at expanding the national pie to benefit the majority. Unless Ukraine does this, it cannot count on being an independent economic actor.

Given this, then, the challenge for Ukraine's political leadership is to insist that the way to increase incomes, generate new jobs, preserve existing ones, and expand the market for European goods is not by having key segments of Ukraine's economy swallowed up by European or Western transnational corporations or big business. Some Central European countries have already experienced this. Any conditions set for Ukraine should preserve the dominant position of domestic business in key sectors of the domestic economy. In the areas where domestic business is not present or is weak, Ukraine should be entitled to implement policies to encourage its emergence and rapid growth.

In the process of doing so, Ukraine should not have to worry about blocking integration with western institutions, such as the EU. If integration takes place without strengthening and dynamically growing of the country's economy, or, worse, through undermining growth, it could do more harm than good. Formal accession to the EU has always involved many conditionalities and restrictions designed for already developed and wealthy countries that are in a position to seriously complicate growth. The EU's economy is advanced but its growth is relatively slow. What Ukraine needs in the upcoming decades is something quite opposite: dynamic growth from the current low baselines. Settling for a subsidized life-style and allowing half the population leave for work in the EU is not an option.

Of course, Ukraine cannot afford trade wars with the EU or the West, as they are its geopolitical support, strategic partners and a market for half its goods. Still, trade and economic relations with the EU and the US need to be pragmatic regardless of geopolitical closeness.

SERIOUS EUROPEAN OR WESTERN FUNDING TO SUPPORT UKRAINE SHOULD COME, NOT AS A MEANS OF PATCHING UP HOLES BUT AS A TOOL TO HELP SHAPE A STRONG DOMESTIC ECONOMY AND GROW INTO A MAJOR TRADE, ECONOMIC AND INVESTMENT PARTNER FOR THE EU, AS BEFITS THE COUNTRY'S POTENTIAL SCALE

As in the past, Ukraine remains interested in their technology and equipment to refit its industries. But projects like the purchase of General Electric locomotives, French helicopters or farm machinery should go through formal or informal competitions with a mandatory non-price-based component, such as locating production facilities in Ukraine or establishing joint ventures with local medium and large businesses and state-owned companies — especially if the procurement is tied to government-backed loans.

For a long time, Ukraine needed the prospect of EU membership to nurture and strengthen in the minds of the many of its post-soviet citizens the sense of an alternative to Russia, a reason for breaking ties with it and overcoming post-imperial inertia. The last few years have given Ukrainians a new impetus for anti-Russian sentiment, which is now stronger here than in quite a few EU countries. Indeed, some notions drifting into Ukraine from the EU actually hinder a further break with Moscow. In Ukraine, understanding has grown that any compromise with Russia will inevitably lead to a complete takeover, but too many people in the EU believe that nothing but formal or informal agreements with Russia will resolve the Ukrainian question.

In short, what matters is not accession to the EU per se, but on what terms Ukraine will integrate. On the symbolic and directional level, Ukraine needs to maintain its EU course as one of the key geopolitical markers of the country's western choice. Any rejection of this basic principle will lead to a dangerous vacuum just when a large part of Ukrainian society still needs this marker.

The anatomy of Euro-optimism

What unreasonable public expectations regarding the EU might get in the way of Ukraine's eurointegration?

Maksym Vikhrov

The Association Agreement with the European Union came into effect relatively recently, but questions about Ukraine's foreign policy direction have long been treated as a done deal. Whatever the configuration of the government comes mid-2019, there will not be a 180-degree geopolitical switch, firstly because supporters of European integration among ordinary Ukrainians are a majority at 50.7%. Another 32.5% favor neutrality while a mere 10.9% still support the idea of joining the Eurasian Union under Russia, according to a 2018 Democratic Initiatives Fund poll.

However, history has shown that these positions can change significantly with just a change of circumstances. What's more, current opinion polls don't reflect the opinions of Ukrainians in the territories occupied by Russia, who are highly unlikely to be Euro-optimists. Still, it's not just a question of arithmetic relativity. Pro-European

MOST LIKELY, THE SUPPORTERS OF EUROINTEGRATION WILL SLOWLY INCREASE IN INFLUENCE WHILE THEIR OPPONENTS REMAIN IN THE MINORITY, NOT THE LEAST BECAUSE OF RUSSIA'S EVER-MORE-DESTRUCTIVE POSITION AND ITS WEAKENING INFLUENCE IN THE REGION

aspirations, even with different ideological accents, have become a common feature for a very broad spectrum of social and political forces, from openly leftish-liberal to nationalist radical groups. Despite internal contradictions, sometimes to the point of open enmity, they affect not only the weary majority but also the current administration, which has to pay attention to them. This kind of potential cannot be seen in either the demoralized and marginalized pro-Russian camp, or among the supporters of "neutrality," who tend to swing between both camps.

A PHILOSOPHY OF PROCESS

Most likely, the supporters of Eurointegration will slowly increase in influence while their opponents remain in the minority, not the least because of Russia's ever-more-destructive position and its weakening influence in the region. In the longer term, however, things aren't quite so simple. At its current stage, Ukraine's Eurointegration is a philosophy of process rather than a philosophy aimed at an outcome, and that means that anything could happen in the long run. Of course, as long as the war with Russia continues — and probably for quite some time after it ends — there is little threat that pro-Russian attitudes will rise up again in Ukraine.

But that segment of society that is oriented on geopolitical neutrality could grow significantly, not just thanks to "russophiles," but also among completely pro-Ukrainian Euroskeptics. Once it finds a political expression, the neutral position could well grow as a powerful alternative to the current mainstream Euro-optimism. Indeed, given the right circumstances, it might begin to overtake it.

In fact, as cooperation with the EU evolves, it won't necessarily foster growing pro-European attitudes in Ukraine. As polls seem to suggest, the smallest proportion of Ukrainians who saw little to know advantages from membership in the EU was back in 2005 and 2007, when only 14 and 16% thought so. By contrast, 10 years later, the number of Ukrainians who thought so not only grew, but grew substantially, to 22% and 26% over 2015-2018, not far less than pre-Maidan levels – nearly 28% in 2011. The point is that it's not just a matter of public opinion or to the political fluctuations that they might lead. What's equally intriguing is the anatomy of Ukraine's Eurooptimism, with the many nuances that could lead to a sharp rise in the opposite mood down the line.

The notion that Eurointegration represents Ukraine's return to its civilizational home is generally popular and correct. However, the positive expectations of Ukrainians vis-à-vis the EU are basically quite pragmatic in nature. In August 2018, for instance, most Ukrainians tended to associate membership with a higher standard of living, with progress combating corruption, and with greater international mobility, especially educational opportunities, according to the 2018 DIF poll. Unsurprisingly, this largely coincides with the list of problems that Ukrainians also consider the most urgent: despite differences among polls, they are primarily concerned about corruption and economic woes – sometimes even more than about the war in the Donbas.



The fact that ordinary Ukrainians link the EU to a resolution of their day-to-day problems to a greater or lesser extent makes it possible for a pro-European camp to have a place in Ukrainian society. And so politicians from this camp do everything they can to support this idea, occasionally resorting to the kind of populism that is more associated with those who favor the Customs or Eurasian Union. Unfortunately, the more strongly Ukrainians connect a solution to their problems with one geopolitical vector or another, the more likely they are to be disappointed.

Growing international mobility as the country integrates more with the EU is clearly evident in statistics since visa-free travel was instituted and Ukrainians began migrating for work in large numbers to the EU. Still, a "European standard of living" is not guaranteed, even when Ukraine does join the EU. In the best-case scenario, the country is likely to lag behind its neighbors for some time to come. An even this level will have to be attained by tolerating difficult, unpopular and even painful reforms such as more expensive natural gas rates, the formation of a land market, replacing the archaic social security system, and so on. Eventually, these reforms will yield positive results, but Ukrainians don't have a very large reserve of patience. At least this year, only 8% of them

IF EUROINTEGRATION DOESN'T START GIVING POSITIVE RESULTS IN THE NEXT WHILE, PUBLIC FATIGUE AND DISCOURAGE- MENT WILL UNDERMINE NOT ONLY POLITICIAN'S RATINGS, BUT ALSO THE TRUST UKRAINIANS HAVE IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

said they were prepared to tolerate a worsening in their own standard of living in order for reforms to succeed. Another 24% said they were prepared to put up with hardship for another year, while 60% said they were unwilling or unable to suffer any more, according to a 2018 DIF poll.

Thus, if Eurointegration doesn't start giving positive results in the next while, public fatigue and discouragement will undermine not only politician's ratings, but also the trust Ukrainians have in the European Union. Moreover, this is not just with respect to economic conditions but also, according to the same poll, to the war on corruption, which 79% of Ukrainians say is one of the country's top problems. By contrast, only 55% say that the war in the Donbas is.

MODERN MYTHOLOGY

It's no secret that the battle against corruption is often carried out under the banner of "Europeanization," which doesn't sound very persuasive. This establishes a very seductive image of the EU as a sterile, corruption-free zone that, if we could only get in, would eliminate this horrible phenomenon forever. Reality is somewhat different from the imagined. For instance, in 2014 the European Commission evaluated the EU's losses from corruption and came up with a figure €120 billion per year. Yet this figure turned out to be quite optimistic. According to a study by the RAND Corporation commissioned by the European Parliament and carried out in 2016, the cost of corruption ranges between €179 and €990 billion in the European Union.

Moreover, a European Commissions business poll in 2014 showed that 37% of business owners in EU countries said that they suffered from corruption while carrying out their normal commercial activities. In Czechia, this figure was 71%, in Portugal it was 68% and in Greece and Slovakia it was 66%. Indeed, 77% of EU residents believe that bribes and patronage were often the simplest way to get certain services in their countries. Meanwhile, only 29% believe that their governments were fighting effectively with corruption. There's no question that this flies in the face of the image of the EU among many Ukrainians and the risk of this cherished illusion turning sharply into disenchantment in the future.

In addition, Ukraine's Euro-optimistic circles aren't homogenous and a split could happen not so much along nominally liberal and traditionalist line as between those for whom Europe offers a specific values- and rules-based matrix to which Ukrainian life should adapt, and those for whom it is the embodiment of some mythical older paternalistic dream of magical solutions to all problems. Metaphorically speaking, this is secondary paternalism, as these expectations tend to be transferred from the person's own country, which already lacks sufficient trust, to foreign or supranational entities.

All jokes aside, 25% of Ukrainians think the West is the driver of reforms, while 28% are certain that it needs to be pressuring Ukraine's government more, and only 9% are convinced that it is already doing enough, according to the DIF poll. Of course, for a certain part of the population, the so-called agents of change, the nominal West, especially the EU, is an ally in the struggle with those forces in Ukraine that are preventing the deracination of corruption and are interfering in reforms. Still, for most fans of Eurointegration, Europe remains largely what sovoks continue feeling nostalgia for in the USSR or Putinist Russia: an association whose membership brings wellbeing, stability and security. "European quality" instead of kovbasa with "GOST," the soviet quality control stamp, "effective institutions" instead of "order" - in short, the form changes but the substance remains almost the same.

Similarly, millions of Ukrainians accepted the market in the lat 1980s as an unknown lifestyle whose image was seen as a panacea to constant soviet shortages, impoverishment and burdensome leveling. Pragmatism was indubitably a stronger motivator in the 1991 referendum than any feeling of nationalism or patriotic idealism. Moreover, this is, generally speaking, quite natural and normal for any society. However, it's worth remembering how enchantment with the market changed to sharp disenchantment when it turned out that the transition to the market could be very painful. Shocked by the dog-eat-dog realities of wild capitalism, Ukrainians were happy to listen to populists who promised to maintain free healthcare and education, a soviet system of subsidies and discounts, non-market utility rates, and other benefits of "advanced socialism."

Something similar could take place again, not even that far in the future when Ukraine joins the EU, but even in the process of Eurointegration. In a broader historical context, this will bring on the next crisis on the way to a mature society. The question is whether the national elite, including the intellectuals, will be able to persuade Ukrainians in the need to continue moving towards Europe, only this time without illusions and unrealistic expectations. Either that, or the country will give into the counterarguments and plunge into the prison of populism, possibly pro-European in form but very much anti-European in spirit.

Slaloming the risks

Ukraine's economy will grow more resilient if it survives 2019

Lyubomyr Shavalyuk

2018 was the year of waiting. Ukraine waited for the IMF money, the start of the election campaign and the answers to some questions, including on further increase of gas price and Sviatoslav Vakarchuk's bid in the presidential election. 2019 will probably deliver more answers than questions. Ukrainians will decide who occupies the Presidential Administration and the Verkhovna Rada for the next term. This will make it clear what political course Ukraine will take in the next five years. Economically, we will find out whether yet another crisis comes. Risks will be plenty. If Ukraine survives them in 2019, it may well forget about deep crises for a long time to come.

The first batch of risks will come from outside. 2018 was a very difficult year for emerging countries. They spent the year watching capital flight helplessly as the US Federal Reserve raised interest rates and folded quantitative easing, and the federal budget deficit expanded. This led to a synchronized devaluation of their currencies with MSCI EM Currency Index plunging over 7% in less than 11 months. Full-blown crises started in several countries, pushing them to the IMF for help.

These trends in the US monetary and fiscal policies will continue. As a result, pressure on the balance of payments in emerging countries will continue, and so will capital flight from them. The longer it lasts, the more countries it will hit — a few more may join Argentina, Turkey and Pakistan which suffered in 2018. And serious side effects will emerge, including the plunge of global prices for raw materials.

Emerging countries are large buyers in global commodity markets, and they are also the most vulnerable ones financially. China imports virtually all groups of commodities. India and Pakistan import fuels and steel products. Mexico buys metals and food. Devaluation of their currencies has undermined their purchasing capacity, therefore it will affect global commodity markets as demand plunges and prices follow. According to the IMF, many groups of commodities will get cheaper in 2019. This will have negative implications for exporters, including Ukraine. In fact, oil proved the point by losing 25% of its price in just the last quarter of 2018. More is to come.

