

# The Ukrainian Week

International edition

#9 (127) September 2018

Ukrainian peninsula: economics,  
tourism, and occupied heritage

Serhiy Nayev on the first results of the  
Joint Forces Operation in the Donbas

Soviet and post-Soviet miners'  
strikes: causes & effects

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## The Ukrainian Week

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**Chief Editor** Dmytro Kravchenko

**Editors** Max Nesteliev, Lidia Wolanskyj

E-mail office@tyzhden.ua

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Tel. (044) 351-13-00

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ТИЖДЕНЬ



## BRIEFING

# The chaos begins

Roman Malko

A new political season has started in Ukraine looking more like a new front in the war of politics. The upcoming fall, winter and spring will be very hot for the presidential election campaign. So will be the summer and the preparation for the parliamentary elections in October 2019. Anything not linked to the elections will be secondary.

PHOTO: UNIAN







Elections in a country at a hybrid war, with some candidates playing on the side of the enemy although it's hard to know exactly who does so, are a risky game. Betting on the wrong candidates will cost Ukraine the loss of independence. This time, it's not just about a likeable candidate beating an unlikeable one, or not. In fact, there isn't much choice at all. Ukrainians will have to choose between the greater and the lesser evil.

The first days of the Parliament's work after the summer break illustrated this. MPs are already busier creating pre-election chaos and turbulence than actually doing their work. Yulia Tymoshenko already sees herself as president, adding anxiety with rhetoric about a Poroshenko-led oligarch conspiracy, ultimate robbing of the country, promises of putting everyone behind bars and confiscating from the rich after her victory. The Opposition Bloc's Yuriy Boyko has not yet felt as president. Yet, he suddenly started lobbying for an Election Code with open-list voting and voicing the Kremlin's thesis of returning the occupied Donbas in a non-violent manner. Olha Bohomolets is regularly attacking reformers from the Ministry of Health, criticizing them for "unprofessional actions and anti-people policies."

WHILE EVERY MP AND FACTION HAS AN OWN VISION OF THEIR PRIORITIES, ONE CERTAIN PREDICTION IS THAT THE DISCUSSIONS OF EVEN THE SMALLEST AMENDMENTS ARE LIKELY TO TRANSFORM INTO MAJOR BATTLES. THESE WILL INCLUDE BATTLES FOR THE CENTRAL ELECTION COMMISSION, THE ELECTION CODE, THE LANGUAGE, MP IMMUNITY, THE STATUS OF THE DONBAS, THE BUDGET AND MORE

MPs have already illustrated this chaos by starting this Parliament session with a failed attempt to vote for its agenda. Meanwhile, they have a long trail of crucial bills left from the previous session which they failed to vote before the break for different reasons. Plus, new ones are pending as well, adding to the mounting pressure. While every MP and faction has an own vision of their priorities, one certain prediction is that the discussions of even the smallest amendments are likely to transform into major battles. These will include battles for the Central Election Commission, the Election Code, the language, MP immunity, the status of the Donbas, the budget and more.

All this might even result in some bloodshed in and around the Rada — possibly from noses injured in clashes. This is not because the MPs will suddenly experience spikes of activity and love for principles. Quite on the contrary. They don't have a position. All they have is the interests of the groups they are part of. The key interest is power, preferably unlimited. Since the size of the power pie is not changing while the number of those with appetite to bite it is growing, their chances of getting there are shrinking. This means that from now on, they will view everything through the lens of its electoral value, a PR opportunity, a chance to score some points, influence votes, use voters and fake results. Adding its own price to the process will be the art of compromise and of making deals as the core element of politics.

One aspect of this price is the change of the election law and the current Central Election Commission staff. Without these the elections can't be fair or legitimate. Those in power may in the end reach some sort of a compromise on the Central Election Commission — the situation has

reached an absurd point now and Ukraine's international partners are demanding a solution. The Election Code reform is in a worse position. Half of the Parliament comprised of the MPs elected through the majority or first-past-the-post system is openly hostile to the abolition of the mixed electoral system and the introduction of open lists. This is a matter of political death or survival for them, as well as of deputy immunity and windfall profits.

The immunity issue triggers equally heated debates and speculations. Two draft laws sponsored by the President and MPs are waiting to be reviewed by the VR, both approved by the Constitutional Court. The President's bill abolishes MP immunity starting with the next convocation — it has better chances of passing the vote. The one sponsored by MPs abolishes the immunity immediately and is of a more populist nature. Will the Verkhovna Rada have 300 kamikadze MPs to vote for it? Even for good PR effect? The key reason why most MPs are unlikely to vote for any of these bills is to avoid giving the President a boost in the elections. He would really like his bill to pass, so that would give him a bonus to brag about in the upcoming campaign.

The bill on including Ukraine's aspiration to join the EU and NATO into the Constitution, sponsored recently by the President, might be easier to get by. But this would, too, help the President. Therefore, it is hard to think of what the friendly factions will want the President to give them in return for supporting his bills. The price tag may include concessions in reformatting the system of governance and transforming Ukraine into a parliamentary republic. President Poroshenko is against this, yet he is hoping to win the second term in office. His partners in politics — permanent and situational — really like the idea of a parliamentary republic, so they will certainly lobby for it.

Another crucial issue is the law on the state language. Many rank it as a priority one. The problem is that there are currently five different bills at the VR and each one sets out details and priorities differently. Add to this the upcoming period of flirting with different voters, and get popcorn to watch the resulting circus.

Then comes the extension of the law on the special status of the Donbas which should either be voted in October or shelved till after the elections. Nobody can say what's best now, not even those in the top offices. This issue is extremely sensitive and can ruin anybody's rates before the elections. It's also the issue of top importance. The war in Eastern Ukraine and everything around it is one of the few topics that still has the capacity to mobilize the frustrated voters ready to run away as far as possible. The other two are how to overcome corruption and to simply make ends meet.

Vacant positions in many offices and numerous officials in the acting status give more space for manipulations. So does yet another increase of gas price. The budget for the next year full of elections, too, is an exciting game of milking the public coffers.

Despite all this, it makes perfect sense to expect those in power to go back to their self-preservation instinct and wisdom to avoid steering the country into a dead end before it is too late. This is virtually the only hope that remains. The same instinct should also work for the society which by now has presented its final trump cards — the intention to ignore politics and indifference. Pretending that the biggest intrigue of the upcoming elections is who will lament "we've lost it all", Yulia Tymoshenko or someone else, after April 2019, is too simplistic. The stakes of these elections and their aftermaths are far higher than that. ■

# Michael Street:

Interviewed by Yuriy Lapayev

“NATO looks at improving how defense forces from different nations can work together better”



PHOTO: UATV

**Dr. Michael Street.** Senior Scientist, NATO Communications and Information Agency Innovation Manager. In 1992 he began to work on software defined radio as part of research funded by the UK MoD. In 1999 joined NC3A to study the military use of commercial personal communication technologies for peace-keeping and similar scenarios. He led NC3A's technical effort to select the future NATO narrow band voice coder and represents NATO on ETSI's TETRA Voice Coding Working Group and the TETRA Security and Fraud Prevention Group. He previously worked on terrestrial and satellite military communications after gaining a PhD in narrow band radio communications at the University of Leeds in 1996. He is a Chartered Engineer and a member of the IEE. Since 2005 he has co-chaired the NATO secure communication interoperability protocol test and integration working group and has established the multi-national SCIP test facility at NC3A, which hosts its first formal tests this month. In 2008 Street joined the Chief Technology Office at NC3A, with responsibility for communication systems. The CTO ensures technical coherence of NATO C3 systems throughout their development, validation, verification and procurement by NC3A and in their subsequent operation. In 2018 he was one of the judges during TIDE Hackathon in Montenegro and Ukrainian national defense hackathon. In 2001 he was awarded the Sir Henry Royce Memorial Foundation's medal for achievement. Michael Street is an author of more than 40 scientific reports.

*The Ukrainian Week* discussed the NATO Hackathons and the features of the first Ukrainian defense hackathon with the administrator and also the jury member, NATO Communications and Information Agency Innovation Manager Michael Street.

## What is a NATO TIDE hackathon? What is the purpose of NATO hackathons?

– NATO's TIDE hackathons are led by NATO's Allied Command Transformation. TIDE stands for Technology for Information, Decision and Execution superiority; and the TIDE hackathons are used to stimulate innovation and transformation by letting some very creative minds demonstrate the potential of disruptive data science, information and communications technologies. They can apply these technologies in a very free and creative way, to solve some of the NATO challenges of sharing information and using it to make better decisions and more effective execution.

Typically, NATO sets three challenges for the teams, all based around some fundamental NATO aim of collective defense; usually they focus on challenges of allowing national defense forces to cooperate in a multinational environment, so they could share information more readily and so be more effective. Teams try to solve one of these challenges by using a combination of readily available technology, their own coding skills and also bringing some cool ideas. The last part is the most important and what we appreciate most. If we look at what kind of people attend the hackathons and participate in them, most of our teams are students – mainly from military academies; but we also get teams coming from universities, government research laboratories and from industry. The teams always have a strong technical background, but they also have a 'can-do' attitude and a passion for solving problems. Most of our hackathon teams are young (or at least they have a young attitude), this means they bring new ideas and fresh thinking to problems. They are also very practical, always developing, testing, trying out what works and what doesn't. Only having one week to create a concept, build it and demonstrate it really focusses their efforts. The final demonstration is in front of their peers and a judging panel made up of senior military officers, technology experts and even a former Defense Minister. So you never see anyone looking idle during the hackathon!

Some of the teams are from outside the defense sector, they are from private companies or universities as we try to keep potential participation as broad as we can. This is a recognition, that to solve these challenges really well you need cooperation between private and government sectors. Usually it's a combination of government, academia and industry. That seems to be a very positive model.



### Who organizes NATO Hackathons?

- NATO's Allied Command Transformation runs the NATO TIDE hackathons. This command has the responsibility for looking into the future and making sure that NATO is prepared for it.

IN JUST A FEW MONTHS WE ARE ABLE TO GET GOOD IDEAS OF HACKATHON TEAMS FROM HERE AND PUT THEM INTO A REAL EXERCISE ENVIRONMENT WHERE THEY HAVE TO CONNECT TO NATO SYSTEMS, TO NATIONAL MILITARY SYSTEMS AND SHARE REAL DATA.

THIS IS A VERY SHORT TIME, TYPICALLY, IN OTHER CONDITIONS THAT COULD TAKE SEVERAL YEARS OF DEVELOPMENT

NATO's Communication and Information Agency provides significant support to NATO TIDE hackathons, providing some 'technology building blocks' which the teams can build upon. These building blocks are very similar to the systems and services which NCIA provides to thousands of NATO users across 29 nations. Staff from both these parts of NATO provide guidance and advice to the teams during the week.

The Ukrainian national hackathon was organized by General Staff of Ukraine, Government Office for European and Euro-Atlantic Integration and Stratcom Ukraine center with help of NATO C4ISR Trust Fund.

### What is the practical use of NATO hackathons?


- The NATO TIDE hackathons are to get innovative technology which can make a difference into service much more rapidly than normal.

In NATO hackathons normally we have three different challenges, which address three different problems. In each hackathon we select a winning team from each challenge. Those winners have a little bit more time to develop their solution further, which could have a positive impact on the way our defense forces cooperate. One month later, they demonstrate it again to NATO's TIDE-Sprint community who chose the most promising solutions. The winning teams and their designs are then fast-tracked to NATO's CWIX Exercise. This is an exercise which focuses on new technology for defense and security so the best hackathon outputs get tested rigorously against innovative technologies which have been developed through more conventional routes. In just a few months we are able to get good ideas of hackathon teams from here and put them into a real exercise environment where they have to connect to NATO systems, to national military systems and share real data. This is a very short time, typically, in other conditions that could take several years of development. We don't expect the hackathons to give us disruptive technologies which are perfect straight away, but this way successful concepts from the hackathon can take a huge short-cut on the path to being put into service by NATO nations. This is an opportunity to get very innovative ideas to solve our problems and refine them very quickly. Plus, we all learn a lot through this development; some of the outputs of our previous hackathons were added to NATO's Future Mission Network standards which define how technology lets the NATO and partner nations interact and cooperate – how they connect their different information systems together.

### What kind of challenges / issues are addressed at NATO Hackathons?

- In the past we've looked at how to find and share information in a multinational environment. This year's winner brought together map data, from NATO geographic systems, from NATO-members and partner nations, information from several sources on activity from friendly forces, hostile forces and Aid Agencies, and it displayed it all as augmented reality on a smartphone to commanders on the field. Some of the services include IoT weather sensors, video streams from drones and other sources and information on the location of friendly forces. This means that when the commander looks at the environment around him, the application, which was built by the winning team at the hackathon, is able to pull all this extra information from a number of sources and put it on the screen. The application incorporates additional capabilities like text chat and radio silence support. It gives the commander extensive information on what is going on, allowing him or her to make better, more informed decision.

Another challenge looked at a problem we call a *federated search*. How to search for information not only in your own systems, but across the information systems of all the NATO and partner nations. This is quite a challenge due to the security constraints that we have. As an example – you search for photo on your phone. Now imagine trying to search for a photo on your phone *and* all your friends phones *and* their computers, where some friends are in other countries and sometimes their phones are switched off or have no signal.



**A fresh perspective.** Hackathon participants can find a unique creative solution to defensive problems

PHOTO: STRATCOM UKRAINE



**The next stage.** The winners of the national defense hackathon will take part in the NATO conference in Berlin

Now do it using a tiny fraction of the data that your phone normally uses. And when you find the image you're looking for, ask your friend if you can copy the photo. In a multinational military environment these things are more complicated and require more thought to try to solve them.

During the week of competition we add some extra complication for the teams to make it more difficult and interesting. But also more representative of the kind of environment that defense forces regularly face and have to operate in. In the last hackathon in Montenegro, we added some extra spice to the challenge half way through the week, making their communication infrastructure less reliable and they have to adapt to this. It keeps the teams on their toes.

#### **What are the differences between the Ukrainian and NATO Hackathon?**

– They are very similar, in the way it is structured, in type of people involved. The main difference is in the challenges. NATO looks at improving how defense forces from different nations can work together better – which is very relevant for NATO. For the Ukrainian national hackathon the challenges are aimed more at areas which relevant to the country's defense forces. So it is focused more on your national needs. One of the challenges is to find solutions to improve communications between different organizations involved in Ukraine's national defense and security. Another task is to make information

sharing between individuals easier, while keeping it secure, trustworthy, authorized and reliable.

#### **What is the level of Ukraine's participation in NATO TIDE Hackathons?**

– We've been lucky to have several teams from Ukraine participate in the last two NATO hackathons. We have a number of very strong Ukrainian teams. They are young, but well educated.

**IN FACT UKRAINIAN TEAMS HAVE WON A PRIZE AT EVERY NATO HACKATHON SO FAR AND THEIR WORK IS TAKEN FORWARD. BUT THEY BROUGHT NOT ONLY A COMPETITION, BUT ALSO GOOD COLLABORATION, SHARING THEIR IDEAS**

They brought a really high level of skill, dedication and imagination to the challenge. In fact Ukrainian teams have won a prize at every NATO hackathon so far and their work is taken forward. But they brought not only a competition, but also good collaboration, sharing their ideas. They contribute to the whole hackathon community, rather than just operating as single isolated teams.

Now, the winner teams from the Ukraine national hackathon – including the "MITI Hedgehogs" team from Military Institute of Telecommunication and Informatics – will join a NATO event in Berlin on the future of the military command post. ■



# Dubious ally

Michael Binyon, London

Would NATO be better off without Turkey? Ankara is now having a furious row with America and its other military allies



**The personal dimension.** Erdoğan can defiantly take offense at the West and NATO, but, it is unlikely he could decide to withdraw from the Alliance

It has denounced its European partners. It has bought arms from Russia. And President Erdoğan now accuses Donald Trump of stabbing him in the back. Is there still any value in NATO's links with Ankara?

The clamour to expel Turkey from NATO is growing. But there is no way that the alliance can suspend or exclude a member from the alliance. And if NATO were to do so, Erdoğan would promptly turn to Russia and China, forming a new alliance that could be devastating for Western security.

In the past year Erdoğan seems almost deliberately to have antagonised his military allies. He has supported Islamist movements across the Middle East. He is said to have allowed clandestine arms supplies to cross the Turkish border to arm Islamist militants. He has sent Turkish forces into Syria to fight against America's allies, the Kurdish groups who have opposed Islamic State terrorists.

In addition, he has cultivated relations with Russia, despite NATO's suspicion of Russia's military intentions. Last year he signed a deal with Moscow to buy 400 S-400 anti-aircraft missiles, and then joined Russia and Iran in proposing a settlement in Syria. He has announced solidarity with Iran in response to the new US sanctions and says he will continue to trade with Iran — a provocative move intended to snub President Trump.

Most recently Erdoğan has got into a personal quarrel with Trump. For the past year the US has demanded the release of Turkish officials working for the US embassy who were arrested on charges of spying. More recently, Trump has demanded the release of Andrew Brunson, an Ameri-

can pastor arrested on charges of terrorism and supporting the abortive military coup against Erdoğan in 2016. The arrest seems to be in reprisal for America's refusal to extradite Fethullah Gülen, the Muslim cleric and bitter foe of Erdoğan, now living in exile in America, whom Erdoğan accuses of masterminding the failed coup.

For Trump, the issue of the pastor is of key electoral importance, as Trump has strong support in the "Bible belt" of southern US states. He has refused to sell Turkey new F-35 aircraft and recently raised the tariffs on Turkish steel and aluminium exports to America from 20 to 50 per cent, as a direct result of Turkey's refusal to release the pastor. In response, Erdoğan slapped new tariffs on a range of US imports.

The escalating row has infuriated Turkey's autocratic leader. He accused America of trying to humiliate Turkey and bring the country to its knees. "We are together in NATO and then you stab your strategic partner in the back," he told Trump at a recent rally. He also accused America and the West of helping to engineer the dramatic fall in the value of the Turkish lira, which western economists blame mainly on Erdoğan's refusal to raise interest rates despite the advice of Turkish economists.

The collapse of the Turkish economy could trigger a global economic downturn. But the lira has since rallied a little, largely thanks to a massive \$15 billion loan from Qatar.

Turkey has also quarrelled just as bitterly with his European NATO allies. He accused Germany and the Netherlands of behaving like the Nazis last year, when they refused to allow Turkish ministers to campaign there among the Turkish minorities in the run-up to the constitutional referendum. Ankara and The Hague withdrew ambassadors from each other's countries — an almost unprecedented sign of anger between NATO allies.

Erdoğan has also threatened to tear up the recent agreement with the European Union to prevent asylum seekers crossing from Turkey into Greece. He has threatened to allow migrants now held in Turkey to storm the land and sea borders into Greece — a move that would infuriate the EU, especially Germany.

All this has led to calls in American papers for the expulsion of Turkey from NATO. But this is more difficult than it seems — there is no precedent for such an action, and it could drive Turkey directly into the arms of Russia, which has long been eager to weaken Turkey's links with America and the West.

No NATO member has ever left the 29-nation alliance, although France pulled out of the unified military command in 1966 and did not return for 43 years. But although Paris effectively excluded itself from the alliance's primary purpose — to deter Soviet expansionism — it remained in NATO's political structure, keeping cordial relations with other members.

There is no appetite at NATO headquarters in Brussels to see Turkey leave. The country was admitted, together with Greece, in 1952 to join the 12 nations that founded the alliance in 1949. It has since occupied a vital strategic posi-

PHOTO: REUTERS

tion on NATO's south-east flank. It also has the second largest army in NATO.

For years Turkey played a key role in containing the Soviet Union. In 1955 it was one of the founding members of Cento — or the Baghdad Pact, as it was known — together with Iran, Iraq, Pakistan and Britain. With its headquarters in Ankara, the Pact was modelled on NATO and intended to block Soviet expansionism into Asia. Without US membership, however, it was not effective. The first blow came after Iraq left in 1963. After the 1979 revolution in Iran the Pact was dissolved.

Turkey also allowed the US to station missiles on its soil in 1961, directed at the USSR, prompting Russia to place Soviet missiles in Cuba and leading to the 1962 Cuba crisis.

Turkey is still vital for NATO's forward defences, especially the huge air base at Incirlik in southern Turkey. This base was used by the US to help Kurds fleeing Saddam Hussein after the first Gulf War and in operations against Islamic State. Turkey has restricted its use by NATO but there are still 5,000 US airmen stationed there as well as many tactical nuclear weapons.

NATO originally did not lay down criteria on democracy and human rights for membership. When Turkey joined, Portugal, a founder member, was still a fascist dictatorship. New criteria on human rights were not laid down until 1999 with the accession of former communist states. Turkey would not meet those criteria today, if it were to apply to join now. Several military coups suspended democracy in Turkey, but NATO membership was never in question.

Nevertheless, Turkey has come close to open warfare with Greece, a fellow NATO member, over sovereignty and rights in the Aegean. Turkey's invasion of Cyprus in 1974, following the Greek-sponsored coup on the island, also provoked a crisis in relations with Greece and other NATO members.

