The Ukrainian Week

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Are Ukrainians ready to protest again?

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Український Тиждень

BRIEFING

Are Ukrainians ready to protest?

Андрій Голуб

The October protests in front of the Verkhovna Rada were not as large-scale and high-profile as the organisers had hoped. This could have one dangerous implication: those in power could develop a false sense of security and control over the situation in the country. It is unlikely that this would be advantageous for the government itself or, above all, society.

According to recent sociological studies, there have been no significant changes in the mood of Ukrainians over the last three years. The scarcity of demonstrations cannot be attributed to loyalty to the current govern-

Ratings of distrust/trust

President of Ukraine –43.4
Verkhovna Rada –66.9
Government –53.3
Civil servants –69.5
National Police –6.9
Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU) –11.6
Prosecutor's Office –59.9
Courts –71.6
National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU) –37.5
Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office (SAP) –39.9
National Agency on Corruption Prevention (NAZK) –42.9
Patrol Police (new) –2.1
Western media –9.7
Russian media –78.4
National Bank –59.9
Commercial banks –61.6
Trade unions –24.1
Political parties –62.1
Ombudsman –15.3

Which protests have you personally taken part in over the last 12 months?



8.7% 1.6% 3.6% 1.4% 0.6% 1.8%

Do you support the actions of the following authorities and state institutions?

Armed Forces of Ukraine 24
State Border Service 5.8
National Guard 18.4
State Emergency Service 17.9
Ukrainian media 5.6
NGOs 11
Church 41.9
Volunteer battalions 22.7
Volunteer organisations 46.7

	Totally support	Support certain actions	Do not support	Don't know
President of Ukraine	6.7	35.2	50.4	7.8
Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada	3.8	25.5	59.1	11.5
Prime Minister of Ukraine	6	33.8	50.8	9.4
Government	3.2	33.8	54	9
Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine	2.9	27.9	61.6	7.5
National Bank of Ukraine	3.2	17.1	63.5	16.2



2% 3.8% 1.9% 1.4% 2.2% 3.4% 0.6% 84.2%

Source: Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences, Razumkov Centre

ment, but rather to the fact that the opposition is equally far away from understanding what the citizens need and how these needs can be met.

On October 23, the Razumkov Centre presented the results of a poll conducted at the beginning of the month, just prior to the protests next to Parliament. In addition to measuring the electoral preferences of the population, the results of which were quickly picked up by the media, sociologists also investigated the level of trust in state and social institutions, as well as support for government actions.

The most trusted institutions in Ukraine appear to include volunteer organisations, churches and the armed forces. This has been the case since the very beginning of the Donbas war; the trio has strengthened its positions compared to data from April. The balance of trust versus distrust is +46.7%, +41.9% and +24% respectively. Also among the leaders are volunteer battalions (+22.7%), the National Guard (+18.4%) and the State Emergency Service (+ 17.9%). Slightly behind, but still in a position of respect, are NGOs (+11%). During the summer, Ukrainian media outlets managed to improve their image in the eyes of their audience somewhat and change their negative rating (-3.3%) to a positive one (+5.9%).

OVER THE PAST 12 MONTHS, ALMOST 85% OF RESPONDENTS DID NOT PARTICIPATE IN ANY PROTESTS, ACCORDING TO POLLS CONDUCTED BY THE INSTITUTE OF SOCIOLOGY. THE MAIN STIMULUS FOR UKRAINIANS TO TAKE TO THE STREETS IS THE STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE – 16% OF THOSE POLLED ARE READY TO DEFEND IT

Institutions that are associated primarily with politicians and officials cannot even come close to such results. Russian media are the leaders in distrust with -78.4%, followed closed by the Ukrainian courts with -71.6%. The Prosecutor's Office has somewhat improved its position, although it still has one of the highest negative ratings (it was -73.8% and is now -59.9%). Trust in officials in general is at -69.5%, in the Verkhovna Rada -66.9%, in the government -53.3% and in the president -43.4%. Even the newly formed National Anti-Corruption Bureau, Specialised Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office and National Agency on Corruption Prevention cannot claim to have citizens' trust – their ratings are -37.5%, -39.9% and -42.9% respectively (although NABU has slightly improved its image over the past six months, similar to the Public Prosecutor's Office).

According to the deputy director of the Razumkov Centre sociological service, Mykhailo Mishchenko, a high level of distrust in institutions does not necessarily result in mass protests. This situation is typical to not only Ukraine, but also other countries. Mishchenko gives the example of France, where François Hollande also reached a high level of distrust at the end of his presidency, yet there were no mass street protests.

"The level of distrust, of course, reflects the attitude towards the authorities. They are not meeting certain demands from society. We should also consider how exactly the public tries to put pressure on the authorities. It is not just about protests. Grassroots activities from society to influence local government are more effective than attempts to influence the president and Cabinet. This method of applying pressure is probably more effective, as the situation in society is largely determined at the lower and middle levels, not at the higher level," says Mishchenko.

At the end of September, the Institute of Sociology at the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine and the Ilko Kucheriv Democratic Initiatives Foundation published a further study aimed at assessing the level of social tension and protest sentiment in society. In total, 22.7% of citizens consider the level of tension to be extremely high and another 38% higher than average. Sociologists estimated the average tension score to be 6.79 out of 10.

At the same time, this high level of dissatisfaction in society has been maintained for several years. Almost half of the respondents (48%) believe that "the situation has aggravated to the point where it is no longer possible to tolerate". In 2016, this figure was also 48%, in 2015 – 45% and in 2014 – 39%. At the same time, when respondents are asked to name factors that they think will reduce tension, a change of power and protests are almost at the end of the list. 11.2% believe that mass demonstrations could reduce tension and 14.6% that resignation of the government would help, while 11.6% are convinced that early presidential elections would be effective and only 7.4% think the same about parliamentary polls. Instead, the following items top the list: real punishment for those guilty of corruption at the highest level of power at 61.8%, realisation of projects that improve prosperity and living conditions (prices, utility rates, salaries, pensions, real changes in education and health care) at 49.8% and the achievement of genuine progress in resolving the conflict in the Donbas (ceasefire, release of captives, etc.) at 40%.

According to the survey, 21.1% of people are ready to protest. On the whole, this figure is relatively stable and has fluctuated between 20 and 30 percent for the last 10 years. It is interesting that in 2013, on the eve of the Maidan, 22% of citizens stated that they were prepared to take to the streets, according to the same Institute of Sociology.

Mishchenko is of the opinion that it is almost impossible to predict the decisive factor that will turn an ordinary protest into widespread rallies. Similarly, it is impossible to draw a clear line between political and social protests, as in the context of tension and general dissatisfaction, one certain event may result in unpredictable consequences.

"The protests in November 2013 were not so large-scale at the start either. They were even smaller than those that took place last week. However, a few careless actions from the authorities – and several hundred thousand people took to the streets. If the level of dissatisfaction with the government is high, any seemingly insignificant situation or conflict can turn into mass political demonstrations. And then it's hard to say whether it's a social or a political protest. For example, when the students were attacked in November 2013. The term 'trigger effect' is used. When tension is high, a rather minor event that in other circumstances would not have such consequences can be enough," he says.

Over the past 12 months, almost 85% of respondents did not participate in any protests, according to polls conducted by the Institute of Sociology. Most of those who did take to the streets were opposed to utility rate hikes. The headline-making demonstrations against illegal construction and corruption, as well as unfair legal proceedings and investigations, attracted at most 2% of the population. The main stimulus for Ukrainians to take to the streets is the struggle for justice – 16% of those polled are ready to defend it. Another question, which politicians and political scientists have not yet found the answer to, is what exactly this justice consists of and in which specific circumstances.

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If elections were held tomorrow

Ukraine's Parliament has started to change the electoral system.
Will they be able to finish the job and what will change if the reform goes through?

Andriy Holub

On October 19, speaker Andriy Parubiy urged MPs to hurry with their speeches. Half an hour remained until the end of the allocated time and three bills on changing the system for elections to the Verkhovna Rada still needed to be voted on.

In the end, the deputies made it on time. "Dear colleagues! I would like to inform you that we have completed the first stage of the electoral reform!" announced the speaker. The chamber replied with loud laughter and some MPs started clapping. Although they finished on time, MPs rejected all three proposed projects. Which was why Parubiy's turn of phrase was considered an apt joke.

"Attention! We still have two more electoral codes to examine. In the next plenary week, we will continue to look at two codes for electoral reform, one of them authored by your respected and beloved Andriy Parubiy," continued the speaker. The chairman of the Rada flashed a smile and paused so that MPs could appreciate his new joke, then added, "And one by Pysarenko".

The tent town that remained after the Great Political Reform protest launched on October 17 had been standing outside Parliament for two days. Although the initiators of the event have different views on its future and most of them have declined all responsibility for what happens in the camp, the Rada dedicated the day to looking at two of the three demands declared by the protestors.

Among them was the "change of electoral rules". In the statements and comments of protest leaders, this topic was mostly overshadowed by the other two – the abolition of parliamentary immunity and the establishment of the Anticorruption Court. However, on the official website of the campaign, the electoral reform was on top of the list.

"Ukraine has a mixed proportional and majoritarian electoral system, adopted in 2011 in the interests of the Yanukovych regime. This means that half of MPs are elected in majority constituencies, where they win mostly by bribing voters and using administrative leverage, and the other half from closed, proportional lists, in which places are often sold. This system is the root of political corruption in the country," read a statement on the Great Political Reform website. It was demanded that MPs approve bill No. 1068-2, authored by several deputies headed by Viktor Chumak, one of the leaders of the protest in front of the Rada.

In fact, the Chumak-sponsored bill was one of the three that the Rada rejected during the evening session on October 19. It garnered the most support out of all

If elections were held tomorrow under the current model



Party lists (225)

- Petro Poroshenko Bloc – 51
- Batkivshchyna – 37
- Civic Position – 33
- Opposition Bloc – 32
- For Life – 26
- Oleh Liashko's Radical Party – 24
- Samopomich – 22

First-past-the-post constituencies (198)*

- The ruling faction – 69
- Other parliamentary factions – 23
- Non-parliamentary parties – 10
- Independents – 96

*In 2014, elections were not held in 27 constituencies in the Donbas and Crimea due to the occupation, therefore only 198 majoritarian MPs were elected

Source: Razumkov Centre polls carried out on October 6-11, 2017, based on the results of 2014 parliamentary elections in majority constituencies

those submitted, but still not enough – 169 votes. However, this does not mean that the matter has been put to rest. In fact, the draft electoral code No. 3112-1 announced by the "respected and beloved" Andriy Parubiy was virtually identical to Chumak's bill in the section concerning parliamentary elections. In fact, both documents are only formally new. They duplicate the provisions set out in Yuriy Kliuchkovskyi's draft electoral code that had been registered back in 2010. Therefore, the fate of the demand for open-list elections would be decided after 6 November, when MPs returned from yet another recess.

DIFFERENT MODELS

Currently, Ukraine has a mixed system for general elections. This means that half of Parliament – 225 deputies – are elected under a proportional system with parties running with closed lists of candidates. Prior to elections, parties adopt a single national list at their conferences and candidates positioned highest on the list win seats depending on the percentage of votes cast in their constituencies for their political force. The holders of the remaining 225 seats are determined in single-member constituencies, where not only representatives of parties, but also independent candidates can stand.

On October 19, MPs could choose one of the three suggested ideas to replace this formula. The bill registered by former Party of Regions member and current representative of the Opposition Bloc Yuriy Miroshnychenko basically duplicates the electoral system that functioned in Ukraine from 2004 to 2011: parties and blocs form closed lists and then have to receive a percentage of votes that exceeds a certain threshold. However, the author was unable to conclusively decide what this limit should be: different articles of the bill refer to 1% and 3%.

Batkivshchyna party leader Yulia Tymoshenko and her allies proposed a more interesting scheme. The country would be divided into 450 constituencies (as well as an overseas constituency), in which parties nominate one candidate each. Voters choose a party and a candidate at the same time. It looks simple: one constituency, one deputy. It is more complicated in practice. The top ten candidates on each list automatically receive seats in Parliament if their party gets at least 5% of total votes around the country. The rest of the seats are distributed according to results in the constituencies.

The third idea, which still has chances of success, is included in the Chumak bill and is also set out in the code authored by Parubiy, as well as two other MPs, PPB's Oleksandr Chernenko and People's Front's Leonid Yemets. In a nutshell, it proposes dividing the territory of Ukraine into 27 constituencies, which in most cases coincide with the current oblasts. There are three exceptions. One is Kyiv, which is split up into two regions (Left Bank and Right Bank, with the Pechersk and Holosiyiv districts of the city included in the Left Bank). Dnipro Oblast is divided into the Dnipro and Kryvyi Rih electoral regions, while the Southern Electoral Region would include Kherson Oblast, the Crimean autonomy and Sevastopol. Parties will put forward separate lists of candidates in each electoral region.

ON NOVEMBER 8, MPs SURPRISED MANY BY PASSING THE BILL CO-SPONSORED BY PARUBIY, CHERNENKO AND YEMETS IN THE FIRST READING. FOR NOW, HOWEVER, SOURCES IN THE RADA ARE PESSIMISTIC ABOUT CHANCES TO PASS THE NEW ELECTION CODE

If this law is passed, voters will no longer be able to simply tick a box next to their chosen party. According to the authors' plans, the ballot paper will have two columns: "I support the electoral list of the political party under ... number" and "I support the candidate for People's Deputy of Ukraine from this political party under ... number". Next to each column, there will be a box for

If elections were held tomorrow under the model proposed by Parubiy's code

Proportional open-list system (450 seats)



Petro Poroshenko Bloc – 95
Batkivshchyna – 70
Civic Position – 62
Opposition Block – 60
For Life – 48
Oleh Liashko's Radical Party – 45
Samopomich – 41
United Right – 29
(Svoboda, Right Sector, National Corps)

Source: Razumkov Centre polls, October 6-11, 2017

the numbers. If the voter supports the party number 9, for example, and regional party candidate number 3, then "09" should be written in the first box and "03" in the second.

After the voting, the Central Election Commission establishes the percentage of the votes each party received in Ukraine as a whole. This is the only disparity between the bills by Chumak and Parubiy. The first one proposes a threshold of 3%, the second one – 4%. Seats in Parliament will be divided among the parties that go over the threshold. Now, the seats go to the candidates as in the list approved at the party conference. Under the new bills, the selection of winning candidates should be based on the popularity of specific candidates in a particular region. For example, party A receives 5% of the total vote around Ukraine and party B gets 10% -- these are the only political forces to have passed the threshold. Accordingly, party A will claim about 150 seats and party B will get 300. The second column on the ballot paper will determine who exactly will become the MPs for these parties. Let's suppose that A received all its votes in only two regions: 75% in one and 25% in the other. Accordingly, 113 most popular candidates from the party list in the first region and the top 37 from the second will become MPs. No candidates will be elected to Parliament in the regions where the party is unpopular, although the draft law requires the nomination of candidates in all 27 constituencies.

COUNTING THE MPs

The current system for parliamentary elections in Ukraine virtually guarantees the victory of pro-government forces. The key reason behind this is single-member constituencies. Thanks to them, the pro-government party increases its representation by about 50%. For example, at the 2012 and 2014 elections, the parties then in power (the Party of Regions and Petro Poroshenko Bloc) won 51% and 35% respectively of all seats in single-member constituencies. These results were far from the national ratings of the parties, which was reflected by the results under the proportional electoral system – 30% and 22%, respectively.

In addition, the party in power always has one more hidden tool – independent candidates. At the 2012 and 2014 elections, these candidates received 19.5% and 48% of single-member seats respectively, getting 43 and 96 seats in Parliament. For comparison, the parliamentary faction of the most popular party at the last election, the People's Front, now only has 81 members. After winning their seats, independent candidates can either join a faction (which often turns out to be the ruling faction) or create their own associations and groups, which can be used to push through various unpopular decisions. On the other hand, other political forces in Parliament, apart from the "faction of power", cannot boast such impressive results in single-member constituencies. Not to mention the small parties, which are not represented by parliamentary factions at all. At the 2012 and 2014 elections, these political forces only won 29.5% and 17% of all seats respectively (63 and 33 MPs).

The reasons behind this situation lie in the single-member constituencies, which have long been associated with administrative pressure and various forms of voter bribery. According to Oleksiy Koshel, head of the Committee of Voters of Ukraine, majoritarian MPs are the main opponents to any changes in the electoral system: "We can already see dozens of constituencies that get massive subsidies and investments, which turns majoritarian MPs into feudal politicians that are guaranteed to win or have the right person elected. The current system is convenient for many local politicians."



If we try to simulate future elections under the existing system, based on the latest poll data and the results from single-member constituencies in 2014 **(see If elections were held tomorrow under the current model)**, then it is obvious that they will only be beneficial to the Petro Poroshenko Bloc and independent candidates, the latter receiving more votes as the president's brand is losing popularity. In fact, if this system is preserved, independents in the next convocation of the Rada will not be "worth their weight in gold", but in platinum, which will be reflected in the price of their votes. Likewise, the level of populism will grow, because almost every independent MP will try to assume the role of a passionate "protector of the ordinary people". In such circumstances, any unpopular but important decisions can be forgotten about.

Voting in parliament for Viktor Chumak's bill to change the election system generally reflects the interests of the parties **(see What about open lists?)**. For example, most members of the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction and the People's Front did not vote in favour. Almost half of non-affiliated MPs ignored the vote, while members of Vidrodzhennia and Volia Narodu groups, comprised mostly of MPs elected through single-member constituencies, cast one vote between them. However, there are other things that are difficult to explain logically. For example, the voting of the Opposition Bloc faction. Simulations show that if a system with open lists is introduced, this party could almost double its number of MPs, but only one member voted for the draft law. Similarly, the Radical Party and Batkivshchyna factions did not give their 100% support either, although a change in the system should be advantageous for them **(see If elections were held tomorrow under the current model and If elections were held tomorrow under the model proposed by Parubiy's code)**.

Alternatively, the Petro Poroshenko Bloc party would probably not be particularly affected by the introduction of regional constituencies and open lists. Since results at the local level will be the most important, the party could recruit popular local politicians who were previously nominated as single-member candidates and gain votes thanks to them.

According to Oleksiy Koshel, most MPs did simply not understand what they were voting for. "The bill demanded by the protesters (Chumak's – **Ed.**) is actually convenient for current political forces and extremely convenient for corruption. Moreover, it is a very comfortable law for majoritarian MPs. After all, it's convenient for those who have support, give their voters incentives, create mini funds, build roads and take advantage of political subsidies, because under such a system the parties would have to compete for these popular majoritarians to bring them into their lists. What's more, I can't even rule out that a new political force with a neutral brand would be formed just to unite dozens of successful single-member MPs. The proposed system is a step forward, but it would only partially solve the issue of corruption," he says.

According to Koshel, at this stage it is necessary to unequivocally abandon the majoritarian system in favour of a proportional one, even with closed lists. This would reduce the probability of voter bribery, but has another problem – the sale of positions in party lists. Therefore, it would be necessary to create safeguards against this. In addition, he emphasises the need to ban political advertising, which is not required by any of the bills proposed to MPs: "This is a measure that would make elections more meaningful, because the parties would have to offer something more than 10-second videos with a catchy slogan and emotional imagery. It will also reduce the cost of elections in Ukraine three, four or five times over. On average, Ukrainian parties spend three or four times more than their Polish counterparts do during elections to the Sejm. Reducing the cost of elections is a way to give new parties a chance at success. In the current circumstances, new parties will never be able to compete with the parliamentary groups because they do not have enough money. A ban on advertising is no less important than changing the system itself."

Olha Aivazovska, chair of the board at the Opora Civic Network, is also convinced that MPs did not particularly look into what they were voting for and pointed out that any proportional system primarily frustrates the authorities because it makes it far more difficult for them to use independent candidates as a tool. In addition, the proposed open-list system makes it difficult to predict election results: "There is one nuance in the unknown number of seats assigned to each constituency. Not to a particular party, but in general. It is linked to turnout, which is always the highest in Western Ukraine. We took the parties and did another simulation based on the 2014 election results, but this time taking into account the turnout. For example, Lviv Oblast could get 34 seats – almost three times more than now. No political players would know how many seats each constituency would get – there are 27 constituencies. Looking at past turnout figures, they realise that this is dangerous, as there will be more MPs in the West due to the fact that the number of voters going to cast the ballot there is traditionally higher."

She goes on to say that the proposed system does not guarantee that nobody will abuse it, but it does significantly reduce such opportunities and increases their cost. In her opinion, candidates are more likely to try to falsify the results of the vote than directly bribe voters: "This system makes it very complicated to simply divide up territory as before, prevent the nomination of strong competitors from other parties and make arrangements beforehand, as it is now often the case during elections in single-member constituencies. If we talk about bribery, it's not the electoral system that's supposed to fight against it, but the inevitability of punishment."

Oleksiy Koshel from the Committee of Voters agrees. In his opinion, as long as there are few precedents of prosecution for electoral crimes, there will be no incentive for a political culture to grow. He points out that as of today less than 10% of bribery cases opened after local elections in 2015 have gone to court. "For me, the case of the students in Chernivtsi who were involved in bribing voters at the last local elections is very revealing. The man behind the fraud was abroad and is free as a bird, while several students will get suspended sentences and possibly even have their lives ruined. This is a classic example of the ringleaders avoiding punishment. The reason behind this is the ineffectiveness of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in investigating electoral crimes.

