

The Ukrainian Week

International edition

#1 (95) January 2016

Will Ukraine have
elections in 2016

Foreign policy objectives
and challenges

Progress in investigation
of Maidan crimes

2016
EVERYTHING
IS POSSIBLE

**The
Economist**

Featuring selected content
from The Economist

WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM

FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION



PREMIER

PALACE HOTEL

- KYIV -

BREAKFAST BEING THE MOST IMPORTANT MEAL OF THE DAY,
WE OFFER THE BEST BREAKFAST IN KYIV.

Filled with energy to start your new day, our breakfasts are served
with a generous dollop of goodwill for our guests.

Every morning. For more than 100 years.

From your Premier Palace Hotel

5-7/29 T. Shevchenka Blvd / Pushkinska Str.

www.premier-palace.com +380 44 244 12 00

BRIEFING

- 5 **Reversing the Deep-Freeze:**
The dangers of further impoverishment

FOCUS

- 7 **Once and For All:**
After the hybrid war, time to deal with the hybrid independence
- 8 **A Game of Snap with Joker:**
Will Ukraine cast ballots this year?
- 10 **Mission Possible:**
Foreign policy objectives and challenges for 2016
- 13 **Francisco de Borja Lasheras**
on how Europe's perceptions of Ukraine reflect its own crises
- 14 **Leaving the Worst Behind:**
Prospects and risks of Ukraine's economy in the new year
- 17 **Oleksiy Khmara** on Ukraine's accomplishments in the fight with corruption

POLITICS

- 18 **Pavlo Klimkin:**
"We expect solidarity and commitment to Ukrainian affairs from the EU"
Ukraine's Foreign Minister on visa-free travel, Normandy Four talks and the future of relations with Russia
- 22 **Yuriy Sergeyev:**
"The main thing is to ensure the Ukrainian issue is heard regularly at the UN Security Council"
Ex-Permanent Envoy to the UN on Ukraine's priorities as non-permanent member of the Security Council
- 24 **Referendum Madness:**
Plebiscite-pushers have got Europe's voters hooked on the cheap rush of direct democracy



- 26 **Iryna Herashchenko:**
"The militants and Russia have not fulfilled any requirements of the Minsk Agreements"
President's Envoy on peace process and exchange of prisoners
- 28 **18 Months is Not a Sentence But a Start:**
Why investigations of Maidan crimes are taking so long
- 31 **Making Headway:**
Reform of the law enforcement sector
- 32 **New Military Command Wanted:**
How Ukrainian military schools should change to train efficient professionals

SOCIETY

- 36 **Mowing Down the Mind:**
How television paralyzes people
- 39 **Yuriy Makarov**
on why language matters
- 40 **Donbas Military Fiction:**
How books turned war into reality

HISTORY

- 42 **Gulnara Bekirova:**
"Those who stay in Crimea and those who left are in an equally difficult position"
Crimean Tatar historian and political scientist on the history and identity of Crimea's indigenous people
- 45 **Leonidas Donskis** on memory and freedom through jazz music in the Soviet Union
- 46 **Illusion of a Federation:**
Historian Stanislav Kulchytsky on the Bolsheviks' tools in dealing with national identity in soviet republics

CULTURE & ARTS

- 50 **Christmas in jazz, French films and folk art:**
The Ukrainian Week offers a selection of art and music venues to attend in January

The Ukrainian Week

The Ukrainian Week #1 (95) January 2016
Founder ECEM Media GmbH. **Publisher** ECEM Media GmbH
Address Austria, Am Gestade, 1, 1010 Vienna
 State registration certificate KB № 19823-9623ПР 19.03.2013
Chief Editor Dmytro Krapyvenko
Editors Anna Korbut, Lidia Wolanskyj

E-mail office@tyzhden.ua

www.ukrainianweek.com

Tel. (044) 351-13-87

Editors address 37 Mashynobudivna str., Kyiv, 03067, Ukraine

Print run 15 000. **Free distribution**

Our partner

ТИЖДЕНЬ





BRIEFING

Reversing the Deep-Freeze

Oles Oleksiyyenko

According to one survey run by the Democratic Initiatives Fund (DIF) and the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) in December 2015, 60% of Ukrainians now think that things are not going as they should, compared to 52% who thought so in December 2013. The main reasons given by those who hold this opinion is the decline in the standard of living (69%) and the high level of corruption (57%). For them, a positive signal, in addition to the end of military action in Donbas would be a rise in the standard of living (51%) and seeing the most corrupt officials sued for their crimes (50%).

The decline in the standard of living for most Ukrainians has really been unprecedentedly significant for such a short period of time. Derzhstat, the statistics bureau, reported in December 2015 that consumer prices had gone up 43% compared to December 2014 and by 79% compared to »

PHOTO BY UNIAN

December 2013. And this is just the tip of the iceberg given the specific methodology and the consumer basket that the statistics agency uses. Meanwhile, the indexation of wages and pensions for most Ukrainians was dramatically less over this same period. For instance, government workers and workers at budget-funded institutions saw their wages go up only 25%.

By November 2015, the newest data available, even the official estimates of the Ministry of Social Policy were that the minimum subsistence wage for the employed was UAH 2,875, for children age 6-18 it was UAH 2,930, and for pensioners it was UAH 2,052. Yet the 2016 Budget used a minimum wage of UAH 1,378 (rising to UAH 1,450 May 1), while the minimum pension is UAH 1,074 (rising to UAH 1,130 May 1), meaning that in both cases, they don't even cover a half of what the Ministry considers the actual living wage.

What's worse, even the average government wage is now at the threshold of the subsistence minimum even for those who are employed: in November 2015, wages averaged UAH 3,426 in education and UAH 3,168 in healthcare. And this does not take into account any children that the individual is supporting. Given that inflation is expected to be 25-30% in 2016, according to the minimal scenario proposed by analysts, the 10% wage increase as of December 1, 2015 will do little to improve the situation. With expectations of growing unemployment this coming year, it matters that the minimum unemployment benefit for those sufficiently vested in insurance will be only UAH 1,102.40 (rising to UAH 1,160 May 1), which is barely one third of the subsistence minimum. Those who are not vested will get barely half of that, or UAH 544. In December 2014, 43% of Ukrainians were ready to suffer a certain level of material decline in order for reforms to take hold, whereas in December 2015, 33% were prepared to do so, only 8% of those were prepared to suffer "as long as necessary," while 25% said "not more than a year." Right now, 59% are no longer prepared to put up with material decline at all, and 39% of them say that they are already completely impoverished. The margin of savings and patience among most Ukrainians has been exhausted for 2016.

Should military action in Donbas finally stop, strong demand for social paternalism on the part of the state will become the priority for most of Ukrainian society. A KIIS and DIF poll in October revealed that Ukrainians expect the state to firstly provide social security (39%), justice and a fair court system (37%), protection from foreign aggression (32%), free healthcare (30%), and guaranteed jobs (29%).

Moreover, only 18-20% of those polled want the state to provide "rods, not fish:" physical safety, law and order, and equal rights with minimal intervention in the economy. Yet only 18% are prepared to pay taxes on all their income, 8% are prepared to actively oversee the government, and only 5% are prepared to participate freely in promoting various ideas or programs. Most Ukrainians are clearly less interested in fulfilling their obligations before their country—and their fellow citizens—than they are in getting benefits from it. This presents a serious threat that populists will manipulate this mood, especially those who are on Russia's payroll, and that the conditions are in place for them to start tearing the country apart.

If the government fails to provide the conditions for the standard of living to start improving again and for ordinary Ukrainians to feel more confident that things are

changing for the better in the near term, the likelihood is that dangerous socio-political processes will begin and the threat to the very existence of Ukraine as an independent state will rise sharply. Still, such conditions obviously cannot be provided through populist "easy steps" that will quickly deteriorate the situation even further.

This means the government will have to look for ways to prevent a social explosion and the triumph of populists and the comeback of once-discredited politicians at a time when budget resources are really limited and the IMF and western partners justifiably insist that they prevent the deficit and the already excessively high public debt from growing.