These tensions were always contained in the interest of solidarity against the Soviet Union. That ideological underpinning has now gone. Turkey has developed strong economic and political relations with Moscow — despite the shooting down of a Russian fighter jet in 2015.

NATO insisted last August that "Turkey's membership is not in question" — a statement issued at a time when Erdogan was having talks with Putin in Moscow. But there is a growing suspicion that Erdogan has now pivoted decisively away from the West and is seeking to replace his NATO links with closer ties to Russia and China.

His quarrel with NATO is largely personal. He was furious at what he saw as a lack of support during the failed coup. He believes NATO wants to block Turkey's support for Islamism in the Middle East. He also is angry that a number of Turkish officers stationed at NATO headquarters have applied for asylum, together with several who fled to Greece after the coup.

The Turkish military retains strong bonds with NATO. They, and western governments, are hoping that NATO membership will survive Erdogan's policies. But as NATO officials may be saying, "With allies like Turkey, who needs enemies?" ■

### III INTERNATIONAL FORUM FOR INTEGRATION AND COOPERATION




# InCoForum

## INTEGRATION & COOPERATION

#### EVENT'S PURPOSE:

Strengthening the capacity of united territorial communities' economic development through international experience implementation, internal and external cooperation between communities and business development

Business and  
communities  
cooperation



International technical  
assistance for business and  
communities development

Investment  
projects  
exhibition

Alternative energy –  
best practices and  
development  
prospects

## 12 October 2018

UKRAINE, Zaporizhzhia  
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PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

# Shigeki Sumi:

“You don’t need to worry about the unity of G7 on issue of Ukraine”

Interviewed  
by Yuriy  
Lapayev

**The Ukrainian Week** discussed with the Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to Ukraine the development of business ties between our countries, ways to improve the image of the Ukraine and the place of Tokyo in the security situation in the Pacific region.

**Your Excellency Mr. Sumi, in 2017, the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) office opened in Kyiv. What exactly is it focusing on in Ukraine?**

– In the end of last year, the JICA has opened its office in Ukraine for the first time. They are focused on several projects. For most now, the Japan and Ukraine have been carrying out big projects such as the Bortnychi Sewage Treatment Plant Modernization Project. That is a very big project, which would cost \$1.1 billion. So surely in order to execute such big project we need office here to look after.

Japan has been implementing a lot of technical assistances. It means to develop Ukraine’s capabilities in many fields, such as Ukrainian Public broadcasting training,

which JICA is conducting now. They are working on increasing of quality, particularly in two areas. First is the educational program, because in Japan NHK has a wonderful program for educational purposes. So the JICA send experts to Ukraine for several times, it’s last for about one month here each time. They give training on how to make good educational programs. And in the case of the emergency you have to have a good network. For example, in case of Japan, when the earthquake happens or heavy rain, like recently cause a lot casualties and NHK plays a big role to tell the people what they should do, whether they should stay at home or need to evacuate. We call this emergency broadcasting. It will cover all territory of Ukraine. Also the JICA gives the technical assistance for personnel. So I hope that would really upgrade the quality of the public broadcasting in Ukraine.

There are many other programs, which JICA is conducting. In the last two-three years, so called democratization project in which JICA experts came to Ukraine to train how to increase transparency. The same time the

JICA invites Ukrainian politicians to Japan. As you know, the wonderful fruits of this training are the introducing of government financing law for the political parties' activities, which was made by Verkhovna Rada. It is very similar to Japanese system. That means that as a party or politician you can make a campaign no matter where are you coming from, a poor family or rich – you still have a chance. Both for the Embassy of Japan and for the Ukrainian government it's necessary to have JICA office here in order to implement those numerous projects.

**As we discussed before, major part of Japan's low-interest lending and financial assistance to Ukraine accounts for the project to modernize Bortnychi Sewage Treatment Plant – preparation for the first stage is being finalized now in Kyiv. Are there any plans for more similar projects across Ukraine, or will this depends on the success of this one?**

– First of all the Japanese assistance, particularly the loan projects, has a big advantage, because the JICA conduct the projects in the combination of the financial aspect. That means it is not separated. For example, when you conduct such big project, then the Ukrainian government needs a loan and has to tender for the projects. But in many cases it is separated, companies are ready to build something, but it's quite another story, who will give money for that. In case of JICA it is combined, so Ukrainian government can discuss in one project the estimates of a cost and who will give the finances. Japanese loan has several advantages: it is long-term, it has a long grace period and the interest is low. So it's much effective to use JICA assistance rather than getting money on commercial bases. The Bortnychi project is underway and it's doing very well. Hopefully, very soon there will be a public tender, which makes a decision on which company will actually do this. And sometime next year the real construction and renovation work will start.

What we are discussing doesn't stop there. We already have talks about possible project for a bridge in Mykolayv. Mykolayv is a big hub for Southern Ukraine, so if there is a new bridge, which crosses the river, will enhance so much the capacity of the port. And the waste management is also very important. In the past Ukrainian people thought, "We have waste areas, where we can just dump it". But you can't continue on that for many reasons. Nowadays the environmental aspects are important. JICA is discussing now, what is a best way for Ukraine to deal with the waste. So if that could lead to another project, which would be another great one.

**How much interest is there for Ukraine as business environment, exporter and a market for products in Japan? Have you seen any growth of Japanese business presence in Ukraine in the past years?**

– Fortunately, now the Japanese business is aware of business opportunities in Ukraine and that is good news. I always tell business people, both from Ukraine and from Japan, that you have several advantages. For mostly is a level of education, it is very high in Ukraine, because everybody can read and write. And also the wages are relatively low as for Europe. Thirdly, because of Free trade agreement between EU and Ukraine, so you can produce something here and export to EU market without having any tariffs. So these are few advantages the Ukraine really has. Based upon these advantages in a past few years new business, investment came to Ukraine. Yazaki company, which makes wiring devices for cars and

**Shigeki Sumi** was born in 1953. In 1977 he graduated from Hitotsubashi University, Faculty of Commerce and Management and, in 1980, from Oxford University, St Catherine's College. In 1977 he entered Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. From 1989 to 1993 – First Secretary, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. In 1993–1996 he worked at Foreign Policy Bureau. From 1997 to 2000 – Counselor, Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Geneva. From 2000 to 2003 he worked at Embassy of Japan in Thailand. From 2005 to 2008 – Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Japan to the International Organizations in Vienna. From 2008 to 2011 – Ambassador, Permanent Mission of Japan to the United Nations. From 2011 to 2014 – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Bahrain. From September 2014 – Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary to Ukraine. The author of several research works.

we are calling it wire-harness, is here in your country. Since Maidan on top of Yazaki, Fujikura, another automobile parts company, which also make wires-harness, has started a big business, a factory here. And also the Sumitomo Electric came here few years ago. Although Ukraine is very well known in Japan as an agricultural country. One company, called Third wave Corporation, started here an agricultural business by getting land in lease. Now they produce many agricultural products like sunflower seeds. What the Japanese companies are really paying attention is IT-business. Because in Japan we have a great demand for IT-experts and Ukraine is very advanced in this area. The problem is a language. Because the Japanese side want at least the Ukrainians, who speaks very good English. Of course, it remains to be seen, but we have a really good future in this area. On

BUT UKRAINE BECAME INDEPENDENT STATE ONLY IN 1991, SO STILL JAPANESE PEOPLE ARE CONFUSED UKRAINE WITH THE SOVIET TIME.

I AM ALWAYS TELLING YOUR LEADERS, THAT TO RAISE A GOOD IMAGE OF UKRAINIAN PEOPLE IN JAPAN IS VERY IMPORTANT

top of that trade is increasing, especially the sales of Japanese cars. After Maidan it has dropped sharply, but now it is coming back. And this is a sign of recovery of Ukrainian economy. We see that Japanese cars like Nissan, Toyota, Mitsubishi, Honda are very popular in Ukraine. Among other European countries the share of Japanese cars is high, above the 30%.

**2017 was the year of Japan in Ukraine. One of its landmark projects was the Imaginary Traveler exhibition at Art Arsenal in Kyiv. How could Ukraine make itself more visible to Japanese society – what are your tips?**

– Fortunately, the Ukrainian people already have very good image on Japan. And recent exhibition in Arsenal, "The Imaginary Traveler: Japan" attracted a huge number of visitors. For Ukrainians Japan is a projection of very modern with IT and automotive business, but also keeping the good old traditions, such as judo, karate, tea ceremony. From their part, the Ukrainians need a



little bit efforts to enhance their image in Japan. They are already known among Japanese people. It is a bread basket of Europe. But Ukraine became independent state only in 1991, so still Japanese people are confused Ukraine with the Soviet time. There are many things, which are actually Ukrainian, but they think this is a Russian product. For example, in the field of cooking if you ask people from whom country is borsch originated, the half of Japanese would say that it is Russia. Even the religious means. We know about Kyiv Rus, which accepted Orthodoxy and was baptized. Only after it goes to Russia and Moscow. However, many people think that this is a Russian Orthodox and it has started in Moscow rather than Kyiv. So you need some additional efforts, spend a little more on promotion to let Japanese people know your history better. But not only history. Also some modern issues like opera or ballet. Kyiv Ballet and Opera come to Japan almost every year. This year Kyiv Ballet has come even two times. The standard and quality of Kyiv Opera and Ballet are the same as Bolshoy Theatre and Mariinskiy. But unfortunately, Russians are very well known in Japan, and Ukraine has lack of promotion. The same is for businesses. I am always telling your leaders, that to raise a good image of Ukrainian people in Japan is very important. Making Japanese people realize the importance of Ukraine is needed.

AND ALSO THE IMPORTANCE OF THE MINSK AGREEMENTS REMAINS UNCHANGED AS RUSSIA SHOULD STOP MILITARY AND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO THE REBELS IN EASTERN UKRAINE.

**I DON'T THINK THERE IS ANY CHANGE AMONG G7 TO THIS AREA**

**At the latest G7 summit, Donald Trump made remarks on the need to bring Russia back to the club. This position is supported by Italy's new government. How do you expect this development to affect the position of G7 on Russia's return to the club and sanctions against Russia for its illegal actions in Ukraine?**

– First of all, any decisions of G7 are made by consensus. And there is no consensus to bringing Russia back to G7. I do not think there is any chance for Russia so far. Of course the position of Japanese government is to engage with Russia, it is important not just to isolate Russia, but also talk for the settlement of the issue of Ukraine. And I don't think this could affect the position of G7 on Ukrainian issue. If you look at the communique, it is clear. Though Mr. Trump said that US could withdraw it, what he said was about economic area. And on Ukrainian issue the position of US is the same that reflected in a statement, that Crimea's annexation is illegal and G7 never accept it. And also the importance of the Minsk agreements remains unchanged as Russia should stop military and economic assistance to the rebels in eastern Ukraine. I don't think there is any change among G7 to this area. On top of that, we have in Ukraine the G7 Ambassadors' Support Group. This group is very active at working in close harmony. With other Ambassadors, we meet sometimes twice a week. We discuss almost all agendas regarding the reforms. I think we are very united; you don't need to worry about the unity of G7 on issue of Ukraine.

**After the election of Donald Trump US-Japan relations started at a high note. Now, we see growing differences between the US and Japan on trade issues. This seems to intensify Japan-China economic interaction and turn Japan into a regional free-trade champion. How do you expect these developments to affect Japan-US relations overall? Do you expect them to impact Japan-US security alliance?**

– Since President Trump came to office our relations are very good. Japanese Prime minister Abe has met him personally already seven times and has numerous phone conversations. There is a very close sort of communication established between our leaders. Of course, there is a discussion on issue of trade, because some people say that why Japan is keep to exporting so many products to US rather to importing. But you should look also at investment. The United States have numerous Japanese companies, numerous factories. You should look on the economy overall. Japanese contribution into US economy is enormous. So I'm not very much worried about this trade issue.

And with regard to China, for Japan it's favorable situation that China will become economically more prosperous. And that is a very good signal to the world. But, of course, what we are saying is that China needs to make it business in a more transparent manner. And then Japan is working on the free trade agreement for Asia-Pacific region and also a FTA with China and South Korea. But even in that case US-Japanese alliance is a key factor, because that brings stability to the region. Like in case of North Korea, it's very important for Japan to keep a strong Alliance with the US.

**Just recently, there were active discussions of Prime Minister Abe's intentions to change Japan's post-war Constitution to abolish the constitutional ban on Japan having a standing military. In the current security environment of growing security risks and increasingly uncertain security alliances, is the appetite for that change growing in Japan – in society and political establishment?**

– The Japanese Constitution adopted in 1946, so it's long time ago. Surely, the world's situation has changed since then. That's why Mr. Abe made a proposal; it's a high time to renew at Japanese Constitution. Here is no time or deadline. And in the area of security and what we call Article 9, we have already the self-defense force and Mr. Abe still thinks that there is a need to have more discussions to what extend the Japanese self-defense force can do. If we say that self-defense force can do the work only for self-defense purpose, we need a clearance what that means. If East Asia, where Japan is located, becomes unstabilized due to the development of missiles by North Korea, how can we deal with this issue; whether this present Constitution is good enough or not. Mr. Abe suggested discussing actively the issue of Constitution, because the government is responsible for providing safety and security to the people of Japan and the situation in Asia is not the same as it was 60-70 years ago. Still we don't know whether we would change it, but his suggestion make the discussions not taboo anymore, and the issue needs to be discussed among the people. And we will see whether we will have a consensus to change the Constitution or not. Japanese people do recognize the importance, at least to discuss this issue. ■





# The return of soviet Crimea

What's happening with the Ukrainian peninsula's economy these days?

**Andriy Klymenko** and **Tetiana Huchakova**, Yalta and Kyiv, Crimean Department of the Maidan of Foreign Affairs

Whether people want them to be or not, their impressions of regions even within their own countries are often shaped by myths — and Crimea is no exception. Most Ukrainians tended to think of the peninsula — with the exception of Sevastopol — as a beach resort and wine-making region, even during soviet times. In fact, it was not quite like that under the soviets. The myth about the “all-union health cure resort” was originally started as propaganda to cover the truth the real nature of the economy of Crimea. Based on how its residents were employed, how its territory was utilized, what the state invested in it, and the volume of manufacturing produced on the peninsula from after WWII until the USSR collapsed, it was:

- firstly, a huge army, navy and air base — and eventually a nuclear and space base — that all ensured the Soviet Union's dominion in the Black Sea region and its access to the Mediterranean and in the Middle East;

- secondly, a major industrial R&D center in the Union for making military instrumentation and shipbuilding;

- thirdly, one of the food-processing centers of the USSR specializing in processing fish caught in the oceans — most of the commercial ocean-going fleet of the Ukrainian SSR was based in Sevastopol and Kerch — as well as vegetables, fruit, grapes and wine.

Crimean industry was based on dozens of enterprises making military instruments, building ships and repairing sea-going vessels. That's where ships for the Soviet Navy, guided torpedoes, missile control systems, navigational and radio equipment, tank sights, complicated parachute systems, including for space rockets and for landing tanks, and so on.

Prior to the 1990s, foreign tourists were forbidden to leave Simferopol to go anywhere except Yalta and Alushta. Sevastopol was off limits even to those who lived in Crimea unless they had a special permit, while even residents of Sevastopol could only enter Balaclava, where the Black Sea Fleet was based, with special permits. Soviet resorts were not a flourishing sector of the economy but, on the contrary, a costly state-funded social program of the Soviet Union.

## POST-SOVIET DEMILITARIZATION

With the end of the Cold War, during the perestroika period and after the USSR collapsed, the military specializations of the Crimean economy were completely lost. But defense itself was not the only victim: light industry disappeared almost completely during the 1990s. With the exception of grains, sunflower, vineyards and poultry, farming reverted to small household holdings. The resource base for producing fruits and vegetables was lost Crimean orchards shrank by more than 80%. Under market conditions, Crimean dairy production pretty much disappeared, as did canned fruit and vegetable and juices. The number of tourists shrank collapsed from 7.9-8.3 million in the mid-1980s to only 2.3mn in the mid-1990s. The jobless workforce was slowly taken up by small enterprises that were not a product of the middle class but simply a means for the local population to survive.

Slowly Crimea's economy took on a new shape and by 2001, going through 2010, the main driver was the chemical industry based on the North Crimean chemical complex where titanium dioxide and sodium carbonate were produced, and the extraction of oil and natural gas on the marine shelf. After the start of the land boom in the mid 2000s, housing also became a major business. The relative weight of farming continued to shrink as trade and services grew stronger.

Following the 1998 financial crisis, Crimea's economy picked up pace again over 2001-2008, but tourism, at only 7-8% of the peninsula's economy, trailed behind industry, trade, transport, farming and construction. But this is when resorts and tourism, initially through growing awareness among Ukrainians and officially starting in 2010, became a strategic priority for the Crimean economy. Over 2011-2013, tourism grew visibly, as did the services related to it. As small enterprises quickly grew in this business, major investment projects began to come to the peninsula. At this point, some 6 million tourists were visiting Crimea every year and by the end of 2013, tourism and recreation were generating at least 25% of the autonomous republic's consolidated budget. Three main regions where resorts formed a mono-economy served more than 75% of all visitors — Yalta with 38%, Alushta with 19% and Yevpatoria with 19% — and brought

In 2013, the peninsula's ports had received **187** foreign cruise liners, adding up to nearly **105,000** passengers. These were record numbers, not just for independent Ukraine but also for all of Crimean history. By 2014, growth was up to **70-80%**

in over 20% of consolidated budget revenues between them.

A major indicator of the success of this shift was the fact that Crimea had become the main center for international tourism in the Black Sea: in 2013, the peninsula's ports had received 187 foreign cruise liners, adding up to nearly 105,000 passengers. These were record numbers, not just for independent Ukraine but also for all of Crimean history. By 2014, growth was up to 70-80% (before the takeover). By 2010-2013, grain-growing was almost at soviet levels, with more than a million tonnes per year, as was wine-making. Indeed, the production of cognacs was 5-6 times more than it had been in the 1980s.


In short, at the point when Russia invaded, Crimea's economy was demilitarized and a completely new focus on tourism and services had become its strategic priority.

## “A NEW SHOWCASE FOR RUSSIA” — FAIL

Although the main purpose for occupying the peninsula was military and strategic, the idea of Crimea as a “new showcase for Russia” gained enormous popularity in 2014, similar to the Olympics in Sochi, but based on tourism and innovation rather than sports, complete with its own Silicon Valley, gambling resorts, free economic zone, cutting-edge technologies, 7-star hotels, just like the Emirates. There was a brief euphoric boom of

## Crimea's main economic purpose

Range of Russian Federation land-based and marine missile launchers from occupied Crimea and the RF BSF marine base in Tartus (Syria)



ideas for developing the peninsula and visitors galore from major Russian businesses. Indeed, two weeks after the annexation, on March 31, 2014, the Russian Federation even established a new Ministry of Crimean Affairs.

But by the beginning of 2015, Moscow understood how impossible its initially ambitious plans for economic development on the territory were and began to focus on absorbing Crimea militarily without tourism to provide a cover. On July 15, 2015, the Ministry was dissolved as well. At that point, the cumulative effect of transformations taking place began turning the peninsula into the Island of Crimea and a grey zone because of a transportation and later energy blockade by mainland Ukraine, and international sanctions. Clearly, Moscow had not expected such a response from the West and was forced to adjust its plans on the run.

In 2016, Moscow's rejection of plans to turn Crimea into a "new showcase for Russia" was final. On July 28, 2016, it reduced the status of both Crimea and Sevastopol within the RF: Putin's decree dissolved the Crimean Federal District, which had been formed right after the annexation on March 21, 2014. The "federal subjects" known as the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol were amalgamated into the Southern Federal District, with its capital at Rostov-on-Don. With this step, Crimea's administrative functions were unified with the military ones, as Russia's Armed Forces in Crimea are part of the Southern Military District with its headquarters in Rostov-on-Don as well.

Among the general population in Russia, euphoria was replaced by annoyance at the "enormous demands" of the residents of Crimea related to all the huge promises that had been

made in the run-up to the "referendum." A mere three years after the annexation, 84% of Russians thought that federal budgeting for Crimea and Sevastopol should be the same as it is for any other territorial entity in Russia. In short, even public opinion was against the notion of a "new showcase for Russia" in Crimea.

## THE REAL SUCCESS STORY OF OCCUPIED CRIMEA

Once it had no cover, the militarization of Crimea became obvious in 2015, not only as the main focus of the Kremlin's Crimea policy but also the main driver of the region's economy. The military "takeover" of this territory had now become Russia's "biggest success story" in Crimea.

One of the signs of this "change of course" was the introduction of large-scale annual military exercises just as the peninsula's tourist sector is preparing for visitors and right through the height of tourist season, complete with artillery fire and bombardment on the Kerch peninsula, right next to the only highway that visitors can take from Russia to the peninsula, as well as the only road bringing in supplies from the deliveries from the Kerch ferry, and from the Kerch Bridge May 2018.

Russia's military "takeover" has led to the expansion and equipment of a gigantic military base that is larger numerically than the biggest US base in the world. In connection with this, the necessary dual-use transport, energy and other infrastructure has been established to join the peninsula to the Russian mainland: the Kerch Bridge, an underwater power link, and an underwater natural gas pipe line across the Kerch Strait.