AS LONG AS THERE ARE FEW PRECEDENTS OF PROSECUTION FOR ELECTORAL CRIMES, THERE WILL BE NO INCENTIVE FOR A POLITICAL CULTURE TO GROW. AS OF TODAY LESS THAN 10% OF BRIBERY CASES OPENED AFTER LOCAL ELECTIONS IN 2015 HAVE GONE TO COURT

They should initiate legislative changes, as it is not only the fault of law enforcement, but also significant gaps in the law. The Ministry of Internal Affairs should conduct training for the investigators who deal with such crimes," he says.

Nevertheless, he believes that the political culture of voters is improving slowly but surely and that bribery techniques are no longer as effective as 10 or 15 years ago. "Recovery from this will probably last for decades, but even our western neighbours – Poland, Slovakia and Romania – also have problems with voter bribery, just on a smaller scale," the head of the Committee of Voters concludes.

It is difficult to predict whether MPs will approve any changes at all. Given the result of voting on the Chumak bill, we could assume that "Parubiy's" electoral code was 60 votes short of getting through its first reading. This number did not seem unrealistic, however, according to ***The Ukrainian Week***'s sources, the prognosis was pessimistic: either the electoral codes would be voted down in full or at best sent for another first reading, which at least left a chance that they would be examined again.

On November 8, MPs surprised many by passing the bill co-sponsored by Parubiy, Chernenko and Yemets in the first reading with 226 votes, including from the Opposition Bloc. What happens next is anyone's guess. For now, sources in the Rada are pessimistic about chances to pass the new election code.

Populism's last gasp

What political ambitions do Yulia Tymoshenko and her party hope to achieve before the 2019 elections?

Roman Malko

As if there was ever any doubt, "I plan to run for the presidency," Yulia Tymoshenko announced on the eve of Pokrova, October 14. "And we will win in order to put the country back on its feet. I don't trust anyone else to do the job."

The Batkivshchyna leader flung the comeback glove at all her one-time political allies, now her main rivals in the upcoming elections. To her disciples, it was a signal: only she could make all the prophecies of psychics, clairvoyants and other fortune-tellers that only a woman president can save Ukraine come true.

DO WE HAVE A PLAN?

What may have spurred Tymoshenko to such an announcement is hard to understand. It did not come across as a spur-of-the-moment statement, although one could possibly see it as a Freudian slip. Until not long ago, it seemed that the Gas Princess understood her paltry chances and had pretty well stopped dreaming about the post of president.

Of course, this did not at all mean that her political ambitions had shrunk, let alone disappeared. On the contrary. Having understood where the real power lay hidden, the Batkivshchyna leader apparently began to seriously bring up the idea of being premier for the third time, although not in its present shape. It seems that she had a very clear plan for amending the Constitution to grant the Head of Government nearly unlimited power while weakening considerably the role of the president. The latter was to become a kind of figurehead while the real power would shift to the PM, who would be determined by the majority in the Verkhovna Rada.

In order to become PM, Tymoshenko would first have to control the legislature or be able to cut a deal with someone. And this looks like where her premierly ambitions probably ran aground. Cutting deals with Tymoshenko has always been fraught, as those who have been incautious enough to get involved in alliances with her can attest—"because Yulia likes to dump people." But maybe that's more of a slur than a fact, most likely started by those who themselves dumped Tymoshenko at one time or another and are now regretting it. In any case, it looks like this grand plan to amend the Constitution the way she wants is already being seriously developed on by an entire working group.

But Batkivshchyna will not necessarily propose this on its own: they could easily organize a cluster play, with others who stand to gain from such changes making the first move. The idea itself has been hanging around for many years now. Efforts were made to bring it to life during the Yushchenko Administration, when PM Tymoshenko held negotiations to form a coalition with the then-president's nemesis, Viktor Yanukovych. Talk was about amending the Constitution to shift the balance of power between the president and premier. As Yushchenko himself eventually explained, the president was going to be elected by the Verkhovna Rada and his powers greatly reduced—Yanukovych, incidentally, had no objections to that then—, while the premier was going to have greatly expanded powers and no term limits.

Needless to say, Tymoshenko was planning to be that lucky premier, but things didn't quite work out as planned. Yushchenko outplayed her and persuaded Yanukovych not to trust her because he would pay dearly. Yanukovych thought about it and decided to back out of the budding alliance and the expansionist initiative fell apart, but never died. Today, Tymoshenko is hardly the only politician who still would like to see such a shift. Narodniy Front (People's Front) people say that Arseniy Yatseniuk and his pal, Interior Minister Arsen Avakov are interested in trying to shift the balance in this way so that the president won't be able to concentrate the most power. Hence the "weak presidency, strong premiership" model that Yatseniuk has already brought up. Only Poroshenko is not exactly thrilled by the idea.

Have Batkivshchyna and Narodniy Front tried joining forces to see their common dream come true? Some meetings did take place, but even though such an alliance seems

Batkivshchyna's transit passengers

Mykhailo Brodskiy was Yulia Tymoshenko's ally for two years, spending over US $100mn on that

Bohdan Hubskiy, a member of SDPU(o), close ally of the odious Viktor Medvedchuk and a representative of the Kyiv Clan

Volodymyr Oliynyk, an ex-mayor of Cherkasy and Party of Regions MP, he co-organized the anti-Ukrainian Ukraine Rescue Committee. Oliynyk is currently hiding in Moscow

Andriy Portnov, Batkivshchyna's top lawyer, he switched to work at Viktor Yanukovych's Presidential Administration in 2010 and fled Ukraine after the Maidan

Anton Yatsenko, known as the godfather of public procurement mafia, was in control of the Tender Chamber of Ukraine NGO that had extensive control over public procurements

to make sense, it is very unlikely. It all comes down, once again, to trust. Both Yatseniuk and Avakov have lived in the Batkivshchyna compound and know what Tymoshenko's promises are worth, even if an agreement were to be signed in blood. In the end, it will be easier for her to cut a deal with more minor, ideologically empty parties—certainly it will be cheaper, at any rate—that pass the threshold in the next election. These could be Oleh Liashko's Radical Party and Vadym Rabinovych's Za Zhyttia. But until the Rada elections roll around, why not play around with the idea of running for president? It offers additional opportunities not only to gain publicity, but also to raise her party's profile and expand her business options. After all, why should political power be the only aim of such a powerful party?

NAKED BUSINESS

A few months ago a member of Batkivshchyna's political council over 2005-2007, businessman Mykhailo Brodskiy, admitted in an interview that during his time, a "guaranteed spot on the party's election list cost between US $3 and 5 million" and that this practice "had not changed much." "Unfortunately, the system is designed in such a way that it's really Big Business," Brodskiy added. What Brodskiy revealed was hardly news to anyone. Similar stories have circulated about Batkivshchyna since the day it was launched... and at all levels, from county councils to the national legislature.

Indeed, the history of Batkivshchyna has been the story of a "transit zone" for many dubious but moneyed politicians. Just a few surnames make that amply clear: Bohdan Hubskiy, a member of SDPU(o), close ally of the odious Viktor Medvedchuk and a representative of the so-called Kyiv Clan; Yevhen Sigal, also from the SDPU(o) and a long-time member of its political council; Kuchma family friend Vasyl Khmelnytskiy; well-known banking brothers Serhiy and Oleksandr Buriak; car magnate Tariel Vasadze; and oligarchs Kostiantyn Zhevago and Oleksandr Feldman.

It's understood that, without their direct testimony, it will be impossible to confirm certain financial relations with the party, but judging by the scale and consequences of its activities, it is equally hard to deny that this stream turned into a serious business. And the growing popularity of the party only increased the cashflow, but whenever problems arose, all the transit passengers hopped off the train. And so it was no surprise when the VI Convocation of the Verkhovna Rada saw BYT become the source of 38 tushky or party-hoppers, while in the VII Convocation, Batkivshchyna "donated" 13 more tushky to its rivals. Brodskiy described this phenomenon in a few words: "The system was such that people bought a spot on the party list, then turned around and betrayed it. They considered that they had simply paid for the right to a seat in the Rada."

Some might expect that Batkivshchyna has changed since those long-ago days, but not at all. Of course, it's been dropped by many big names, such as Oleksandr Turchynov, who seems to have gotten tired of playing "Yulia's shadow" and decided to try out some headline roles on his own. Indeed, the party has grown far younger and can boast graduates from Harvard and Oxford today. But the leader has not changed, which means the basic human resource principles have also not changed. "Our girl will do everything for us," one of the regional functionaries of Batkivshchyna responded when asked why he was so inactive."

TODAY, BATKIVSHCHYNA IS ENTERING POSSIBLY THE MOST COMPLICATED AND MOST INTERESTING PHASE OF ITS EXISTENCE. IF TYMOSHENKO FAILS, ONCE MORE, TO CARRY OUT HER PLANS IN THE 2019 CYCLE OF ELECTIONS, BECOMING NEITHER PRESIDENT NOR PREMIER, SHE CAN SAY GOOD-BYE TO HER POLITICAL DREAMS, ONCE AND FOR ALL

A MOTLEY PACKAGE

With no ideological foundation whatsoever and a penchant for primitive demagoguery, Yulia Tymoshenko performed miracles to attract the hearts of uninformed voters to support her. Oozing both affective and effective populism, she attached to herself legions of fans and half-crazed grannies who did not even try to understand where she was coming from. "Our Yulia" was enough for them. It's hard to say that she grabbed them with her intellect or her deep wisdom. She was simply personally very appealing.

And this blinded electorate was ready to take anything at face value, from fairytales about how candidates from BYT signed documents stating they rejected state apartments and immunity, to nonsense about Batkivshchyna arming itself with the ideology of solidarity. Say what you want about Yulia, but she was able to guarantee her own popularity at a very decent level—something that is still true today—, and

Vasyl Khmelnytskiy, an oligarch. A friend of the Kuchma family

Hryhoriy Omelchenko, known as a compromat man, was excluded from Batkivshchyna in 2009 after announcing that Yulia Tymoshenko had been recruited by the FSB in 1995

Mykola Bahrayev was the president of Tavriyski Ihry, a top music festival in 1992-2008. He arranged roadshows in support of Leonid Kuchma, the pro-Kuchma For United Ukraine party, and Viktor Yanukovych

Oleksandr Feldman owns Barabashovo, the largest market in Kharkiv. He was one of Viktor Yanukovych's confidantes in the 2004 presidential campaign

Tariel Vasadze was elected to Parliament in 2002 as part of For United Ukraine party. He then switched to Batkivshchyna, only to be excluded later and end up in the Party of Regions

this kept attracting "buyers," those who wanted to gain a seat, whether in a local, county or oblast council or the Rada itself. Indeed, Tymoshenko has established a kind of multi-level marketing system that draws people with political ambitions, generally in business or offering some other interesting "resource" to her party.

The Batkivshchyna leader is good at manipulating in the international arena as well. Reputable foreign publications carried two landmark articles penned by her—or by her loyal Batkivshchyna shadow foreign minister, Hryhoriy Nemyria: a hawkish one in 2007 about the need to contain Russia, and a second one in 2009 about Ukraine's and Russia's common "European calling." Nor is this the only example of cognitive dissonance: in its search for allies, Batkivshchyna has freely swung from the rightist European People's Party to the Socialist International.

IT'S HARD TO SAY WHO IS TYMOSHENKO'S CLOSEST CONFIDANT TODAY. AFTER TURCHYNOV LEFT, HIS PLACE SEEMED TO BE TAKEN UP BY OLEKSANDR ABDULLIN, A LONG-TIME ALLY AND BUSINESS PARTNER OF LEONID KUCHMA'S SON-IN-LAW, IHOR BAKAI, WHO FLED TO RUSSIA YEARS AGO

What about Tymoshenko herself: did she ever believe in anything that she said or promulgated? Certainly she always had a very strong team working with her to develop the necessary messages and slogans that one could easily believe in without really getting into their essence—and no trace of an ideology. Of course, those who needed to see one there, in that ecumenical Babylonian cauldron, then that, too, was included in the package of services.

But when there was no team and Tymoshenko had to improvise, the bloopers were quite remarkable: giggling next to Putin just as he was invading Georgia. Whatever one may think of Saakashvili, but not to support Georgia in 2008 meant to side with an aggressor who was in violation of all international rules. Nor was this incident some kind of clever political quid pro quo. She didn't do this because she was some kind of FSB agent, beholden to Putin or out on a limb. No, that incident showed the real Yulia Tymoshenko, the inevitable paradox when an image pasted together by professional admen is diametrically opposed to the real person behind it—and just how easily that image can cloud over the minds of hundreds of thousands of people. How they can be made to believe in something that never existed because it could not have existed, and thus to love, not the person, but the packaging—and only the motley package. The real Yulia is known only to those who are closest to her, those whom she allows to see her.

Just one good example is her participation in a session of the National Security Council at the very beginning of the war in Ukraine, when she talked about the need to demonstrate peacefulness. Perhaps she was advised to do so, but it was a piece of advice that most suited Tymoshenko's character—an iron lady who turned out not to be no warrior after all, not determined, not principled, and absolutely not "with Ukraine in her heart..." Afterwards, of course, every situation is open to interpretation or even denial. And for Tymoshenko, this has always worked beautifully. Ukraine's own post-fact politician.

A DANGEROUS MOMENT

It's hard to say who is Tymoshenko's closest confidant today. After Turchynov left, his place seemed to be taken up by Oleksandr Abdullin, a long-time ally and business partner of Leonid Kuchma's son-in-law, Ihor Bakai, who fled to Russia years ago, during the Orange Revolution. Prior to joining Batkivshchyna, Abdullin tried being in SDPU(o). Significantly, when Abdullin and his buddies joined BYT, the legendary parliamentarian Stepan Khmara immediately quit both the faction in the Rada and the Batkivshchyna party, where he was deputy leader, in protest. He announced that for him it was impossible to remain in the same company as an odious Kuchma man and oligarch, out of both political and moral considerations. But there was never a shortage of people like Abdullin around Tymoshenko. Of course, there were also many others, with completely positive, pro-Ukrainian credentials, but they had little influence over the business model.

Today, Batkivshchyna is entering possibly the most complicated and most interesting phase of its existence. Time inexorably ticks on and the opportunities to see dreams come true keep shrinking. If Yulia Tymoshenko fails, once more, to carry out her plans in the next while, if she flops in the 2019 cycle of elections, becoming neither president nor premier, she can say good-bye to her political dreams, once and for all. She will join the ranks of political has-beens. To prevent this, Tymoshenko appears prepared to go for broke, betting everything she has on this last throw of the dice.



Anatoliy Hrytsenko, an ex-Minister of Defense and leader of the Civic Position party

Natalia Korolevska came to politics "with a dream" but ended up the Minister of Social Policy at the Cabinet of Mykola Azarov under Yanukovych as President

Oleh Liashko, leader of the Radical Party

Viktor Lozinsky shot a local during a hunting session when he was member of the Verkhovna Rada Committee Against Organized Crime and Corruption

Nadia Savchenko, a former prisoner of the Kremlin and current freak of Ukrainian politics

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

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Better late than never

What should Petro Poroshenko do to have any chance of a second term?

Oles Oleksienko

The further their term moved past the midpoint of the Constitutionally allotted presidential term, the more every one of Ukraine's presidents worried about how to preserve and, even more, to extend, their position beyond the next election. Most of them clearly did not exert enough of the right kind of effort in time to lay the groundwork for this immediately after being elected to the post. Instead, their attention was gobbled up by the effort to concentrate power and by the time the next election loomed, their political prospects became completely dependent on technical moves and the application of administrative leverage.

Today's Head of State is no exception—despite the fact that he came to power with a strong mandate just as the country reached a turning point after the Euromaidan and gained further support with a majority in the Verkhovna Rada in his first year in office. In short, he had every opportunity to carry out the radical transformations the country needed, if not for ordinary Ukrainians, than at least in his own long-term interests.

Every government needs the right kind of support from the society it governs. One way to garner it is to reshape its social structure. This means measures that would establish a substantial substratum of voters who have gained positions that they do not want to lose and therefore link their future to the preservation of those in power and to maintaining the policies of the current leadership.

In most countries, this has typically happened at times of historical turning points and revolutionary transformations, when changes became long-term or even irreversible. The new leadership depended on the new social groups that linked their own prospects and well-being with them.

The question is whether the current president will use this opportunity or not. Of course, there are certain circles that are interested in preserving the current administration, but it's hard to say that they have the numbers and social influence to ensure the prospects for the current powers-that-be to remain in office.

In fact, Petro Poroshenko has not managed to establish real social support for his administration in his three years in office. In June 2014, right after he was elected, ***The Ukrainian Week*** noted, in an article entitled "The heavy mace," that when a relatively obscure individual in whom a wide circle of voters has invested idiosyncratic and generally unrealistic expectations begins to be more specific, the broad electoral base that brought him to power in the first round of voting was likely to dissipate quickly. Yet, attempts to preserve the oligarchic system under which Poroshenko himself has been used to working over the last 10 years will have a negative impact both on the country's prospects for development and on the prospects of the president himself to stay in power.

Poroshenko really needed to have put some targeted effort into establishing a new social support system for a post-revolutionary government, but instead he seems to have bet on finding support in the traditional pro-government social strata: the bureaucracy, enforcement agencies, and that element of business that has to support whatever administration happens to be in power. Of course, this option is a lot simpler, but it's also quite predictably unreliable. Yes, these three groups are historically pro-government by their very nature and it's much easier to just keep relying on them. Caveat emptor. First of all, they are never oriented on any specific individual or party, but on the government as a continuum. Secondly, their support



is obviously too narrow to ensure a win in the next round of elections.

On the other hand, relying on traditional approaches to gaining power for a second term, such as administrative leverage or picking up some cheap popularity by buying off voters with social benefits, is also a fairly hopeless option today. The social groups that are oriented towards this kind of benefit expect quite a bit more and will follow much more bombastic populists. Here the current president has no chance a priori of competing in populism with the opposition, which can promise what it wants without worrying about where the money will come from. On the contrary, all the latest politically-motivated increases in social benefits are only likely to increase appetites for more and foster populists.

In his own election platform, Poroshenko demonstratively distanced himself from social populism, noting: "All the party platforms that you have read until now promised manna from heaven, but it never fell." He went on to assure people that he would "spend money as soon as it appeared, in order to build a new economy."

It turns out he needed to have gone farther. From the beginning of his term, he need to focus on establishing the conditions in Ukraine that would as quickly as possible encourage the majority of Ukrainians to be active participants and take responsibility for their own lives—and that would have also established the conditions for dynamic economic growth. Opinion polls at the time showed that most voters expected this and were prepared to suffer the difficulties of the "transition period." Indeed, 71% of those who voted for Poroshenko were prepared, to one extent or another, to "put up with hard times today if this leads to a better standard of living tomorrow."

That time should have been used to launch a full range of instruments that would ensure the dynamic growth of the middle class, which tends to have a market mentality and often even some family business assets. The employment market and the country's economy, together with the presence of exceptional surplus cash "under mattresses" among a significant proportion of Ukrainians provided excellent conditions to launch entrepreneurial initiatives from the bottom up. All it needed was the right environment and guarantees of some kind.

The deep chasm in which Ukraine has found itself offers all the necessary conditions for government policy to maximally foster commercial activity, to support domestic manufacturers on foreign markets and to protect competition on the domestic one, and to see the national "pie" expand dynamically, rather than the wretched slices that people are still trying to carve up today.

This means that a competitive, level playing field needs to be maintained and the monopolist parasites nibbling away at the already weakened economy need to be stopped, since their main source of wealth is lobbying rather than running productive businesses.

Equally important is to ensure that the tax burden is fairly distributed, that everyone pays their fair share and not just those who don't have the means to lobby all kinds of breaks at the political level, direct and indirect. At the same time, this burden should be reduced to a reasonable level. What's more, the corruption tax needs to be eliminated as it seriously increases the official tax burden.

For all this to happen, Petro Poroshenko needed to take on the role of the catalyzer and coordinator of state policy immediately after being elected, aiming his efforts at reviving the economy across as broad a spectrum of the population as possible, and to support and protect it against outside interference. He also needed to undertake a thorough transformation of law enforcement and oversight agencies into instrument for guaranteeing lawfulness and security rather than being a tool for pressuring and terrorizing business. This would have provided a basis for the proper development of competitive SMEs.

Next, what was needed was real, rather than merely cosmetic, radical reform to revive the judiciary to establish the inviolability of private ownership, to protect business initiatives from raiders, and to ensure that all market players fulfilled their rightful obligations.

In the last three years or so, no real steps have been taken in this direction. Yet this remains the only path, not just to the successful development of Ukraine itself, but to maintain the political prospects of the current president. Realistically, does Poroshenko have enough time in the next two years to take then necessary steps before he has to run for office again?

On one hand, there is less than one third of the president's term left. On the other, there still looks to be time to propose to Ukrainian voters a program of changes like this and to at least show decisiveness in implementing them. More than likely, this would make it possible for a majority of active Ukrainians to focus on a reform platform—a number that is potentially growing every year. According to a poll from the NAS Institute of Sociology carried out in July 2017, it looks like the share of Ukrainians who are ready to suffer some worsening in their living standard for the sake of serious reforms had grown to 39%, up from 33% in 2016, while the share of those who aren't prepared to suffer for the sake of real change has shrunk significantly, falling from 60% in 2016 to 50% in 2017.

THE ECONOMICALLY ACTIVE SHARE OF UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IS THE ONLY REMAINING SOCIAL SUPPORT THAT THE CURRENT PRESIDENT IS LIKELY TO BE ABLE TO DRAW ON DURING THE NEXT ELECTION CAMPAIGN—IF HE PLAYS HIS CARDS RIGHT

However, President Poroshenko needs to completely ignore the old bureaucratic and law enforcement guard, with its penchant for corrupt income and piracy towards the real business class. Instead, he needs to undertake a real cleaning out of these Augean stables and make such agencies work in the interest of normal, competitive business.

