

# The Ukrainian Week

International edition

#2 (96) February 2016

Why Minsk process  
is stalling

New economic priorities  
for Ukraine

History of Islam  
in Western Ukraine



## Populism Kills



The  
Economist

Featuring selected content  
from The Economist



[WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM](http://WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM)

FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION



**MARCH 1**  
**KYIV**

**National Opera  
of Ukraine**

**JOYFUL  
HOLIDAY  
of the SPRING**

**MARCH 4**  
**LVIV**

**Lviv Opera House**



used phonogram

**World masterpieces of the Chinese culture  
under international concert tour  
Zhengzhou Opera House  
Shaolin Tagou Martial Arts School**

INFORMATION  
PARTNER

УКРАЇНСЬКИЙ  
**Тиждень**

**CONCERT.UA**  
**222 00 22**

BUY TICKETS  
HERE



**中华人民共和国文化部**  
MINISTRY OF CULTURE OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA



**信威集团**  
XINWEI GROUP



Міжнародна громадська організація  
«Культурно-дослідницький центр  
України та Китаю «Ланьхуа»  
国际非政府组织“兰华”  
乌克兰与中国文化研究中心



**BRIEFING**

- 4 **A cold shower for Mr. President:**  
How the current political crisis emerged
- 7 **Denys Kazanskyi on miners' strikes in the occupied parts of the Donbas**



**POLITICS**

- 8 **Roman Bezsmertnyi: "We must get prepared for a serious and long-term confrontation with Russia"**  
Ukraine's envoy to the Trilateral Contact Group in Minsk on the causes of the crisis in the peace process and Ukraine's further actions

**ECONOMICS**

- 12 **Placing accents in the right places:**  
What is the potential of the three priority sectors of Ukraine's economy?
- 15 **State support and golden loaves:**  
Things in common between the promotion of economic development, corruption and paternalism in Ukraine



- 18 **On a cold road to savings:**  
What hampers Ukraine's transition to energy efficiency

**FOCUS**

- 20 **Breaking out of hollow rhetoric:**  
What makes Ukrainians vulnerable to populism
- 24 **The evolution of political doublespeak:**  
The history of populism in the years of independence

**NEIGHBOURS**

- 26 **The breaking point:**  
How the EU has changed in 60 years
- 28 **Thoughts on the future:**  
Experts comment on how they see the EU dealing with the current crises



- 31 **Special privileges:**  
What trouble the EU may store for itself in shaping a deal to suit British interests
- 32 **Róbert Ondrejcsák: «Visegrad countries need to support Ukraine in its NATO-integration in case your country will decide to follow this path»**  
Director of the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs on strategic goals of V4 and cooperation with Ukraine

**SOCIETY**

- 34 **An unloved child:**  
What saved Mykolayiv from separatism
- 36 **The Black Sea outpost:**  
How political preferences changed in Kherson Oblast since the first years of independence and after the Maidan
- 38 **Kateryna Barabash on Ukraine in the eyes of Russian liberals**



**HISTORY**

- 40 **Traces of Islam in Western Ukraine:**  
The origins and the history of the Muslim community in Volyn

**CULTURE & ARTS**

- 44 **What's that Teyve was listening to?**  
World-famous klezmer music has many traditions and roots in Ukraine
- 46 **Gerardo Ángel Bugallo Ottone and Tamara Zabala Utrillas: "Zarzuela is a very good way to understand the diversity of Spain"**  
Spanish Ambassador and Counsel on Cultural Issues on cultural diplomacy



- 50 **Love through music, films and paintings:**  
*The Ukrainian Week* offers a selection of events to attend in February and March

**The Ukrainian Week**

**The Ukrainian Week** #2 (96) February 2016  
**Founder** ECEM Media GmbH. **Publisher** ECEM Media GmbH  
**Address** Austria, Am Gestade,1, 1010 Vienna  
 State registration certificate KB № 19823-9623ПП 19.03.2013  
**Chief Editor** Dmytro Kravyenko  
**Editors** Anna Korbut, Lidia Wolanskyj

**E-mail** office@tyzhden.ua  
**www.ukrainianweek.com**  
**Tel.** (044) 351-13-87  
**Editors address** 37 Mashynobudivna str., Kyiv, 03067, Ukraine  
**Print run** 15 000. **Free distribution**  
**Our partner**









## BRIEFING

# A cold shower for Mr. President

Bohdan Butkevych

In the last week, Bankova and the President personally suffered a number of very painful blows that, while they may not completely changed the political situation in Ukraine, might seriously weaken Petro Poroshenko's position. Moreover, the blows came from within and from outside: wobbles within the ruling party and the tone of ultimatum coming from international partners showed that the country is now in a political crisis that can no longer be swept under the rug of war.

The bombshell that came with the resignation of Economy Minister Aivaras Abromavicius and his accusations directed at Ihor Kononenko, the President's closest adviser and personal friend, was a very cold shower for Petro Poroshenko. It was not just a matter of loss of reputation, but the fact that the Lithuanian expat had effectively blown up »

PHOTO BY UNIAN

Bankova's carefully-wrought plans to tame Premier Arseniy Yatseniuk. Plans were for the next Government report to tear his performance to shred, after which the President would have the complete right and enough votes in the Verkhovna Rada to completely reshuffle the Cabinet—in his own favor. And then Yatseniuk would have found himself a king without a kingdom. In the kamikaze team, the number of President's men would have significantly increased and it would become a coalition in name only.

But when Abromavicius announced that Kononenko and the Presidential Administration were trying to take over a number of top state enterprises and pushing for Andriy Pasishnyk as deputy economy minister, everything went topsy-turvy. The President no longer had any moral basis for attacking Yatseniuk, not to mention that the scandal over Ihor Kononenko hit the Head of State himself. Until recently, most accusations of corruption tended to leveled at the Head of Government, now all the anger and suspicion were shifted to the President.

The consequences of the economy minister's resignation were not long in coming. On Monday, February 8, Yehor Firsov, a one-time UDAR member who had always had his own opinion of matters, quit the Petro Poroshenko Bloc faction. He had long been in a tight clinch with the Presidential guard: Kononenko, Berezenko, Hranovskiy, and Tetriakov, the head of the faction in the Rada. As a member of the so-called Anti-Corruption Platform within the Poroshenko Bloc, he refused to be associated with Kononenko's corrupt scheming and to be in one faction with him. But what angered one of the youngest elected deputies the most was that his colleagues refused to vote to remove Kononenko from his seat in the legislature. They either did not notice or did not want to notice the corrupt component in the behavior of one of the Bloc's leaders.



## **A SNAP ELECTION COULD FUNDAMENTALLY CHANGE THE SITUATION IN THE COUNTRY, BUT MOST LIKELY THE PRESIDENT WILL DO EVERYTHING IN HIS POWER TO PREVENT IT AT LEAST DURING 2016**

Mere hours after Firsov, another BPP member, muckraking journalist Serhiy Leshchenko, published a series of text messages between Abromavicius and Pasishnyk that clearly confirmed the minister's accusations: Kononenko really was trying to push his own people into positions that offered "opportunities." However, Leshchenko did not go so far as to leave the faction just yet, nor did the rest of the "anti-corruptionists," like Mustafa Nayem and Svitlana Zalishchuk. Still, the presidential councils were visibly shaken. Understandably, these deputies are aware that they will have to follow Firsov. Otherwise, there would soon be no purpose to their being in the Petro Poroshenko Bloc at all.

Now, Poroshenko faces a very unpleasant fork in his political road. If he lets Kononenko stay in the faction, he will establish a permanent sore spot over which criticism will be raised against him again and again and eat into his already-low ratings. Since the

Poroshenko Bloc is hardly the monolithic entity that Party of the Regions was under Viktor Yanukovych, more than one deputy is likely to use this as a dignified excuse to leave the faction, starting with the Anti-Corruption Platform and the FPTP members, to avoid damaging their own political images by remaining in a ruling party that is growing more and more compromised.

To throw Kononenko to the wolves, however, would also make the President vulnerable because Kononenko is for Poroshenko even more than Azarov was for Yanukovych. This is a friend from army days, a business colleague—and a witness who knows too much to be simply tossed from the game. Nor is there anyone who could replace him in the President's inner circle. Right now, Poroshenko needs his own man in this position more than ever.

In addition to all this, there's another aspect to the trap Bankova finds itself in, the international one. The departure of Abromavicius and his revelations of corruption raised severe criticisms against Poroshenko among the country's western allies. This is especially true of the US, which is clearly fed up with the imitation of reform and Bankova's constant machinations to take over all levers of power. Indeed, the G7 ambassadors made it very clear to the President that any Cabinet shuffle, snap election or attempts to increase Poroshenko's powers would be frowned upon. And if Poroshenko should not agree with any of this, all he needs to do is remember the next IMF tranche and the hole in his budget.

As a result, the President was forced to back down. The West appears to also be growing irritated as it sees Poroshenko's behavior become more like Yanukovych's. The Donetsk "professor" had his Family, while the Vinnytsia candy king has his "Dear Friends 2.0," where, instead of a son, an army buddy is in charge. And so it will not let him usurp power.

The four other ministers who resigned with Abromavicius withdrew their letters of resignation and Yatseniuk proudly stated to the effect that "we came together and we will only leave together." It's a rhetorical pose that the Premier has tirelessly resorted to since the days on the Maidan. But the residue remains: the central figure, Aivaras Abromavicius neither withdrew his resignation nor dropped his accusations. And so the government was unable to whitewash itself in this situation.

A snap election could fundamentally change the situation in the country, but most likely the President will do everything in his power to prevent it at least during 2016. But the longer it is postponed, the more catastrophic the consequences will be for the Petro Poroshenko Bloc, as it already appears to be going the way of Yatseniuk's Narodniy Front... from victory to support that has waned to the range of the margin of error. Most other parties are very keen to see a snap election called, and the more PPB falls apart, the more those who leave the faction will join the camp of those lobbying for a dismissal of the Rada.

No one would envy President Poroshenko in the current situation, although it is no one's fault but his own. Having come to power with a remarkably high rating, Ukraine's fifth president traded it to promote and enrich his army buddies. The tight squeeze he has now found himself in was inevitable. ■



# Back to USSR

Denys Kazanskyi

The crisis in occupied Donbas has grown worse and worse. By the end of January, some very visible protests took place simultaneously in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts. Small and micro business owners rose in protest against the new ‘tax code’ issued by Ihor Plotnytskyi’s people, which institutes a sizeable ‘tribute’ effectively making these businesses nearly unprofitable.

“The actions of the ministries of finance and taxes have led to today’s demonstration under the cabinet building,” wrote separatist, Anastasia Piatorikova, who opposes Plotnytskyi. “The main demand is to reduce the tax rate and to cancel the requirement for cash checks and receipts if a retail space is over 15 square meters. Since it is impossible to bring goods into LNR legally, rigorous accounting is unrealistic right now.”

The demonstration under the Luhansk Oblast State Administration (ODA) building, now home to the LNR ‘government,’ involved several hundred Luhansk residents protesting against the separatists and drew widespread attention across Ukraine. The LNR leadership also reacted—by threatening criminal charges against the participants.

“I’d like to remind all those directly involved that any mass event must be approved by the interior ministry and the local council,” warned LNR ‘deputy interior minister’ Oleksiy Cherepovskiy. “Unsanctioned rallies are punishable by fines and criminal liability.”

Meanwhile, in Russian-held Makiyivka, MakiyivVuhillia miners were also hard-pressed. The association’s mines owed backwages and the debt only kept growing. On January 13, a strike began at the Kholodna Balka mine, when the first shift refused to go down and demanded their back pay.

Shortly, the DNR ‘minister’ showed up and persuaded the miners to work after all. Some got a portion of their owed wages in the form of a few thousand Russian roubles that same day. The most active strikers were fired, however, and the militants promised to punish the leaders, calling them “Ukrainian provocateurs.”

“On January 13, 2016, Makiyivka miners used social networks to stir up anger and start a strike,” DNR press reported. “At the start of the work day, a crowd gathered, including female relatives and former employees. They actively agitated the miners to disrupt production.”

Printed in the separatist paper *Makeyevskiy rabochiy*, the comments of Larisa Tolstykina, DNR ‘premier’ Aleksandr Zakharchenko’s chief-of-staff, were not music to Donbas ears, however. “All the Makiyivka mines have been operating on a subsidized basis for years,” she wrote. “Today, our challenge is to get our enterprises working on a break-even basis



at minimal cost, because this branch is key for the city and the republic... There’s not a single industrial sector here today that is making money that might be used to help miners... MakiyivVuhillia and the branch ministry are working to resolve this problem. I know no one likes the process of reorganization and the layoffs it entails, but, sooner or later, we will have to go through it... The mines must conform to the laws of economy: extract, sell, earn.”

Ironically, reforming the mining industry had been proposed by more than one Kyiv Government and international donors—and postponed endlessly.

After using leftist populist slogans to heat up the situation in the Donbas in the spring of 2014 and playing on widespread nostalgia for the Brezhnev years to take over the region, Russia’s proxies have brought rapacious, feudal bolshevism to the region instead. The Donbas proletariat now has to work for pennies—often completely without pay. Workers no longer have the right to strike: any orga-

## AFTER USING LEFTIST POPULIST SLOGANS TO HEAT UP THE SITUATION IN THE DONBAS IN THE SPRING OF 2014, RUSSIA’S PROXIES HAVE BROUGHT RAPACIOUS, FEUDAL BOLSHEVISM TO THE REGION INSTEAD

nized protests are labeled “treason” and “sabotage,” while the organizers are likely to be imprisoned as “vermin” and “enemies of the people.”

Now occupied Donbas must live by the law, “those who don’t work, don’t eat” and everything that “doesn’t suit the market place” should die. In the early 1990s, the Donetsk elite showered Ukraine with curses. Now, the same Donetsk papers that once portrayed Kyiv and Western Ukraine as the enemy of Donbas are presenting miners as the enemy.

With the destruction of the Ukrainian state in occupied Donbas, the Labor Code has disappeared, as have human rights and freedoms—in fact, everything that the stalinists and communists liked to stigmatize and ridicule in Eastern Ukraine.

In exchange for poverty and powerlessness, soviet people had achievements to celebrate—nuclear missiles, satellites in space and submarines. Occupied Donbas has only poverty and powerlessness—coupled with criminal chaos, lawlessness, and complete economic collapse. Instead of the ghost of Leonid Brezhnev, the ‘people’s republics’ have raised the ghosts of Lenin vs Stalin. Worse, there is no way to defeat them at the ballot box, now that elections have been cancelled there. ■

# Roman Bezsmertnyi:

“We must get prepared for a serious and long-term confrontation with Russia”

**U**kraine’s envoy to the political subgroup of the Trilateral Contact Group in the Minsk talks spoke to *The Ukrainian Week* about the causes of the crisis in the Minsk process, the threats Russia poses to the world, and the need to overhaul the parameters of security action on the European continent.

## How do we escape the trap of the Minsk agreements? Is there any prospect and sense in re-launching the process as Minsk-3?

Minsk-3 is a trivial way to say that everything that was associated with Minsk-2 is no longer valid starting January 1, 2016. It is not by coincidence that since that date, several events took place that are hard to interpret. Just a few days after the New Year, we heard the Russian president talking about some new implementation plan, while the Ukrainian president said that a broader road-map was needed. The tensions climaxed and came to a stalemate when the representatives of some districts of Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts demanded again that the Constitution of Ukraine be amended. This development, in fact, means that the process of implementing the Minsk agreements is back to its starting point.

While the Ukrainian political elites and the Ukrainian citizens believed January 1 to be the end of the suffering associated with the Minsk process, Moscow considered it to be just the beginning. This is the fundamental difference of the approaches to describing the process. The decision of the Normandy Four to continue the negotiations was obviously a response to this discussion, so the talks were resumed. Some new objectives were set: to try to agree on this or that within a certain timeframe, but... Without resolving the issues related to the security block as set out in the first, second and third paragraphs of the plan, going forward would actually mean working against the will of the sovereign and creating additional tension.

## Do you have an idea on what basis the process can continue?

In February, a meeting of the Normandy Four foreign ministers countries is to be held, followed by a discussion or a video conference of the state leaders. Further possible progress on the above issues will be discussed. I am not making any suggestions, I just assess the

Interviewed by  
**Roman Malko**

situation based on what I see. Unless the security block issues are not resolved, moving on to political issues and policies will not be possible, forget about taking further steps. What does the security block mean? It includes the ceasefire and the implementation of the first and second protocols (on heavy and light weapons, tanks, and mine-clearing), which were effectively derailed after the shelling, clashes and fighting in some areas along the demarcation line resumed. This has obviously affected the negotiations that are underway and the prospects of the political process. I believe that the proposals, or rather a text (it cannot be even called a document, since it has no addressees, no signees, and was not submitted by a member of the trilateral contact group) submitted by Russia was an attempt to go back to the starting point of the Minsk agreements implementation and to start over with the procedure for amending the Constitution. Then Russia will interpret as it pleases the security block, and then the economic, humanitarian, and political issues.

## How do you see Ukraine’s response, given Russia’s destructive position?

I would even consider terminating the discussion on political issues. This, again, is just a suggestion. Because Russia’s rhetoric is obvious and understandable, there have been no practical steps, and no will was expressed, based on their proposals, to stop the conflict. It is true that it has gone from the direct front line action to the stage of a conflict with occasional fights and minor clashes, but the conflict continues, and the tension does not subside. Had Russia opened its humanitarian convoys and demonstrated what it brings to Ukraine, this would have been a signal that Russia is really beginning to do something. It should be understood that all European international instruments categorically prohibit unchecked shipments from the neighboring or other countries. All the more so that this creates a gray area and a number of threats to the European continent, such as, for example, the traffic of military arsenals, ammunition, etc. through the territory. This is not only contrary to European instruments, but also falls under the jurisdiction of the Rome Statute.

**Some European policymakers say that sanctions against Russia can be relieved: does this mean that they do not understand the situation and Putin’s intentions fully, or do they still believe that they can find some kind of a compromise with him?**





What I said above is sufficient to continue sanctions and to stop talking about the future with Russia. Given all this, I find it very difficult to accept the linking of the Donbas problem to sanctions. Isn't the annexation of Crimea and the weapons that Russia spreads on the territory of the neighbor country sufficient to realize that this is a huge threat to the existence of the Ukrainian state as such and the European community in general?

I told one of the European leaders: "If you use the argument of sanctions once again when talking to me, it will be our last conversation. There is nothing to talk about." In my view, it is the issue of the intra-European corruption, and not an answer to the crux of the problem. Therefore, current talks on the possible lifting of sanctions in exchange for certain steps to be made by Russia are the evidence that Russia had bought some of the European establishment, and this needs to be acknowledged and understood.

### **Does this mean that we shouldn't expect our Western partners to take any more radical steps than sanctions in the near future?**

We can entirely count on their help. However, we must get prepared for a serious and long-term confrontation with Russia. Not as an opponent, but as an enemy. We need to start calling everything that's happening conventional and intelligible names. Why? Because today we call prisoners of war "illegally held persons," fighting on the front lines an "anti-terrorist operation," and the measures taken by the UN a "humanitarian action." Hence the problems with involving international force components. Only when we call things the way we see them can we count on the honesty and frankness of both the Europeans and the international community. Only then will it become clear that from the geopolitical standpoint, the security configuration in the European continent requires major revisions and changes. Today it does not stand up to criticism, and if NATO did not provide support to the European security coordination structures, there would be nothing to talk about.

The steps taken by Russia on the international arena, including in Syria, its attempts to rekindle the Karabakh conflict, as well as the situation in Transnistria and Moldova are absolutely destructive activities in the European continent. Its support for the leftist and far-right movements, the involvement of the Russian Orthodox Church in the process, and immense informational expansion in the European market are the issues that need to be thought over. First of all, we need to find out how to protect today the Intermarium countries against the further Russian aggression, because geographically they will be the first to come under fire.

### **Are these issues still on Europe's and world's agenda, or is the conflict in Syria slowly pushing Ukraine to the backseat which Russia seems to want?**

Europe has two options. Either the Ukrainian-Russian conflict will consolidate it further, or it will just split over the Ukrainian issue. It should be remembered that the Ukrainian crisis is not a counterweight to the Syrian one. Both are the elements of the global security crisis. It is impossible to resolve the Syrian crisis by changing the Constitution of Ukraine. This is not how it should be done. This multilayered and multidimen-

sional construction gives the impression that the problem has no solution. But first of all, all actions should be assessed legally in a very clear manner. We can do this based on international and European legal instruments. Secondly, we should perceive the situation objectively. What I mean is we should understand that when we are talking, for example, about prisoners of war, we cannot call them "illegally held persons," etc.

These contradictions have already created a lot of problems. What will happen in the future, when time comes to bring the perpetrators to justice? How can we classify their offenses in terms of international and domestic law? After all, not all who took up arms on the other side did so out of their free will and according to their beliefs. But no one will talk about this, because under the current terminology, they all qualify as terrorists, and we perfectly well understand that terrorists cannot be negotiated with or amnestied. Now, imagine that at some stage of the negotiations we will have to talk about amnesty. For whom? For terrorists? Well, then read Articles 6-8 of the Rome Statute. There are many more problems like that.

If we call this a Ukrainian-Russian war, we recognize it to be an international conflict, which would instantly change the role of the OSCE and the UN in the process. I believe that it is better to be honest to our own nation and give the situation its real name. Why? Because if this is a war for the Ukrainian nation, then what are Leonid Kuchma, Yevhen Marchuk, Iryna Herashchenko and Roman Bezsmertnyi doing in Minsk?

Generally speaking, everything that Russia did from the very start is an international crime, and this is the only way to classify it and the only way to find answers to questions that will arise tomorrow and the day after. The Geneva Convention provided comprehensive answers to all these questions back in 1946. It sets it all out in detail: the status of the parties to the conflict, servicemen, regular military units and volunteer units.

### **Do you see any ways out of this collapse?**

Moscow has deliberately let the situation degenerate into the legal chaos. Russia has done it quite often, having inherited this practice from the Soviet Union. This is why in response the world should be united in several aspects. Firstly, new approaches to the global security issues are needed, with Russia having a minimal impact on their implementation. I am not saying that it should not be a party to peace processes, but its veto power at the UN Security Council just doesn't work. Such approaches should be changed. The more so that this has been discussed for the last fifteen years. Secondly, the security parameters for the actions in the European continent should be changed entirely. If it's up to NATO, it should be NATO, and leave alone the OSCE and all the rest. Next, we should understand that Ukraine cannot avoid the constant preparation for the conflict. This requires major changes, starting from the Constitution and ending with the doctrines and legislation in the area of national security. Every Ukrainian, after what has happened and has been going on for the last two years, should be able to use weapons. This means that we are facing a number of challenges, from general education to military service. It is obvious now that we are in the same situation as Israel, and we should learn to live with this problem. ■

# Serhiy Horbatiuk:

“Documents related to the ‘anti-terrorist operation’ on the Maidan have been destroyed”

**T**he *Ukrainian Week* spoke to the Head of the Special Investigations Office at the General Prosecutor's Office about the investigation into the Maidan events, lustration of investigators, and the Tymoshenko case, in which he had been personally involved.