The RF Armed Forces have also been rapidly building up the biggest Joint Task Force in Europe. Crimea is now the pri-




ority location for only the latest in weapons, especially missiles. All 11 of the old soviet airfields in Crimea are rapidly being upgraded, together with missile launch sites, anti-aircraft batteries, radar systems, and nuclear weapons storage bases. A new fortification zone has been set up in northern Crimea. New military towns are being built and existing ones reconstructed for armed forces to be deployed, along with housing for service personnel. The number of different special forces has been dramatically expanded. The RF AF contingent in Crimea has been expanded to 60,000 soldiers and officers with prospects of growing to 100,000 over the next few years.

At this point, all other aspects of life in Crimea have been subordinated to the ideology of a military bridgehead: the civilian economy, the social sphere, education and the upbringing of children and teens, human rights, the information sphere, and national politics. Indeed, the development of the military base determines the priorities of the peninsula's economy. This means, firstly, the revival of the defense industry and everything connected to military infrastructure by ensuring that Crimean enterprises get defense contracts and through state investment in infrastructure.

In 2014 alone, manufacturing in Sevastopol grew 372.9%. By the end of 2015, Crimea was declared the leader for growth of industrial output in Russia, at 12.4%. The index for industrial output in the Southern Federal District of the Russian Federation was at 106.4% in 2016, within which Sevastopol once again had the highest indicator at 121.8%. By mid-2018, the official pace of industrial output in Sevastopol remained very high at 110%.

Notably, Russian statistics on Crimea do not reflect indicators related to the Defense Ministry, the MIC or the power sector, similar to soviet times. In addition, the huge volumes of defense manufacturing, such as at the shipbuilding plants in Feodosia and Kerch that were taken over by Russia, are now included in the indicators for their new Russian "owners."

The Pella Shipbuilding Plant of Leningrad is one of these "curators," and then lessee of the More Shipbuilding Plant in Feodosia, which actually belongs to the state of Ukraine but was "handed over" to the federal government of Russia after the latter took over Crimea. On November 15, 2016, the More Company was officially leased out to this Russian plant until the end of 2020. Later, it became part of the Kalashnikov Concern. The More plant is building three new Karkurt-class missile corvettes in the nearby marine zone. This corvette has 8 Calibre-NK winged missiles, which are widely used by the



Black Sea and Caspian Sea Fleets of the Russian Federation to attack targets in Syria, which is 2,500 kilometers away. On February 7, 2017, the plant also began production for the main border patrol hovercraft, the A25PS for the Border Service of Russia's FSB. Plans are to produce 20 such craft.

Over the next few years, at least 9 new missile corvettes will be built at the taken over Crimean plants, with a total of 72 winged missiles of the Calibre-NK class on board. This represents a threat, not only to Ukraine, but also to EU countries and the Mediterranean region as a whole. In the second half of 2018, Russia's BSF will begin adding vessels produced, not by Russian plants, but by plants that were seized from Ukraine. All told, defense production in Crimea and Sevastopol grew 430.8% in 2017 compared to 2015 and 227.6% compared to 2016.

## MOSCOW'S REAL PRIORITIES


On August 11, 2014, the Russian Federation approved a targeted program called "Socio-Economic Development in the Republic of Crimea and the City of Sevastopol to 2020," with a budget of RUB 669,594,630,000 or US \$9.8bn, 95.9% of which was coming from the federal budget. Clearly, the implementation of this program has determined the economic life of Crimea. Still, anticipation among Crimean collaborators that they would enjoy a "shower of gold" from Russia as a result of this was unfounded. By early 2018, more than 1,000 contracts had been signed under the program with the main executors worth nearly RUB 600bn. About half of these were with Crimean contractors, but their total value was only RUB 28bn, or 3.5% of the actual amount allocated by the program at that point. The lion's share of the golden shower went to Russian firms, especially in terms of job generation.

Even in 2014, the allocation of funds from the federal targeted program (FTP) was very eloquent: more than 80% of the expenditures were intended for three gigantic projects — the Kerch Bridge, the Tavrida Highway from the Kerch Strait to Sevastopol, and two new power stations. 10% was left for social services about 5% for tourism, and 1.5% to "ensure inter-ethnic unity." This illustrated Moscow's priorities very visibly: developing the critical logistics and energy infrastructure for a huge military base.

Notably, the construction of the Kerch Bridge stopped construction of nearly all new roadways and bridges in Russia. In 2017, only 10 new roadways were built across Russia, other than

## Coefficient of Crimea's financial independence, 2012-2017

Ratio of taxes collected in Crimea to expenditures in the Consolidated Budget, US \$ mn



Sources: Crimean Ministry of Finance (2012-2013), "Ministry of Finance of the Republic of Crimea" (2014-2017), Maidan of Foreign Affairs calculation

this bridge and the Tavrida highway. There simply wasn't enough money for anything more.

At the beginning of 2018, the total financing for this federal program was up to RUB 837,174,19,000, of which RUB 770,192,94 was capital investment. Based on Moscow's priorities, the money is currently being allocated thus.

What's important to also remember is that investments in MIC enterprises in Crimea are being undertaken by Russian corporations outside of this program. The construction and reconstruction of defense facilities is also taking place outside the FTP as this comes from the Russian Defense Ministry budget.

The FTP funding is being expanded for a number of reasons, starting with the ruble's nosedive against the US dollar. In addition, the FTP was originally drafted in a hurry and during its implementation, many aspects specific to Crimea became visible. For instance, the cost of the Tavrida highway grew from RUB 41.8bn to RUB 144.0bn.


From the very beginning, the implementation of the FTP was complicated, deadlines were missed, endless corruption scandals plagued it, and criticism from top officials in Moscow grew harsher. This led to a gradual replacement of the Aksionov puppet Crimean Government with administrators from Russia. By the end of July 2018, a proposition had been drafted up in Moscow to extend the FTP through 2022 and increase funding by RUB 37bn, to cover 55 facilities in Sevastopol and a further 85 in the rest of Crimea. The authors of the proposal predicted that the FTP would be extended at least another 3-4 years with funding increasing in line with this. The most serious and long-term issue that needs to be resolved, both technologically and financially, is water supply.

## THE KERCH BRIDGE: CONSOLIDATING OCCUPATION

When the Kerch Bridge is completely open for traffic (trucks by the end of 2018 and trains at the end of 2019), it will undoubtedly have serious military, political and economic consequences for Crimea. For starters, military logistics will be immensely simpler because trucks carrying men and material will be able to drive right in. After it finishes constructing the bridge, Russia will most likely be tempted to either close access from the peninsula to mainland Ukraine altogether — or make it as difficult as possible.

### On life support

Budget revenues of «Republic of Crimea» and allocations from RF Federal Budget



Over 2019-2019, the need for ferries to carry freight from Russia to Crimea will gradually disappear. But the remaining Crimean ports will continue to operate the way they do now, as an overflow system handling marine deliveries that don't involve ferrying: grain, scrap metal and sodium carbonate to Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Egypt, Northern Cyprus, as well as glass, building materials and petroleum products from the Russian Federation, and cement and ilmenite from Turkey. Passenger traffic through Simferopol Airport will continue to shrink, the new terminals designed to handle over 7 million passengers a year will remain underused, and the investments made in them will not bring any returns.

Simplified road access could lead to growing flows of tourists to Crimea if the cost of vacationing on the peninsula becomes competitive for tourists from Russia. In any case, this is encouraging Moscow towards a policy of organizing vacations for low-income Russian citizens at Ukrainian sanatoria in Crimea that were expropriated by Moscow like so many spoils of war. RF civil servants, who are effectively prohibited to travel outside Russia, will also be encouraged to vacation in Crimea.

## BANKING


Prior to Russia's takeover, Crimea and Sevastopol enjoyed a solid network of commercial banks, as 69 Ukrainian banks had branches on the peninsula. The RF planned to take advantage of Ukrainian financial institutions to ease the pain of the transition period, but none of Ukraine's banks agreed to continue operations under the occupation. Major Russian banks that were already operating in Crimea prior to this, such as Sberbank, Alfa Bank and VTB, also stopped operations because of the fear of sanctions. This added another factor for certain foreign businessmen who, after visiting Crimea to test the investment waters, went into waiting mode.

Since the Russian occupation began, 34 Russian banks have launched operations in Crimea and two Crimean banks were transferred to Russian jurisdiction: Morskiy Bank, which belongs to Russian tycoon Aleksandr Annenkov, and the Black Sea [Chornomorskiy] Bank for Reconstruction and Development, which was "transferred" to the "Republic of Crimea" in September 2014. These are relatively small banks that have little importance for the Russian financial system. Indeed, 19 have already lost their licenses, one bank went bust and one is in bankruptcy procedures. Four banks left the Crimean market on their own. As of August 1, 2018, 8 Russian banks were still operating on the peninsula, all of which are subject to international sanctions.

## TOURISM: RAPIDLY SHRINKING NUMBERS

After it was annexed, Crimea turned into a resort only for Russian tourists, and the quality of tourists changed dramatically as well. Previously, Russian tourists tended to be from the middle or wealthier classes. Over 2014-2017, low-income Russians began to travel to the peninsula on discounted tours organized by their employers. Well-known sanatoria belonging to agencies such as the Defense Ministry, the SBU, the General Administration, the State Fiscal Service, the Presidential Administration, the Verkhovna Rada, and so on, were treated like military trophies and passed on to their Russian counterparts, which proceeded to send their staff on holidays there.

Over 2010-2013, every tourist in a Crimean sanatorium was matched by four tourists in mini-hotels and rental apartments. Because of this growth, the tourism industry generated a substantial multiplier effect, as much as 3.5-4.0, in other branches of Crimea's economy. In other words, for every UAH 1 in taxes paid directly by sanatoria, B&Bs and hotels led to UAH 4 in taxes paid by shops, services, entertainment places,



Sources: Crimean Ministry of Tourism (2007–2013), "Council of Ministers of the Republic of Crimea" (2014–2017); expert data from Maidan of Foreign Affairs

transport, and by locals who served the tourists. Over 2014–2017, this correlation between tourists in major hotels and in the private sector shifted to 1:1.5.

In addition, the Ukrainian government's easy approach to small tourist businesses to gradually bring them out of the shadows was replaced by threats and fines. Much higher taxes on land and property forces many hoteliers to quit the business as mandatory contributions to the Russian budget grew tenfold over the last four years.

In fact, resorts have already stopped being one of the priority areas of the Crimean economy, both in terms of budget revenues and in the social sense. Any official quantitative assessments of tourism in Crimea today are not worth paying attention to, as they are largely propaganda. According to our estimates, statements that there are 5.2–5.5mn tourists a year now are two to three times larger than reality.

### SMALL BUSINESS IN DECLINE

Over 2014–2018, Crimean SMEs shrank considerably in number. At the beginning of 2014, there had been 15,553 working small private enterprises and 116,200 private entrepreneurs. As of July 1, 2018, there were 1,382 private enterprises, a more than tenfold decline, and 55,328 private entrepreneurs, less than half.

Unlike Ukraine, say Crimean entrepreneurs, Russia doesn't have a simplified tax reporting system and has not reduced the number of inspections. Small business in Crimea has seen reporting requirements multiply, along with a huge number of inspections and an unforgiving system of enormous fines for the least violation. Prior to 2014, small businesses accounted for more than 35% of employment on the peninsula and this indicator was growing steadily. Today, they account for only 19.5%.


The decline of small business in Crimea is likely to continue. Practice has shown that entrepreneurship, free thinking and independent consciousness are antagonistic to the model of relations that operates in modern-day Russia.

### CONSUMERS: BIG WAGES FOR SELECT SECTORS ONLY

One of the main slogans prior to the Crimean pseudo-referendum on March 19, 2014, was that wages, pensions and social benefits would rise considerably. Among those Crimeans who were drawn to Russia, the image of the standard of living in Russia was shaped by watching TV shows based in Moscow and St. Petersburg, and by the servicemen in the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol, whose salaries were like per diems on international business trips.

Initially, these promises were held: starting in March 2014, salaries for government employees were paid in rubles at a

**Fixed investment by source, 2017, US \$ mn**



Source: "Krymstat," the RF Crimean Statistics agency

higher-than-normal exchange rate. The coefficient used for calculating the exchange difference was 3.0 for commercial entities, which was the actual exchange rate then, but public sector salaries and pensions were calculated at RUB 3.80 to the UAH, a kind of "reward for betrayal."

In 2014, food products on the shelves of Crimean stores were still mostly Ukrainian-made, inexpensive and of good quality, so the first year, pensioners, officials, teachers and doctors saw their buying power go up. But by the beginning of 2015, the Russian system began to be used to calculate wages and pensions. Meanwhile, Ukrainian goods began to disappear from shelves, to be replaced by costlier Russian equivalents, and eventually deliveries from the mainland stopped altogether when activists set up a blockade at the end of 2015 and the Government of Ukraine changed its policies.

By 2016 it was obvious that Russian salaries and pensions were actually a lot smaller than "advertised" in 2014. Between the higher prices for Russian goods and the steep decline of the ruble in the aftermath of Russia's aggression against Ukraine completely wiped out the illusory effects of 2014. An additional complication affecting the social status of Crimeans was a decline in the real number of jobs available to locals because of an influx of workers from nearby Russian provinces.

A look at discussions about salary levels in Crimean forums suggests that the average nominal salary in Crimea in 2016–2017 was in the range of RUB 10,000–15,000, although official statistics say it was close to RUB 25,000. Many public sector employees get around RUB 8,00–12,000. The exceptions are officials in government offices, police, military personnel, and workers in prosecutors' offices, the judiciary and the military-industrial complex, whose salaries are 5–10 times higher than the average in Crimea. Meanwhile, the average pension was RUB 11,000–12,000 in 2016–2017. In fact, most pensioners get only RUB 10,000.

Our analysis also showed that, compared to 2014, the consumer basket had inflated by 75.16% in ruble terms by 2017 and 154.79% in hryvnia terms based on the exchange rate. All told, the buying power of the Crimean monetary unit in relation to the consumer basket has shrunk eightfold since the peninsula was occupied.

Based on salaries and pensions, Crimea has turned into an ordinary Russian backwater with a low standard and quality of life. As nominal salaries go down while priority sectors, as Russia defines them, see their salaries go up and up, Crimean society will polarize more and more between highly-paid Russian workers and the original residents of the peninsula, who will watch their capacity to purchase systematically shrink. ■



# Serhiy Nayev: "The Joint Forces should put an end to Russian aggression against Ukraine"



*The Ukrainian Week* discussed the first results of the Joint Forces Operation in the Donbas with its commander, Lieutenant-General Serhiy Nayev.

## What changes have already occurred since the start of the Joint Forces Operation?

– Unlike the ATO, the Joint Forces Operation (JFO) operation is a military one. At the same time, it is a package of military, organisational and legal measures aimed at guaranteeing national security and defence, as well as the deterrence and repression of Russian armed aggression.

We are dealing with the occupation of certain districts of the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions by a Russian aggressor that has created the bogus "DPR" and "LPR" organisations and keeps them at the point of bayonets in order to weaken and destabilise Ukraine.

In essence, the 1st and 2nd Army Corps that the occupants have formed in the territories under their control in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions respectively are subordinated to the Southern Military District of the Russian Armed Forces. Both corps are part of the 8th Army, whose headquarters are located in Novocherkassk (Russia). The occupation forces receive arms, ammunition, fuels and lubricants, money and food from Russian territory. It should be noted that all positions in these formations above company commander are staffed with Russian officers. This is primarily due to the Russian command's distrust of the local traitors. The units of the Russian occupation troops are also mainly made up of Russian "holidaymakers" and "volunteers" that are convicted criminals, Russian nationalists or other adventurers

who have been recruited to participate in the war in Ukraine by Russian military enlistment offices.

Therefore, we are dealing with Russian armed aggression and should act accordingly. At the same time, the main task is to prevent the spread of this occupation to other territories of Ukraine.

I want to emphasise that the JFO is just one of the tools by which the state will achieve the liberation of the temporarily occupied territories in the Donetsk and Luhansk Regions and restore constitutional order there. Our mission is also to protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of individuals and legal entities, as well as to ensure the independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine.

In this regard, a special regime began to operate in certain areas on April 30. The security and defence forces, in addition to other state bodies involved in the JFO, have been granted special powers, notably to use lethal and non-lethal weapons, to detain persons and hand them over to the police, to check documents, to carry out personal inspections of citizens, their belongings and vehicles, to temporarily restrict or prohibit the movement of transport and pedestrians, to enter residential and other premises belonging to citizens, and to use for official purposes the transport and communication facilities of citizens, enterprises and organisations, except for the transport of diplomatic and international organisations.

It should be noted that the special regime was mainly introduced due to the actions of the enemy (the use of weapons, preparation and implementation of terrorist acts or sabotage) that threaten the safety of the Joint Forces (JF) and the local popu-

lation. At the same time, it can be introduced when the JF are conducting intelligence operations, combat training, demining the area and other facilities, and responding to natural and man-made emergencies.

The JFO territory is divided into a safety zone and a combat area. In the safety zone, the JF commander can decide to create both restricted and prohibited areas. It is possible to get into restricted-access areas with a special permit from the JF commander or the commanders of operational tactical groups. No unauthorised persons are allowed in the forbidden areas at all – a special pass is required.

The combat area is understood to be the area along the contact line, where units of the Armed Forces, other military formations and law enforcement officers conduct combat missions to prevent the enemy from breaking through into the territory of the state. It is clear that access to such territories is only possible with special permission.

At the same time, the reason for admitting persons not involved in the operation to the JFO area may be: the residence of a person or close relatives there (confirmed by documents), if a burial place of family members is located there, the death of close relatives, property ownership in the area of operations and participation in settling the conflict, in particular the resolution of humanitarian issues, as well as diplomatic and consular activities.

**How have relations between Ukrainian military and security agencies changed with the transfer of command to the Armed Forces? Has this effected the quality with which tasks are carried out?**

– The need to change the ATO format was long overdue. Our military enemy is one of the most powerful armies in the world. This is a treacherous opponent that actively uses the tools of hybrid warfare. Accordingly, our actions in confronting this enemy must be rapid, timely and proactive. This can be achieved through an effective centralised management system.

Since the beginning of the JFO, the chain of command for bases and units performing combat missions in the Donbas has changed. While the ATO was previously subordinate to the Anti-Terrorist Centre of the Security Service (SBU), the JFO is currently under the strategic command of the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

This has made it possible to increase the efficiency of the JF during operations. A major advantage of the JF is the system for coordinating the actions of the military and law enforcement officers, as well as their cooperation with the military-civilian administrations. Indeed, not only military tasks are assigned to us. The JF are also involved in law enforcement activities and conducting international cooperation, as well as humanitarian campaigns.

As an example, I can refer to the Help East strategic humanitarian initiative that I launched to incorporate the most effective practices for assisting the civilian population living in the combat area. This work was begun while I was leading Operational Command East and a task force in the ATO zone.

**What issues remain unresolved or need improvement?**

– Of course, during the operation, we perform a wide range of tasks. In particular, this refers to establishing defensive positions, following the procedure for admitting people to the area of operations, ensuring provisions and training reserves.

Measures to save the lives of fighters and reduce combat losses are a separate task. The soldier as a person, their fate and future have been and remain among the main priorities for us.

We continue to equip JF bases and units with modern weaponry. In particular, this refers to defensive weapons such as anti-tank missile systems, counter-tank combat systems and battlefield intelligence tools.

Separately, I would like to focus on solving humanitarian problems in the region. Citizens of Ukraine living in the Donbas,

**Serhiy Nayev** was born on 30 April 1970 in Mohyliv-Podilskyi, Vinnytsia Region. In 1987-1991, he studied at the Moscow Higher Military Command School. In 1991-1993, he served as a platoon commander in the Western Group of Forces (Germany), after which he returned to Ukraine. He has been part of the Armed Forces of Ukraine since May 1993. In 1993-1999, he served in command positions from the commander of a mechanised platoon and intelligence company to Chief of Staff of a Motorised Infantry Regiment in the Carpathian Military District. In 2001, he graduated from the Ukrainian National Academy of Defence with a gold medal. From 2001 to 2003, he was the commander of a mechanised regiment under Operational Command West. From 2003 to 2006, he commanded a separate mechanised brigade under Operational Command South. In 2007, he graduated from the Operational and Strategic Faculty at the National Defence University. In 2007, he became deputy chief of staff of the 13th Army Corps of the Ukrainian Ground and in 2012 was promoted to deputy commander of the same unit. From 2015 to 2017, he was commander of Operational Command East for the Ground Forces. In 2017-2018 – Chief of Staff and First Deputy Commander of the Ground Forces. On 5 March 2018, he was appointed deputy chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of Ukraine. Since 16 March 2018, he has been Commander of the Joint Forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces.

whether they are in areas around the demarcation line or the temporarily occupied territories, should be sure that the JF will do everything possible and necessary in order to restore the rule of law in these territories.

We hope that the main burden of solving economic and social problems will be taken on by professionals in the Military-Civil Administrations. This concerns renewing the full-fledged work of industrial facilities, developing horizontal economic ties, promoting small and medium-sized businesses, and reducing unemployment. It is clear that this refers to regions that are under our control.