And even if these steps do not result in the full desired effect because of the shortness of time before the 2019 elections, a decisive and consistent administration could prove sufficiently effective to gain the support of the economically active share of Ukrainian society. After all, this is the only remaining social support that the current president is likely to be able to draw on during the next election campaign—if he plays his cards right.

Once again, though, it has to be shown through deeds and not words, that he is prepared to do that which he should have been doing, going on four years now—even if under pressure from a looming election. If the active, patriotic voters among Ukrainians can be persuaded that the current administration has finally chosen the right course of action and it moving in that direction, this will be far more appealing than the triumph of populists, whose return to power would be fraught with poorly forecast, but clearly very negative, consequences.

The eastern policy trilemma

What kind of model is needed for the de-occupation of ORDiLO?

Maksym Vikhrov

De-occupation means not only re-establishing control over Ukraine's eastern territories, but also returning local residents to the Ukrainian political, economic and socio-cultural environment. It's this last bit that is causing a fair amount of anxiety in political circles, ranging from muted skepticism to open alarm. It's clear that reintegrating the people who have been living under occupation now for over three years will be very difficult. To a large extent, the outcome will depend greatly on the approach that Kyiv takes.

In 2014, the country's most densely-populated counties in Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts found themselves under occupation, affecting 3.5-4 million or nearly half of the population of Donbas. Today, it's hard to know exactly what the population of ORDiLO—as the occupied regions of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts are called—might be. Based on the number of IDPs in Ukraine, 1.5 million, and an unidentifiable number in Russia, it could be between 2 and 2.5 million, similar to Lviv or Odesa Oblast. Although it is suffering from negative demographics, the population is very slowly growing again as IDPs began to return with the de-escalation of the armed conflict. People are being pushed to return into occupation largely by the fear of losing the property they abandoned and the inability to adapt to their new homes.

In order to develop an effective policy towards the people living in ORDiLO, first Ukraine has to decide what these people mean to it. Public opinion is pretty clear on that: most Ukrainians see their fellow citizens on the occupied territories as hostages to personal, political and military circumstances. Only 6% see them as having betrayed Ukraine. This is really the most productive approach, because if Ukraine takes that position that "our" territory" is populated with "outsiders," the only option will be internal colonization based on police force and the administrative dictates of the central government. If the Donbas had really been a civil war, there would not be any other option. But fortunately the situation in ORDiLO is quite different: most of people are not participants in terrorism but its hostages.

HOSTAGES, NOT PERPETRATORS

Of course, there are people who believe in separatism in ORDiLO. But too many outsiders use the results of the 2014 pseudo-referendum in which Russia's proxies claim Donbas voted unanimously for the two pseudo-republics to say "they're all like that there." What evidence of the "love of the people" for the occupying force there is, is based on chasing locals out to participate in rallies, large-scale farewells to dead militants, and so on. Opinion polls in the occupied territories show a very different picture. According to one survey in occupied Donetsk Oblast, only 18% of the local population consider themselves "citizens of DNR." What illustrates the real level of separatism in ORDiLO even more strikingly is the number of residents who have actually acquired a "republican passport:" the proxies in "DNR" and "LNR" themselves put the figure for the last two years at 190,000.

Despite the damage to political and economic ties, it seems that the local population continues to link its future to Ukraine, some-

Building bridges. Restoring the infrastructure is a necessary condition for the revival of the region. But de-occupation will not be successful unless serious political, social and economic changes take place in the areas affected by the war

times even in the face of its own political convictions. Of course, living under military occupation has had its impact on people's worldviews, practices and so on. But it's not worth overestimating this influence, for two main reasons. First, the occupation looks unlikely to last long enough for the militants to raise an entire generation. Secondly, their propaganda affects the day-to-day life of locals far less than practical considerations. In the liberated towns of Donbas, at any rate, the term "Novorossiya" only comes up in kitchen gossip or in marginal circles.

If someone wants to see "treason" in the fact that millions of Ukrainian citizens are under occupation, they can, but the fact is that Ukraine needs its people there. They have lived in Ukraine all their lives and are far more integrated than the Russians who are busy buying up housing in Donetsk and Luhansk. Unfortunately, Ukraine is constrained by the Minsk accord and cannot really effectively interact with the residents of ORDiLO until the Law "On the specific nature of self-government" takes effect. Until then, however, the groundwork for a strategy in the Donbas needs to be laid now. If Ukrainians want Donbas to become a proper part of Ukraine, and not just a formality, any policy towards the region needs to stand on three pillars: restoring security and justice, rebuilding democracy and developing a new, modern economy.

SECURITY IS TIED TO JUSTICE

Security and justice are two sides of the same coin in this case. Firstly, it means retaking control over the country's eastern border and re-establishing legitimate state institutions across ORDiLO territory. Security measures will not be completely effective without ridding the region of the pro-Russian separatist movement. In order to do so, Kyiv can use legal instruments, that is, to sue those who will not be eligible for the amnesty required by the Minsk accords. If the guilty are convinced that they will inexorably face justice and punishment, many of the more dangerous separatists will likely flee Donbas together with the Russian forces.

There also needs to be some form of restitution in ORDiLO, to restore the property that the Russian proxies have been confiscating since 2014. Moreover, a broad-based campaign needs to be carried out to persuade locals to sue the Russian Federation to compensate them for the moral and material damage the war brought them. Such lawsuits have already been launched, but the government in Kyiv, human rights activists and international organizations need to support systematic and mass-scale efforts, like class action suits in other countries. Even if Ukraine is unable to find a mechanism for enforcing the payment of damages, the campaign will mean a lot politically and socially: the Ukrainian state needs to eventually declare its right to demand reparations from Russia. The rest of the crimes by the occupying forces also need to be documented and submitted to courts of various instances, including international ones.

DEMOCRACY FOR DONBAS

Since it was trampled under the occupation, the restoration of democracy in Donbas will be a major factor in the real reintegration of the region. This is critical, both in terms of values and in terms of political purpose. The local population needs to be confident that in returning to the Ukrainian flag, they won't be treated as second-class citizens but will, on the contrary, have their rights and freedoms fully restored. The growth of civil society and political pluralism should weaken the monopoly of pro-Russian forces that was fostered in the region by the Party of the Regions for more than a decade. In the future, Kyiv will have to foster the establishment of local civic alternatives to pro-Russian and separatist elements, something that is critical, not just at the tactical level, but strategically as well. The drive for unity should be moved from a "Kyiv vs Donbas" framing to the internal regional level.

What's more, once its "special status" expires, the population of ORDiLO will have to accept decommunization, the new language law and other changes that either have taken place in Ukraine or will have done so while Donbas eked out a living under occupation. Moreover, such changes have to be promoted by local national democratic forces that enjoy sufficient local support, not officials who are simply following orders from above. It may be easier by far to simply reconstruct the local administrative chain-of-command, but history has shown that the loyalty of bureaucrats is the least reliable support system when push comes to shove. And so, the few years that ORDiLO is officially under "special status" provide the timeframe during which Kyiv has to attract the support of local activists and help them gain political weight.

NO FIVE-YEAR PLANS, THANKS

Rebuilding Donbas economically will also go along way to foster the reintegration of the local population. First of all, the residents of ORDiLO need to be encouraged to stop seeing themselves as the passive recipients of outside assistance but to become engaged as broadly as possible in rebuilding civilian life. At the communication level, the restoration of Donbas needs to be presented as making a better future for all Ukrainians, not as simply resolving a local problem. Moreover, rebuilding Donbas is the perfect opportunity to strengthen interregional ties in Ukraine through horizontal communication. This means engaging teams of workers from other oblasts of Ukraine while workers from ORDiLO are retrained or learn a new specialization outside Donbas. For Donbas, with its highly industrialized history and culture, this kind of experience could be at least as valuable as travel exchanges and similar programs.

Over and above this, Ukraine has an opportunity to westernize the region economically in the process of renewing Donbas. International corporations are already beginning to actively launch new manufacturing facilities in Ukraine, which means that they should be offered not just attractive but "greenhouse" terms to do so in Donbas. In addition to socio-economic benefits, this will bring political dividends as well.

Firstly, reorienting the local economy towards western technologies and investments to will weaken pro-Russian tendencies and put an end to the myth of Donbas's dependence on Russia. The expansion of foreign business in Donbas will also weaken the grip of local oligarchs whose loyalty to Ukraine is suspect at best. Indeed, Donbas was originally developed by European industrialists who were invited by the Russian Empire to come here in the mid-19th century. The effect was explosive: within a few decades, the region had undergone an economic miracle and—unfortunately temporarily—was on track towards normal European development.

In short, the de-occupation of Donbas is a historic opportunity to begin a huge undertaking with the people of the region. Understandably, this will take enormous effort, but there will never be a more favorable time than the turning point of the post-war years. This is the moment when Ukraine can invite Donbas to build a common future together. Still, this time around, no stillborn "compromises between East and West" should come up. Ukraine's development course has been decided and all Donbas has to do is come on board.

Could the region see this as a historic defeat? Undoubtedly this will be true among the pro-Russian, degraded, neo-soviet elements of Donbas. But contemporary, democratic and Ukrainian Donbas, on the contrary, will finally have a chance to emerge and flourish. For these tectonic changes to be launched, Ukraine's leadership needs to drop its ideological blinders and act proactively, with a long-term strategy in its sights. Most importantly, over the next few years, Ukraine needs to move along the path of reform as far as possible, otherwise this region will find itself integrating, not to the Ukrainian project, but to a rotten post-soviet bureaucracy and corruption.

PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

Odd Egil Pedersen:

"We would like to try to understand how the experience you have fighting the terrorists in the Donbas area may influence the way NATO does operations"

Interviewed by **Yuriy Lapayev**

The Ukrainian Week spoke to Major General Odd Egil Pedersen, Deputy Chief of Staff of NATO's Military Partnerships Directorate, about the role of the Ukrainian military in the Alliance's operations, and the interest of Western military in Ukraine's Anti-Terrorist Operation and Russia's Zapad 2017 exercise.

We know that for a long time there has been successful partnership between NATO and Ukraine. We understand why it is important to Ukraine. But what are the priorities for NATO in this collaboration?

When you underline that this is important for Ukraine, it is also important for NATO in order to get Ukrainian experience from the antiterrorist operation in Donbas, as well as the general experience that Ukraine has in the Armed Forces in order to develop better NATO concepts and doctrines for the future. You also said that there had been a long relationship for many years. We enjoy having Ukrainian troops supporting NATO operations, supporting NATO Rapid Reaction Force, supporting us in exercises. Also, supporting the pool of forces that are evaluated and certified as ready for NATO operations, which is extremely important for us.

In the future, we think we will enhance this cooperation and build even a stronger relationship.

You probably heard about the Comprehensive Assistance Package that was approved last year at the Warsaw Summit. It is addressing a wide range of capabilities and abilities to develop support to Ukraine. I can mention cyber defense, rehabilitation of wounded soldiers, command, control, surveillance and reconnaissance systems that are being developed. It is also about building support of your energy sector and protecting your infrastructure.

And of course, since you have faced quite a lot of sophisticated cyber attacks, NATO is also facing that challenge. So it will be important for us to have experience from Ukraine in how you handle it, and to discuss it with NATO.

So it is not only about the Ukrainian focus on getting support from NATO, but also about us getting support from you.

You have mentioned that NATO will make some changes according to Ukrainian experience in the ATO. Can you speak more about it?

This is something that we want to learn more about. There are contacts established with the Land Command in Izmir, which is a part of the NATO command structure, and the Ukrainian land forces. And we would very much like try to understand how this experience you have fighting the terrorists in the Donbas area may influence the way NATO does operations and concepts of our

own type. That is an important lesson learned. I don't know the details, but it is certainly an interesting topic because we need to be able to meet the same type of challenge, a hybrid war.

Are you satisfied with the current level of collaboration with the Ukrainian side?

Let me say that it has been an experience with the relationship for many years. There have been the Ukrainian forces participating in several NATO operations, there have been Ukrainian units participating in the reaction forces, and they are following the training program that we are in charge of. There are four phases in that training program and it ends up with an evaluation of whether they are able to handle NATO doctrine. They have passed the exam all the time and done well in NATO, whether it is exercises or operations.

How can you evaluate the Ukrainian troops and their participation in NATO operations?

Ukraine is participating in naval operations and is involved in all the operations that we have on land. Their footprint is very limited, comparing to what they did previously. And we understand the reason for that because you fight the battle in your own country. There is no doubt that we understand it very well. I think the question is what kind of standards Ukrainian units are showing in the operations they conduct. At a tactical level, your forces are just as equal as most of NATO countries. The issue that you can improve can be the level of English. It is challenging for all Ukrainians to speak English. In NATO, however, if you don't master this language, you are in trouble. This is something that I would advise to all military persons in Ukraine: to improve their skills in the English language.

Also, I'm sure that Ukrainian Armed Forces can improve their education for military and for noncommissioned officers. This profession is extremely challenging. Being educated enough and trained well enough is something that has to continue. You can't just say that you are good enough and then stop. You need to be able to continually improve yourself and to challenge your own way of doing things.

You used to command cyber security units. What details of cooperation do you see for NATO and Ukraine in this field?

I am not in charge of that cooperation, I stay in the strategic military command. But when it comes to cyber defense, it is important to understand the challenges you are facing. NATO should also be able to be prepared for the same type of attacks. I hope that the Allied Joint Force Command in Naples is able to transfer their knowledge in order to enhance your own defense. A lot of it is about technical equipment and infrastructure, but it is also about knowledge and education. And it is not possible to solve this just by having a course or two. This is enhanced activity that will carry on for years. You need to invest properly, you need to educate and you need to build structures that are handling the incidents very quickly. In the cyber segment, we are talking about seconds sometimes, and there is a need to handle a situation in a prescriptive way in your country. Romania is the leading nation in NATO trust fund for the cyber segment in Ukraine. That is the way we do business in such issues in NATO. It is the nations that actually have capabilities. Romanian intelligence services are in contact with your national security services. I think that is the right way to start.

What can you say about Zapad-2017, the latest Russian military drills? What do they mean for NATO?

That is something we focused on very carefully. What I can share with you is that, first of all, it takes time to analyze what happened during this exercise. The way I see it is that Russia has communicated that this will take place in the very limited area: in Kaliningrad, in the Baltic Sea, and around Saint Petersburg. Of course, the experience we have is that this exercise was taking place throughout Russia. We saw activities in the Arctic, closer to Ukraine, as well as in Eastern Russia, even in the Abkhazian region of Georgia. That geographical footprint was much larger than communicated. Also, it was large in terms of the number of people (probably 17 to 20 thousand people took part), and the scope of military capabilities, warships, strategic submarines, all kinds of land capabilities (artillery, air defense, infantry, armored forces, special forces) and an intercontinental ballistic missile force of Russia. So, they have exercised all range of capabilities.

Like any other country, Russia has right to train their own forces. But the disappointment for us was that they did not communicate how big that exercise would be prior to it. So they violated the Vienna Document. They missed the opportunity to be transparent.

As you can understand, when you have military exercises of that scope, NATO countries which have borders with Russia would be a little afraid of what is going on. It is a little bit too early to draw conclusions, but this exercise focused on the defense side in the very beginning, and then they reversed to attack at the end of the drills, which is worrisome for us in NATO. It then tells us that the attack that was rehearsed was directed to touch some of our neighbors. And that is what we have seen so far. More analysis will come out of this exercises in the future I think. So it will be interesting for us to follow it closely. I don't know how Ukraine looked at this exercise but I think it is certainly important for your country.

Some people in the Baltic States are still feeling unsafe, even with NATO battle groups deployed. Are there any plans to increase that presence?

It is important that the population voice its concern about that because it is also about how much resource NATO should deploy in those areas. The Enhanced Forward Presence that we have currently is four battle groups. Everybody understands that we are not deploying sufficient forces to defend the whole of NATO with those four battle groups. This is just a signal to send to Russia, so they see that we are willing to commit all countries to the defense of these states in case they are being attacked. We understand that we cannot just defend these four countries with four battalion groups, this is not advisable in the military meaning. But the political signal is that all NATO is focusing on defending, and if they are attacked, the attacker will meet all the nations, which is quite serious.

Major General Odd Egil Pedersen was born in 1959 in Ringebu, Norway. He began his career in the Norwegian Armed Forces in 1978 as an NCO at the Infantry NCO School and went to the Army Military Academy. He worked for six years in various positions as platoon commander, staff officer, Electronic Warfare (EW) officer and exercise planner. He was appointed Commander of the Norwegian EW Company in 1990, and moved from there to the Army Staff in Oslo in 1992 as a staff officer C4IS. After two years at the US Marine Corps University in Quantico, Virginia, he was promoted to Lt. Col and appointed Military Assistant to the Chief of the Norwegian Defense. He deployed as the Contingent Commander Norwegian Forces in Afghanistan in 2007, and was appointed Director of Land Power and Operations in the Norwegian Army TRADOK late in 2007. In 2010-2012, Major General Pedersen served as Director of Intelligence, Allied Command Operations, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE). He served as Director at the Plans and Support, Norwegian Intelligence Service, and as CO at the Norwegian Armed Forces Cyber Defense in 2013 – 2016.

Moving right along

What exactly is being produced in Ukraine today, what does the army still need, and how much of this can be provided by the domestic defense industry?

Volodymyr Zablotskiy, Defense Express

New arrivals. Strazh, a tank defender, from the Zhytomyr Armored Tank Plant, the Kyiv Armored Tank Plant, and the Artem Holding Company, all state-owned, is displayed at the Arms and Security 2017 show

Russia's undeclared war against Ukraine is into its fourth year now, costing, in addition to human suffering, 4% of the country's territory and 20% of its heavy industry, especially strategically important enterprises that produced ammunition, military devices, weapon guidance systems, and so on, that were located in Crimea and occupied Donbas.

All this time, Ukraine has had to rely on itself alone, since the bizarre—not to put it more strongly—policy of the West towards the aggressor has also restricted Ukraine's ability to acquire weapons and military equipment. Indeed, those restrictions remain in place to this day. And so, on one hand, Ukraine had to provide armament and military equipment for its fighting forces, and, on the other, to develop promising models of weapons, find a way to substitute imports that used to be supplied by Russia, and at the same time to reform its entire military-industrial complex (MIC).

At this point, there have been some clear successes in these areas, alongside the revival of Ukraine's armed forces. Certainly, there remain unresolved problems, but Ukraine's army has everything it needs to fight off the enemy.

Over September and October, a series of international arms exhibitions and conferences took place in Poland and Ukraine, including the XIV International "Arms and Security 2017" Show and the V International Conference on "The Challenge of Coordinating Military Technical and Defense Industry Policy in Ukraine. Prospects for developing armaments and military technology," held October 10-13 in Kyiv. A closer look at Ukraine's defense products presented at these events, the conference materials on current issues in re-equipping the military, and military technology cooperation with foreign partners in Ukraine offers a number of conclusions. Given the uncertainty over US promises to supply weapons such as Javelin anti-tank units, Ukraine's Defense Ministry plans to increase the purchase of Ukrainian-made Stugna and Corsar anti-tank guided missile systems, as well as BTR-4Es and Oplot tanks.

WHAT'S NEW?

Just at the last exhibition, Ukraine's MIC showed several dozen new models of arms and equipment that take into account recently-acquired battlefront experience: many of the samples had just come back from the front. The most widely represented were armored vehicles, including: the upgraded T-72AMT tank made at the Kyiv Armored Tank Plant, a state enterprise; the Strazh tank defender made at the Zhytomyr Armored Tank Plant, the Kyiv Armored Tank Plant, and the Artem Holding Company, all state-owned; an upgraded BTR-4MN1 made at Kharkiv's Morozov Machine-Building Design Bureau; a light armored vehicles in the Kozak line, made at the Praktyka Research and Production Union, a private company. Also presented were such systems as the Bars-8 mobile mortar unit produced by Bohdan Motors; the Khortytsia mobile radio and radio surveillance unit and the Plastun 3D high-speed radio monitoring and tracking system made by the Infozakhyst R&D Center in Kyiv; anti-UAV systems from UkrSpetsTekhnika, a state-owned company; and the Kropyva combat control system made by TOV Lohika Construction Bureau.

Working together with international partners, Ukraine has begun to produce new armaments and equipment, including the Polish-Ukrainian ZRN-01 Stokrotka 80mm MRLS called Margarytka; the new PT-17 Polish main battle tank, which will replace the T-72 and PT-91; M4-WAC-47 automatic rifles, and more. The new Margarytka was impressive, against both land and airborne targets like UAVs.

The question is how much of what the army needs can be produced in Ukraine and what is needed to ensure qualitative superiority against the enemy in the battlefield? The Defense Ministry says that, at this time, the Army has enough armaments and equipment to successfully carry out the missions it is being assigned. Still, it intends to re-equip the Armed Forces in 2018 with new and more effective models.

The rapid development of technologies and the appearance of qualitatively new types of armament and equipment affect the way that military action is planned tactically and has led to a reassessment of the role and place of all the components of the modern battlefield. At the top was the data component—the reconnaissance, control and communication systems that determine the speed with which command decisions can be made. Cutting-edge digital communications systems mean that a mobile unit from the US Armed Forces can be deployed 8 hours after getting executive notifications, whereas its Russian counterpart needs 24 hours or more. This critical issue is being addressed in Ukraine by procuring military digital communications systems from Turkey, which are manufactured

to NATO standards. The signing of a contract was preceded by comprehensive testing at a training field where the Turkish models proved the most reliable and most effective. What's more, the manufacturer offered Ukraine a better deal than other providers, even Israeli ones.