Domestic risks are no smaller. According to its National Bank (NBU), Ukraine will have to repay over US \$5.8bn of its foreign debt in 2019. This serious sum is an equivalent of a third of the country's foreign exchange reserves at the end of 2018. The IMF tranche, financial assistance from other donors and the issuance of Eurobonds in October can help Ukraine cover at least half of the sum needed. Finding the rest may be more challenging. If the government has to buy currency on the market, this may lead to double devaluation pressure, especially as it couples with the balance of payments deficit caused by the potential capital flight and the plunging commodity prices. Then hryvnia will lose in value again. This will not have disastrous consequences but will be felt by everyone.

The main thing is for the government to have funds with which to buy the currency. This was the key domestic problem in 2018, and it will remain so in 2019. In 2018, the Cabinet of Ministers struggled to meet the budget plan for revenues and

Cash down



borrowings for six months. After hryvnia fell to UAH 28 per US 1 in July-September, budget revenues went up — mainly thanks to revenues from the customs. The government may use this recipe in 2019. A risk, however, is that the pre-election populism inflates the plan of spending to the point where no revenues will be enough to fund it, however imaginative the government and the parliament are.

Ukraine was not lucky in terms of domestic borrowing in 2018. Still, the government plans to draw UAH 52bn net (borrowings less payouts) in 2019, which is way more than it did in 2018. This may be one of the biggest risks. Time after New Year will show whether it can deal with this risk, and how it can do so.

Overall, 2019 will be a difficult year for the country both politically and economically. Hryvnia will go down to over UAH 30 per US \$1. It is unclear whether the government can guide Ukraine's economy through all the risks without excessive turbulence. This gives jitters. On the one hand, the government proved its ability to take wise and balanced decisions in 2018. It chose to raise gas prices, thus making the richer part of the population cut down on consumption a bit, rather than allowing a new crisis to unfold that would once again throw the country several years back. On the other hand, the government has shown that wise decisions take a lot of effort and time. The trouble is that Ukraine might face a more pressing need for quick decisions in 2019 than for wise or balanced ones.

A bedroom community for the EU?

What challenges will the growth of labor migration to EU countries present Ukraine?

Oleksandr Kramar

Labor migration from Ukraine has changed cardinally in recent years and differs from previous waves both by its very nature and by its impact on the economic situation in the country. The massive scale of this new migration is only starting to be felt and it's becoming obvious that, without the necessary rethink and adjustments to economic, tax and social policy, it will eventually threaten huge problem and imbalances.

Ukrainian migrant workers in the 1990s and early 2000s were much more driven than today by the need to simply survive for individuals who had lost their means of living during the transition period back home. Migrant flows went mostly to more distant countries in Western Europe and the vast majority of these illegals rarely came home before they managed to gain some form of official status in their new country of residence. Today's migrant workers are mostly going officially, with more noticeable fluctuating and seasonal components, looking ever more like a natural extension of migrant flows within Ukraine itself, as individuals from depressed regions, rural areas and suburbs continue to move to larger and wealthier economic centers.

By comparison, the scale of migration across the border is not as big, but the potential for it to grow remains fairly high. Derzhstat figures show that, since 2012 alone, some 450-650,000 Ukrainians change their domicile within the country annually, for a variety of reasons, but mainly economic ones. An even larger number do so unofficially or are part of the fluctuating and seasonal migration from population centers where they reside to those where they find a job. While this internal migration of Ukrainians is not as noticeable as the cross-border version, its impact on the socio-economic situation and tax revenues not much less vital.

Lately, these internal movements between bedroom and employment communities and places in the middle of the countries have simply overflowed beyond it. Moreover, this is not just as the result of some critical worsening of the economic situation in Ukraine, as is popular to state these days, but mainly because of the liberalized visa regime and the improvement of opportunities to be officially employed in EU countries neighboring Ukraine that have a labor shortage. This was the natural outcome of the process of bringing Ukraine into a unified European economic and human space at the same time as the domestic labor market remained uncompetitive.

NOT BY POLAND ALONE

The first and so far most powerful magnet for Ukrainians was the biggest neighboring EU economy, Poland. In 2017

alone, Warsaw issued new residency permits to over 585,000 Ukrainian citizens, while in QIII of 2018, the number of Ukrainians working there legally had grown to 426,000 according to the Polish Social Insurance Fund. However, the Polish labor market has lost some of its attractiveness for Ukraine's migrant workers lately. The NBU prepared an analytical brief that registered a slowdown in the pace of issuing new permits, which suggests that the flow of Ukrainian migrants to Poland will slow down in 2019 and further. The number of applications for employment was already down in the first six months of the year to the level of the first halfyear in 2016.

Having tested the waters in Poland, Ukrainians have more actively been checking out labor markets in other, so far mostly post-socialist countries in Central and Eastern Europe, where access to jobs has become much easier. Indeed, Ukrainians are the top group gaining residency or work permits in Lithuania, Estonia, Czechia, Slovakia, and Hungary. More recently, they joined the top three immigration group in Bulgaria, Croatia, Lithuania, and Denmark. For instance, in 2016, the official Czech quota for workers from Ukraine was only 3,800, but it has grown more than tenfold, doubling every year: to 7,200 in 2017, 19,600 in 2018 and 40,000 for 2019 according to a recent decision by the Czech Government. Lithuania issued 18,000 working visas in 2016, of which nearly 10,000 went to Ukrainians, while in 2017, 20,000 Ukrainians received them and in 2018 19,000 permits were issued to Ukrainians in just the first seven months. Estonia, which is less than half the size, issued 12,000 permits to Ukrainians in the first three quarters of 2018, amounting to nearly 1% of the country's entire, not just able-bodied, population. Among Baltic countries, the smallest number of Ukrainians goes to Latvia, which issued around 3,000 work permits. However, the growing trend of migration to other CEE countries could well bring the number of Ukrainians in Latvia up to the tens of thousands.

NEXT STOP GERMANY

A dramatic increase in access to the relatively small countries in CEE could prove to have been just a prelude to a massive entrance to the largest economy in the European Union, with one of the highest salary levels on the continent, Germany. At the moment, Ukrainian migrant workers are a relatively small group there: official statistics put the number officially employed there at around 43,000, up 10% for 2018. These numbers are in the same ballpark as Czechia, Lithuania or Estonia, with their many times smaller populations, economies and wages.

The main driver of migration Minimum gross wage in EU countries that are attracting the main flow of migrant workers from Ukraine, as of January 1, 2019 €1.560



However, the situation is about to change radically as Berlin has decided to liberalize access to the labor market for countries that are not EU members, just as it did for its eastern neighbors earlier. The new rules allow citizens of a non-EU country to easily get a six-month work permit. They will be able to not just to fill new vacancies but also compete with migrant workers from neighboring EU countries. Today, Germany reports over 420,000 officially registered employees from Poland and 350,000 from Romania. Predictions are that quite a few Ukrainian migrant workers will move from Poland to Germany. It's quite likely that Ukrainians working in Czechia, Lithuania and Estonia will also begin to shift westwards, which will increase demand - and wages - on those labor markets to attract more Ukrainians, as they remain the largest and least expensive labor force among all other European countries.

All these changes will spur an even larger outflow of new workers from Ukraine, as the difference in wages remains extremely high. For instance, based on available data, even the minimum wage in Poland has gone up to PLN 2.250 as of Jan. 1, 2019, or nearly UAH 16.400 at the current exchange rate, in Czechia it is CZK 13,350 or around UAH 16,300, and in Slovakia it's €520, which is also close to the Polish level. In Lithuania, the minimum wage is now up to an even higher €555 or about UAH 17,500, in Estonia it's €540, but this level of income is not taxed in Estonia, so in fact, it is the range of about €675 or UAH 21,300 at the current exchange rate compared to the other countries, all of whom tax this level of income. Meanwhile, the gross minimum wage in Ukraine has just gone up to nearly UAH 4,200, but in fact even the average wage in most parts of the country is well below than the minimum in neighboring EU countries.

Unquestionably, such an enormous difference in the value of labor has been drawing Ukrainians away from the domestic labor market and will continue to draw them to neighboring countries, not only on a permanent basis but also on a seasonal and fluctuating basis.

THOSE WHO STAY BEHIND

What's more, in Ukraine itself, competition is growing for those workers who are in demand on other European markets. This is forcing wages up, a trend that should continue, and leading to inter-sectoral flows, especially from those branches and professions that were traditionally considered more qualified and complicated to simpler work, including manual labor. The extremely low salary levels in the government sector and public services, and in a slew of other sectors of the economy from which direct migration to the EU is not possible is forcing some part of those employed there to retrain and replace workers in fields Ukrainians are most actively leaving behind for the EU.

Meanwhile, this group is actively expanding thanks to those spheres where the European labor market was difficult to access or closed altogether until not long ago. Among others, in spring 2018, the Polish Health Ministry turned to Ukraine's Ministry of Education and Science with a proposal to simplify the recognition of medical diplomas for those who gained them abroad. One of the main requirements was knowing the Polish language. Today, Poland is expecting a huge shortage of midlevel medical personal: of 220,000 nurses that are employed in that country, 73,000 are already of retirement age, while there are less than half as many doctors per 1,000 residents than the average for the EU. It's obvious how this shortage will be covered: even given the existing barriers to this particular segment of the labor market, Ukrainians already constitute 36% of the foreigners who have the right to practice medicine in Poland.

If current trends continue, the difference in wages, compounded by the structural problems in Ukraine's economy and the lack of proper government policy to modernize and expand industrialization, inertia will transform Ukraine into one huge bedroom community for the wealthier countries of the EU. This process will pick up pace, deepening the shortage of labor in many segments of Ukraine's economy while increasing demand for goods and services on the part of the families of migrants and, depending on the season, the workers themselves.

These new realities will lead to changes in attitudes towards the problem of migrant labor and the position of migrant workers both in their communities and in relation to the government. They are getting rid of the label, "the most impoverished segment of Ukrainian society, which has to save itself from starvation because it could not find a job at home." More and more, migrant workers from Ukraine are looking for higher salaries, not going for a job that they could just as easily have in Ukraine, but for much smaller pay.

Meanwhile, the burden of supporting the social sphere and infrastructure in Ukraine is borne by those who continue to work in their homeland for a much smaller wage. Aligning Ukraine's prices and rates with world levels and raising rates of pay for the work of specialists in areas from which they are going abroad to European levels need to be extended to include raising the pay of those who stay behind in the other domestic spheres.

In a situation where Ukraine is turning more and more to an EU suburb for migrant commuters, taxation systems also cannot stay the way they were in the past, as they were based on a post-soviet social model. This situation needs a mechanism to radically rebalance taxation and social contributions, the financing of education and medicine, and expanding the system to include contributions from migrant workers. Either that, or these spheres will start to degrade severely over time, with a growing shortage of resources to fund them, and worsening fiscal and quasi-fiscal pressure on those who continue to live and work in Ukraine. And this inevitably means that their real standard of living will decline.

The current model of centralized funding of such services as healthcare, education and welfare, which are enshrined in Ukraine's Constitution, simply does not anticipate a situation where a growing segment of the able-bodied population will be making their livings outside the domestic economy. The question of how to get those who work abroad to contribute to the ever-growing burden of budget and social fund funding back home is about to become a major problem.

Laura Cooper:

"The United States is steady in its assistance to Ukraine, and we have been before the elections, we are during this period of time, and we will be after"

Interviewed by Yuriy Lapayev

The Ukrainian Week talks with Acting U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy on the act of aggression in the Kerch Strait and the military assistance to Ukraine.

Can you comment briefly on which meetings you had today and which goals you have for these meetings?

— Today, it was, I think, really important for me to communicate with all the Ukrainian government officials that I met with that the United States is standing by Ukraine in this difficult time, and that we condemn Russia's reckless act of aggression in the Kerch Strait, and that we continue to commit to Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, extending into the maritime domain. So I met with a variety of officials, actually, to include the Parliament, and in all of those meetings we had very constructive discussions about how the U.S. has been supporting Ukraine with security assistance, and how we will continue to support Ukraine with security assistance.

And, if we go farther on that question, can we expect — Ukraine — can we expect any increase in cooperation between the United States and Ukraine on military issues after this last aggression of Russia in the Kerch Strait?

— I'll say that, first of all, we had a strong record of support for Ukrainian security assistance since 2014, and at this point we have spent \$1.1 billion in U.S. assistance. This coming year, the U.S. Congress has authorized \$250 million in security assistance, so one of my goals for this visit was to discuss with the Government of Ukraine what its priority needs are for security assistance. Certainly we

have already been talking about assistance in the maritime domain prior to this recent crisis and aggression, but now I think we're considering how we might further expand our assistance in the maritime domain. We also have the recently published Ukrainian Naval Strategy, which really charts the course for how Ukraine wants to pursue maritime capabilities. So this gives us an opportunity to support that.

Was it discussed, the question of transferring those American frigates?

— Right now we're in the process of transferring two Island-class patrol boats from the U.S. Coast Guard, and that is underway, and we had a really wonderful ceremony with President Poroshenko a few months ago where he came to the United States, and in Baltimore actually oversaw a ceremony for that transfer. And that process is underway. And we're looking at the range of other possible requirements that Ukraine may have in the maritime domain. And we will consider how we might factor those into our assistance package.

If coming from Ukraine to other allies of United States in Black Sea region — do you have any plans to do anything increasing of capabilities or increasing the presence in this region?

- I think it's important to note that all of our assistance comes within an international context, a NATO context, certainly we're helping support and train Ukrainian forces to meet NATO standards and we're very fortunate to have NATO partners as part of the security assistance team, to include in the Defense Reform Advisory Board. So we consult frequently with all the NATO allies on how we might better support Ukraine. And then in terms of actual NATO deployments, we've seen a big increase in NATO presence in the Black Sea over the past year. The statistics are actually pretty impressive: in 2017, NATO countries had 80 patrols in the Black Sea, whereas we increased in 2018 to 120 days of patrols in the Black Sea. So vou're seeing already a substantial increase. You're also seeing at NATO considerable dialogue on Black Sea security, which is quite impressive.