**Have you recorded any changes or activity on the part of the enemy that can be considered a kind of response to changing the format of the operation?**

– The beginning of the JFO did not go unnoticed by the enemy. This was mainly seen in the intensification of measures designed to have an informational and psychological impact on the population of the temporarily occupied territories and the rest of Ukraine, as well as the international community. The main objective of the enemy's actions is to discredit not only the JF command or the military and law enforcement officers involved in the operation, but also the state leadership in general and the policy of reintegrating the temporarily occupied territories. In addition, we have noted an intensification in the operations of sabotage and reconnaissance groups around the demarcation line.

At the same time, it should be noted that the number of attacks on our positions has decreased. The enemy has realised that we will decidedly rebuff any provocation, especially those involving the shelling of peaceful settlements and checkpoints along the contact line, which primarily impacts the inhabitants of cities and villages in the Donbas.

We will not allow the enemy to undermine the process of normalising life in areas controlled by Ukraine and we will work towards this in all available ways.

The JF should put an end to the Russian aggression against Ukraine. This is the mission put before me as a commander by the president of Ukraine, the commander-in-chief of the Armed Forces. We are performing this task. Our strength is in unity, so victory will be ours. ■

# The island of bureaucrats and soldiers

How Russia is turning Crimea into a military base by changing its economy and society

Maksym Vikhrov



**The land of fatigues.** Like Kaliningrad Oblast, Crimea is primarily the military base allowing Russia to deploy huge forces right under the West's nose

The occupiers widely advertised the Kerch Bridge they opened in May 2018 as a symbol of political, administrative and economic “unification” with Russia. The problem is that the peninsula’s economy will not be rescued by such projects — its biggest troubles are caused primarily by Moscow’s policy, not infrastructure issues or international sanctions. The developments in Crimea after 2014 show that the occupiers are returning it into the 18-19th centuries when it was nothing more than a southern military outpost of the empire.

This is bad news for the Crimeans — anything that does not serve Russia’s military or administrative needs will inevitably stagnate and gradually decline. Nothing short of external interference will be able to change this.

## THE GREAT DEPRESSION

The occupational authorities are not trying to conceal Crimea’s economic dependence. According to their data, Crimea’s 2017-2018 budget has a deficit of RUB 2bn [current exchange rate is RUB 67.18 per US dollar] with the revenues amounting to RUB 172.2bn and spending to RUB 174.7bn. The ac-

tual short age may be far higher: Vitaliy Nakhlapin, the “first vice-premier” of Crimea, has said that the deficit of the 2017-2018 budget exceeds RUB 20bn. The major source of this is the economic isolation resulting from the sanctions, shunned by investors. Just two weeks ago, American Best Western Hotels & Resorts closed down in Crimea — this was the last Western hotel chain operating there. According to current data, some companies, such as Volkswagen, Adidas, Puma and DHL, still work there as the EU sanctions only concern some sectors of the economy. But this does not change the overall result dramatically. Russian statistics estimated total foreign investment in Crimea at 7.2% in 2014, 3.3% in 2015, 3.4% in 2016 and 1.2% in 2017.

The Russian business, too, is losing interest in the peninsula. Back in 2014, Russia accounted for 45% and 43.9% of the total investments and budget transfers in Crimea. Over 2016-2017, private investments collapsed from 33.4% to 14.2%. Fear of international sanctions played a role in this after they hit some Russian companies involved in the construction of the Kerch Bridge. Overall, 44 Russian and Crimean companies and 155 individuals are currently under international sanctions.



Sanctions are not the sole source of Crimea's troubles. The occupational authorities publish their statistics selectively. They conceal the figures for some industries, including the extraction of minerals, water supply, administration and a number of others. Still, the data that is available provides a good enough diagnosis of systemic troubles in Crimea's economy.

Crimean businesses involved in agriculture, forestry and fishery, transportation and storage, ended 2017 with losses. Hotels and restaurants ended up in the same category. The total number of loss-making businesses in the region ranged between 35% and 45% in 2017. These include public enterprises. The Crimean Seaports state-owned company reported RUB 13.8mn of losses in 2014. In 2017, its losses rose to RUB 97mn. Crimean Autotransport, another state-owned company, generated profits in 2016 but ended 2017 with a deficit of RUB 228mn. The losses of Crimean Power Generating Systems grew from RUB 1.6mn to RUB 19.2mn between 2015 and 2016.

The occupational authorities declared multiple plans of a privatization campaign but never carried them out. What's worse, private business in Crimea is in a more dire position after the assault of the occupational authorities against it: while 54,000 private companies and 135,000 individual entrepreneurs were registered in Crimea in 2014, two years later the Russian statistics counted 22,000 private companies and under 40,000 individual entrepreneurs. According to estimates by the experts of the Maidan of Foreign Affairs, a Kyiv-based NGO, small businesses generated 31.2% of jobs in the region in 2011. Over the years of occupation, this indicator has fallen to 19.5%.

Crimean exports offer another interesting case. The region is seeing an increasing trade deficit, its exports going down from US \$79.5mn in 2015 and US \$47.7mn in 2016 to US \$29.8mn in 2017. Its imports are far higher, albeit shrinking as well from US \$100.1mn in 2015 down to US \$63.4mn in 2017. It therefore comes as no surprise that Crimea's "Council of Ministers" published a budget forecast in the winter of 2018 claiming that the region will have to be subsidized at least through 2030. The authors of the forecast claim that any improvements will come from "revenues from Russia's budget system", i.e. subsidies. Crimea is already heavily dependent on them as 82.5% of all investments in the peninsula are the funds from the federal budget, while the share of subsidies in the revenue section of the budget is as high as 67%.

Where exactly the subsidy money is going is a big question. Over the years of the annexation, Russian investment in the region has amounted to nearly US \$6bn. These are the figures from reports and statements by the occupational authorities. What they don't indicate is the depreciation of Crimea's capital assets, including buildings and constructions, machinery and equipment, transportation and so on — numbers on these barely change in the statistics over the years of the occupation. The "official" statistics estimated it at 70.5% in 2014 and at 69.8% in 2016. No serious military projects, other than the Kerch Bridge, have been implemented in the region. Promises have been floating around to remodel Belbek, a military airport, into a civilian one, but the latest delay rescheduled it to 2020. Another project for 2020 is to complete Tavrida, the federal highway between Sevastopol and Kerch. Meanwhile, Moscow seems to be busy with military projects of scales that leave anyone guessing. The funding that remains after that is not a resource for the development of Crimea's economy, but the life support therapy that keeps the region from ultimate degradation by merely slowing down the process.

### THE ILLUSION OF THRIVING

The issue of the quality of life in Crimea has been sidelined meanwhile. According to Russian statistics, average monthly income per capita was RUB 15,600 in 2014, RUB 18,000 in 2016, and RUB

21,300 in 2017, and RUB 24,000 for Sevastopol in 2017. The same figure for the Southern Federal District of Russia was RUB 27,200, and RUB 31,400 across Russia. Apparently, the annexed Crimea is not among Russia's most affluent regions. Still, even these figures are to be interpreted with caution.

Firstly, official statistics are hardly reliable -- the real wages of Crimeans are significantly below the nominal numbers. The occupational administration reports the average wage in finance and insurance at RUB 65,200. But databases of vacancies across Russia rarely list such offerings: only two out of 201 full-time job offerings in this segment start at RUB 50,000, while the rest normally range between RUB 12,000 and 20,000. The same goes for the mining industry. Statistics list the average wage there at RUB 58,000 while the database of vacancies offers such figures for one in every four jobs only. The officially declared wage for doctors is at RUB 50,000 but the real offering is at RUB 20-25,000 with extra bonuses for administrative positions. More generally, only 11% of job offerings in the database of vacancies for Simferopol pay over RUB 30,000. 17% offer RUB 25-29,000, and the rest offer less than that.

RUSSIA'S POLICY OF CADRE COLONIZATION, MILITARIZATION AND INTEGRATION WITHIN PUTIN'S AUTHORITARIAN REGIME HAS VIRTUALLY KILLED ALL OF THE REGION'S STATUS AS A PLAYER IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS. THE MOST CRIMEAN ELITE CAN HOPE TO GET NOW IS SMALL RENT FROM THE SUBSIDIES CONTROLLED BY THE CURATORS IN MOSCOW

Secondly, the income statistics is affected by the militarization of Crimea. According to the Russian Defense Ministry, the wages for Russian contract servicemen range between RUB 20,000 for a rank-and-file soldier and RUB 67,600 for a platoon commander. Civilian personnel at military units and organizations within the Russian MoD framework is paid between RUB 11,000 and 40,000. High wages are also typically paid to the functionaries of the occupational regime. All this results in a serious gap between the earnings of most Crimeans and the military and bureaucrats. The same disproportion exists between the pensioners who make up 31.5% of Crimea's population or nearly 0.7 million people. According to the occupational administration, the average pension in Crimea is RUB 12,000 and RUB 13,000 in Sevastopol. The gap lies between normal pensions and those paid to the retired military who preferred to retire in Crimea back in the soviet days.

Thirdly, the question is who exactly receives high wages? The annexation of Crimea was followed by the inflow of Russians to the peninsula. According to Ukraine's State Statistics Bureau, the population of Crimea was 2.3 million people before January 1, 2014, including 386,000 in Sevastopol. According to the official Russian statistics now — however reliable it is — Crimea's population shrank to 2.2 million by January 1, 2018, including to 362,000 in Sevastopol. The highest inflow of immigrants to Crimea is from Russia. Over 2015-2017, 52,500 people left Crimea and 88,200 arrived to the peninsula (this does not take into account Sevastopol). 54.5% of the new residents have come from Russia. Sevastopol has seen an even higher inflow of the Russians: 21,700 people arrived in the city over 2016-2017, 62.6% of them Russians. It is therefore reasonable to assume that most of the widely advertised "high Russian wages" are not of the Crimeans, but of the Russians who have settled in the peninsula in the past few years.

### THE ARCHITECTURE OF LOYALTY

Emine Dzheparova, Deputy Minister of Information Policy, believes that the real number of Russian immigrants in Crimea can be double or triple the official number. Experts of Information Resistance, a volunteer intelligence and analytical group, assume that

the population of Crimea has changed by 17-25% over the years of occupation. Whatever the actual numbers are, this demographic Russification of Crimea is cementing the occupational authorities.

This is aggravated by the fact that many people loyal to Ukraine have left Crimea after 2014. If they had stayed at home, these people could have become domestic opposition to the occupational regime. By and large, Crimean Tatars remain the one local group most loyal to Ukraine, but their influence is weakened by relatively small numbers. According to Ukrainian statistics, Crimean Tatars accounted for 11% of the peninsula's population in the early 2014, i.e. 232,000 people. By contrast, the immigrants from Russia — especially the military and the bureaucrats — are both comfortable with the status quo and extremely loyal to Russia and Vladimir Putin who has given them the opportunity to migrate to the peninsula. Crimean pensioners, too, are loyal to Russia as many of them served in the soviet army or special services and underwent the respective ideological preparation.

Russian statistics estimated total foreign investment in Crimea at 7.2% in 2014, 3.3% in 2015, 3.4% in 2016 and 1.2% in 2017

Thirdly, Moscow's cadre policy for Crimea ensures that it stays under its tight control. After the annexation, the "government", "parliament" and "Supreme Court" of Crimea were chaired by the locals as before — Sergei Aksionov, Vladimir Konstantinov and Igor Radionov. In the Russian system, however, these positions are quite nominal since the institutions of parliamentarism are virtually defunct in Russia while regional self-governance is cemented within the power hierarchy. The rest of the key positions in Crimea were taken by the tried and tested cadres from Russia. The "Prosecutor's Office" of Crimea is chaired by Oleg Kamshilov, ex-first deputy prosecutor of Moscow. Chief of the "police" is Pavel Karanda, ex-deputy head of the Russian Interior Ministry's Department in Vologda Oblast. Viktor Palagin was transferred from Bashkortostan to head Crimean FSB. Even the "Ministry of Emergencies" in Crimea is chaired by Aleksandr Yermeyev who was transferred from Siberia. Before the annexation, all these positions had been occupied by people from the Party of Regions. Russian ex-deputy minister of industry and trade Dmitriy Osviannikov was "elected" as "Governor of Sevastopol" at a pseudo-referendum. A group of "Crimeans" is now present in the Russian State Duma. But they will hardly spoil their careers in Moscow to help their distant compatriots. Otherwise, Crimea has no representatives of its own to lobby for its regional interests in Russia. Even if the local elite is incorporated within the occupational structures

dares to rebel against the bureaucrats imported from Russia, it will have no chance of success as the region is entirely dependent on transfers from the Russian budget.

## MOSCOW'S TOY

All this makes the consequences of the annexation for Crimea far deeper than mere political subordination to Moscow and international sanctions. First and foremost, the annexation is changing its economy. Far from investing into the development of the territory it has occupied, Russia is quietly transforming Crimea from the "resort of the entire Soviet Union" into its military outpost. It is difficult to say how strategically important it is for Russia. But the effect of this militarization is already obvious. The industries that could have become the foundation of the regional economy, including tourism, are not developing. As a result, the peninsula is tumbling into an ever deeper dependence on subsidies from the federal budget. In their propaganda, the occupiers present this as the challenges of the transitional period. But some destructive processes are looking ever more irreversible.

This is especially true for the state of the environment. Ukraine's Ministry for the Temporarily Occupied Territory reports that 70% of Crimea's green steppe has either dried up or has been more damaged compared to the pre-annexation period. Deputy Minister Yuriy Hrymchak says that the peninsula is returning to the state in which it was returned to the Ukrainian SSR in the mid-1950s and the revitalization of Crimea was launched with the mainland's resources. If this trend persists, Crimea will turn into a supplement of Russian military bases, not the window of the Russian World as many in Russia had claimed.

Similar processes are taking place in the socio-political field. Russia's policy of cadre colonization, militarization and integration within Putin's authoritarian regime has virtually killed all of the region's status as a player in the political process. The most Crimean elite can hope to get now is small rent from the subsidies controlled by the curators in Moscow.

At the same time, Moscow does not price Crimea's loyalty too dearly. Chechnia will receive RUB 27bn in subsidies in 2018 and Dagestan will get RUB 59bn. Yakutia will receive RUB 43.9bn, followed by RUB 39.3bn for Kamchatka Krai and RUB 27.1bn for Altai. Crimea will receive a mere RUB 17.1bn in subsidies.

Crimea's integration into the Russian system is changing the way its resources and power are distributed — these are concentrated more and more in the hands of "the president's men", primarily officials and siloviki, the law enforcement bloc. Being part of these structures in Russia opens some good prospects in terms of career, status and income. Mainly, however, it protects the individual from other bureaucrats and siloviki. Those who live on subsidies and donations, including pensioners, public sector employees and recipients of all kinds of privileges can provide some stability as well — their loyalty reinforces Putin's hierarchy during the periods of the growing public frustration in Russia.

The one class that will have a hard time in Crimea is the middle class. The attack against the local business which the occupiers launched after the aggression may well just be an introduction. While in 2014 Russia guaranteed the owners that their property would remain intact based on Ukrainian documents, in the spring of 2018 Russia's Ministry of Economy drafted amendments to this. They abolish guarantees for the objects with ownership rights acquired after January 1, 2008. If these amendments are enacted, this will open endless opportunities for confiscating people's property.

Moreover, the redistribution of property was launched in Crimea in 2014 before any amendments. The Crimean society seems to have got the message: Crimeans are no longer the masters of their peninsula. The new masters have their own plans for the region and have no intention of getting consent from the locals. ■



**The bridge is ours.** Connection with the mainland Russia will make military logistics easier for Russia but will not solve Crimea's economic problems

# The cost of cool

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Air-conditioners do great good, but at a high environmental cost. The rapid growth in their use makes it urgent to limit the damage

“Air-Conditioning cannot be a grand success in the [American] South for the reason that the honest natives of the region recognise the natural summer heat as a welcome ally, in that it makes the inside of houses and offices agreeably uninviting.” In the annals of mistaken predictions, this one — made in 1935 by Clarence Cason, author of “90° in the Shade” — merits an honourable mention. In fact, air-conditioning soon became universal south of the Mason-Dixon line, turning the South into an engine of prosperity and even reshaping its politics by luring Republican migrants to a region that had once been a Democratic stronghold.

The stifling summer of 2018 in the northern hemisphere has been a banner season for air-conditioners and a reminder of how they have changed the world. Sales in France in the first three weeks of July were 192% higher than in the same period of 2017. In Japan, the government is helping schools install coolers. In Texas, on the orders of a judge, the state government has been putting them into prisons.

At current growth rates, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), which advises national governments, 1bn air-conditioners will be installed globally in the next ten years. That would increase the world’s stock — 1.6bn in 2016 — by two-thirds (see chart). If you include refrigerators and systems that cool food, vaccines and data, the stock could be 6bn units in a decade. The growth in cooling will save lives, improve education and create wealth in the world’s hottest countries. But it brings huge environmental risks, warming the planet even as it cools people.

Lee Kuan Yew, the first prime minister of Singapore, took the view that air-conditioning “changed the nature of civilisa-

tion by making development possible in the tropics... The first thing I did upon becoming prime minister was to install air-conditioners in buildings where the civil service worked. This was key to public efficiency.”


## WHEN CHINA BECAME COOL

In 1990 few Chinese households had air-conditioning. Twenty years later, the country had just under one unit per household. It now accounts for 35% of the world’s stock, compared with 23% for the United States. India and Indonesia are seeing rates of increase similar to China’s in

At current growth rates, according to the International Energy Agency (IEA), which advises national governments, 1bn air-conditioners will be installed globally in the next ten years. That would increase the world’s stock — 1.6bn in 2016 — by two-thirds (see chart). If you include refrigerators and systems that cool food, vaccines and data, the stock could be 6bn units in a decade

## Chilling times

World, air-conditioning units, bn



Source: International Energy Agency

the 1990s. The population of the 800km long southern coast of the Arabian Gulf increased from 500,000 in 1950 to 20m now, thanks to air-conditioned vertical palaces. At current rates, Saudi Arabia will be using more energy to run air-conditioners in 2030 than it now exports as oil.

At the moment, only 8% of the 3bn people in the tropics have air-conditioning, compared with over 90% of households in America and Japan. But eventually, it will be near universal because so many trends are converging behind its spread: ageing, since old people are more vulnerable to heat stroke; urbanisation, since fields cannot be air-conditioned but offices and factories must be; and economic growth, since, after mobile phones, the middle class in emerging markets want fans or air-conditioners next. Even the proliferation of skyscrapers in the developing world’s megacities encourages air-conditioners. Because tall buildings have different air pressures at top and bottom, they usually have to be sealed, and cooled in summer. Shopping malls, open-plan offices and data-processing centres are all inconceivable without air-conditioning.

Environmentalists fret about this. An article in the Washington Post excoriated “the deluded world of air-conditioning”. Another in the New York Times castigated buildings so cold in summer that “I could preserve dead bodies in the office.” Yet air-conditioning makes people, literally, healthier, wealthier and wiser. A study by Tord Kjellstrom of Australian National University found that, in South-East Asia, people without cooling could not work during 15-20% of working hours. It was too darned hot. Solomon Hsiang of the University of California, Berkeley calculated that, in the Caribbean and Central America, GDP falls by 1% for each degree above 26°C. In the tropics, cooling boosts productivity.

The same goes for learning. A recent study in PLOS Medicine, a weekly journal, by Jose Guillermo Cedeño of Harvard





**To save or to kill?** The scientists give a lot of pros and cons about air conditioners

University, followed two groups of college students in Boston during the summer of 2016. Those living in air-conditioned rooms did significantly better in a variety of cognitive tests than their peers in uncooled digs. Studies in Denmark showed that air-conditioning schools improved children's ability to learn mathematics and languages.

Most simply, cooling also saves lives. Western Europe suffered a withering heatwave in 2003; 11,000-17,000 more deaths than normal were attributed to it in France, mainly from cardiovascular and heart disease. There was a public outcry and the government brought in a range of reforms, including making air-conditioning mandatory in old-people's

homes. This year France has been even hotter than in 2003 but excess deaths so far seem to have been much lower: the health minister recently said the number of hospitalisations this summer has been only slightly greater than normal. Europe, it seems, is learning to cope. In Spain, according to a study by Joan Ballester of the Barcelona Institute for Global Health, heat-related deaths fell between 1980 and 2015, though average summer temperatures rose almost 1°C and there were more old people. In south-west Germany, says Stefan Muthers of the German Weather Service, 2003 and 2015 were the two warmest summers in the past 50 years; 1,700 people died in 2003 but the death toll in 2015 was almost 20% lower.

Heatwaves take an even bigger toll in poor countries that are unable to protect themselves. The World Health Organisation (WHO) forecasts that, without adaptation (which is of course happening), over a quarter of a million extra deaths could be attributable to rising temperatures by 2050 — about as many as the number of deaths in childbirth now.

If the definition of air-conditioning is widened to include cold chains for food, industrial processes or vaccines, the overall market increases — and so does its capacity for good. According to Toby Peters of Birmingham University in Britain, cooling for things such as industry, food and data storage uses only a little less energy than air-conditioning. Refrigerated transport is not far behind. These have as many benefits as cooling buildings.