CITIUS, ALTIUS, FORTIUS

These days, the quality of a weapon is judged not only by its calibre and reach, but also its accuracy and speed in hitting a target. Here, the advantage goes to high-precision ammunition that can hit a point target such as a reinforced firing position, armored vehicles, command headquarters, bridges and so on in one or two shots. This has the added advantage of seriously economizing on ammunition and resource containers: to destroy one and the same point target, ordinary ammunition may need as many as 100 shells. Meanwhile, the speed with which a mission can be carried out means that the gun can change position and avoid returning fire.

Among Ukrainian-made high-precision weapons with guided artillery shells using semi-active laser targeting systems include the 152mm Kvitnyk-E and 122mm Karasuk manufactured by the state-owned Progres R&D Complex. These two can destroy defended point targets at a distance of 20 and 12 kilometers. Moreover, all their components are Ukrainian-made.

The Pivdenne Construction Bureau in Dnipro is in the process of completing the Hrom-2, a mobile short-range ballistic missile system that can strike 250-450 km. It is somewhat analogous to the Russian Iskander. This project is being financed by an international buyer. Next year, plans are to put this SRBM through bench and field-testing. Based on the results, General HQ may decide to adopt this SRBM for the use of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The domestic version of this weapon is expected to have better tactical specs than the version for export because of international restrictions. And so Ukraine's army will be able to relatively quickly have a very powerful non-nuclear weapon in its arsenal to hold back the enemy.

Pivdenne is also developing two new high-precision AAD systems that can operate within a radius of 250 km and is working on completely upgrading its current MRL systems. For instance, the Ukrainian version of the 300mm Smerch —code-named Vilkha—MRLS can hit targets up to 120 km away. Its mobility and precision are also being improved.

The Luch Construction Bureau in Kyiv has finished preparations to test its domestic anti-ship cruise missile (ASCM) called Neptune for the Ukrainian Armed Forces. This December the first such missile will be launched to its maximum range. This will be a coastal version and next to be developed will be air-launch and ship-launch versions. Once these ASCMs are delivered to Ukraine's Navy, its attack component will be restored and combat capacity qualitatively improved.

Ukraine's Air Force is more in need of transport and patrol aircraft, which can easily be supplied by the domestic defense industry. There are also some options for upgrading the current fleet of helicopters and even developing new models at Motor-Sich in Zaporizhzhia. Drone technology is also actively evolving. The Antonov Corporation is working to developing the Horlytsia drone, but several other manufacturers, including private ones, have also been developing UAVs.

On the other hand, replacing the current fleet of fighter aircraft is a real challenge. Partly because of the high cost of promising fighter jets, the decision has been made to limit themselves to upgrading and extending the lifespans of the current fleet of soviet-era models like the SU-27, SU-25 and MIG-29 until 2030. Sooner or later, though, the acquisition of new aircraft will have to be on the table.

PRIORITIZING AIR DEFENSE

The military is insisting, however, that the priority be strengthening the country's air defense system, upgrading existing system and developing new ones for seeking and destroying airborne targets. This reflect broader trends in the world today, where technological progress has meant that air defense systems ensure the combat action of fighter aircraft and not the other way around, the way it was until not long ago. This was also testified by Ukraine's use of military aircraft in the war zone in 2014.

To establish an effective ADS, the government understands that it needs to set up and support an uninterrupted radar field over Ukrainian territory and the adjacent territories of neighboring countries at a wide range of altitudes. It also needs to constantly monitor and control the use of its airspace.

Today, Ukraine has the necessary resources and is actively developing new radar systems. The Iskra R&D Complex in Zaporizhzhia has taken the initiative to launch one such station in the 80K6T class mobile 3D surveillance radar system, preliminarily called Leleka, at its own cost. This station can detect and track up to 300 targets simultaneously at a distance up to 500 km at all altitudes: aircraft, helicopters, ballistic and cruise missiles. The Leleka is currently undergoing testing but has already attracted the attention of military attachés from a number of countries, including the US, where anti-missile defense systems are one of the top priorities.

ACCENTING TECHNOLOGY

Another critical area is weaponry for Special Operation Forces (SOF), especially radar equipment and electronic warfare devices. The development of the latter is leading to a switch to massive EW operations. There are already EW devices in circulation based on new physical principles: electromagnetic weapons and software weapons such as viruses, trojan horses, sniffers, exploits, and more.

In order to properly develop weaponry for SOF in Ukraine, certain options are being considered in the development of electronic weapons and increasing the effectiveness of combating electronic terrorism. This includes "... applying new physical and technological approaches in forming...small-scale high-energy impulse sources that can generate fatal electromagnetic and kinetic damage to the enemy's military installations."

Given that traditional weapons systems are reaching the limit of their evolution, major countries have been focusing more on developing weapons systems based on unconventional operating principles. In Ukraine, the priority has been to develop weapons that generate electromagnetic pulse or EMP for demining, bombs, guided missiles and so on; surface-to-air and surface-to surface laser-based weapons; high energy radio frequency weapons or HERFs based on high-energy generating devices; and non-lethal weapons.

One interesting approach used by Ukrainian specialists is the intelligent monitoring of land-based mobile and stationary objects using multi-agent air-based systems. This would use UAVs with computer vision that can monitor from the air using intelligence software. This has a number of advantages, including the capacity to monitor a larger territory and reduce the time needed for monitoring.

NOW FOR THE NAVY

The top priority for Ukraine's Navy is to expand its fleet of vessels as soon as possible to at least the minimum necessary number. Unfortunately, it's probably the hardest task. Firstly, the cost is enormous. Secondly, military vessels have very lengthy production cycles. The government's targeted defense program to develop weapons systems through to 2020 has two short-

term objectives: expanding the building of small armored artillery cutters and modernizing the *Hetman Sahaidachniy* frigate.

In the medium and long term, the program calls for building Project 58250, the main multipurpose *Volodymyr Velykiy* corvette, landing and counter sabotage boats, a mid-range reconnaissance boat and Lan-type missile cutters. In addition a coastal surveillance system is supposed to be set up, equipped with Ukrainian-made CP-210 Delta 360° radar towers and mobile P-18 Malachite or Burevisnyk-1M units.

Unfortunately, despite the announced "priorities," the promised funding for 2017 to finish construction on the corvette was never released, and there is no guarantee that it will show up in 2018, either. This means that, for the foreseeable future, there's little reason to expect good news related to the corvette. It looks like, at the earliest, the Navy will get its long-awaited corvettes after 2020. In the meantime, while the Hetman Sahaidachniy is being upgraded, Ukraine's Navy will not have a single fully-functioning vessel in its maritime zone.

Another difficult issue is equipping the vessels with weapons, including weapons that are not made in Ukraine. And while some ASCM and SAM systems could gradually be produced by the domestic defense industry, medium calibre cannons, antiship torpedoes and mine-trawling equipment will have to be bought abroad. Given the international restrictions in place, the issue becomes even more complicated.

Repelling Russia's aggression effectively is impossible without expanding the country's marine capacities, which means mobilizing all resources and determination on the part of Ukraine's military and political leadership. Alas, the latter is very doubtful:

UKRAINE IS PROCURING MILITARY DIGITAL COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS FROM TURKEY, WHICH ARE MANUFACTURED TO FIT NATO STANDARDS. THE SIGNING OF A CONTRACT WAS PRECEDED BY COMPREHENSIVE TESTING AT A TRAINING FIELD WHERE THE TURKISH MODELS PROVED THE MOST RELIABLE AND MOST EFFECTIVE

the draft Marine Strategy of Ukraine, which is key to developing Ukraine's navy and all the country's maritime activities, and put together by specialists, has been gathering dust at the Cabinet of Ministers for more than a year now.

Next comes expanding the defense industry as part of the overall economy, reforming Ukraine's MIC, expanding joint ventures in military technology with foreign companies, and so on. Given Ukraine's own military technology potential, the country should be able to move up to the social, economic and financial level of European countries and to be an equal partner on global markets. This means joint efforts on the part of all stakeholders—the government, science and business—, identifying specific steps to encourage innovation, and providing it with the necessary government support.

The government also needs to pay more attention to domestic critical technologies, which are a particular priority in terms of ensuring national security and economic growth. Ukraine needs a state system run by a coordinating agency and customer, a national strategy, a critical technologies development program, and mechanisms for supporting it. Using leading EU countries and NATO, defense CTs are the dominant factor in national security or the security of a group of nations, so state financing is provided at the national level, while at the international level, a group of states finances it, such as through NATO or the EU.

In addition to supplying the country's armed forces, Ukraine's defense industry is a major player on global markets, as this is one of the key areas where high-tech products are exported. According to UkrOboronProm, the state-owned defense giant, Ukraine currently supplies dual use weapons systems and equipment to 68 countries and is in negotiations with another 83. As of July 1, 2017, total orders were worth US $2.365 billion.

What's more, this is a channel for communicating with potential partners, and gaining access to new technologies and investments. This is significant, as, right now, high-tech products have only around a 7% share of all of Ukraine's exports. Fortunately, this share is growing steadily.

INTEGRATING WITH NATO

Given the need for its enterprises to advance joint projects and accelerate the move to manufacturing products to NATO standards, UkrOboronProm has been expanding its cooperation with the Alliance. Already 70% of its companies are certified to ISO 9001 standards and are instituting the AQAP 2000 management and quality control systems.

40 UkrOboronProm enterprises have been given access to the NATO Master Catalogue of References for Logistics. Ukraine is currently carrying out 37 different defense projects under NATO programs, including at the Kyiv Politechnical University. In December, Ukraine's MIC will be presented at NATO headquarters in Brussels. The company recently announced its strategy for reforming the defense industry—corporatization, audits, clusterization, comprehensive technology security actions, and the launch of HARDA, the Main Agency for Cutting-Edge R&D—and a large-scale program for import substitution that will involve 400 companies in 21 of Ukraine's oblasts.

At this point, the legislative and regulatory base needs to be improved. Although changes to the Tax and Customs Codes have already been introduced to streamline the import process for all of Ukraine's defense enterprises, without exception, another 40 regulations still need to be revised. Key here is to adopt the Law "On cooperation in military technology" and to amend Cabinet Resolution #170 dated March 16, 2016, "On the procedure for importing, first deliveries and targeted use of goods identified in Art. 287 of the Customs Code of Ukraine for use in the manufacture of products for military use."

A number of key questions also need to be legislated:

- removing legislative restrictions on setting up enterprises on state-owned properties;
- transforming state enterprises into public stock companies;
- acquiring the instruments necessary to restructure liabilities;
- applying mechanisms for private capital to be involved in stock companies;
- simplifying the process of setting up a JV with foreign capital.

Last, but not least, there is the growing role of private defense manufacturers, which has become a serious trend. Being more flexible, efficient and a lot less corrupt, private business is capable of raising Ukraine's MIC to a new level of quality. Changes for the better are primarily being driven by the establishment of horizontal ties and cooperation, the broader engagement of scientists, and the growing experience of the manufacturers themselves. The result has been qualitative changes in the private part of the defense industry. Today, it's no longer just individual products, as before, but entire defense systems and assemblies with high added value.

All that's left is to hope that qualitative changes at its enterprises will slowly but surely bring Ukraine's MIC to a real hub. That, however, can only properly happen after fundamental reforms.

PHOTO: UNIAN

David Kramer:

"Putin's greatest export is corruption, but we import it, we allow it into our countries"

Interviewed by **Yuriy Lapayev**

Former Senior Director for Human Rights and Democracy at the McCain Institute and President of Freedom House recently presented his new book *Back to Containment: Dealing with Putin's Regime* in Kyiv. ***The Ukrainian Week*** spoke to him about the book, as well as the current state of affairs at the US Department of State and the forecast for America's foreign policy.

In your book you highlight some of the characteristics of Vladimir Putin and his regime. Do you think there is a correct understanding of him among top-level American politicians?

If you look at the comments made by many senior US officials, including when they appeared in the US Senate for the confirmation of their current positions — I would include Ambassador to the UN Nikki Haley, Rex Tillerson as the Secretary of State, Jim Mattis as Secretary of Defense, CIA Director Mike Pompeo, — they all have been quite clear and candid about the threat the Russia poses and very critical about Putin and his regime. Vice-president Pence made a trip to Estonia, Georgia and Montenegro in the summer. It was also very clear. In Georgia in particular he reiterated support for Georgia's aspiration to join NATO; by implication, I think, the same thing could be applied to Ukraine. If you look at the US Congress, it has passed legislation this year calling for additional sanctions against the Putin regime. All of that is positive. You have the appointment of Kurt Volker as US Special Representative for Ukraine, who I think is terrific and said all the right things. He is clearly looking out for Ukraine's interests. I think he is refreshingly blunt about where the problems lie and where responsibility lies. That is in Moscow.

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David Kramer was born in Malden, Massachusetts in 1964. He was educated at Tufts University, receiving his B.A. in Soviet Studies and Political Science in 1986, then going on to get his M.A. in Soviet Studies in 1988 at Harvard University. From July 2005 to March 2008, Mr. Kramer was Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs working on issues related to Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine, and nonproliferation. From October 2010 to November 2014, he was President of Freedom House. In 2014, he became Senior Director for Human Rights and Democracy at the McCain Institute. Mr. Kramer is currently a Senior Fellow in the Vaclav Havel Program on Human Rights and Diplomacy at Florida International University's Green School of International and Public Affairs. He has recently authored *Back to Containment: Dealing with Putin's Regime.*

Then you do have President Trump and his comments which consistently have been soft on Putin and Russia. I agree with President Trump and candidate Trump, that it would be nice if the US and Russia could get along. Everyone would like that. Ukraine would like that. I just don't think it's possible with the current regime in Moscow.

Mr. Putin has talked about outside powers wanting to take a chunk of Russia since as far as 2004, after the Beslan tragedy. Then, of course, the Munich speech of 2007 and holding the US, NATO and the European Union as the threats to Russia continually ever since. He needs to perpetually push this myth that there are the outside threats to Russia in order to justify his authoritarian control. As long is that is the case, I don't see how we can have a normal relationship with Russia. I don't give up on Russia as a whole, I also think it is important to differentiate the Russians from their leadership. And I think that the level of support (for Putin – **Ed.**) is shallow in Russia. If there were a real alternative and there were real elections, Putin might still win but not by Turkmenistan standards. Many current senior US officials and the US Congress have a proper understanding of the threat that Putin's regime poses. I don't know if that view is shared by the President, but I do think the Vice-President has that view. And if you look at the increasing export of US energy, that is a positive thing which also has an impact on Russia. If you look at the increase of military presence and at the administration following the sanctions, then these actions are speaking louder than words. It's a mixed picture in some aspects. But statements by the US administration have been right. Nikki Haley was sitting near Madeleine Albright and Condoleezza Rice at the conference in New York sponsored by The Bush Institute. She referred to Russia's interference in last year's election as a kind of warfare — such strong words. And she has been very outspoken about that.

Some say that Western politicians sometimes make a mistake by trying to deal with Russia in a more soft, civilized and diplomatic way, because the Russians understand and respect power and hard skills instead...

I do agree with that. I think Putin respects strength, when somebody has the courage to push back. And he exploits weakness, what he sees as softness on the part of the West and others. In my book I argue about a tougher line in dealing with Russia. We need to increase sanctions, not simply maintain the current ones. And that is what the discussion is about. With maintaining the current sanctions we lose the argument, we lose that debate. Putin has to think and to expect, that he will receive tougher sanctions if he doesn't change his behavior. We have to keep pushing the sanctions up. Coupled with the drop in oil prices, the sanctions have had an impact. I think Putin didn't expect that. I think he didn't expect sanctions at all because there was no reaction after Georgia. I described this in the book. And I do see the fault of the Bush Administration in which I served. But it was different circumstances – the end of the Bush Administration and a five-day war that was over quickly, allowing Russia to continue this creeping annexation in Georgia. And almost no losses comparing with Ukraine or Syria. The US did not really impose any consequences on Russia for its invasion of Georgia. And then you have a new Obama Administration coming. Not even one year passed, and the Obama Administration was talking about Reset Policy, actually saying that the Russian invasion on Georgia was just swiped off the map. They never really looked back. That came across in Moscow as an impression that the US needed this relationship more than Russia did. As long as we give that impression and create that image, we won't win. It is not the kind of competition in which we can win or lose. It is in everyone's interest. And sometimes our policies can make it worse.

Do you think that the current administration can play harder?

Again, if you look at the actions of the administration, they are better than some of the words the President has said. If they implement the sanctions legislation, that would be another indication that they are in fact taking a tougher line. The US Congress has been great on dealing with this. I mean, in 2012 when the Congress passed the Magnitsky legislation over the Obama Administration. But it is actually the administration which implements the sanctions.

The other question which is specifically related to Ukraine is whether President Trump will approve the provision of lethal military assistance. I have argued since 2014 that the US should provide it. It is to help Ukraine defend itself, not to go on the offensive. And it is in line with our commitments in the Budapest Memorandum. Ukraine is not asking for US soldiers on the ground to fight for Ukraine; it is asking for Javelin missiles, anti-radar equipment and other things that are defensive in nature. If Russia does not send tanks to Ukraine or fly into Ukrainian territory, then it has nothing to fear. Ukraine is on the frontline in defending the West against Russian aggression. And it seems to me, that the least we can do is to help Ukraine in defending its own territory. Secretary Mattis was here, he said all the right things. Kurt Volker is outspoken about this. State Department seems to support it. But I don't know when the White House will make a decision. President Obama opposed this even though the Congress supported it. Vice-president, Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chief of Staff – they all supported it. And yet Obama refused to do this. I think that was a terrible mistake on Obama's part.

In your opinion, what measures can be effective in managing the Russia-Ukraine conflict? Would it be the military, economic or diplomatic approach?

The increase of sanctions is important. Every few months when Russia refuses to comply with the Minsk Agreement — which I think we should abandon because it's not

working – we should increase sanctions. In September 2014, the Minsk Agreement 1 was signed and didn't work. Then Minsk 2 was signed in February 2015 and it isn't working. At some point we have to realize that either we have to be more creative to come up with Minsk 3, or we have to apply more pressure on Russia. For me, applying more pressure on Russia is about the only way we can solve this problem.

Russia right now does not feel enough pressure to change its policy. Until Russia is affected by tougher and wider sanctions, it doesn't have many reasons to get out of Ukraine. To be clear, I include Crimea in this. Crimea is not mentioned in the Minsk Agreements. And yet the US and other countries should never recognize Russian annexation. It's illegal; it would redraw the map of Europe and violate the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity. There are sanctions which are specifically for Crimea, they should stay and be increased.

We should support Ukraine in a diplomatic way. We should make sure that we are clear: we side with Ukraine in this crisis. After all, this is the situation where Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine didn't invade Russia.

We should also make sure that things like Nord Stream 2 are not carried out. Nord Stream 2 is a terrible idea; it is not even viable commercially. And it hurts Ukraine, as well as the Baltic States, Poland and even Germany. Because it makes Germany more dependent on Russia directly. Lastly, we need to clean up our own situation in the West. Putin's greatest export is corruption, but we import it, we allow it into our countries. So we need to fix our systems. Putin and his regime cannot both demonize the West, view us as a threat saying that we try to launch color revolutions against Russia, and at the same time put their money in the West, send their kids to the West or buy real estate here. We must do a much better job at fixing our own system and making sure that this corrupted money is not infecting our system.

Half a year ago President Trump proposed a serious cut in international aid, which many see as America's soft power. How could this affect American approach to foreign policy? What difference does this make compared to the period of Obama's presidency and the rule of the Democrats?

I think that the Congress will leave a lot of funding that the Trump Administration wants to cut at the end of the process. There is strong support for foreign assistance in both the Senate and House of Representatives. The leaders at the Pentagon, current and previous, have said that the military budget will have to increase if you cut foreign assistance budget. Because the Pentagon will be called upon more and more to step in and deal with crises. The whole idea of foreign assistance is to prevent situations from exploding.

I think that despite the 30% cut that the Administration requested, this won't happen. And then, if the money is approved, the Administration will have to spend it right. There is a great person in charge of the US Agency for International Development, Mark Green. He understands the importance of foreign assistance. So I expect that this soft power will continue to be a key part of US foreign policy. The Bush Administration and George Bush spoke about the freedom agenda: Bush believed in that passionately, but the war in Iraq did some damage to this concept. It discredited promotion of democracy. Barak Obama said five days before becoming president that we can't impose democracy through the barrel of a gun. And he is right. But then Obama showed little interest in democracy and human rights issues. The current administration has shown even less interest. And yet, if we don't support democratic forces, the world will become a less safe place. The US has supported democracy for decades, and I hope we will return to that.

There seems to be a huge difference in the way the US Administration (and political establishment) perceives Eastern European states that are NATO members and Ukraine, not even suggesting that the latter might one day leave the grey zone and join the Western club of nations. Is that a correct impression? Is there any way for Ukraine to bridge that difference?

We have to go back to 2008 when both Ukraine and Georgia asked for membership action plan (MAP). NATO allies, in particular Germany, would not agree to do it. They agreed only that Ukraine and Georgia would become members some time. There has been slow progress in that area. One of the challenges in Ukraine was a lack of popular support for joining NATO. That, of course, has changed since Putin's invasion. Now you have more than 50% of supporters. I think that this is a very positive development. Putin has done more to unite the country than anyone else in some way.

Another reason is that Ukraine became a victim of bad relations between Angela Merkel and Mikheil Saakashvili. Because it was a duo, Ukraine would not join without Georgia. The US decided not to push for one or the other.