## How difficult is it to identify police members who were present in the government quarter in late February 2014?

— If Berkut or Interior Troops members on the video wear masks and helmets, it is virtually impossible to identify them by expert examination. For individual suspects against whom we have expert opinion, their visors were lifted so that the faces could be seen. Besides, there was one left-handed officer, he was the only one that day who held his gun under his left arm. In general, if the inves-

Interviewed by  
**Stanislav  
Kozliuk**

tigation cannot identify fighters, we collect other evidence, such as testimonies, recognizable backpacks, assault vests, weapons in hand, and possible injuries.

## The Berkut took their weapons to an unknown location...

— Not just weapons. At the Kyiv branch of Berkut, all documents related to their allocation and hand-out were destroyed. However, the Main Directorate of the Interior Ministry has kept the orders assigning weapons to specific officers. Besides, only 25 units were stolen, for the number of personnel present in the government quarter, while the company is made of 96 men. We have also found shooting test results for the bullets and shells from those weapons.

## At what stage is the investigation into the fire at the Trade Unions building?

— We examine it as part of the proceedings for the organization of an unlawful anti-terrorist operation. This case involves the former Head of the Main Directorate of the State Security Service for Kyiv and Kyiv Oblast. Documents related to the organization and implementation of that "ATO" have been destroyed. The investigators believe that by doing this, those involved in the operation wanted to protect themselves by concealing the very fact of ever planning or conducting that anti-terrorist operation. At the same time, we have the plan of the operation that was made public by Hennady Moskal. Judging from this plan, there was a command HQ, to which all units, including MIA, Berkut, Interior Troops, and special task units, were subordinated. It is the heads of this HQ that are responsible, according to charges, for the events of that night, including the assault of Maidan and the fire at the Trade Unions building. Besides the deaths and personal injuries of the protesters, they are also charged by the investigation with the deaths and injuries of the MIA personnel. During clashes on that day, three protesters were killed and over 400 wounded. Some law enforcement officers were also wounded and killed. The heads of the anti-terrorist operation command staff were fully aware of





the situation, they knew that their further actions would lead to bloody clashes, but they still gave orders to start the operation.

#### **Is there a final conclusion on what happened at the Trade Unions Building in Kyiv?**

— "Alpha" unit fighters explained that protesters were throwing Molotov cocktails at them. We have not interrogated any Maidan protesters who could either confirm or deny this allegation. But even if this was the case, in a situation when people are attacked by fighters in full outfit and equipped with Kalashnikovs, while assault and murders are going on in the street, they exercise their right of defense of extreme necessity. Inside the building, there were over 20 fire sources from fuels and lubricants. That is, there was no single epicenter, which would have been an indication of arson. During the inspection of the Trade Unions building, investigators found only two bodies.

The investigation also established that security forces on the night of February 18-19 coordinated the titushky on the corner of Volodymyrska and Velyka Zhytomyrska streets.

#### **Does it mean that by that time the Interior Ministry had already provided the titushky with weapons?**

— As far as February 18 is concerned, the fact of distributing service weapons to them has not been established. From testimonies and video footage, it is clear that the titushky had their own weapons, pistols that are not in the inventory of the Interior Ministry. In the evening of February 18 and in the night of February 19, they received bats, shields and stun grenades from the police. They were issued weapons from the MIA warehouses on the evening of February 20, after the then-Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko announced that the police were allowed to use weapons. At that time, the titushky received 408 Kalashnikov rifles and about 80,000 cartridges to them. Besides, policemen were also issued weapons. That is, there was a real plan of their large-scale use against the activists. Fortunately, the final order never arrived.

#### **How many police officers were killed on Maidan?**

— 13 security force members were killed and 215 suffered gunshot wounds. But as of today, no charges have been presented. Pistols, revolvers, and various types of hunting weapons, including those using 5.45 mm Kalashnikov bullets, were used against MIA officers. We can't say that the protesters used systematically any one type of weapon. But it should be noted that the first police officers were killed and wounded after 2 pm on February 18, i.e., already after the first Maidan protesters had been murdered and injured. In particular, the security forces used against the citizens hunting ammunition, which they fired from pump guns. Also, the protesters were dispersed in Mariyivsky Park by the policemen jointly with the titushky. Only when the police and the authorities crossed the line, did the protesters begin to use firearms.

#### **Have the killers of the first victims, Nigoyan, Zhyznevesky and Senyk been identified?**

**Serhiy Horbatiuk** was born on June 20, 1973. He started working at the prosecutor's office in July 1995, and has been an investigator since 1996. In 2004-2014, he was investigator and senior investigator of major crimes at the GPO. He has been engaged in high profile cases, including the Pavlo Lazarenko and Yulia Tymoshenko proceedings. He investigated the case of abuse of Maidan activist and currently MP Mykhailo Havryliuk. On December 18, 2014, he became the Head of the Special Investigations Office of the GPO.

— Unfortunately, these crimes have not yet been solved, and the persons who shot them have not been established. Nigoyan was killed with buckshot, while Zhyznevesky and Senyk were killed by projectiles used for stopping vehicles. These are used by the MIA and are not available to the public.

#### **How obvious is the Russian trail in the events on Maidan?**

— We have received documents from the State Security Service on the visits to Ukraine in December, January and February of the FSB representatives and of Putin's Aide in the Presidential Executive Office Surkov. On February 20, their plane landed at about 7 pm, that is, already after the shootings. The information that we received from the SBU is related to their travel and actions aimed at "getting acquainted" with the situation. That's it.

However, the investigation examines the impact of the Russian representatives on senior officials and police officers and their attempts to steer the situation in a certain direction. FSB officers were present on Maidan. SBU representatives whom we interrogated explained that the Russians' visit was only a "reconnaissance trip" to collect information about the protests in Kyiv.

**WE CAN'T SAY THAT THE PROTESTERS USED SYSTEMATICALLY ANY ONE TYPE OF WEAPON. THE FIRST POLICE OFFICERS WERE KILLED AFTER THE FIRST MAIDAN PROTESTERS HAD BEEN MURDERED**

#### **What about "humanitarian assistance" from Russia during the protests? Reportedly, it involved the transfer of riot control weapons to Ukraine.**

— Yes, Russia provided Ukraine with such weapons as "humanitarian aid," including stun and gas grenades, etc., to be used against the protesters. However, these weapons failed the safety test of the Ukrainian Health Ministry, so they could not be used. We don't know whether they had passed similar tests in Russia. The facts of the meetings between Surkov and Yanukovich are also hard to confirm. I can say for sure that on February 18-20, Yanukovich received phone calls from Russian numbers. Putin himself told in an interview that after February 21, he coordinated Yanukovich's relocations in Ukraine. The influence of the Russian authorities on the former Ukrainian president in the previous months cannot be ruled out either. So, we keep following the Russian trail. The question is, what was its impact on the course of the events on Maidan. ■■



Read the full version at [ukrainianweek.com](http://ukrainianweek.com)

# Placing accents in the right places

Oleksandr Kramar

What is the potential of the three priority sectors of Ukraine's economy?

**W**hen President Poroshenko spoke to the Kyiv Art Arsenal packed with journalists and bloggers at the press-conference on January 14, he mentioned three industries that the government should focus on as priorities for Ukraine's economy. Those include agribusiness, IT and renewable energy. However, he didn't say anything new, but merely confirmed actual trends in Ukraine's economy that have been evident at least since the 2008-2009 global crisis. At that time, only the IT and agricultural sectors were showing any growth in Ukraine and the need to drastically cut consumption of costly imported energy became really urgent—initially because of a highly unfavorable gas contract with Russia in 2009 and since 2014 because of the loss of the lion's share of heating coal extraction capacities in Donbas. This has led to the growing role of atomic energy and a need to balance it between times of peak and low demand.

## IT GROWTH SLOWS

According to official data from Derzhstat, the statistics bureau, exports of computer, IT and telecommunications services were worth US \$1.6 billion in 2014 while imports were only US \$0.5bn, of which computer services were worth US \$1.06bn and US \$0.21bn. Because of the relative opacity of the IT sector, however, it can be assumed that a major share of its output and export are not registered in official statistics. This makes it all the more significant that a recently-published joint study by Ukrainian Digital News, AVentures Capital, industry associations and leading IT businesses reports that exported IT services were actually worth more like US \$2.3bn in 2014.

However, even official statistics registered more than triple growth in exports of IT services over 2010-2014, from a baseline of US \$335 million in 2010—growth that was unprecedented in any other branch of Ukraine's economy. Notably, the proportion of added value in IT services is immeasurably higher than in traditional manufacturing. That is, US \$1bn of exports add the same to national GDP as several billions in the farm sector, never mind the steel industry.

For 2015, there is no outside assessment so far, but Derzhstat registered a significant flattening out in exports of computer services for the first three quarters of the year. What might be the reason behind this is moot at this time: a decline in European currencies vs the dollar, shrinking demand for Ukrainian services, movement into the shadow economy, or a mix of all these factors. Still, IT market players are bullish and continue to expect foreign orders to keep growing.

One thing IT market leaders all agree on is that their business cannot be a panacea for the entire domestic

economy or for most jobless Ukrainians in the medium term. For one thing, not everybody can work in this industry, and even though jobs are being generated at a solid pace, increasing the IT workforce from just under 100,000 employed today to even 300-400,000 in a country of 39 million—that is, minus occupied Crimea and Donbas—is not possible even in 3-5 years.

## FARMING ON THE RISE

So, the development of the agro-industrial complex or AIC would seem more important. In 2007, just before the world economic crisis, agricultural sector constituted only 6.6% of Ukraine's GDP, and 19.9% of the processing industry. By 2014, it had changed to 10.3% and 11.4%. Derzhstat has not yet published official figures for 2015, but it's already evident that it will be a watershed. After a long period of improving dynamics, the gross added value (GDV) of agriculture was UAH 156.8bn for QI-III, passing this indicator for the processing industry, UAH 154.9bn, as well as in absolute volumes. Figures for QIV are not available yet, but even in 2014, it was obvious that the farm sector was very competitive at UAH 52.9bn vs UAH 49.4bn.

Still, the farm sector does not represent the entire AIC, even though they are often treated as equivalent in Ukraine. Derzhstat does not publish the share of added value of individual branches of the processing industry and even if we assume that the share of food processing is equivalent to its weight in the gross output of



**THE PER CAPITA SHARE OF GVA IN FOOD PROCESSING AND COMMODITY BUSINESS IS SIGNIFICANTLY HIGHER THAN IN THE MACHINERY OR STEEL-MAKING INDUSTRY IN THEIR CURRENT STATE**


industrial production—33.0% for the first 11 months of 2015—, then it turns out that at least one third of GVA in the processing industry should also belong to the AIC. In reality, as will be shown below, the share of added value in the food-processing industry is greater than its relative weight of total output.

In short, the volume of GVA created by the AIC is at least double what is generated in the rest of the processing industry and is considerably larger than the other processing and extraction sectors put together. The change in export value among the basic branches of Ukraine's economy has been equally impressive in recent years. Over 2008-2015, the export of food products from Ukraine grew 180%, from €7.36bn or 16.2% of total exports to €13.24bn or 38.5% of exports at the same time as exports of ferrous products dropped



## Drives and outsiders

Exports of chosen goods and services from Ukraine,  
2007 = 100%



from €18.0bn or 39.6% of total exports to €8.1bn or 23.6%, a decline of nearly 40%, while exports of machinery fell from €7.4bn or 16.3% to €4.2bn or 12.5%, a decline of nearly 44%.

Right now, the way things stand, the prospects for Ukraine's steel industry and machine-building sector are not very optimistic, which means their shares are likely to shrink further in favor of food processing in the country's economy and exports. Despite the steep decline in output volumes, the steel and machinery industries remain largely separate from domestic demand and depend 60-90% on export markets.

## DEBUNKING STEREOTYPES AT HOME....

Persistent stereotypes in Ukraine about the low level of employment in the farming and food-processing industries and the low added value of their products compared to machine-building or steel-making are not supported by the facts.

As of November 2015, the domestic food-processing industry alone employed 288,200 Ukrainians, while the steel industry employed 236,000. Agribusiness, as opposed to farms and subsistence farming, employed 414,000, while the machine-building sector employed 336,600. Moreover, these figures don't reflect the number of individuals registered as private entrepreneurs (one-person legal commercial entities) and micro businesses with less than 10 employees, which, for obvious reasons, are far more common in the food growing and processing industry than in metallurgy or machine-building. The per capita share of GVA in food processing and commodity business is also significantly higher than in the machinery or steel-making industry in their current state.

Based on the "Expenses and Output" tables published by Derzhstat with considerable delay—current data is only for 2013—, the agricultural sector generates 9.9% of total GVA in the domestic economy, the food-processing industry generates 3.4%, while machine-building generates 3.5% and the steel industry only 1.8%. If these figures are compared to the number of individuals employed in these four sectors and the fact that the steel and machine-building industries

reflected a considerably higher share in 2013 is taken into account, then it becomes obvious that per capita GDV in the food industry is many times higher than in the machine-building sector and nearly double that of the steel industry. This once again confirms that most of Ukraine's companies in the machine-building and metallurgy industries are far less economically effective and promising than those in the AIC.

## ...AND ABROAD

The other widespread stereotype is that developed countries specialize, in the international division of labor, in preparing finished products with high added value, and import raw materials, including food. This is really only true of those economies that have a real shortage of certain kinds of industrial and agricultural raw material or are not sufficiently endowed with farmland relative to the size of their populations, such as Germany, Britain, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Yet a whole slew of poor countries with very dense populations and a lack of resources, including farmland, are also forced to import raw materials and food, and to export finished or semi-finished products.

On the other hand, developed economies with sufficient industrial raw material or considerable farmland have no problems with specializing in, say, farm products in exchange for finished industrial products, including heavy machinery. The US, for instance, has a large trade deficit: in 2014, it exported US \$28.36bn more in agricultural commodities and processed food than it imported. What's more, this was the result of trading a number of items that are predominantly in commodity groups, such as oil seed (predominantly soy), where exports were US \$25.26bn more than imports, grains US \$19.36bn more, food-processing residues and waste US \$8.94, meat US \$9.35bn, livestock feed US \$8.94bn, cotton US \$5.44bn, dairy, eggs and honey US \$3.65bn, and fruit and nuts US \$2.22bn.

The foodstuffs and agricultural commodities in which the US is a net exporter led to an overall positive balance of trade of US \$78.73bn in 2014, making this one of the country's main areas of specialization in the global division of labor. As to the majority of other food-processing products, especially those considered more highly processed and of greater added value, the United States is the major target market for foreign producers. Such imports include wines and other alcoholic products, processed meat and fish products, vegetables, sugar, confectioneries, processed vegetables, fruits and nuts, chocolate, and so on.

Excluding oil and petroleum products, whose net import into the US has sharply declined in the last two years as prices on the crude market collapsed and domestic processing grew, the three largest product groups in which the country was a net importer were equipment (machines, nuclear reactors, boilers), worth US \$104.54bn; surface transport other than rail, worth US \$125.08bn; and electronics and electronic equipment, worth US \$142.4bn. Altogether, this added up to a US \$372.02bn trade deficit for the US. In other words, the US was a seller's market for manufacturers of finished products from other countries, and not the seller.

In heavy machinery, the US was a net exporter only in aviation and space technology, worth a total of US \$90.89bn, which represented small volumes relative to

the scale of the country's economy, similar to the US \$2.02bn of rail cars and locomotives, and US \$1.96bn in marine vessels it exported. It's easy to see that these quantities are far too small to balance out the deficit in other areas of the machine-building industry. The US showed a trade deficit in a number of other finished industrial product groups: light industry at US \$124.95bn; furniture and components at US \$40.12bn; pharmaceuticals at US \$28.60bn; ferrous steel at US \$15.62bn, and steel products at US \$15.01bn.

How is the US not a classic "raw material colony" according to the logic of those who are critical of treating the AIC as one of the priority branches of Ukraine's economy? But Americans don't seem to think in stereotypes, focusing instead on market forces, profitability and the real competitive advantages that their country and individual corporations have in the global division of labor.


### COMMON SENSE, NOT NEUROSES

In short, if it wants to expand its economy, there's nothing wrong with Ukraine orienting itself on a branch that costs relatively little to generate jobs while providing a living wage to its citizens and products or services that can realistically find a niche on the world market. It seems pointless to focus on the logic of the prestige of certain sectors or industries that generally require huge capital investments yet cannot always find good markets to sell to.

The reality is that high-tech industries generally work for those countries where they operate and develop, with only a small share of output sold outside their borders. They also require major investment in R&D. Ukraine as a state and domestic businesses will not be ready for many years to independently finance large orders of modern technology, such as automated production lines. In many branches of the domestic economy, it's still more economical to pay 20-30 individuals when the same work could be done automatically by equipment that has long been available and requires 1-3 operators at most. The cost of this kind of equipment and the salaries of the specialists is considerably higher than the hand work of 20-30 semi-skilled workers. Moreover, with unemployment high even in the most basic industries, this is the reality that Ukraine faces today.

For a country with annual GDP of €70-80bn, a state budget of €15-16bn—obviously not enough even for the most basic needs of a country of 39 million—, and only about €100mn in total public spending on science and research to compete with far more powerful economies in prestigious, research-intensive hi-tech sectors is simply not realistic, and potentially even harmful. To get to that point, Ukraine needs to first expand the capacity of its manufacture of simpler products and services, as well as real effective employment levels, and to grow both public and private demand severalfold through the relatively basic sectors whose products are in need all over the world and are within the reach of Ukrainian business today.

Ukraine will have to accept the fact, at least for awhile, that the most prestigious and hi-tech sectors can develop long-term only in the form of cooperation or of working on commissions from the leading economies. Ultimately, machine-building and hi-tech innovations are, one way or another, always connected to



the basic sector. For instance, if you want to produce modern cars, farming equipment or food processing lines, equipping these production lines and programming them is tied to these sectors.

And so, regardless of the declarations of officials or the desires of theoretical economists to shift the focus of the country's economy, foreign investors and domestic business are primarily focusing on the AIC, energy-saving technology or IT is legitimate, logical and something that can potentially bring Ukraine as a whole the best results. Ukraine's agricultural sector has one main advantage: a powerful unused resource that, on a per capita basis, has no match in Europe, and few in the world. Why ignore it? The IT sector does not need much in the way of investment, it has enough motivated individuals to work in it, and external demand for its services is steadily growing: it's real, not hypothetical.

The energy-conservation technology sector also has enormous potential, as Ukraine's economy is very energy-intensive and not sufficiently diversified. If these two problems are tackled, it will guarantee steady demand for many years ahead. This includes both expanding atomic energy and increasing accumulative and balancing capacities by using pumped storage plants (HAES). Ukraine is unique in that it imports nearly all of its nuclear fuel for US \$600-700mn a year and pays others to temporarily store its nuclear wastes when it has all the necessary conditions to establish its own closed cycle. Above all, the country has a huge need to store atomic energy during low consumption periods and use it during peak demand.

In the end, developing atomic and stored energy, and introducing energy-saving technology also represents colossal demand in the hi-tech machine-building industry and R&D sectors related to them. The question is whether they will be imported or domestic. Obviously, at least during the first while, they will be predominantly imported. ■



# State support and golden loaves

Lyubomyr Shavalyuk

What the promotion of economic development, corruption and paternalism have in common in Ukraine

**P**resident Poroshenko's mention of new economic priorities for Ukraine raises many questions as to how the head of state sees the basic model Ukraine's economy should follow in its further restructuring and development.

## THE SAME OLD PATERNALISM

Question number one: Why is the head of state once again falling into the trap of paternalism? Government support for the economy in Ukraine has always maintained typical Soviet features and has never been effective during the whole period of independence. Until recently, the majority of state programmes were virtually devoid of effective support tools and instead featured, or were even dominated by, proposals that boiled down to simply providing selected businesses and industries with a certain amount of subsidies, privileges and so on. This effectively amounted to direct or indirect theft of public funds by the officials who created the programmes and the "businessmen" who received money from them. Moreover, these proposals profoundly distorted market conditions and the competitive environment, removing the equality of opportunity. The culmination, perhaps, was the "State program to enhance economic development for 2013-2014" proposed by Mykola Azarov and Serhiy Arbuzov, the premier and chair of the central bank under the Yanukovich presidency. This involved half a trillion hryvnias and brought all possible opportunities for embezzling public money at the time.

One example was the coal industry subsidies that allowed Viktor Yanukovich's son, Oleksandr, to annually increase his capital several times over. Another one is the targeted reduction of Ukrainian Railways tariffs so that steelmakers (who, in the end, turned out to be uncompetitive in the current global environment) reduced their costs and suffered no major losses as a result of the past crisis. President Poroshenko probably remembers these elements of independent Ukraine's economic history rather well. Therefore, his statement on priorities for development can be interpreted in one of two ways. Either the head of state is still enthralled by paternalism and its inefficient command-and-control system, or he is a part of the Golden Loaf Fan Club. It would be nice to be wrong.

## IN SPITE OF, NOT BECAUSE OF

Why did the president call the agribusiness, IT and energy sectors the high-priority ones? The fact is that they are currently at the peak of their development. But, unfortunately, this happened in opposition to the state, not thanks to its support.

The agricultural sector began to make progress in 2004-2007, when it miraculously overcame the fol-

lowing critical obstacles: the lack of a market for land, the absence of proper leasing regulation, a deficit of financing for farmers, etc. The same applies to the food processing industry, which continues to grow at a good pace despite everything. Even Yanukovich began to call agriculture the locomotive of the economy, undeservedly taking credit for its rapid development. Now Poroshenko is going the same way. This is troubling.

IT is also progressing well in Ukraine despite the state. Masked police raids on IT companies are too recent to fade from memory. What kind of government support and priority treatment could the president be talking about if these events occurred during his tenure (although these elements of state "care" were hardly lacking during Yanukovich's era either) and became so widespread that they provoked a furious outcry in the media?

The energy sector is no exception in this logical sequence. Take the oil and gas industry for example. Europe has been offering us money to modernise our gas transportation system for a long time. All the state had to do was update the legislation. However, the officials of the past, corrupted by Gazprom, had no intention of doing this. When everything went pear-shaped and the prospect of homes freezing in the winter became incredibly real, there was a sudden burst of activity: reverse gas flows were set up, charges were reduced for companies that produce natural gas (only in the 2016 budget) and a lawsuit against Gazprom was filed



**THE INDUSTRIES MENTIONED BY POROSHENKO AS NEW ECONOMIC PRIORITIES HAVE BEEN DEVELOPING LARGELY DESPITE, RATHER THAN THANKS TO THE STATE**

at Stockholm International Arbitration Court to review onerous gas contracts. Only these harsh circumstances and lack of alternative to the current scenario forced the authorities to act and created a positive dynamic in the industry.