## BETWEEN FARM AND FORK

In many developing countries, half the food crop is lost to rats and insects after harvest. Reducing that through refrigeration in storage or transport could do more to boost overall food availability than a new green revolution. In the process, it would also limit the greenhouse-gas emissions from wasted agricultural production. According to the WHO, 600m people fall ill at some point each year — and over 400,000 die — from eating contaminated food. A quarter of liquid vaccines are spoiled because they are not kept properly chilled. The death toll from diseases that could be vaccinated against but aren't, says the WHO, is 1.5m a year, more than die in road accidents. Better cooling would reduce all these harms.

However, as Homer Simpson, an American philosopher, said of alcohol, air-conditioning is the cause of, and solution to, many of life's problems. In "Losing Our Cool", a book from 2010, Stan Cox, an agricultural scientist, listed some of its damages: "emission of greenhouse gases...ozone-depleting chemicals [and] a lever to open ecologically vulnerable parts of the country to reckless growth." He even blamed it for obesity caused (he said) by sitting around in artificially cooled refuges. A recent article in PLOS Medicine, by David Abel and colleagues at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, calculated that, by 2050, there will be 17,000 excess deaths in the eastern half of the United States from an increase of ozone and PM2.5 in the atmosphere (pollutants with a diameter of 2.5 microns or less). Air-conditioning, the authors think, will be responsible for almost 1,000 of those deaths.

Air-conditioners produce greenhouse gases in two ways. First, they are responsible for a share of the CO<sub>2</sub> generated in the power stations that produce the electricity they run on. At the moment, according to the IEA, it takes about 2,000 TWhs (terawatt hours) of electricity to run all the world's cooling machines for a year. This produces 4bn tons of CO<sub>2</sub>, 12% of the total. Without drastic improvements in air-conditioners' efficiency, the IEA reckons, they will be burning up 6,000 TWhs by 2050.

On hot days in Riyadh, air-conditioners account for 70% of electricity demand during peak hours, usually the early evening. Peak hours matter because countries must build enough power stations to meet the maximum demand. But most of the time full capacity is not used, meaning firms earn nothing from it. So energy companies build peak capacity as cheaply as possible, which often means using coal or diesel. So demand for air-conditioning is pushing countries to build not just more power plants, but more polluting ones.

Second, air-conditioners use so-called “F gases” (such as hydrofluorocarbons, or HFCs) as refrigerants. When — as is common — the machines leak in use or on disposal, these gases escape, doing vast damage. HFCs trap between 1,000 and 9,000 times as much heat as the same amount of CO<sub>2</sub>, meaning they are much more potent causes of global warming. On this basis, Paul Hawken of Project Drawdown, a think-tank, calculates that improving air-conditioners could do more than anything else to reduce greenhouse gases.

### HITTING THE FAN

Fatih Birol, the head of the IEA, calls the insatiable energy demands of air-conditioning “one of the most critical blind spots in today’s energy debate”. Slowly, that blind spot is being opened up. In 2017, the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory in California, a research centre, calculated the extra carbon emissions that could be saved if air-conditioners were better. If HFCs were phased out and all units were as efficient as the best ones, the world could be spared around

1,000 average-sized (500MW capacity) power stations by 2030. There would be many more air-conditioning units, but each would use less energy. In India, this would save three times as much in carbon emissions as the prime minister’s much-vaunted plan to install 100 gigawatts of solar capacity by 2022. In China, it would save as much as eight Three Gorges dams (the largest dam in the world).

Such gains will not be easy to achieve. A common way to improve energy efficiency is to impose minimum energy standards or energy codes for buildings. But these vary from country to country (they are stricter in Japan and Europe than in America, for example). And most poor, hot countries do not even have them.

Getting rid of toxic refrigerant gases also depends on regulation, in this case an international agreement called the Kigali amendment (after the Rwandan capital where it was approved). The deal sets a timetable for phasing down the toxic gases. The trouble is that, to win the backing of tropical countries, the agreement allows them more than a decade to phase the gases out. Since air-conditioners often have a useful life of more than ten years, it could take until 2038 before the full effects of the Kigali amendment come into force — a long time to wait when demand for cooling is growing so fast. With the deal, argues Dan Hamza-Goodacre, boss of the Kigali Cooling-Efficiency Programme, a non-governmental organisation, air-conditioners can produce better health, higher productivity and more food while limiting the rise in global temperatures. In its absence, people cannot have those benefits without the environmental costs. ■

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
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
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# One year, two languages, thousands of reasons

The passage of the German-Ukrainian Year of Languages

**Ernst Reichel**, Ambassador of Germany to Ukraine,  
**Beate Köhler**, Director of Goethe Institut Ukraine



**Podium discussion called “Internat/Інтернат: The art of translation.”** Participants: Sabina Stöhr, Yuriy Durkot, Serhiy Zhadan, Maria Ivanytska (moderator) at the Mystetskiy Arsenal [Art Arsenal]. Zhadan’s 2018 book *Internat* was awarded the Leipzig Book Fair award for best translated work

*Bormaschyna* (Bohrmaschine or drill), *wunderkind*, *schukh-liada* (Schubblade or drawer), *drushliak* (Durchschlag or sieve), and *vinshuvate* (Wünschen or to wish) are just some of the words that connect millions of Ukrainians to the German language. In addition, more than 700,000 Ukrainians know what the expressions “Dankeschön” and “Herzlich Willkommen” mean, simply because they are already studying German and using it as a foreign language. This number alone puts Ukraine in an impressive 5<sup>th</sup> place in the world.

“Take the next step!” This is the slogan we used to promote the German language over the last year. We—the German Embassy and Goethe Institut—, together with the German Academic Exchange Service and the Central Administration for Education Abroad, have been able not just to reach those who are already studying German, but also to acquaint thousands of Ukrainians with it and get their interest.

After all there are many important reasons why people learn it: learning German means preparing for a trip to Germany, as a tourist, a pupil or student, an employee, or an entrepreneur. Learning German means diving into the world of over 100 million native speakers in Europe. Learning German means the opportunity to take a German language course many Ukrainian schools and universities, to relish the rich cultural palette in German films, literature and music, or to dig into the information provided in journals, newspapers, internet sites and specialized literature. Last, but not least, learning German opens considerable professional prospects, from working as a translator to being a German-language tour guide, from a medic to a lawyer, from a political scientist to an engineer, in Germany, in German-speaking countries, or even in one of the nearly 1,000 German companies in Ukraine.

The German-Ukrainian Year of Languages was announced jointly by Ukraine’s Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin and Ger-



## #TAKETHENEXTSTEP

During German-Ukrainian Year of Languages under the banner “Take the next step!” Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany in Ukraine has been publishing stories of people who have taken a step forward in learning German or Ukrainian as a foreign language, about their experiences, impressions, and their pieces of advice.

### Liudmyla Kovalenko-Schneider, Director, Wiederstrahl German Cultural Center:

I first heard German when I was about 8-10, when my great-grandfather sang me some German songs. At the time, German sounded very easy and melodious and when I got into 5th Grade, I began to study it at school.

### Yelyzaveta Styranko, student:

I began to study German out of sheer interest: we had two of my grandmother’s books at home that no one in the family could read. I kept looking at the pictures and the umlauts and I thought the language was enchanting. I like to speak German because it’s a very beautiful language—the language of Goethe and Schiller. I love reading German poetry in the original.

### Maria Karapata, journalist:

Every language is a living organism. Those who learn languages need to always think about this aspect. Try to simply feel and develop an affection for the German language—and you will open up much more than just “unattractive” words like *Schmetterling* [butterfly] and *Kugelschreiber* [ballpoint pen].

many’s then-Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier in the fall of 2016 in Berlin. In honor of 25 years of partnerly relations between the two countries, language should also play a significant role, it should be learned and knowledge of it deepened. After all, cooperation in education and learning foreign languages is a natural component of cooperation at the political and economic levels.

True cooperation has never been a one-way street: just as we used the Year of Languages in Ukraine to promote German, our colleagues at the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry and foreign missions in Germany promoted the mellifluousness of the Ukrainian language and the prospects for learning it. Ukrainian is already offered in many universities in Germany and we hope that, thanks to the German-Ukrainian Year of Languages, it will become even more popular.

“Take the next step!” is how we appealed, together with our Ukrainian partners not only those who are studying German in Ukraine but also those studying Ukrainian in Germany.

Looking back at the German-Ukrainian Year of Languages, we can point to many results, starting with more than 100 events in more than 30 towns and cities in Ukraine, and a myriad of events for those who are studying Ukrainian in Germany. In addition to this, we organized 12 months of live debates between Germans and Ukrainians, between older people and youth, between artists and their gallery owners, between writers and their translators, in German and in Ukrainian, synchronized or consecutive translations—and some times even without the assistance of a translator. This is exactly how we hoped, from the very start, that the idea of a German-Ukrainian Year of Languages might turn out. ■



**Motivation.** With the help of tablets in four Ukrainian cities — Zhytomyr, Ivano-Frankivsk, Kyiv and Sumy — the Goethe Institute invited people to learn 10 phrases in German while walking or running through the park



**More than a symbolic achievement.** During the German-Ukrainian Year of Languages, nearly 100 events were held in 30 Ukrainian cities and towns

PHOTO: EMBASSY OF GERMANY

PHOTO: GOETHE-INSTITUT UKRAINE

# What's wrong with values?

Why the principles of the existence of society become empty abstractions

Philippe de Lara, Paris

Both pro-Europeans and Maidan activists have made and make great use of the concept of “values”. They promote politics based on values. This is noble and legitimate. It means principled politics as opposed to cynicism and brute force: things like the rule of law, human dignity, preference for rationality and open criticism rather than prejudice and emotion. Two centuries ago, Kant gave the insuperable formula of values in politics: our principles of action must be universal and public. It means, first, that our principles must be valid for anyone and set an example for others, and second, that motives and objectives are acceptable only if they could be publicly expressed (which does not mean that they have to). This runs from the impartiality of the state and the equality under the law to more substantial principles:

human rights, quest for justice and happiness. “Open society” is the watchword of values.

It has become fashionable to despise “values”. Values are soiless abstractions, they say, values-based politics naively deny the overwhelming role of power relations in human affairs, domestic and international. Worse, it rules out the politics of identity, that is the will of national or ethnic groups to defend their historical narrative, their way of life and what they take as their existential interests, universal or not. Let us be “realistic”, they say, let us allow for power interests and national pride, instead of denying them. If some nations believe in authoritarian rule or in the superiority of men over women, let them do. Traditional values are as legitimate as universal values. Actually, universal values are challenged because they are



**A place for discussion.** Abortion is one of the most urgent topics when it comes to rights and values. In Poland, this issue is the most exacerbated in Europe

charged for the failures of globalization. This criticism has a point: the universalization of liberal economics and governance and the illusion of “the end of history”, that is that all nations are longing for the European way of life and will join it one way or another, have indeed strong connections with “values”. That’s why the revenge of power politics and identity politics is on a roll, from Putin and Erdogan to Trump and European populists, despite their brutality, bad faith, and disastrous results for the welfare of their people. These guys claim to offer alternative values, we must stand for our values and find how to fight against theirs.

But this is not the whole story. There is something wrong with the current understanding of universal values. This must be acknowledged to cope with brutes. Values activists are too prone nowadays to confuse genuine fundamental issues, not negotiable, with issues open to discussion and compromise. In the name of “values”, they put on the same footing rights which are vital for freedom and democracy, and rights which might be improvements but are liable to discussion, qualification, etc. We are facing brutalization of public discussion once any disagreement on politics or policy takes a civil war tone. By a devilish mechanism, universal values, which should foster freedom, tolerance and friendliness among citizens, generate intractable conflicts and the regression of liberal principles. I suggest calling this the scattering of values. I am aware that this problem is not easy to articulate. Through the following examples, I’ll try to be moderately provocative, to stimulate reflection without unleashing outrage. I beg my readers to take them just as proposals, not as knock-down arguments.

1. Is legal abortion really a human right? Considering legal abortion as a wise and necessary policy is one thing, treating people rejecting abortion for religious or other grounds as fascists is another one. Abortion was legal and even favoured for decades as the primary method of birth control in Soviet Union. Yet Soviet Union was a terrible tyranny, destroying freedom and human dignity in everyday life. Instead of calling names conservatives who deplore abortion or same-sex marriage, liberals should show them respect and tact, and even admit they have a point, at least worth reflecting upon. I support the legal status of abortion in France and I am close to religious people holding the opposite view. This is by no means an obstacle to our friendship, rather a matter of enriching our conversation, which is the purpose of friendship. A simple thought experiment may make the point more obvious: abortion is nowhere a right as such, there are rights to abortion until such and such step of pregnancy. “Abortion until the 12<sup>th</sup> (or the 10<sup>th</sup>, or the 14<sup>th</sup>) week of pregnancy is a fundamental right” sounds ludicrous. Conversely, if we admit that torture is incompatible with fundamental rights, we cannot say that torturing a little bit is compatible.

2. The universality of basic freedom and rights, including for minorities, is not negotiable and should be entrenched in our constitution and our education. But are these rights really at stake whenever such and such minority raise such and such claim? For instance, in the non-negotiable scheme of rights and political recognition of minorities, there is room for various possible compromises regarding education in minority languages or the place in public life of languages other than the official language of the country. In what we stand for, we must be able to distinguish what belongs to core values, and what are more or less remote consequences of standing for such values. Otherwise, the extremists will always have the last word. Integral nation-

alists will be better patriots than civic nationalists, fierce multiculturalists morally better than those who care for national identity, etc. And the former and the latter will be unable to face a deadly threat. In Ukraine, LGBT activists, as well as people demonstrating against the Gay Pride should not forget that if Russia was to invade Ukraine, it would make no difference between them.

War makes my point easier to articulate in the case of Ukraine. But this is a predicament common to all democratic societies. The growing hatred between rednecks and liberals in the United States paved the way for Trump and is paving the way for Putin-like tyrants in Western countries. Instead of opening the civic conversation, pluralism seems to wage civil wars. Liberals have a point when they insist that extremism and violent reactions against progress come from the other side. Conservatives have indeed often a bitter and violent style, behaving like desperate minorities even when the mainstream of public opinion is on their side. That is what push so many of them in the harms of Putin and its likes. But liberals are not innocent either when they promote undue fundamentalization of so-called value issues.

VALUES ACTIVISTS ARE TOO PRONE NOWADAYS TO CONFUSE GENUINE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES, NOT NEGOTIABLE, WITH ISSUES OPEN TO DISCUSSION AND COMPROMISE. IN THE NAME OF “VALUES”, THEY PUT ON THE SAME FOOTING RIGHTS WHICH ARE VITAL FOR FREEDOM AND DEMOCRACY, AND RIGHTS WHICH MIGHT BE IMPROVEMENTS BUT ARE LIABLE TO DISCUSSION AND QUALIFICATION

The party of the Good is as evil as the party of Anger. The extension of the content of human rights goes along with impatience, discontent and intolerance. When freedom and free speech are jeopardized by the furor of “values”, liberal values become accomplice of their worst enemy. Our standards of respect and dignity are much more sensitive and demanding than our predecessors’. We don’t accept any more gender and race discriminations which were once seen as unfortunate but acceptable. This is a good thing: equality is better when it is more inclusive. But this enhanced sensibility must not go against the basic liberal values of toleration, freedom of conscience and protection of intimacy. Such values should supersede any other considerations, notably our craving for transparency and for recognition. Challenging the right to privacy of politicians leads to challenging everyone’s privacy. Interpreting the equal rights and equal dignity of gay people as the duty to like them is dangerous and self-defeating. Toleration is liberal, mandatory love is not, as the Russian rhetoric of love shows us every day.

Scattering of values is a nonstarter because values make sense only as a global scheme in which they are intertwined and hierarchized in some order. No value is absolute, values are bound to limit each other. See the values of merit and of equal opportunity: we are right in cherishing both, yet they seem incompatible at first sight. But both are effective only if properly combined. We have to distinguish core principles from those which are less important and liable to interpretation and weighing. All this should be common sense but is becoming less and less intelligible. Therefore, I suggest to speak of “European civilization” instead of “European values”, to recover the sense of toleration and friendliness which is challenged not only by brutes but also by misplaced confusions and escalations about “values”. ■



# The problem with Irish

Ignoring the language issue risks the likelihood that Ukrainian will disappear altogether in Ukraine

Oleksandr Kramar



A few years ago, Manchán Magan, an Irish writer and journalist, travelled across Ireland from Dublin pretending he only spoke Irish. He discovered that the staff of most service providers and stores could not communicate with him. Here is how Magan described one of his experiences: “Do you speak English?” a sales assistant asked in a cold intimidating voice. ‘Sea,’ I said, nodding meekly. ‘Well, can you speak English to me now?’ I told him as simply as I could that I was trying to get by with Irish. ‘I’m not talking to you any more,’ he said. ‘Go away.’” Encouragingly, Magan told the sales assistant that he could understand him if he spoke English. “English only,” was the answer from the sales assistant’s boss, who repeated it twice. When Magan asked them what other languages he could speak to them in, they pointed to a list of seven countries on the wall.

Magan encountered many problems in other parts of the country. His terrible experience was especially shocking given that official Irish statistics are that 25-40% of his countrymen supposedly know the language, and that Irish is one of the working languages of the EU.

## WHAT THE POLLS SAY

To assume that Ukrainian is safeguarded from a similar scenario in Ukraine is to be overly complacent. Despite the rise of national sentiment and some growth in patriotism triggered by Russia’s aggression, the environment where Ukrainian is used in the country keeps shrinking.

At first glance, the latest polls across Ukraine — outside the occupied territories — look far better than those conducted prior to 2014. But this is misleading, because pre-2014 statistics included mostly russified Crimea and the equally russified parts of Donbas that are currently under occupation. Indeed, surveys show that most people in Ukraine feel that the Ukrainian language is under pressure and threatened, and are keen to see more proactive efforts on the part of the government to expand the use of Ukrainian.

According to surveys conducted by Ukraine’s top pollsters and published by Prostrir Svobody or Freedom Space Movement, 17% of those polled believe that Russian speakers in Ukraine are experiencing pressure because of their language, while 72% reject this notion. 60% of those polled believe that the Ukrainian language should become the main language in all areas of communication and 61% say that the state language policy should “support the spread of the Ukrainian language in all areas of life.” 64% think that the government should support Ukrainian first and foremost.

Meanwhile, a closer look at the numbers reveals that the share of ethnic Ukrainians using Ukrainian at home

is moving closer to 50%. According to a survey conducted by the Razumkov Center in the spring of 2017, 92% of Ukraine's citizens, excluding the occupied territories, described themselves as ethnic Ukrainians and only 6% as ethnic Russians. A survey by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) revealed that 88% of Ukraine's citizens described themselves as ethnic Ukrainians and less than 6% as ethnic Russians. 50% of those polled by KIIS say that they speak Ukrainian at home, 25% speak Russian mostly or always, and 24% speak both languages in their families. This reflects the nationwide situation. In big and mid-sized cities, Ukrainian is in a far worse position, especially in South-eastern and Central Ukraine.

### STOCKHOLM SYNDROME

Ukraine has a lot in common with Ireland in this. Three centuries of being dismissed as "Little Russians" has engendered an inferiority complex that is most felt around the issue of language. Ukrainians could expect to pursue their personal and professional ambitions, or to join the upper classes only by abandoning their native language and switching to Russian. Eventually, the pressure exerted on several generations of Ukrainians turned them into the drivers of the process. As a result, russification continues in Ukraine, as if it were still a corner of the Russian empire, not a fully independent nation.

More and more Ukrainian-speakers continue to abandon their language because the government offers no clear and effective language policy, post-imperial inertia continues, and too many Ukrainian-speakers are passive about defending their language rights. As a result, Russian remains the dominant language in Ukraine today. The country's colonial legacy means that Russian still dominates in its main economic and cultural centers, Lviv being the only exception among major cities. It dominates in business and mass media as the majority print products, except for textbooks and children's books are published in Russian. Most mid- and top civil servants still speak Russian, at least in everyday life. In violation of the law and thanks to loopholes, Russian continues to dominate among bureaucrats, especially in unofficial or off-record communication.

Despite the appearance of ukrainization, Russian is de facto overly present in Ukraine's school system, especially in the sciences in secondary and vocational schools, non-humanities faculties in universities, and most faculties across the board in post-secondary institutions in southeastern Ukraine. Lectures are often delivered in Ukrainian while seminars and consultations with professors are in Russian. In a nutshell, most schools with Ukrainian as the language of instruction, vocational schools and universities in big and mid-sized cities, both in southeastern Ukraine and beyond, continue to use Russian in education, especially for extracurricular communication. Non-school education is even worse in this regard.

The domination of Russian in the media, radio and customer service remains a huge problem. According to data from Freedom Space, only 31.9% of printed press is in Ukrainian while nearly 62% is still in Russian. In fact, the share of press in Ukrainian has shrunk from 34% to 32% since 2015. Moreover, Ukrainian remains a minority language on radio and TV, both of which influence Ukrainians far more than the press.