There's another development that I'd like to make sure that you're aware of from today, I don't know if you've had a chance to hear about our Open Skies Treaty flight that occurred over Ukraine today. But I think this is important to mention because it's yet another sign of international support for Ukraine in the midst of this aggression. So the United States actually piloted the plane, and it flew from Andrews Air Force Base to Germany, and then from Germany to Ukraine today, and this flight was part of the Open Skies treaty, which allows for reciprocal observation flights and is intended to promote transparency. So the United States was piloting it, but it's really important to note that there were many other countries involved. In fact we had Canada, Germany, France, the UK, Romania, and of course Ukraine all on board the plane, with 25 U.S. crew members. So I think this is another important to mention – how we're using an arms control mechanisms to increase transparency and show international support for Ukraine.

As I know, some countries have postponed or freezed some projects regarding the military assistance to Ukraine because of upcoming elections in Ukraine next year. Somehow want to wait until the results come in. Can you tell the position of Laura K. Cooper. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Russia, Ukraine, Eurasia. Prior assignments in the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy include: Director of the Strategy office, where she helped manage the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review; Acting Director for South Asia; and Afghanistan Team Chief, Stability Operations Office. Prior to joining the Department of Defense in 2001, Ms. Cooper was a policy planning officer at the State Department in the Office of Coordinator for Counterterrorism. She has also served as a Junior Fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Ms. Cooper has a Master of Science in Foreign Service degree from Georgetown University, a Master of Science in National Resource Strategy degree from the Industrial College of Armed Forces at National Defense University, and a Bachelor of Arts degree from Northwestern University.

DoD, of the United States, of that exist issue — so are you going to freeze or continue or wait until elections?

 I would say the United States is steady in its assistance to Ukraine, and we have been before the elections, we are during this period of time, and we will be after. One sign of that steady support in the security assistance domain is the fact that General Dayton, retired General Dayton who is also the director of the Marshall Center, visited last week in his new capacity as the Secretary of Defense's senior advisor for defense reform. He is replacing retired General Abizaid who had that role previously. So you can see we're maintaining the momentum even as General Abizaid moves on to a new assignment. Secretary Mattis has appointed General Dayton to be able to continue this very important defense reform work through this period of time. You know, you mentioned elections, and I think it's important also to note that the United States' interest in this election is just seeing a free and fair election. The United States has no particular candidate that it is advocating for, but we do want to see these democratic processes proceed.

> WE CONDEMN RUSSIA'S RECKLESS ACT OF AGGRESSION IN THE KERCH STRAIT, AND THAT WE CONTINUE TO COMMIT TO UKRAINE'S SOVEREIGNTY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY, EXTENDING INTO THE MARITIME DOMAIN

As the open sources shows, Russia is developing some new military units near Ukraine-Russia border, deploying more forces, and those forces are mostly attacking by nature. Does the U.S. regard this information while developing relationships between the United States and Ukraine?

- The United States is monitoring very closely the situation in Ukraine and the surrounding region and closely monitoring Russian activities globally. In terms of Ukraine and our approach to Ukraine's security assistance, it's a dynamic approach. So as Ukraine's security assistance needs evolve, as its capability needs evolve, we're taking that into account. And we're taking our cues from what the Government of Ukraine says it needs.

Do you have some signs or some information that the last attack in the Kerch Strait was pre-planned?

— I would just point to what Secretary Mattis said about the attack. He described it as a flagrant violation of international law, and a cavalier use of force. **■**

One more year down the tubes

What's causing the socioeconomic situation in occupied Donbas to get worse?

Denys Kazanskiy

2018 ended very much in a minor key for the militants in the Donbas. When asked by journalists when Russia would get around to recognizing the two "national republics," Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov made no bones about the fact that Moscow had no intention of recognizing DNR and LNR, let alone uniting them. This means that only two options remain for ORDiLO: to return to Ukraine or to continue to rot as unrecognized territories. The second option pretty well precludes any kind of growth or development.

THE SQUEEZING OF UKRAINIAN INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISES, THE LACK OF LAWS AND COURTS, THE RUPTURE OF ECONOMIC LINKS WITH OTHER REGIONS OF UKRAINE, THE POWERLESSNESS OF THE LOCAL POPULATION, AND THE VIOLENCE AGAINST ANY AND EVERY PERSON WHO DISAGREED WITH WHAT WAS GOING ON – ALL CONDEMNED ORDILO TO A SLOW BUT INEVITABLE EXTINCTION

Lavrov's unambiguous statement was no surprise. Similar statements have come from Moscow time and again in the last four years, so that far fewer people living in occupied Donbas believe that they will join Russia than did in 2014. But plenty still do. And for such naive individuals, the Kremlin's categorical position was a real slap in the face: unpleasant and offensive. So the supporters of the two republics are starting the new year with the unpleasant realization that nobody in Russia needs or wants them, and a "happy return to the family fold" like Crimea is not going to happen.

ORGANIZATIONAL CHAOS

As time goes on, the prospects for the two pseudo-republics to continue is becoming less and less appealing. In the second half of 2018, the economic situation in OR-DiLO grew noticeably worse. This was especially true in the territory controlled by DNR. After the assassination of separatist leader Oleksandr Zakharchenko and the sweeping out of his circle, control of Donetsk went to the Denys Pushylin group. However, these people proved even less capable of organizing than the Zakharchenko and Tymofeyev team. Even those aspects that seemed on track began to collapse. For instance, it came out very recently that the workers at Teplytsi Donbasu [Donbas Hothouses] simply "forgot" to collect the harvest and left everything rotting in the fields. That led to a shortage of vegetables in DNR and prices on what there is have started to climb.

Typically any economic problems in ORDiLO were blamed on dirty tricks played by Ukraine: everything was due to the economic blockade and military actions. But today the situation is so plain stupid that Ukrainians can no longer be blamed for it. Back in April 2018, the site of the "DNR Council of Ministers" claimed that Teplytsi Donbasu would provide 70-80% of all the vegetables for the "republic." In December, the same site announced the actual harvest figures.

"An inspection of the territory of the hothouse complex revealed that a majority of the vegetables were left in the fields and were no longer harvestable. About 2.8 hectares [7 acres] of sweet peppers remained unpicked, 2.0 hectares of green and rotunda bell peppers were not harvested, and 0.4 hectares of Chinese cabbage were unharvested. According to the confirmation of seeds and seeding materials used, the normal term for seeding Chinese cabbage was not adhered to. Despite good weather conditions, harvesting was not carried out in October. The result was that the cabbage froze and was attacked by pests. It is not suitable for sale to the public. The crop could have been more than 26 tonnes, although only 8.417 t was actually harvested according to data from DP Teplytsi Donbasu. Thus, the approximate volume of harvest that remains in the fields and could have all been sold on the republic's markets is 17.6 t," states the site.

Social nets are already full of jokes about how Denys Pushylin learned to shred cabbage at MMM [a notorious pyramidal scheme from the 1990s], not how to grow it, which is why he can't organize harvesting. In fact, the situation is anything but funny. If even the harvesting of vegetables remains an unresolved problem, what can be expected in more technical areas?

AMBITIOUS PROJECTS VAPORIZE AND LUHANSK LANGUISHES

There is little official information about industrial conditions in DNR, and they try not to advertise the size of the problem, so most of what can be picked up on the internet is rumor. For instance, the residents of Horlivka talk about the preservation of the Styrol chemical plant and layoffs. How true this information might be is not very clear, but the lack of positive news about work in Horlivka's main employer suggests that the situation is bad. Of course, DNR/LNR propaganda typically trumpets the least little success in every available source.

Other ambitious projects that were earlier hot topics on local media have also gone quiet. For instance, the "Donetskiy" tramway that Zakharchenko and Tymofeyev promised to organize the manufacture of in the city was quietly buried after Zakharchenko & Co. were removed. The only tram that was actually built turned out to be nothing more than a repaired old Czechoslovakian "Tatra." In the end, it didn't end up being launched on a run because of problems with the brakes and the local press is now forbidden to bring up this flop. Only anonymous bloggers dare to discuss it. "The first tram wasn't allowed to go into operation because it lacked brakes, the second one died at an even earlier stage and will probably never be assembled for lack of parts," was the explanation given for the sad fate of the Donetsk tramway by blogger Donetsk Aborigine on his telegram channel.

The real power in DNR occupied territory after the killing of Zakharchenko went to people who were once with Ukrainian oligarch Serhiy Kurchenko, meaning actually those who stood behind him. Today, he controls all the industry in ORDiLO through his company, Vneshtorgservis, meaning external trade services. After Zakharchenko was eliminated, the post of premier was established in DNR, and former Vneshtorgservis employee Oleksandr Ananchenko was appointed to the position. Ananchenko is now mainly in charge of the economy, while 37 yearold Pushylin is more of a figurehead. The real state of the economy in LNR is even less well known. Unlike Donetsk, there is no evidence of any kind of activity, even an underground opposition. Still, the occasional bit of information makes its way into the press. In November, the former Ukrainian MP and separatist Oleh Tsariov, who supports LNR and DNR, published a letter from LNR in his blog in which the anonymous author described the economic situation in the occupied part of Luhansk Oblast.

"People are tired of living in stress," writes the author of the letter from LNR. "We can't go to Russia, no one is recognizing the republics, salaries are tiny - a kindergarten minder gets RUB 3,000 a month (about US \$44), a top specialist in the municipal administration gets RUB 7,000, a tunnel engineer gets RUB 15-20,000, and an underground miner gets RUB 7-12,000 based on meeting target volumes. Meanwhile, prices are equal to or higher than in Rostov-on-Don, but salaries are not. Companies are scraping the bottom of the barrel. A lot of people are quitting and going where they can make more. That means illegal mines, where pay is RUB 1,500 a day or mines in Rostov Oblast, such as DTEK SU Obukhivska, where salaries start at RUB 40,000 (US \$570). Mines are sorely lacking tunnel engineers, electricians and miners and so they have to switch from four shifts to three or even two.'

MIGRATING EASTWARDS TO SURVIVE

The result of this economic decline has led to a crazy situation where some residents of ORDiLO are migrating to equally impoverished and unrecognized Abkhazia for work just to feed their families. A report on "gastarbeiters" from DNR and LNR was recently published in Russia's Komsomolskaya Pravda. People who went to Abkhazia to pick mandarins complained that they were being offered only RUB 5,000 a month in ORDiLO, while in Abkhazia heavy work paid as much as RUB 1,000 a day.

All these economic difficulties were compounded by a serious rise in food prices in the last month, moreover an increase that appears to have no objective basis. For instance, in some places 10 eggs cost as much as RUB 80 — expensive even by Kyiv standards, where 10 eggs cost UAH 27 at a supermarket and UAH 22-24 at an open market, which is RUB 56-61. Where do such high prices come from, given the miserably low wages in ORDiLO? No one has an answer. But the most popular guess is that the militants are taking "tribute" from wholesalers, taking advantage of the fact that locals have no rights and can't do anything to protest abuse.

Prices for poultry and vegetables have also skyrocketed and some have simply disappeared from store shelves,



Trams don't run here. Despite considerable hype, the "people's leaders" were unable to organize the operation of public transport in Donetsk or Luhansk

like it was in 2014 when the conflict in the Donbas disrupted supply chains. For instance, flour deliveries are being disrupted in Donetsk lately.

NOSTALGIA FOR THE DEAD STRONGMAN

All these problems have led supporters of DNR to gradually develop a nostalgic attitude towards Zakharchenko's "strong hand." Some residents of ORDiLO have even started writing in social nets that things were not so chaotic when he was around, that prices were stable, that vegetables weren't left to rot in the fields, and so on. Meanwhile, people have no respect for Russia's new point man, Denys Pushylin, and blame all their problems on his poor management.

Of course, it's clear that the roots of ORDiLO's problems are not in the person of the latest "Gauleiter," who is always restricted severely and forced to coordinate all his actions with the Kremlin, but in the situation that left parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast in the hands of the militants in the first place. That this territory would deteriorate and decline was obvious from the very start to anyone who had even a smattering of understanding of economics. And 2018 saw the continuation of the same negative processes that had been going on all the previous years since the territories were taken over by illegal armed groups. The squeezing of Ukrainian industrial enterprises, the lack of laws and courts, the rupture of economic links with other regions of Ukraine, the powerlessness of the local population, and the violence against any and every person who disagreed with what was going on - all condemned ORDiLO to a slow but inevitable extinction. And as long as the territories continue under the current conditions, things will only get worse.

Given all this, it's not hard to predict what will happen with the Donbas in 2019. If there is no progress in reintegrating it into Ukraine — and this depends in part on the results of the upcoming elections in Ukraine and a slew of external factors — ORDiLO's plunge into the abyss of neglect and impoverishment will continue. \blacksquare

A survival guide

What should Ukraine's policy priorities be for the next few years?

Maksym Vikhrov



Priorities. In the broader cultural sphere, Ukraine's main objective must be to provide the conditions necessary to promote ukrainianization

The war is slowly moving to the background for the majority of Ukrainians: in a Democratic Initiatives Foundation poll, 79% recently said that the biggest problem hampering economic growth this year was corruption, while 55% thought the war in the Donbas was. But the recent escalation around the Azov Sea suggests that the overall situation has not changed much since 2014. The main national priority remains withstanding Russian aggression: defending the country borders, reinforcing its defensive capabilities, liberating Crimea and the Donbas from occupation, and getting the release of Ukrainian hostages.

Nevertheless, internal weaknesses continue to pose an equally serious challenge for Ukraine's survival as a state. Although the Constitution declares Ukraine a "unitary and relatively centralized state," in practice its integrity as a sate depends very much on a shaky consensus between Kyiv and regional elites. This was made clear, not for the first time, with the "open season" against civic activists that wept the country's southern oblasts this past year. The sad thing is that this was not a series of precedents but simply the latest symptom of a chronic illness in Ukraine. Lacing both force and political will, every new central government establishes a tacit agreement with local princelings, "buying" their superficial loyalty in exchange o not interfering, in part or altogether, in local politics.