The same goes for the defence industry. Its growth is owed almost entirely to the Russian-Ukrainian War, not public policy. Before the conflict broke out, the sector was in slow decline, although it was one of the pillars of the Ukrainian economy in Soviet times. The state was involved in the recovery of military production insofar as it has ownership of the industry's companies. But no more than that. Government control of these facilities, as in most cases, leaves much to be desired. So what caused the president to recognise defence as a priority sector of the economy, if not the



desire to "ride the wave" and attribute its success to the current authorities? This is a rhetorical question.

As a result, we can say that the agriculture, IT, energy and defence sectors, with few exceptions, have not seen any effective steps from the government that would demonstrate that they are a priority for the country's economic development. They are moving forward as a result of global trends, coincidences and the extremely stubborn resistance of certain businessmen.

### LONG LIVE CORRUPTION?

Question three: will the new "priority" for the economic sectors that the president mentioned be the first step towards a new, untapped field for corruption? Is this what he had in mind? As already noted, in Ukraine today there are too few tried and tested instruments of state support for businesses and industries that are effective while not stimulating corruption. Now, the basis of this support involves minimising costs through subsidies, government loan guarantees, preferential price formation, various tax exemptions and privileges. All this does not work and leads to corruption and distortions. But there are some nuances.

First of all, in the current environment it is only possible to misappropriate public money through state support for the economy if an industry is significantly concentrated or, even better, completely monopolised by one person — an oligarch. When a sector is competitive and fragmented, this means that budget funds allocated to it will reach not only the destinations intended by officials, but also other market participants. Corrupt officials will not allow this to happen, as the ability and desire to share is not one of their virtues. If a state programme allocates money to "insiders" and deliberately forgets about the rest, there would be considerable uproar from society. Given this, state support for the IT sector is least likely to be corrupt, because the industry is highly fragmented among many firms.

It could be that the recent raids were meant to consolidate various IT companies, for example, into one holding company, which could then be the basis for a state programme and have money allocated to it. But if so, their initiators have only demonstrated their prehistoric mentality. For the main factor of production in the field of information technology is people, who

can simply move to another city or, more likely, country, if their work is interfered with. Many have already done so, especially because of these searches, which can only be a negative thing for Ukraine. People are mobile, unlike physical capital (buildings, equipment, etc.). Therefore, the IT industry cannot be consolidated and monopolised by force as the metallurgical or chemical ones were, since their main factor in production is physical capital. So these efforts will not bring any benefit for anyone in our country. This means that either the authorities have abandoned the idea of giving any support to the industry due to the inability to make money from it, or the assistance could really reach the intended recipients, which is very doubtful considering our history.

However, for corruption in state programmes to become a reality, it is desirable for those who control the supported industry to work in government, e.g. MPs, ministers or those who are on good terms with them. IT does not quite fit into this context. But agriculture is ideal. Indeed, many owners of large agricultural companies know the president personally — one even worked as deputy head of his administration. They have decent representation in parliament, which lobbies their interests and is perfectly able to initiate and push through the government programmes they need. So corruption could well be a factor. However, in that case the question arises why farmers are being moved onto the standard taxation regime in the 2016 budget. What is the point of giving with one hand and taking away with the other?

Today, it would be much easier to organise corruption through government support for the defence industry. Companies in this sector are mostly state-owned and their managers are in a position to carry out orders from the government or individual oligarchs, as they did for many years. It would seem that the door is open: the state budget provides a vast amount of funds for defence, with the requirements of the army as cover, and then both their directors and their patrons from the higher echelons of power will be set. But it is not that simple. Several months ago, the government initiated the reform of state enterprises (under pressure from its Western allies, of course), including the introduction of market salaries for executives, new motivational incentives, competitive selection procedures for high-level appointments



and, finally, professional supervisory boards, independent from the authorities. If this reform is brought to fruition, the new, motivated managers will be much less disposed to corruption than their predecessors, as their own managerial abilities will be able to bring them more than corrupt actions could. So the launch of state programmes supporting military enterprises in order to siphon off public money could become a much less realistic option.

## INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE

Of course, countries around the world widely practice state support for businesses and industries, often in a rather clever and ingenious fashion. This assistance is sometimes effective, sometimes aimed at corruption, so Ukraine is no fundamental exception on a global scale. International experience encompasses many effective tools; however, they must not only be fine-tuned for our conditions, but also skilfully applied. In addition, several lessons must be learned from state support practices around the world.

Firstly, what is the point in talking about promoting certain industries when virtually the entire economy suffers from state intervention and inefficient control from the authorities? Horizontal reforms to improve the business climate and make life easier for all sectors bar none are much more efficient than specific support for one or more industries. It is necessary to reform the fiscal system, judiciary, law enforcement agencies, tax office and customs. By doing this, the state will be able to help a significantly more noticeable number of business players than by supporting individual companies or industries. We cannot yet know which branch will thrive when the business climate in Ukraine becomes dramatically more favourable. So there is no need to waste energy chasing a rabbit, when there is the real possibility of catching a bison. This is illogical and impractical, confirmed by global experience.

Secondly, the industries mentioned by Poroshenko have been developing largely despite, rather than thanks to the state. Why give special help to those who are managing well on their own? Seeing as they have become the epicentres of the world's fourth industrial revolution, their further development is in no doubt. It will probably be enough for the state to simply not bother them and create conditions for them to function comfortably. It should not be the case that as soon as any company reaches a certain level of success, it is immediately noticed by the security forces, tax authorities and other sources of harassment. These sectors are riding the wave. Under these conditions, government support, especially financial, is not necessary for the most part. Instead, it is possible that the areas whose development is held back by several factors, especially the quality of the business environment, offer much more potential that is being artificially nipped in the bud. Thus horizontal reforms could open them up and, say, double the number of locomotives for the economy.

Thirdly, we must not support the economy using tools that distort prices and the competitive environment, as they kill off entrepreneurial initiative. Market prices provided by competition are the main reference point for production costs and value for all stakeholders in a certain sector, both existing ones and those who are only considering entering the market. If there

is no market price, businessmen are left in the dark. And if at the same time the state regularly changes the rules, as often happens in Ukraine, entrepreneurs are trapped in a permanent storm that drives away any desire to develop and invest in business.

Fourthly, it is impossible to support enterprise and industry with money in any form. The main function of business is to make a profit. If money starts to magically fall from the sky, the business becomes a lazy cat that does not feel like catching mice anymore. Instead, government assistance should involve qualitative factors that improve productivity. The authorities can do everything that businesses need, apart from providing funds. The list of possible actions includes assistance in retraining staff, attracting, for instance, European grants for equipment upgrades, systematising information on various world markets, financing and insuring export operations, promoting products in different countries through embassies and consulates, organisational assistance in entering the European market and so on. There are dozens of such tools that have been used successfully around the world. It is simply necessary to systematically learn from international experience and work out how to adapt it to Ukrainian conditions. The state has an almost inexhaustible amount of opportunities to help businesses organisationally through its centralised structure. This is all within the realms of possibility, but only after horizontal reforms are carried out and with maximum emphasis on offsetting opportunities for corruption.

## GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR THE ECONOMY IN UKRAINE HAS ALWAYS MAINTAINED TYPICAL SOVIET FEATURES AND HAS NEVER BEEN EFFECTIVE DURING THE WHOLE PERIOD OF INDEPENDENCE

Finally, in order for the state to support business effectively, the latter should have at least some sort of decent product. Supporting the production and sale of raw materials is pointless, because commodity markets are global and information about them is publicly available around the world. But more sophisticated goods and services, especially technical ones with a high amount of added value, often need help with promotion.

It is an open question whether the support for high-priority sectors of the economy mentioned by the president will turn into a corrupt system for stealing public money. Given the chosen fields, our analysis of the opportunities for fraud they offer and the fact that a number of continuing reforms reduce the scope for corruption in such initiatives, Poroshenko is more likely driven by paternalism than an intention to earn money from economic development programmes. If so, it would be better for the state not to launch this assistance now and, after carrying out horizontal reforms, wait a few years to see which sectors take off and which need help. If not — and the president has neither corrupt nor paternalistic intentions — Ukraine will have to surpass itself and master the extremely complex tools of state support for the economy that other countries use to triumph in the face of global competition. ■

# On a cold road to savings

Stanislav Kozliuk

What hampers Ukraine's transition to energy efficiency



I got a bill of about UAH 2,000 for utilities last month. No idea where to get the money. Do you know any way to cut the costs?" one friend asked me a few months ago in social media. In practice, it turns out that her apartment has no meters for gas, electricity or water. In this case, there is nothing I could do apart from shrug my shoulders and tell her to read the law.

The president's recent statement on the priority of energy efficiency for Ukraine can be seen as a good sign because, as has been demonstrated, local authorities and communities show no initiative without orders from above. For example, it was only after a similar statement from Poroshenko in 2014 that cities actively started to develop Sustainable Energy Action Plans (SEAP). In addition, it could serve as a good signal to investors, because at the moment Ukraine is losing money and energy because of outdated gas and oil-fired boilers in both industry and the utilities sector, which owners are in no hurry to modernise.

If cities can manage to comply with procedures and relevant documents, they have good opportunities to receive foreign financial and technical support. This means grants and loans in foreign currency, which are cheaper than Ukrainian ones. Then this money should be spent on upgrading housing stock, specifically, the installation of meters and thermal insulation. This is what urban energy saving must start with.

"As long as the amounts of heat, gas, and electricity use are not recorded in Ukraine, there will be losses in heat distribution networks, pipes will not be fixed and we will continue to get massive bills for unfathomable services. Currently, comprehensive accounting of the use is

disadvantageous for companies that supply heat, water and electricity. They sustain a lot of losses on the way to the end user. And they can cover them with subsidies from local budgets. If everything is properly accounted for, such leeway disappears. Modernisation of thermal insulation should come afterwards. The money allocated for subsidies would be better used on this. That would help us cut utility bills in the future," says Ruslana Velychko-Tryfoniuk, regional coordinator of utility and energy programmes at the OPORA citizen network.

SEAPs encourage cities to develop plans and projects that should regulate money spent on energy conservation. Both foreign loans and city funds are attracted for this. However, sometimes this document is not disclosed to the public, so the community does not know exactly how much money local authorities are planning to allocate to energy efficiency programmes. Besides, OPORA explains, mayors see this document as more of a recommendation piece of paper than a serious development plan.

"Mayors don't understand what energy efficiency is. At one time, the mayor of Sumy asked why the city wasn't dealing with this issue. By then, however, Sumy had already adopted its SEAP and public discussions had to be initiated. I think the mayor only mentioned this because energy conservation is cool and everyone is talking about it," adds Velychko-Tryfoniuk.

It is believed that industry uses the most energy resources in Ukraine, but this is not the case. The largest consumer is the housing sector. In order to make the energy reform for consumers less painful, the government introduced subsidies to enable the poorest to survive the transitional period without much loss. That was where reforms stalled and everyone rushed to get state subsidy. One major factor that makes so

## THE SUSTAINABLE ENERGY ACTION PLANS INTRODUCED IN 2014 ENCOURAGE CITIES TO DEVELOP PLANS AND PROJECTS THAT SHOULD REGULATE MONEY SPENT ON ENERGY CONSERVATION

many people technically eligible to subsidies is the fact that their earnings are not reported. Cases have been documented when government officials received subsidies as they were officially unemployed, while enjoying hefty "grey" income in the meantime. The Ukrainian Association of Renewable Energy also claims that subsidies are not an efficient way to use funds.

"In terms of the economy, the entire mechanism of subsidies is complete nonsense. Today in Ukraine, gas is becoming more expensive. The government has allocated nearly UAH 30bn to offset part of its cost to the households for 2016. Unless the model changes, the govern-



ment will have to incur such costs annually. If, instead, these funds were used to implement energy efficiency measures, subsidies would almost be a non-issue as soon as next year," says Vitaliy Daviy, president of the association.

The lack of energy conservation culture in the households contributes to the problem. However, the increased tariffs force people to make savings they had never considered before. "We are running an educational campaign in 17 Ukrainian cities. When you start to explain that we have to make savings by turning off, for example, a light you don't need, people are very surprised. No one cultivated a culture of energy consumption in society before. In addition, local authorities put up resistance. It's not clear why. In most cases, this is simply because they are lazy," OPORA comments.

In addition to manipulation with subsidies, monopolists may have their interest in the energy conservation market if they manage to take it under control on time. Today, the Ukrainian household utility sector is practically made up of large monopolist suppliers that set their own prices for services and set the bar for quality, simply because there is no alternative. But from July 1, 2016, the owners of residential buildings will be able to choose their service providers. If the tenants do not do this themselves, the city will designate a contractor to them. In addition, residents will be able to pick their own management company to replace the local housing office. This hides one potential risk: city mayors can register some of such companies in order to make a profit. Nimble businessmen started to create such substitute service providers in the 2000s. Comprehensive accounting of their services could change this. This would prevent companies from redistributing their losses to all consumers and force them to provide better-quality services. This, in turn, will generate competition in the market.





"With regard to corruption in the field of energy efficiency, it is clearly evident at the level of district heads, mayors and school headmasters. We're talking about the energy efficiency programme to replace gas with alternative fuel. Funds were allocated to it, various government programmes were launched; private investors showed interest too. Projects were implemented, but not on a mass scale. Why not? Because local officials get kickbacks from coal and gas supplies and can't see what their personal interest is in a biofuel boiler project. How would they make money by supplying this fuel?" Daviy says. If the situation is changed, the president's slogan about energy savings as a priority could turn into real projects and investments.

Mayors are using the situation to their benefit as well. As part of the financial and technical assistance scheme, deputy mayors are trained in energy management to subsequently deal with energy efficiency matters. However, OPORA notes that people close to local authorities are often appointed to these positions. So it is unlikely that they will implement energy efficiency in practice. "Mayors are occasionally taken abroad to look at the experience of other countries. The head of one Ukrainian city insisted that he would only go with his wife. Obviously, this was refused and his deputy went instead," says OPORA.

The Parliament has not yet passed a law regulating energy efficiency. An initial version of it was drafted in the early 2000s. The latest one was approved by the European Commission and ready for vote in 2014. Yet, it got stuck at the Ministry of Regional Development and Construction. Meanwhile, Ukraine has signed the energy efficiency directive with the European Commission and will have to comply with them no matter what. Still, further improvements will be difficult without the relevant law, while the priorities declared by the president will remain nothing more than words. ■



BOOKSTORE



# Breaking out of hollow rhetoric

Oleksandr Kramar

## What makes Ukrainians vulnerable to populism

**P**opulism is traditionally understood as the rhetoric appealing to the dissatisfaction with life, fears and hopes of large social groups, the counterpositioning of their interests to those of the elites or the social, ethnic and other minorities that are less attractive from the electoral point of view. The core of populism is the desire to gain as much support as possible by any means, usually to convert it to power during elections, or to keep it when already at the helm.

The true motives and intentions of populists are usually very different from their rhetoric. As a result, when they get into the high offices, their promises are fulfilled minimally or for show.

### INHERITED VS ACQUIRED

The breeding ground for the blooming social populism in post-Soviet Ukraine was provided, on the one hand, by the Soviet legacy in the form of its anti-individualist, anti-middle-class, paternalistic philosophy and the communist propaganda deeply rooted in the minds of most of the society, combined with more radical brain washing methods and the physical selection of the population. It was supported by the lumpenization and the miserable living conditions of the bulk of the population, the delayed piecemeal reforms, and the slow social restructuring.

The Ukrainian society remains profoundly paternalistic. A survey of the Institute of Sociology of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences "Ukrainian Society: Social Change Monitoring" for 2014 shows that two years ago, only 9% of the citizens older than 55 (i.e., born in 1959 or earlier) believed that people should improve their living conditions on their own, rather than relying on the government. However, among the young people under 30 (who were born after 1984 and grew up in independent Ukraine) this figure was only 24%, and 17.3% among the middle-aged people. Instead, 76.8% of the unemployed, 73.4% of those employed in the public sector and even 71.7% of those working in the private sector believe that the state must protect the population from the economic hardships.

Only a small share of the respondents agree that the significant social stratification was inevitable in a free market society (as a result of differences in incomes), while the overwhelming majority believe only an insignificant differentiation to be justified. A clear majority of Ukrainians do not understand the difference between the social equality and the equality of opportunity, since 73.8% of the respondents said the absence of social stratification was important, while 72.6% want equal conditions for all. However, the one excludes the other, because under equal conditions,

the more successful citizens are bound to be much richer than the less successful ones.

Most paternalistically minded are the residents of small towns and medium-sized cities, where the share of the public sector and the government sector in general is the highest (only 12.7% of them believe that people should improve their living conditions independently). The least paternalistic are village dwellers (18.1%) and Kyiv residents (18.9%). But even in the latter two cases, it is an extremely small share of those relying primarily on themselves.

The social structure of the Ukrainian society is also extremely conducive of social populism. The welfare of the lion's share of voters depends on the centralized redistribution of the national output through the budget, pension fund and other social funds. For example, Ukraine has 11.4 million pensioners and another 3.6 million people receiving salaries from the budgets of different levels. These categories of the population are the most vulnerable to social populism, together accounting for about 15 million people. Most of them are eligible to vote and are the most active voters.

The number of the unemployed, according to the methodology used by the International Labour Organization (ILO), is 1.85 million; another 0.25 mil-




### ATTEMPTS BY UKRAINIAN POPULISTS TO FULFILL AT LEAST A PART OF CONTRADICTIONAL PROMISES UNDERMINED THE ECONOMY AND DROVE THE COUNTRY INTO A DEBT TRAP, DESTROYING THE INCENTIVES TO PRODUCE, SAVE, WORK AND DEVELOP

lion are those who, despite their working age, are not counted among the unemployed, but they "gave up hope" and are not looking for a job because of the "unavailability of the right one"; 2.4 million farmers formally involved in subsidiary farming can be considered to be rather conventionally employed, as well as 3.3 million employed in other sectors. Most of these 7.8 million citizens are also extremely susceptible to populism through their living conditions and volatile earnings.

At the same time, only 8.8 million Ukrainians are today officially employed in the private sector (including sole proprietors and microbusinesses), including 7.1 million hired employees and 1.7 million owners. However, a number of small business representatives also tend to social populism, needless to mention its popularity with the employees working in most sectors of the economy.





In 2014, only 20.1% of the population had the official average per capita income exceeding UAH 2,640. The State Statistics Service has not yet published the 2015 data, but given only a slight increase in nominal income last year, it is safe to say that as of the end of 2015, the same 20% had average income per person exceeding the official subsistence level, which the Ministry of Social Policy set in December 2015 at UAH 2,878-2,951 for the able-bodied and children aged over six, and at UAH 2,060 for the retirees. At the same time, the average pension is UAH 1,700, while the minimum one is the meager UAH 1,074.

First of all, the generational change is still underway, and secondly, it only has a limited effect through the unreformed system. Everything is clear with those who retired during the Soviet era or in the early post-Soviet years (born before 1940). Their active life entirely coincided with the heyday and the collapse of the USSR, before the new social relationships were formed. The same goes for citizens born before 1970, whose minds were formed in the Soviet Union or during the Perestroika era in a broad sense (i.e., in 1985-1995).

It has to be admitted that only a small share of them saw the transition to market economy as the logic behind the changing social and economic rela-

tions. For most, even those who more or less actively supported the changes, it was primarily about the Western standards, and not the principles of life. They would go perfectly well for the social and economic model of the Soviet Union, if it could ensure the income levels and other outward attributes that lured the average Soviets and especially the young people during the Perestroika years.

Market economy, with its inevitable social stratification and the need to constantly compete for a place under the sun, was not on the list of what was expected from a market democracy. Even among those who were quite successful in 1990-2000s, many still have at the back of their minds the notions of the socio-economic relations and "social justice" acquired during the late years of the Soviet regime. Little can be added about the citizens who lost the fight or simply lived by inertia to their retirement in the same social niche that they occupied in the Soviet or the first post-Soviet years.

The survey of the Institute of Sociology shows that 35.2% were satisfied with their life in Ukraine in 2014, and 37.6% were dissatisfied, including just 3.8% of those entirely satisfied and 10.1% of those completely dissatisfied. Among those "actively building their future," 58.8% vs 22.5% were satisfied with their lives, while among those "looking for their place in the world" and those "not wishing to adapt," the dissatisfied (40.9% vs 44.6%, respectively) largely outnumbered those satisfied (32.9% vs 27.5%).

However, the younger generation, especially those who grew up during the relatively "fat" 2000s and aspire to the European standards of life "here and now" (taken as a given, and not as the results of decades of efforts), is also prone to populism. Similarly, by the way, to many of their peers in today's EU countries, young Ukrainians aspire to high living standards and are ready to demand them (or, as a maximum, to fight for them during mass rallies), but not to achieve them through routine gradual efforts.

The social class resistant to populism is not only small in numbers, but also grows slowly. In this situation, politicians, community leaders and opinion makers, instead of encouraging immunity to populism, often use it as a vehicle for their own purposes. They try to convince people that the problem is not populism as such, but only the non-compliance of certain political forces and leaders with their slogans and promises, which in fact they could not and did not plan to do.

### POPULISM AS THE KEYNOTE OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS

The political structuring of the society, that is, the segregation between the supporters of the center-right and the center-left that is characteristic of a capitalist society, has still not taken place in Ukraine. In the world, the above political forces promise and at least try to implement the policies supported by their voters and criticized by their opponents. When the government is rotated, the representatives of the opposition camp are given a chance to demonstrate the advantages of their program.

In Ukraine, this until recently was prevented by the electoral split along the geopolitical and civilizational divide, resulting in the constant need to mobilize supporters. Therefore, while declaring their adherence to the centre-right policy, most national political

parties actively use the social populist rhetoric, giving conflicting promises that could never be fulfilled.

Rather than focusing on the interests of specific social groups, they promise everything to everyone: to increase spending and reduce taxes; to ensure fiscal preferences to the core sectors of the economy, while encouraging the development of the new sectors; to ensure tax benefits and reduce social expenditures for the categories of employees constituting the majority of the country's workforce, at the same time preserving free healthcare and education and improving social protection of the vulnerable groups.

The result is the failure to live up to the promises (and the lack of intensions to do so). According to sociological surveys, those dissatisfied with the party system existing in the country often say that the political forces do not adhere to their programs and goals stated before the elections, defending the interests not of the voters, but of their leaders and sponsors from the financial and economic clans.

Their attempts to fulfill at least a part of their conflicting and contradictory promises undermined the economy and drove the country into a debt trap, destroying the incentives to produce, save, work and upgrade, focusing the attention and the energy of the most active part of the society on new inadequate requirements, and resulting in demands for more populism.