A study of cafes, restaurants and stores in 26 cities across Ukraine has revealed that Russian dominates in the service sector, too. Only 49% of the places covered by the survey make sure that the staff reply to customers in Ukrainian. In stores, 44% of sales assistants and consultants do so. This is better than Ireland, but is Ukraine moving in the right direction?

### COLONIAL CITIES

The threat of Ukraine becoming like Ireland linguistically is aggravated by the way it is being urbanized and suburbanized. While non-occupied Ukraine no longer has fully Russian-speaking regions, Halychyna in Western Ukraine, covering Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Ternopil Oblasts, is the only region that can be described as a Ukrainian-speakers. In other oblasts, small and mid-sized russified cities dominate the Ukrainian-speaking countryside. Proportions vary across Ukraine and urban-rural interactions result in mingling where part of the urban population switches to Ukrainian while some of those living in small towns and villages switch to Russian. But this is hardly changing the overall picture. Most big cities with suburbs and many mid-sized ones remain post-colonial centers of russification by inertia from the centuries when Ukraine was subjugated to Russia.

In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian dominates in only 9% of the territory – the part of the oblast covered by Kharkiv proper and its county and Chuhuiv and its county. But the total population of this territory of under 3,000 sq km is 1.71 million people or 62.5% of the oblast population. As a result, the oblast is generally listed as a Rus-

According to data from Freedom Space, only **31.9%** of printed press is in Ukrainian while nearly **62%** is still in Russian. In fact, the share of press in Ukrainian has shrunk from **34%** to **32%** since 2015

sian-speaking one. The remaining 90.7% of the oblast, or 28,500 km<sup>2</sup>, has nearly 1mn residents, which is comparable to the sizes of most oblasts in Central and Western Ukraine. In this part of Kharkiv Oblast, over 80% of the residents, ranging from 69 to 95% in different counties, speak Ukrainian as their native language.

In Dnipro Oblast, over 80% of residents in every administrative county speak Ukrainian. In some, 90-95% list Ukrainian as their mother tongue. Russian-speakers prevail in the big and mid-sized cities that are home to most of the oblast population although they cover less than 3% of the oblast territory overall.

In Mykolayiv Oblast, Russian-speakers make up an absolute majority in the oblast capital and its suburbs. As the city is home to 42.5% of the oblast population, Mykolayiv Oblast is also considered predominantly Russian-speaking. Meanwhile, 80-97% of the oblast population outside the capital speaks Ukrainian. All counties in Kherson Oblast, except for Henichesk County, are in a similar situation.

The domination of Russian in big cities of the otherwise Ukrainian-speaking country is a result of the colonial policy enforced by the Russian Empire, then the Soviet Union. To understand just what Ukraine is facing now, historically, urban populations in Ukraine were

quite small when active russification kicked off in the 18th century. In Kyiv, 129 Russians made up a mere 0.7% of the city's 20,000 residents in 1742. They were the "Great Russian merchant folk." Gradually their number increased by some 5,000-10,000.

### A ONE-WAY PROCESS THE WRONG WAY

In theory, urbanization and suburbanization could serve as a melting pot for Ukrainian- and Russian-speakers. Instead, Ukrainian-speakers tend to get russified more easily than the reverse as they move to the cities. Once they leave their homes, many adjust to the language that dominates in their new environment. Surveys show that Ukrainian is used in public less than at home, leading to greater discrimination against the language in public domains. This is particularly visible in a range of regions and cities of certain types. According to an April 2007 survey by the Sociology Institute of the National Academy of Sciences and SOCIS, a pollster, 57.2% of Ukrainian citizens spoke Ukrainian at home and 53.6% did so in public. But the figures for southern and eastern oblasts, leaving out occupied Crimea and Donbas, were 41% and 34%. In Kyiv, 43.7% spoke Ukrainian and surzhyk, a mix of Ukrainian and

it as impolite, unattractive and unnecessary to insist on Ukrainian.

### BILINGUALISM LEADS TO RUSSIFICATION

The long-standing campaigns that support the idea of a bilingual Ukraine, which is popular in some political circles, are also misguided. Over the last few decades, Ukraine has seen constant homogenization in bilingual environments. Unless the government adopts an effective pro-active language policy, bilingualism will just be an intermediate step in the process of russification. Of the 5% of bilingual Ukrainians in Central Ukraine, only 1% eventually switched completely to Ukrainian between 1992-2010, while the other 4% switched to Russian. In southern Ukraine, 1% of the 10% bilinguals switched to Ukrainian, while the other 9% became Russian-speakers. As a result, the share of those using Russian only at home has gone from 43% to 54% in southern Ukraine and from 56% to 64% in Eastern Ukraine. In short, the bilingual pool is being replenished by Ukrainian-speakers.

Urbanization and suburbanization were expected to "blend" Ukrainians in small and mid-sized cities with villages around them that are beyond the reach of russification. However, as rural and small-town Ukrainian-speakers moved to bigger centers, they tend to switch to the language that already dominates in their new location — Russian — much as they did under the Russian empire and Soviet Union. Polls in Kyiv continue to reveal a huge gap between those speaking Ukrainian at home and in public, where Russian is still used as the default language of communication. And to outsiders, this seems like a perfectly "natural" process: since the cities are Russian-speaking, newcomers should adapt by switching to Russian, leaving Ukrainian at home.

### WHOSE SIDE ARE WE ON, ANYWAY?

The only way to turn this process around is for the government to radically intensify its language policy and stop the continuing russification of independent Ukraine. Otherwise, like Ireland, Ukraine could face the nearly complete disappearance of its native language in the not-to-distant future. The longer the current trend lasts, the more difficult it will be to stop. At some point, it may well become irreversible — Ukraine has Belarus as a perfect illustration of this prospect.

Ukrainian society has several different civilizational groups that can be narrowed down to two main categories. The first one includes Ukrainian-speakers, those who occasionally speak Russian, and ethnic Russians and other ethnic minorities who don't mind the fact that their children, and grandchildren will eventually speak Ukrainian and leave the Russian world. The second group includes ethnic Russians, other russified minorities, and Ukrainians who, for whatever reasons, reject a Ukrainian identity and have made a deliberate choice in favor of a Russian one. This second group primarily sees the restoration of empire in the post-soviet environment, in the form of a Eurasian union, a union of three "fraternal" nations, or *Russki Mir*. They reject the idea of a Ukrainian nation or a full-fledged, independent Ukrainian state out of hand.

Many surveys show that the first group presents the majority both nationwide and in most of Ukraine's oblasts. It provides the foundation for political forces that support the preservation and development of the

THE FIRST STEP TOWARDS THIS IS STRICT  
UKRAINIZATION OF ALL PUBLIC SERVICES.

LACK OF UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE SKILLS SHOULD BLOCK  
ACCESS TO PUBLIC SECTOR JOBS

Russian, at home while only 35.4% did so in public. In other cities over 250,000, 37.7% spoke Ukrainian at home and 33.3% did so in public.


As generations change, many young people who spoke Ukrainian with their parents at home and Russian in public, in school or at work, tend to gradually switch to Russian entirely — even at home. This process of russification may look perfectly natural to an outsider, but as it picks up pace, it is likely to lead to the gradual disappearance of the Ukrainian language and of Ukrainians as a nation on a big part of the country's territory. Indeed, this is the very goal that those who are vehemently against "forced ukrainization" are promoting. Whether they realize it or not, all those who defend the "rights of the Russian language" in Ukraine's post-colonial environment are, in fact, lobbying for *Russki Mir*, Moscow's expansionist credo that Russia has no boundaries and wherever Russian is used is Russian territory.

What's more, surveys reveal that the highest proportion of those who believe that the rights of Russian-speakers in Ukraine are being violated is in the very oblasts where the Ukrainian-speaking population has faced constant discrimination and intense russification has taken place ever since independence: Donetsk, Luhansk, Kharkiv and Odesa Oblasts. Those who say so are not looking for more opportunities to use Russian: they want Ukrainian to completely disappear from every aspect of their lives. Although they may overtly declare "tolerance" towards Ukrainian, Russian-speakers tend to actually be more aggressive in defending their right to speak Russian, whereas overly tolerant Ukrainian-speakers, especially in Central Ukraine, are quicker to yield to Russian in communication, viewing



### Taking away language

Share of citizens who consider themselves ethnic Ukrainian and speak Ukrainian at home



Ukrainian state, and a civilizational choice in favor of Europe. This group is not homogenous and it's not always sufficiently aware of its national identity, so it needs a proactive position on the part of pro-Ukrainian political forces that it can support. If such political forces can deliver positive innovations in other areas of life in Ukraine by reforming the socio-economic and political models, they will be supported even more.

The second group represents a substantial share of Ukraine's population and considers itself a national minority, not an ethnic one, identifying with a nascent Russian political nation. In some parts of Ukraine, this group probably constitutes a majority, although censuses and polls suggest that its true numbers do not reflect the potential share of ethnolinguistic groups in Ukraine's society. That number can only be established after the "undecided" part of Ukrainian society makes its choice. Since this group is passive and opportunistic, its choice will be determined largely by post-colonial inertia and the influence of Russian media.

This is why Ukraine's political players today must decide whose interests they will defend: those of the Ukrainian political nation or those of the Russian national minority. For now, most of Ukraine's political leaders offer only lip service and a ritualistic, formal place for the Ukrainian language while accepting the abnormal domination of Russian in key spheres not as a temporary phase in Ukraine's post-colonial process, but as completely acceptable development trend.

### A STEPPING-STONE TO IDENTITY

This situation is not just about language, either. Russification is both a means and an end for Russian and soviet elites looking to gain dominant positions in Ukraine and continually pull it back into the Eurasian space. Any territorial patriotism that is not backed by linguistic and cultural self-identification sooner or later turns into mere "regionalism," and every generation finds it harder to explain the difference between their "local" identity and the identity of a neighboring nation with the same language, many similar traditions

and a common media environment. Language is one of the key factors in the ability of ordinary Ukrainians to differentiate between domestic and foreign products, which affects their ability to resist outside influences.

What Ukraine needs is consistent language policy oriented towards consolidating the political nation with the Ukrainian language as the basic marker of identity and the key instrument to overcome post-colonial inertia. State language policy needs to enable Ukrainian citizens who were previously russified by brutal force or indirectly, or were deprived of opportunities and incentives to learn the indigenous language and to freely master the language of the country they live in. In everyday life, most Russian-speaking Ukrainians are not only loyal to Ukrainian but actually want to switch to it. However, they have little opportunity to do so in an environment that has been russified for centuries. So, it's up to the government to ensure proper access to media products in Ukrainian and to expand the use of Ukrainian to a scale that can transform it into a properly functioning state language from its current formal position. The only way to accomplish this is to make sure that mastering the language is a must, without depriving individuals of the chance to fulfill themselves while living in Ukraine.

The first step towards this is strict ukrainization of all public services. Lack of Ukrainian language skills should block access to public sector jobs. At the same time, courses in Ukrainian should be established wherever necessary. Meanwhile, violations of the language law in the private sector should incur serious fines, especially when customers address service staff in Ukrainian. Any discrimination against Ukrainian-speaking employees or applicants by employers or colleagues should be treated as harshly as sexual abuse.

IN EVERYDAY LIFE, MOST RUSSIAN-SPEAKING UKRAINIANS ARE NOT ONLY LOYAL TO UKRAINIAN BUT ACTUALLY WANT TO SWITCH TO IT. HOWEVER, THEY HAVE LITTLE OPPORTUNITY TO DO SO IN AN ENVIRONMENT THAT HAS BEEN RUSSIFIED FOR CENTURIES

First and foremost, however, the focus should fall on derussifying the media and printed press. All TV and radio channels should broadcast in Ukrainian exclusively. A few nationwide and regional channels can be set aside for national minorities. Post-imperial inertia and the expansion of Russian-language products in Ukraine have led to a situation where real demand among readers is distorted. Most Ukrainians can read Ukrainian, but there simply aren't enough Ukrainian-language products, so they read Russian products instead. This leads to supply driving demand, a situation that is unacceptable and dangerous when it comes to Ukrainian in Ukraine.

To defend the position of the state language for a transition period of 20 years, the government needs to establish a norm requiring all print periodicals circulating in Ukraine to have a Ukrainian-language version of their product, with at least an equal number of copies in Ukrainian and Russian available at every point of sale. This is the only way to overcome post-colonial inertia where demand is enforced by supply and the actual preferences of Ukrainians are not reflected. ■

# Linguistic concessions as a guarantee of occupation

Could Ukrainization have prevented the current occupation of the East of Ukraine?

Yelyzaveta Honcharova, Bakhmut

The processes that took place in the Donetsk Region during the collapse of the Soviet Union and the restoration of Ukraine's independence were very varied and diverse. In some places there were miners' rallies attended by thousands, in others the death throes of communism continued long after the fall of the empire. However, the specifics of the Donetsk Region meant that the changes were much more social than national. Even active and progressive citizens were then convinced that it was not the right time for Ukrainization and that these issues should be solved gradually, without touching the region's sore spots.

"At that time, I was studying in Kyiv, and it could already be felt on a physical level that Soviet Union was no longer viable and doomed. Young people willingly joined the People's Movement of Ukraine, walked the streets chanting slogans, participated in events and rallies, and it was possible to buy books – samizdat with anti-communist articles – in un-

derground passageways," journalist Tetiana Chuchko from Toretsk remembers. "But when I returned home to my mining town on the cusp of 1991, this inspiration gradually disappeared. There was a catastrophically small number of people who wanted real change. Especially when it comes to national consciousness, which was supported here solely by the actions of certain individuals. I remember rejoicing when a Ukrainian mural appeared in our House of Culture on the eve of the first presidential election – it was ordered by the then-director who supported national ideas. You see, this was like the first realization that we were no longer Soviet, but Ukrainian."

Nevertheless, the Donetsk Region apparently expected changes no less than other Ukrainian regions. A resident of the village of Novhorodske near Horlivka, Aryna Radionova believes that from the very beginning it was necessary to present Ukrainization not as a process of bringing something new, but as a restoration of the Ukrainian roots that are ample in that



**After the Shock.** Large voluntary patriotic events only became the norm in Donbas cities in recent years

area. "Even in the mid-1950s, more than half of the schools in the Donetsk Region taught in the Ukrainian language, because people spoke Ukrainian. This is especially true of, for example, the old part of our industrial area – the Cossack settlement of Zalizne or Shcherbynivka, where people still speak the language. I know that Prosvita [society supporting the development of Ukrainian culture] was active in the city in the 1990s, but our local authorities did not let its representatives into schools and universities to give lectures on the history of Ukraine."

Volodymyr Berezin, one of the members of the Poshuk [Search] political club that was formed at the start of the Perestroika era in Bakhmut, says that Prosvita was active across the Donetsk Region. (At that time, Bakhmut was still called Artemivsk, but activists from the political club initiated the first local referendum in Ukraine in order to rename it, which, unfortunately, showed the unpreparedness of local residents to bid farewell to the communist past.) He says that the club was created in 1989 as a base for the social movement and nurtured members of the local Prosvita and Ukrainian Language Community. But unfortunately, it was not possible to combine forces for total change: "The originators were workers at the local Victory of Labour factory, Konstantyn Chaikin, Mykola Tkachenko and Volodymyr Isayev, as well as Oleksandr Labenskiy and the brothers Serhiy and Oleksiy Honcharov, who have already left us. Among the activists were Viktor Shendrik, now a rather well-known writer, and teacher Serhiy Chechui, who later moved to Canada. The People's Movement and Prosvita were represented in the political club by Ivan Birchak, a candidate for the Verkhovna Rada at the first elections, and geologist Vasyl Suyarko. They had a clear goal and worked towards it. For example, when we campaigned to rename the city, Prosvita made a lot of leaflets with a Cossack on them. The slogan of the time was 'If Ukraine, then Bakhmut!' When war broke out in our region, I called Vasyl, who now teaches in Kharkiv, to tell him how right they were when they argued that it was necessary to work on the Ukrainization of the region from the start. But we split up: I went into ecology, some people got involved in regional studies, others in culture, others still in business or solving the social problems of Chernobyl victims. Had we been more active then and achieved meaningful results, it is likely that this war would have been avoided."

I also heard from my father that the children of these activists now have to pay for what their parents did not finish in the 1990s by living through war. Once we attended a city demonstration together in Bakhmut, when the Ukrainian flag was carried through the streets for the first time in recent history. In recent years, as a volunteer, he sincerely apologised to the lads from the army, thinking that he did not do his best to neutralise the conditions for the declaration of the "Russian world" here. One of his friends also told me about the causes and consequences of the "unfinished" Ukrainization of the Donetsk Region. That friend was the aforementioned professor at Karazin Kharkiv National University, Vasyl Suyarko, a public and political figure in the Donetsk Region and one of the signatories of the Manifesto of the Democratic Party of Ukraine. He says that at the time he tried to convey the message about the need for the Ukrainization of Russified regions as a guarantee of the existence of Ukraine. But even those who were elected to Parliament did not understand the importance and urgency of this.

Suyarko believes that Ukraine missed its chance to implement a national idea with an "iron fist": "Historical experience shows that reborn states start with nationalistic authoritarianism. Do not forget that our country is not an ordinary piece of the Soviet empire, but a descendant of the Ukrainian People's Republic. I was present when Mykola Plaviuk, the last president of Ukraine in exile, handed his mandate, presidential at-

tributes, documents and flag to Leonid Kravchuk, which confirms direct succession – that is the heart of the matter. The nationalist approach has positive effects: General Mannerheim in Finland and Pilsudski in Poland clearly demonstrated that this was the only way to not only form a national idea, but also successfully counteract military intervention by the former metropolis. People wanted a strongman, but the unformed post-totalitarian society was offered a parody of democracy instead. What we have now is a direct consequence of this. In 1991-1993, I wrote an article entitled The Donbas Will Be the Vendée of Ukraine, in which even then I predicted the events in the East that ended in war."

COMMUNIST IDEOLOGY IS UNDOUBTEDLY A TOOL FOR THE DESTRUCTION OF THE UKRAINIAN NATION, CULTURE AND HISTORY. THEREFORE, WITHOUT DESTROYING IT, IT WAS NAIVE TO TRY TO BUILD A COUNTRY: ALL ITS SYMBOLS, IDEOLOGICAL POSTULATES AND EVEN FIGURES WERE AGAINST UKRAINE AS AN INDEPENDENT STATE

Vasyl recounts the steps that were not taken by the authorities when construction of the restored Ukraine began, which created the right conditions for the invasion and imposition of the "Russian world" by the aggressor country. Firstly, ignoring the creation of a Ukrainian church at the local level, because the Moscow Patriarchate has become a powerful weapon in the Donetsk Region during this war. Secondly, at the beginning of our independence, there were no facilities for learning the language, although people needed them. Only later did they realise this was not a necessary condition for existence in the country. It is even worse that the issue of language has become a source of hostility for various political purposes. "I often spoke at the miners' rallies that preceded the collapse of the empire. Anti-communist slogans were heard at the rallies in Donetsk and Makiyivka that were attended by tens of thousands – people pulled down the Soviet flags from the mines and raised Ukrainian ones. They would often ask where they could learn the language. But unlike the Baltic countries, we did not immediately create a system for protecting the national language. It was impossible for conscious citizens to do this without state support. Now history shows us that consciousness is linked to words. This is your territory, land and language. Even those who do not speak Ukrainian should understand that it is the main national language. This identification has been broken inside us. Another culture, history and language mean another mentality. You know, even when someone in their daily life gives a price in "roubles" [instead of hryvnias] it means they live within a different, foreign mentality, because they do not respect the symbols of the state. And it is very easy to make them into a traitor."

Suyarko regards another factor behind the failure of real Ukrainization to be superficial decommunisation, especially in the eastern regions of the country, which basically made it impossible to build a new state. Communist ideology is undoubtedly a tool for the destruction of the Ukrainian nation, culture and history. Therefore, without destroying it, it was naive to try to build a country: all its symbols, ideological postulates and even figures were against Ukraine as an independent state. "Compromises are possible, but there cannot be concessions. In this case, the abandonment of genuine, high-quality and ideological Ukrainization was a fatal concession. This can only lead to defeat. Therefore, we unfortunately lost the battle at that time, and now we have to do it under completely different conditions," Vasyl Suyarko admits. ■



# Rostyslav Prokopiuk:

“It is activists who generally are forced to defend the interests of the Ukrainian state in the Czech Republic”

Interviewed by **Yaroslava Kutsai**, Prague



**Rostyslav Prokopiuk** was born in 1958 in Verbychi, a village in Volyn, North-Western Ukraine. He got his degree in Psychology at the Mykhailo Drahomanov National Pedagogic University in Kyiv. Since 1999, Dr. Prokopiuk has worked in the Czech Republic where he founded his clinic for treating addictions. Apart from the Czech Republic, he practices in Slovakia, Austria and Germany. Dr. Prokopiuk has authored two books, *Live Your Life* and *Not Smoking Is Easy*.

Originally from Volyn, psychologist Rostyslav Prokopiuk became known in the Czech Republic for helping people with addictions. In the 28 years of his life abroad, he has earned respect from the local celebrities. Quite a few of his clients parted with their addictions after 15 minutes on his couch.