Somehow, the numberless calculations of today's top officials—who were in opposition not long ago—about the tens and hundreds of billions of losses to the state through the corrupt schemes in place during the Yanukovich regime have not translated into effective action to improve the situation over the last two years. The oligarchs and Big Business continue to sell Ukrainian-made goods to their offshore companies at below cost to evade taxes. Top officials continue to cost the country billions in losses to both the state budget and to business by abusing the state procurement system, taking bribes for permits and licenses, covering up for contraband and smuggling, and manipulating the VAT refund system.

To even partly close the loopholes through which the budget and economy are losing hundreds of billions of hryvnia per year is something officials and the political elite have no desire to do, although it's the absolutely only way to stabilize the situation in the country. Another way to renew social justice could be higher taxes and fees on luxury goods and services, such as expensive cars, high-end gadgets, expensive homes, jewelry and precious metals, premium-class hotel and restaurant services and so



THE GOVERNMENT NEEDS TO PREVENT A SOCIAL EXPLOSION AND THE TRIUMPH OF POPULISTS AND COMEBACK BOYS AT A TIME WHEN BUDGET RESOURCES ARE REALLY LIMITED

on, as well as property taxes that are more differentiated and tied to market value rather than based on the size of the space. It's equally important to set up a more effective mechanism for leveling out tax contributions among different categories of the employed, because it's highly discriminatory and unfair when barely half of those who are nominally employed are paying the proper taxes and social contributions and supporting all the social and state infrastructure.

Obviously, the process of shifting at least some part of the expense of education and healthcare from the state budget to alternative mechanisms for legally getting funds from the direct beneficiaries of the services also needs to be started. Dropping the constitutional atavism about "free medicine and education" is possibly even more important than judiciary reform or decentralization because Ukrainians have long ago recognized that neither healthcare and nor education is "free." The trouble is that, right now, they are being paid for in a distorted fashion that does nothing to prevent the deterioration of these two areas or to improve the quality of the services they provide. ■

Once and For All

Yulia Oliynyk

Russia has lost its war with Ukraine. But the question is, has Ukraine won? Ukrainians themselves began to call this Russian-Ukrainian war a “hybrid war:” there seems to be no war, but people are still dying. Finally it became obvious to us all that not only the war was hybrid, but so were Ukraine’s politics, economics and culture.

There’s supposedly an Opposition Bloc in the legislature, but there is no opposition to the ruling party. After all, why would, say, Ihor Kononenko oppose Rinat Akhmetov—over Ihor Kolomoyskiy’s assets could be the only reason.

Ukraine’s economy is supposedly free market-based but business lives off the state budget, deciding who will better sell the army fuel, who will provide “services” to Ukrzaliznytsia, the national railway operator, and who will help themselves to credits guaranteed by the Government. Supposedly the country also has commercial banks, but bank capital is not circulating, so only hybrid loans can be issued: insiders lending to insiders on “insider” terms. Ukraine’s customs service and border patrol similarly guard the country’s borders in a hybrid fashion, so that contraband flows without interruption and without being taxed into businesses without leaving a trace on domestic GDP. After all, how will people in the regions survive if they don’t engage in smuggling cigarettes in Zakarpattia, digging for amber in Rivne Oblast or moving gobies across the border in Sumy Oblast?

In culture, hybridity is no less evident. For instance, what is “Russian-language Ukrainian literature” if not a hybrid? Or holding Cabinet meetings in the Russian language because the Armenian Avakov and Georgian Saakashvili don’t want to—supposedly “can’t”—speak Ukrainian. Can you imagine that a German deputy who is an ethnic Turk not speaking German in the Bundestag?

Russia as the USSR was also a kind of hybrid totalitarian empire. In 1991, Ukraine gained a similar hybrid-style independence for itself, and has lived for nearly 25 years in that state, with thousands of monuments to Lenin, a russified government and cultural environment, heads of collective farms and red directors in the legislature, criminal oligarchs, and a traumatic, pathological love of the “younger brother” for his “big brother.” 25 years of hybrid independence... is that not a bit too much?

Today, the Russian empire is dying. But this is no guarantee that it will actually die, because it’s gone through agonies before—last in 1917, nearly a century ago. Then, Ukraine failed to gain independence. In the words of General Pilsudski: “Ukrainian politicians have sat on the revolutionary train but got out on the way to independence at a station called Socialism.” In the 1990s, Ukraine’s national democrats tried to get to the station called Capitalism but found themselves in the embrace of a specifically Russian pseudo-capitalism—we would now call it hybrid capitalism—that

loves its Lenins on central squares, its red flags, its impoverished people, and its criminal business.

In 2016, Ukraine not only can look forward to celebrating 25 years of independence, but to finally getting rid of all this hybridity. Much needs to be done to achieve this, but the main steps are pretty obvious:

(1) Business needs to operate on real, competitive market principles and not serve the public purse through black market and grey market schemes, which means not only accessible credits and demonopolization, but also transparency as to the ultimate beneficiaries of businesses.

(2) Healthy business should be allowed to develop in the regions that are currently economically depressed and the local population lives without income.

(3) Ukraine’s historical farm sector should be based on the building blocks of productive unit such as family farms and any restrictions on the tenure of farmland should be established in law with input from experts and growers so that a land market can finally be instituted as a stimulus for the economy.

**IN 1991, UKRAINE GAINED
A HYBRID-STYLE INDEPENDENCE FOR ITSELF,
AND HAS LIVED FOR NEARLY 25 YEARS IN THAT STATE**

(4) The country needs a proper social-democratic party that will defend the interests of hired labor and have nothing to do with either communists of the Symonenko-Zyuganov type, or with socialists of the Moroz-Medvedchuk type, so that populist manipulations will not be decisive in the competition for votes.

(5) In the humanitarian arena, Ukraine needs not only Ukraino-centric cultural policies, but a renewed effort at ukrainianizing: since Ukrainians were forcibly and brutally russified over several centuries, they should surely have the right to restore historical justice. The policy of protecting and preserving national identity is a European tradition that Ukrainians should uphold, for if we want to eliminate hybridity once and for all, we need to learn to defend our national interests. The choice is simple: either Ukraine becomes Ukrainian, or it dies. A Russian Ukraine is simply an oxymoron, another form of hybrid given to us by the empire.

Then there’s the military sphere: what kind of army should Ukraine’s be, given that it never really existed until now, with the exception of a few heroic, but brief periods in the 20th century? And what about foreign policy, where Ukraine always drifted among foreign channels and was never a geopolitical player, although it has real potential for this, at least in Eastern Europe?

These and many other challenges face the new generation of politicians in 2016. And how they respond will determine how soon Ukraine gets rid of the empire. That this is inevitable is no longer in any doubt. ■

A Game of Snap with Joker

Bohdan Butkevych

Ukraine's main political players want pre-term elections, but this won't happen

Right now, Ukraine's politicians are facing a conundrum: nearly all the parties want a snap election to the Verkhovna Rada, except maybe Premier Arseniy Yatseniuk and his nearly moribund People's Front. Even the Petro Poroshenko Bloc would be happy to get rid of a few dozen unruly deputies in their faction for more compliant majoritarians, although the President keeps saying "Four years with no elections" and joint statements keep being issued with the Premier and Speaker with the message "Peace and love, brother!"

Most likely, though, there won't be any snap election or even a Cabinet shuffle. In fact, Yatseniuk appears to be the only real obstacle to a pre-term "celebration of democracy." Or, to put it more precisely, he's been able to persuade everyone that the lynchpin to the current government configuration lies in him. Now, at the beginning of January, with the political season not yet started and after the scandalous adoption of the State Budget, it's quite clear that Yatseniuk is going to be around for a long time yet. And that pretty much guarantees that there will be no election soon.

Understandably, Yatseniuk's main purpose is to hold on to his spot in the PM's office because his party has little to no chance of gaining seats in the next legislature, and to hang on to his post as Head of Government for as long as possible so that he can prove to angry voters that he is able to accomplish something. If he is dismissed now, then, as possibly the most hated politician in the country today, he will have to forget about his political career for a few years at the least. For that, Ukrainians can thank both the media that serve Bankova and those that are hostile to the PM, for having made Yatseniuk the main culprit—often enough very much deservedly so—in the stalling of "decisive reforms" and the impoverishment of a big chunk of the population.