For decades, Ukrainian politics were characterized by the constant change of the "facade" (leaders, political parties, and governments) combined with the intact corrupt oligarchic system of government and business. In the political area, these sentiments are reflected in the drastic fluctuations in the levels of support for certain politicians and their political parties (**see Organize or Face Disappointment, The Ukrainian Week, Issue 23/2014**). The massive credit of confidence results in inflated ratings, followed by deep disappointment and even hatred. The only chance to avoid this for populist politicians is not to come to power to be able to continue parasitizing on irresponsible rhetoric. After all, even getting to the helm would not help them live up to their expressed or implied conflicting promises.

However, the new generation of politicians successfully exploits the propensity for social populism of the considerable part of the population that is not really interested in the true intentions of the politicians or their willingness to fulfill their promises. "Punishing" just another political project to replace it with an identical "new" one only results in the loss of time for the country and the voters. The authors and sponsors of these short-lived projects are aware from the very start of the need to prepare a backup, while recovering their investments during the short time that they might keep at the helm.

The rule of populism in politics is accompanied by the increasingly manifest economic gap between Ukraine and not only the developed countries, but also the growing number of countries in Asia and Africa. If this trend continues, it will entail the further decrease of the remaining national wealth that could be redistributed to the poisonous sweet promises of solving all the problems at the account of the "bad guys." All this is happening at the time when the country badly needs the bitter truth and a constructive ideology.



\*Civil society



The deep logic behind social populism is based on the point-blank rejection of the possibility that others who are "no better" than I can live "much better while I can't have enough of what I want/need." Since the poor always outnumber the rich, it is destructive in nature and purpose. The redistribution of the national income, according to this logic, should follow not natural (earning based on consent of the parties), but unnatural patterns (redistribution through coercion).

The exaggerated version of this logic is embodied in the pushing over the edge experiments of the Bolshevik regimes, but it is present in its soft form in any populist society, where masses believe that their situation could be improved not by looking for more efficient ways, but by receiving "manna" from the "right" politician, president, government, or state.

### THE PROBLEM IS ROOTED IN THE SOCIETY WHICH KEEPS GENERATING DEMAND FOR IRRESPONSIBLE POPULISM AND FORGETTING THAT THERE IS NO SUCH THING AS A FREE LUNCH

However, since redistribution requires no constructive efforts, but rather ensures a discouraging lack of confidence in using the fruits of one's labors, it hinders the country's development. A person may be motivated to earn and save for himself and the loved ones, but not for "the man." In this case, it is better to earn, save and invest as little as possible in order not to excite envy. At least, officially. Hence the opposition to legalizing incomes and the trend to conceal property and siphon assets abroad at the first opportunity.

The populists themselves increasingly often fall prey to their own populism, because someone with a monthly income of US \$1,000 (UAH 20,000-30,000),



believing himself to be part of the middle class and wanting the "blood" of oligarchs and multimillionaires, will be surprised to learn that a compatriot with an income of UAH 8,000-12,000 might, in turn, want his blood, while being considered too wealthy by someone earning UAH 2,000-4,000.

## THE SOLUTION

The problem is rooted in the society which keeps generating demand for irresponsible populism and forgetting that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Therefore, the only way for people to overcome populism is to learn from their own mistakes. However, the price might be too high, and the consequences irreversible and fatal, if the country's opinion leaders fail to take responsibility. Instead of continuing to play populist games, they should openly and actively explain to the citizens the real cost of nice promises, and generate alternative pragmatic policies based on the realistic perception of the complex reality and the ways to improve it.

The long-term improvement of the living standards should only be based on self-perfection, knowledge, skills and qualifications gained, increased productivity, more effective investment of efforts (e.g., through professional retraining), and the ability to constructively defend own interests before the representatives of other social groups, employers, or authorities.

As many people as possible in Ukraine should understand the fact that miracles do not happen, and that in order to increase spending it is necessary to raise taxes, and in order to ease the fiscal burden, it is necessary to cut costs. However, when budget spending on a sector is cut, citizens should be prepared to increase its financing either directly or through alternative public mechanisms (insurance, etc.).

In a democracy, the society dictates the decisions. But it should understand their consequences and costs, and be ready to pay a price, both literally and figuratively. Otherwise, high expectations from populists competing in empty rhetoric will only deteriorate the situation in the country, degrade the living standards, and lead to the degeneration of the increasing number of crucial systems, from education and medicine to public administration, administrative services, the law enforcement and the judiciary, housing, and environment.

In the political arena, overcoming populism will hardly be possible without the real self-organization of citizens into grassroots movements, financed through membership fees and mass donations of their members or supporters, including the representatives of small and medium businesses. Once they win elections, first at the local, then at the regional and national levels, their members and supporters will understand the difference between cheap populism and promises to "solve all your problems for you" and the real programs capable to really change the situation in the country.

This social stratum of citizens who have no illusions or excessive expectations can be strong enough to ensure a necessary margin of support for the pragmatic public policies and the fundamental reform of the country. The people prepared by this bottom-up system will be able to fill the talent pool necessary to change the existing political and bureaucratic systems. ■



BOOKSTORE



# The evolution of political doublespeak

Denys Kazanskyi

## The history of populism in independent Ukraine

Populism is by far not a uniquely Ukrainian phenomenon. Yet, there are so many populists here that most of the time the voters can't see or hear anyone else. The voices of reason are lost in the loud hysterical skirmishes and the promises of happiness for all, here and now. The politicians have long been competing not for the best platform, but for bigger hand-outs to distribute to voters during elections. In the meantime, the country's debt is growing, as it is going to rack and ruin, trying to live up to the irresponsible election promises of the ardent "fighters for public happiness."

It is hard to say who is more to blame for the populist rhetoric prevailing in Ukraine: the politicians or the electorate. If the voters were wiser and more responsible, they would not vote for the obvious bawlers promising them a pie in the sky. But the people who are reduced to despair, who witnessed the collapse first of their "Soviet motherland," and then of the economy of the young Ukrainian state trapped in tight market conditions, want to hear a soothing word and a promise that everything will be fine soon, like someone who is seriously ill. And where there is demand, there will be supply.

Ukrainian populism was born almost at the same time as the independent Ukrainian state, and over the 25 years of its existence it went a long and winding path of the evolution, adapting at each twist of events to the new conditions and challenges.

In the 1990s, the populists flew the red flag. Since the beginning of the decade, they gained popularity in Ukraine, tempting people with the return to the Soviet anabiosis, using Soviet symbols and the favorite slogan of the populace, "to each according to his needs," in endless variations. The "red" voter base were all those who were not happy with the new life: retirees; factory workers who weren't getting paid on time; miners who were losing their jobs after the mines were closed; and people for whom Ukraine was unacceptable on ideological grounds, such as Russian nationalists, chauvinists, and imperialists.

Several players were active on this electoral field, including Petro Symonenko's Communist Party, Oleksandr Moroz's Socialist Party and the scandalous Progressive Socialist Party led by Natalya Vitrenko.

The peak of their popularity was in the late 1990s, marked by miner strikes. If we look at the voter map of Ukraine as of the 1998 parliamentary elections, we can see how difficult the economic situation was in the country at that time. That year, the Communist Party won the race by a large margin, getting 24.6% of the votes. The Socialists, jointly with another left-wing populist force, the Peasant Party, received 8.5%. Vitrenko's Progressive Socialist Party got 4%. The three parties together won 171 parliamen-

tary seats. The Communists won in 16 oblasts, including Chernivtsi Oblast in Western Ukraine, as well as Kyiv and Sevastopol. Moroz's Socialists won in another two oblasts.

The 1999 presidential election was even worse. In the first round, Vitrenko, Symonenko and Moroz got 44% between the three of them. However, endlessly mobilizing people with loud but empty slogans turned out to be impossible. Thereafter, the popularity of the Reds, who proved to be successful only in the cause of personal enrichment, plummeted.

The economic recovery of the early 2000s put an end to the era of the Red populism. The Communist Party of Ukraine in 2002 won 20% of the vote by inertia, but ceded leadership to Viktor Yushchenko's Our Ukraine. The Socialist Party got a little more than 6%. The Progressive Socialists did not get into the Parliament. Two years later, the populists who used Soviet rhetoric were hopelessly lost as the battle of the titans unfolded: Yanukovich vs. Yushchenko, the nominees of large business groups from the different regions of the country. In 2004, the pro-Russian slogans were boldly whisked away from the Communists by the representatives of the Donetsk financial and industrial clans, who dominated the former electoral field of the Red populists ever since. The latter eventually sank into oblivion.



### UKRAINE'S NEW REALITIES ONCE AGAIN MADE POPULISM EVOLVE. BUT THE ZEITGEIST TAILORS IT INTO ANTI-CORRUPTION POPULISM TO APPEAL TO CIVIC ACTIVISTS

In the early 2000s, steel prices were going up in the world. This was an injection for Ukraine's economy. Exports of ferrous metals became the main item of Ukrainian exports and generated the inflow of foreign currency to the budget. The improved economic situation sent populism to new heights. Now the populists could afford not only to scold the government and promise a better future, but also to bribe voters with money, while being at the helm. Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovich was the first to use this tactic on a wide scale, when he ordered to raise pensions and social benefits before the 2004 election. The calculation was simple: to buy the votes. Luckily, the budget already had money for that.

But the plan didn't work, and Yanukovich's victory had to be postponed. However, the delayed action bomb was planted in the country's economy for years to come. In the mid 2000s, Yulia Tymoshenko took up

Yanukovich's torch and also resorted to just distributing money to citizens, hoping to win the election. The famous "Yulia's thousand" (Yulia Tymoshenko pledged to compensate UAH 1,000 to all Ukrainians for their savings held at the Soviet state-owned Oshchadbank and essentially through hyperinflation and shock therapy in the former Soviet Union — Ed.) has become part of the local folklore and gave food to numerous jokes, but raised the prime minister's rating all the same. Then Ukraine saw another motorcade of generosity, the Law "On Raising the Prestige of Miners' Work" that increased payments to miners. In this way, Tymoshenko flirted with the Donbas, trying to lure Yanukovich's core electorate. Tragically, the funds were wasted from the budget on the background of a devastating crisis that broke out in 2008 following the collapse of the global metal prices. To ensure financial support for its populism, the government had to take out loans, driving the country into debt.

However, even this tactic failed to guarantee Tymoshenko victory in the election. When Viktor Yanukovich became president he, again, took up his rival's baton and started buying votes by disbursing money and increasing social payments. Before the 2012 election, it was the turn of the "Victor's thousand" that made former Soviet Oshchadbank depositors line up to get it. In the

her rating increases. Tymoshenko is traditionally successful in the role of the nation's protectrix.

Interestingly enough, Ukraine's new realities once again made populism evolve. But the zeitgeist tailors it into anti-corruption populism to appeal to civic activists. The radical anti-corruption rhetoric and the promises to "teach a lesson" to kleptocrats are in high demand primarily among the middle class and the creative community who are less concerned with utility bills and more with the country's main problem—its corrupt officials and bloated bureaucracy.

This voter category has recently been wooed by the former Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili, who has long had authority with certain circles. His calculation proved accurate. Ukrainians are fed to the teeth with local politicians who were repeatedly caught in lies and shady dealings. Given the small choice in rotten apples, Saakashvili made a favorable impression, being a newcomer with no negative background in Ukraine. Not surprisingly, intellectuals, civic activists and the volunteer community perceived him as at least some kind of an alternative and some hope.

However, Saakashvili's anti-corruption speeches are usually not very specific. The Head of the Odessa Oblast does not bring any documents or figures before the court



meantime, the country's gold and forex reserves were wasted, instead of being used to support the hryvnia exchange rate that slowly went down due to the economic crisis. Eventually, reserves squandering created the need for financial assistance, which Yanukovich got from Russia in exchange for reversing Ukraine's foreign policy. By the time Ukraine's fourth president fled the country, the state gold and forex reserves were almost exhausted.

The tragic events of 2014, the Russian occupation of Crimea, the war, and the thousands of deaths resulted in another radical twist in the populist rhetoric. The self-indulging populism of the 2000s was now replaced with the thundering wartime slogans. Once again, as in the hungry 1990s, the speakers grew more radical. Oleh Liashko, brandishing a pitchfork and shouting abuse and threats during his speeches, quickly gained popularity. A laughing stock during better times, he turned into a "doctor" offering a miraculous pill to a seriously ill patient on the background of the economic downturn and the military threat.

The electoral field of the Left has now been taken by the experienced populist Tymoshenko. She promises to cut utility rates and to free Ukraine from the oligarchs. Her promises are obviously unrealistic, but nevertheless

of public opinion, increasingly limiting himself with generalities that are hard to disagree with. His anti-corruption forums are crowded, and his speeches are mostly bright and fiery, but contain nothing but accusations against the Yatsenyuk's government, which Saakashvili audaciously undertook to fight. His criticism of corruptionists is very selective. The loud accusations almost never result in any action.

It is obvious that the Georgian politician is planning to pursue his career in the capacity of the Ukrainian politician of a national scale, and is preparing to create his own political force. But what program could this force offer besides fighting the scammers from Yatsenyuk's team is so far unclear. It is no secret that Saakashvili's achievements in the economy have been rather modest. During his rule, Georgia failed to overcome poverty and unemployment. To overcome the crisis in Ukraine, emergency measures are needed to rescue industry, revive business, and cut bloated government spending.

Only unpopular measures could help Ukrainians in the current situation. But who among the Ukrainian politicians could honestly admit that he is running for office to implement such program? As of today, this remains an open question. ■



# The breaking point

Michael Binyon

The European Union: from 60 years ago till present



**The grumpy club grows.** Britain is threatening to turn its back on the whole enterprise and declare the European Union a failure in which it wants no part

**T**he EU has rarely faced greater challenges or been in such disarray as it finds itself in today. On almost every front, the 28 members see disagreement, infighting, economic strains and social chaos threatening their cohesion and the very existence of the EU itself. Mass migration is destabilising member states, terrorism and refugees are forcing nations to re-erect frontier controls, the euro is still struggling with the bankruptcy of Greece and the sluggish economies of southern Europe and one nation, Britain, is threatening to turn its back on the whole enterprise and declare the European Union a failure in which it wants no part.

Europe started in an extraordinary burst of optimism and idealism. The idea of uniting the nations of Western Europe (eastern Europe by then lay behind the Iron Curtain) to prevent any future war and to co-operate in creating wealth was born after the Second World War. A number of European statesmen, including Winston Churchill and the French foreign minister Robert Schumann, called for a new “United States of Europe”, and in 1949 the Council of Europe was established to enshrine human rights and bolster democracy in Europe. The first practical economic cooperation began with Mr.

Schumann’s proposal for a European Coal and Steel Community in 1950, which would integrate the two key industries of France and Germany, the main adversaries of two world wars. Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg were invited to join, and in 1951 the six countries signed the treaty of Paris, with another French diplomat, Jean Monnet, as the secretary-general.

The new body brought considerable economic advance to these countries, and in 1957 they set up an expanded market to reduce all trade tariffs between members. The Treaty of Rome, setting up the Common Market, was signed that year. Britain, fearing trading competition with the British Commonwealth, stayed out. But a few years later Britain and six other European countries formed a rival trading bloc, the European Free Trade Area. Most, however, soon applied to join the more dynamic Common Market, and after long negotiations Britain, Ireland and Denmark were admitted in 1973. Gradually, as tariffs were reduced and prosperity grew, others joined: Greece was admitted in 1981 and Spain and Portugal, nine years after first applying, in 1986.

The new enlarged community took on many new supranational powers. A European Parliament was set up in

1979, and integrating the democratic politics of Western Europe became a key aim, with the Brussels Commission as the co-ordinating secretariat and administrative headquarters. France and Germany were the main motors of what had become the European Economic Community, but states such as Italy—with a succession of weak national governments—saw the EEC as a vital stabilising force and warmly supported the goal of “ever closer union”. Britain, with a longer history of independence and sovereignty, was always more hesitant.

The collapse of communism and the emergence of eastern European states eager to re-integrate with the West was a big but welcome challenge to the EEC, which by then had broadened its responsibilities to include a defence and security dimension and renamed itself the European Union. At the same time, former neutral countries—Austria, Finland and Sweden—were admitted, and the EU took a series of steps to remove all trade barriers and create a single market in 1992. It also began planning a much more ambitious project: the single currency. This would abolish national currencies and make trade easier and swifter, and would run parallel to the other big advance, the abolition of internal border controls in the EU under a treaty signed in the Luxembourg town of Schengen. The new euro, replacing national currencies in most, but not all, members came into being in 2002.

After long and difficult negotiations, to include transition arrangements for countries with weak post-Soviet economies, a further group of 10 former eastern European nations was admitted in 2004. They all looked to the EU as a model of democracy and a way of turning their backs on their communist past with the guarantee of human rights, freedom to travel and independent judiciaries. The EU became a symbol of a new era to them, just at the time as some of its oldest members were beginning to have doubts. The EU also began negotiations with other countries eager to benefit from better trade and political links. Turkey had originally applied for an association agreement in the 1970s, and finally applied for full membership. But the one big neighbour that showed little interest was Russia, which was unsure whether the EU presented a challenge or an opportunity.

By now the EU had some 25 members, and its size was beginning to cause problems. It was much more difficult to reach decisions, and the right of single members to veto decisions became controversial. The Brussels Commission had lost some of the dynamism it had under Jacques Delors, its former president, and in many countries, especially Britain, there was a feeling that Brussels was too remote, not properly accountable and too bureaucratic. The European Parliament was enlarged to take in new members from each country and had more than 700 representatives. Their work was seen as ineffective, and many deputies were accused of lavish expenses and lifestyles.

A series of treaties, including the Lisbon Treaty, was passed to try to streamline the EU and make it more responsive, with a better balance of power between the big and smaller members. But with the global crash of 2008 all the problems came to a head. The Eurozone, which had functioned well at the start, began to accelerate the differences in economic growth between its members. Germany became ever more dominant and powerful, while the periphery—Ireland, Spain, Portugal and especially Greece—faced growing deficits and problems caused by the inflexibility of the Eurozone rules. The

Eurozone faced extremely low growth, and several countries almost went bankrupt and had to be bailed out with emergency funds. The refusal of Greece to trim its budget and implement economic reforms to improve tax collection and fight corruption led to a widespread loss of confidence in the euro and was exploited by populist leaders in the richer northern countries to argue that national governments had surrendered too much power to Brussels.

Already, a new mood of “Euroscepticism”, first seen in Britain, had begun to shake the idealism of the founding fathers. France and the Netherlands, once solidly pro-Europe nations, had voted against the 2004 proposed new EU constitution. Populist leaders on the right, such as Jean-Marie Le Pen in France and Pim Fortuyn and Geert Wilders in the Netherlands, campaigned against the influx of foreign, especially Muslim, migrants. In Britain, which admitted more than one million Poles seeking work under the freedom of labour rules, there was growing opposition to migrants even from within the EU.

The refugee crisis of 2015 hit the EU not only politically but also psychologically. The thousands who crossed the Mediterranean in unsafe vessels, with many drowning, forced the question: should they be rescued and offered asylum, or should they be turned back to deter people smugglers? The crisis became worse when thousands more began trekking across the Balkans to reach Germany and Sweden, which had rashly promised to admit Syrian refugees without limit. Many of them turned out not to be refugees but economic migrants from Africa and elsewhere.



## **AFTER THE GLOBAL CRASH OF 2008, A NEW MOOD OF “EUROSCEPTICISM”, FIRST SEEN IN BRITAIN, HAD BEGUN TO SHAKE THE IDEALISM OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS**

The EU was bitterly divided. It could not agree on a quota system to resettle the refugees. It could not agree how to pay for them or how to amend the Dublin convention on asylum rules. The huge numbers and the entry of terrorists posing as refugees forced many countries to reimpose—temporarily—border controls. It looks as though the Schengen agreement is now doomed. It has been hard to integrate so many outsiders, and assaults on women in Cologne have spurred xenophobia and Islamophobia throughout Europe. No European nation now believes Brussels can solve the problem, and in a few months Britain is to hold a referendum on whether to leave the EU. The opinion polls are very close. If Britain—a major economic power—leaves, it will be a mortal political blow. Other countries may also threaten to leave if they do not get a better economic deal from Brussels. And the Eurozone has still not produced strong growth or fixed Greece’s broken economy.

Even in pro-European nations, the old idealism has vanished. Italy is now quarrelling with Brussels. Spain is struggling with separatism. Poland has just elected a strongly nationalist government. The smaller countries feel marginalised. And all countries resent the dominance of Germany. The future of the once mighty EU—the world’s second largest democratic union—looks bleak indeed. ■

# Thoughts on the future

Interviewed by Anna Korbut

Experts spoke to *The Ukrainian Week* on how they see Europe coming out of the current crises



**“The more other member-states don’t help, the more anti-EU sentiment could grow in Germany”**

**JUDY DEMPSEY**

Non-resident senior associate at Carnegie Europe and editor in chief of the Strategic Europe blog

There has been a change in the Germans’ perception of their government. First of all, the popularity of Angela Merkel’s party has really fallen. Secondly, 80% of the public believes that the government does not have a grip on the refugee issue. Thirdly, and very worryingly, the far-right party, the Alternative for Germany (AfD), is rising. Their rate of 12% shows that it’s just not a typical fringe eurosceptic party, but a serious far-right one. It will be very interesting to see if the AfD will get elected to the regional parliaments next month when three important regions go to the polls. This party is putting pressure on Merkel’s sister party in Bavaria, the Christian-Social Union, who call on the Chancellor to put a cap on the numbers of refugees in Germany. The CSU which has become increasingly populist has adopted such a stance in order to maintain their core conservative base in Bavaria. The CSU does not want to see any kind of tilt of the vote to the AfD. One of the AfD leaders already suggested that the police should shoot at refugees who try to cross the border to Germany. It caused outrage. Decent Germans won’t vote for it. Still, it is the AfD that is now the party providing the anti-refugee and anti-EU stance. A contradictory trend to the rise of this party is the fact that there are so many strong volunteer organizations in Germany at the moment. Without them the refugee crisis would be even worse. Volunteers feed the refugees. They teach them German. They provide homes for them. And slowly but surely young children of refugees are attending schools in order to learn German and become integrated.

As to the popularity of Angela Merkel herself, it has fallen as well, but it used to be very high, over 70%. She’s no longer the most popular politician (actually, Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier is). Now, Merkel is trying ways (although she won’t say it) to restrict the number of refugees coming to Germany. She will not call for the restoration of borders, and she can’t afford to do this because that is against everything she stands for. Moreover, Merkel knows that this will actually inflict heavy damage on the EU’s and Germany’s economy and of course the Schengen system. At the beginning of the crisis, she told her party: give me a little bit of time and we can do it. But the problem is that for that time she depended on peace talks on Syria. Those didn’t succeed. In fact, Vladimir Putin compli-

cated matters for Merkel. She hoped that the talks would result in some kind of a peace deal for Syria. Instead, more refugees started to try to reach Europe. So, pressure is coming on Merkel from outside, particularly from Putin’s bombing of Syria.