In Ukraine, Prokopiuk was unknown for a long time. As the Revolution of Dignity began, followed by the war in Eastern Ukraine, he realized that help for the Ukrainian military and the promotion of Ukrainian culture abroad are his personal cause.

His experience as a therapist and connections with celebrities came in handy.

## What encouraged you to take up civil activism?

— I have always been nostalgic for Ukraine. But this sharp feeling of patriotism and the sense of belonging to Ukraine came in 2013. As our rallies in Wenceslas Square began, I thought that it would be good to create some other format of meetings. In my years of practice, I have had many patients including Czech celebrities. “If you ever need anything, we will lend you a hand,” many of the people I once helped told me. I never called them because I never needed anything personally. But the developments in Ukraine made me think of those contacts. I called them and all of them responded. In the first year of the Maidan, I organized a big three-hour concert with 12 cappellas at the Broadway Theatre. This inspired me, so I decided not to stop. That’s how the Forum of Cultures NGO appeared. We have organized a dozen charity concerts ever since. Pikardiyska Tertsia [a well-known Ukrainian male a cappella band] performed here twice, Serhiy Prytula and his Variaty comic show performed three times. This helped us collect US \$3,000. I know that these people are trustworthy and would donate all the money to help in the frontline.

## How easy was it to find Ukrainian artists for charity concerts?

— In fact, it’s very difficult to negotiate with our celebrities. You’re asking them to perform for a military hospital and they are asking US \$1,500 for four songs. For some, this is nothing more than business.

## Does this upset you?

— We should not lose hope because of this. There will be people who will help you, no matter what. You just have to look for them. For example, singer Oleksandr Lozovskiy responded to my requests. Singer Paul Manandise was a discovery – he’s not even Ukrainian, but a French married to a Ukrainian woman. He has recently released his Ukrainian debut album called *Miy Ray* [My Paradise]. That’s how he referred to Ukraine.

Sergei Loiko, a Russian writer and photographer who works at Priamyi TV channel in Ukraine, is another example. When his book *Airport* was released, it was translated into Czech. I was excited and called him. Quite soon, the translation into Czech was released. I started organizing the presentation. Now, we are working on presenting *Your Look, Cio-Cio-San* by Andriy Liubka. These projects have been made in cooperation with the Václav Havel Library. We were also working on the Independence Day concert at the House of National Minorities? Why are we doing this? The answer is very simple: we want to remind people of Ukraine. I have recently come across a Lviv-born young man with an amazing voice. He has just returned from fighting on the frontline. This will be his debut. He’s very nervous. We have many talents who don’t know how to market themselves. They need to be given a chance.

**How did you come up with the idea of working with Ukrainian military suffering from the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)?**

— An ICTV journalist told me two years ago that this is a very serious problem in Ukraine. They asked me whether I could help. This was a challenge I took up. I'm trying to help not just the entire country abstractly, but specific people. The most important thing is to make sure that they feel that they are not forgotten. It is important to support the fighter spirit in them. We have arranged a concert with the Czech standup comedy band Na stojáka to collect money for rehabilitation in Kyiv for one of the boys. I am extremely lucky to be able to work with decent volunteers. They are sending receipts and showing what they spend the money they receive on. The Czechs support such initiatives because they know that their donations are not wasted.

I've also come up with an idea of a talk show where contributions are made with medicines. One Slovak donated a EUR 1,000-worth of medicines and told me: "If you asked me for money, I wouldn't give any. But medicines – no problem. I'm sure that if you decide to eat up all the medicines I've bought, you will surely die."

But this is still not enough. So I've decided to sell the paintings I make when I relax. My office is in a nice building, so I displayed them on the stairs. I've already sold two paintings – and that's an extra EUR 300 for a military hospital.

**What is the most important thing that the Ukrainian community in the Czech Republic needs today?**

— We need a new Ukrainian center. The Ukrainian Embassy here is doing quite a lot within its financial capacity. But it is activists who generally are forced to defend the interests of the Ukrainian state in the Czech Republic. The incident around the exhumation of the remains of Oleksandr Oles illustrates this<sup>1</sup>. That was a horrible situation. We had to urgently look for contacts with the top officials in Ukraine. Roman Skrypin [a Ukrainian journalist] had these contacts – he was in Prague at the time. I still work with him on a number of programs.

Prague once hosted the Museum of Ukraine's Liberation Struggle. A portion of the documents was destroyed by one of the three bombs thrown at the city in 1945. I have a beautiful collection of paintings and books by Ukrainian emigrants in my basement. I would like all of this to serve a purpose, to grow into something. So far, I have no results.

Generally, people don't want to change anything. I can't help those who don't ask. This would be a violation of ethical rules in psychology. But once I've promised to do something, this is a train I can't jump off.

**According to a research by Centrum pro výzkum veřejného mínění (Public Opinion Research Centre) from March 2014, 64% of the Czechs were interested in the situation in Ukraine. Two years later, only a quarter were. How would you explain this dynamics?**

— Some groups support Ukraine inexorably. They took it to the streets just a couple of days ago to remind people about Ukrainian political prisoners. They also screened a film about Oleh Sentsov. I thank them! We can't underestimate this. But don't blame the Czechs – they have their own problems. Their military were killed in Afghanistan just recently. There is a problem of refugees. There are elections and the government which has not been functioning for an awfully long time.

**Why do you think they once again elected the pro-Russian Milos Zeman?**

— It is important to realize that many Czechs did not vote for the Zeman of today; they voted for the Zeman who established the Civic Forum and still had a clear mind. Another factor, with all of my deep respect for the Czechs, was jealousy. Ze-

man was elected by those who did not want success for academic Jiří Drahoš as president – and he did have a real chance to win. It's some kind of suspicion about the accomplishments of others. "Hey, my neighbor has better tiles in his bathroom. Where did he get the money to buy it?" Human jealousy is the most fertile field for populism. Sometimes it gets so strong that people stop thinking about the consequences of their actions here and now. This shortsightedness is very dangerous now.

We did not realize on time what evil the Russians could do to us. We made a lot of concessions to them because of all this friendship of the peoples concept. It is now obvious that we can't return to this harmful format of the friendship of the peoples. We have to think of relations that benefit both of us.

UKRAINIANNES HAS ITS UNIQUE MAGIC: THE LINK WITH THE EARTH, THE RIPENESS OF THINGS THAT IS INCARNATED IN THE LANGUAGE. WE WERE A PEOPLE KNOWN FOR ITS HEALERS FOR MANY CENTURIES. SO WE HAD TO FIND A WAY TO HEAL OURSELVES. BUT THAT TAKES YOUR OWN WORDS

**Pragmatism?**

— I would put it differently: we need to establish a balance between intuition and reason. The former is very important because it helps us act in advance and avoid many mistakes. We have lost it somewhat. But without it, the second aspect is impossible.

**Still, many Ukrainians and people from former soviet republics live in the Czech Republic who stick to this format of the "friendship of peoples" as if there was no war, just some misunderstanding. What is this? A crisis of identity?**

— There is a crisis of morality. Many simply don't understand their identity. When you don't understand who you are, you are easily manipulated. That's what helps the hybrid war carry on.

I have personally experienced this. I was born in the Soviet Union and worked with kids in soviet pioneer camps. I still remember songs by Alla Pugachova [popular soviet and Russian singer] that kept us all on one wave. Then the collapse happened and it was time to return to our roots. Quite a few people never got rid of that *homo sovieticus* in their minds though. This is sad because Ukrainianness has its unique magic: the link with the earth, the ripeness of things that is incarnated in the language. We were a people known for its healers for many centuries. So we had to find a way to heal ourselves. But that takes your own words.

We should get rid of our insecurities when we leave our houses in Ukraine, the insecurities of starting a conversation in Ukrainian. That's the way to shape our common space. But how do you do this? You can't do this by force. When I came to the Czech Republic in the early 1990s, my Czech was horrible. But the Czechs reacted enthusiastically to my attempts to speak it, encouraging me with «pěkně! krásně!» [Nice, beautiful!]. They praised me for that rusty language of mine. That's how it should be in Ukraine. We should praise people switching to Ukrainian. ■

<sup>1</sup>In January 2017, a Ukrainian newspaper reported about forced exhumation of the remains of Oleksandr Oles, a famous Ukrainian diplomat and poet of the 20th century, and his wife Vira froms cemetery in Prague. This was done in accordance with the Czech laws whereby a rent of 20,000 Kč should be paid every ten years for every burial site. The rent was paid by a Czech citizen of Ukrainian origin who died recently. His son decided to bury his father on the site, removing the remains of the poet and his wife for that purpose. The incident triggered prompt reaction from Ukraine's President and MFA, and arrangements were made to move the remains to Ukraine

# The anatomy of Slovak russophilia

How Russia is building a network of influence in Slovakia

Olha Vorozhbyt

In mid-July, the Slovak media reported that a group of parliamentarians and entrepreneurs headed by independent MP Peter Marček was going to visit Crimea on 1-4 August. Moreover, they wanted to travel to the occupied peninsula from Moscow, which is contrary to Ukrainian legislation. Ukrainian Ambassador Yuriy Mushko warned about the consequences of such a trip, stating that the delegates who travel to the Crimea through Russia will most likely be banned from entering Ukraine in the future. He also advised them to avoid making appearances that could be used for propaganda purposes.

HOWEVER, ACCORDING TO SURVEYS, THE LEVEL OF RUSSOPHILIA IN SLOVAKIA IS THE HIGHEST AMONG THE VISEGRÁD GROUP, WHICH IS A VERY DISTURBING TREND FOR A COUNTRY THAT IS UKRAINE'S IMMEDIATE NEIGHBOR. MORE JULY EVENTS IN SLOVAKIA WERE ANOTHER ALARM BELL NOT ONLY FOR UKRAINE, BUT ALSO FOR THE EU

Even the head of the Slovak parliament Andrej Danko who, if we track his statements and actions, also has a rather pro-Russian position on many issues, decided to react to the warnings of the Ukrainian ambassador. The speaker and head of the right-wing Slovak National Party, which for some time was a junior partner in a government coalition with ruling party "Direction – Social Democracy", is quite a frequent guest in Moscow. On a recent visit there, he waxed lyrical about Slavs and Russian icons, emphasising that "We, small peoples, can only turn to the great powers – without their help we are unable to achieve peace."

In a post on Facebook, Danko demanded that Foreign Minister Miroslav Lajčák recall the Ukrainian ambassador because of his warnings to Marček. "If any citizen, never mind a deputy of the National Council of Slovakia, wants to go somewhere, no ambassador will tell him whether he should do that or not," wrote the politician. In addition, Danko did not react at all to a rude and unethical comment under this post from Russian diplomat Dmitry Kovalkov. Opposition MPs have suggested sending the latter out of the country for such unworthy behaviour.

As for Marček himself, as noted by political analyst Pavol Demeš in a comment to Slovak website noviny.sk, this MP has never showed much interest in foreign policy. However, a video taken in the airport before his departure to Crimea nevertheless appeared on his

Facebook profile. He did indeed travel to the occupied peninsula. According to Marček, his delegation included another 4 parliamentarians and 10 entrepreneurs. Slovak media has reported that it is unknown who financed the diplomats' trip to Crimea.

On the eve of the visit, the odious politician also made a comment to Russian newspaper Izvestia stating that he considered Crimea to be Russian. This position does not coincide with the official position of the Slovak Foreign Ministry, nor that of some of Marček's parliamentary colleagues. Moreover, in the situation described above, there were also MPs who expressed their indignation at the actions and statements of this politician.

However, according to surveys, the level of Russophilia in Slovakia is the highest among the Visegrád Group, which is a very disturbing trend for a country that is Ukraine's immediate neighbour. For example, in last year's survey of Slovaks by the International Republican Institute, the majority of respondents (75%) stressed that Russia should be seen as a partner in the European security system and should be returned into European security structures.

More July events in Slovakia were another alarm bell not only for Ukraine, but also for the EU. The infamous biker group Night Wolves has opened its own base in Slovakia in the small town of Dolná Krupá near the capital Bratislava.

The Night Wolves, along with their leader, nicknamed the Surgeon, are close to Vladimir Putin, and members of this group also participated in the annexation of the Crimea and hostilities in the Donbas on the side of the invader. The area that the Moscow bikers call their European base looks similar to a military facility and photos taken from the air show that military exercises are taking place there.

Journalists who managed to obtain photos of the base say that there is military equipment and tanks on its territory. This hardware belongs to the Slovak Ministry of Defence and was leased to the Night Wolves by the chairman of the Slovak Institute for Military History. The latter has already been brought to justice for these actions.

It has been stated that the territory on which the military base is located belongs to Jozef Hambalek, a close associate of former Interior Minister Robert Kaliňák. He heads the Slovak branch of the Night Wolves. Hambalek, like ex-minister Kaliňák, is also an ardent biker. His nickname is Džono and on the Honda Tuning





**The "Wolves" in Bratislava.** Slovak President Andrej Kiska considers the Russian bikers to be a security risk to his country

website he recalls that he and Kaliňák rode all around Slovakia for 10 days in 1999. It is important that this information about Kaliňák and Hambalek can be found on the investigation site [aktuality.sk](http://aktuality.sk), co-authored by Ján Kuciak, whose murder several months ago brought tens of thousands of Slovaks to the streets.

American magazine Newsweek reports, citing the Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, that government representatives are concerned about the presence of the Night Wolves in Slovakia.

However, they go on to say that members of this group have not done anything illegal yet. Yesterday, Slovak president Andrej Kiska spoke about his concern around the presence of the Night Wolves. "Their founder is on the sanctions list and cannot travel to

the EU. These are not innocent motorbike lovers, but a tool of the regime that participated in annexing a part of Ukraine, which is a violation of international law," said the Slovak president. In his opinion, the European headquarters of the Night Wolves in Slovakia is a serious security risk for the country.

Twitter users sharing images of the base are concerned and have compared the presence of the "bikers" to the build-up to the occupation of Ukrainian territory. Slovak analysts, in particular Daniel Kráľ, argue that the launch of the aforementioned base could give new impetus to the support of the far-right in Europe. One way or another, this is another opening Russia has found to spread its expansionist policy towards the West. ■



# The strikes of opportunism and independence

While defending its interests, the soviet coal industry helped the Soviet Union collapse

Maksym Vikhrov

The summer of 1989 saw the most massive strike of coal miners in the Soviet Union. Launched on July 10 in Kuzbass – the Kuznetsk Coal Basin – it spread to the Donbas by July 19. That series of strikes tends to be interpreted as the harbinger of Ukraine's independence. It was the pressure of the striking coal miners that forced the Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR to pass a law on the republic's economic autonomy. The strikes of the late 1980s made the miners' movement look like anti-

soviet independentists that joined efforts with Narodnyi Rukh, the People's Movement, the key pro-independence dissident political force in Ukraine, to drive Ukraine towards independence. A closer look at those developments, however, reveals that the miners – with all due respect for their determination – were pushing for their own corporate interests first and foremost, while their cooperation with Ukraine's national democratic forces was mostly an opportunistic union. That episode of

Ukraine's history is both interesting and useful today. The miners' strikes between the 1980s and 1990s provide a clear example of how a powerful corporation or an equivalent commercial entity can become a subject of politics and affect the future of states.

## THE WORKERS' ARISTOCRACY

Whoever wants to understand the miners' strikes of the late 1980s should understand what soviet coal mining industry was like. It had been



PHOTO: UKRINFORM

**Not a grassroots movement.** Miners' strikes of the late 1980s were directly orchestrated by the red directors

in a pretty dire position during Stalin's industrialization. A huge number of mines stood ruined after the revolutionary turmoil, while specialists were either eliminated or fled the country. A lack of workforce was a universal phenomenon. To some extent, the Soviet Union compensated for its technological backwardness with equipment and experts imported from other countries for the money received from plundering the country and its population. More generally, the workforce was recruited through forced labor mobilization or delivery of labor camp prisoners under convoy. The conditions of life and work in the Donbas could only be attractive for those who had no choice or other place to go to. Therefore, the Soviet Union's coal industry looked very sad right after World War II with slightly over 600,000 miners across the entire country. Once the post-war reconstruction was completed, however, their status began to change rapidly. The country needed more and more coal and material incentives gradually replaced terrorist-style forced labor in mines.

By the 1950s, 1.5 million people were working in the coal industry. The change was not about numbers alone. Firstly, it was a strategic industry since the soviet industry and energy sector relied heavily on coal. Secondly, the coal corporation had its powerful lobby in Moscow that could deliver ultimatums, threaten and blackmail virtually anyone including secretaries general. Thirdly, the coal industry controlled huge symbolic capital which mattered a lot in the superideological totalitarian state: soviet propaganda portrayed miners as the salt of the soviet land, the heroes of labor and the glorious builders of Communism. Therefore, any attacks against them were simply dangerous. Fourthly, the coal industry was a well-spread network of communities with virtually military-style discipline and hierarchy. The coal communities included mine staff, as well as the whole towns and villages whose life was built and based around the operation of mines. As a result, coal miners had turned into an equivalent of aristocracy of the workers' class by the late 1970s. In addition to high salaries, they received significant privileges, including a 30-hour long work-week, benefits, bonuses and more.

By contrast to the industry, the economy was following an opposite

trend. According to the Ministry of Coal Industry, 78% of coal enterprises were operating with losses in the Soviet Union by 1958. More than half of them reported up to 30% of losses. When the glory and wealth of coal miners peaked in 1978, the industry was no longer making any profits whatsoever. 1980 finished with the soviet coal industry's loss of 1.3bn rubles while 1985 saw a loss of 1.8bn.

This was not unexpected. The first source of the losses was the nature: a century of active coal mining began to exhaust the deposits of the Donetsk Basin and the profits it could generate. For example, over 40% of the Donbas coal was extracted in the mid-1970s from the layers of up to 1.2 meters high – this ruled out efficient mechanization of the process and stifled the productivity of enterprises. Soviet leadership contributed to the decline with its chaotic policies of authorizing the construction of poorly productive mines and feeding them with subsidies.

Finally, the entire world was switching to the era of oil and gas while the coal industry was becoming a thing of the past.

### A CORPORATE RIOT

The 1989 strike was caused by the declining quality of life for the miners which they found especially painful. On one hand, they had grown accustomed to their well-being. On the other hand, their labor was indeed difficult, harmful and dangerous. The rallies were not chaotic: the decision to strike was taken by the leadership of mines, the strikers were let in the square based on their work number tags, while the failure to attend the strike qualified as a missed day of work. "By contrast to Lviv where we were surrounded by a noisy and uncontrolled crowd, Donetsk met us with organized thousand-strong rows of protesting miners sitting at the square in front of the party oblast committee and banging their helmets against the asphalt," wrote Mykola Holushko, a KGB officer from Mikhail Gorbachev's entourage. Gorbachev had good reasons to rush to Donetsk: 500,000 miners stopped working in the Donbas, Lviv and Volyn basins simultaneously. The miners did not encourage all of the frustrated public to protest. Quite

on the contrary, they were determined to stay away from the "civilians" since they saw the strike as a personal or corporate conflict with those in power from day one.

What the miners did lack was political experience. The strike that swallowed mines from Lviv to Vorkuta did not have a common list of demands. As a result, the miners customized them to fit their own needs in every given region. The majority of their demands were about better funding, living and working conditions, longer vacations, earlier retirement etc. A miners' strike committee of Vorkuta also demanded abolition of the provision on the leading and defining role of the Communist Party in the soviet Constitution, elimination of privileges for the *nomenklatura* and real elections of the Soviet Union Supreme Council leader. The Donbas

According to the Ministry of Coal Industry, 78% of coal enterprises were operating with losses in the Soviet Union by 1958. 1980 finished with the soviet coal industry's loss of 1.3bn rubles while 1985 saw a loss of 1.8bn

did not support the political section of the demands. "I don't see why we should share this political extremism today," the Regional Union of Strike Committees claimed.

The strike resulted in the Soviet Union Council of Ministers' Resolution No608 dated August 3, 1989, that promised many things for the miners, including economic independence of mines and a license to export the coal extracted over the norm. The state pledged to make the mines profitable and improve the environment in the mining regions. In a word, the government pledged to build communism for the workers of a given industry. The euphoria from this victory did not last: the government shelved Resolution 608 as soon as the strikers calmed down.

When they realized that Moscow was not going to meet its promises, the miners tried to renew their struggle in the summer of 1990. This time, the miners' corporation decided to openly declare itself as a political entity. "The first convention of miners underlines full independence of the workers' organizations in the coal and mining industries from any political entities. Our aspiration towards independence determines our approach to the Communist Party of the Soviet Union," said the resolution of the





**The oligarchs' striking assets.** The trade unions of miners mostly defend the interests of Rinat Akhmetov today

First All-Union Miners' Convention held in Donetsk on June 11-15, 1990. The convention blamed the dire position of the miners on the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, demanding the withdrawal of party commissars from their enterprises and nationalization of the party's property. Seeking to create a stronger impression, the miners held a one-day strike on July 11, 1990, where 300,000 miners stopped work at 100 mines. They blocked the work of party commissars at enterprises and shut down their offices. This was clearly a challenge for the Communist Party of the Soviet Union which was right in the middle of its 28<sup>th</sup> convention. Moscow ignored all this.