It seems that Yatseniuk put things quite bluntly: either I'm premier or you can kiss the coalition good-bye. And that would mean a snap election this spring, something that the Presidential Administration does not want. He had no qualms about confronting the entire political elite and is currently celebrating, maybe not a victory, but the preservation of the territory he has staked out. He succeeded by maximally personalizing the situation in the country: either I'm in government or the government goes. The reality is that, weak as the party's future may be, right now People's Front votes are the only thing keeping the current coalition alive. Otherwise, it has no chance of surviving, no matter how it tries to re-form itself, even if it includes "the living and the dead and the unborn" such as former Party of the Regions deputies from the Opposition Bloc. Yatseniuk effectively set up a classic stalemate. It worked.

Interestingly, as recently as the beginning of December, it looked like the PM's days on Hrushevsky Street were numbered. Poroshenko's closest allies and the

President himself were sending out signals in every way possible that it was time for him to pack his bags. Speaker Volodymyr Hroysman began to consider how he would rearrange the furniture the PM's Office. Then suddenly Bankova retreated. Why?

Firstly, because the White House let it be known that it was very much against such a move. Rumor has it that the Americans were absolutely unwilling to support Hroysman as an alternative, not so much because they are enamored of Yatseniuk but because they don't want to see Poroshenko usurp power. Nor do they see Hroysman as the right person to be at the helm in Ukraine at such a very difficult time. President Obama is coming to the end of his presidency and is thinking of his place in history: a new round of political and economic crises in Ukraine that could well lead to an escalation of the situation at the front, too, is the last thing he needs.

Secondly, Poroshenko has no realistic candidate for the premiership, besides Hroysman. Rumors that the President wanted to push the informal leader of "Dear Friends 2.0," Ihor Kononenko for the post most likely



IT'S LIKELY THAT THERE WON'T BE ANY ELECTIONS IN 2016, BUT A SNAP RADA ELECTION COULD WELL BE CALLED FOR SPRING 2017

really were nothing more than gossip. Poroshenko is not prepared to commit political suicide.

The idea of Mikheil Saakashvili as premier is so far being treated as more of a joke. Poroshenko understands very well that the Georgian ex-president is a dangerous ally with enormous ambitions and far more experience running a country—albeit one that is around one tenth the size of Ukraine. And he has a track record of success, together with the natural gift of a high-quality populist. So it's one matter to sic him on Yatseniuk, but another altogether to let him replace the PM.

Credit should also be given to Saakashvili that he understands the game being played by Bankova quite well and has clearly decided to work his way to power in Ukraine on his own. He has already launched his own political project that so far looks quite promising. If persistent rumors are right, he also has the healthy financial support of tycoon Kostiantyn Hryhoryshyn, who is currently at odds with both the President's inner circle and Yatseniuk's team. Moreover, neither Poroshenko nor Saakashvili have burned any bridges.

Meanwhile, from old habit, the spin doctors at Bankova are trying to channel the anti-Poroshenko protest vote towards parties that the Presidential Administration has control over. So far, they have managed to set up "Nash Krai," "People Control" and "The Party of Ordinary Folks" with Serhiy Kaplin. The idea of an anti-corruption imi-



Unlikely friends. Yatseniuk managed to get in a tough position: either he remains Premier, or the coalition won't exist, meaning that snap elections should take place in spring – something Bankova doesn't want

tative has been blowing in the wind for some time and the President's team is trying hard to latch onto it as well. However, it will be very hard to come to an agreement with the Anti-Corruption Movement, whose leader, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko is aggressively set against Poroshenko, especially after his ugly dismissal as head of the Security Bureau of Ukraine (SBU). Saakashvili might be a little easier to persuade, especially since "Mikho" is still governor of Odesa Oblast.

The Presidential Administration understands that early Rada elections are in the cards, sooner or later. The main question is how much later. On the one hand, it's not worth waiting too long because the President and his party are losing ground, even if not as quickly as Yatseniuk and People's Front. So, the longer the election is postponed, the fewer chances of even achieving the results they had in 2014. On the other, no one is prepared to call an election just for the sake of doing so. They need to be prepared and to establish a clear system of satellites, allies and spin-offs. Since most of this is not currently in place, Poroshenko has no mind to rush things.

What's more, however intractable Yatseniuk may have been, he's a useful figure for Bankova at the moment. With his marginal ratings and dismal voter trust, he will make a convenient scapegoat on whom to pin everything later on. Indeed, the Administration has been active in this for a year already and the tactic will likely sustain it for another half-year. Poroshenko's strategy for the upcoming six months appears to be to keep nibbling away at Yatseniuk without any consequences and to form various columns for the march to the election.

As to the other Rada parties and the forces close to them, it's clear that they are generally itching to go to the polls. For instance, with the ratings of the Opposition Bloc and Vidrodzhennia (Renaissance Party) on the rise, both Serhiy Liovochkin and Rinat Akhmetov are keen to increase their influence over domestic politics. Still, their expansion is only possible as long as Bankova connives by not going after ex-separatists or former officials from the Yanukovich regime. The price for this is no political moves against the current President. Whether or not to

violate this "mutual non-aggression pact" is a big question, but the Regionals could well just wait it out until the elections fall in their lap.

Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna party is also not against early elections. Her once sky-high ratings she's as likely to see as her own ears, but it would be nice to gain a couple or five more seats in the Rada. Batkivshchyna's ratings suggest that this is quite realistic, especially if Ms. T. continues to fill the ears naive voters with rants about utility rates. But, the cost of yet another campaign is keeping the red hearts from rushing headlong into early elections, as Tymoshenko no longer has the kind of capital as in the glorious 2000s.

Samopomich did quite well in local elections last fall, but it's still busy digesting hundreds of new deputies at the lower levels who need to reliably settle on the party bandwagon. On the one hand, an early election could well increase Samopomich's forces in the Rada quite significantly. Its moderate opposition to the Poroshenko Administration also pulls for early elections. But Sadoviy's party has nowhere special to rush to, as its main goal is the 2020 presidential race. Until then, Samopomich needs to figure out how to keep its nose clean by limiting responsibility and its involvement in real government. Then, again, there are the campaign costs that the recently-adopted party financing bill will not cover in any way. This means that, for Sadoviy & Co., early elections are a nice idea, but not one they are in a hurry to support.

Who's categorically against early elections is Oleh Liashko. His Radical Party is wobbling on the threshold of making it into the next Rada. Ukraine's favorite loose cannon had been having a very hard time just now: the KO handed to him by the arrest of his party member, a notorious ex-PR deputy chief for Azov, Ihor Mosiychuk, continues to work very much against him. With Tymoshenko hogging the issue of utility rates and Saakashvili good at setting up a political show, what is left for Ukraine's main pitchfork-bearer? Liashko needs to drag out the date of the next election in order to come up with some approach that works.

The only party itching for an election tomorrow is Svoboda. With its clumsy attack at the party following the August 31 grenade incident, Bankova did a very big favor for Oleh Tiahnybok & Co.: their ratings recovered. As the local elections showed, Svoboda is quite capable of repeating its success in 2012, or at a minimum making it into the new Rada with a healthy margin. Thanks to its main sponsor, Ihor "Poops" Kryvetskiy, money is not an issue for Svoboda. The real problem is that its handful of majoritarians in the Rada from the party is clearly unable to influence the situation. In the local elections, however, Svoboda gained factions all across the country, so there could be a string of demands from those county and oblast councils about the need for early elections.

In short, there won't be any election this coming spring, which means there won't be any in the summer, either. That makes next fall the earliest that an election might be called. However, it's 99% likely that the snap election will be called on the heels of Yatseniuk's dismissal, and that's unlikely to happen, given the current configuration of forces, until at least the fall, in which case the election will be called for spring 2017. Whatever happens, the political situation in Ukraine is in a very fragile equilibrium that could be disturbed by the least little thing. Still, it's most probable that Ukrainians will not go to the polls at all in 2016. ■

Mission Possible

Bohdan Yaremko, *Maidan of Foreign Affairs*

Foreign policy objectives and challenges for 2016

Ukraine's diplomatic team is entering 2016 in a state of persistent systemic crisis: it lacks a clearly formulated set of priorities and presumptions based on specific values, and has no clear objectives; its management system is in ruins; the necessary instruments and material support are either underdeveloped or absent altogether; and the level of professionalism and ethics of the majority of Ukraine's diplomatic corps is unacceptably low.