> UKRAINE IS ON THE FRONTLINE IN DEFENDING THE WEST AGAINST THE RUSSIAN AGGRESSION. AND IT SEEMS TO ME, THAT THE LEAST WE CAN DO IS TO HELP UKRAINE IN DEFENDING ITS OWN TERRITORY

However, it is NATO's policy since its founding to keep the door open for countries that are inspired to join. As long as the country wants to join, we must act right. Article 5 has made Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania safer, in particular these days. If we close the membership door to Ukraine, we are granting Russia a de facto veto over your country's aspirations to join the Alliance. We must show some roadmap which has the end of the process, make some criteria for Ukraine to meet. It will make Ukraine safer and more secure. When Germany joined NATO in 1955, it was divided between East and West, and yet that did not prevent the country from joining the Alliance.

Do you think that the currently unfilled vacancies in the Department of State can pose a serious threat to American foreign policy?

Wess Mitchell has recently been appointed the new Assistant Secretary for Europe and Eurasia, replacing Victoria Nuland. He is a great person who knows the region very well and has a very clear understanding of the threat Putin poses. I think having him there is a big plus. But your question is right: the State Department is significantly understaffed. I don't remember that in previous times. Now many of the positions are not filled. Not because the Senate is blocking confirmation of the individuals, but because the White House and the State Department have not nominated people. This has created low morale at the State Department; it has left embassies and other bureaus unclear about who has authority. This is a big problem.

Russia moves to the desert

How the Kremlin is building up its presence in the Middle East

Michael Binyon, London

Energetic policy. Vladimir Putin at the November 1 meeting in Teheran with his Azerbaijani and Iranian colleagues, Ilham Aliyev and Hassan Rouhani, where the US $30 billion energy deal was signed

In the Middle East, one of the world's most strategic regions, Russia now holds all the cards in its hand. President Putin's recent visit to Tehran, where he signed a US $30 billion energy deal, completes the total of the countries he has courted that now depend crucially on Moscow for future economic and political stability. Meanwhile America, once a controlling power in the region, is nowhere to be seen.

The change is as sudden as it is startling. The key has been Russia's decisive intervention in Syria at a time when the Obama administration was distancing itself from the troubled Muslim world and was reluctant to commit troops to yet another Middle East conflict. The massive Russian military help to the Assad regime has changed the balance. The Damascus government, which was losing to the rebels, is now firmly in control. And those neighbouring countries which formerly backed the rebels – especially Turkey and Saudi Arabia – are reluctant to back an opposition that, more and more, is becoming dominated by Islamist extremists.

Looking around the region, it is astonishing to see how rapidly Russia has gained influence at America's

expense. It has warm relations with President Sisi of Egypt, who has been disappointed by Washington's lukewarm embrace of the military strongman, and has recently sold arms to Egypt. It is on good terms with Iraq, despite the large presence of Americans helping the Iraqi army. It has long enjoyed good relations with Iran, despite Moscow's disapproval of Iran's attempt to build a nuclear weapon. In Libya, Moscow is backing General Khalifa Haftar, the strongman widely regarded as the only person able to bring stability to the country.

And in a major coup that has worried NATO, Moscow has forced President Erdogan of Turkey to abandon the hostility that followed the Turkish shooting down of a Russian military jet only two years ago. Putin's sharp and immediate retaliation at the time, cutting off all trade and stopping the profitable flow of Russian tourists to Turkey, hurt the mercurial Turkish leader. But this was followed by Putin's swift support for Erdogan after he defeated the coup attempt against him last year – in contrast to Turkey's NATO allies, which appeared to regret the coup's failure. As a result, Erdogan swallowed his pride, changed his policy of opposing Assad in Syria, joined Russia in co-sponsoring a Syrian peace conference in Kazakhstan and appears to be looking north now to Russia, rather than West to NATO, for future political cooperation. America, meanwhile, is still refusing to extradite Fethullah Gulen, the exiled Islamist preacher whom Erdogan accuses of masterminding the plot. And relations between Trump and Erdogan have sunk so low that both sides have now suspended the issue of visas to each other's citizens.

But the real coup for Moscow is the new deal with Saudi Arabia. For years the Saudis refused to have relations with the Soviet Union, believing it to be the country of "godless communism". But since the collapse of communism, the two countries have found their interests growing closer. In particular, both are huge exporters of oil, and have an interest in keeping the price of crude oil stable. There are now regular exchanges on this.

Saudi Arabia has also grown disillusioned with America, with which it has a long-standing defence and security relationship. The Saudis were outraged by the speed with which the US abandoned President Mubarak of Egypt when protests led to his overthrow during the Arab Spring. They were angry that Washington did not intervene in Syria after the Syrian use of chemical weapons against the opposition. And they were furious at President Obama's negotiations with Iran, which led to the easing of sanctions. For the past 40 years, the Saudis, who see themselves as the leaders of Sunni Islam, have been locked in political, regional and religious conflict with Iran, the leading Shia Muslim nation in the Middle East. And the new generation of Saudi leaders believe the kingdom ought to be more assertive in promoting its own interests.

Russia's support for the Assad government put the two countries on opposite sides. But with the defeat of moderate Syrian opposition forces and the growth of extremists such as Islamic State, the Saudis now see Islamic State as the bigger threat – and are willing to work with Russia to defeat IS.

The recent unprecedented visit to Moscow by King Salman of Saudi Arabia was a triumph for Putin. It coincided with three important economic agreements: the sale of Russian arms to the kingdom, which would have been unthinkable only a decade ago; the possible sale of Russian nuclear energy technology; and the huge $15 billion agreement on the export of Russian wheat. The Saudis will now abandon the wasteful and expensive attempt to grow their own wheat. And the deal now makes agriculture the third largest Russian export, after oil and arms. This is very important for Moscow at a time when Western sanctions have given a huge boost to Russia's agricultural economy.

Moscow is now the only important outside power in the region, and the only country with an active military role in the Middle East. It has even managed to maintain good relations with both Palestinians, whose cause Moscow has long supported, and the Israelis. Many of the large number of Russian Jews who emigrated to Israel maintain close links with Russia, to the economic and cultural benefit of both countries. Binyamin Netanyahu, the Israeli Prime Minister, is a frequent visitor to Moscow, and has warm relations with Putin.

THE REAL COUP FOR MOSCOW IS THE NEW DEAL WITH SAUDI ARABIA. FOR YEARS THE SAUDIS REFUSED TO HAVE RELATIONS WITH THE SOVIET UNION, BELIEVING IT TO BE THE COUNTRY OF "GODLESS COMMUNISM". BUT SINCE THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM, THE TWO COUNTRIES HAVE FOUND THEIR INTERESTS GROWING CLOSER

"We are now on both sides of the chessboard," said Alexey Pushkov, the former influential chairman of the Federation Council's foreign relations committee. But maintaining close links with countries that are bitterly quarrelling each other is tricky. Soon Russia will be forced to choose sides – in particular, both Israel and Saudi Arabia want Moscow to put pressure on Iran to change its policies. "I don't think any country can influence what happens in Iran," Pushkov said. He said Moscow was grateful to Iran for never sending fighters to Chechnya. But he was sceptical that Moscow could change Iranian policy.

Nor does the Kremlin believe it will persuade Turkey to abandon NATO. "It is deeply embedded in the West. This is really just a quarrel within the family," Pushkov said. The Saudis are also hoping to rekindle relations with America under President Trump. Adel al-Jubeir, the new Saudi foreign minister and former ambassador to Washington, sees the Saudi opening to Moscow as a way of bringing the Russians into the Middle East constructively. He recently told Western journalists that Saudi Arabia now sees no threat from Moscow.

Moscow will never be able to play a decisive role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict however, as it has little influence over Israeli policy and does not provide the huge military and economic support that the Americans do.

But for the moment, Putin's bold initiative in Syria has paid off in a way he could not have imagined. The test now comes in Syria. Can Moscow persuade Assad to make peace with his enemies? Can Russia stabilise the country and then pull out? Or will Syria become a permanent burden, draining Russia of money, claiming Russian casualties and making relations with the West tenser and more difficult? It is easy to hold the cards in your hand. It is harder to know which ones to play and in what order.

PHOTO: REUTERS

PHOTO: U.S. HELSINKI COMMISSION

Charles Davidson:

"It is important to develop rhetoric about kleptocracy as a cultural and moral issue"

Interviewed by **Anna Korbut**

"After the fall of the Iron Cutrain, the West has seen destructive import of corrupt practices and norms, and their effect on its values", says a September report from the Hudson Institute's Kleptocracy Inititave. Focusing on how non-state actors export kleptocratic norms to the West, it argues that the post-Cold War flow of money and values was not a one-way affair. Post-Soviet kleptocracies like Russia or Azerbaijan, as well as China and other countries around the world, whose ruling elites now possess far-reaching financial and political interests in the West, have been increasingly assaulting the West's value system with their money. Moreover, the West has been allowing and encouraging that by providing havens for it. ***The Ukrainian Week*** speaks to Kleptocracy Initiative Executive Director Charles Davidson, based in Washington, about European and American havens for ill-gotten money, their impact on democratic systems and the ways to dismantle them.

Kleptocracy affects the countries where the money is stolen first and foremost. How do you assess its impact on the countries where the money is hidden?

When I testified at a Helsinki Commission hearing on Combatting Kleptocracy with Incorporation Transparency on October 3, I said that the following: "The most dangerous threat to our national security is the aggression of authoritarian regimes that actively seek to undermine our freedom and democracy, and to export authoritarianism into the OSCE region and around the globe. What is at stake is the survival of our civilization. These regimes have already upended the post-World War II international order via invasion and violation of treaties, perverted a rules-based global system of relatively fair economic exchange via intellectual property theft and corrosive business practices, and attacked our government's computer systems. And these regimes are sharing best practices and increasingly behaving like an axis of evil."

In an earlier statement, a testimony before the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs in December 2016, I spoke about corrupt officials or kleptocrats seeking to secure their illicitly gained assets at a safe haven, with rule of law protecting property rights. The West, generally speaking, has provided this haven. Western diplomats are increasingly ignored when they warn of corruption across Eurasia: this anti-corruption talk is increasingly taken as hypocrisy despite decades of diplomatic effort to support more democratic and transparent societies in Eurasia.

The point I make to young Ukrainians is the West's role in facilitating grand corruption. We are beating up

Ukraine and others to be less corrupt. Yet, we are assisting the oligarchs in the looting. This is nuts, but it is part of a much broader problem in the West. We are doing the same thing vis a vis Russia, China, and even ourselves in a way: we allow systems of secretive and anonymous companies that enable our own citizens to drop out of being part of the polity.

Where does the US rank in the list of havens for kleptocratic money?

We are number one. The best article I know that summarizes this is titled Corruption: Moving money out of purgatory by Kara Scannell of the Financial Times (published on July 5, 2016 – **Ed.**). It wasn't always like that.

We had the big scandals of US tax evasion (investigations into it starting in 2008 – Ed.), in particular the UBS AG case. A UBS banker, Bradley Birkenfeld, was a whistleblower about massive tax evasion by Americans – about 50,000 accounts or more that the bank was servicing. The scandal revealed how this was done, the trips that the UBS bankers would take to the US under tourist visas and false pretenses, the famous incident of a banker smuggling diamonds in a tube of toothpaste. That led to the creation of a special group at the Internal Revenue Service in the US dedicating itself to going after this.

As a result, UBS paid a big fine and there was a big diplomatic scandal. A lot of Americans were caught on tax evasion. A lot of people then paid the taxes; a whole system was set up for people to voluntarily disclose their evasion. A big clean-up was done in Switzerland, but that was from the standpoint of the US. We took measures that led to the shutting down of Wegelin, the oldest Swiss private bank. Many others were hurt; a lot of fines were paid. Switzerland is still a huge haven for all of these things. All that activity involved just US clients, and I'm not sure they are the biggest part of their business. But it did have effects.

So it is also a terrible thing for the US – from the political standpoint, and in terms of its soft power, prestige and credibility – to have done that, and then to allow evaders and kleptocrats to come here using our secrecy services.

Do you see a possibility of a consolidated international effort to tackle this?

Absolutely. The core of the matter is the international offshore financial system. I was one of the early entrants into the anti-offshore movement, co-founding a think tank called Global Financial Integrity in 2006 with Raymond Baker. GFI is small but very influential, its numbers widely quoted by The Economist, the World Bank etc.

This offshore secrecy system is not understood. One of the reasons is that it is secret. Unless you are a practitioner in that field or you are using it. The people who are using it don't advertise it. Yet, they all know that it's wrong. That is an interesting thing about it: unless people who do bad stuff follow an ideology or are convinced that what they do is right, it can crumble pretty fast. I've had a lot of experience with such people. They may have many excuses to justify what they are doing. But none of them are proud of it. I have never encountered anyone who said "Yes, I'm a fantastic provider of services to murderers and criminals and tax evaders, and I'm »

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really happy about this, and I'm educating my children to do the same thing." That is actually a considerable vulnerability of this system. Very few people want to be doing something that is despicable and wrong. But they do it for money, and there is no social censure. So to some extent, the best way to start getting rid of this offshore system is not necessarily laws, although there is a lot going on in the US Congress around that, but public awareness.

I can give you an example of a first-term congressman I met a couple of months ago. A Russian oligarch was misbehaving in his district. So he educated himself about Russian kleptocracy and introduced a bill to push back against the nefarious influences of that kleptocracy and Putinism in Eastern Europe.

The legislative part of the US government has woken up to these things. One example, the bills in both the Congress and Senate that are gathering steam to do away with anonymous companies.

But a very important part of the reform is for young people and the Fourth Estate to start rhetoric about it as a cultural and moral issue, among other things. If democracy is governance that is supposed to emanate from the will of the people, the voters, then you won't get legislation or executive action without expressing this will. Look at Barack Obama – he was constantly looking at the polling on this or that issue, far too much probably. But for public opinion to turn on this issue, it needs to become much better known.

In my testimony for the House Committee on Foreign Affairs I stressed that people within the electorate need to understand the link between authoritarianism and kleptocracy, and the system of financial secrecy and offshore systems much more broadly.

There was a Ben Judah article where he spoke to average Ukrainians. They were very conscious of the West's role in facilitating the grand corruption in their country. That's not something Americans have been aware of, even people in the political thought class. When I talk to them about this, they find it hard to believe, because of their ignorance of offshore finance.

People have to feel that something is wrong and needs to change. Take the Protestant Reformation: it started with just a spark and grew like wildfire. We have seen similar things historically. But we have become far too cynical, at least in my country, about political change and things getting better. We have become used to things getting worse. Anybody who is optimistic is thought of as being stupid. Although I think that is changing.

If we look at the practical reforms of executive steps that can be taken, we in the US are the most behind in terms of the legal possibilities for owning assets anonymously.

The low hanging fruit to correct the aspect where we lag behind Europe is in regards to anonymous or shell companies. The Anonymous Companies Act*, that is now in Congress has very good chances of passing, especially after the Magnitsky and Global Magnitsky Acts** did almost unanimously. Recently, Senator Marco Rubio jumped in to co-sponsor the bill in the Senate. There are a lot of bills being proposed on the Hill that would support this legislation in various ways.

How much resistance do you expect to such initiatives?

There is resistance. A lot of it is not expressed candidly because it is hard to have good arguments in favor of anonymous companies. A big surprise has been that major banks have come out in favor of the Anonymous Companies legislation. Their own think tank, The Clearing House, has supported it. It wouldn't come out in favor of something its constituents don't support. HSBC, an international British bank, has recently put out a quarterly report where it slipped into a paragraph saying that they are in favor of the beneficial ownership legislation. So, things are changing.

This is partly because of public pressure, and partly because societies are starting to fall apart and there are people on top realizing that they are part of the problem. Bankers are not stupid. They know that they are making money, but if things get too bad, they won't anymore. Even if it starts with two-three people, they will have lunch with colleagues tomorrow, and suddenly it's 4-5. Then it grows.

To my knowledge, the only constituency in the whole country against this legislation is the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. They don't give any good reason for it, or they give false statements in terms of how it can affect small businesses. Why they are opposing it is anybody's guess.

How can countries like Ukraine plundered by their own kleptocrats persuade Western havens to reject or expose their corrupt money?

It is only power that can achieve anything. What I always tell young Ukrainians and other delegations coming here is that they should make noise. They should not be bashful about bashing American delegations and people; they should tell them how the grand corruption is happening. US officials should hear that when they come to Ukraine. A lot of US officials don't really know about this. A lot of these US officials have had careers that did not bring them into contact with this world. There has not been enough publicity about it – although a lot more now than there has been before.

In the case of Ukraine, the US is a relatively minor player. Austria certainly plays a big role. London does too. But the US has political power – still. If we pass the Anonymous Company Act, we will have the ability to put pressure on the others just as we did with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. One idea brought about by an external party, which we happily embraced, is to have FCPA penalize not just the bribe givers, but the bribe takers. That would be a powerful tool to add to the arsenal, and a political statement, too.

* Sponsored originally by Sen. Ron Wyden (D), then co-sponsored by Sen. Marco Rubio (R), the True Incorporation Transparency for Law Enforcement (TITLE) Act was introduced to the Senate in June 2017 and has now been referred to the Committee on the Judiciary. If passed, it would prevent individuals from using anonymous shell corporations to engage in illicit activities like money laundering, sex trafficking, fraud and terrorist financing.

** The Global Magnitsky Human Rights Accountability Act was in December 2016. It authorizes the US President to impose financial sanctions and visa restrictions on foreign persons in response to certain human rights violations and acts of corruption.

Washing whiter

Increasingly, hunting money-launderers is automated



Keen, no doubt, to stay alive, drug traffickers tend to be prompter payers than most. For software firms, this is just one of many clues that may hint at the laundering of ill-gotten money. Anti-money-laundering (AML) software, as it is called, monitors financial transactions and produces lists of the people most likely to be transferring the proceeds of crime.

Spending on this software is soaring. Celent, a research company, estimates that financial firms have spent roughly $825m on it so far this year, up from $675m last year. Technavio, another research firm, reckons the market is even bigger and will grow at more than 11% annually in coming years. This is partly because authorities are increasingly quick to punish institutions that let down their guard. Deutsche Bank, for example, has been hit with fines worth at least $827m this year alone. Governments, eager to appear tough on crime, are urging prosecutors to go after not just institutions, but also their employees.

The number of anti-laundering regulations is climbing yearly—by nearly 10% in America, Canada and the EU, and by roughly 15% in Australia, Hong Kong, Malaysia and Singapore, says Neil Katkov, a regulatory analyst at Celent. Even the red-tape-slashing administration of President Donald Trump is unlikely to cut regulation in this area.

David Stewart, head of anti-money-laundering systems at SAS, a software giant based in North Carolina, reckons that efforts to abide by such rules now take from a half to about 70% of most banks' entire spending on compliance. A survey this year by Duff & Phelps, an advisory group, found that financial firms typically spend about 4% of revenue on compliance, a figure expected to reach 10% in 2022.

Many clues that lead software to block a transaction, or to flag it for a human to investigate, are straightforward. Round sums are more suspect than jagged ones. Spikes in transaction volumes and amounts are suspicious. So is cash deposited in an account via multiple branches. An area's culture also matters. Sasi Mudigonda, of Oracle, says its software considers transactions linked to eastern Ukraine riskier than the west of the country, where Russian influence is weaker. Even age counts—crooks who move money disproportionately steal the identities of old people and young adults, says Michael Kent, chief executive of Azimo, a remittances firm.

Software also hunts for clues that someone on one of hundreds of watch lists has concocted a fake identity—the giveaway could be the opening of an account with a password or phone number once used by a corrupt official. ComplyAdvantage, a firm based in London, licenses software that generates long lists of suspected criminals by sifting through hundreds of millions of articles, including those in The Economist, and then determines which transactions may benefit one of them.

Moving the proceeds of big-ticket crime conventionally involves disguising them as legitimate trade payments. Software from a Singaporean firm, AML360, is designed to flag instances of this. Daniel Rogers, the company's boss, says it monitors "a jigsaw puzzle" of factors such as ship itineraries, the locations of commodity producers and fluctuations in their prices. The software notices if a firm imports expensive stainless steel when a cheaper source of the material is closer at hand, say, or if an importer's spending on copper rises as its price falls.

The next step for AML software is a big leap in the amount and types of data it crunches. Last year SAS launched Visual Investigator, developed at a cost of about $1bn. It links financial transactions with text and even imagery in reams of social media. This could reveal, for example, that a restaurant's cash deposits appear too large for the amount of online "buzz" the business generates; or that a payment recipient skis with a kleptocrat.

With SAS software, rather more than half of flagged transactions lead to the filing of a suspicious-activity report (SAR) with authorities. Monique Melis, head of regulatory consulting at Duff & Phelps in London, argues that, to reduce "false positives" further, regulators should begin systematically to disclose the SARs that lead to a discovery of crime. Software could then be better calibrated to withstand a growing problem highlighted by Sophie Lagouanelle of FircoSoft, a Paris developer of AML technology: savvy launderers are learning how the software works to slip past it.

Should human analysts fear for their jobs? Probably not. They will still be needed to follow up on many flagged transactions. Business has not slowed for Berlin Risk, a German consultancy that discreetly investigates the nature of a person's character and earnings by talking to as many as 20 people who know him. As its senior partner, Carsten Giersch, puts it, "You will never see a robot interviewing sources." Or is that the next step?

Tarnished or spotless?