The recent visit of the Bavarian CSU’s leader to Russia didn’t go down particularly well in Germany, especially after all the reporting on the Russian-German teenage girl gone missing and the Russian media spreading all those lies about this. Eventually, if the German elites see that Russia is of no help in the Syrian war, they wonder what relations the Germans can have with Russia. Foreign Minister Steinmeier still believes that there is some room for diplomacy. But Merkel does not appear to agree at this point, especially given what happened in Eastern Ukraine and the fact that Putin’s bombing of Syria is making the refugee crisis even worse.

Meanwhile, the social-democrats in Germany are dependent on Merkel (for the coalition — **Ed.**), so they can’t criticize her too much. Plus, there is nobody in the SPD who could challenge Merkel. In fact, it’s hard to see who would want her job at the moment. The SPD are squabbling being over the asylum law, logistics, proposing ideas of their own. They are not in a strong position in the polls and the CDU has been weakened. But the coalition is staying together at the moment because there is no other option. What doesn’t help in the meanwhile, is that Merkel cannot depend on the other EU member-states to take their share of the refugees which most have refused. The more they don’t help, the more anti-EU sentiment could grow in Germany. Ordinary pro-EU Germans believed in the idea of solidarity among EU member states. Now they don’t find solidarity when it comes to the refugees.

Merkel has been trying to call for solidarity and unity in the EU. But then, a series of elections are coming up in EU member-states — French presidential election, populist parties in Denmark closing their doors to asylum seekers, the British referendum on staying in or leaving the EU — make unity even harder to attain. Plus, with the refugee crisis, Germany’s influence is waning, too. It cannot persuade the other EU member states to understand why they have a moral and legal obligation to help the refugees.

Political weight of a member-state within the EU depends on its representation in European institutions:

- **Germany** has the most influence currently as it is represented by the highest number of people in European institutions: 15.4% in the European Parliament, European Commissioner office and Directorates-General. 20% of parliamentary group coordinators also represent Germany.
- **France** began to rapidly lose its influence: compared to 2009 when it had the most citizens in the EU institutions (16.4%), it now is only fifth in that regard with 8% of all EU officials being French.
- **Great Britain** was the leader with 17% in the abovementioned institutions in 1999, but has gradually been losing positions ever since. Today, it has 11.4% representatives in European institutions, but retains the second largest representation in parliamentary group coordinators (14.8%).
- **Italy** had as many representatives in European institutions as Germany in 1999. Today, it only has 9.4%.
- **Spain** has fewer representatives in EU institutions compared to 1999 (9.5% back then compared to 8.7% now). Yet, its representation has risen in the European Parliament, European Commissioner office staff and Directorates-General.





## “Schengen is the best thing the EU has done up to this point”

**CHRISTOPHER HARTWELL**

**President of Management Board, Center for Social and Economic Research, Warsaw**

I wouldn't say that the restoration of border controls in the EU is a major threat right now. But the EU has lost its way in the past few years — probably since the global financial crisis. It has been so focused on macroeconomy, mostly protecting the euro, that it has lost grip of other issues, including external policy. The current crisis shows what the EU is trying to do with its member-states — and that's what it did with regard to the eurozone, trying to bully its way through. What we see now is a backlash against that. The idea of restoring border controls and dismantling the Schengen zone is a pushback against Brussels and its undemocratic thinking, whereby member-states say that they still have the right to border control and their own immigration policy without being dictated from Brussels. Right now, there is a lot of posturing about this. If this actually goes further, it could have serious economic ramifications. Schengen is the best thing the EU has done up to

this point — it facilitates free labor and capital movement, and it's something to be proud of. It will be sad if it goes away.

Poland has reaped benefits of free movement of both capital and labor. Opening up the border with Germany has done wonders for Poland's manufacturing, technology development and foreign direct investment coming into Poland. Free labor movement helped more than just in a way of people leaving Poland — which is the headline story. It has also contributed to importing managerial know-how, which is still low here, bringing in Germans, Dutch and Brits who know how to run organizations, industrial farms and things like that. So, it's very important both ways. But the most important thing about it was the Poles had an opportunity to go out into the EU and be in the UK, the Netherlands and elsewhere, and taking advantage of the opportunities that have not yet generated themselves here. By the way, the fact that the Poles leave for other places creates opportunities for Ukrainians on the labor market.

## “The challenge for the EU is to develop a strong European voice in security policy”



**BASTIAN GIEGERICH**

**Director of Defence and Military Analysis at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, London**

I think the first thing to recognize from the perspective of the EU is that the security environment is now much more challenging. And the challenge for the EU is to develop a strong European voice in security policy. At this point, the EU is not well placed to deliver that sort of

contribution because it has internal challenges, as well as a bit of disillusionment among EU member-states with regard to the instruments of common policy, and specifically the Common Security and Defense Policy.

In theory, the greatly promising aspect of the EU as a security actor is the ability to combine civilian instruments ranging from diplomacy and aid to civilian crisis management, with the military crisis management tools — bringing all that under one roof. The problem with that is that this has not yet materialized in reality. NATO, by contrast, is a military organization and does not have these civilian capabilities. It is a strong actor, but it doesn't have the other side which, I think, is also necessary in solving today's security challenges as they are not exclusively of military nature. The EU has potential in that, but it doesn't realize it or bring it to life in practical

terms. Optimists would probably add “yet” to this. I'm more skeptical than that.

By June 2016, the EU will present a new “EU Global Strategy”. What I think it will say is that the world is a much more contested and complex place, so the EU needs to get better at coordinating its mechanisms and means, and think about how it can make a contribution in this new environment. The problem is that this is not really a concrete guide for action. The document will probably be something short and readable, it will be a contribution to the conversation, but I don't think it will be a breakthrough guide for action after which the EU will move into a different sphere of security policy.

With regard to managing crises that have civilian and military aspects to them, the EU itself has no means. It needs to use the capabilities of its member-states in order to act. And very often it can do so as an entity only when one or two member-states take a strong lead position. Meanwhile, the countries that do leading positions on specific issues have to make sure that the others feel included in the process and their voice is heard, their interests are respected. Otherwise, once some member-states feel that it's not the case, finding a compromise becomes more difficult.

## “The greatest risk we are facing now is the lack of solidarity and cohesion inside the EU”



**SVEN BISCOP**

**Director of Europe in the World program at Egmont — Royal Institute for International Relations in Brussels; member of the Executive Academic Board of the EU's European Security and Defence College (ESDC)**

The answer to the current crises is not in NATO, but in countries' own policy towards refugees, and it's a diplomatic one. It lies on more of an EU level.

It is true that the countries closer to Russia have a different perception of its threat than those farther

from it. Western European members believe that we have to be cautious about Russia, but at the same time we shouldn't overstate its military threat to EU and NATO territory, unlike in the case of Ukraine. The feeling in Brussels is rather as follows: ok, Putin tries to shift the competition into the military field. That's where he thinks he is strong. But we should keep it in the diplomatic and economic fields, where he is weak. The more we repeat the anxious message that Russia is a great threat to Europe, the more we play into Putin's hands. This is my feeling. However, this is not to minimize it.

I was lecturing at the Baltic Defense College — they know that there is not

enough interest in Europe to escalate with Russia, and that the only answer to its intentions can be comprehensive actions of diplomacy, economy and military, with the focus probably lying on the diplomatic and economic aspects. We are not going to war with Russia.

Overall, I don't think NATO sees any real military threats to itself today. I don't think Russia poses a military threat to us directly, which can't be said about the case of Ukraine of course. There is a threat of terrorism for us as we've seen from attacks in Paris and Brussels. But that's not a vital threat that put the survival of our countries and models of society at risk. When I speak of threats here, I mean a risk of violence.

The greatest risk we are facing now is the lack of solidarity and cohesion inside the EU, evidenced among other things by the coming to power of political forces in some countries that see a solution to problems in cutting themselves off the EU. That very clearly undermines the EU as a political entity and an actor.



## “The challenge for NATO was always to do different angles at the same time”

**BEN NIMMO**  
Adjunct Fellow at CEPA, Washington; Senior Fellow of the Institute for Statecraft, London; former lead press officer on Russia and Ukraine issues for NATO

NATO member-state defence ministers are meeting on February 10-11. They are looking at two main angles — Eastern Europe and the South-East, the Mediterranean and ISIS. The East is basically about the Russian issue as the main concern of the Baltics, the Poles and the Bulgarians. The South-Eastern aspect focuses on Syria, the Mediterranean. The challenge for NATO was always to do different angles at the same time. It will be interesting to look at what the ministers say in the next few days. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg just announced that they have agreed on the principle of an enhanced forward presence of NATO forces in the Eastern part of the alliance, and an improved ability to send reinforcements. He said that it would be a multinational presence, and that it would be rotational. That's quite interesting, and new. Before, NATO hadn't had any kind of consistent on-ground presence of combat troops there. Last year, they decided to set up NATO Force Integration Units in Baltic States. But they are not combat units. My understanding is that what NATO ministers are talking about now is potentially combat troops, although Stoltenberg said that the details are still to be decided. And that would be the first time that the Alliance has had combat troops stationed there.

If it is combat troops, I expect Russia will accuse NATO of breaching the 1997 NATO-Russia Founding Act. Stoltenberg said that the decision is “fully in line” with NATO's international obligations. What the Act says is

that NATO promises not to carry out “additional permanent stationing of substantial combat forces”, “in the current and foreseeable security environment” as it was in 1997, but instead to ensure “the necessary interoperability, integration and capability for reinforcement” for collective defence. My impression is that NATO would still be sticking to the letter of the agreement, but it's likely that Russia will accuse NATO of breaching the agreement. Stoltenberg said he's planning to meet Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on the margins of the Munich Security Conference this weekend, so we'll see if the meeting goes ahead, and how Lavrov reacts.

At the same time, there are other issues on the agenda. There have just been talks between Turkey and Germany about NATO doing more about migrants crossing the Aegean. That hasn't been a formal request yet, but they are discussing this now and Stoltenberg said he might be able to announce something as early as 11 February. That would be another thing for NATO to do potentially in the South-East, at the same time as putting some boots on the ground or bases in Eastern Europe. There is also talk of NATO providing AWACS aerial surveillance and coordination aircrafts not directly to the campaign in Syria, but what the Americans reportedly asked for is for the Alliance to send its AWACS to the areas where national AWACS are currently working. So, it wouldn't be NATO directly involved in Syria, but it would still be doing something there.



## “Now national interests are weighing more than collective interest and solidarity”

**EVERT SOMER**  
Former NATO Spokesman for Civil Emergency Planning

The EU has been struggling with the refugee problem enormously since people started coming here. This is an external aspect, but it is having an impact on the internal one: it carries the risks for the EU. What I mean by this is that every country wants to benefit from being member of the club. But not everybody wants to share the same share of burden. However, both in the EU and in NATO you have to carry together the burden of a certain project. NATO is a project of collective defense where everyone has to contribute in an appropriate way. The same goes for the EU.

Then it fuels the tendency for nationalism. In the EU and within NATO countries have always had national interests. But now these national interests are weighing more on the positions nations are taking than collective interest and solidarity.

This may have to do with the fact that people don't always believe in the EU and think, what can there be better for them. However, if you look at the life of an average EU citizen 60 years ago and now, we are bathing in richness. We have never had a life as good as it is now. So, politicians should make this clear. But a lot of them are, too, against the EU. That leaves good-willing politicians less room to maneuver — after all, they want to be re-elected again. So, now foreign ministers of the founding countries are sitting together in Rome (for the Treaty of Rome that of-

ficially established the European Economic Community was signed in the city in 1957 — Ed.) to discuss the project started 60 years ago and how we can make things in it better, but not let it derail.

How do we improve cohesion — I don't have an answer. Look at my own country — the Netherlands. It is going to have the referendum on the DCFTA Agreement between the EU and Ukraine on April 6. Why do they do this? Because they have a problem with the influence of the EU. I don't think that the organizers have that much of a problem with the DCFTA with Ukraine. They could well pick other agreements — with Georgia or Moldova — that went through parliament on the same day. But Ukraine has a different profile because of MH17, the war in Ukraine. That's a tool to mobilize people. Still, I don't think it's against the Ukrainians. It's rather against the EU.

And then I ask myself the question: all these people complain about having no influence on European decision-making. But if you look at the number of people voting for the European Parliament, it's always extremely low. If they don't bother to go to vote for the EP, why do they complain? What should be done is that every politician — doesn't make a difference where he/she comes from — should, first of all, not act for national interests to always be first. And, secondly, not act as if Brussels is a threat.

# Special privileges

In shaping a deal to suit British interests, the EU may be storing up trouble for itself

If Britain adhered to Groucho Marx's dictum of never joining a club willing to have him as a member, it would be on its way out of the European Union. The "renegotiation" of Britain's EU membership pursued by David Cameron, the prime minister, has been a fanciful exercise designed to keep his Conservative Party in check. But it has at least forced Britain's EU partners to accept that, if pushed, they are better off with the infuriating islanders as part of the family. The EU, said Bild, an exuberant German tabloid, would be "spiritually" poorer after a Brexit (even if that may be read as a plea not to be left with the French and Italians).

The paper was responding to a draft settlement for Britain sent to EU governments last week by Donald Tusk, president of the European Council. Mr. Cameron aims to convert Mr. Tusk's paper into a deal during a summit of EU leaders on February 18th-19th, and then put Britain's membership to a referendum, probably in June. There is plenty of time for hiccups before then. The Poles and others are grumbling about an "emergency brake" that allows Britain to restrict benefit payments to working EU immigrants. France is suspicious about safeguards for non-euro members. Last week Martin Schulz, president of the European Parliament, warned an audience in London that Britain had tested Europe's patience. He and his fellow lawmakers could hold up the legislation needed to implement parts of the deal. Mr. Tusk himself admits that the situation is "fragile".

But broadly, although Mr. Cameron has taken a hammering at home over the draft, the signs in Europe look good. Few seem in the mood for a showdown; even the Poles are less obstreperous than expected. Mr. Cameron's peers decided that they needed to give him enough good-ies for him to make his case to voters. And the prime minister secured some victories that many had argued were beyond his reach, even if they hardly amount to the fundamental change in Britain's membership that he once promised.

For that Mr. Cameron can thank the litany of woes afflicting Europe. Next to security fears, euro-zone sclerosis and the worst migrant crisis the EU has ever known, Britain's little problem looks eminently solvable—and the departure of an economic and foreign-policy heavyweight an accident best avoided. Mr. Cameron helped by steadily restricting the scope of his demands (see article). And the dread prospect, should Britain vote to leave, of spending years in painful negotiations over an exit settlement probably did Mr. Cameron no harm. When everything else is falling apart, says a European official, at least the Britain talks give us a chance to get something right.

Where does this leave the rest of Europe? Mr. Tusk's great fear was that other countries would seek their own special treatment during the renegotiation: a carve-out from climate rules for the Poles, say, or a more lenient fiscal regime for the periphery. So worried were the deal's brokers that they explicitly warned some governments not to try any funny business during the talks.

And by and large, apart from Catalonia's chancer of a president (who mused that he could exploit the flexibility the EU showed with Britain in his bid for independence from Spain), they did not. Indeed, the most contentious elements of the Tusk deal seem designed to avoid such antics. Much of the package consists of clarifications of existing law designed to soothe British anxieties without upsetting the workings of the EU (or tampering with its treaties). A "red card" granting groups of national parliaments the right to block legislation, for example, gives Mr. Cameron something to boast about. But the threshold of 55% of parliaments means it will rarely, if ever, be used.

Most strikingly, the legislation that will satisfy Mr. Cameron's obsessive demand to deny in-work benefits to migrants for four years will be crafted to limit its application beyond British shores. The European Commission, which will draft the law once the governments have struck their deal, has even stated that Britain satisfies the criteria for pulling the emergency brake before specifying what they are. Downing Street could not resist crowing about this concession before it was announced.

## THEN EVERYONE WILL WANT ONE

Thus does the circle look squared. Mr. Cameron will probably win a deal that he feels able to sell to British voters. Assuming there are no nasty accidents at referendum time, the rest of the EU reduces its list of crises by one without fatally damaging itself in the process. Could this turn out to be that rarest of beasts: a European diplomatic triumph?

Not quite. Mr. Cameron says other countries can enjoy the fruits of his renegotiation, but few will. Apart from a rule allowing governments to pay lower child benefits to parents with children abroad (which migrant-worker magnets such as Germany may exploit), most EU countries do not care about the provisions Mr. Cameron negotiated. This is a deal to satisfy British concerns.

Alas, that may be the problem. A package designed as an improvement for the whole machine might be presented as a one-off. But special treatment for the British sets a precedent. The Italians might cite it to pursue their vendetta against the fiscal limitations of the Stability and Growth Pact. Easterners could call for exemptions from refugee-sharing schemes. Previous special deals (such as the Danish opt-outs of the Maastricht Treaty of 1992) did not have this effect, but they were struck in happier times. Today the EU is under siege from populists looking to bring the edifice down, and joint projects like the passport-free Schengen zone are in grave danger.

Still, before all that British voters will have to be seduced by their prime minister's diplomatic dance. So far, despite the EU showing Britain that it wants it inside the club, many Britons still seem distinctly unimpressed. Mr. Cameron, hoisting his renegotiation prize triumphantly, does not want to follow Groucho's example. But there is no guarantee that the electorate will agree. ■





# Róbert Ondrejcsák:

«Visegrad countries need to support Ukraine in its NATO-integration in case your country will decide to follow this path»

Interviewed  
by Vitalii  
Rybak

**R**óbert Ondrejcsák, former State Secretary of the Slovak Republic's Ministry of Defense, currently Director of the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA), a Bratislava-based international relations and security think-tank, spoke to *The Ukrainian Week* about strategic goals of the Visegrad Group, Ukraine's NATO-membership and reforms in the Ukrainian army.

**In the 1990s, the main goal of V4 was Euro-Atlantic integration. Now, when Visegrad countries have become members of the EU and NATO, what is the strategic goal of the Group?**

The Visegrad Group covers a lot of issues. It would be a mistake to reduce it to one particular field – V4 works on many projects in terms of security, energy, infrastructure and education. We are doing scientific research together. Common security is very important for us: since January 1, 2016, Visegrad Battlegroup within the EU framework, which is the flagship project for our security cooperation, is in the standby mode for six months.

There is also an International Visegrad Fund which provides financing for different cultural, scientific and educational purposes. Visegrad countries also have common interest in stabilization of their neighborhood—Eastern Europe. Ukraine is of course the most important part of it, but also the countries of the Western Balkans and South Caucasus.

**What exactly is the Visegrad Battlegroup? How is it organized and what functions does it have?**

Battlegroups of the EU reached full operational capability in 2007. It's not a permanent unit, every six months a different group of countries creates two common military units. In 2011, defense ministers of Visegrad Group at their meeting in Levoča, Slovakia, agreed on the creation of the Visegrad Battlegroup, to have it in stand-by mode in the first half of 2016, with Poland as a lead nation.

The Battlegroup consists of almost 4,000 soldiers and is basically a rapid reaction force of the European Union. It is organized under the leadership of Poland, but other countries are contributing significantly. The biggest challenge of the BG is their potential deploy-

**Dr. Róbert Ondrejcsák** holds PhD in International Relations, M.A. in Political Science, History and Philosophy. He currently serves as Director of the Centre for European and North Atlantic Affairs (CENAA). He was State Secretary of Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic, where he led the process of Strategic Defence Review and preparation of the White Book on Defence. Dr. Ondrejcsák was responsible for security policy, NATO and EU issues, as well as international multi-lateral and bilateral cooperation.

ment: they were never deployed in almost a decade of existence.

#### **Is there a possibility of the Visegrad Group expansion for deep cooperation with Ukraine?**

Ukraine is a very important partner of the Visegrad Four—there are many possibilities for cooperation. For example, chiefs of staff of Visegrad Group and Ukraine signed an agreement in Brussels, last autumn, which states that Ukraine will join the Visegrad Battlegroup by providing air transport, a capability which is very much needed for the V4.

#### **How have Ukraine's chances for joining NATO change since the beginning of the war with Russia? Will the freezing of armed conflict in Donbas affect these chances?**

It is one of the biggest strategic changes in the region that support for NATO-membership increased significantly in Ukraine during the last few years. It rose from approximately 20% to approximately 2/3 of all voters. Such a wide support is crucial—there is no NATO-membership without it. Still, that is not the only criteria.

First of all, Ukrainian government has to decide how it will define the future of Ukrainian security. If Ukraine wants to join NATO, this intention should be declared on the political level—as far as I know that didn't happen yet openly and clearly. Ukraine also has to meet certain political, economic and military criteria.

I am absolutely sure that Visegrad countries need to support Ukraine in its NATO integration in case your country will decide to follow this path. The security of V4 cannot be separated from Ukrainian security; therefore, we will be more secure if Ukraine participates in the same structures as we do. But it is exclusively the decision of Ukraine. No one can influence it, not to mention to tell you to go or not to go to the Alliance. The conflict in the Donbas is crucial to solve, moreover, it cannot be left as a “frozen conflict”, which could place in Russia's hand a strong leverage over the future of Ukraine.

#### **Speaking about the reforms, how would you assess the development of the Ukrainian army since 2014?**

It is very difficult to reform the army when you are at war. Usually reforms are done during peace time on the basis of experience gained during the war, but we don't know when the war in Eastern Ukraine will end, therefore, it would be obviously a mistake to lose time and just wait with necessary reforms till it ends. A lot of improvements have already been made, but a lot of things still needs to be done. First and foremost, you

can still develop human resources and interoperability-related issues. Without proper military and civilian experts it would be almost impossible to move forward. Harmonization of defense planning procedures with NATO would also be an advantage—so there is still a lot of work to do.

#### **We can sometimes read in the European media that NATO invaded Russian geopolitical space and caused the conflict in this way. Do you see reason in such statements?**

What you describe now is strictly Russian narrative—that is how Russia addresses those issues. The Russian propaganda as part of informational war is very strong in Central-European countries. Surely we have to communicate with the Russians, but we also have to set strict rules which must be valid for both sides. These include respect for full territorial integrity of each state, including Ukraine, and total independence in defining strategic orientation. If we are speaking about the future and foreign policy of Ukraine, no one except Ukrainians has a word. It is a sovereign right of every nation to choose its way. It seems quite ridiculous to me that someone is blaming NATO for starting the conflict in the Donbas—there is only one invading country, Russia. Only the Russians are to blame for the beginning of this war.

#### **Could the conflict with Ukraine define the future of Russia?**

It is very difficult to predict the future of Russia. We are not interested in a collapsing Russia—nobody wants to destroy this country, it is a false argument of Russian state propaganda oriented at the domestic audience. We just want a normal, predictable Russia that respects international law, does not attack its

**WE JUST WANT A NORMAL, PREDICTABLE RUSSIA THAT RESPECTS INTERNATIONAL LAW, DOES NOT ATTACK ITS NEIGHBORS, ANNEX NEARBY TERRITORIES AND CREATE FROZEN CONFLICTS OR PUPPET SATELLITE STATES**

neighbors, does not annex nearby territories and does not create frozen conflicts or puppet satellite states. The key to the Russian future lies in the actions of Russian leadership and citizens. If they chose aggressive behavior, sooner or later they will have to pay the price for that and not only in a form of economic problems, but also the overall crisis of the whole country and society, as a direct consequence of actions of the Russian leadership.