How this is linked to national security was beautifully illustrated in the history of the Donetsk "clan." By offering them grandiose economic concessions and encouraging a sense of total political impunity, including for their separatist blackmail, Kyiv ended up with a ravished region. Of course, that doesn't at all mean that a Donetsk-like separatist scenario threatens every region in Ukraine, but the political wisdom of local leaders should not be taken for granted. Given that some of the country's western neighbors are not only developing "special" relations with different oblasts but are also probing Kyiv's response to external interference. The situation with Hungary was a classic example.

Still, threats to national unity are not coming only from outside. For instance, the illegal extraction of amber in Volyn, which the president promised publicly to stop by "eliminating their protection" back in the summer of 2015, but nothing has happened. What's more, even without army supply stores or "wandering tourists" from Russia, the miners have openly resisted law enforcement efforts for years, clashing with the police, trashing their cars and blocking roadways. The economic and environmental damage that these and other illegal industries are costing the country are nothing compared to the degree to which they are undermining its statehood, simply because this kind of situation shows just how little of a monopoly on power the government really has and changing this situation is not just a question of politics but also of national security in the deepest sense.

Maintaining the current foreign policy course is also a key security issue. Today, more than 50% of Ukrainians support it, while those who favor some kind of union under Russia have steadily shrunk to 11% now. However, the proportion of Ukrainians who would prefer to see the country geopolitically "neutral" is quite substantial, at over 32%. The proportion of those who don't see any benefits from Eurointegration grew from 22% in 2015 to 26% by the end of 2016, based on DIF polls. It's clear that work on public perceptions needs to continue.

To protect the country from a possible comeback of destructive forces, enshrining the country's course towards Europe and NATO at the constitutional level makes a lot of sense. At the same time, the country's leadership and citizens need to prepare themselves for the possibility that, as relations with the EU tighten, relations with individual EU member countries could also become more difficult. The example of Hungary is just one such case. In other words, Ukraine's leadership needs to learn not only how to resist Russia, but also how to establish boundaries in interactions with the West. Ukraine's unalterable cultural "genes" may establish its civilizational place in Europe, but relations with the EU need to be pragmatic. For one thing, the EU does not equal all of Europe, but is just the latest format for cohabitation among European nations – moreover one that is neither all-encompassing nor without its flaws. Finding a balance between the desire for unification – and de facto dependence – and a healthy form of national self-interest will be anything but easy.

As to the socio-political arena, ridding the country of oligarchic misrule remains on the agenda — getting Big Business, with its penchant for using leverage with the Government in order to engage in systematic corrupt and gain access to sectors that offer lucrative rents, out of government. Moreover, the issue is not just overcoming corruption but national security as well. It's enough to remember just how significant a role the country's oligarchs played in the crises of 2014. Until Moscow launched its violent plan to rob Ukraine and destroy its economy, most of them did absolutely nothing to stop Russia's "soft occupation" and were quite happy to live in the aura of Russki Mir.

That year also revealed the problems that had been accumulating in the lower reaches of Ukrainian society. It's no secret that Russia found the main support for its hybrid aggression among the Ukrainian masses that clumped together during the "Russian spring" and were happy to become cannon fodder for a "separatist insurrection." In contrast to reassuring stereotypes, lumpenization is a problem, not only in the depressed parts of the Donbas but across the entire country. The disaffected, marginalized, poor and largely unemployed, even though able-bodied layer of Ukrainians is a social bomb that potentially threatens Ukraine's survival no less than GRADs in Donetsk.

There's a good reason why the middle class is considered the foundation of stability and democracy in a society. But the lumpen, with its low standard of living, education and overall culture, is the target audience of destructive forces both within and outside the country, ranging from the criminal subculture and sects, and ending with terrorist organization and radical populist movements. To delumpenize Ukraine requires comprehensive reforms that are rooted in overcoming poverty by increasing employment rates and education levels — not by mechanically inflating public spending on welfare.

Still, providing the conditions for the middle class to grow stronger and larger is not enough. The broadest spectrum of Ukrainians needs to also be engaged in governing the country. This will foster both a stronger civil society as a counterweight to oligarchs, and the consolidation of a civil community as a counterweight to an atomized and asocial lumpen. Fortunately, civil society organizations enjoy substantial public trust, but only about 7% of Ukrainians are engaged in community action, according to a DIF poll. This is why decentralization needs to be completed as soon as possible so that millions of ordinary Ukrainians will experience grassroots democracy and learn how to organize and govern themselves.

In the cultural sphere, in the broadest sense of the word, Ukraine's main objective should be to provide the conditions necessary to promote ukrainianization. Government funding of film-making, the establishment of the Ukrainian Cultural Foundation and the Ukrainian Institute are steps in the right direction that have already brought positive results. In addition to such specific steps in specific areas, there need to be systemic changes in the country's leading institutions that will ensure that the national culture will be spread and develop, especially in education. Some shifts have already taken place: a new law on education was passed, education reform has been launched, the Kivalov-Kolesnichenko law on regional languages has been rescinded, and so on. A timely bill "On ensuring the functioning of Ukrainian as the state language" has already passed first reading in the Verkhovna Rada.

THERE'S A GOOD REASON WHY THE MIDDLE CLASS IS CONSIDERED THE FOUNDATION OF STABILITY AND DEMOCRACY IN A SOCIETY. BUT THE LUMPEN, WITH ITS LOW STANDARD OF LIVING, EDUCATION AND OVERALL CULTURE, IS THE TARGET AUDIENCE OF DESTRUCTIVE FORCES BOTH WITHIN AND OUTSIDE THE COUNTRY

However, the history of independent Ukraine has shown that passing a law and ensuring that it is actually upheld are two very different things, especially with the issue of language. To ensure that the formal status of Ukrainian is supported by substance requires consolidated effort on the part of the political class, public institutions and civil society. The same is true of educational reforms. Although the New Ukrainian School has been launched for public schools, reforming technical-vocational education and launching the National Agency for Quality Post-Secondary Education are still waiting. It's quite likely that these, too, won't happen without public pressure.

Of course, the list of tasks in both culture and other spheres is far longer. The national agenda needs to be shaped through broad-based public debate, become mandatory in political platforms and government programs, and be implemented through the consolidated effort of the entire society. In practice, however, things don't go quite like this and sometimes not at all like this. The political class does one thing, the intellectuals and opinion-leaders something else, and broader society wants something altogether different. Still, given the limited resources, time and space for maneuvering, coordinated efforts to embody the nation's priorities are not an idealistic whim but the guarantee that Ukraine can survive as a nation and a state.

The year of grants

What are the prospects for the sciences in Ukraine in 2019?

Oleh Feya

The big deal coming up for science administration in Ukraine is the launch of the National Research Foundation (NRF), an agency that is supposed to issue grant money transparently. The hope is that it will counter the brain drain from the sciences and raise the quality of research. However, the launch is already facing some hurdles.

An independent European audit of Ukraine's research infrastructure carried out under the Horizon 2020 program showed that lack of funding is the key issue that underlies all the other problems facing the country: outdated research facilities, low salaries for scientists, and the brain drain from the country's scientific ranks. Nor will 2019 turn out to be the breakthrough year as far as funding is concerned. For one thing, funding for the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) is being pegged at UAH 4.6bn — as much as has been earmarked for the Central Electoral Commission. The Law "On science and scientific and technological activities" states that funding allocated to the sciences should be at least 1.7% of GDP. Right now, it's 0.27%.

THE SYSTEM WHERE SCIENTISTS ADVISE THE GOVERNMENT HAS PROVED EXCELLENT IN EUROPE

> In 2019, on the other hand, the National Council for the Development of Science and Technology is expected to start functioning fully, together with the NRF. The National Council was set up back in 2017, in accordance with Art. 20 of the law on science, as an advisory body under the Cabinet of Ministers and directed by the Premier's Office. It includes world-class academics with a high reputation and it is expected to advise the government on the development of science in the country. The administrative committee includes the education minister, other ministers, officials from oblast state administrations, and the rectors of leading post-secondary institutions. The Council is to meet at least once every quarter but so far it has only convened once, in January 2018.

The 2019 Budget provides only UAH 509,000 for this body to operate, which is very little.

"The system where scientists advise the government has proved excellent in Europe, for example," explains Yulia Bezvershenko, deputy chair of the Council of Young Scientists at the NAS. "That's why we saw the National Council as primarily an advisory body that provides a platform for scientists, profile ministries and business to discuss the development of science and its role in the country's well-being as equals. When the Council got together in January, the premier tried made it very clear that he wanted to take on the political leadership in reforming science. Everything looked pretty good. But now it's been almost a year and there's no dialog at all. The science committee cannot present its accomplishments and propositions to speed up the founding of the National Foundation itself."

Bezvershenko says that the Council needs funding, regardless of the fact that the scientists in it work on a voluntary basis. The money needs to go to set up an analytical department to collect data about Ukraine's science system.

"This unit would work over the data that would then be audited by the science committee, discussed with government officials and provide the foundation for real policy," says Bezvershenko. "Scientific statistics are at a very low level here and they need to be handled by professionals. Not long ago, the CEDOS think-tank undertook a study among some of the country's best educational institutions. It turned out that the quality of the work of the Academy of Teaching Sciences is under considerable question. This is the kind of work the analytical unit under the National Council should be doing: collecting statistics and analyzing them. Only when we have the right information will it be possible to make policy decisions that are appropriate and well-reasoned. And so funding needs to be provided to set up such a service. Without it, the science committee will do a lot less than it could and should. It was hard to explain the need for this funding. What's worse, committee members from outside Kyiv were not paid back for their travel to Kyiv, although this is required by law.'

On July 4, the Government established the National Research Foundation and it will begin issuing grant in the new year. Of the minimal budget of UAH 300mn requested, the NRF received only UAH 262mn. Even its legal status is still in the air: the Cabinet is in no hurry to confirm an interim head for the Foundation, and without a director the institution cannot be registered as a legal entity. This has already cost the Foundation its status as the main manager of budget funds. Right now, the NRF remains under a ministry, which violates both the Law "On scientific and science and scientific and technological activities" and the very notion of the Foundation as independent agency that is equidistant from all players in science.

'At one point, there was talk of UAH 1 billion, but UAH 262mn is not bad for a start," says Stanislav Vilchynskiy, a PhD in physics and maths who was selected to the NRF's Science Board. "The State Basic Research Foundation is a department under the Ministry of Education and Science that already exists today and has a budget that is considerably smaller. I get the impression that Groisman is putting a lot of hope in the Foundation and understands how important it is, but there are people in the Ministry who are resisting this. The first signal should go from the National Council, which also includes officials from MES. My personal opinion is that they have been deliberately protracting the registration of the Foundation. I have good reason to believe that those running the current State Foundation, which will cease to exist the minute the NRF is registered, are doing everything they can to prevent this from happening.'

The Foundation has three sections: 14 researchers in mathematics and natural sciences, 9 researchers in biology,



Young scientists are supposed to receive UAH 1 billion through a presidential fund

VINNYTSIA NATIONAL TECHNICAL UNI

medicine and agronomy, and 7 researchers in the humanities. All told, the Science Board includes 30 scientists.

"The members of the Science Board of the NRF were selected on September 16, with more than 5 individuals competing for each spot in all the sections," explains Vilchynskiy. "However, the documents approving the members of the council have been sitting on Ms. Hrynevych's desk ever since [Liliva Hrvnevych, Minister of Education and Science]. As soon as the Science Board is legally formalized, we will elect a head and heads of each of the sections. After that, we will hold a competition to select an executive director for the NRF, hire a staff of 60, and begin holding competitions for grants as soon as the budget money is in the Foundation's account.

'Once the Foundation is registered, it will become completely independent structurally from MES," Vilchynskiy continues. "But for this to all work properly, the ministry needs to also prepare a request to the Cabinet to appoint an acting director of the NRF who will, in accordance with the law, carry out the registration. This seems to be the point that MES is being openly dilatory over, and the impression is that it will continue to do so until mid-2019. The point is that, until the NRF is officially registered, its budget for 2019 – UAH 262mn - will be sitting in the ministry's account. If the Foundation is not registered, the money will continue to sit there, with all the possible consequences and prospects."

According to Vilchynskiy, the projects that the Foundation will issue grants to will have to meet the highest European standards, as the minimum grant will be UAH 1 million for 12 months. Every project will be independently and transparently vetted by experts and the members of the Science Board will provide support for both fundamental research, such as natural and technical sciences, and applied research.

'We will be especially working to foster research by young academics, as one of the purposes of the Foundation is to stop the brain drain by offering talented researchers the conditions for normal work," says Vilchynskiy. "I've had many opportunities to talk with young researchers who are working abroad. Many of them would like to return but Ukraine doesn't currently offer the kinds of opportunities and funding that they need. I'm hoping that the NRF will be able to do this, even if only for a limited number of young scientists - provided that it gets up and running.'

Meanwhile, President Poroshenko approved the decision to establish a fund worth UAH 1 billion to support young people, master's degree holders, post-graduates, and PhD students. The assumption is that it will start working in 2018 as well, although how it's supposed to work isn't clear yet. Altogether, the hope is that, starting in 2019, Ukraine will finally have a system to properly fund scientific projects through grants.

The politics of fury

Philippe de Lara, Paris

The "Yellow Vests" movement was unexpected. It started as a spontaneous discontent triggered by a new tax on fuel. Various fears and resentments suddenly converged on a series of disparate social demands cemented by distrust against Emmanuel Macron, "the president of the wealthy". At first sight, it looked like usual French politics. Since 1995, all French presidents (J. Chirac, N. Sarkozy, F. Hollande) endured a dramatic drop of their popularity within 6 months after election. Their reforms were wrecked by leftist social movements, inner division of their majority in Parliament... and bad luck, that is depressed economic conditions. After his unexpected election, Macron seemed in a better position than his predecessors: had he not put an end to the rise of populism in Europe? Had he not a clear mandate and the means and energy to implement his program of reforms? With him, not only France but EU had recovered a strong leadership. 18 months later Macron faces not only a violent rejection of his policies, but an even more violent rejection of his person. "Macron get out!" was the main slogan of "Yellow Vests".