It's worth considering the statement—outdated to the point of banality—that foreign policy is merely an extension of domestic policy and answering one question: Is this really true in the case of Ukraine?

However inconsistent it may be in its formal decision-making process, the country's leadership keeps reminding everyone that Ukraine is fighting off armed aggression by Russia. In fact, the country is at war. So, does Ukraine's foreign policy with regard to the Russian Federation reflect this state of war?

The problem is not so much in the absurdity of there being a Russian embassy in Kyiv or a Ukrainian mission in Moscow. The point is that diplomatic relations are established between countries that recognize one another and have declared their readiness to develop relations based on the principles of international law. The start of an undeclared war, the annexation of Crimea, the financing of terrorist and other illegal armed groups



War and Peace. Minsk accords are the main foreign-policy dilemma facing Ukraine in the war with Russia on a practical level

on the occupied parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, the endless appeals, and deliberate twisting, distortion, exaggeration and manipulation of historical facts by Russia's political leadership and its propaganda machine with the goal of challenging the legitimacy of Ukraine within its current borders, if not the very existence of a Ukrainian state, is irrefutable evidence that Russia does not recognize Ukraine, does not respect its territorial integrity, and has no intention of adhering to the general rules and principles of international law in its relations with Ukraine, let alone to any bilateral contractual commitments.

Statements that a Ukrainian diplomatic presence must be maintained in the Russian Federation in order to protect the rights and interests of Ukrainian citizens are quite meaningless as there are no socially significant or even well-known instances where Ukraine has been able to defend the interests of its citizens in Russia—not even when its efforts enjoyed broad-based international support.

So, what exactly is the purpose of maintaining diplomatic relations between the two countries?

Despite their unambiguous statements regarding Russia, Ukrainian diplomats and their top leaders are having a hard time understanding the logic of war. The function and role of policy under war conditions need to be re-evaluated from top to bottom. And this is being driven by the success of Russian diplomacy, which, despite sanctions and universal condemnation of its behavior towards Ukraine, has managed to force its interpretation of events and even reached some formal and half-formal agreements and decisions that are beneficial to it. Because Russia is basing everything on the logic of war. Her diplomats “enter battle” when the military branch has ensured the most convenient conditions.

In the case of Ukraine, politicians and diplomats are the ones giving the military the orders to fire or to cease firing. With their hands thus tied, Armed Forces HQ are currently unable to offer the main advantage of the battlefield to the diplomatic corps: the option of choosing when and where to hold the battle. And that, naturally, makes it impossible to control the agenda during any negotiations. Of course, there is little reason to suggest that UAF HQ feels any discomfort because of its inability to take the initiative and act independently. But the commanders and rank-and-file at the front feel this, full-force.

Ukraine's diplomats need to understand that when there's a war, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the entire diplomatic corps are just a large adjunct of the Defense Ministry. The objective of the diplomatic service at this time has to be, not the abstract development of relations with someone, somewhere, but an active search for allies and partners to support military action. They need to ensure the necessary political and material support for running this war and the flow of information about the actions of the Armed Forces, to arrange as many obstacles as possible for the enemy, to neutralize its diplomatic and informational resources to the maximum, and to force it

to focus on secondary matters. We're talking about an arsenal of diplomatic weapons: bilateral relations, work with international organizations, large international and regional economic and energy projects, and so on. There must be total diplomatic war.

THE MINSK TRAP

Right now, the Minsk accords are the main foreign-policy dilemma facing Ukraine in this war with Russia on a practical level. This ugly fruit of the Russian school of diplomacy is not just unrealistic in the execution, but is completely without advantage for Ukraine, immoral and harmful. By insisting that these agreements are the only alternative and imposing this belief on Ukrainian society and the international community, Ukraine's Head of State and its diplomatic corps have set up another stalemate for themselves and Ukraine, as the Minsk agreements are simultaneously impossible to carry out and impossible to not carry out.

The endless references to the Minsk accords in various reports and decisions by the G7, EU, NATO and even the UN have achieved the unthinkable. They have provided the basis for referring to the legitimacy of a completely unnatural attempt to reconcile the victim of a murder with the gun that is killing it, leaving out any notions about legality and morality—never mind the fact that a gun does not shoot itself. Yet, for Ukraine today to not implement the Minsk accords will mean taking a stance against the unanimous

STARTING WITH THE KUCHMA ADMINISTRATION, UKRAINE'S DIPLOMATS HAVE SERVED NOT SO MUCH THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE OR SOCIETY, BUT THE NEED TO JUSTIFY THE INABILITY, MISTAKES, CRIMES OR INERTIA OF THE RULING CLASS

opinion of the world community. This could have been done relatively painlessly until the end of last summer, when weapons banned by the accords were being actively fired at Ukraine along the entire frontline and causing both civilian and military casualties. Instead, Ukraine's diplomats decided to ignore this opportunity, while the country's political leadership chose to continue to try to implement the accords unilaterally. As a result, casualties appeared even under the walls of the Verkhovna Rada in Kyiv.

Attempts to continue to carry out the provisions of the Minsk agreements, such as amending the country's Constitution and certain laws could have an irreversibly negative impact on the domestic situation, given the heightened tension among ordinary Ukrainians. Or, it's entirely possible that this could become the point of no return in relations between a large share of patriotic activists and Ukraine's government. The threat is all the greater since there is active resistance to implementing the Minsk accords not just coming from voters who are against the government, but within the government itself. This means that carrying out Minsk provi- ➤

sions could result in the collapse of even those inclusive instruments of social stability that remain in Ukraine today.

Carrying out the Minsk provisions is also beyond the capability of Ukraine in terms of available resources. But most of all, these agreements are not an instrument that could possibly resolve any of the problems facing the Ukrainian state today. For starters, the widely used phrase that de-escalation has been achieved thanks to Minsk needs to be questioned, as all it achieves is to put the diplomatic cart before the military horse.

In fact, Ukraine's diplomats made one serious systemic miscalculation, among all the mistakes made in 2015: they allowed the Minsk accords to be linked to the international sanctions against Russia. Although these sanctions were never imposed as part of any Minsk agreement, now, the main stakeholders—the US, Germany and France—have taken the position that as soon as the Minsk provisions have been implemented, it would make sense to drop the majority of the sanctions against Russia. But the point is that, on one hand, the sanctions are the only effective leverage against Russia today, and on the other, the Minsk accords will never lead to peace on Ukraine's soil, because the issue of Crimea is not even touched on in them. And so the country will de facto remain in a state of war regardless of Minsk.

In short, the overriding objective for Ukraine's foreign policy in 2016 will be a Mission Impossible: to avoid carrying out the political components of the Minsk accords while not making it possible to accuse Ukraine of breaking its commitments

promising fairytales as explaining why the jailing of Yulia Tymoshenko was not politically motivated, that the Maidan in Kyiv was a horde of extremists and terrorists, that reforms can only be carried out in Ukraine after the war—that no one has officially declared, incidentally—and that corruption can only be handled by the Prosecutor General, Mr. Shokin.

WINNING BACK TRUST

Next, the top management of the Foreign Ministry need to stop passing the buck for the inability to properly organize funding for the agency at the necessary level to the heads of foreign missions and mid-level managers. Shutting down foreign missions until funding levels for those that remain are down to the level of the allocated annual budget is also a path that leads only to decay and collapse. The diplomatic service needs to understand its priorities, identify the instruments for reaching its objectives, and honestly admit to itself and to voters what it can actually accomplish and what will have to be dropped.

Of course, this kind of work requires real leader who not only have the necessary skills but also the political will. The emergence of such a leader at the MFA is unlikely while the agency is completely subservient to the will of the president. What's more, dualism in the management of this area of foreign activity because the minister is appointed by the president but works with and is funded by the premier's team will not help the MFA find a charismatic, confident, pro-active leader. Change and reform of the entire system for managing foreign affairs needs to be a society-wide task, because it has to start with changes to the Constitution itself. Hopefully, 2016 will be the year that Ukrainians actively formulate and approve a new Basic Law for their country.