#### **How would you assess regional cooperation between Ukraine and Slovakia?**

The potential is much higher than reality—both sides miss a lot. The Ukrainian side failed to do a lot of reforms necessary for economic and social development, not only for the Euro-Atlantic integration. On the other hand, Slovakia did not pay enough attention to Ukraine for a long time—and that was a mistake because Ukraine is our biggest neighbor and it is impossible to divide our future from the Ukrainian one. ■

# An unloved child

Stanislav Kozliuk

Mykolayiv is a city of strong Soviet nostalgia. What saved it from becoming a capital of yet another “people’s republic”?

**T**he history of Mykolayiv was changed upside down with the efforts of local activists. In April 2014, they dismantled the tents of Novorossiya supporters when the police failed to do so. Later, they started volunteering and organized assistance to IDPs from Crimea and Donbas. Meanwhile, patriotism was becoming trendy here, following the pattern seen all over Ukraine. Back in 2013, the first festival of vyshyvanka, Ukraine’s traditional embroidered attire, was attended by 11 people. In 2015, about 10,000 showed up.

Still, the latest general elections in the oblast brought a landslide victory to the Opposition Bloc, mostly comprised of ex-Party of Regions members and considered an outright pro-Russian force. At the local elections in Mykolayiv, it won 26 seats out of 54. This is not 50%, but former Party of Regions actors can still veto fundamental issues.


"I would not say that the pro-Russian sentiment in the region is now an urgent problem, even though the Opposition Bloc has won local elections in the oblast. This happened primarily not because people supported the former Party of Regions, Russia, or Putin. It is rather the reflection of the disappointment in the current authorities and specifically Petro Poroshenko. So, this was an anti-government vote of sorts, expressing their mistrust of Petro Poroshenko Bloc rather than their support for the Opposition Bloc. The situation with mayoral elections in Mykolayiv was similar: people voted against Ihor Dyatlov<sup>1</sup>, and not essentially in support of Oleksandr Senkevych," explained Dmytro Bashtovyi, Civil Network OPORA electoral programs coordinator in Mykolayiv Oblast.

He added that some part of the oblast’s population do believe in what the Russian television broadcasts, including stories about fascists coming to power in Kyiv. However, the number of such people is not critical.

"During the 2014 parliamentary election campaign (held under the mixed system—**Ed.**) the Poroshenko Bloc won in the first-past-the-post element, while the Opposition Bloc gained the majority in the party-list component. However, we can’t say that Mykolayiv Oblast changed its colors from blue and white (previously used as the Party of Region’s colors—**Ed.**) to something different overnight," said Yevheniya Mateychuk, an activist and head of the local branch of the Democratic Alliance, one of the new parties.

"However, old people remain in places and they stick to the same old schemes. Say, you need to clean the streets that are crucial to the city’s traffic. You can always find private that will come and do the job. But, strange as it may seem, you face sabotage in that regard," she added.

The problem is that, even though a new mayor was elected, old functionaries, from department managers to



**Ready for restart.** With Lenin gone from the city’s central square, Mykolayiv has yet to see a transformation into a success-story

directors of utility enterprises, remain unchanged. And, one way or another, they are linked to those who were in power before the post-Maidan reshuffle.

"We had enormous snowfall recently. And we have the old acting head of public utilities department and his deputy. Every evening we would come to them and demand their plan for cleaning the streets for the night and the next day. We looked for companies that could help if the utility enterprises failed to cope. However, the work was sabotaged by Valery Polozhenko. He is the City Council deputy from Nash Krai party linked to Ihor Dyatlov. Accordingly, blocking or undermining the work of public utilities played into certain hands," explained Mateychuk.

Still, it is safe to say that the City Council has been revamped. In particular, thanks to the arrival of 10 people from the Samopomich party. Poroshenko Bloc also brought new faces: those who fought in the east and businessmen. Surprisingly, there were also quite a lot of first-timers on the City Council posts coming from the Opposition Bloc.

"The Nash Krai (Our Region) party composition in the oblast was tailored to appeal to public-sector em-



ployees. Their candidates included about 30 former Party of Regions members. They nominated school directors and university presidents to the City Council, and invested heavily in the election campaign. However, people did not vote for them eventually. Another political force that can be associated with the Opposition Bloc is Vidrodzhennya (Renaissance) party. They launched a good campaign and looked for candidates in the courtyards, literally. They would choose someone who had the support of the neighborhood and nominate him. This did bring some results," said Bashtoviy.

As for the mayoral election, Oleksandr Senkevych, the opponent of the Ihor Dyatlov, was little known among the civil society. Nevertheless, as activists point out, the participation of the Samopomich candidate against the nominee of the Opposition Bloc accused of separatism polarized the voters. Eventually, he turned into an "incarnation of evil" and the embodiment of the Yanukovich regime in many voters' eyes. This created a good background for Senkevych, who had clean hands in this respect. His campaign was not very well coordinated, but he eventually won by a margin of almost 20,000 votes.

"I would not say that changes in Mykolayiv are that visible now. District administrations and their heads are unchanged. Only their deputies have been replaced. Senkevych obviously lacks managerial experience in politics. However, he is trying to improve the situation and looking for investment. Mykolayiv Development Agency has been established, with the task to find money, attract foreign funds, implement projects, etc. Recently, we received funding from the Canadian Embassy," said Bashtoviy.

City residents are reluctant to talk about its large enterprises and businessmen. They nostalgically remember Soviet times, when the city had a special strategic status and was closed, and nearly built an aircraft carrier. If you ask them about current representatives of big business, they can hardly name any names. Some recall Mykola Kruhlov, the former head of the Oblast State Administration and an MP. He is called the "enforcer" of the Yanukovich regime in Mykolayiv Oblast and is linked to the infamous raiding scandal over the Kornatsky agricultural firm near the village of Chausove Druhe that took place in the summer of 2013. Then, Arkady Kornatsky's employees who worked in the field were attacked by young people carrying pump shotguns. Five employees were injured. Kruhlov himself denied his connection to the incident. When Yanukovich fled, Kruhlov announced that he had broken up with the Party of Regions, because it had no "leaders of the national scale." "Today Kruhlov is supposedly retired, even though it is possible that he still has an impact on the situation in the region. For example, Dyatlov's family has ties to him. Kruhlov could influence the oblast both through the Opposition Bloc and Nash Krai," Mateychuk explains.

"There is no "overlord" here, like Ihor Kolomoisky in Dnipropetrovsk or Rinat Akhmetov in Zaporizhzhia. I recently met with mayors, we discussed the grant program that Vinnytsya is taking part in. I proposed to include Mykolayiv in the program, but unfortunately, there is no one to promote the oblast's interests in Kyiv," Oleksandr Senkevych shared his views.

However, today Mykolayiv Oblast has a chance to move away from the agricultural stereotype and start

developing tourism. Civic activists point out that since the annexation of Crimea, the flow of Ukrainians looking for vacation destinations in the region increased. These include the Kinburn Spit, the historic town of Ochakiv, and the two national parks. Infrastructure is the major problem so far.

"We need to have infrastructure in place for investors to come. But we don't have it. We held meetings at the Ministry of Infrastructure, discussed options to find funds to repair roads, because this year the oblast budget was reduced. And tourists need to somehow get to their holiday destinations. We need to fix the airport. While Kherson already has flights to Istanbul, Mykolayiv is just starting to sort out its own mess. Tourism development is out of question until we have resolved these problems. We should invite investors when the infrastructure is ready. So far, the city has established a working group to somehow deal with this issue. But it is too early to talk about any huge development," Mateychuk explained.

## EVEN THOUGH A NEW MAYOR WAS ELECTED, MYKOLAYIV HAS KEPT THE OLD FUNCTIONARIES, FROM DEPARTMENT MANAGERS TO HEADS OF UTILITY ENTERPRISES

As for the large enterprises, most of them are located in Mykolayiv and related to shipbuilding. They were all affected by the collapse of the Soviet Union, so that some are already bankrupt, while others are on their way to bankruptcy. In the 1990s here, like in most oblasts, factories were dismantled for scrap metal, and those that remained are mainly involved in repairing and building private yachts. For example, the Black Sea Shipyard went out of business two years ago. The 61 Communards Shipbuilding Yard now has 1,500 employees, but no large orders, even though it is part of Ukroboronprom, the state-owned weapons and military equipment concern. Zorya-Mashproekt production complex, a producer of gas turbines, until recently worked closely with Russia, selling about 90% of its products there. Those contracts were terminated, and the employees are worried about losing their jobs. Building modern large ships is currently not on the agenda of local plants. The only two companies that continue stable operation are Nibulon, a wheat cultivation plant, and Russian Aluminum which partially subsidizes Mykolayiv and is one of its core enterprises.

"We all need success stories, at least at the city level. Mykolayiv has to set an example for the entire oblast of how to solve problems. If we manage to do something similar to what Vinnytsya did, we will not discuss the issue of tourism. We will have to solve it and attract investors. Mykolayiv is a neglected city. It has been unloved. If its previous managers made it degenerate to this level, it's hard to believe that they loved it. It is a mess of kiosks, billboards, and bad architecture of newly-constructed real estate," Mateychuk complains. "Nevertheless, we have a fairly green city, two rivers and a large coastal area. If we can put it right, we will have vast space for recreation and tourism. Mykolayiv is a nice place to do some serious work." ■

<sup>1</sup> Previously local businessman and chair of the Oblast State Council, Ihor Dyatlov ran for the mayoral office from the Opposition Bloc against Oleksandr Senkevych nominated by Samopomich in the fall of 2015. In June 2015, Mykolayiv Prosecutor's Office launched investigation into his involvement in the separatist movement based on the respective collective petition by Mykolayiv civil activists. In November, Oleksandr Zakharchenko, the self-proclaimed leader of the "Donetsk People's Republic" said that Dyatlov participated in the conflict between separatists and pro-Ukrainian residents of Mykolayiv in the winter of 2014.

# The Black Sea outpost

Roman Malko

How political preferences changed in Kherson Oblast since the first years of independence and after the Maidan

It is quite an interesting region, whose residents, like in many other places in Ukraine, wholeheartedly believe that their land is almost a 100% miniature copy of Ukraine: it has its own pro-Ukrainian west, pro-Russian east, a conventional Donbas, and even the Dnipro that divides it in two parts. The picturesque miniature Ukraine in the Black Sea steppes owes its existence to several waves of colonization, but was especially affected by the last two. After the mass deaths of the locals in the 1932-1933 Holodomor, many ethnic Russians were brought here to replace the extinct Ukrainians. After the World War II, many people earlier deported to Siberia and Central Asia upon accusations of being accomplices with the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) were resettled here. Entire villages were relocated and settled mostly on the right bank of the Dnipro. As a result, most residents of Beryslav and Bilozerka counties (central-western and western parts of Kherson Oblast) were always pro-Ukrainian. Historically, this was the land of Zaporizhzhya Kozaks who set up their wintering settlements there long before the city of Kherson was founded.



## ONE MAJOR PROBLEM FOR KHERSON, EVEN AFTER THE CHANGE OF AUTHORITIES THROUGH A SERIES OF ELECTIONS, IS THE RESILIENCE OF THE OLD BUREAUCRATIC APPARATUS

The difference between the residents of the right bank and the left bank of Kherson Oblast is stark, local historians say, and is also based on the traditional way of life stemming from both historical and geographical features. On the left bank, especially in the steppe villages that are largely dependent on the centralized government support, where unemployment rates are high and farmsteads subsist on shipped water, very often everything is decided by a village baron that most of the time sides with the authorities. In fact, a specific modern form of serfdom has emerged there. On the other hand, in places where the kozak traditions were somehow preserved, with the later addition of the insurgent spirit that came with those resettled from Western Ukraine, the residents usually strive for independence, which also manifests in their lifestyles. An independent wealthy farmer character has been cultivated here for centuries.

However, the above division is fuzzy and rather nominal. Everywhere inclusions can be found that are at odds with the overall atmosphere. For example, Nova Kakhovka, a town built in the 1950s as a "socialist city" was inhabited by workers coming from all over the Soviet Union. It still has plenty of military retirees, and it is not surprising that the electoral preferences of this part of Kherson Oblast have little to do with either the free or entrepreneurial mindset. Henichesk county, which until recently was considered entirely pro-Russian, is not quite like that. It has a sizable Crimean Tatar community, and has become the first destination for the refugees from the occupied Crimea.

After Ukraine gained independence, Kherson Oblast remained a red zone and the base for the communists, socialists and their sister Peasant Party for quite a long time. This was most manifest during the 1999 presidential election, when the two main contenders were the then-incumbent President Leonid Kuchma and the Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko. Kherson supported the latter, but Kuchma won the election, and the oblast owes its subsequent decommunization to him to some extent. Serious staff purges took place in the oblast. As a result of this "administrative leapfrog," as Kuchma called it, Kherson Oblast left the red zone.

Ever since, however, there has been opposition to the government in Kherson Oblast. First, the Socialist Party of Ukraine enjoyed relatively strong support in the oblast for a while, and Stanislav Nikolayenko, one of the associates of the party leader Oleksandr Moroz. It all ended when Moroz stroke a deal with the Party of Regions in 2006. The electorate felt betrayed and no longer voted for them. Later, a similar story happened to Yulia Tymoshenko's *Batkivshchyna* party, which, despite the impressive support in the Kherson Oblast, failed to live up to its promises and had to make way for more radical nationally oriented parties. However, this was a little later, after the Maidan.

Pro-Ukrainian parties were also present in the oblast. They were always present here ever since Ukraine gained independence, but never had a massive support, and therefore were not a threat to the authorities. In Kherson Oblast, experts say, the authorities never fought with the patriotic opposition, which always had its clearly defined niche, winning a steady 20-30% of the votes. Some even see in this collision a kind of an informal nonaggression pact: the pro-government



forces had all property and power in their hands, while the cultural field was left to the Ukrainian wing. There were barely any other options. The most pro-Ukrainian part of Kherson Oblast is probably in its southern part where 82% of Ukrainians lived according to the 2001 census. Active and, most importantly, ongoing cultural efforts of the pro-Ukrainian forces eventually brought unexpected results. In 2014, the gradual increase in the numbers of conscious citizens resulted in a quantum leap, and Kherson Oblast, which the ignorant credited with being part of the "Russian World," was overwhelmed by a wave of patriotism while local political forces switched roles.

In the early 2000s, according to a survey conducted in Kherson, most people wanted to see Putin as their president, and were for some reason dissatisfied with their own. However, when Putin attacked Ukraine, occupying a part of Kherson Oblast for a while, these dreams were gone for good.

In general, the electorate of Kherson Oblast has not changed. There is still 25% of the pro-Russian population, 30% are pro-Ukrainian, while the rest are qualified as passive majority. Shocked and threatened by war, this majority immediately found its position, and the patriotic Ukrainian political parties that always had the second place suddenly came out on top. This was a major breakthrough of 2014, which started with the presidential elections, continued with the parliamentary elections, and was consolidated during the local ones. The pro-Russian voters either did not go to the polls or voted for the Opposition Bloc, Nash Krai, Vidrozhennya, or the Local Self-Government Party. One way or another, for the first time in many years, the regional electoral tradition was broken. In Kherson, the long-term Mayor Volodymyr Saldo, who had often been accused of corruption, but was seen as a fairly good manager, was voted down in favor of Volodymyr Mykolayenko supported by the local Maidan. There have also been changes at the oblast level. The head of the

Oblast Council today is Andriy Putilov, who ran for the Mayor of Kherson several times, ending up in Parliament in 2012 as the candidate of the united opposition.

The oblast elites, as expected, drifted towards the Poroshenko Bloc, while the patriotic electorate, which previously voted mostly for Batkivshchyna, this time had a swing to radical political forces. First of all, this was due to the split of Batkivshchyna. One of the elders of the local party branch, the current Mayor of Kherson Volodymyr Mykolayenko, who had considerable support in the city, was expelled from the party. Secondly, it acquired new members who had no previous association with it. For example, a little-known businessman Vladyslav Manger, who allegedly had been an assistant advisor to a former Party of Regions member and today's separatist Oleksiy Zhuravko, became No2 in the party and its main sponsor. Although this rotation was blessed by Yulia Tymoshenko herself, many voters did not like it. Batkivshchyna's failure in Kherson is an indicator of the level of political responsibility. Nature abhors a vacuum, so the vacant place was immediately filled by Svoboda, Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, and UKROP.

Today, there are two-way efforts at the level of oblast and municipal authorities to establish constructive work. Head of the Oblast Council Andriy Putilov is focusing on stabilization, trying to reach compromises with all the key players, and has been successful so far. He is supported by Poroshenko Bloc, Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, Nash Krai, and even the Opposition Bloc. The representatives of all these political forces hold some top positions in the oblast. Although the balance is still rather shaky, it is more noticeable compared to the municipal level where Kherson Mayor Mykolayenko failed to find allies. This definitely hinders the city's development. Kherson's residents are starting to grumble that the Mayor lacks a firm hand and initiative. Another major problem for Kherson, which is most often quoted, is the resilience of the old bureaucratic apparatus. Despite the new government and many more young people in authority teams—up to 70% in some places, like Kherson—old red directors remain in place. There has been no staff turnover that is desperately needed. Clearly, the oblast feels a dramatic lack of cadres and skills. But experts believe that the patriotic and active youth, even with no adequate qualifications or management skills, could still replace old corrupt professionals. Such change would bring better results over time.

Today, Kherson Oblast is going through difficult times. By a twist of fate, it became a border region (with the Russian-occupied Crimea) facing lots of new challenges it has to address. However, despite all the problems, the situation here still inspires optimism. The wave of decommunization washed away dozens of Communist idols from the oblast's map for good, and the sentiments of the population not only swung towards patriotism, but were also seriously reformatted, hopefully forever. It looks like Kherson Oblast will never again become a red zone or a potential brick in the "Russian World" construct. ■



# "Get lost, bro!"

Kateryna Barabash, Moscow

How are Russian liberals different from Russian nationalists?

**W**e used to think that the watershed in Russian society ran along the red line that separates the 86% from the 14%. If that were the case, people with liberal views would be able to sleep with a clear conscience. But how can anyone sleep peacefully when the main question irking Russian liberals is: "If we're one people with Ukrainians, how come they hate us so much?" Fearful echoes of their frustration with Ukrainians have been heard for some time in Russian liberal circles. Even during the Euromaidan, many in Moscow were whispering: "We understand it all, but what a shame that they're jumping around to anti-Russian slogans down there." And these whispers were going around among liberal and pro-Ukrainian folks, not among *krymnashis*,<sup>1</sup> vatniks or nationalists.

While they sincerely supported the Maidan, Russian democrats resented the unbrotherly "fuhgeddaboutit" attitude towards the shared "fraternal past." And Ukrainians had to explain to them that the anti-Russian slogans emerged after the Federation Council gave the Russian president the go-ahead to send his army into Ukraine if he didn't like what he saw. "So what?" they responded with pouting lips. "That's the President, that's the Federation Council. Normal Russians had nothing to do with it." Yet, two years ago, being offended out loud was awkward. The mourning and grief over those killed on the Maidan was not over when bloodshed started in the East.

In truth, any war that isn't waged next to our homes eventually becomes familiar and slow-moving. The armed conflict in Donbas has gradually stopped being a sore point for Russian liberals and once again, they are offended that Ukrainians don't see them as brothers. On the contrary, Ukrainians more and more can be heard saying, "Get lost! Don't bother us." It's just so unpleasant. "We're one people because I also like Ukrainian kovbasa," writes well-known Russian journalist Olga Romanova and just about sheds tears over comments posted by Ukrainians: "Bug off with your brotherhood already." Another well-known media personality calls on the Ukrainian government to wake up and stop suspecting all Russian citizens on its territory of engaging in sabotage. He then reminds Ukrainians that he personally has risked his own freedom defending his "fraternal people." A third writer concludes that Ukraine is being run by the same cottonheads—vatniks—except they're flying the blue-and-yellow flag. So now the term "vyshyvata" has appeared among Russian liberals, meaning embroidered cottonheads. The general tone of these comments comes down to the same thing: "I'm not killing Ukrainians. I actually love them. There shouldn't be any war because we're brothers. So just stop picking on me and go after those who keep yelling "Krym nash" and 'Free Donbas!'"

This unexpected surge of brotherly feelings has washed away any patina of dignity from liberalism in the Russian Federation, revealing the infantilism that causes the Rus-



**Liberal imperialism.** Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the likeminded Russians still see Kyiv and the rest of Ukraine as "our land"

sian democrat, as Volodymyr Vynnychenko once famously put it, to stumble on the Ukrainian question. Russia's liberals held on for a long time, nearly two years. But in the end, they, too, stumbled.

Unable, actually, to explain wherein lies this much-touted "brotherhood" of the two peoples, they began to complain against Ukraine, saying, in effect, "It's your brothers you're offending with your 'get lost,' the ones who are championing your freedom from this end! We've come to you with open hearts and you tell us to get lost!"

## LIFE'S ROUGH, BROTHER.

The Russian liberal is presumably also a Russian for whom nothing Russian is strange—including the passion for freebies. The soulful "manilovness"<sup>2</sup> inherent in our latitude has somehow resulted in the Russian liberal being convinced that his good intentions are enough for others to love him, a holy national conviction that everyone else owes us something... This is the sense in which the Russian liberal has not gone far from his fellow Russian the nationalist. "I supported the Maidan and all you can say is 'Get lost'?! How's that possible? I wished you well. I even say 'in Ukraine' and not 'on Ukraine' as in 'on the steppes.' What the heck more do you want from me?! Besides, don't you owe me just a little because I treat you like an equal?"

And just try saying to them, "Buddy, tone it down a bit! We aren't obliged to love you just because you don't support the war in the East."

He'll be insulted, he'll start grumbling, and next thing you know he's posting in Facebook about the ungratefulness of his Ukrainian brother. "Honestly, how could you? We give you good advice at every step! Look here, we didn't say much against it when you invited Saakashvili to run Odesa. We were even close to being in favor and we let you exercise this whim. I mean, how many times have we told you how to build Ukraine? Countless times! And ev-

<sup>1</sup> "Krym nash" or "Crimea's ours" is the slogan Russians use to justify the illegal annexation

<sup>2</sup> Manilov is a character in Nikolai Gogol's *Dead Souls*. Referring to a dreamer or overly sentimental person, this surname echoes the verb "manity," meaning "to deceive."