How the image of Ukraine in the West has changed since the Maidan

Olha Vorozhbyt

The awakening. Immediately after the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine seemed a discovery, a symbol of helplessness and the beginning of the embodiment of the American dream at the same time

When the Russian president called Anne de Kyiv "Russian" during his visit to France in May, many discussions broke out in Ukraine. About the fact that he was wrong, of course, with comments and explanations from famous historians, and also about the fact that Ukrainian history is being stolen yet again.

However, if the discussion had remained at the same level, then it would perhaps have been forgotten about outside of these two countries. Russian and Ukrainian editors on Wikipedia would continue to attempt to rewrite articles in the online encyclopaedia in order to give Anna Yaroslavna the right citizenship, and the rest of the busy world would have been indifferent to this. At that point, the people behind Ukraine's official English-language Twitter account decided to explain this to the world in the current *lingua franca* – a visual representation of historical facts.

When the official Russia account continued to harp on about pride for the joint history of three peoples (Russian, Ukrainian and Belarusian), Ukraine posted an old GIF from The Simpsons. It shows the nameplate of Russia at the UN being replaced by the "Soviet Union". Not really anything new for us, but the majority of the Western media reacted warmly to this "Twitter war", the CNN calling it a "groundbreaking use of GIF diplomacy". Western media outlets that, despite the entire series of complex events since 2013, had not been devoting much material for the general public to Ukrainian history, briefly but clearly explained what was going on with Anna Yaroslavna. Thanks to a good understanding of modern internet communication, the Ukraine Twitter account also saved our blushes during the biggest hacker attack on government computer systems a month after the scandal around the princess of Kyiv. These short episodes are just two of the many brushstrokes in the portrait of Ukraine that Western readers could observe over the last three years, when we at last started to think about our international image.

CORRUPTION AND OLIGARCHS REPLACE HIGH HOPES

This portrait is rather complex, chaotic and incomprehensible to those who live to the west of Prague. Immediately after the Revolution of Dignity, Ukraine seemed a discovery, a symbol of helplessness and the beginning of the embodiment of the American dream at the same time for the rest of the world. A discovery, because the active post-Orange Revolution years was followed by a period of talk about "Ukraine fatigue" and disappointment, then the Maidan with its eye-opening to the image of another type of Ukrainians. It also turned out that not only Ukraine but the system of international law was helpless as a neighbouring state was able to seize part of the territory of another country without any obstacles or resistance. The American dream, because volunteer soldiers and civilians who were able to bring the most amazing things to the frontlines came to the aid of an almost helpless army. The image of someone who does not give up in a horrible situation has been a favourite leitmotif of American cinema since its inception. However, everyone expected a very quick happy end. A 45 million strong country with a bunch of problems is, unfortunately, not like Hollywood, and the entire complex process of the protagonist's transformation never lasts the two hours we see on screen, or even two years. In reality, anti-heroes emerge and there can be a twist in the plot, which is the stage that Ukraine is currently stuck at.

Journalists, analysts or just sympathetic observers are asking questions like the one in a recent *New York Times* article: "Why [does] Ukraine, a land of so much promise thanks to its educated population, fertile farmland and vibrant civil society, have a tendency instead to generate so many headline-grabbing scandals?" This text begins with the story of the successful capture of one of the most serious modern cybercriminals, Hennadiy Kapkanov. Foreign law-enforcement officers expressed respect for the professionalism of their Ukrainian counterparts. However, a judge in Poltava refused to keep him in remand pending investigation and released him. Kapkanov, of course, fled, and his whereabouts are still unknown. For a Western, and in particular an American, observer, this is just another in a series of high-profile scandals linked to Ukraine. It is possible to complement this list with the link between the rocket engines for North Korean nuclear warheads and the Pivdenmash plant, as well as the news about the Ukrainian citizenship of the hacker Profexer, who allegedly unknowingly created a hacking program for the Kremlin, through which Russia was able to intervene in the American elections.

Ukrainian history of the last three years is often superimposed onto the internal historical and political narratives of Western countries. Often, the assessment of events in Ukraine does not show a level of understanding of what is happening here, nor of the country's history, politics and culture, but only describes other Western policies. This summer, during a debate in the Verkhovna Rada on the Historical Responsibility of Germany to Ukraine, historian Andriy Portnov noted that Ukraine acted as a litmus test for the Germans on how they evaluate EU or US policy. Russian propaganda made excellent use of this approach and, given the third place of the Alternative for Germany party, the main propagator of Kremlin talking points in that country, at the last parliamentary elections, it is very important that Ukraine take this into account in its relations with Germany.

In order to have a holistic understanding of the situation, it is important to take into account materials produced by think tanks for their niche readership. If we compare the opinions from 2014 and 2017, expert conclusions have shifted from "There are so many challenges and opportunities. Will they succeed?" to "We need to apply more pressure, we're losing the patient!" If we read this year's analytical reports on the reforms in Ukraine following the Maidan, they predominantly point out significant progress over these four years. Much more than in the previous 22 years. This is almost a quote from two recent reports by the Chatham House and the US Helsinki Commission. At the same time, they note constant delays in reforms, corruption, the tendency to keep making the same mistakes and the significant slowdown in progress compared to 2014-2015. In this context, in addition to its hybrid tools, Russia directly promotes the idea of Ukraine as a failed state. This definition is not difficult to find in materials about Ukraine not only on Russia Today, but also, for example, in The Guardian.

STRENGTHENING CULTURAL DIPLOMACY AND UKRAINIAN STUDIES AT FOREIGN UNIVERSITIES WILL HELP TO CHANGE THE APPROACH TO LOOKING AT UKRAINE AND THE PROCESSES THAT ARE TAKING PLACE HERE. IN ADDITION, IT WILL GIVE MORE OPPORTUNITIES FOR UKRAINIANS TO UNDERSTAND THE FOREIGN CONTEXT TOO

However, Ukraine itself gives many reasons to draw negative conclusions and have doubts about its future. The issue of corruption, which is now a stumbling block in dealing with Western partners, is one of them. We should also add the Saakashvili phenomenon and the removal of his citizenship to the above-mentioned scandals, as this threw more grey spots onto Ukraine's already dirty portrait. An important aspect is that Saakashvili's credibility in the West is greater than that of the current president. For example, the former Georgian president and head of the Odesa Oblast State Administration can say live on CNN that Ukraine has taken a path that is "widespread in our region – oligarchs and corruption" and the presenter will mention several times during a five-minute interview that he is a personal friend of President Trump. This selection of main themes and problems leads to liberal Western press and analysts seeing Ukraine in the light of corruption and delays to reforms, which often pushes conversations about a war with more than 10,000 dead, Ukrainian hostages in Russian prisons and the terrible human rights situation in the occupied territories into the background. The latter topics also get a lot of coverage in the press and they are researched by analysts and scholars. However, if we compare assessments from 2014 and 2017, the words that were then combined with "Ukraine" were "hope" and "the struggle against Putin" and now – "oligarchs", "corruption" and "the struggle against Putin". We certainly have enough on our plates.

CULTURAL DIPLOMACY

This situation leads to the fact that less and less is written about Ukrainian history and culture. Accordingly, it is difficult for an outside observer to understand it, especially in view of the dominance of the Russian approach to studying and interpreting Ukraine. However, if you look through the book suggestions tagged "Ukraine" on Amazon, a lot of new journalistic and historical books about Ukraine and our history have been released since the EuroMaidan. At the same time, there are no stands with them in our airports where such books are often purchased.

Quite long after the end of the Revolution of Dignity, Ukrainian embassies, even in key countries, remained without mission chiefs. After new ambassadors were appointed,

the Ukrainian diplomatic service, alongside its other operations, began to develop a new approach to another important area – cultural diplomacy. Embassies, even with the same low funding, started to pay more attention to cultural events. At the same time, there was talk about creating a Ukrainian Institute – an institution like the German Goethe-Institut, the British Council or the Polish Cultural Institute. This February, Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin presented the Ukrainian Institute project, and on June 21 the Cabinet of Ministers issued an order to establish the Ukrainian Institute as a state institution.

This structure is affiliated with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but should be independent in determining the aspects of its work, the minister noted. The Institute will be funded partly from the state budget, partly from donors and philanthropists. In a comment to ***The Ukrainian Week***, the coordinator of the Ukrainian Institute project at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Iryna Shum, said that they are hoping to launch in key capitals, such as Berlin or Warsaw, next year. "All the preparatory work is done. We have all the documents and will soon announce the competition for the position of Institute head," she said. An important distinction between the operations of cultural centres and the diplomatic service will be that non-diplomats will work in the former institutions. "We want to have a competitively selected professional team for these cultural centres. Above all, experience in implementing international projects will be taken into account," says Iryna Shum.

It is important that the inner circle of specialists whose publications often form public opinion have access to knowledge about Ukraine through the Ukrainian studies departments (Ukrainian language, literature and history) at universities. One of the most active centres is the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, which has been functioning there since 1973. In a comment to ***The Ukrainian Week***, history professor and director of this institute, Serhii Plokhii, said that interest in Ukraine increased with the beginning of the Maidan in 2013 in both the media and the academic world. However, since the end of 2014 many non-experts have been speaking about Ukraine and the demand for qualified commentary has somewhat reduced. "The peak came in 2014 and since then there has been more interest in Ukraine than in 2013, but it is still relatively low. With the other crises in the world, Ukraine is gradually being forgotten about," says Prof. Plokhii. That is why it is important that those who have a career in Ukrainian studies and are able to talk to the Western press do this more actively. Professor Plokhii also emphasises this factor: "The problem is that few representatives of Ukrainian society and academia know how to speak to the press".

In addition to the Ukrainian Institute at Harvard, an important institution that forms the agenda for Ukrainian studies is the University of Cambridge. This year the return of Ukrainian studies to the European University Viadrina in Frankfurt an der Oder was also announced, because, as noted by German researchers of Ukraine, there are no other centres for Ukrainian studies in their country. An interesting aspect in the German-speaking vision of Ukraine is that it is largely shaped by contemporary Ukrainian writers – and not only through translations of their works. Oksana Zabuzhko and Serhiy Zhadan often speak in the German press about current events in Ukraine.

Strengthening cultural diplomacy and Ukrainian studies at foreign universities will help to change the approach to looking at Ukraine and the processes that are taking place here. In addition, it will give more opportunities for Ukrainians to understand the foreign context too. Very often, it is possible to see that Ukrainian politicians do not understand the international situation and the conditions in which the audience that they want to convey their views to lives or works. Even though their ideas or opinions may be compelling and correct, foreigners who are accustomed to another format find it hard to accept them. It is clear that there is a lack of international platforms where Ukraine can speak about its vision of certain historical events or controversial political aspects. However, it is better to be heard on a topic and earn respect than to voice important information without conveying it to the target audience. These are the points that can be addressed through the creation of Ukrainian cultural institutes abroad and the development of Ukrainian studies at universities. In that case, the promotion of Ukraine and talking points in reports can be based on a certain context, not on what we now find appropriate, successful or important.

Twiplomacy. This @Ukraine tweet for the UN General Assembly in September got 1.5K likes. The tweets on the event from the President's official account got up to 400 likes

Today, the portrait of Ukraine that a Western observer sees through the prism of the media and Western experts is rather blurred. Though still much clearer and focused than prior to 2013. There are more books on Ukrainian history and the current state of affairs, while modern Ukrainian authors are successfully translated into foreign languages. But this is nowhere near enough, especially when not only the Ukrainian narrative (which is still not clearly formed), but also Western democratic values in general are coming under fire from Russian propaganda and hybrid warfare. Ukraine is increasingly talked about in the context of its problems with corruption and oligarchs, which overshadows other important issues. It is very important to both deal with these first problems and give a loud voice to those who are less likely to be heard.

Understanding Ukraine

The Ukrainian Week asks American and European experts about how their societies see Ukraine today, what sources they use to stay updated on the country and what they lack for a deeper understanding of developments and trends in Ukraine

Interviewed by **Anna Korbut, Alla Lazareva, Olha Vorozhbyt**

"There is a huge amount of potential in Ukraine, but I fear that as in the past, that potential will be stopped and stymied by the entrenched political/business interests"

Hannah Thoburn, a Research Fellow at the Hudson Institute, where she focuses on Russia, Ukraine, Eastern European politics, and the transatlantic relationship, Washington

Ukraine has grown by leaps and bounds in the past four years. It may not be where it – or the West – wants it to be, but the moves forward and changes in mindset are palpable. There is a huge amount of potential in Ukraine, but I fear that as in the past, that potential will be stopped and stymied by the entrenched political/business interests that also exist in Ukraine. Because of that dynamic, true leadership is still lacking in Ukraine and holds the country back.

To stay informed about what is happening throughout Ukraine on any given day, I use a wide variety of sources. I use Facebook and Twitter to communicate with old friends and professional connections, as well as to read the statements of some Ukrainian politicians and to keep up with the latest, breaking news about events in Ukraine. Reports from Ukrainian think tanks, various polling sources – especially IRI's polls, Ukrainian government websites that publish speeches and statistics, and the daily reports from the OSCE are all very useful. The websites of local newspapers are also useful – though they often lack key details – as are local bloggers. Access to information about historical events (pre-1991) is rather harder, but improving all the time.

"It would be nice to get more information about Ukraine's economy and the results accomplished by the Government over the past four years"

Massimiliano Di Pascuale, an independent researcher of Ukrainian politics and culture, Italy

When I write or read about Ukraine, I use KyivPost, RFE/RL, Hromadske.tv, Euromaidan Press, StopFake, Deutsche Welle, BBC, Ukrayinska Pravda, Business Ukriane, InformNapalm, Taras Kuzio's blog or UNIAN for my assessments. I contact some researchers from the good network of contacts I have developed amongst academics and jouranlists for deeper analysis.

Overall, I trust news from KyivPost, RFE/RL, Hromad¬ske.tv, StopFake. But it's better to keep my eyes open. The war with Russia has turned some Ukrainian journalists into pro-government propagandists. This is not in line with the principles of media freedom and independence.

It would also be nice to get more information about Ukraine's economy and the results accomplished by the Government over the past four years in improving socio-economic conditions as well as the anti-corruption campaign.

"I don't like paid articles but I can spot them almost immediately after years of work in Ukraine"

Piotr Pogorzelski, Polskie Radio, Warsaw

I try to use the portals and agencies that offer unique information, such as Ukrayinska Pravda, TSN, UkrInform, RFE/RL. What do I not like and lack? A lot of news are copypasted, or offer a line of references from one source to another. There is very little unique information. I don't like paid articles but I can spot them almost immediately after years of work in Ukraine.

"A corrupt political elite that goes well beyond the current government holds the country back and continues to deny Ukraine's 44 million people a chance to realize their full potential"

Melinda Haring, Editor of UkraineAlert blog at the Atlantic Council, Washington

Ukraine today is both impressive and heartbreaking. I lived in Kyiv ten years ago and it has changed massively. I have been blown away by the unleashing of creative talent. The food scene rivals that of Washington, D.C.; the country's civic activists routinely plan some of the most brilliant campaigns I've ever seen, and Ukraine's IT sector is highly sought after for good reason.

However, a corrupt political elite that goes well beyond the current government holds the country back and continues to deny Ukraine's 44 million people a chance to realize their full potential. Everyone knows what Ukraine needs to do – it's no great mystery. The country must pursue radical and comprehensive judicial reform, drop parliamentary immunity, and reform its electoral laws to allow more people to participate. Ukraine's got great talent, but it cannot break in yet.

I read RFE/RL's Ukraine-in-Crisis blog, Ukrayinska Pravda, the KyivPost, and Novoe Vremya, talk to a variety of Ukrainian politicians, analysts, scholars, and ordinary people almost daily, and travel to Ukraine as often as possible. Twitter is also a great place for breaking news.

"I would like to stress on the need to consider promoting a more balanced image for Ukraine"

Laurent Chamontin, policy analyst and author, author of *Ukraine et Russie: pour comprendre* (2016), Paris

In my view, Ukraine is in the middle of a crossing a river. Of course, there is some uncertainty linked to the conflict with Russia. As to reforms, those who dream of modernizing their country apparently think that the movement is slow. But one has to think about the part of the path that already crossed. The past three years have seen significant progress in social and administrative fields, and economy, even if the result is still not too visible. Of course, much is still to be done. But many statements made recently prove that the Western business community is now seeing Ukraine in a more favorable way, and that's worth the attention. If the efforts don't slow down, the application of the healing methods that have worked for Central Europe could give Ukraine a chance to reach the point of no return.

What is important to think about is Ukraine's image on which it has to work now in order to provide some backing to the reforms. I have access to a wide range of information on Ukraine from the press in French, English and Russian, as well as my own source in Ukraine, including in universities. This puts me quite far from the rest of the French who only hear about Ukraine when some noticeable incident takes place on the frontline or a political crisis erupts. I would like to stress once again on the need to consider promoting a more balanced image for Ukraine.

"In my opinion, the number of those who associate themselves with the new Ukraine is growing"

Alain Guillemoles, journalist at La Croix daily, author of *Even the Snow Was Orange* and *Ukraine: An Awakening of the Nation* books, Paris

I see Ukraine as a country that is actively transforming. As a result, it's like a giraffe with its neck in one color and spots of another. You can meet outstandingly modern people here and those whose behavior hasn't changed since the soviet time. You can go to an Internet café here and find yourself next to a hipster listening to the same music people listen to in Berlin or Paris; then, ten minutes later, you can get attacked by an old lady convinced that you can't be sitting on the stairs of the empty metro escalator. The same thing is happening in the economy, the segment I am most interested in. Some companies operate under soviet schemes while others are super modern components of the global world. Some Ukrainians change rapidly and transform the country. Others are slowing down the process. Confrontations between them often lead to clashes. In my opinion, the number of those who associate themselves with the new Ukraine is growing. The country is changing gradually and the spots on the giraffe's neck will soon cover all of the skin.

I get my information about Ukraine by visiting it on a regular basis to have my own vision of things. In between my trips, I read what my colleagues produce in Ukrainian and international media. I read UNIAN, Tyzhden.ua, StopFake and UA Crisis Media Center in French, as well as publications by French and English-speaking correspondents working in Ukraine. Social media keep me in touch with a huge number of people who spread information, just like I do. We form a community of information sharers in order to have the best possible vision of what's going on. What do we lack? Good information on the economy. I understand that companies don't want to talk too much or focus attention on what's going on in their business. So it's not easy to get them to speak openly. But that kind of information is necessary to help understand the country that is changing actively.



"For me it is important to have solid institutions that help me verify the news, put in in the context and analyze it"

Jakub Múčka, Director at Online encyklopedie migrace, contributor to HlidaciPes.org and Aktualne.cz, Prague

I read current news from various source. I often use Novoye Vremia and Hromadske.tv. For me personally, it is important to have solid institutions that help me verify the news further on, put in in the context and analyze it. For me, these include 1) independent media that work as NGOs (Hromadske.tv) or as public media (I support UA:Pershiy although I fear that politicians might block its work by limiting its budget); 2) international media working in Ukraine, such as BBC Ukraine or RFE/RL; 3) academic field with experts, including from the Kyiv Mohyla Academy and Ukrainian Catholic University, and 4) Ukrainian NGOs and international organizations that do the monitoring (UN, OSCE, HRW, Amnesty International, Reanimation Package of Reforms, and so on).

Czech media offer enough information about the war, the Russian propaganda or the situation in the occupied Crimea. What we lack is analysis of reforms and domestic politics in Ukraine, social processes in the country. These issues are not transparent and difficult to understand for us. Also, we really lack closer and more intense cooperation with Ukrainian journalists.

"What I miss in the current landscape of sources is reliable and readable information about social policy in Ukraine"

Susan Stewart, Senior Associate at the Eastern Europe and Eurasia Research Division, German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP), Berlin

On the situation in Ukraine, reforms have not completely stagnated, but it has become clear that there are certain key measures which are not in the interest of the ruling elite, and these are being blocked. Also, the campaign for presidential and parliamentary elections in 2019 has de facto already begun, which means that unpopular reforms are less likely and populist rhetoric and measures more so. On the whole, external actors and significant parts of Ukrainian civil society are still pushing hard for the reform agenda to be implemented, but the majority of the ruling political and economic elite will need to be replaced for this to occur.

With regard to the sources I use to inform myself about developments in Ukraine, there are many. I read RFE/RL reports, BBC Monitoring, the KyivPost and lb.ua daily, and I also rely on Gorshenin Weekly for an overview of events each week. In addition I follow newsletters from, among others, Vox Ukraine, RPR and AntAC. When I am researching a specific topic I search for information on the internet in English, German, French, Ukrainian and Russian, and I ask people from my network of contacts for advice, including the very helpful colleagues on the Ukraine World mailing list.

Compared to 20 or even 10 years ago there are many more sources available, which is usually a good thing, but can also make it difficult to assess their validity. Also, it is important not to get into too much of a rut and always rely on the same sources, since no one source is completely objective – even if some are much more objective than others! It is important to do research about the source and not just use it uncritically. What I miss most in the current landscape of sources is reliable and readable information about social policy in Ukraine – the pension system, the healthcare system, the education system, etc. Sometimes there is some very specialized literature about these topics, but more policy analysis for a broader audience is sorely needed.

"Ukraine needs to develop and promote cultural themes more actively through the media"

Nathalie Chrin, documentary director and activist of the Ukrainian community in France, Paris

Since I am of Ukrainian origin, I get my information from social media first and foremost. My relatives and friends spread so much more information than what the French media offer. I have an impression that Ukraine is getting stuck in the war and nobody is really helping it find a solution. This overshadows the good news, such as economic agreements signed with European countries or the developing partnership with the EU. As to my French friends, their answer is clear: "Nothing is happening in Ukraine because we don't hear anything about it." It is difficult to shape a clear opinion on a situation when only one source of information is available.