And this is where the MFA needs to think who will become the defender of the agency's interests in this process? Ukrainian diplomats have still not found the strength to clearly and unambiguously stand on the side of the Ukrainian people during the Euromaidan. This means they cannot really expect the kind of support from this corner that, for instance, allowed the country to resurrect its armed forces from their state of ruin. Serious differences within the ruling coalition of political parties and the inability to satisfy the endless whims and image-related demands of the current Administration are destroying any hope the diplomats might have had to have someone in civil society lobby on their behalf.

Restoring public trust will be one of the most difficult and massive challenges facing the MFA for the foreseeable future. At the moment, it's hard to imagine that Ukraine's diplomatic corps is prepared to understand this and not just to flatter itself as the elite of domestic bureaucrats. That they can understand that any agency must see as its main purpose to provide services to its citizens and domestic businesses.

As long as this way of framing issues remains a dream, Ukrainians can only hope that 2016 is the year that the current system collapses altogether and we can finally start to build a new one. ■

UKRAINE'S DIPLOMATS MADE ONE SERIOUS SYSTEMIC MISCALCULATION IN 2015: THEY ALLOWED THE MINSK ACCORDS TO BE LINKED TO THE INTERNATIONAL SANCTIONS AGAINST RUSSIA

altogether, while not only maintaining sanctions against Russia but getting the West to recognize that it makes no sense to drop them until Russia completely withdraws from Donbas and Crimea, and compensates Ukraine for the damage and losses caused by its aggression.

Ukraine's diplomatic corps does not have many resources at its disposal. This means that, in order to tackle these supremely difficult challenges, it needs to be relieved of one extremely burdensome and counter-productive function: being involved in inventing explanations and acceptable reasons for the inability of Ukraine's leadership to meet the expectations of Ukrainian society and the country's international partners. Starting with the Kuchma Administration, Ukraine's diplomats have served not so much the interests of the state or society, but the need to justify the inability, mistakes, crimes or inertia of the "Ukrainian" ruling class. It's high time to recognize that, for the foreseeable future, public opinion in Ukraine will remain the primary criterion according to which Ukraine's leadership and its state will be judged by foreign partners.

Once this is understood, Ukraine's diplomats will lose their taste and desire to participate in such un-



Read the full version at ukrainianweek.com

The Pillars of European Scepticism

Francisco de Borja Lasheras, Associate Director and Policy Fellow, ECFR Madrid

In countries such as Spain, France or Germany, public perceptions on Ukraine, the Maidan and the war, are a mixture of big-picture frame alongside much confusion. The public generally attributes the core responsibility for the conflict to Russia and Putin. Yet, for certain pundits, diplomats and politicians, the EU and some of its member-states would also be to blame for “provoking” Russia. Oversimplifications on Ukraine abound, though this is the case with other international topics. A chief example is the binary approach that overdoes the cleavage of Western Ukraine (“pro EU”) versus Eastern Ukraine (“pro Russia”). Many people see Ukraine only through the lens of its oligarchs and corrupt leadership. This scepticism partly springs from the Orange Revolution’s discredited politicians and the impression that many new ones are Old Guard too. The volatile nature of Ukraine’s politics compounds the picture. Though propaganda and misinformation have certainly played a role, the fact is that there is still a poor basis in Western Europe for an objective, nuanced understanding of Ukraine as a country. Foreign policy discussions are, in a way, a reflection of this, and of an equally poor rapprochement between Western and Eastern European societies.

Another thing the crisis has confirmed is the widening gap between the traditional public space where mainstream media operates, and the second dimension of the social media, misinformation and propaganda jungle. Political and social thinking within our global societies and establishments is shaped by both, with the latter developing almost as a parallel public space.

Mainstream media outlets have generally given a fair and balanced account on key events since the Maidan. In parallel, however, especially in the cyberspace, an ongoing clash of ideas and worldviews within our societies has been evident. These “opinion wars” have often pitted pro-Western and liberal voices, generally defending Ukraine, and anti-Western and sceptics showing understanding for Russia’s actions. The polarized nature of these discussions has sapped any space for nuanced, constructive views.

This battle of ideas, now shifting to Syria, has been a playfield for propaganda and misinformation. But propaganda has merely tapped into simmering dissatisfaction and mistrust within Western societies, in times of crisis of collective ideals and institutions. These discussions have often not really been about Ukraine itself, but rather about the West, Europe and global governance. Some politicians and pundits have used the crisis to hurl geopolitical abuse at the US, Europe and the West, or to dust off old propositions of Russia’s role in European security architecture. Further, the fact that a majority of Ukrainians continually signal a will to be subjects



rather than objects of international relations is, sadly, an annoyance to many grand strategists or Russlandverstehers.

At work are also more profound factors that go to the very core of Western societies and political systems. Firstly, we are witnessing the return of polarized politics with its Manichean thinking and resulting worldviews. Hence hollow assumptions that the West has ill goals everywhere, including Ukraine. Secondly, as we enter a new Age of Insecurity, fears of ISIS and generalized instability, many of those in power cling to *Realpolitik* notions that favour relations with authoritarian leaders over de-



UKRAINE’S DILEMMAS OVERLAP WITH AN ATROPHY OF EUROPE AND THE WEST AS POLITICAL NARRATIVES AND SYSTEMS, WHICH HAS GAINED TRACTION AMIDST UNSETTLING ABUSES, STRUGGLING INSTITUTIONS AND DECLINING LEADERSHIP

mocracy promotion, especially after the Arab Spring. The premise is Putin, Assad or Egypt’s Al Sisi are a lesser evil to chaos and instability. Thirdly, many cosmopolitan Europeans feel uneasy with processes of nation-building, of the kind Ukraine is currently going through. They are no longer used to the idea of patriotism, seen as a slippery slope to the nationalistic bigotry against which post-war Europe was built. Many of these cosmopolitan Europeans approach Ukraine with a lofty, though sometimes narrow emphasis on even-handedness and fairness that prevents them from reckoning that one party might be essentially right and another essentially wrong. But above all, Ukraine’s dilemmas overlap with an atrophy of Europe and the West as political narratives and systems, which has gained traction amidst unsettling abuses (Iraq, tortures), struggling institutions (eurozone) and declining leadership. Realistically, Western and European identity, and its basic corollary (solidarity), were always weak tenets, but they have now become more acute. Hence, hollow rhetoric has proved a poor recipe for a predominant moral relativism and nihilism that sees some sectors permanently stressing the West’s own galling contradictions and hypocrisies.

The New Ukraine has a small chance to prove sceptics wrong. In my view, it is but one part of a broader challenge: to revitalize the European narrative, making it again a truly inspiring project for our societies, even in uncertain times. In that process of renewal, instead of just more summits and countering propaganda, we need to invest much more in societal rapprochement as the basis for any purposeful pan-European solidarity. ■

Leaving the Worst Behind

Lyubomyr Shavalyuk

Ukraine's economy will start moving upwards and gain momentum gradually

2015 was one of the hardest years for Ukraine's economy since its independence. The country found itself at the crossroads of a number of negative trends, both global and local, both old and new. As a result, we faced a whole range of problems at the national scale, the very emergence of which gave rise to the sense of fear and insecurity in the country.

Considerable capital flight, drop in global commodity prices and the loss of a large share of export capacity in Donbas led to a dramatic deterioration of the balance of payments, entailing the collapse of the hryvnia. Strict fiscal consolidation under the auspices of the IMF loan program combined with the slow progress of financial decentralization resulted in the accumulation of significant funds in the government accounts and shrinking aggregate demand, largely contributing to GDP reduction. The process of slowly but surely purging the banking system of insolvent financial institutions that continued throughout the year kept both depositors and borrowers in suspense, resulting in the lack of credit activities and determining the adverse impact of the financial system on the country's economy.

However, as of the beginning of 2016, most of these problems have been left behind. Ukrainians have become noticeably poorer. We have lost a part of the economy. But macroeconomic stability has been achieved, and it seems quite sustainable as of today. This means that we can look confidently to the future (assuming that there will be no escalation of hostilities) and get to analyzing the trends and challenges that the Ukrainian economy is to face in the coming year.

FOREIGN TRENDS


Most problems and foul winds in 2016 are expected to come from abroad. They will be countered with just a few positive developments. Therefore, the negative pressure on the BoP and the hryvnia will continue.