<sup>3</sup> Obama chmuck.

ery time you insist on doing it your way. For pete's sake, our patience is running out. And what about that forum of intellectuals that you held last year in Kyiv...that was something to see! Our best minds show up and have everything all figured out for you: what you should and shouldn't do, what's 'good' and what's 'bad,' how to eliminate your corruption (when we haven't managed to weed our own out)... and you just insisted on your way."

The Russian nationalist is convinced that he should be loved just because he's Russian, a representative of the Great, the Holy, the Enigmatic... He doesn't see any connection between "*krymnash*" and the dollar being worth nearly 80 roubles, and is sincerely offended by the fact that "someone" is causing the currency of his country, the Russian Federation, to lose value in the outside world. He's certain that that he can make a mess anywhere on the plant and whoever fails say "Thank-you" for this is just a russophobe and an "obamachmo."<sup>3</sup>

It turns out that, even if they are somewhat smarter than the nationalists, Russian liberals are anything but their opposite. Their demands are simply more modest. Where the nationalist believes in his own exceptionalism without any basis, the liberal can justify his belief with serious arguments: he's against V.V. Putin and he's not killing Ukrainians. And that's it! That's the only difference. In all the other respects, he is just as offended when his 'younger brother' won't obey him and he cannot even imagine that he himself might be just as responsible for his country's misdeeds as Putin's supporters, *krymnashists* and *obamachmos*.

Indeed, "who's responsible" is one of the favorite talking points of Russian liberals today. Well, it's hard to

call it discussion when there are no real disputes around this and it's simply fashionable to nod about it: "I didn't vote for the current government. I didn't steal Crimea. I'm not fighting in Donbas. I don't think of the Ukrainian language as a distorted form of Russian... So to hell with all these Ukrainians who don't love me!"

The concept of collective responsibility is out of the question. It does not exist. There's only taking offense. Forget about how many years the word "German" was

## THE ARMED CONFLICT IN DONBAS HAS GRADUALLY STOPPED BEING A SORE POINT FOR RUSSIAN LIBERALS AND ONCE AGAIN, THEY ARE OFFENDED THAT UKRAINIANS DON'T SEE THEM AS BROTHERS

offensive in the USSR, although no one would dream of tossing German anti-fascists out of the history books. Yet an entire people is being prohibited from having its own national memory that can preserve the bloodbath at Baturyn and the destruction of the Zaporizhzhian Sich by Catherine II, and the stealing of Crimea, and the Donbas.

"But that wasn't me," you say? You're right, it wasn't you. But it's your country. Learn to take responsibility for the state to which you give the taxes that paid for tearing apart a neighboring country. You don't know how? You don't want to? You don't have any connection to it? Then you're no liberal, sir. You're just another armchair anti-putinist. ■



Schweizerische Eidgenossenschaft  
Confédération suisse  
Confederazione Svizzera  
Confederaziun svizra

Ambassade de Suisse en Ukraine

Under the auspices of the Embassy of Switzerland in Ukraine

# SCHOLA CANTORUM BASILIENSIS

Pearls of French Classicism

Classical pieces of 17th century composers:

Jean-Marie Leclair, Marin Marais, Thomas-Louis Bourgeois,  
François Couperin, Michel Lambert, Jean Philippe Rameau,  
Marc-Antoine Charpentier

Artists:

Aude Freyburger (soprano)  
Miriam Jorde Hompanera (oboe)  
Natalie Carducci (violin)  
Teodoro Baù (viola da gamba)  
Julio Caballero Pérez (harpsichord)

22/03  
19:00

Free entry. E-Mail registration required by 5 March at [kie.events@eda.admin.ch](mailto:kie.events@eda.admin.ch)  
Tchaikovsky National Music Academy of Ukraine, Kyiv, 1-3/11 Arkhitektora Gorodetsкого str.

n | w Fachhochschule Nordwestschweiz  
Schola Cantorum Basiliensis



Schola Cantorum Basiliensis  
Musik Akademie Basel



VIVA!

Тиждень

ЄДИНСТВЕННА

день

INSTITUT  
FRANÇAIS  
UKRAINE

УЛ: ПЕРШИЙ

FRANCOFONIE  
UKRAINE



Suisse.



# Traces of Islam in Western Ukraine

Mykhailo Yakubovych

The origins and the history of the Muslim community in Volyn



**The Tatar tower in Ostroh.** The dense Tatar community used to live around it

**W**hen we think of Islamic presence in Ukraine, Crimea is the first place to come to mind. The Crimean Khanate, which lasted for more than three centuries, ruled not only over the peninsula, but also over vast territories in Southern Ukraine, including parts of today's Donetsk, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson oblasts. The influence of the Ottoman Empire covered Mykolayiv and Odesa oblasts which at the end of the 18<sup>th</sup> century were home to the Nogai Horde. These lands were called Bucak (between the Danube and the Dniester) and Yedisian (between the Dniester and the Southern Bug). Some historians would also recall the Kamyanets Eyalet, which existed during the Ottoman rule in the south of the modern Khmelnytsky Oblast, the west of Vinnytsia Oblast and a part of Chernivtsi Oblast (1672–1699)—all in South-Western Ukraine. Today, Islam is mostly associated with the South-East of Ukraine, since the largest Muslim communities are left in the annexed Crimea and in the Donbas, and even migration to other oblasts has not changed the situation dramatically.

However, there is another page of Ukraine's history that is directly related to Muslims, but is rarely men-

tioned by the local academics. No textbook on the history of Ukraine today mentions the "Muslim nation" of the Polish or Lithuanian Tatars (the term "Western Tatars" is also used, while they called themselves Lipka Tatars). They lived in the territory of what is now South-Western Ukraine for over 500 years. Some villages and towns in the oblast had mosques where the texts of the Quran and other sacred books were copied, observed religious holidays, and developed unique folk traditions up until World War II. While Poland, Belarus and Lithuania have special research centers and publications dedicated to the heritage of the Western Tatars, in Ukraine the study of this nation's heritage is limited to several local studies. The opening in 2015 of an exhibition at the Books and Printing Museum in the city of Ostroh, Rivne Oblast, was probably the only special event in the years of independence. However, as is often the case with provincial cultural events, it received no publicity, even though some of the exhibits were rare and significant.

How did the Tatar settlements appear in the Ukrainian land, especially in the period when Islam was perceived as a threat as a result of aggression by the Horde's khans and later the Ottomans, Crimean Tatars, and Nogais?

There was another side to this coin. Despite the fact that in Ukrainian culture, the "infidels" were generally perceived as enemies, this was not always the case. Few historians would take seriously the famous "Letter of the Zaporozhian Cossacks in Reply to the Sultan of Turkey," knowing how Bohdan Khmelnytsky kowtowed to the Ottoman Caliph, praising him in his petitions and giving assurances of allegiance and other manifestations of respect. The authors of the 16–17<sup>th</sup> centuries, such as Ivan Vyshensky and Vasyl Surazky, found that Ottoman Muslims were less damaging to the Orthodox people than Catholics, and that the "Turks are more honest to God in at least some truth than the christened residents of the Commonwealth of the Two Nations" (Ivan Vyshensky, "Knyzhka" (Book)). The outright discrediting of Islam and the Muslims started after the Treaty of Pereyaslav in 1654, when a part of Ukrainian intellectuals became actively involved in building up Muscovy's imperial policy. The first anti-Islamic work of those times, the "Alkoran" by Ioanykiy Halyatovsky (Chernihiv, 1683), which contains various "prophecies" about the Tsar relieving all Orthodox churches of the rule of "Turks," carries a dedication to the Moscow tsars Ivan V and Peter I.

## THE ORIGINS OF MUSLIMS IN UKRAINE

Earlier, in the 14–16<sup>th</sup> centuries, the perception of the Muslims in Ukrainian lands was somewhat different.



One of the evidences was a series of joint actions against Poland by Khan Uzbek, the Muslim ruler of the Golden Horde, and Prince Boleslav Yuri II of Galicia–Volhynia in 1337–1340. Later, when Khan Tokhtamysh of the Horde (died in 1406) rebelled against Tamerlane and asked the Lithuanian Grand Duke Vytautas for asylum, his troops fought several battles alongside the Ruthenian magnates, including the battle of the Vorskla River (1399). One of Tokhtamysh's sons, Jalal ad-Din, took part in the Battle of Grunwald (1410), and the other, Haji-Girey, was put by the Lithuanians and Ruthenians on the Crimean throne, which gave rise to the Crimean Khanate as an independent state.

It is with Tokhtamysh and his troops that the history of the Muslim community in Ukraine begins. The supporters of this Khan spent some time in Kyiv province, and some Tatar garrisons began to settle down in the cities of the Right-Bank Ukraine, even Ukrainians were still fighting their brothers in faith elsewhere at that time (Princes Olelkovychi of Kyiv devastated the nearby Horde *ulus* in the mid-15<sup>th</sup> century). By the end of the 15<sup>th</sup> century, some Tatar settlements emerged in the territory of Poland, Lithuania, Belarus, and Northern Ukraine, with their own ways of life and various privileges. Their communities tried to develop their own culture in a new place. This was a relatively easy task, since for a nomadic nation, relocation to a new land was more of a routine. Moreover, given the military significance of these settlers, they did not have to undergo forcible Christianization.

The beginning of the 16<sup>th</sup> century marked the new era in the history of the Muslim population of Volyn. In 1512, defeated by Prince Kostyantyn of Ostroh near Vyshnevet, a large group of Perekop Tatars was taken captive. Already having some experience of providing asylum to Tatars escaping for various reasons, including internal conflicts, from the Crimean Khanate, the Prince actually turned them into allies by settling them in his lands and providing certain guarantees. At the beginning of the 17<sup>th</sup> century, according to some historical sources (such as the account of the papal nuncio Fulvio Ruggieri, "The Division of Ostroh" between the sons of Vasyl-Kostyantyn of Ostroh in 1603, inventories, etc.), Tatars had several settlements in that area—first and foremost, in the city of Ostroh, where they had a mosque, a cemetery and land plots, and where their community lived in the Tatar Street. Tatars also lived in the nearby villages of Khoriv, Rozvazh (in the modern Ostroh County, Rivne Oblast) and Pidluzhzhya (Dubno County, Rivne Oblast). In addition to that, the records for the late 17<sup>th</sup> century mention dense Tatar communities in what is today Khmelnytsky Oblast: in the villages of Novolabun (Polonne County) and Yuvkivtsi (Bilohirya County) and the towns of Polonne and Starokostyantyniv. There are also accounts of the "Tartar priests" and "Tatar hetmans." The former were obviously the imams of the mosques, who, besides the purely ceremonial responsibilities, also performed a rather broad variety of social functions, while the latter were local officials, who were responsible for the community to the Prince. A 1620 inventory enumerates the obligations of the Tatars: "To defend the lands, forests



**Rare evidence.** A tombstone on the Muslim cemetery in Ostroh

and borders and, if commanded by the elder, to stand guard in case of raids." Starokostyantyniv in 1636 had 60 Tatar houses, that is, several hundred people (since the town had a few thousand residents, this amounted to 5–10% of its population). The "Lutsk City Book" also mentions these people (under the year 1619), recounting those who served the family of the Ostroh princes. Small Tatar groups lived in the villages of the region, taking advantage of the protection provided by the princely house. In 1669, Polish king Michal Wisniowiecki issued a special charter, which confirmed the Volhynia Tatars' titles of nobility, and preserved the names of some of their community leaders, including an Ostroh resident Romodan Milkomanovych, who petitioned for the support of his brethren in faith.

In 1600, the Latin-language writer Simones Pecalides thus described the customs of the Tatars: "...Here in Ostroh they came to settle. Near Horyn, the rocky river, they set their camp. And also in other places, and already plow the fields, without abandoning weapons... They celebrate very loudly the day of Bayeran: they all convene to the Mosque from the fields that are scattered around..." ("De bello Ostrogiano," translated into Ukrainian by Volodymyr Lytvynov). This is a description of the celebration of *Bairam*, either the Uraza Bairam or the Kurban Bairam, two major Muslim holidays. The mosques that were built in Ostroh and several other places, unfortunately, did not live to our days. Presumably, they were of the same "simple" style that was used by the Lipka Tatars living in Belarus, Lithuania, and Poland. Those were typical wooden houses with the addition of one or two minarets that differed from small churches or chapels only by their orientation towards Mecca and the absence of crosses. Dozens of such mosques can still be found in the villages of Bohoniki and Kruszyniany (Poland), in the towns of Iyve and Novogrudok (Belarus) and other settlements. Local Tatars also

**BY THE END OF THE 15<sup>TH</sup> CENTURY, SOME TATAR SETTLEMENTS EMERGED IN THE TERRITORY OF POLAND, LITHUANIA, BELARUS, AND NORTHERN UKRAINE, WITH THEIR OWN WAYS OF LIFE AND VARIOUS PRIVILEGES**

had their own cemeteries, mazars. The last graves of a *mazar* preserved in Ostroh date back to the 1920s.

The social life of the local Tatars is of particular interest. The first settlers were 100% men, therefore, the only way for them to procreate was to marry locals: the Ostroh inventory of 1621 mentions common Ukrainian female and male first names of the time (Bohdana, Nalyvayko, etc.) with the second name of "Tatarchyn." These, obviously, were the members of the local Tatar families. The inevitable assimilation at some point caused a number of Muslims to convert to Christianity. This was the case, for example, with the grandfather of the famous Ukrainian orientalist and Ukrainianist Agatangel Krymsky, who belonged to the family of the "converted Tatars." »



Keeping the records. Pages of the Quran copied in Ostroh in 1804

### MULTICULTURALISM IN THE GALLANT AGE

The linguistic evolution of this Tatar community is rather interesting. Already in the 16–17<sup>th</sup> centuries, local Tatars virtually lost their language. During that period, in all areas of their life, except for the religious rites, where Arabic was used, the local language dominated. Most researchers emphasize that the Lipka Tatars used mostly Old Belarusian with a few polonisms, in which they wrote using Arabic and Persian alphabets. However, in 2006 in a study published in Slavonic and Eastern European Review, Ukrainian-American researcher Andriy Danylenko proved that at least a part of the old Tatar texts was written in the "Polissya dialect," that is, a creole combining the Belarusian and Ukrainian languages. Only in the 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> centuries did the Volyn Tatars finally switch to Polish, and the Belarusian ones to Belarusian. However, one of the three preserved 19<sup>th</sup> century Volyn *ketabs* (the term used for the written heritage of the local Tatars, from the Arabic word "Kitab" for "book"), alongside the Polish vocabulary also uses Ukrainisms. These ketabs included Qurans, which often contained translations of the Arabic text, *hamayils*, or "collections of prayers," and various medical texts such as herbal recipes, charms, etc. Ostroh State Historical and Cultural Reserve has an Arabic Quran copied in 1804 by Mustafa Adam Aliy. A family descending from the Yuvkivtsi Tatars preserved a hamayil written in 1870, which has a Ukrainian translation of several suras of the Quran, written down in Arabic script.

After leaving the military service as the armed guards of the magnates (which was already irrelevant in the 18<sup>th</sup> century), local Tatars became small landowners and merchants. In 1708 in Ostroh, for example, there was a "bakery" (as evidenced from the city register) that manufactured "products suitable for consumption," which were obviously the halal food. Similar enterprises also existed in other cities of Volhynia. Some of the Tatars even had serfs (up until 1861).

### ASSIMILATION

After the events of 1792, when, following the second partition of Poland, Volyn found itself in the Russian Empire, the life of the local Tatars in general did not change significantly: they remained a privileged group, and sometimes even worked in public institutions (according to the historical documents, the Russian authorities es-

pecially appreciated their indifference to alcohol). The mosques still operated, and their relationships with the Muslims from other regions of the empire, including the Crimean and Kazan Tatars, became closer. Now in their homes, the Lipka Tatars could read not only the handwritten Arabic Qurans, but also the printed ones published in St. Petersburg, Kazan and Crimea; among their preserved relics, other printed religious literature can be found, mostly of the Kazan origin. Another issue is that in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, few local Tatars could read in Turkic languages. However, the imams of the mosques of the North-Western Ukraine, who in the imperial times were formally subordinated to the Taurida Spiritual Muslim Directorate, would go to Crimea to study. It is also possible that some fulfilled their religious obligation to perform Hajj or umrah, which was much easier at the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century due to the development of transport. The pilgrims usually left by sea from Odessa to Istanbul, from where they sailed on special Turkish ships through the Suez Canal to the Arabian Jeddah.

In the early 20<sup>th</sup> century, Volyn had a rather large group of population who identified themselves as "Mohammedans." According to the first census of the Russian Empire (1897), in the Volyn province they included 4,703 males and 174 females; out of them, 3,703 men and 114 women believed their mother tongue to be Tatar, while another 1,000 spoke Bashkir and Chuvash languages. This gender disparity is probably due to the fact that a large proportion of Muslims stayed there temporarily, perhaps coming on business or for other purposes. Therefore, it can be argued that the size of the "indigenous Tatar" population of Volhynia did not exceed a few hundred people (the "General Description of Volyn province" compiled a century earlier provides the figure of 90). Despite the small number of the descendants of the Lipka Tatars who remained faithful to Islam, some mosques still operated in the 1910s in Ostroh and some nearby villages. It is interesting to note that during the World War I, the mosque in the village of Yuvkivtsi came under scrutiny of the secret police after the Tatars who had visited the Ottoman Empire arrived there. According to the documents of the Central State Historical Archive (Kyiv), the authorities suspected these "emissaries" of calling the local Tatars for an anti-Russian uprising ("Correspondence between the police directorate and the assistant director of the district department on collecting information and placing under surveillance the members of the Muslim religious sect Zhdanovych and Mukhlyo, residents of Volyn province. February 19—July 14, 1915," code No. 1335. Op. No. 31. D. No. 1899).

For the last time, the activities of the Tatar communities (both religious and cultural) were mentioned when Volyn was part Poland, in 1922–1939. In 1936, Islam was even "officially" recognized in Warsaw, and Muslim organizations were allocated funding from the state budget. In those years, the cemetery in Ostroh was still visited by the Tatars from Belarus (including Minsk and other cities) who had relatives there, but they were no longer seen after the World War II. Today, only some representatives are left of those large communities, while others were effectively assimilated and for the most part lost their original religious and cultural identity. Hopefully, one day this issue will attract attention of not only individual enthusiasts, but also of a serious research project that would result in creating a real or at least virtual museum of the history and culture of the Volyn Tatars. ■





# Sam's

steak house

FIRST STEAK HOUSE IN UKRAINE

Since 1996

Sam's Steak House  
37, Zhylyanskaya str., Kiev, Ukraine | Reservation: (044) 287 2000

[www.karta.ua](http://www.karta.ua)



# What's that Tevye was listening to?

Hanna Trehub

World-famous klezmer music has many traditions and roots in Ukraine



**Fun and colorful:** Along with jazz, swing, Louisiana cajun, country and Western, klezmer formed the foundations of rock 'n' roll, which evolved into rock and later music styles

"Someone was on the fiddle, someone on a viola, someone on a bass, trumpet, flute, clarinet, harp, dulcimer, balalaika, drums, and cymbals," Sholom-Aleichem wrote about a klezmer band that he knew. "Some of them knew how to play the most complex melodies on their lips, on combs, on their teeth, on glasses or cups, on bits of wood and even on their cheeks. The great writer never forgot the brilliant musical phenomenon of Ashkenazi Jews called klezmer. Together with dance music, kobzars and hurdy-gurdy players, this lively music echoed on the streets of Ukrainian towns and villages where Jews lived next to Ukrainians and other ethnic groups. When the klezmers began to play, there were no Christians or Jews—everybody partied. "Klezmer is one of Ukraine's folk music traditions," clarinetist Dmytro Herasymov, frontman for a Kyiv-based klezmer band called Pushkin tells *The Ukrainian Week*. The term "klezmer" comes from two Hebrew words, "kley" and "zemer," meaning "musical instrument" and is one of the popular instrumental styles of music among Ashkenazi Jews who lived in Central and Eastern Europe and spoke Yiddish. Klezmer is the world music of the Jewish people that evolved alongside the religious music of the Hassidim. There is also a musical tradition belonging to Sephardic Jews who initially lived in Spain, Morocco and Malta and spoke Ladino. Their music has merged with such genres as tranquillo, fado-ladino, algerias, buleria and solea flamenco, and fandango that can be heard today in Spain, Portugal and Italy, and across the Caribbean and Latin America.

Jewish musicians began to be called "klezmers" in the 14<sup>th</sup>-15<sup>th</sup> centuries in various parts of Germany and neighboring countries, especially Poland and Lithuania. In later centuries, klezmer musicians were barred from the

music unions of Catholic Poland, which forced them to set up their own professional associations. In Prague, the first klezmer guild was already formed in the 17<sup>th</sup> century and provided musical accompaniment outside the synagogue during the merry feast days of Simkhat Torah and Purim, as well as during processions carrying the Torah scrolls to the synagogue. The first person to write down melodies played by klezmers was Chazzan Yehudi Elias, a cantor from Hanover and the editor of the Hanover Compendium of 1744. Alongside colorful elements of the Baroque tradition, the notations contain the lively musical idiom typical of Jewish song. In the 18<sup>th</sup> century, the heart of klezmer-making migrated to the east, to Czechia, Hungary, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. Typically, klezmer was played by small bands of 3-5 performers for weddings, festive celebrations and fairs. In the 18<sup>th</sup>-19<sup>th</sup> centuries, every town and stetl had its klezmer band and the core of their repertoire crystallized around various phases of betrothal and marriage ceremonies, much like Ukrainian troisty or dance musicians. "Every Jewish wedding had certain dances that were always played, like the 'Hopkele' and 'Kozatske,'" explains Herasymov. "Odd as that may seem, but these are nothing more than the Ukrainian Hopak and Kozachok." Herasymov adds that the sound of klezmer in Balti, in Moldova, is not that different from the klezmer music played in Boyarka or Uman, Ukraine. In a sense, it's really music from one and the same region and the musical traditions of Bessarabia had a major influence on it. Even such the great American klezmer player, Dave Tarras, who was born in Ukraine and even played outside of Kyiv, performed music in a clearly southern Ukrainian, Greek-Bessarabian style. Many of the compositions that he recorded in the US had names that were obviously from Ukraine: dances called "Odesa Sher" and "Mykolayiv Sher," "Dem Monastrishter Rebin Chosid'l" and many more. In Ukraine, Jewish musicians borrowed from both the Black Sea Greeks and the Crimean Tatars, and obviously listened to both Hutsuls and Bukovynians in the Carpathian mountain region. So when you hear the music played today by musicians from Sartana or Bakhchisarai, the melodies of khaitarma, you can hear the familiar lively klezmer motifs as well.