PUBLICLY, "YELLOW VESTS" STAY "APOLITICAL" AND AVOID THE DIVISIVE POSITIONS OF THEIR AGENDA, BUT ON FACEBOOK THEY ENDLESSLY REPEAT THEIR HOSTILITY TO EU, EVEN PROMOTING A "FREXIT", AND GIVE WAY WITHOUT SECOND THOUGHT THE MOST EXTREME CLICHÉS. PUTIN COULD NOT HAVE DREAMT BETTER

Despite the weakening of the movement and 10,3 billions € of welfare expenditure, jeopardizing the economic recovery of France and of the Eurozone, disorders and urban violence are persisting. The president and beyond him every politician and any mode of political representation are targeted ever more aggressively. "Yellow Vests" claim to be the people, they express its will directly. For them, only such a filterless expression is legitimate. Their anger is so deep that it is not negotiable and does not need further justification. Repeated declarations of Macron and his ministers acknowledging "your anger is right" have no effect.

Before the violent demonstration of December 1st on the Champs Elysées, one could wonder about the nature of the movement, given its spontaneous and "apolitical" appearance. Media were complacent, intellectuals divided: was it a democratic insurrection against oligarchy or a populist revolt eyeing to authoritarianism? a protest of the poorest people against growing inequalities, or of neglected rural territories against "wired" cities ? the last battle of endangered professions and regions unable to find their place in the new digital and robotic economy? a concern about the most painful reforms to come, notably on pensions? Such social and political factors may play, but there is more, and unfortunately it is not reassuring.

First, urban violence, insults, vandalism are not collateral damages of a peaceful mobilization. "Yellow Vests" leaders cynically admits the fact: "We firmly condemn violence, but we have to admit that it is efficient". Indeed, violence was instrumental in the retreat of the government. Instead of organizing and channelling their demonstrations, they stick to a strategy of unpredictable gatherings and do nothing to help the police in preventing vandalism and violence. By the way, such a guerrilla strategy is by no means spontaneous, it requires careful organization. Actually, after six weeks, the spontaneity of the movement, maybe genuine at the beginning, has become a myth: leaders and spokesmen emerged on Facebook, they have the same talking points, including the insistence on the "horizontality" of a movement without leaders, and the denial of their own accountability: "I speak only for myself, others may think differently, and I will follow them". "I am satisfied with the measures announced by the government, but since my fellowmen aren't etc."

French "Yellow Vest" protests shake loose EU

Second, anger against Macron evolved in a watchword overshadowing all other demands: the "Citizen's Initiative Referendum". It sounds like participative democracy, but it is not: the main point of this referendum is not policy issues but the revocation of elected representatives. "Yellow Vests" want the referendum to be free from any legal or constitutional checking (for instance if it contradicts human rights or international obligations). It is not meant to empower civil society, but to give unlimited force to individual resentment. Publicly, "Yellow Vests" stay "apolitical" and avoid the divisive positions of their agenda, but on Facebook they endlessly repeat their hostility to EU, even promoting a "Frexit", and give way without second thought the most extreme clichés against Jews, Migrants, George Soros, Free Masons, homosexuals, etc. Putin could not have dreamt better. Behind the "right anger", fake news, conspiracy theories flourish, spread by overexcited social networks, with the help of Russian disinformation which created hundreds of fake "Yellow Vests" profiles on Facebook.

Last, populism goes along with distrust of media and elites ("them") and credulity to any hoax circulating on Facebook ("we"). Belief in conspiracy theories was already high in France like everywhere in Europe (see my article "Europe in wightlessness" in May 2018). The "Yellow Vests" movement brought it to Russian heights. The burglars who trashed the Arc de Triomphe and plundered luxury boutiques were in fact agitators hired by Macron, some of them were even policemen. Immediately after the attack in Strasbourg on December 11th, "Yellow Vests" leaders declared that it was in fact a plot staged by Macron to weaken the movement. Even after it was established that it was a terrorist attack, which killed 5 people, many "Yellow Vests" stuck to some conspiracy theory ("a highly suspicious coincidence").

"Anger" was from start the key word of the movement, but "rage" is more adequate, because anger is an articulate motive against something, calling for compensations etc.,



Unjustified cruelty. Allegedly apolitical "Yellow Vest" protesters staged President Emmanuel Macron's mock beheading

while fury is a blind emotion calling for revenge or scapegoating. "Civil war is inevitable" declared Christophe Chalençon on Christmas eve, supposedly a moderate leader of 'Yellow Vests"! How Macron came to raise such hatred? He made mistakes, he was sometimes arrogant or casual, but far less than his predecessors, he made a lot of reforms at high speed, at the risk of frightening the people, but he followed scrupulously his program. Admittedly, this program revealed inconsistencies, reducing fiscal pressure on wages and business on one hand, creating new taxes on the other. Now, all this can explain unpopularity, not hatred. On December 22th, some "Yellow Vests" staged a fake public trial of Macron in a stadium, ending with the decapitation amid applause of a dummy featuring the president (see picture). Explanations lie in French politics, but also in global trends. Macron concentrates criticism because there is no political alternative in France. The political system collapsed in 2017, and no recomposition followed. Rather the two government parties declined further, meanwhile the neo-communist party La France Insoumise (LFI) failed to become the main opposition force, despite (or because of) the ambition of its charismatic leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon. Even Macron's new born party still do not exist on its own, neither in Parliament nor in the public debate. Therefore, the president is responsible for everything.

The Far Right is the only party which survived on the ruins of the party system, and the only one benefiting from the "Yellow Vests" movement: Far Right voting intentions at the European elections (in May 2019) had reached already 26% in September (against 20% for Macron's party, LREM). In December, thanks to the movement, Far Right jumps at 32%, while LREM is at 19%. But Far Right is not credible because it has nothing to offer, except leaving EU and the Eurozone, a perspective rejected even by those who are mad against "Brussels". Marine Le Pen rakes support among "Yellow Vests" without saying much. 18 months after her pathetic performance at the presidential election, she is back in the game and just has to whisper the operative word: "Yellow Vests" are "the Forgotten". Meanwhile the vocal support of LFI brings it nothing despite the inflammatory declaration of its leaders (it is worth quoting François Ruffin, a LFI's MP who declared in front of the presidency: "The president and no one else is slashing and burning our country, tearing apart our republic, M. Macron must go now, either by car, helicopter or scooter, he must go before our people become mad of rage").

Once a defence and hope against the dismantling of liberal democracy by Trump and Putin, Macron's presidency leads into the trumpization of French society. The Constitution gives him time and stability until 2022, and he may have the historical dimension required to bounce back. But the politics of fury he is facing is not only French. From Washington to Warsaw, from Rome to Prague and Budapest, liberal democracy is threatened to death from the inside, to the satisfaction of the Kremlin. It is properly a tragedy: The politics of fury pretends to give power back to the nations, but its success would leave them powerless and precipitate what it wants to fight. However weak and unable to cope with the stakes and perils of the world, EU is the only shield of political freedom and safety for European nations. But unlike the French presidency, UE is vulnerable to coming elections. The outcome of a majority of populist anti-European parties in the European Parliament could be a collapse of the Union. I can only find a twisted and tiny hope in the possibility for Macron to get in 2019, thanks to the fear provoked by the "Yellow Vests", the authority in Europe he did not get by his ambitious propositions in 2017.

Chain reaction

Social and political implications of the emergence of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church

Maksym Vikhrov



An amazing transformation. President Poroshenko was an advocateand lobbyist of Moscow Orthodoxy and now he's turned into an advocateand lobbyist of a tomos and an independent church

Creation of an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church is the aftermath of the systematic developments within eastern orthodox Christianity in Ukraine. The recent announcement of autocephaly, or simply tomos, as it is known in Ukraine, has merely legitimised social and religious reality, which emerged as a result of complex historical events. Without doubt, the importance of the decision of Bartholomew, patriarch of Constantinople, for the religious affairs in Ukraine will be enormous. Its implications will, however, be much broader and will affect not only social, political, cultural spheres, but even, perhaps, the state security. Ukraine is a modern secular state, and yet religion and the Church play an important role in the life of the ordinary citizens — nearly 72% of Ukrainians consider themselves religious.

Proportion of those, who received moderately religious upbringing is steadily increasing — while in 2000 only 31% of Ukrainians claimed they were brought up in accordance with their 'faith', this number rose to 40% in 2018. Surely, one can easily question the actual religiosity of Ukrainians. The number of people who routinely attend the mass is slightly lower than those, who declared themselves 'religious' - 52% and 72% respectively. Some 24% of Ukrainians attend the mass at least once a week, while 21% reported they only go to church once a month (Razumkov Center, 2018). It is worth mentioning that as of September this year nearly 71.5% of Ukrainians indicated that they did not know what tomos was (KMIC, 2018). Nevertheless, the Church alongside the army and the voluntary movement remains one of the few social institutions, which are largely trusted by the population (61%, 57% and 65% respectively) (Razumkov Center, 2018). Unsurprisingly, any major developments in the church affairs would have some inevitable repercussions for the entire country.

In this particular case, the nature of these repercussions will be determined by Russia's reaction and shifts It is worth mentioning that as of September this year nearly **71.5%** of Ukrainians indicated that they did not know what tomos was (KMIC, 2018). Nevertheless, the Church alongside the army and the voluntary movement remains one of the few social institutions, which are largely trusted by the population **(61%, 57% and 65%** respectively) (Razumkov Center, 2018)

in Russia's strategy in its 'hybrid war' against Ukraine. rather than creation of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church itself. Over the past couple of months Moscow (or, in other words, Russian Orthodox Church's authorities) has proven that it prefers escalation of the conflict to tactical compromises. Perhaps the reason behind it may be the amount time and efforts Russia has spent mentoring Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) to become a sole player in Ukrainian religious life. Needless to say, local Ukrainian pro-Russian elites happily embraced this initiative. During the presidency of Yanukovych, UOC MP has been given an unofficial status of 'state church', which, fortunately, has never become a written law, but has nevertheless been condoned by giving privileges on more than one occasion.

Currently it is not unlikely that UOC MP will seek to destabilise situation in Ukraine. Being unable to pull Ukrainian Orthodox Church back into the Russkiv Mir sphere of influence, UOC MP will probably attempt to prevent Ukraine from moving away from Russia. Providing UOC MP becomes radicalised, there is a real possibility that this church will be headed by forces favouring 'great Russian' chauvinism fitted into the framework of outdated Russian love of Tsar, absurd fear of state-issued biometric IDs and other rather bizarre notions. This will ensure that the faithful flock stay loyal and ready to follow UOC MP's leaders in any of their risky political endeavours. In fact, it has been a while since UOC MP has been gearing its churchgoers up for an upcoming 'persecution' by the 'filaretists', as they liked to call Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP). Pro-Russian politicians in Ukraine have immediately backed these fears — in July 2018 Volodymyr Novynskyy, Ukrainian MP of the 'Opposition Block' (which mostly consists of the former members of the Party of Regions) claimed that if Ukraine eventually receives tomos it will lead to a religious war in the country.

It is unclear whether any mass protests will occur as a result of Istanbul's October decision, but, understandably, this option should not be dismissed. If this happens, Moscow will have a picturesque proof of 'religious persecution in Ukraine' in its hands, which will be promptly used in order to slander Ukraine in front of its western allies, strengthen anti-Ukrainian sentiments in Russia and legitimise Putin's role not only as a 'unifier of the Russian historical territories', but also as a 'saviour of the canonical Orthodox Christian faith'.

However, should this happen, it will only further marginalise the role of UOC MP. UOC MP's influence has already been decreasing. From 2008 until 2018 the number of Ukrainians, who stated that they attend churches led by UOC KP has been on increase, rising from 12% to 29%. Meanwhile, the number of Ukrainian adherents of UOC MP reached its height in 2010 rising **P**

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to 23.6%, and then fell to its current 13%. In the aforementioned period the number of people, who declared themselves as 'simply orthodox', not specifying whether they attend UOC MP or UOC KP, decreased from 38.6% to 23.4% (Razumkov Center). This process has accelerated after 2014, when Moscow began using UOC MP to justify its military aggression against Ukraine. Occupation of Ukrainian territories has also partially affected statistical data, however Ukrainian Ministry of Culture reported that nearly 120 religious congregations have already left UOC MP. Religious Information Service of Ukraine reported slightly lower quote of 70 congregations, however, the sole fact, that UOC MP is losing its parishioners, remains unchallenged. Now, after establishment of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, this tendency will likely continue and as a result UOC MP's influence will be limited to a local level in southern and eastern regions.

AFTER ESTABLISHMENT OF INDEPENDENT UKRAINIAN ORTHODOX CHURCH, THE SWEEPING DE-RUSSIFICATION OF UKRAINIAN RELIGIOUS SPACE MAY POTENTIALLY ACCELERATE. IN A SHORT-TERM PERSPECTIVE, IT MAY LEAD TO INTER-CHURCH AND CIVIL CONFLICTS, WHICH WILL IN TURN BECOME ANOTHER ELEMENT IN RUSSIA'S HYBRID WAR AGAINST UKRAINE

At the same time, Moscow's bitter reaction to creation of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church has, in fact, assisted Ukraine in its efforts to eradicate local structures of 'Russian world' in the country, which were linked to UOC MP in one way or another. These include highly branched out network of pro-Russian institutions affiliated with UOC MP, be it voluntary civil organisations or paramilitary units, which were operating disguised as private security firms.

The well-known incident, that took place in January this year, when members of the "Orthodox Union Radomyr" [Affiliated with UOC MP - Ed.] assaulted civil activists from Zaporizhzhya, seems to only prove the facts mentioned above. After Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) raided and searched the premises of "Orthodox Union Radomyr", authorities discovered that this organisation had at its disposal not only propagandist Russian materials, but also firearms and other weapons. Few years back, when UOC MP still maintained its privileges and had an influential lobby in the previous Ukrainian government, such searches and security measures were understandably unrealistic. But presently SBU can even choose to work directly with priests. For example, in early December this year twelve priests were summoned for questioning in Rivne. Furthermore, Ukrainian state could even consider taking certain strategic steps that would ultimately lead to an outright abolition of UOC MP in Ukraine. For instance, in November Ministry of Justice of Ukraine invalidated the previous transfer of Pochayiv Lavra to UOC MP. Pochayiv Lavra, a historic church complex in the west of Ukraine, has been righteously believed by many to be the stronghold of Russian influence in the Ukrainian region of Galychyna. As it happens, the government's has been well-grounded indeed - in 2015 journalists gathered an evidence that Pochayiv Lavra's priests have been selling and printing pro-Russian propaganda.