One of the major global trends that will have an overwhelming impact on Ukraine is the further drop in commodity prices. According to NBU estimates, commodity products account for about 80% of Ukraine's exports and for 40% of its imports. The good news is that the prices for different commodities are falling along different curves. For example, in the first half of January, crude oil traded in the range of USD 30-32 per barrel, which is more than 40% cheaper than a year ago. Investment banks race to lower their price forecasts, and the expectations quoted today are USD 20 or even USD 10 a barrel. Since the oil market hasn't yet reached

Debt relief

Massive foreign debt restructuring carried out by the Government of Ukraine at the end of the last year will ease debt burden on the budget. The saved funds could then be used to support business activity

Government debt repayment, UAH bn



* including redemption of all old Eurobonds in exchange for new securities

Source: Treasury and Parliament data

the bottom, Ukraine will benefit for a few quarters from cheap energy. We will be buying natural gas for less than USD 200 per 1,000 m³ (and the price might drop further), and will also be able to import inexpensive coal. By contrast, the drop in grain prices has not been so dramatic. Some products even reached the bottom last year, with their prices going down to multiyear lows. For example, in the year to mid-January 2016, global corn price in the Gulf of Mexico fell by 13%, and wheat price by 18% in total. Therefore, Ukraine's balance of payments related to commodity trade will be more or less balanced, and the falling commodity prices will not result in a significant shortage of foreign currency in the country.

Another important trend is trade with regional countries. On January 1, 2016, the FTA agreement between Ukraine and the EU came into effect. Import duties on European goods supplied to the Ukrainian market will be decreased differently and gradually, but some growth in imports can be expected from the very beginning of 2016. Besides, the Parliament has abolished the import surcharge of 5-10%, effective January 1, which should also reduce the cost of imports and contribute to their inflow. This will exert some pressure on the trade balance and the hryvnia towards its devaluation. We can only hope that last year Ukrainian producers did not waste their time and made all the steps necessary to prepare their products to enter the European market in 2016. Time will tell whether these expectations were justified and whether the increased Ukrainian exports to the EU would com-

pensate for the increased flow of commodities into the country. At least, the prospects for entering the European market this year are good: Bloomberg expects the euro zone economy to grow by 1.7%, the same figure is provided by the consensus forecast of British weekly *The Economist*, integrating the estimates of 23 leading global banks and financial companies. If the European economy is to grow at a solid pace, there will definitely be a niche for Ukrainian producers on the EU market.

This is not quite the case with the Russian market. Since the Kremlin withdrew from the free trade area with Ukraine, further reduction in commodity exchange between the two economies can be expected. According to the State Statistics Service, in 10 months of 2015, Ukrainian exports to Russia amounted to over USD 4 billion, which means that annual exports to Russia totaled about USD 5 billion. Is this a lot? For comparison, in 10 months of 2015, total exports from Ukraine to all countries dropped by USD 14.6 billion. This was due to different reasons, ranging from the destruction of Ukrainian production facilities and logistic sectors to various administrative and bureaucratic barriers to our goods in key target markets, including exchange rates fluctuations in many countries. Compared to these losses incurred last year, the decline in Russian exports does not seem critical and may well be offset by the efforts made in other markets.

The main negative trend that is likely to continue into 2016 will be the repayment of foreign debt by Ukrainian private sector. In 10 months, Ukrainian companies paid USD 4.9 billion net (redemption minus raising new debt) of private foreign debt, which is 39% more than in the same period of 2014, and banks repaid another USD 2.6 billion of foreign debts (three times more than in the same period of 2014). Today the trend still continues, so this year it will also negatively affect the balance of payments. This will be compensated to some extent by the fact that the Ukrainian government, thanks to the debt restructuring deal agreed in 2015, will not have to spend billions of dollars to repay foreign debt (**see Debt Relief**). On the one hand, this will help to accumulate the funds that Ukraine is likely to receive from the IMF on the NBU foreign exchange reserves. On the other hand, this will create a precondition to decrease borrowing on the domestic financial market, which will ultimately make available some resources in the banking sector that financial institutions will use for lending to the real economy, rather than for purchasing government bonds. Foreign direct investment could become another positive factor for the financial account of the balance of payments. Investment attracted in 10 months of 2015 brought to the country USD 2.2 billion net. It is a modest figure, but this year, subject to favorable conditions and good pace of reform, it may double.

On the whole, the new year promises to be not very favorable in terms of Ukraine's relations with the external sector as reflected in the balance of payments. Scarce currency proceeds are likely to be combined with the NBU policy of gradually eliminating foreign exchange restrictions. If the Central Bank goes ahead with exchange rate flexibility, this

will lead to the gradual and not dramatic devaluation of the hryvnia. However, the significant devaluation of the national currency is not to be expected, as there are no serious grounds for it today. However, the loss by the hryvnia of 10-15% of its value as a result of the sum vector of all positive and negative factors seems quite realistic (greater fluctuations are possible during the year, but the rate is bound to return to more stable and moderate values). The important thing is that flexible exchange rate will help create a dynamic balance in the currency market, allowing economic agents to gradually start growing instead of surviving.

PUBLIC SECTOR

Last year, the public sector was a factor of economic decline rather than growth. Severe austerity (combined with poorly administered financial decentralization) that Ukraine had to introduce as part of the IMF's Extended Fund Facility has brought a positive result: macroeconomic stabilization. However, it also had a major negative side effect: in the first six months, there was a double-digit drop in GDP.

In 2016, the public sector will not become a force for progress in the Ukrainian economy either, because the approved budget in its essence is the same document that we have had for many years and that we would prefer to gradually get rid of. However, there will be some changes bringing hope to the new year.

IF THE EUROPEAN ECONOMY IS TO GROW AT A SOLID PACE, THERE WILL DEFINITELY BE A NICHE FOR UKRAINIAN PRODUCERS ON THE EU MARKET

The main positive change in the public sector lies on the surface: it is the large amount of money in the government accounts. As of the early December 2015, the government had accumulated almost UAH 48 billion on the single treasury account (STA). A month later, in early January 2016, only a little over UAH 9 billion were left out of this sum. This means that almost UAH 40 billion were poured into the economy. It is not so important whether they were paid to state employees or used to redeem government bonds held by banks and financial companies. The main thing is that the system received an additional resource, which will help significantly revive the business activity in the first six months of 2016. The effect will be the opposite of what happened a year earlier. Therefore, given the low comparative base and further liquidity injections into the economy, it would not be surprising if in the first quarters of this year the economy shows growth of 3-5%, significantly exceeding skeptical expectations.

Besides the funds in the STA, the government also had over UAH 47 billion in NBU accounts (probably in foreign currency) as of the early December 2015. This money was accumulated in preparation for the foreign debt repayment. However, following the debt restructuring and the refusal to repay Russian Eurobonds, this resource has become avail- ➤

able. Therefore, it may well be expected that in 2016 it will be used if not for additional budget expenditures, then at least for advanced repayment of domestic debt or, say, for VAT refunds. It should also be noted that local governments are beginning to benefit from the decentralization, including the possibility of opening their own accounts with commercial banks. As of the early December 2015, such accounts held UAH 10.7 billion (three times more than at the beginning of the year), which may well be put into circulation in 2016, stimulating the aggregate demand in the country.

The tax reform that was never adopted has become the big disappointment of the last year. The government contented with cosmetic innovations to the tax system, which, like the changes made in 2014 to the 2015 budget, will have no positive impact on the economy. This makes the tax reform and its adoption this year even more important. The country needs a fiscal system reform that would be simple, radical, and friendly to Ukrainians. If it succeeds, its positive effects will be difficult to overestimate. Relevant and adequate taxation system could not only radically improve the investment climate in the country and launch the process of economic development for years to come, but would also raise the meager ratings of the current government and the Prime Minister. A good tax reform could extend the life of the current coalition, while the bad one would trigger the destructive processes in the Ukrainian politics. Of course, it is most likely that the country will see the immediate results of introducing any taxation changes only the next year. However, positive transformations could influence the expectations of the counteragents, making some macroeconomic indicators show positive dynamics already in 2016.