## FROM FATHER TO SON, FROM CONTINENT TO CONTINENT

Every place with enough history also has its legends. When it comes to klezmer, then many of the legends are related to Ukraine. In the mid-19<sup>th</sup> century, violinist Yosel Drucker (1822-1870), nicknamed Stempenyu, was called the Halychian Paganini came from an ancient line of Berdychiv klezmerists. His father, Sholyem-Berl played the clarinet, his grandfather Shmuel played trumpet, and his great-grandfathers, Faivish and Froyim played dulcimer and flute. Avram Moshe Kholodenko (1828-1902), nicknamed Pedotsur, also from Berdychiv, was a re-

nowned virtuoso violinist as well. He was one of the few klezmer players who knew how to read music and recorded a slew of klezmer melodies, including Lulle, a lullaby. Other well-known klezmer players included Israel Moshe Rabinovich (1894-1963) from Fastiv, Avraam-Itzhak Berezovskiy (1844-1888) from Smila, and Ezekiel Gosman (Alter) (1846-1912) from Chudniv in Zhytomyr Oblast. The fate of klezmer musicians on Ukrainian territory in the 20<sup>th</sup> century was closely linked to the way the traditions and rhythms of the life in the Jewish community were affected as pressure came from all sides to modernize and the political situation changed swiftly and radically, especially during the two World Wars. Many of them simply immigrated to the US, including two of the most influential figures in the story of modern klezmer music in the States: clarinetist Dave Tarras and Naftule Brandwein (1884-1963). Born Dovid Tarashchuk to a family of trombone players in the village of Ternivtsi, Teplytsia County, now Vinnytsia Oblast, Tarras emigrated to New York in 1921. Among his 500 recorded performances is one of the most famous klezmer standards in the world, “Chusen kala, mazel tov.” Just about all the music Herasymov talks about is originally from Ukraine.

“Tarras was familiar with the melodies played at Jewish weddings, which were a lot like today’s DJ sets, running from 40-90 minutes, with one sher dance or freilach following another,” says Herasymov. “The main thing was for the rhythms and styles to stay the same.”

Born in Peremyshliany, now Lviv Oblast, Brandwein was one of 12 sons of klezmer violinist and improvisational wedding poet Peysekhe Brandwein. With his 12 sons, Peysekhe put together one of the best-known klezmer bands in Halychyna. In 1908, the younger Brandwein moved to the US and soon became a star, making many recordings over the years under the name “The King of Jewish Music.”

More than one klezmer player became a professional musician, such as Lypovets-born Pyotr (Peysach) Stolyarsky (1871-1944), who came up with a unique approach to developing talented children and was the first teacher of the great violinist David Oistrakh (1908-1974). The first teacher of Jascha Heifetz (1901-1987) was his father Reuven, who played in the Even klezmer band in Vilnius. One of the founders of the choir, opera and symphonic conducting department at the Lviv Conservatory of Music was pianist and conductor Bronislaw Wolfsthal (1883-1944). Born in Kamianets-Podilskiy, he also first studied with his klezmer-playing father in Lviv, then went on to study music in Vienna, Leipzig and Berlin.

In WWII, many klezmer players also lost their lives during the Holocaust. The movie “The Pianist” by Roman Polanski was based on a memoir that Polish pianist Wladislaw Szpilman (1911-2000) wrote about his uncle Rubin, also a klezmer player, who died in Treblinka.

## KLEZMER MEETS JAZZ

The style of klezmer bands, say some historians, appealed a great deal to black musicians who also set up their own small bands and evolved what we know now as jazz and big-band music. The klezmer styles known as *terkische* and *bulgar*, which were the most popular in the US during the 1920s through 1940s, obviously caught the attention of those who lived together with the Jewish immigrants from Central and Eastern Europe. Along with jazz, swing, Louisiana cajun, country and Western, klezmer formed the foundations of rock ‘n’ roll, which evolved into rock and later music styles.

In short, klezmer is an improvisational, largely upbeat style of music that is steeped in real life and happily borrowed melodies from various neighbors and shared its own with them. In its most authentic form, klezmer can no longer be found in its countries of origin, including Ukraine, because of the systematic destruction of the traditional Jewish lifestyle under the soviet regime, together with religion, art and culture, and, later on, because of the Holocaust. Much klezmer music was preserved and reinterpreted by Balkan gypsies who play weddings to this day and also call themselves klezmers. It was Serbian musician Nele Krajljic who brought their music to the attention of director Emir Kusturic, who used it in the film, “Black Cat, White Cat” [“Black Queen, White Tom”].

## SINGING BY THE SEA

If not for the collapse of the Soviet Union and the survival of Odesa Jewish songs, klezmer music might never have been revived in Ukraine today. As the member of an Odesa klezmer band called “Mom’s Kids,” Yulia Luki-anenko, points out, authentic klezmer always was an instrumental form, but its melodies underlie many different forms that have more in common with the musical, cabaret and various kinds of post-soviet chanson than with klezmer itself. This is, of course, a vocal form, not instrumental, which often satirizes the lives of Jews and their neighbors in the bustling port city of Odesa, where the speech is a blend of Ukrainian, Yiddish and Russian not found anywhere else in the world. Popular songs like “Deribasivska, at the corner of Richelieu,” “Rakhile,” “The story of the Kakhovka Rebbe,” “Lemonchiki,” “7:40,” “A terrible racket at Shneersohn’s house,” “Music’s coming from Moldavanka,” “7:40,” and “Odesa Mama,” are all in the style of the 1920s and 1940s. They all contain klezmer motifs that preserve a shadow of the memory of that music despite the soviet years. Thanks to singer Leonid Utyosov (1895-1982) and pianist Alexander Tsfasman (1906-1971), one of the originators of jazz on soviet soil, these songs were heard in both popular and jazz formats.

“Whatever you want to call an Odesa Jewish song, but it’s not limited to “Hava nagila,” “7:40” and specific chanson,” explains Lukianenko. “If you carefully listen to different interpretations of that same ‘Lemonchiki,’ you will see many interesting musical bits that have a distinct klezmer feel to them. For instance, Isaak Dunayevsky (1900-1955) fairly openly inserted echoes of Lulle in several of his works, a lullaby that was a standard in klezmer repertoire from Kyiv and Odesa to Warsaw and Bucharest.”

Having left Ukraine for the big, wide world and gained popularity there, klezmer is gradually coming home again. Strange as it may seem, its return is not through the efforts of the Ukrainian Jewish community but through musicians who have fallen in love with it. A major role in this process has also been played by the Grammy-winning Klezmatiks band from New York and a slew of other similar bands in Poland, Germany and even Argentina, where klezmer successfully mated with the tango. In Ukraine, klezmer bands are not that many. Kharkiv has its Klezmer Band, Lviv has Heses Arie and Tehilim, Chernivtsi has A Yiddishe Neshama, Kyiv has the Pushkin band, and Odesa has Mamyni Dity or Mom’s Kids. Klezmer can be heard at any number of festivals, including LvivKlezFest, which has been an annual event in the city since 2009, as well as in clubs and small performance halls. Slowly but surely, this happy music with its openness to all kinds of improvisation is returning to its fans in Ukraine. ■

Jewish-Crimean  
khitarma



“Chusen Kala  
Mazel Tov”  
by Dave Tarras  
[Congratulations to the  
Bride and  
Groom]







# Gerardo Ángel Bugallo Ottone and Tamara Zabala Utrillas:

“Zarzuela is a very good way to understand the diversity of Spain”

**O**n February 5, the Embassy of Spain in Ukraine presented a fantastic collaboration project with Kyiv Philharmonic. Spanish conductor Ricardo Casero, the Academic Symphonic Orchestra of the Philharmonic, tenor Israel Lozano and soprano Olha Chubareva introduced the local audience to the drama of the Spanish zarzuela. Shortly before the event, Ambassador Gerardo Bugallo Ottone and Counsel

Interviewed by **Hanna Trehub**

on Cultural Issues Tamara Zabala Utrillas spoke to *The Ukrainian Week* about why zarzuela is so special to Spain, and their plans in cultural diplomacy.

**The Ukrainian audience knows the Italian opera, Austrian operetta, and American musical. Spanish zarzuela has many things in common with all these. How did it develop in Spain, and what role did it play in your culture?**



**Gerardo Bugallo Ottone:** In theory, the first zarzuela, “La selva sin amor”, was reportedly written by Spanish writer Lope de Vega. The theater has a very long tradition in Spain. The Spanish public didn’t like operas, where everything is sung. Frankly, I also don’t particularly like these singing dialogues, and they were not well received by the theater-going public in my country. From the beginning, zarzuela developed along the lines of the modern musical. This is a theater play with a story that is interesting for those who’re watching it, and it includes musical pieces. It became very popular because the plays are often rooted in local traditions. Madrid has its local tradition which is Castilian. There’re many other regions of Spain with their own folk music traditions. Zarzuela is a very good way to understand the diversity of Spain. There are some mythical names in zarzuela, which are directly related to different parts of my country.

As I mentioned before, the long tradition of Spanish theater which rejected sung dialogues, formed the basis for zarzuela. Pedro Calderón de la Barca wrote the most famous of the early zarzuelas, a piece “El golfo de las sirenas”. The name of genre came from “La Zarzuela”, the name of a small royal palace near Madrid, originally a hunting lodge built by King Philip IV. By the way, this is the current residence of the kings of Spain. This small palace, situated in the woods near Madrid, is where performances were originally held as part of the royal court ceremonies. However, zarzuela in its modern form appeared in the 19<sup>th</sup> century, with the music of Francisco Barbieri, who is generally considered the creator of zarzuela as we know it today. Due to economic difficulties, longer pieces, similar to those sang in the opera, became too expensive for the public, so musical impresarios developed the so called “génerochico”: short zarzuelas of 1 hour or a little more which were affordable for everybody and became extremely popular.

In the 1940s, Spain had a very popular zarzuela where the action was taking place in Ukraine. It’s titled “Katiushka, la mujer rusa” by composer Pablo Sorozabal. This is story of a girl from the Russian imperial family, who as a result of the Bolshevik revolution goes into hiding, forgetting even her origins. In the plot, a communist commissar falls in love with the main heroine, finds out who she is, and protects her. During the Spanish Civil War the republicans modified the plot to make the Bolsheviks appear in a positive light, but after later “Katiushka” was once again popular with its original plot, as a story about communist persecution of aristocratic families in Ukraine and Russia. These connections with real life contribute to the distinct greatness of zarzuela.

**Many countries in the world speak Spanish, and many of the cultural models they regard as their native originally come from Spain. Is zarzuela, or a local version of it, popular there?**

**G.B.O.:** Zarzuela appears in some parts of the world where Spanish language and culture is important. In the Philippines, “sarswela”, as they pronounce it, was and still is very popular, al-

**Gerardo Ángel Bugallo Ottone** serves as Ambassador of the Kingdom of Spain to Ukraine since 2013. He started his diplomatic career in 1984. He previously served in Spain’s embassies to Algeria, Hungary and USA. Ambassador Bugallo was Vice-President of the North America Department at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and served as Counsel for Spain’s Prime Minister Cabinet. In 2002-2004, he was Director General on Foreign Policy for the Asia-Pacific Region and North America at the Spanish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2004, he became Deputy Permanent Representative of Spain to the UN in Geneva.

**Tamara Zabala Utrillas** is Spanish diplomat, Counsel on Cultural Issues for the Embassy of the Kingdom of Spain to Ukraine.

though it is sung in the different languages of the Philippines: Tagalog, Cebuano etc. In Cuba, the tradition of zarzuela is also very strong and popular, and adopts distinctly local flavor. The same goes for Argentina: as a matter of fact, the first tangos appeared in zarzuela shows.

**Spanish tenor Plácido Domingo made zarzuela well-known in the opera domain. Are there any other Spanish singers who promote this genre alongside opera music?**

**G.B.O.:** A good lyric singer will do both zarzuela and opera. The very best vocalists, including Plácido Domingo, José Carreras, Alfredo Kraus, are well-known as opera singers (because opera is better-known in the world), but all of them appreciated zarzuela very much. Especially Plácido Domingo, who in recent years has, together with Anna María Martínez, contributed to the promotion of zarzuela in the world. I remember the huge impression from Domingo’s singing of “No puede ser”, a song from “La tabernera del puerto”, a famous zarzuela by Pedro Sorozabal, during the first of the Three Tenors’concerts, performed in the Baths of Caracalla in Rome.

**Probably the best-known operas with a Spanish storyline are “The Barber of Seville” by Gioachino Rossini and “Carmen” by Georges Bizet. Do they have anything common with zarzuela?**

## THE LONG TRADITION OF SPANISH THEATER WHICH REJECTED SUNG DIALOGUES, FORMED THE BASIS FOR ZARZUELA

**GBO:** “Carmen” is an opera with a Spanish theme, and it reflects the fascination exerted by Spain upon many musicians. In all likelihood, they were acquainted with zarzuela, as well as with Spanish folk music or flamenco. Very few people are aware of this sort of bridge between popular music and high culture, to which zarzuela belongs, in particular via the adaptation of popular melodies and themes for librettos. “Carmen”, though not technically a zarzuela, incorporated many Spanish musical traditions. It lacks spoken parts, which exist in some operas, such as “The Magic Flute” by Mozart. ▶

Actually, this one could technically be considered a zarzuela as it includes long dialogs, which are told, not sung.

**Culture is referred to as soft, but very efficient power in international affairs. To which extend Spain focuses on cultural diplomacy?**

**G.B.O.:** Spain has the Cervantes Institute present in many places all over the world. When I came to Ukraine as Ambassador, I had in mind as one of my main priorities the opening of a Cervantes Institute in Kyiv. It looked difficult at the time, because there was less interest in bilateral ties during the Yanukovich era. Just one month after my arrival, however, Maidan erupted. Now that things are more or less settling down, we can return to our original plans and start considering possibilities for a new Cervantes Institute in Ukraine. Obviously the economic situation all around the world isn't the best now, but we're studying possibilities to open here an Aula of the Cervantes Institute (maybe, inside one of the universities) and to start from there.

The Cervantes Institute, to speak loosely, is more connected with the promotion of the Spanish language than with promotion of our culture. But the first is connected to the second. In Ukraine many people underestimate the importance of the Spanish language: it is the second language with the most native speakers in the world, after Chinese; it is the second language on the internet; it is the second language in the USA, where it is growing very rapidly and which is now the second country in the world with more Spanish speakers, after Mexico. Then, Spanish is important in international business.

Very prominent Spanish writers are still known in Ukraine only in intellectual circles. Take José Ortega y Gasset, a Spanish philosopher. He has some masterpieces that could be extremely interesting for Ukrainians right now, such as "The Revolt of the Masses". It was written more than 70 years ago. Also, I would like to bring to Ukraine more real, traditional Spanish cuisine.

**T.Z.U.:** Talking about the Cervantes Institute, we're currently involved in preparing the DELE exams, which test Spanish as a foreign language.

We are working also on the promotion of our literature. Classical authors like Cervantes, Lope de Vega, Calderón de la Barca, are quite well-known in Ukraine, their works are translated. Also, some contemporary authors, such as Arturo Perez-Reverte or Carlos Ruiz Zafon, have had their works translated into Ukrainian. But we are working on

**SPAIN ISN'T AS PRESENT IN UKRAINE AS WE WOULD LIKE IT TO BE, BUT WE DO HAVE SOME VERY INTERESTING ACTIVITIES BOTH IN THE CLASSICAL SPHERE AND IN MORE CONTEMPORARY AREAS**

getting additional books translated, or making them available to a wider audience. For instance, we are hoping that the Dukh-i-Litera publishing house will print a new edition of Ortega y Gasset's major work, "The Revolt of the Masses".

**Many Ukrainians see the image of Spanish culture through the prism of popular music rather than literature, theater or art. What are you planning to do to promote these different aspects of Spanish culture here?**

**T.Z.U.:** Spain isn't as present in Ukraine as we would like it to be, but we do have some very interesting activities both in the classical sphere and in more contemporary areas. We have great collaboration with Kyiv Philharmonic. In 2016, we commemorate the 400<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Cervantes' death. We're also involved in the international guitar competition and festival at the Philharmonic, and working on a very ambitious project with Kyiv Opera House. In the more contemporary area, we have cooperated closely with Gogol Fest in the past. This year, we aim to bring contemporary dance to the Gogol Fest, and a choreographer who will be here for two weeks, working closely with Ukrainian dancers. In the field of cinema we have several projects; we cooperate with Molodist film festival, and



PHOTO: OLEKSANDR FATUSHNAK



organize the Spanish Film Week which proved a great success. In addition to that, we have smaller projects, such as our “Summer Cinema” at the Master Klass center, not only in Kyiv, but throughout Ukraine with our partners from the Ukrainian Association of Hispanists. Another priority area is journalism, where we organize an annual journalism forum in autumn. In 2015, we talked about the importance of freedom of speech and expression, which enabled us to combine cultural activities with the promotion of human rights.

**G.B.O.:** Probably, the most important cultural events we have organized over the last 20 years was the visit of Nobel Prize winner Mario Vargas Llosa. I know him personally and so I contacted him, given the situation in Ukraine and his well-known political commitment. He never asked for a single dollar for the visit because he took the Ukrainian cause very much to heart. He was very outspoken and criticized Putin’s actions in your country very strongly. Even with the barrier of the language we manage to do things like that, because his messages were universal.




Maybe the most important connection between Spain and Ukraine today stems from the very special circumstances Ukraine is experiencing. Ukraine is crucial for the future of Europe, and Spaniards are aware of that. Then, we should also remember the Ukrainian community in Spain – more than 80,000 people who have a very positive image in my country and serve as a bridge between both peoples.

The barrier of language is a very big obstacle for me, especially when we’re talking about humor. If it weren’t for that, it may have been a very good instrument, because our senses of humor are very close, but the language barrier has so far stopped us from bringing prominent Spanish comedians to Ukraine, which is a pity.

**Communication of things happening here, as well as promotion of our culture, is one of the ways for Ukraine to protect itself against Russian aggression. How can the Ukrainian side cooperate with Spain in this regard?**

**G.B.O.:** Obviously it’s a question which should be directed to the Ukrainian Embassy in Madrid, rather than to the Spanish Embassy in Kyiv. Nonetheless, it is an issue we are looking into. Right now we’re considering the possibility of exhibiting Ukrainian paintings in Spain. I have had a conversation with the director of the “Winter On Fire” documentary, who would like to have it screened in Spain. But once again, this is a question of commercial impact. I hope that we’ll be able to show it on the television, because this is the best way to achieve the biggest impact. In my country, we have Russian propaganda with huge amount of money, yet it is not particularly successful, as most people can see through it. I would like to see more exchange and would encourage the Ukrainian Embassy in Spain to work in that direction.

**T.Z.U.:** Our Embassy and other EU Embassies are in touch with the Cultural Department of the Ukrainian Foreign Ministry, in order to help it project a positive image of Ukraine which is not only restricted to the conflict in your country. ❏





February 11 — 21

**Liubov.Live**

**Zhovten Cinema  
Koštiantynivska 26, Kyiv**

Liubov.Live is a series of short romantic films collected by the Dovzhenko National Center. These 10 quality shorts by young Ukrainian filmmakers include some of the top films on the subject of love to come out in recent years. Their emotional power comes from their portrayal of life as it is among Ukrainians.



February 20, 18:00

**Frank Sinatra:  
The legend turns 100**

**Menorah Center**  
Sholem-Aleichema 4/26, Dnipropetrovsk  
The Performance Big Band conducted by Volodymyr Alekseyev presents a concert in honor of the 100<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the birth of Frank Sinatra. The program will include the best songs of Old Blue Eyes, from Moon River and Let It Snow to Strangers in the Night, Magic Moments, Tell Her, and Under My Skin. The vocalists are singer and songwriter Alik Shneideris, charismatic orchestra soloist Tetiana Orlova, and the talented leader of the RadioStars band, Koštiantyn Hovorun.



Starting February 25, 18:00-

**Sonia Delaunay 130**

**Izolyatsia Platform  
for Cultural Initiatives  
Naberezhno-Luhova 8, Kyiv**  
Kyiv is about to see an exhibition of Sonia Delaunay, a world-renowned Ukrainian-French artist and designer. November 2015 marked the 130<sup>th</sup> anniversary of Delaunay's birth. Born in Ukraine, Delaunay studied in Germany and worked in France. Her style embraces Orphism, Simultanism and Art Deco and is marked by her love of the bright colors that bring to mind childhood memories. The exhibit includes works by contemporary designers from all over the world celebrating her style.



February 26-27, 20:00

**Concert for piano  
and orchestra:  
20<sup>th</sup>-century works**

**House of Cinema  
Sakahanskoho 6, Kyiv**

Through the medium of sound, the atmosphere of the Age of Invention and the literary circles of that period are recreated. One of Kyiv's most celebrated chamber orchestras, the Virtuosi of Kyiv, play works by the best-known composers from the United States, Italy, France, Latin America, Ukraine, and more. This evening promises to be a pleasant surprise for lovers of classic and jazz music.



March 1, 19:00

**Lviv Jazz Orchestra: Jazz  
for People in Love. Part 2**

**Central Officers' House  
Hrushevskoho 30/1, Kyiv**

Kyiv welcomes the romance of spring along with a unique musical series prepared by the biggest jazz band in Eastern Europe for true lovers of jazz. The Lviv Jazz Orchestra will play world hits all about love, including songs by James Brown, Etta James, Ray Charles, Michael Buble, and many other outstanding musicians. Talented vocalists such as Yuriy Hryhorash, Davyd Meladze, Oksana Karaim and Anis Yettaeb will add their flavor to this evening of romantic jazz standards.



March 3-10

**Italian Film Week  
Various venues**


**Kyiv, Vinnytsia,  
Zaporizhzhia, Lviv, Mariupol,  
Odesa, Kharkiv, Chernivtsi**

The Italian Film Festival presents some of the top films made by Italian directors in recent years. Since Italian movies are not often played in Ukraine, this is a great opportunity to catch up with what Italian filmmakers are doing these days. This year's program includes four feature-length films: *Allacciate le cinture* (Fasten Your Seatbelts) and *Sangue del mio sangue* (Blood of My Blood), which depict the realm of emotions and relations; *La foresta di ghiaccio* (The Ice Forest), which delves into mysticism; and *Mia madre* (My Mother), a thoughtful look at the primal relationship.



# JAZZ

premier thursday  
11.02-07.04



with Oleksiy Kogan

[premier-palace.phnr.com](http://premier-palace.phnr.com)  
+380 (44) 244 12 35



## SUNDAY BRUNCH AT HILTON KYIV BECOME PART OF A GREAT TRADITION

Every Sunday from 12:30 till 16:30

1650 UAH per person

Up to 6 years old free of charge, 6 to 12 years old 50% discount

Live music and kid's entertainment

For table reservation, please contact +38 067 690 2353



30 Tarasa Shevchenka Boulevard | Kyiv | 01030 | Ukraine

T: +38 044 393 5400 | F: +38 044 393 5401

[kyiv.hilton.com](http://kyiv.hilton.com) | [hilton.ru](http://hilton.ru) | [kyiv.reservations@hilton.com](mailto:kyiv.reservations@hilton.com)

#HiltonKyiv  Hilton Kyiv  @HiltonKyiv  @hiltonkyiv