The French media are often biased. They don't know or understand Ukraine, nor do they get help from the real specialists on Ukraine – there are few of those. After all, Ukraine is not only about war. It probably needs to develop and promote cultural themes more actively through the media, with exhibitions, books, music, forums for new technology and the like to get the French press interested. This could be a way to help the French realize that Ukraine is a trump card of Europe that makes the continent more powerful, not weaker.

Order of mind

What elements of nostalgia for the past, in addition to the desire to restore the USSR, exist in Ukraine

Andriy Holub

In the early 2010s, long before the Maidan and decommunization, the image of the hammer and sickle painted blue and yellow was spreading on the Internet. A sarcastic remake of once popular symbol that was installed in every city and town across the country as a manifest of Soviet megalomania, it was now used as joke meme to illustrate the essence the country: a soviet symbol painted in the colors of the national flag.

Sadly, the joke was an accurate interpretation of the system that had been in place in Ukraine for at least the first 20 years after independence. After the revolution and the war with Russia broke out, many rushed to claim that a return to the past was no longer possible. Indeed, the many bridges, soviet stars and even monuments to Lenin painted blue and yellow no longer seemed funny. They were perceived instead as an attempt by society to show those in power the preferred vector for the future in a situation where people had no other legal mans to show that will (decommunization laws came later, in 2015).

UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IS STILL PRONE TO PARADOXES THAT COEXIST IN ITS MIND. SOCIOLOGISTS DESCRIBE THIS AS AMBIVALENCE IN WHICH AN INDIVIDUAL ACCEPTS AND SUPPORTS OPPOSITE VALUES

Three years later, it is more and more obvious that changes in laws, however slow, are still ahead of changes in the mindset of the people. Nostalgia over the soviet past and the homo sovieticus mindset sometimes hide in places where nobody expects to see them.

They are not easy to trace through the available sociological surveys. Sociologists tend to claim that Ukraine has gotten rid of its eternal multivector paradox and has made a decisive choice in favor of European development. Surveys also indicate that fewer people feel sorry about Ukraine getting independent. The number of those who would vote for separation from the Soviet Union if the referendum took place today is the highest since 1991: 72% in 2015 compared to 46.5% in 2003.

Nostalgia of Ukrainians over the Soviet period is also fading, albeit slower than many would like it to. According to a poll by Rating, a sociology group, 35% of Ukrainians felt nostalgic over the Soviet Union in 2016. This was slightly higher than the percentage in 2015, but 11% down from 2010. 34% of Ukrainians still wish for a revival of the Soviet Union, according to a 2016 poll by the Razumkov Center. The overall findings of that survey are presented in the big annual report titled The Identity of Ukrainian Citizens in the New Environment: The State, the Trends and Regional Nuances. At the same time, 65% of that share of Soviet Union-wishers realize that the restoration is unrealistic today.



That same survey says that only 10% of people attribute themselves to soviet cultural tradition. It remains the second most popular one following the Ukrainian tradition, but the share of its adepts constantly declines. Some more than 2.5% of Ukrainians still identify themselves as soviet citizens.

It is interesting to explore broader answers of those polled who would like to see the Soviet Union restored. They confirm the assumption that the faith in the communist ideology had gone bankrupt way before the Soviet Union collapsed. Lenin's testaments mean nothing today while the image of the Soviet Union in the eyes of today's citizens is based exclusively on comparisons between the present and the past, the latter being a fairy tale place where no problems of today existed. The supporters of the Soviet Union's restoration most often cite confidence in the near future (64%) and free higher education in the Soviet Union (58%) as the reasons for their nostalgia. Only 7.8% list soviet communist ideology as their reason.

Still, soviet legacy remains very present. It manifests itself, first and foremost, in the reluctance to break

away from routine habits, even if outdated in the present time. Rating did a survey in September 2017, shortly before the newly reintroduced Day of the Defender celebrated now on October 14. It explored public opinion on the attitude to this holiday rooted in the Cossack culture and the abolition of February 23, the Motherland Defenders' Day or Soviet Army Day , a substitution for the Men's Day in the post-Soviet territory. 59% of those polled support or understand the idea of reintroducing October 14 as the state holiday. 27% oppose it to a bigger or a lesser extent. Support is higher in the West (77%) and declines in the East (to 33%). The East is the only region where the number of opponents is 41%, exceeding that of supporters. Even such results, however, were unthinkable of in Eastern Ukraine five years ago. The support of the newly introduced holiday does not vary much by education, gender or age.

A significant difference in views is between those who support the recognition of OUN and UPA as participants of Ukraine's liberation struggle or the status of the Ukrainian language, and those who don't. The latter are far less in favor of the October 14 holiday. This outcome is not surprising.

What is difficult to explain through logical reflections is the results of the survey on the abolition of February 23. 56% of respondents across Ukraine opposed this, while 34% supported the decision to stop celebrating the day. "45% of those who support October 14 as the Defender of Ukraine Day do not support the abolition of the soviet holiday," the authors of the poll explain. This means, that about 25% of Ukrainians believe that it is fine to equally celebrate the Defender of Ukraine Day and the Day of the Soviet Army, and see no contradiction in that.

Abstract numbers manifest themselves in life. Many parents of school students complained on social media about attempts of others to arrange a Men's Day celebration on October 14, like the one that was traditionally done on February 23 where boys or men are given gifts. Many began to question why it was only boys that would get the gifts when women also serve in the East of Ukraine today, and why would anybody want to congratulate all men, even those who have nothing to do with defending the country? Many parents, however, don't see anything wrong about this: their priority is to arrange a celebration for their kids.

Another example comes from a recent decision to rename the High-Mobility Paratrooper Troops, widely known for the VDV abbreviation in Russian, into the Paratrooper Assault Troops, and to reschedule their day from August 2 to November 21. At the same time, their hats would be changed from blue to maroon.

The goal of the change is to harmonize Ukrainian military with most of the identical units across the world. This decision, however, stirred a heated debate on social media.

This episode revealed an interesting paradox. Many were willing to stand against Russia that had attacked Ukraine. Yet, they find it far more difficult to reject the tradition launched back in the soviet time. The October 14 celebration story also shows that demonstrated patriotism can often be a way to stay in the comfort zone and keep away from change.

Ukrainian society is still prone to paradoxes that coexist in its mind. Sociologists describe this as ambivalence in which an individual accepts and supports opposite values. A lot has been said and written about the ambivalence of Ukrainian society. "We have democratic values and totalitarian means. We are building a democracy but are willing to shoot anyone who disagrees," sociologist Yevhen Holovakha once described this.

One of the reasons for this could hide in the skills that were necessary for a life under the imperial and totalitarian regimes. While the values of communism have lost their meaning in the eyes of most Ukrainians, the model of life built then is still recreating itself. In fact, the model inherited from that time is the biggest contribution of the Soviet Union into the present. It is important to remove it like a Lenin statue or to cover it with a sheet like a plate. We should be cautious so that we don't wake up in a country with a giant metal trident painted in red one day.

What reasons do you have to be in favor of the Soviet Union?*



*The respondents could choose all options

Source: Razumkov Center, 2016

What cultural tradition do you attribute yourself to?



Source: Razumkov Center

On the red sideline of history

How socio-economic developments in Ukraine marginalized its left

Maksym Vikhrov

Last week, the left celebrated the 100th anniversary of the Bolshevik coup. Ukraine prepared for the landmark date in history thoroughly and well in advance, removing 1,320 Lenin monuments, replacing over 50,000 Soviet toponyms, making communist propaganda illegal, and getting rid of the Communist faction in Parliament. However, the reason for the marginalization of the Ukrainian left is neither the decommunization nor, even less so, the defeat of poverty and social injustice. Quite on the contrary, the war only aggravated the social problems. However, the left today have nothing to offer to the society, apart from vague theories and even more dubious practices.

At first glance, the social foundation for the left in Ukraine is enormous. According to the UN estimates, about 60% of Ukrainians live below the poverty line, and even the State Statistics Bureau is unable to reliably evaluate the scale of social inequality and the rate of unemployment. It would seem that one battle cry should suffice to bring hundreds of thousands of workers into the streets for a new "social" Maidan. However, already 90 years ago, Socialist dreamer Volodymyr Vynnychenko wrote from exile: "Proletariat as a class does not exist; there is only a variety of more or less stable groups, with often contrasting interests." Since then, the social structure of the Ukrainian society has become much more complex. It is not just about the divide between the white and blue collars. Even within one profession, salary levels may vary by an order of magnitude. Besides, almost a third of the Ukrainian workforce (migrant workers, IT experts, etc.) is directly integrated into foreign economies. Then, there is a host of precariat, the new class of people with no permanent employment, and therefore no certain place in the system of social and labor relations.

Almost everyone complains about social injustice, but the perceptions thereof vary. Therefore, uniting millions of Ukrainian employees under the revolutionary banners is something out of the realm of the unthinkable. In fact, the left faced this problem already a hundred years ago and even in the proletarian Donbas. For example, left radicals forced the workers of most Luhansk factories to join the 1905 winter strike by physical intimidation. Today, making migrant workers, software developers, village school teachers and office administrators from the capital jump on the same revolutionary bandwagon is practically impossible. Realizing this, the leaders of the Ukrainian left, namely, the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Progressive Socialist Party of Ukraine, chose to forget about Marxism and focused instead on protecting the Russian language and the Moscow church, and on other topics that could appeal to voters.

Social dissatisfaction did not go away, but it is hard to see workers' protests as the precursors of the proletarian revolution. At the dawn of Ukraine's independence, miners could have become the drivers of a broad labor movement, but they consistently distanced themselves from all the rest, looking after their own corporate interests. Therefore, when in the late 1990s the "Donetsk clan" suppressed the miners' revolution other proletarians remained unmoved. Similarly, in 2011–2012, nobody was in a rush to support the "Chornobyl" protests. Even after the death of a protester during the dispersal of the tent town in Donetsk then, neither pensioners -- the closest "brothers in class" -- nor compatriots from Donetsk showed any solidarity. What do they care about other people's allowances?

Since then, little has changed. According to researchers' estimates, in 2011–2013, rallies in support of employee rights accounted for just 10% of the total number of protests. In the absolute majority of cases, they were organized by individual labor collectives demanding the payment of wage arrears, protesting against enterprise closures, etc. Leftists traditionally put the blame for such lack of coordination on weak independent trade unions, obstacles created by the "anti-popular government," etc. However, in 2004 and 2013, Ukrainians were able to organize Maidan protests, and in 2014 also launched a large-scale volunteer movement. Therefore, the reasons for the lack of social movements, obviously, lie not so much in the field of opportunities as in the field of motivations.

However, to be successful, the Ukrainian leftists lack not only the organized and united proletariat, but also the "bourgeois exploiters." At first glance, private capital is doing quite well in Ukraine: out of the 17 million productive citizens, about 4 million are employed by small businesses, 2.6 million by medium businesses, and 1.7 million by large businesses. So should the bourgeoisie be held responsible for the problems of Ukrainian employees? Of course, there is exploitation. By no means all businessmen are conscientious and law-abiding employers. However, the main source of social problems in Ukraine is not at all the flaws of capitalism, but the systemic corruption, organized by and for the benefit of the oligarchy.

The point is that political and business groups, or the so-called clans, do not just exploit their own employees, but also redistribute the resources of the entire country to their own advantage. They get much more profits from such "schemes" than from exploiting workers at their enterprises. Let's take as an example the infamous Rotterdam + formula, through which Ukraine lost about UAH20 billion since March 2016. Rinat Akhmetov is believed to be the main beneficiary of the "scheme," since 80% of this amount, or about UAH16 billion, goes to his company, DTEK. No exploitation could bring him such easy money, unless all 188,000 DTEK employees work free of charge for a year. This, of course, does not mean that Akhmetov's enterprises are alright, but the oligarch's profits could hardly stem from payroll embezzlement, etc.

In general, according to the estimates of the Institute of Economics and Forecasting of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, during the years of independence, US $148 billion were channeled from Ukraine to offshore jurisdictions. For comparison, state budget revenue this year is US $29 billion. This means that the oligarchs not only appropriate the fruits of someone else's labor, but also loot the country. In this sense, Ukrainian oligarchs are more similar to a hostile army ravaging

PHOTO BY UNIAN

The humble social protest. Glorified by soviet propaganda, the solidarity of Ukrainian workers barely exists. The country's trade unions' movement, weak and mostly controlled by oligarchs, is a manifest thereof

a captured city than to the "bourgeoisie" of the Soviet posters. Not only workers suffer from this, but also businessmen and every other strata of the population, with the exception of the oligarchs themselves.

In this way, Ukraine could be considered a capitalist country only formally, since it is de facto managed by the oligarchic aristocracy setting its quasi-feudal rules of the game. In line with the Middle Age standards, money and power in Ukraine are interdependent: belonging to a certain "clan" opens up access to economic resources, and vice versa, the availability of economic resources is easily converted into power. Within the "clans," relations are built based on the vassal loyalty to the suzerain, and not party affiliation or administrative subordination. In this sense, both Maidans were not just anti-authoritarian protests, but, in fact, bourgeois revolutions, and the national and democratic forces went much further in their struggle than the left-wing dreamers did. That is why the right, not the left, is considered by the society to be the crusaders for the economic freedom, civil rights and justice, and rightly so.

Could the left win the status of the drivers of socio-economic progress? In theory, yes, but practice so far is in favor of the supporters of capitalism. Today, Ukrainian industry is in dire need of modernization. The only real source of innovation is European investments and technologies, as well as access to European markets, that is, the Western model of "bloody capitalism," which the Ukrainian bourgeoisie seeks to defend from the oligarchs. The proletariat is also increasingly oriented towards the "decadent West." This applies not only to migrant workers: thousands of Ukrainians are now working at new plants that companies from Germany, Japan, France, Poland, etc. open in Ukraine. Over the past two years, about two dozen such enterprises have emerged, but what can the left offer to Ukrainians? A return to the "bright Soviet future" or a more modern utopia?

In addition, leftists have powerful competition in the form of mainstream Ukrainian populists. While having no ideology whatsoever, they manage to flirt with all social strata at the same time and, judging by voter behavior, the society likes it. After all, by no means all Ukrainian leftists are interested in the emancipation of the working class. Some, mainly Stalinists and Sovietophiles, jumped at the opportunity of creating "Novorossiya," thus becoming Russian accomplices in the hybrid war. Others realigned themselves with modern Western trends and are more concerned with gender issues, LGBT rights and the fight against "traditional values" than the struggle with the capital. Even there, however, their achievements are rather modest.

Does this mean that the Ukrainian leftists found themselves on the wrong side of history? By no means. Ukraine is not likely to become a socialist country in the foreseeable future; however, a well-developed market economy does not rule out (or even requires) an organized labor movement. For example, American Federation of Labor/Congress of Industrial Organizations unite about 12 million workers, while the German Trade Union Confederation has over 6 million members. It is not just about the quantity, but also the ability to engage in real action, which Ukrainian fictitious trade unions are simply not capable of. If the left activists could revive trade unions, the whole of Ukraine would have benefitted from it. Or, maybe, the left could bring to life a Social-Democratic movement, absent from the Ukrainian political scene. One way or another, the left have plenty of chances to find a niche in the Ukrainian society. To do so, however, they have to cope primarily with their own flaws and to be acquainted not only with theories, but also with the Ukrainian realities.

New Education Law: A change of mindset

Mostly discussed for its regulation of the language of instruction in schools, the new law offers more overlooked innovations intended to change the quality and the content of education in Ukraine

Hanna Trehub

PHOTO: UKRAINIAN PHOTO

Future citizens. The State must create the conditions for obtaining civic education aimed at forming the competencies necessary for exercising the rights and obligations of citizens

Legislation is a field where regular updates are needed to make sure societies catch up with the conditions dictated by their time. The adoption of the new Law of Ukraine On Education is not an exception to the rule.

In 1991, the newly-independent Ukraine adopted a law on education to replace the old Soviet one. 26 years ago the society and the market had different demands for their education. On September 5, after much public debate and pressure to reform the nation's outdated education system, the Rada adopted the new law that offers some innovations and changes. Its best-known section, Article 7, defines the language of instruction and is currently debated in Europe. However, the law is also about the functioning of the education system in Ukraine, the quality changes to it and the improvement of its performance. In the future, the reformed education system is expected to generate high-quality professionals, as well as educated and competent citizens.

According to Article 3 of the new law, all citizens of Ukraine are guaranteed equal right to education. It clearly states that this guaranteed right is provided regardless of age, sex, race, state of health, disability, citizenship, nationality, political, religious or other beliefs, place of residence, language of communication, origin, social and property status, prior convictions, and other circumstances. In addition to that, everyone has the right to access public educational, scientific and information resources, including online resources, electronic textbooks and other multimedia teaching resources, in the manner prescribed by the law. Thus, the emphasis is made on inclusive education for all without exception, guaranteed by law.

Article 5 describes education is a priority of state policy that ensures innovative, socio-economic and cultural development of society. The funding of education is defined as an investment in human potential and sustainable development of society and the State. The State must create the conditions for obtaining civic education aimed at forming the competencies necessary for exercising the rights and obligations of citizens and understanding the values of a civil (free democratic) society, the rule of law, and the rights and liberties of the citizen. Competency, a term that was absent from the 1991 Education Law, is a dynamic combination of knowledge, skills, ways of thinking, views, values, and other personal qualities. It determines the ability of a person to successfully socialize and engage in professional activities and/or further education.

Article 6 defines the human centric approach to education, ensuring equal access to education without discrimination on any grounds, including disability, as one of the fundamentals of state policy in the field of education. The law speaks of developing an inclusive educational environment, particularly in schools that are the most accessible and close to places of residence of persons with special needs, in Article 20. It says that educational institutions may form, as appropriate, inclusive and/or special groups and classes for the people with special needs. If requested by people with special needs or their parents, the formation of such groups and classes is mandatory. Schools should provide students with physical, mental and intellectual disorders, as well as sensory impairments, auxiliary means for education. It requires state authorities and local self-government bodies to form inclusive resource centers in order to ensure the right to education and psychological and pedagogical support for children with special needs. Existing school premises should meet the accessibility requirements in accordance with state regulations, and new ones should be designed for universal and reasonable accommodation.

The new law mandates that the language of instruction in educational institutions is the state language. The state guarantees every citizen of Ukraine the right to obtain education at all levels (pre-school, general secondary, vocational (technical), professional pre-higher and higher education), as well as out-of-school and postgraduate education in the state language in state

and public educational institutions. Persons belonging to national minorities and indigenous populations of Ukraine are guaranteed the right to study in public educational institutions to acquire preschool and primary education in the language of the respective national minority, along with the state language. This right is exercised through the establishment of separate classes (groups) with instruction in the language of the respective national minority, in addition to the state language. National minorities are also guaranteed the right to study their language in public general secondary schools or through national cultural societies. This setup, as well as a number other educational innovations, are meant to act as a mechanism of inclusion, allowing the representatives of national minorities and indigenous peoples to enjoy the same benefits as the rest of Ukrainian citizens. This includes access to education in Ukrainian universities and to public offices that is impossible without fluency in Ukrainian as the state language.

The new law focuses on the role of science in education. It makes authorities and institutions involved in education accountable to society, and separates the functions of control (supervision) and operation of educational establishments into different institutions. It outlines education as a field integrated with the labor market. A separate paragraph is included on noninterference of political parties and religious organizations in the instruction process. Students are to be provided diverse and balanced information on the issues of politics, ideologies and religions.

Article 12 prescribes anew and in detail the meaning and content of complete general secondary education introducing new components that were absent from the 1991 version. According to the new law, the purpose of complete general secondary education is the comprehensive development, education and socialization of a person capable of life in a society and civilized interaction with nature, striving for self-improvement and life-long learning, ready for conscious life choices and self-fulfillment, responsibility, professional life, and civic activity. This goal is achieved by shaping the key competencies necessary for every modern person to succeed: fluency in the state language; ability to communicate in one's mother tongue (if different from the state language) and foreign languages; competence in mathematics; competence in the field of natural sciences and technology; innovation; ecological competence; information and communication competence; and life-long learning. These are complemented by civil and social competencies related to the ideas of democracy, justice, equality, human rights, well-being and healthy lifestyles, with the awareness of equal rights and opportunities, cultural competence, entrepreneurship, financial literacy, etc. All competencies include the following common skills: reading and understanding, ability to express individual opinion both orally and in writing, critical and systematic thinking, ability to logically justify a viewpoint, creativity, initiative, ability to constructively manage emotions, evaluate risks, make decisions, solve problems, and co-operate with others.

The new law introduces education districts. The purpose is to set up the infrastructure for obtaining complete general secondary education with subject-oriented instruction, comprehensive personal development, rational and efficient use of available resources, and the buildup of material and technical base of educational institutions, as well as their modernization. An educational district will encompass a set of educational institutions and their branches, including out-of-school institutions, cultural establishments, PE and sports institutions that provide access to education for the residents of the respective district.

Adult education is covered in a separate article. Being part of life-long education, it is aimed at ensuring the right of adults to continuous education taking into account their personal needs, social development priorities, and the needs of the economy. Adult education is composed of postgraduate education; professional employee training; retraining and/or advanced training courses; continuous professional development; etc. Postgraduate education involves the acquisition of new skills and the improvement of those previously acquired in the process of higher, vocational (technical) or professional advanced education and practical experience.