In October 1990, the miners gathered for the Second Convention where they were going to officially break off from the official trade unions controlled by the state. But then Coal Minister Mykhailo Shchadov (the miners had held a no-confidence vote on him back in 1989) managed to spark a clash between the Donbas

and Kuzbass convention members. This internal conflict was used to reject their demands. Regardless, it was already too late to speak to Moscow: the USSR was on its last legs.

### CONVENIENT INDEPENDENCE

Once Ukrainian miners realized that negotiations with Moscow made no sense in the given political circumstances, they launched talks with Kyiv. In March 1991, Donetsk hosted the first miners' rally where traditional socio-economic demands were supplemented with requirements to make the Declaration of State Independence for Ukraine a constitutional document, to dismiss the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, to hold re-election of the Ukrainian SSR's Verkhovna Rada, etc. The Ukrainian SSR's leadership knew how fragile it was and pledged to some unrealistic commitments, including doubling salaries for all workers of the coal industry. The miners liked Kyiv's willingness to

make concessions, as well as the prospect of putting a state border between themselves and the cheap Kuzbas coal and Russian gas, thereby turning themselves into monopoly energy providers of Ukraine. This sparked Stakhanov-like enthusiasm for undermining the soviet order and pushed the miners to establish contacts with Ukraine's national democratic forces. Vasyl Kuibida, the People's Movement leader, recalled later that it was the Donbas miners from the Dimitrov Mine that nominated Viacheslav Chornovil to become president of Ukraine.

This union was superficial: the miners supported national democrats but preserved their corporate autonomy. "We will be working with the new democratic parties and help you take power from the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. But we are not joining you under your flags," was the position of the All-Ukrainian Union of Strike Committees that joined the Independent Democratic Ukraine coalition established to coordinate resist-

ance to GKChP, the State Committee on the State of Emergency. The Donbas unanimously supported Ukraine's independence at the 1991 referendum. But the miners continued to stand for their corporate interests. On June 7, 1993, the most massive strike in the history of Ukraine started: more than 200 out of 250 mines across the country stopped working. The reason was a hike in food prices, so the miners demanded an increase in wages but added political claims to that. In 1993, they demanded a referendum of no-confidence for the president and the Verkhovna Rada, as well as economic autonomy for the Donbas. This was hardly a chaotic strike of average workers given its scale and the fact that it started from Zasiadko Mine which had not joined any strike since 1989.

In a strange coincidence, four days after the strike began, Yukhym Zviatkovsky, the former director of the mine who had moved to the office of Donetsk mayor and then became First Vice Premier of Ukraine shortly before the strike – heading the negotiations with the government of Leonid Kuchma – got concessions in the interest of directors of these mines. The demands of average miners were largely ignored. A week later the strike ended thanks to the efforts of mine directors. As to the political demands, they were cunningly sold down the river. On June 17, the Verkhovna Rada scheduled a consultation referendum on no-confidence for the president and parliament. Then, both referenda were cancelled – allegedly, for the lack of resources. The differences between the industry leaders and average miners had long been brewing and manifested themselves back in the 1980s. In June 1993, they led to the final split and conflict whereby mine directors ultimately subordinated the masses of miners and converted the protest into their political capital. When the collapse of their life quality moderated the ambitions of the miners while Berkut's batons and unrestrained freedom of action for mine directors made them obedient, the miners' movement was ultimately instrumentalized by the former bosses of the coal corporation that rapidly turned into the owners of enterprises and oligarchs.

### LESSON UNLEARNED

Today, miners are no longer seen as a huge explosive force. The legends of 30 years back faded in the spring of

2014 when the Donbas miners who largely did not support separatism, did nothing to disrupt the riots in the Donbas and prevent the aggravation of their own positions. After most of the coal-rich parts of the Donbas ended up on the territory not controlled by Kyiv, the social weight of miners shrank to a minimum. However, it's not the number that matters but the persistent trend towards monopolization of the coal industry. According to the Association for the Protection of Energy Consumers' Rights led by Andriy Herus, Rinat Akhmetov's DTEK extracts 85% of coal in Ukraine and controls 60% of coal imports. It owns 80% of thermal power plants in Ukraine (other indicators for this company are no less threatening). This allows DTEK's Akhmetov to wage wars against the Ukrainian government by lobbying his own business interests, not even the interests of the industry. This campaign could be led behind closed doors of the top cabinets. Instead, miners are traditionally used as its main tool.

The most recent appearance of coal miners took place in April 2015 as several thousand miners crowded the government district in Kyiv. The protesters demanded the dismissal of Volodymyr Demchyshyn, the Minister of Energy and Coal Industry, higher prices for coal and thermal power plant-produced energy, and state subsidies for the coal industry. At the same time, a convention of coal miners was taking place where the delegates of miners' communities condemned the work of Volodymyr Demchyshyn and were threatening to launch an energy disaster. Journalists and eyewitnesses reported that most of the miners were from DTEK enterprises. The main effort to hold the convention came from DTEK people as well. One does not need much insight to draw conclusions here: DTEK was actively campaigning for an increase in coal prices from UAH 1,100 to 1,500 per t in the spring of 2015. It needed the government to authorize such a price hike. The government blamed DTEK for monopolizing the industry and charging too much as the real production cost of a ton of coal from DTEK mines was allegedly UAH 800-900. Naturally, the company

wanted to compensate for the losses it faced with the occupation of the Donbas, so "the miners on a hunger strike" turned into the leverage of socio-political pressure against the government. They could have been hungry indeed as their mines were already delaying their wages.

THE MINERS LIKED KYIV'S WILLINGNESS TO MAKE CONCESSIONS, AS WELL AS THE PROSPECT OF PUTTING A STATE BORDER BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND THE CHEAP KUZBAS COAL AND RUSSIAN GAS, THEREBY TURNING THEMSELVES INTO MONOPOLY ENERGY PROVIDERS OF UKRAINE

As a result, Ukraine found itself in a pathological situation where individual companies manipulated their weight in the energy sector to launch an open war against the government and used their staff as a battering ram. The revenues they receive under the likes of the infamous Rotterdam+ coal supply formula hardly ever reach the average workers. In other words, the coal is getting more expensive while the position of the miners is getting worse.

At first sight, ineffective management of the industry is the reason for this – especially the failure to eliminate corruption schemes. However, even full eradication of corruption in the coal industry will only delay the crisis into which it has been tumbling over the past half a century. Once Ukraine's energy sector modernizes itself sooner or later, it will no longer need even the mines that remain in operation today. How dramatic that final depends on how effectively the government will manage to support the workers whose arduous and hazardous work will no longer be needed by the country. The main problem is that the threat of big influential companies capable of shaping the entire industries – from energy and transportation to agriculture, banking and more – will not vanish. There is no guarantee that the DTEK miners banging their helmets against the asphalt in Kyiv in 2015 will not be replaced by the staff of other companies whose emotions and interests will be similarly manipulated by other bosses and managers. At some historical moments, such corporate wars can influence not just a given government but the existence of the state. And that influence will not necessarily be aimed at preserving Ukrainian sovereignty. ■

# The occupied legacy

Who should protect the cultural heritage of Crimea?

Mykhailo Yakubovych



**Barbarian restoration.** Russian initiatives in Bakhchysarai have resulted in barbaric renovation of the Khan's Palace

In 2017, Ukrainian media buzzed about the “barbarian reconstruction” of the Khan's Palace in Bakhchysarai, a complex of palaces that were home for Crimean khans constructed in the 15th century. It acquired its modern looks in the 18th century with a series of reconstructions after a bypassing unit of Russian Feldmarschall Kristof Minikh burned the khans' residence down in 1736.

To Crimean Tatars and many other peoples of the region this palace is the equivalent of the hetmans' palace in Chyhyryn for Ukrainians, Versailles in Paris for the French or Topkapi in Istanbul for the Turks – a symbol of their past power. After the Bakhchysarai complex ended up in the hands of the occupational authorities in 2014, the preservation of this historical site became a burning topic.

The Russia media report that Ukraine has neglected the site so Russia is now investing new funding to revive it. The Ukrainian media report that it is being ruined but don't offer more details. UNESCO has issued some statements on it: the Khan's Palace was nominated for the World Heritage list in 2003. Statements have also been published by the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Crimean Tatar organizations, including the Mejlis, the representative body of Crimean Tatars. A “trial process” against the “government of Crimea” is ongoing in the occupied peninsula. According

to the local media, it is about negligent treatment of ornaments in the palace – some calligraphic scriptures have been plastered with concrete by the workers doing the repairs, the old roof was replaced with modern tiles, and more.

This puts the occupational authorities in a strange position: they build a major mosque in Simferopol and constantly report improvements for Crimean Tatars on the one hand, while making such a gross reputation-damaging mistake on the other hand. It looks like the ongoing rapid rewriting of historical memory to fit Russia's narrative will reveal more of similar “reconstruction” or “restoration” fails by Russia in the occupied Crimea. Reports of similar damage have come from Khersones Tavriysky, a cultural reserve where “reconstructions” were made using modern materials and a street stage was installed at a historical site. Access to these sites has been restricted so they are receiving fewer visitors.

While the Khan's Palace is in the spotlight, other sites are as important to remember. The narrative of old Crimean history goes far beyond the peninsula as it covers the traces of Turkic political presence in Southern Ukraine. Unfortunately, many Ukrainians see this period as a time of alien rivals and aggressive conquerors, and as something very remote from the history on which Ukraine is based in their eyes, that is the history of Kyiv Rus and the Cossacks.

We will not aim to dispute the demographic losses suffered from the Tatar and Nogai assaults against Ukrainian cities and settlements, although the actual scientific discussion on this topic is still ahead. But the other side of this medal was the domestication of the steppe and the incorporation of it into the Ukrainian mindset. In our minds today, Ukraine is unthinkable as the South-Western forests without South-Eastern steppes.

Another dimension of that Turkic legacy is political: as Ukraine is waiting for a tomos of autocephaly for its Church, it recalls that the steppe regions had been the “canonical territory” of the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Constantinople (Istanbul) before they were conquered by

Russia. Until recently, only historians discussed this. Now, some sources claim, this fact can be helpful in Ukraine's pursuit of autocephaly.

The question is what of this history – more familiar to some of us, and less so to others – can be rescued so that it can speak for itself in the future. The Turkic sites of the Great Steppe include numerous tombs with Ottoman scriptures. Previously, some of them ended up in Ukrainian museums while most were simply crumbling. These tombs have not yet been catalogued properly. Other sites include the Akkerman Fortress, the mosque in Izmail, the sites in Ochakiv, Mykolayiv and Dnipro. Quite recently, Dnipro municipal authorities transferred to the Crimean Tatar community the building of an old mosque. This marked an important development for the Muslim Crimean Tatars and the right step in terms of memory policy and restoration of justice.

Not all sites get this lucky. I studied Crimean Tatar manuscripts that are now scattered anywhere from the US to Iran, and was extremely happy to find some in Lviv's History of Religion Museum. After I researched the materials stored at the museum – they come from Zincirli Madrasa, the oldest Islamic educational facility of Eastern Europe located in Crimea – I found out that most of the collection returned to Crimea in 2008. These Crimean stocks were originally moved to Lviv in the 1970s when the first Museum of Religion History and Atheism in the Ukrainian SSR opened there. After Zincirli was restored in 2008, the manuscripts were returned to it. In 2007, Turkey invested almost US \$3mn in the site and Zincirli opened as a museum complex in 2009. Ten years later, the occupants removed the Ukrainian and Turkish flags from the nameplate. Some Russian bloggers only lamented about the fact that plate scripts were in Turkish, Ukrainian and English, not in Russian. No Crimean sources report about what happened to the manuscripts, including at least several dozen handwritten Qurans of the 16-19<sup>th</sup> centuries, whether they are still stored in Bakhchysarai, and



whether all of the museum's other materials remain intact.

It is no secret that many archeological and other artifacts from Ukraine used to often end up in European or Russian markets. Until recently, a website worked that sold all kinds of finds, including from Crimea. A colleague once showed me a fragment of an interesting astronomic device with Arabic scripts on it found near Crimea – he bought it for peanuts at one of website's auctions. As a rule, artifacts end up on the black market far more often than they do in the hands of researchers or museums. Also, there have been massive cases of stealing artifacts from museums in Ukraine. Book archives on Ukraine's territory were often damaged by burglars, fires or political decisions. For example, Stalin's regime handed over a third of the stocks held at the Lviv Ossolineum Library to the Polish People's Republic in 1947.

In the 21st century, it is crucial to preserve sites and artifacts both physically and digitally. Modern Digital Humanities have developed to the point of creating global databases of manuscripts and are about to offer more opportunities, including search, analysis, copying and reading of the newly digitalized manuscripts. Until recently, all this took some very painstaking efforts. Digitalized manuscripts today offer access to materials that have been destroyed, are endangered or lost. This makes the work of researchers so much easier.

At one point, the remains of Ossolineum's handwritten funds (now held at the Vasyl Stefanyk Lviv National Research Library) were scanned and posted for free access on a Polish site. We are only dreaming about something similar: Ukrainian researchers are still facing quite a few bureaucratic barriers when accessing archives. For example, every local scientist in Turkey where some of the largest collections in the world are stored has the right to get copies of manuscripts free of charge. In Ukraine, obtaining copies of manuscripts is often a challenge. Some museums welcome cooperation from researchers while others don't provide full catalogue information. To make things worse, the recent Resolution № 2059/5 by the Ministry of Justice essentially bans free copying of most documents, including manuscripts, archive researchers lament, so the copying of documents by ordering the service from a given archive becomes pretty costly. It's easy to understand the scale of the challenge: a request to copy a hundred pages of a document from the 17<sup>th</sup> or 18<sup>th</sup> century means spending almost the whole monthly salary for a Ukrainian researcher. Meanwhile, the

Russian authorities have included hundreds of Crimean sites and artifacts in their records and are actively developing their own interpretation of Crimea's ancient and modern history. Russia has several research centers working since 2014 that have published many journals, collections, magazines, translations – including of Crimean classics – and history books. Not all of them serve the purpose of Russia's narrative as their authors had been worked on their topics long before the occupation of Crimea. Still, this is a Russian view of the Crimea, and it is developing under a pattern applied to other Muslim subjects of the Russian Federation. What makes the situation of Crimea different is that the official Russian historiography often treats Crimean Tatars as the incoming settlers, and Crimea as "Russian land". All these materials are translated into other languages and promoted in the global research community thereby shaping the "Russian humanitarian aura" for Crimea and the Russian school of Crimean studies. Also, *kazasker* or *ka-diasker* books, the long-time records of the chief judge from the Bakhchysarai court that make one of the most valuable source of Crimea's history – were partly destroyed and partly taken to St. Petersburg back in the day. They now remain at the Russian National Library.

A great contributor to the research of Crimea's history was the Foundation of Bekir Çoban-zade founded by Resul Veliliyev, a well-known Crimean businessman and philanthropist. The foundation published manuscripts and funded an annual fellowship to research Crimean Tatar history. The foundation was active throughout the period of occupation. Then Resul Veliliyev was arrested in April 2018 under bogus allegation of stocking up on expired candies to sell them later. He has already spent several months under detention at the Moscow Lefortovo prison. Commentators assume that this case can be politically motivated: many in Crimea and Moscow don't like any "independent" Crimean Tatar activity. In October, a Kurultai of Crimean Muslims is scheduled to take place as yet another attempt to legitimize figures loyal to the Kremlin as so-called leaders of the Crimean Tatar people.

Integrating a smaller culture into the greater concept by monopolizing the interpretation of it perfectly fits into the concept of colonial politics. That's how old oriental archives were compiled in the early modern Europe. The compila-

tion of oriental funds in the Escorial Royal Library began with the Spanish pirates seizing a Moroccan boat with Arabic manuscripts and gifting them to Phillip II. Such approaches could have been a norm 300 years ago but can hardly be normal today when the research of old times is based on public availability of sources. While many EU member-states allocate multimillion grants to support the research of manuscripts and art pieces preserved in the local libraries, this window of opportunity is slowly closing down in many problematic areas.

In Ukraine, deportation of Crimean Tatars stands within the same category as the Holodomor and is echoed by the current occupation of Crimea. Many efforts are focused on keeping the topic of

After Zircirli was restored in 2008, the manuscripts were returned to it. In 2007, Turkey invested almost US \$3mn in the site and Zircirli opened as a museum complex in 2009

Crimea on the surface of international politics. Culture – of Crimean Tatars and others – plays a significant role in this. It makes sense to interpret all cultural values remaining in Crimea as stolen. But this raises many nuances and problems from the perspective of international law. As a result of some of these problems, Scythian gold from a Crimean museum that was displayed in the Netherlands several years ago has not yet been returned to Ukraine. Time has come to create comprehensive databases or catalogues that would allow us to develop clearer demands regarding the preservation of this legacy. This is a task not just for the fans of old history and artifacts, museum staff or the ministries in charge. The problem is that all this Crimean history is gradually used to legalize the occupation of the peninsula. Some crucial cultural values can be taken out of Crimea (that's why it's important to discuss this with international organizations that have some tools of influence).

A pretty straightforward, yet difficult and costly task is to create a hub in Ukraine for the cultures of indigenous peoples, thus turning it into the main center for broadcasting cultural senses, and historic memory to a certain extent. This will probably take more than just instructing a respective institute at the National Academy of Sciences. What we need is an institution with a modern model, modern funding and academic productivity. Meanwhile, Crimea seems to increasingly turn into a cultural island with fewer bridges connecting it to Ukraine. ■

September 15, 19:00 — September 15, 19:00 — September 17, 20:00 —

**Kuzma 50**  
**Arena Lviv**  
**(vul. Striyska 199, Lviv)**

Andriy Kuzmenko, front man of the Skriabin band, would have been 50 years old. And although Kuzma is no longer with us, Ukraine celebrates the birthday of its beloved musician. The band's songs have long been national hits and will be performed by more than 20 well-known artists. "Kuzma lives in his songs and his fellow musicians decided to make this a birthday gift to his memory: a major concert in Lviv," say the organizers. "Kuzma would definitely have been celebrating here with us."



**The Best Women's Voices**  
**National Philharmonic Hall**  
**(Volodymyrskiy Uzviz 2, Kyiv)**

For anyone who has dreamed of going to a concert featuring the world's greatest female artists, the Philharmonic Hall is about to make your dream come true. Accompanied by the National Academic Brass Band, soloist Margaryta Meleshko will perform some of the most famous songs from the greatest of the greats: Edith Piaf, Aretha Franklin, Ella Fitzgerald, Liza Minelli, Marilyn Monroe, Sarah Brightman, Lara Fabian, Whitney Houston, and Shirley Bassey. The evening's tempo will be set by conductor Oleksiy Vikulov.



**Andrukhovych and Karbido**  
**Ukrainian Radio Recording**  
**Studio (vul. Leonida**  
**Pervomaiskoho 5-6, Kyiv)**

Here's an evening of literature and music with a twist: Yuriy Andrukhovych presents his new album *Lithography* with the Polish band Karbido. According to Andrukhovych, the band plays a unique blend of jazz, avant-garde and his poetry in a series about his hometown of Ivano-Frankivsk, once known as Stanislaw. This new album already premiered in Poland to wide critical acclaim, so the home audience can look forward to the excitement of the Andrukhovych-Karbido national tour in nine cities.



September 18, 19:00 — September 21–23, 18:00 — September 28–30, 09:00

**Myroslav Skoryk**  
**National Philharmonic Hall**  
**(Volodymyrskiy Uzviz 2, Kyiv)**

This unique evening of classical music with Ukraine's best composer and winner of the Shevchenko Award, Myroslav Skoryk, should please the most demanding listener. The legendary composer will be accompanied by the National Academic Symphony Orchestra under the baton of Volodymyr Sirenko. Soloists are Valeria Tulis (soprano), Marko Komonko (violin), and Ihor Leshchyshyn (oboe). The program includes the Grand Overture, Concerto for Oboe and Orchestra, Ukrainian wedding songs for soprano and orchestra, the Carpathian Concerto, and the world premiere of Skoryk's Concerto #10 for Violin and Orchestra.



**Odesa JazzFest**  
**Odesa Oblast Philharmonic Hall**  
**(vul. Bunina 15, Odesa)**

Odesa loves to usher in the fall with jazz. This year's JazzFest celebrates its coming of age, 18 years in Ukraine's lively city on the Black Sea. Ten bands from 10 countries will fill its sunny streets with improvisations and experimental jazz over the course of three days. In addition to the already traditional presence of bands from Ukraine, Lithuania, Austria, Greece, and Norway, jazz musicians from Czechia, Korea and Israel will join the roster this year. Every day of the festival, listeners can expect new interpretations and unforgettable impressions.



**OldCarLand**  
**Expocenter Ukraine**  
**(prospekt Akademika**  
**Hlushkova 1, Kyiv)**

Aficionados of unusual cars are all abuzz about the last days of September this year, when one of the biggest tech fests takes place in Ukraine's capital. At this 9th OldCarLand exhibition, hundreds of unique automobiles of all ages will come together from every corner of the country. The oldest car at the festival will be more than 80 years old, others were only made for a very short time, so many of them are the only examples of the particular model still around. Little guests to this festival of cars can join a race on kids' sized pedal cars and many master classes.