The new year gives two more good hopes to the country. Firstly, electronic public procurement system should start operating at full capacity. It should not be underestimated. It is not only about saving up to UAH50 billion of budget funds annually thanks to this innovation. In an effective country, every link in the chain has to be effective. In this area, the state has traditionally trailed behind, but the electronic procurement is a tool that could trigger a radical change in the situation. At least, there is a hope. Secondly, great hopes should be laid on privatization. The large privatization that was promised by both Yatsenyuk's governments did not happen either in 2014 or in 2015. The reason is obvious: the oligarchic-parasitic lobby. If this year it is overcome, and the privatization process is launched, the country will not only receive additional financial investment (probably from abroad), but also get rid of the many parasites hindering its development. Let's be hopeful for that as well.


In summary, the public sector in 2016 should return to the economy everything it took from it in 2015. This will not be enough to make a breakthrough, but is sufficient to stimulate economic growth at a slightly higher rate than expected.

FINANCIAL SECTOR

Last year, the banking sector went negative by almost all indicators: number of banks, loans and

Gaping abyss

Ukraine's banking system has not yet hit the lowest low in terms of deposits and loans. It might reach that point in 2016



deposits, revenues, impact on the economy, etc. By the year end, the decrease in credit and deposit bases practically stopped (**see Gaping abyss**), giving hope that 2016 will reverse the trend, and the financial institution will start attracting deposits and providing loans. For this to become a reality, the NBU should complete the purging of the banking system, sending a clear message not only to the professional community, but also to the civil society. Currently, the Central Bank continues to remove financial institutions from the market, rarely but regularly, keeping tense both market players and potential investors. Bankers know bet-

MOST OF THE NEGATIVE FACTORS THAT SHAPED THE ECONOMY LAST YEAR WILL NO LONGER EXIST IN 2016. NEW YEAR GIVES HOPE

ter than anyone else that money likes stability, and this is exactly what all parties involved in the financial sector currently lack. If there is no stability, there will be no deposits and no lending. In this situation, the financial sector could remain a burden for the economy rather than a growth factor in the new year as well. Unfortunately, the National Bank, despite all its progressive activities, has so far failed to achieve the final result: the resumption of lending.

So, most of the negative factors that shaped the economy last year will no longer exist in 2016. New year gives hope. Ukrainian economy is starting on the path of growth, balanced by moderate hryvnia devaluation, encouraged by the money saved by the government and potential resumption of lending. In this framework, the GDP could well grow by 3-4% annually. And even though the rate of this growth will not yet be satisfactory, it could still beat the skeptics and lay the foundation for a powerful leap forward as soon as the critical mass of reforms is accumulated. ■

Light at the Bottom

Oleksiy Khmara, *President of Transparency International Ukraine*

At the International Anti-corruption Conference held in Kyiv in November 2015 President Poroshenko publicly promised that the government was already sharpening its axe against corrupt individuals and was ready to take action.

His metaphor was easy to understand: Ukrainians grow increasingly weary of the most corrupt officials. This leaves those in power with no much choice but to show at least some accomplishments in the feeble battle against those who steal from the treasury. 2015, however, was more of a warm-up before the battle. Those in power spent it establishing an infrastructure for anti-corruption bodies, pumping up anti-corruption standards, criminalizing corruption activities and opening registries and other state information to the public. When it came to the implementation of all this in practice, the process stalled: criminal cases against Yanukovych's henchmen are being closed one after another; the henchmen themselves flee totally unobstructed and the law enforcements bodies turn a blind eye to all accusations of corruption among the ranks of the new reformers. This is a classic embodiment of the three wise monkeys: "Hear nothing, see nothing, say nothing."

Whether there will be somebody to punch corrupt officials in the Year of the Red Monkey so far remains to be seen. An effective fight against corruption is based on four pillars: 1) maximum transparency of information; 2) irreversibility of punishment for corruption; 3) transparency of spending; and 4) readiness of citizens to counteract corruption. The government has actually done much to reinforce each of these pillars. It opened access to official information in registries and databases. Registries on real estate, land and owners of businesses are open to the public. The car register should be opened starting from January. A unified online base of electronic income and property declarations by officials should kick off in April. As soon as this is put into effect, everyone will be able to independently punish corrupt officials on-line. Say, you've seen a vehicle parked illegally on the sidewalk by a government building. You can check its owner in the open databases; if owned by an official, another online database will show you his or her declaration to see whether the vehicle is reported. If not, you can report spotting a potentially corrupt official to the police. Law enforcers will then launch criminal proceedings. If proven guilty, the violator will serve two years in prison. Similar procedure applies to officials who live in expensive estates, own large land plots or are ultimate beneficiaries of big businesses.

By the end of 2015, Ukraine basically had all the core anti-corruption bodies. The Anti-Corruption Bureau is already functioning in the country, with nearly a hundred carefully selected and well trained fighters against the most highly corrupted individuals employed. To help the ANB, the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office is being finalized within the General Prosecutor's Office. It will monitor the actions of ANB detectives for compliance with laws and accompany their investigations all the way through court verdict. Almost completed is the formation



of the National Corruption Prevention Agency. Starting from 2016, it will review declarations, the lifestyle and conflicts of interest of all civil servants.

The establishment of the anti-corruption infrastructure has more than once sparked media scandals in the past year: once over people who weren't accepted to the ANB because they were inconvenient for the President; another time over attempts to shove candidates loyal to the current Prosecutor General into the Anti-Corruption Prosecutor's Office. The creation of the National Corruption Preven-



BY THE END OF 2015, UKRAINE BASICALLY HAD ALL THE CORE ANTI-CORRUPTION BODIES

tion Agency was launched twice: initially, the procedure to select its top officials betrayed too much of the Premier's influence.

There is little reason to believe that the two most senior people in the country will quit their attempts to continue meddling with the newly-established anti-corruption agencies. They can keep doing so by stifling fighters with corruption financially, or by trying to red-tape their interaction with other services as much as possible. Therefore, the risk of the new institutions finding themselves paralyzed is still quite high.

The Europeans and Americans have made it clear though: they will give Ukraine no more money without anti-corruption efforts. And Ukraine needs money. So those in power are likely to take some steps in the implementation of the anti-corruption campaign in 2016. Clearly, they will hardly put the most notorious people like the Kliuyev brothers or Mykola Zlochevsky (Minister of Environment under Viktor Yanukovych and owner of Burisma Holdings gas extraction company—Ed.) in jail. But they may well prosecute many of the current and former MPs and ministers. Ukraine's courts, whose corruption level is beyond legendary, will remain the weakest link in the chain.

The major driver of change will, of course, be the citizens. Frequent journalist investigations, ongoing civil pressure and comprehensive independent control over the actions of officials—this is the simple recipe of the all-time driver of reforms in Ukraine. Today, this driver has been propped up with an effective "online brain": new services to monitor expenditures, ProZorro electronic public procurement system, and a unified portal to monitor public spending are the new additions to the registers and databases opened earlier.

Corruption will remain the most notorious in the province. Decentralization will give local communities much more funding for their development. Yet, they will not necessarily spend the money properly, particularly as all of society and the newly-established anti-corruption bodies focus on the squabbles between Ukraine's top leaders through the hands of valets from their closest circles. ■

Pavlo Klimkin:

"We expect solidarity and commitment to Ukrainian affairs from the EU"

On December 18, the European Commission approved the visa-free progress report on Ukraine, which means that starting mid-summer, Ukrainians may get the right to travel freely within the EU. On January 1, 2016, the Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine and the EU came into effect. Shortly before, *The Ukrainian Week* spoke with Ukraine's Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin about this, as well as the prospects of elections in the occupied parts of the Donbas, the Normandy format negotiations, and the future of Ukraine's diplomatic relations with Russia.

Interviewed by
Anna Korbut

Some believe that Ukraine has received the news of potential visa-free regime with the EU as a sort of a Christmas present, a political advance...

I don't agree that this is a present. Our country has deserved this. In fact, we would hold all reforms anyway. But the prospect of the visa-free regime will spur them and encourage a more systematic implementation.

Ukraine has not fulfilled several important requirements concerning the establishment of the infrastructure to fight corruption. These are some of the key ones to which the prospect of visa-free travel was tied...