Hence, after establishment of independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the sweeping de-russification of Ukrainian religious space may potentially accelerate. In a short-term perspective, it may lead to inter-church and civil conflicts, which will in turn become another element in Russia's hybrid war against Ukraine. It is very likely that before the year ends, Russian media will start circulating frightening fakes, albeit this time instead of 'crucified boys' Russian news channels will probably feature monks or priests. It is unlikely that Moscow will succeed in its efforts to convince the West in the existence of Ukrainian 'religious war', just as it had previously failed to force on its theory of 'civil war' in Ukraine. In fact, tomos has been as essential for Ukraine's efforts to preserve its Orthodox Church from Russian interference, as the fall of Yanukovych. Moscow may and will cause a lot of troubles using UOC MP as its tool in Ukraine, however from the historic point of view, for Russia it is currently too late to lock the stable-door when the horse has bolted. The more aggressive Russia becomes in its efforts to lock the stable-door, the quicker UOC MP will become a radical, but largely marginalised opposition to an independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church. Additionally, now that the canonical status of UOC MP is rather ambiguous, its political toxicity will increase proportionally to its radicalisation. Ukrainian politicians, undeniably, are not particularly picky in their choices, but after a while public manifestation of 'friendship' with UOC MP will do more harm than good.

Nonetheless, this does not mean that the future of the independent church is set, and it's even less likely that it will be painless. The new church will have to compete for approval and acceptance among Ukrainian orthodox churchgoers. Most importantly, independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church will have to prove to society that its establishment wasn't just a simple political move on the eve of elections, an empty formality or a consequence of perplexing geopolitical games. Why? Because in October this year 54% of Ukrainians reacted positively to the creation of an independent church, while only 19% said it was a negative development, and 19% of respondents did not care (Sociological group 'Rating', 2018). And this result can equally be improved or impaired. Undoubtedly, more than few Ukrainian politicians may attempt to compensate their volatile popularity at the expense of the new church. However, Ukrainian society will hardly accept it if the distance between the state and the Church suddenly shrinks. Only 34% of Ukrainians support the idea of 'national orientation' for the church, and only 47% out of the UOC KP churchgoers supported this thesis. Furthermore, barely 12% of Ukrainians endorsed the possibility of the formation of 'state Church' (Razumkov Center, 2018). And yet, to gain a social popularity it won't be enough to keep the distance with the state. The popularity has to be earned. While 61% of Ukrainians trust the Church, only 45% of those, who responded, agreed that it has a moral authority in society. Over the past eight years this number has fallen by 11% (Razumkov Center, 2018). It will also be hardly possible to retain the popularity based on historic victory over UOC MP or using the patriotic rhetoric. Success of the independent Ukrainian Orthodox Church will rest on its ability to respond to changes and improve its communication with various social groups. However, this depends on whether authorities of the new church will go along with their historical mission and whether they are willing to implement it.





Nuclear arms in the hands of Russian leaders

The missile rhetoric from Stalin to Putin

Stanislav Kulchytskiy



The early dialogues. Khrushchev and Kennedy talks led to the conclusion of the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water in 1963

Politicians and pundits across the world are looking wearily at the causes and possible implications of America's withdrawal from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty signed in December 1987 with the Soviet Union. A historian's voice will be helpful in this context. As we look at the approach of Russian leaders, from Joseph Stalin to Vladimir Putin, to nuclear missiles, we can see the conclusions that will help us to understand the present situation better.

STALIN'S LEGACY

In August 1945, before the end of World War II, a committee on the development of nuclear weapons was established in Moscow. It reported to Joseph Stalin directly. In the spring of 1946, a similar body was launched to coordinate the development of missile equipment. In June 1947, the third committee emerged with a similar status. It worked on developing air and missile defence systems. Their demands were binding for ministries, government bodies, academic institutions and construction enterprises that employed millions of workers, engineers, civilian and military officials. While the rest of the country was struggling amidst the post-war devastations, these committees faced no material or financial limits.

The results of their work were quick to arrive. In 1949, the Soviet Union tested a nuclear bomb. In 1953. it tested a thermonuclear bomb. The Soviet army enrolled the first complex equipped with the R-1 missile (range of 270km) in November 1950. A powerful ballistic missile plant was built in what had then been Dnipropetrovsk and is now Dnipro. Stalin did not get a chance to apply the nuclear missiles his country was developing for his geopolitical purposes. In March 1953, a dozen actors from his closest group ascended to power, while in June 1957, Nikita Khrushchev tried walking in Stalin's shoes.

A SUPERBOMBMAN

In May 1954, the Soviet government decided to develop a missile to take a manmade satellite to the Space based on a report by scientist Sergei Korolev. The actual goal of this task was far from space exploration. Instead, the government decision spoke of the ability to "ensure that strategic targets can be hit in any military-geographic area of the globe."

In October 1957, the Soviet Union launched the first satellite, while on April 12, 1961, Yuri Gagarin went on the first flight to Space. Agitation departments in the party committees of all scales presented this as evidence of what socialism was able to accomplish, how the Americans lagged in the space race, and how the decay of the capitalistic economy was to blame. Meanwhile, Khrushchev used these accomplishments to back his foreign policy assaults. After German Titov, the Soviet Union's second astronaut, returned from Space, Khrushchev said at a reception in the Kremlin in August 1961 that "We don't have bombs of 50 or 100 megatons, but we have a bomb of over 100 megatons. We sent Gagarin and Titov to Space, but we can replace them with other load and send it anywhere on Earth." As he met every astronaut returning to Earth with celebrations, the First Secretary of the Communist Party Central Committee saw a superbomb rather than a human in them.

The construction of ballistic missiles in Dnipro was put on an industrial scale. In December 1959, the Strategic Missile Army was established and equipped with R-12 missiles designed by Mikhail Yangel. They could be permanently combatready in the shafts protected from air strikes.

"TRAIN THE POPULATION TO EXPECT A NUCLEAR WAR"

Starting from the mid-1950s, Soviet leaders began to establish personal contacts with the leaders of western countries. It created an illusion of the Kremlin's dynamic foreign-policv course but did not deliver significant results. The first ever visit of a Soviet leader to the US in September 1959 was fruitless. Khrushchev's meeting with John F. Kennedy in June 1961 in Vienna was a failure too. The minutes published after the meeting showed that the Soviet leader adopted quite an aggressive tone in his conversation with the young American president. The dialogue mostly focused on the German issue. Khrushchev claimed that he would sign a peace treaty with the German Democratic Republic unilaterally. This would mean that the Americans would no longer have access to West Berlin. At the same time, Khrushchev suggested that western leaders would not risk starting a war over this. As

he claimed that the Soviet Union would not start one (after the Americans lose access to West Berlin), Khrushchev added with a note of demagoguery

that "If you start a war over Berlin, it's better that it happens now than later when more terrifying weapons emerge."

placed the responsibil-This ity for difficult decisions on the US president. The Soviets expected Americans to tie the president's arms out of fear. Nothing of the sort could happen in the Soviet Union. Khrushchev viewed Soviet people as the population rather than as citizens. The protocol of the Communist Party Central Committee presidium meeting on July 1, 1962, has a section On Berlin. The attendees, including Khrushchev, Mikovan, Gromyko, Kosygin, Brezhnev, Suslov and Ponomariov, were analysing ways to squeeze the troops of western countries out of West Berlin and the West's possible reaction to those actions. "Train the population to expect a nuclear war" was the short sentence summing up the discussion.

This shows that Khrushchev saw the use of nuclear missiles as a possible option. The scary sentence in the meeting protocol confirmed that intention. In this case, it was not Khrushchev's intent to blackmail the Americans. The sentence was in a top-secret file only for insiders on the very top of the Communist Party. Obviously, the availability of nuclear missiles in the Soviet Union could be further used to blackmail NATO leaders. The Kremlin's powerholders were prepared for any scenario.

THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

By then time the statements on the inevitability of a nuclear war were recorded, Defence Minister Rodion Malinovsky was already finalizing the development of operation Anadyr upon instruction from Khrushchev and consent of Cuba's Fidel Castro. This was about deploying 24 R-12 missiles and 16 R-14 missiles with nuclear warheads in Cuba, as well as 50,874 military and maintenance personnel.

Operation Anadyr caused a bad crisis between the US and the Soviet Union. The world spent a few days

Signed in **December 1987**, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) began to be diluted by the progress in the production of tactical missiles

on the brink of a nuclear missile war in October 1962. Then the tension was eased when Kennedy stated that the US had no intention to take over Cuba. Khrushchev withdrew Soviet missiles from the island. Following the crisis, a direct connection line was set up between the Kremlin and the White House. It played an important role in preventing international complications in the future.

Now known in every detail, the Cuban Missile Crisis shook the politicians that made fateful decisions back then. They got too close to the verge of complete darkness. Even Khrushchev and the people close to him probably no longer dared to tell themselves "Train the population to expect a nuclear war". Uncontrolled arms race was leading the world into a dead end. US Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara was the first to speak about it publicly, claiming that the concept of implemented nuclear prevalence ("unacceptable damage") **B** had to be cast away and replaced with the concept of "strategic stability". After lengthy preparations, the Ministries of Foreign Affairs of the US, UK and Soviet Union signed the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water on August 5, 1963, in Moscow. It was open to be signed by the UN member-states that wished to do so.

The next step was to sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons developed by the UN Disarmament Commission. Aimed at preventing the expansion of states with nuclear weapons, it was adopted by the UN General Assembly on June 1, 1968. The Treaty recognized five UN Security Council member-states, including the Soviet Union, USA, UK, France and China,

RUSSIA IS TRAINING ITS POPULATION TO EXPECT AN INEVITABLE NUCLEAR WAR WHILE BLACKMAILING OTHER COUNTRIES WITH ITS NUCLEAR MISSILES TO ACCOMPLISH ITS AGGRESSIVE GOALS

as countries that have nuclear weapons. They agreed to not transfer it to non-nuclear-weapon states, nor support or encourage them to obtain it. In July 1947, the Soviet Union and USA signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests.

LOOKING FOR A BALANCE

Willy Brandt's Ostpolitik seriously softened tensions in Europe. In August 1970, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a treaty refusing to use force against each other. West Germany recognized the post-war borders in Europe, including the border between the German Democratic Republic and Poland. West Germany and Poland signed a treaty to recognize the German-Polish border, too. Four powers, including the UK, the US, France and the Soviet Union, signed an agreement on West Berlin guaranteeing free access to this enclave. Finally, both parts of Germany recognized each other and established diplomatic relations.

The American-Chinese solution initiated by US President Richard Nixon was followed by the emergence of a new geopolitical situation. Therefore, Soviet leaders responded positively to the signals which the US President sent both to China and to the Soviet Union. In May 1972, Nixon flew to Moscow and signed the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT-I) on the levels agreed by the moment of the signing. In June 1979, SALT-II was signed at the meeting between Leonid Brezhnev and Jimmy Carter in Vienna. It limited the number of strategic nuclear warhead carriers to 2,400 pieces. The US Congress did not ratify the treaty after the Soviet army invaded Afghanistan. But the sides complied with the restrictions it set out up until the treaty expired in December 1985.

As the tools to deliver nuclear weapons evolved, they prompted the need for new treaties between the the two superpowers. Since SALT-II did not retulate restrictions on the deployment of surface-to-surface

> ballistic and cruise missiles with the range of 1,000-5,500 km and 500-1,000 km. Not counting on goodwill of the Soviet leaders, America's politicians were willing to spend

dozens of billions of dollars for the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) that had to protect the US from an intercontinental missile attack.

Dubbed by journalists and subsequently better known as Star Wars, SDI built on innovative space technologies. America's new president Ronald Reagan called the Soviet Union "evil empire" and was successful in creating a united anti-Soviet front with NATO countries and China.

Three meetings between Reagan and Gorbachev between 1985 and 1987 were followed by a treaty on the liquidation of intermediate and short-range nuclear missiles. The Soviet Union committed to dismantling and destroying the entire class of these missiles. The US undertook similar commitments. That radical decision taken in December 1987 seriously contributed to the easing of the confrontation in the most important dimension of the Soviet-American relations.

In May 1988, the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began. Mikhail Gorbachev supported the military operation by the US and other countries against Iraq which tried to take over Kuwait. In September 1989, the wall dividing West Berlin and the capital of the German Democratic Republic lost its functional role and turned into a relic of the epoch that was rapidly moving into the past. On September 12, 1990, a treaty was signed in Moscow to finalize the solution of the German issue between representatives of the US, UK, France, Soviet Union, West Germany and East Germany, allowing the German nation to reunite. Berlin became the capital of Germany. The Cold War was over and the Yalta Europe seized to exist.

All this led to the signing of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START-I) between the Soviet Union and the US. Signed on July 31, 1989, at the meeting of Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush, it set equal limits on the number of warheads and delivery tools for both countries.

When the Soviet Union collapsed and ballistic missiles emerged where the main part divided into multiple independent missiles with nuclear warheads, a new treaty was necessary. START-II appeared in January 1993 when Boris Yeltsin met with George H. W. Bush in Moscow. The document banned the use of multiple independently targetable vehicles on intercontinental ballistic missiles.