The specifics of relations between educational institutions and political parties, as well as religious organizations, are outlined in Article 31. It requires that state and public educational institutions are separated from churches (religious organizations) and are secular. Private educational establishments, in particular those founded by religious organizations, have the right to determine the religious orientation of their educational activities. Political parties have no right to interfere in the educational process of schools. No political party cells or political associations can be formed and function within school premises. An important paragraph of this article prohibits school administration, pedagogical and academic staff, state authorities, local self-governments and their officials to engage students and professors in events organized by religious organizations or political parties, except for events provided for by the educational program. An anti-discriminatory clause also sets forth that students cannot be restricted in their right to acquire education in state and public educational institutions based on their belonging or not belonging to any religious organizations or political parties.

Article 42 of the law addresses the issue of academic integrity. It refers to a set of ethical policies and statutory rules that the participants in the educational process should abide by in the process of learning, teaching and conducting scientific or creative activities. This should ensure confidence in the outcome of the education process. Adherence to academic integrity by the pedagogical and scientific staff implies providing references to the sources of information used for ideas, inventions, statements and information. Copyright norms should be met, and reliable information should be provided on the methods and results of research. For the students, integrity procedures regulate independent completion of school tasks, the provision of references to the sources of their information, adherence to copyright rules and more. A welcome change comes from the definition of what constitutes violations of academic integrity in the new law: academic plagiarism, self-plagiarism (i.e. publication of own previously published scientific results as new scientific results), fabrication, falsification and cheating. All these have long been a serious problem in Ukraine's education system, inherited from Soviet practices and nurtured further by the intensity of school education and a lack of social censorship for such practices. The new integrity provisions are aimed at changing the approach and mindset on education.

Sanctions for the violation of academic integrity procedures by school staff can include refusal of academic degrees or titles, abolition of degrees awarded earlier, refusal of the right to participate in statutory bodies or occupy statutory positions. Students may have to go through a repetition of tests or the components of education in which the violation took place, deprived of scholarships or allowances.

Article 45 of the new law introduces a mechanism of institutional audit, a comprehensive external review and assessment of educational and administration processes in schools. The purpose is to ensure its effective work and sustainable development. The law institutes the position of Education Ombudsman, an official appointed by the Cabinet to protect individual rights in the field of education.

The European society is based on the educated society principle, high culture and equal opportunities for all. This is the purpose of the reform launched by the recently adopted Education Law, one of the necessary tools for changing Ukraine for the better.

Frank Sysyn: "Absent from the political map of the world in early 1917, Ukraine was already there in early 1918"

Interviewed by **Hanna Trehub**

Canadian historian spoke to ***The Ukrainian Week*** about the 100th anniversary of the 1917 Ukrainian Revolution, overcoming Soviet stereotypes of that period, modern discourse on the 20th century liberation struggle and its participants, and the current state of Ukrainian studies abroad.

Ukrainian public discourse tends to heroize history, in particular when it comes to the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle of 1917–1921. What does such interpretation leave out of equation, and does it simplify the events of the early 20th century? How can we move away from the rudiments of the Soviet narrative about the October Revolution?

The main question about the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–1921 may be different: why did we lose? For the Ukrainian historians writing in exile, for the Ukrainian society, for the emigrants the question was this: what did they all do wrong, why did they not realize the impor-

Frank Sysyn was born in 1946 in Passaic, New Jersey, USA. He completed a Bachelor's degree at Princeton University's Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs in 1968. He received a Master's degree in history from the School of Slavonic Studies at the University of London in 1969. In Harvard University, he joined Professor Omeljan Pritsak and the Ukrainian Studies Fund to establish an academic program in Ukrainian Studies. In the decade that followed, he held a number of research fellowships in the United Kingdom, Poland, and the USSR, and completed his Harvard Ph.D. with a dissertation on Adam Kysil, a prominent political figure of the 17th century.

tance of having their own army, as did the Poles and other neighboring nations? These, briefly, were the main issues that the Ukrainian historiography abroad dealing with the above period was concerned with.

In Ukraine itself, after 1920s, historiography of the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle could not develop either naturally or freely. In a way, some attempts were made to show the roots of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic, but with time they also dwindle to nothing.

I believe that the modern take on the Ukrainian revolution should focus on the following issue. When Ukraine became independent 25 years ago, Ukrainians talked about gaining independence, while in the Baltic states, which also became independent in 1991, they talked about restoring their statehood. In Ukraine there was no such discourse, and only today they are beginning to talk about the restoration of the Ukrainian statehood.

Going back to the idea of how we should discuss in today's Ukraine the events dating back to a hundred years ago, the Ukrainian Revolution and the liberation struggle, it would be quite natural, after the long period of falsified Soviet history and demonization of Ukrainian political figures, to try to show their achievements as they were in reality. For me, the most important and the greatest of these achievements was that Ukraine, which was absent from the political map of the world in early 1917, was already there in early 1918. There would have been no Ukrainian Soviet Republic either, if an independent Ukrainian state had not existed previously. I think that eventually we will be able to move away from discussing why we lost, and simply evaluate the people that took part in the events of 1917–1920, evaluate them as people of their time, and understand this stage in the history of the Ukrainian nation and Ukrainian statehood.

Nestor Makhno gained his distinct place in contemporary Ukrainian culture, becoming an iconic figure. If we talk about the real historical figure and his role in the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle of the beginning of the last century, what would he be like?

It is already interesting that this is being discussed today. I could not imagine that the information about otaman Zelenyi or the anarchists would reach our time and the general public in this form. Obviously, the figure of Nestor Makhno has its specifics. In the West, there was a certain interest in the anarchist movement, but we should question the extent to which he was a theorist of anarchism. Rather, we should see him as a leader of the peasant movement. We are talking about 1917, when the Ukrainian state did not yet exist. The group that gathered in the building that we know today as the Kyiv City Teachers' House tried to take under control the situation in Ukraine and to manage it somehow by forming the Central Council. Let's recall Hrushevsky calling people to the first viche, an almost legendary event. I cannot say if it really gathered a hundred thousand people as it was reported, but the fact is that a host of people came, and this was a shock for the Ukrainian movement. Its roots turned out to be deeper than we imagined. They made a giant step forward in 1917, the results of which we can still feel today.

I have written about Makhno, but the topic that interested me most was not his figure. When reading Nestor Makhno's memoirs, I paid attention to their third part entitled "Ukrainian Revolution." I searched for more information and found an article published abroad in 1926, in which Makhno says that at the beginning the Ukrainian issue was not important, but as of 1926 it was the key issue in Ukraine. Today we have a broader perspective of those historical events, and they have long ago been given the name of the Ukrainian Revolution. The point is also that it was a revolution in consciousness to the extent that the existence of the Ukrainian State was recognized.

Today I am a bigger pessimist than I was ten years ago. Back then, I thought that even Russia to a certain degree recognized the existence of Ukraine as a fait accomplit. Today, we can see how deeply rooted is Russia's reluctance to recognize Ukraine. Until a certain point, Ukrainians themselves were ambivalent, even at the time of the proclamation of independence in 1991, as to whether they wanted to have their own state and whether it should be the heir to the events of the Ukrainian Revolution. And 1917–1921 was a complicated period, with peasant movements, Ukrainian-Russian war, Polish-Ukrainian war, Polish-Ukrainian alliance. For an average person, understanding this period is extremely difficult. Do not forget also that a large number of Ukrainians still believe the myth of 1917–1921, the Soviet version of the events and history of that time.

Historian Vladyslav Verstyuk stresses that we should not percieve the Ukrainian peasantry and its role in the revolutionary and state-building processes of 1917–1921 as either amorphous or purely savage and anarchic. If we reject the previous narrative, what was the role of this social stratum in the Ukrainian Liberation Struggle?

25 years preceding the World War I was a time of great progress in the Russian Empire, especially after the 1905 revolution. During these years, peasants became more literate. The peasant class is not a homogeneous group, rather, it unites people from different groups. It is different in Southern Ukraine, on the Right Bank and on the Left Bank. I think that Soviet historiography tended to deal with masses, groups, classes, strata, but not with people. Vladyslav Verstyuk suggests to turn to people and to have a look at the real peasants we are talking about.

It is believed that the peasantry did not leave any documents. I am not sure that this is the case. In newspapers published in 1917–1918 we can find correspondence from

peasants and see what they wrote about in the 1920s. In this way, we could understand them better. We have good examples of this, because this is how they studied the peasants of Halychyna in Western Ukraine. We can observe dramatic progress, how the peasantry was drawn into a new life. The peasants of the Central, Great Ukraine were more prosperous and literate than the peasants of Halychyna, and it is also important to understand them.

It is also true that the peasantry could not organize the defense of Ukraine, but talking about it as a kind of a "wild" mass is not the case, because it does not stand up to any criticism.

That is, the Bolsheviks and the Soviet authorities were afraid of Ukrainian peasants not only because they were numerous, but also because they were educated, had an independent stand regarding the further development of the country in which they lived, and were attached to private property? In this case, was the Holodomor of 1932–1933 a cruel social experiment aimed at weakening this intellectual potential by physically destroying it?

I have already read the book by Anne Applebaum about the Holodomor. She very convincingly demonstrates that Stalin and certain Bolshevik circles were afraid of the Ukrainian peasantry. In 1917–1920s, peasants distanced themselves from the Bolsheviks, and in the 1920s their education in the Ukrainian language improved, they had certain economic privileges, and were attached to land and land ownership. This was a threat to the Bolshevik regime, because it was a prelude to a society that was different from what they had concieved. The Ukrainian people is overshaded by the Great Famine to this day. A whole generation of educated peasants of the early 20th century was lost and replaced by Soviet serfs.

A LARGE NUMBER OF UKRAINIANS STILL BELIEVE THE MYTH OF 1917–1921, THE SOVIET VERSION OF THE EVENTS AND HISTORY OF THAT TIME

Germans and Austrians who occupied the Ukrainian lands in 1918 were reluctant to surrender their political power and promote the self-government of the Ukrainian lands, explaining this with the lack of intellectual and political elites among Ukrainians. Both now and then, this category is crucial for determining the direction that a state would take and for its existence as such.

We are talking about the views of the Germans, the people who mostly did not speak any Slavic language and had certain ideas and stereotypes regarding Ukraine based on their previous contacts with Ukrainians. This is true.

The generation of the intellectual and political elite of the years 1917–1921 was formed before the revolution. It is important to understand the specifics of the then situation of Ukrainians and Belarusians. In the case of the former, the Habsburg part of Ukraine was a great help, whereas the Belarusian elite was formed in the 1920s, in Soviet times, and later exterminated by Stalin. The Ukrainian cultural and, to a degree, political elite was formed during the two decades preceding the World War I. It was extremely active, and managed to attract lots of people and the wide strata of the Ukrainian population.

If we compare this situation with the present day, Ukraine is now fully literate and educated, and has a huge number of talented and intellectually advanced individuals. However, in the society, which is still recovering from the destruction of the Soviet times, every person is alien to the state, as the state is alien to a person. It is hard to build partnerships and associations on such foundation, because everyone is afraid of everyone. Recovering from such terrible events as the World War I and then living through the Holodomor and the World War II was hard, but in general, as I see it, there is nothing wrong with the Ukrainian society today, the problem lies in the economic structures. I mean the rule of the oligarchs in Ukraine.

In a certain sense, state figures of the Hetmanate believed they had made a mistake in 1917–1918 by not incorporating the old elite, while the new Ukraine has made a mistake by incorporating the elite of the previous Soviet regime, which, represented by former Komsomol functionaries, still rules the country today. The recent revolutions in Ukraine were needed exactly to launch a revolution of consciousness. The elite of 1917 were people with certain ethics, an understanding of what a state was and how it was possible to change the realities of the then Ukrainian State. The old Soviet elite, unfortunately, was unable to create the Ukrainian State and, as a result, we have this post-colonial society, where people are used to live keeping a close eye on Moscow, where all decisions are made for them. Hence the attempt to make Kyiv another Moscow, in a sense of a bloodsucker of the nation. At the same time, I understand that there are various shoots of change in Ukraine. Ukraine and its people have shown their maturity twice already, especially during the Revolution of Dignity of 2013–2014. The question is, how to destroy the old structures.

In your book *Religion and Nation in Modern Ukraine*, you and Serhii Plokhii study the impact of the religious factor on the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation. Why did the state figures of the early days of independent Ukraine in the 1990s turned the blind eye to the religion as a factor of state security?

There are various reasons for this. The first is that all KGB documents, including the dossiers of the church elites, remained for the most part in Moscow. I think, if we take a closer look, we can see that the Russian Orthodox Church has remained an imperial structure, because Leonid Kravchuk, a Soviet apparatchik, had this illusion that once he had his own independent state, it would be easy to resolve the church issue in it. He failed due to the fact that the church hierarchy was much better integrated with the post-Soviet system. Another reason why is was impossible is because there was lots of Ukrainian priests throughout Russia, since the church personnel in the Soviet era was coming mostly from our territories.

I was surprised by the extent of the revival of religious structures in Ukraine. Partly this happened, quite possibly, because people here did not have other values, as well as through the return to tradition. Religious pluralism and the competition in the religious market is helpful to some extent. Religious

Ukraine is very diverse in its various regions. In the East, we have a post-Orthodox society, where Orthodoxy has nothing to do with God or religion. In Central Ukraine, traditional factors still exist, while the environment of Western Ukraine is more pluralistic. The competition between the Greek Catholics and the Orthodox is a good thing. Protestants in Ukraine, too, are a positive factor, because they have their social policy, and do not recruit people en masse.

It was important from the very beginning to understand one thing that our secular elite failed to realize: that the Moscow Orthodox Church could be instrumentalized. We had and still have presidents belonging to the Moscow Patriarchate. They underestimated the fact that the Church can act as an independent factor of implementing pro-Moscow policies. Now Ukraine has to live with it.

Recognizing the Ukrainian Church to be autocephalous is also a difficult process that is still underway in the Orthodox world. Despite all, the Kyivan Patriarchate turned out to be viable. However, it is not clear what will happen to it, when Patriarch Filaret joins the angels due to his old age. Another interesting story is the revival of the Greek Catholic Church.

It is difficult to say whether religion will still be an important factor in 20 years. When we look at Poland or Slovakia, we see liberalization in this regard. Perhaps this will also be the case in Ukraine, but nowadays Churches play an important role in it.

When we talk about Ukraine of the last 25 years, the process of establishing its modern political nation is still underway, as well as that of defending its statehood. Is it possible to draw any historical conclusions from the revolutions that took place in Ukraine over this time?

The process of gaining independence for Ukraine was not over after the end of the Revolution of Dignity. The Ukrainian State is still under threat not only through the internal factor, when the political elite does not understand how to manage a country on behalf of its people not only to make money, but also to ensure its economic growth. We do not know what will happen in 2–3 years. One thing is obvious, though: the Ukrainian society has changed. However, the loss of the younger generation that goes to the West in search of a better life, which is quite understandable, means that Ukraine is not yet fully on the path of development.

We once said that Ukrainians were so naive that they voted for Yanukovych as their president, but have a look at what's happening in the world: recently, a liar and a swindler such as Trump was elected President of the United States. We can see what is happening in Western Europe, which Ukraine takes for a role model. Ukraine has to somehow find internal resources to stabilize its situation, but without change for the better in the economy, this will not happen.

At the end of the 1960s, you and Omeljan Pritsak were actively involved in establishing Ukrainian Studies centers in the United States and Canada. How is this academic subject area doing today?

With great respect to what Professor Omeljan Pritsak has done, I would add that another 15,000 American Ukrainians have created the Ukrainian Research Institute at Harvard University, understanding the importance of such a move. That was a special generation. Perhaps, had there been other alternatives for the Ukrainian cause, they would have done differently, but they chose to fund science at Harvard, which received wide publicity.

There was also a negative side. In 1968, Ukrainian History and Philology Chairs were opened, and the Institute was established in 1972–1973. Later, however, starting in 1975, a major crisis happened in the academic life of the United States, when many professors lost their jobs.

Ukrainian Studies actively developed in Canada as well, and the history of Ukraine was taught in the country's universities. Many professors specializing in this field came there after the World War II and established Ukrainian Studies there. They kept them going, but we must take into account their age: many have already passed away.

Today, the situation is completely different. The center of Ukrainian Studies is in Ukraine, and it has many good specialists. They study the archives that we had no access to oversees, when it comes to historic research. Unfortunately, Ukrainian academic structures have not been reformed. There has been no reform of the Academy of Sciences, and no reform that would let university professors do academic research. There is no money for such projects.

The role of what is happening in Canada, the United States and Europe is quite different, since more and more people of non-Ukrainian origin studying in various universities there are interested in Ukraine. Let's take Germany. Historians there have made a tremendous breakthrough in historical science about Ukraine. Today, Frank Golczewski and Andreas Kappeler are no longer the only ones who write about it.

Today's complicated situation in Ukraine also concerns those engaged in Ukrainian Studies abroad, in particular, in history studies. But there is also a cultural weakness: for how much longer will Ukrainian in Ukraine be the state language only in theory, while everyone speaks Russian? Yes, this is a personal choice, but why should American students study Ukrainian if they know that Russian would suffice for communicating in Kyiv? This is also important, considering that political officers dispatched to Ukraine also choose to study Russian for communication purposes out of all Slavic languages. Stronger Ukrainian culture and language would attract more people to study them.

THE NEW UKRAINE HAS MADE A MISTAKE BY INCORPORATING THE ELITE OF THE PREVIOUS SOVIET REGIME, WHICH, REPRESENTED BY FORMER KOMSOMOL FUNCTIONARIES, STILL RULES THE COUNTRY TODAY. THE RECENT REVOLUTIONS IN UKRAINE WERE NEEDED EXACTLY TO LAUNCH A REVOLUTION OF CONSCIOUSNESS

Foreigners need to know more about modern Ukrainian culture. However, cultural heritage, such as rustic and folklore culture, cannot be rejected either, it is also necessary. Who could think that embroidered shirts would become so popular in Ukraine now? Ten years ago, those vyshyvankas would have been ridiculed. Today, vyshyvanka shirt has become a symbol, because the spilt blood of your generation makes it not just an object, but gives it a symbolic meaning.

November 9, 7p.m.

Tekstura Exhibit

TseHlynaArt Gallery
(vul. Naberezhno-Luhova 2B, Kyiv)

An unusual combination within a single art space. Two artists, two directions. Textiles and ceramics, color and dynamics. Natalka Borysenko calls tapestries, embroidery, collages and painting on cloth her passions, whereas Olesia Dvorak-Halik's creative efforts are in the harmonious combination of ceramics with wood, metal, plastic and other materials. In their art, both women touch on the philosophical questions of existence, the relationship between people and nature, as well as the social and political issues of our times. Entrance is free.

November 10 – 26

German Weeks in Ukraine 2017

Lviv, Lutsk, Chernivtsi, Kyiv, Odesa, Kryvyi Rih, Oleksandria, Sumy, Dnipro, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Pokrovsk, Mariupol, Severodonetsk

On the 25th anniversary of diplomatic relations between Germany and Ukraine, a series of cultural and arts events is being launched in 14 cities across the country. The grand opening of the festival will be a performance of Swan Lake at the Dnipro Academic Opera and Ballet Theater. The performance will include renowned soloists from the Berlin State Ballet—Yana Salenko and Mariana Walter. The exciting festival program includes an enormous variety of collaborations, from theater and art to joint music projects and educational programs.

November 14, 7p.m.

Mark Gross Quartet feat Benito Gonzalez

BelEtage
(vul. Shota Rustaveli 16A, Kyiv)

Evenings of jazz in autumnal Kyiv continue in the "Jazz from New York" project in Ukraine's capital. For those who enjoy improvisation, there will be a special surprise: this time the BelEtage stage will present renowned, Grammy-winning American saxophonist and virtuoso jazzman Mark Gross. Together with pianist Benito Gonzalez, he will perform music dedicated to the legendary Cannonball Adderly, American alto saxophonist and composer *par excellence*. The Mark Gross concert is part of the International Jazz Subscription, the first cycle of concerts in Kyiv involving world-class stars of jazz.

November 16 – 20

Jerusalem Days in Kyiv

Oscar Cinema in the Gulliver Shopping Mall
(Sportyvna ploshcha 1, Kyiv)

Here's a unique opportunity for Kyivans and their guests to enjoy the cinema program of the Days of Jerusalem in Kyiv Festival. All you have to do is register in advance on the festival site: **www.jerusalem2017.com.ua**. Four films will be presented to viewers, all of them shot in Israel and awarded numerous national prizes. *Jeruzalem* is a horror film, *Abulele* offers fantasy, *Bethlehem* is a thriller, and Scaffolding a drama. The various subjects and genres make the program unusually interesting and wide-ranging, and the most demanding film aficionado will be thrilled to find a movie just right for them.

December 5, 8p.m.

Myron Walden Quartet

Sentrum
(vul. Shota Rustaveli 11, Kyiv)

This year's series of jazz concerts in Kyiv will end with a fantastic performance by this funk quartet from the US led by Grammy-winning saxophonist Myron Walden. The jazzman's career launched with a flash in the early 1990s, when he graduated from the Manhattan School of Music and won the Charlie Parker competition. His star-studded path led him to many performances on the same stage as his one-time idols, tours with jazz groups and inspired work on his solo albums.

December 16, 7p.m.

Valentyn Sylvestrov. Kyiv Camerata

National Philharmonic Hall
(Volodymyrskiy uzviz 2, Kyiv)

The great Ukrainian composer turned 80 this year and has chosen to celebrate his birthday on the stage of the National Philharmonic Hall together with the Kyiv Camerata ensemble of soloists under artistic director and conductor Valeriy Matiukhin. The evening's celebratory program includes Hymn for 2001, Quiet Music, Moments of Poetry and Music, seven Bagatelles for String Orchestra, three Serenades, and Chamber Cantata #4.



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