A TOOL OF BLACKMAIL

When the Russian operation to seize Crimea was in full swing in March 2014, Vladimir Putin met with journalists and assured them that his country had nothing to do with the developments in the peninsula. A year later, on March 15, 2015, Russiya 1 TV channel screened what it referred to as a documentary titled Crimea. The Path to Homeland. The peninsula was annexed, the Russian society happily welcomed that development and Russian media were extremely successful in fueling hatred against the Ukrainian people which had until recently been considered a "brotherly nation". It was no longer convenient for the Russian leadership to keep its contribution to the annexation of Crimea secret. Therefore, Putin spoke openly to film director Andrei Kondrashov. "As to our nuclear deterrence forces, we were ready to transfer them into full battle readiness," he said, among other things. "I spoke to colleagues (leaders of Western countries - Ed.) and told them that Crimea is our historical territory, that Russian people live there and they are in danger, and we could not abandon them.³



Virtual saber-rattling. Russia's newest miracle weapons currently live in computer presentations

Before that statement, Russian radio and TV journalists had for a year been echoing the "radioactive desert" phrase, implying that NATO member-states would turn into a "radioactive desert" if they tried to interfere with Russia's takeover of Crimea. Long influenced by the Kremlin's policy defined in the sentence of "training the population to expect a nuclear war", the Russian people were not afraid to hear the "radioactive desert" phrase. That is the most unsettling thing to know.

Having the support of their people, the leaders of modern Russia annexed Crimea in blatant violation of the Atlantic Charter declared by Roosevelt and Churchill on August 14, 1941. The document established the postwar world order based on three principles: territorial integrity, non-use of force in international relations, and creation of collective security. On January 1, 1942, the 26 countries that fought against Hitlerled Germany and its allies supported the Atlantic Charter, signing the document as United Nations. Dozens of countries were created and fell apart over the next seven decades. But no country was successful in seizing part of another's territory using its military prevalence despite some attempts, such as Iraq's attempt in Kuwait.

The annexation of Crimea was conducted by the leadership of a state with nuclear weapons and a veto in the UN Security Council. Putin's thinking that these two factors make him unaccountable under international law is wrong.

"WE WILL GET TO PARADISE AS MARTYRS"

Signed in December 1987, the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) began to be diluted by the progress in the production of tactical missiles. In 2017, Novator, an air-to-air equivalent of the Kalibr surface missile that did not fall under the INF, appeared. Russia deploved it in its European part. Iskander-M tactical missiles with the range of over 500 kilometers were found in Kaliningrad Oblast and the occupied Crimea. On October 2, 2018, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg officially stated that Russia was not complying with its commitments under INF.

Putin's reaction was similar to Khrushchev's response in the Cuban Missile Crisis. When speaking at the Valdai club on October 18, he assured the audience that "Our concept of nuclear arms use does not envisage a preventive strike. Our concept is a response to a strike." Then he immediately referred to the Kremlin's talking point of an inevitable nuclear missile war. "An aggressor must know that payback is inevitable, it will be destroyed in any case. We are a victim of aggression, we will get to paradise as martyrs and they will simply die because they will not even have time to repent," he said. Interestingly enough, a former Cheka officer added a new religious dimension to this long-present Soviet statement.

On October 20, Donald Trump declared the US' intention to withdraw from the INF which Russia violates on a regular basis. European member-states of NATO insist that America's president should try to convince Russia to stick to the document because the whole of Europe is within the reach of Russia's intermediate and short range missiles. NATO ministers of defense are to meet for talks on this in Brussels this December.

Time will show how things develop. One thing that is clear now is that the Putin-led Russia is training its population to expect an inevitable nuclear war while blackmailing other countries with its nuclear missiles to accomplish its aggressive goals. Whatever treaties prescribe, an aggressor should be put within certain limits via other means, such as the development of defense capabilities.



Serhiy Zakharov:

"Donetsk has let go of me, yet it keeps haunting me"

Interviewed by Yelyzaveta Honcharova

Serhiy Zakharov is an artist from Donetsk known for his plywood caricatures of "Novorossia" leaders installed on the city streets in 2014. The installations resulted in his captivity in Donetsk that year. In his interview with *The Ukrainian Week*, Serhiy speaks about his complex relations with his city and the attitudes of the creative crowd to politicians.

You moved to Kyiv right after you were released from captivity. Have you found your place here over these years?

— I can't say that I immediately found myself in the heart of the crowd in Kyiv, and that was hardly my goal anyway. My artwork today is mainly concentrated in the small house space, a tiny

STILL, BIG GALLERIES STICK TO A CERTAIN CASTE SYSTEM, ALTHOUGH I HAVE HAD DIFFERENT EXPERIENCES EXHIBITING MY WORK OVER THIS TIME. A HOUSE FORMAT IS NOT JUST A CHALLENGE, A MANIFESTATION OR A PROTEST. IT IS ALSO A NEW EXPERIENCE WHERE YOU ARE AN ARTIST AND A CURATOR AT THE SAME TIME

gallery owned by the talented artist Dmytro Kolomoitsev, also originally from Donetsk. When he returned from the war two years ago, we decided to organize an association of several artists calling it UkrMacroVsesvit or Ukr-MacroUniverse. We have six or seven permanent members but we are open to new people for our projects. You know how these things happen: you sit and talk with your friends, give it a thought and wonder why not make a gallery since there are artists among you. The space is just one room, but we are all free in our desires, ideas and implementations here. We have no schedules or obligations, everything happens spontaneously. Once we have

a critical mass of works and an idea, we do an exhibition.

Why have you chosen the format of *kvartyrnyk* or house exhibition?

– Everybody knows that the format of house exhibitions or house concerts was popular in the soviet time with its censorship and the image of secrecy. Today, it's less about ideological reasons – you can now say whatever you want in art and beyond, nobody really feels any bans. Still, big galleries stick to a certain caste system, although I have had different experiences exhibiting my work over this time. A house format is not just a challenge, a manifestation or a protest. It is also a new experience where you are an artist and

a curator at the same time. I don't think of it as some sort of closed space or selectivity. It is indeed physically impossible to have a large crowd in a house, but are all big galleries that crowded all the time? What we display is art for a certain

group of people. We even advertise it among those interested. I appreciate this very format and experience. I don't think of it as just a starting point for something of a greater scale because what we have now is interesting.

What exactly do you do?

— We've had a lot of exhibitions and performances. They are all different and powerful, just without any unnecessary smug. Something like a "personal exhibition of one of Ukraine's least unknown artists". We've recently hosted an interesting event titled *Something Is Coming* ("Щось буде"). The exhibition in the apartment did not have a clear theme, but it was never

designed to have a single goal. We went outside during the exhibition and did street shows. For example, we found two window spaces closed with bricks next to other normal windows with glass. These were perfect spaces for some paintings. People started coming by and asking what it was and why we did it. We explained that we have brought paintings to their yard since they were not going to art shows. Another performance took place near a strange soviet-time building with a brick figure of a sitting person at the entrance. We made the head of a mammoth for it. It was somewhere there that academic Vikentiv Khvoika had discovered a pile of big mammoth bones and the Upper Paleolithic Cyril settlement from nearly 20 thousand vears ago in Podil, a district in downtown Kyiv, in 1893. We used this to show something interesting to the locals who may have been unaware of the mammoths. By the way, the performance involved our guests, Virliana Tkach, the New York curator of a show about playwright Les Kurbas at the Art Arsenal, and film director Andrew Tkach.

Did you do paintings for his documentary?

— Yes. His film *Hunger for Truth* was screened in many countries, including Ukraine. It's a story about a Canadian journalist who came to the Soviet Union and witnessed the Holodomor. What's important is that it also shows modern history that links what happened in the Holodomor period to Russia's ongoing aggression. I painted illustrations for the story of the captive Serhiy Hlondar. It's not just the general theme of captivity that I can relate to -I portray the real locations and events which I know from my own experience. For example, the streets and buildings of Donetsk. Those facts are important too.

Do you feel permanent connection with the city you left?

— It happens so that virtually all of my colleagues in our art group are linked to Donetsk in one way or another. Most moved to Kyiv a long time ago. I am the only one who had to do it because of the war, it was forced and tragic for me. Still, I don't see this as selection by origin. I don't think this somehow affects our art or shapes something like a "Donetsk style". In fact, I really appreciate collective intelligence, the atmosphere, the opportunity to do something together. I would definitely not



A hint of irony. The House of Cards installation was created at Izolyatsia in 2014. It later toured all European capitals

identify art by territory. It's just nice to remember the people we all used to know when we share stories from our past. Everyone knows where these things happened because they are all familiar places for them.

Has Donetsk let go of you?

- It has. But it keeps haunting me. I have mentioned the film with my illustrations from Donetsk. I have also published a comic book titled The Hole («Діра») about my captivity in the "Donetsk People's Republic" where I have references to this city. A recent project funded by the Germans presented nine documentary graphic stories about this war. In that project I drew the stories of people in captivity, the soldiers, the volunteers and the residents of the territory in war. Now, I am contemplating another graphic novel, a fiction story by my friend who is a writer, about a fiction creature finding itself in Donetsk in 2014. I don't think the city can let go of me irreversibly. But it's no longer painful, I no longer have an obsessive desire to return, I no longer suffer.

Your harshly satirical installations with figures of Motorola [Arseniy Pavlov, a Russian militant and war criminal in the Donbas and a number of other wars — Ed.] and the likes of him in the streets of Donetsk are known around the world. Are you still involved in social projects?

 Back then in 2014 we created an installation called The House of Cards at Izolyatsia [an art space that has since moved to Kviv – Ed.]. It was comprised of large cards with the images of "DNR" and "LNR" leaders; we went to all European capitals with it. As the next major project, I ran for the office of the Mariupol mayor in 2015. I wanted to show people that the city could be very different, evolve differently. That this different evolution wasn't a catastrophe as people from the big business were saying. Mariupol has a port, a unique sea and a resort. Metallurgy killed all this, and that's the catastrophe. But people don't see any other options. Clearly, someone from Rinat Akhmetov won the election. I didn't expect mindblowing results as many candidates

were running and some got no votes at all. But some people did vote for me!

The mere process was important in that case: we organized happenings and performances every day, developed an interesting election platform and gathered artists. We cleaned the territory around the synagogue, created a unique exhibition space to give the locals a chance to come and see their local talents. I had Dmytro Potekhin, a Kyiv blogger who had also been in captivity after going to Donetsk to see what was going on there, was helping me. He was held at Izolyatsia, by the way. Do I think that an artist can be a mayor? It's perfectly realistic. The world has seen many such cases. To be perfectly honest, however, I did not run to win. I just wanted to show people that an alternative choice exists even if nobody shows it to them. I'm sure that it's impossible and inappropriate to have an artist, a musician or an actor as the president, especially now. Because this is about the country's strategy, not just about some managerial function.

The heirs of Kapitoshka

Ups and downs of modern Ukrainian animation

Olesia Anastasyeva

In 2014 "Babay" became the first full length animated movie to have been released in Ukraine since the proclamation of independence in 1991. This film, funded by the state and recorded at "Ukrainmafilm" studios, was met with criticism and caution. Film's artistic quality was said to be the main reason for such disapproval. Two years later, animated film, another 'Mykyta Kozhumvaka', was shown in Ukrainian cinemas. 'Mykyta Kozhumyaka' received approval from the audience and was welcomed by both film critics and the general public, and its production team has spent a lot of efforts advertis-

CURRENTLY THERE ARE MORE THAN THIRTY DIFFERENT ANIMATED FILMS BEING PRODUCED IN UKRAINE, FINANCED EITHER BY THE STATE ORGANISATIONS OR PRIVATE INVESTORS. THESE INCLUDE SHORT-LENGTH, FULL-LENGTH OR TV SERIES FOR SMALL CHILDREN AND THEIR PARENTS

ing their creation. In 2018, another Ukrainian animation, "Stolen princess: Ruslan and Lyudmyla", earned over UAH 36 million in box offices across Ukraine, and its copy rights were licensed to other countries. It would not be unreasonable to suggest that from now on Ukrainians are likely to see local animated movies being released in cinemas at least once a year.

At the same time, it would be wrong to assert that Ukrainian animation industry had been non-existent before. However, its presence has been rather limited to short-length films and festival production. For instance, in 2003 short-length Ukrainian animated film "The Tram № 9 has been running" won the Silver Bear at Berlinale. According to our information, currently there are more than thirty different animated films being produced in Ukraine, financed either by the state organisations or private investors. These include short-length, full-length or TV series for small children and their parents.

EVERY MAN TO HIS TASTE

With a great pleasure we can declare that Ukrainian animation is not a uto-

pia anymore. Ukrainian animation film studios are currently working on a number of full-length films, which, as everyone hopes, will gradually create a Ukrainian alternative to American and Russian films.

"Today we are putting the finishing touches to the project named "The language that unites: French-Ukrainian cocktail". That's an ambitious project initiated by 12 different artists and animators from Ukraine, France and Switzerland, who created short stories based on French loan words", — explains Olena Golubyeva, executive director of Ukrainian Animation Association, and producer at "Red Dog" studio. According to her, the aforementioned project is incredibly valuable for the public since it motivates one to explore and experi-



Change of the format. Nowadays Ukrainian animation industry is represented by a number of private animation studios, such as Red Dog, Image Pi, Animagrad and others. In consequence, Ukrainian animated films had been given a chance to return to the big screen and on commercial TV

ence a different culture. The project is sponsored and supported by Ukrainian Cultural Fund (UKF), Institute Francais, Swiss embassy in Ukraine and Ukrainian Animation Association. Further, "All alone right here", another animation directed by Anna Dudko, has won partial presidential funding. "For me, as a producer, that's a matter of personal pride", continues Golubyeva, "because Anna Dudko came to study at our studio as a young director in 2013. Her short-length film is set to be finalised by February 2019 and will soon be shown at various film festivals. This animation film will be suitable for both adults and children and everyone will relate to its plot and characters in their own way. I guess Anna managed to visually express very deep, childlike feelings, and there is no exaggeration or overstatement in it". In addition to the aforementioned animated films, Anatoliy Lavrenishin, another artist and director, has been working on "Viktor Robot" animated film for three years now.

According to Volodymyr Khutkyy, producer at Ukrainian animation studio Image pictures, they are currently working on the second full-length animation film named "The Sercret". The film tells a story about adventures of the two owls in an imaginary world, inhabited by humanlike animals. "This film will be made in 3D. The target audience of "The Sercret" are not only children, but also their parents, since it's a family comedy. We will soon be releasing our first animated film, "Klara", which has already been finalised and the talks are being held about the release date", says Khutkyy.

It is worth noting that Ukrainian animated films are not only back on the big screen, but also on commercial TV. At present, several Ukrainian directors and producers are working on animated comedy "Chortovyyky". "Chortovyyky" is a fantasy town, which has been invented by producers as an allegory to current important issues in the world and Ukraine. These comedy series, according to its co-author Oles Yusypchuk, were created in the cut-out animation style. "We are talking about the simplistic style, which will allow us to lower the costs of production and speed up the process. Sadly, we can't afford to spend few years of hard work on four hours of film animation", says Yusypchuk. According to director, the film is intended for anyone in the 16-30 age category, and it will be aired on NLO TV channel in 2019. Another animation film, planned to be shown by the same TV station, is called "Dangerous Zone". According to, Roman Gryshchuk, who is a manager at Mamakhokhotala and Multopia animation studios and is in charge of film production, says that "Dangerous Zone" is the story about the family being left behind in the zone of ecological disaster. The family is living side by side with fantastic mutated creatures, who have now established their own society. Thus one human family shares the city with anthropomorphic beings. As in previous cases, the target audience for this animated film are teenagers and voung people.

Stepan Koval, director and manager of the Novatorfilm studios, tells The Ukrainian Week that his team is currently working on the second season of "My country is Ukraine" project and "Colourful language" mini-series, both put into effect in a stop-motion technique. "The target audience for these projects are anyone above the age of three. It will be possible to view the films at several presentations, and then on commercial TV, once we finally get a green light from the stations to air it at a time suitable for children. Then, hopefully it will make its way to online services", — continues Koval.

In addition to the above-mentioned films there are several others, in the different stages of completion. For instance, Animagrad studio, which released "The Stolen Princess" this year, expects to present its other big project, "Mavka, the Forest Song", in 2020. Animagrad has also won the "patriotic pitching" category announced by the Ukrainian Ministry of Culture for its full-length film "Roksolana" and "Klub Vseznavko". It was also announced that Yarko Studio is working on its shortlength film "The Trap" and "The Southern Farm", funded by private investors. "Um-Group" has also won state funding for tis series "Kuzyuka". Directors and the production teams are currently working on several others animated films. Among them are, for instance, the short-length project "Love" made by TTM studios, "Myshko and Moon Dzvinka" series by Borysfen-S studios, "Lets speak Ukrainian" by TET-Production (part of the 1+1 TV Channel Group), "Tsar Plaksiy and Loskoton" by





The wind of change. "Babay", Ukrainian animated film, was released in 2014. It is the first animated film that has been created in Ukraine since the proclamation of independence in 1991

Sakhaltuvev's company, "The Stolen Moon. The Godfather" by Magika Film. "Petryk" – cartoon produced by Studio KAPI. Furthermore, director Dmytro Lisenbart is currently preparing the first version of the "Smart kids" and Oleg Fedchenko is working on "Stories from around the world". Using the funding of the private investors, studio Lastoon is working on "GrenVeeGarden" series, and How-How Studio announced it will be releasing its short-length film 'Forgotten Island". Additionally, Glowberry and Animagrad are currently working on "The Mum is on her way home" and "Brave Leverets" respectively. Studio Kvartal 95 is working on "Mukha ChoMukha" TV series and the full-length animated film called "Gulliver returns". Odessa Animation Studio is hoping to release its "Legends of

Trypillya", while Rostyslav Garbar is working on "Dave and Eve".

OUR OWN IDENTITY OR JUST A SIMPLE IMITATION?

Ukrainian pre-1991 animation industry has demonstrated its ability to produce unique and appealing product. However, frankly speaking, for quite a while Ukrainian animation has been struggling. Large state film and animation studios were shut down, just to be replaced by private production studios. The current question is, however, whether Ukrainian animation will preserve its own distinctive style or will resort to imitating other animation schools? Olena Golubyeva thinks it is not an easy topic. "There are global animation studios, which set rules and create tendencies; their style has become n truly canonical. Here I am talking Disney, Pixar — even though they are one company nowadays. But would we call it the "school of animation"? I guess we would, because these films have received the highest regards by the audience, especially due to its particular stories and characters. Would

you rather have Ukraine associated with "Klara", "Mavka" or "Gulliver"? It's a yes and no. Another example of a distinctive national animation style, according to her, is Japanese anime. This genre, despite being limited to 'lowcost' animation, becomes a style great in its own right, owing to the talent of the Japanese animator Hayao Miyazaki. Thus films like "Mavka", "Klara" or "Gulliver" are a positive development, because essentially they are the first step forward on the way to creation of a distinctive Ukrainian animation school.

Volodymyr Khutkyy believes that the current animation market is dictating its own rules to directors and producers. According to him, "we have to compete with an incredibly powerful western industry, which has its own history, advanced technologies, well-kept tradition and very well-managed production process". Therefore independent authors should either originate their own distinctive style (providing they have access to the relevant technologies), or try to follow and imitate western or oriental styles. "When it comes to us. Ukrainians, we decided design our own vision, omitting national specifics, and therefore creating the product which will be well-received and apprehended by any age group in any country. Indeed, this has been the reason why we were using well-known magical elements and motives such as fairies, magicians, dragons, dwarves and other famous mythological creatures. At the same time, when we were working on appearance of the characters and geographical locations – we simply chose the ones we deemed most captivating and interesting for potential viewers; sometimes it may have turned out to be stereotypical and sometimes it was unusual and realistic", says Khutkyy.

According to Oles Yusypchuk, there are many animators in Ukraine and everyone choses to follow the style they feel is the closest to their work. No doubt, animators are also well-acquainted with the Ukrainian animation classics — "Adventures of Captain Wrongel", "Cossacks", "Eneyida", or astonishing masterpieces created by Borysfen studios. Nevertheless, it would be difficult to say that modern Ukrainian animation has its own distinctive style.

Film experts, consulted by **The Ukrainian Week** for this article, indicated that Ukrainian animators are currently using the styles created by artists in other countries. For example, some animators are using "Simpsons" or "The Family Guy" as guide. The most successful Ukrainian animation, "The Stolen Princes" was also created using the classical Hollywood template.



Ukrainian theme. Animagrad studio presented two full-length projects, "Mavka, the Forest Song" and "Roksolana"

THE PLOT. THE STORIES

Not always animation techniques, used in the film, are the key to creating successful product. Many Ukrainian animators keep asking themselves what is this film going to be about? Who will be the he-



roes? Shall we just take the dialogs out, and will it be relevant nowadays if we base our story on the classics of Ukrainian or world literature?

What is it going to be about? That's a global question. One needs to intuitively feel what is going to be relevant not only tomorrow, but also in three or even five years", thinks Golubyeva. "Interestingly enough, it seemed that children's stories will always be in demand, but, oh well every generation is different, and so are the stories. Children's songs, educational stories - there is lack of those in Ukraine. Heroes are those, who viewer can easilv identify themselves with", elaborates further Golubveva. Successful release of "Over the Garden Wall" and "Hilda" are the great example. It is also a way to introduce native, Ukrainian, history, to the global community. According to Golubyeva, popular Ukrainian comics "The Three against the Evil" would make a great animation film. When we talk about the art, it needs unique stories created for the specific film.

There is a great deal of animation companies across the globe that aim at creating the product of their own distinctive style. Aardman, the British animation studios, produces animation films in a "clay animation", when each piece is made of malleable substance, while Laika, the US based animation studio, is using stop-motion technique. Japanese studios, for instance, are working in 2D format, drawing anime, frequently with little or no dialogues. Eventually all these products will find its viewer. Therefore, the style and techniques of the film are less vital than the idea, plot and, of course, a masterful execution. When it comes to commercial animated films, undeniably there are certain rules, which, if followed, will increase the likelihood of high earnings at the boxes offices. This includes comprehensible and adventurous plot, attractive characters and relatable sense of humour. Oleksandr Naryzhnyev, codirector of "Chortovyyky", agrees with Khutkyy in his assumptions. "You can create anything you like! You can choose any

topic, any subject, any object, even pens, pencils, stones or even a simple sock, you name it! All you need is an idea!". On the other hand, wordless animated films require a special set of skills to make. It is the plot that matters, not the characters or technique. According to Stepan Koval, Ukrainian animator, classical literature may soon become the source of endless inspiration for many animation scenarios. Ukrainian literature may provide thousands of those. The real question is — will directors be willing to use these motives?

MONEY: HOW MUCH DO WE NEED AND WHERE DO WE GET IT?

Production of just one minute of animated film may cost dozens of thousands of dollars, according to the people interviewed by *The Ukrainian Week*. The costs of production also depend on techniques used in it, and whether we include additional costs of the ready product (such as costs of music and marketing).

In Ukraine majority of animated films are funded by the Ukrainian State Film Agency (DerzhKino), Ministry of Culture and Ukrainian Cultural Foundation. "Sometimes we are being commissioned more practical projects, such as educational films. We created the animation named "You and the Police", for instance. Ministry of Culture ordered us the 'animated alphabet', which was rather a slide show with the word 'animation' in its name", says Olena Golubyeva. She also indicates, that "we are not looking for any other funding opportunities, but the presidential funding for short animated movies. But I would not say we are not interested. Ukrainian Animation Association joined the Eastern European Animation Union, which created an easier access to the European Union funding. I would not say it's easier this way (especially bearing in mind the amount of documents we have to file), but European contests present many opportunities, they have transparent and clear participation rules. Pitching is very useful, because even if you fail to secure a funding, you would still establish extensive professional contacts. It is a networking opportunity. Also, you can always receive valuable advice from the pitching experts, who will be looking specifically at your film".

At the same time, even those animators, who receive funding from private investors, admit that it is not always possible to entirely give up state funding. That is mainly due to the fact that private investors are frequently facing the risk of losing all their investment. Majority of animators, contacted by The Ukrainian Week, stated that they mostly work on their own. Only authors of the afore-mentioned "Chortovyvky" reached out for support from the animation studio in Kazakhstan in order to meet the deadline. Authors of "Klara" did cooperate with animators from other countries, but the final product was created in Ukraine. Where can we see Ukrainian animated films? In case of full-length pictures or series commissioned by commercial TV channels, one can easily view it in cinemas, on TV channels or online. But when it comes to shortlength animated series, the process isn't as straightforward. People interviewed by The Ukrainian Week were not unanimous, when asked whether Ukraine lacks human resources to create films, however, when asked about the key problems in the industry, the answer was clearer - funding and human resources.



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January 19, 16:00

Pikardivska Tertsia

Ivan Franko National Academic **Drama Theater**

(ploshcha Ivana Franka 3, Kviv)

Christmas time is when this famous Lviv sextet traditionally performs carols for its fans. The a capella group is launching a tour of Ukrainian cities and one of its stops will be the capital. The group's Christmas program includes carols from all historical eras, from the most ancient to the most contemporary. Moreover, they will offer works in Ukrainian, Polish, Spanish, English, and Estonian. As a special gift to their Kyiv fans, the sextet will also perform original works as well as traditional folk songs.

NAONI Maria Zankovetska Drama Theater (vul. Lesi Ukrainky 1, Lviv)

–January 21, 19:00———January 24, 19:00-

Lviv's special Christmas season continues until the end of January this year. The legendary National Academic Orchestra of Folk Instruments (NAONI) performs a concert of unforgettable holiday works. NAONI includes more than 40 instruments in its arsenal, from tsvmbalv [hammer dulcimer] to the bandura. tylynka [a Carpathian two-hole flute], and drymba [Jew's harp]. The orchestra plans to surprise Lviv listeners with its virtuoso covers of world-famous rock hits. Don't miss out on a real musical treat!



Skrvabin.Simfo

NKMZ Palace of Arts and Technoloav

(ploshcha Myru 1, Kramatorsk)

Andriy Kuzmenko may no longer be among us, but his songs live on, their deep and subtle meanings reaching the hearts of thousands of listeners. The All-Ukrainian Remembrance Tour of Kuzma Skriabin begins in eastern Ukraine in January, playing in Severodonetsk, Kramatorsk, Pokrovsk, Mariupol, before moving on to Zaporizhzhia and Khmelnytskiy, and wrapping up in Uzhhorod, the far western end of the country. Kuzma's most popular hits, so loved by his Ukrainian fans, will be performed by the Pops Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Mykola Lysenko: People like Boats, Sleep on Your Own, Happy Places, and more.



Lvivarnia or Lvivery Beer Cultural

Christmas Magic

Experience Center

organizers.

February 2, 19:00——

Jay-Jay Johanson Caribbean Club (vul. Symona Petliury 4, Kyiv)

The cultural scene in Kyiv's capital is hot, even in wintertime. The performance of the Swedish romantic king of trip-hop Jay-Jay Johanson will warm you better than any mug of glüwein on a cold winter evening! This longawaited solo concert in Ukraine is the firsts time in nearly 18 months since the musician performed before Ukrainian listeners at the Jazz Koktebel Fest an Atlas Weekend in summer 2017. Johanson's last solo concert was even longer ago, in 2015, so music lovers of the country's capital can't wait to see Jay-Jay in person this February.

-February 8, 19:00———Until February 18-

Ara Malikian Palats Ukraina

Virtuoso Spanish violinist of Lebanese origins, Ara Malikian, performs for the first time in Ukraine. Love of music was nurtured by his parents when he was still a child, as Malikian's father was his first violin teacher and the boy was inseparable from his violin. Unsurprisingly, his first public performance was at the age of 12. Malikian likes to improvise and experiment, and has collaborated with Spanish composer José Luis Monzón. The result is an amazing blend of Bach and flamenco.

(vul. Velyka Vasylkivska 103, Kyiv)

(vul. Kleparkivska 18, Lviv) Christmas is a magical time of year, especially in Lviv. You can feel this magic, not only at the many Christmas fairs and coffee houses bright with Christmas decorations, but also at the Lvivery Cultural Experience Center. From December 28, the center will be presenting its "Christmas Magic" show, presenting the works of five well-known Lviv artists. "Our team focused on happy memories from childhood in preparing this show and we hope our visitors will enjoy the same feeling," say the