I believe that political advances were granted earlier, and to other countries. For example, to some Balkan States, although I'm not at all trying to say that their progress had been insufficient. But given the current perception of the migrant crisis in the EU, no one would grant political advances related to visa liberalization.

It is another thing that Brussels is using the visa liberalization action plan to help promote reforms in Ukraine. Most of them are linked to the process of building confidence in the way government institutions work in Ukraine. There is also a wider dimension to this: the entire anti-corruption model for Ukraine had been developed without connections to visa liberalization. For example, all of anti-corruption requirements are included in our joint program with the IMF. That is, we would fulfill all these requirements even if they had not been included in the action plan for the visa-free regime or in the IMF program. But it is true that we have been able to do this in a more systematic and structured manner and within a shorter term. Therefore, I believe that it (the EC's decision — Ed.) was not an advance, but rather an opportunity to use instruments.

The EU is using the "more for more" principle, a typical one for Eastern Partnership. This means that the

more positively assessed reforms a country implements, the more aid it can count on. The same rule applies to the visa-free regime. The EU is clearly past the point when it was prepared to grant purely political advances. The only thing I agree with is that this is a political advance in recognition of Ukraine's and Ukrainians' belonging in Europe.

Because the procedure to get a visa will no longer be as impassable for many Ukrainians as it was even five years ago. I still remember the time when we just started discussing visa liberalization, invited all EU consuls and resolved problematic situations. Today, the visa-free regime for many Ukrainians means not just simplified technical procedures, but also the recognition that Ukraine belongs in Europe.


Confidence in Ukrainians is an important aspect. What exactly do we have to do within the next six months in order to improve it, rather than lose it?

I think that everything we have done (including the establishment of the anti-corruption system, the reform of the law enforcement and of the document system: January 1 is the starting date for the issuance of new passports in compliance with European standards) comprises a system that has just started working. For the EU, it is important that it works consistently. That would be the real sign of trust, and not for the European Union alone.

This is not only a matter of the next six months. This is more about how the EU will work with us on reforms in general. For many years, I have been telling the EU that we only need two things from them in terms of cooperation: solidarity (today we have it, including in the political field, for example, the decision to extend sanctions against Russia), and a proactive attitude and commitment to Ukrainian affairs. The mentality in the EU is gradually beginning to change in this direction. They understand, for instance, that reforms here cannot be entirely modeled, say, on the reforms that took place in the Czech Republic. This is very important.

Is there a consensus among the EU countries to extend sanctions against Russia? And what should we expect after July 2016, the date to which the sanctions have just been prolonged?

There is a consensus. The decision to extend sanctions proves this. There has virtually been no discussion on whether sanctions are needed; the debate that did take place focused on the efficiency of the sanctions policy, on whether it can encourage Russia to fulfill



Pavlo Klimkin, born in 1967, studied Physics and Applied Mathematics at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Department of Aerophysics and Space Research, and graduated in 1991. In 1993–1997, he served as an Attaché, Third and Second Secretary of the Office of Arms Control and Disarmament of the MFA of Ukraine. In 2002–2003, Mr. Klimkin was Head of Economic and Sectoral Cooperation with the EU of the European Integration Department of the MFA of Ukraine. In 2004, he was appointed Minister-Counselor of the Embassy of Ukraine to the United Kingdom. In 2012–2014, he served as Ukraine's Ambassador to Germany. In 2010–2014, Mr. Klimkin was Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine, and was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs in June 2014

Minsk Agreements, and on whether this policy is sufficient. There are differences in the positions of individual countries, but they probably reflect contradictions existing within the European Union in general.

What will happen in six months? It's like looking into a crystal ball. The sanctions strictly depend on the compliance with Minsk Agreements. It is measured by clearly defined criteria. First and foremost, this means withdrawal of Russian mercenaries from the occupied territory, bringing the border back under the Ukrainian control, providing full access of the OSCE and the international community to the ground, and holding real elections, not just another farce.

I often hear: should we vote for amendments to the Constitution, if we don't have any real progress in the Minsk process? I understand this logic, and I always say that the constitutional provisions referring to the law on the specifics of local government and the law itself will only come into force following free and fair elections. That is, the law will not be implemented if neither the international community nor Ukraine recognizes these elections.

Is there pressure from Ukraine's Western partners to hold just any vote in the occupied parts of the Donbas, even if formal, only to get rid of the Ukrainian issue?

Absolutely not. A few weeks ago (on December 3, 2015—Ed.), foreign ministers of Germany and France, following our discussions, issued a joint letter, where they spelled out that the elections should be held with the ensured access of the media and political parties, under Ukrainian legislation, and in compliance with the OSCE criteria. For them, this is an axiom to some extent. Otherwise, the Donbas will remain Russian de facto, while we are talking about integrating the Ukrainian Donbas into our country. They understand this perfectly well. They also understand that it cannot be "frozen" like the conflict in Transnistria. That this is about challenges to the European security system. There is a clear understanding that the election should be valid and real.

Are there any signs that Russia would agree to it?

Russia does not need the Donbas as such. It needs to keep Russian or quasi-Russian control over the region and to use it to divert Ukraine from its European path. Everything that has been going on to this day with regard to the FTA and other things were just attempts to keep Ukraine in the Russian sphere of influence, because many people in Russia think within this framework. They basically don't understand one very simple thing: it is impossible to negotiate and agree on something at the level of abstract states. Ukrainians have already passed the point of no return, and no one will want to live in a country like today's Russia. Germany and France are

also aware of this. Sometimes I am being asked, whether Steinmeier and Fabius exercise pressure during the Normandy format talks to speed up elections in the Donbas. Of course, they are interested in the elections, but in the real elections, not in another farce.

How could Ukraine close its borders after the elections?

There are two aspects to this. I remember all ministerial meetings: the three of us keep saying that the mandate of the OSCE mission working in Ukraine covers the entire territory of Ukraine. And it should have already taken it under control, including the borders. The gradual transfer of the border control to Kyiv should depend on our ability to keep it. We consistently emphasize this. Russia consistently objects. But its objections to the presence of the OSCE make no sense, to say the least, since it agreed that the mandate of the Special Monitoring Mission extends to the whole territory of Ukraine. Now we insist that the Special Monitoring Mission should have more bases in the Donbas, from which it could carry out inspections. However, its representatives have not been given access to the border. As long as this is the case, there is no way to make sure that the endless flow of military equipment and ammunition supplies will stop. This also means that we cannot hold the vote there. I always say that at least agreeing on the modality of the elections will already be progress. We still cannot hold them as long as there are people with guns, tanks and hostages there. Otherwise, who will risk going to campaign there and becoming one of those hostages?

We need a way to actually prepare the elections, and these preparations should involve the international community. Today, we cannot send a UN mission there since Russia is member of the UN Security Council (granting it the right to veto such proposals—Ed.). So we have to use other options. One is to broaden the mandate of the OSCE mission and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights. The ODIHR should send missions and observe the security status in the region. All this, step by step, is very important. But it is unrealistic to achieve this all overnight, after all that has happened and is still happening there, and especially after the Russian propaganda has entrenched itself in everyone's mind after a year and a half.

Similarly to the UN Security Council, Russia is member of the OSCE and its vote counts. Does Ukraine then have ways to broaden the mandate of this organization?

We are working on it. Its mandate officially expires in March. We will try to extend it, and I hope we will succeed. Currently, SMM is responsible for monitoring and verifying, but not for the issues related to stabilization. If (as I very much hope) someone starts laying down arms or at least we gain control over weapons by bringing them to certain areas under the control of the OSCE, it should have the relevant mandate. We must guarantee safety to anyone involved in the preparation of the elections in the region. This would not be possible without the OSCE or some international presence. There should be political will and pressure on Russia to embrace these ideas not only in theory, but in terms of practical implementation as well.

How consolidated should this pressure on the Kremlin be to make it accept these proposals?

This pressure exists today, coming from the European Union and our other partners. During John Kerry's latest

visit to Moscow Ukrainian issues were discussed there first, by the way, prior to the Syrian issues. However, Russia has so far been refusing to have any real dialogue in the political group. They keep saying, for example, that media access is impossible (in the occupied parts of the Donbas—**Ed.**) and that the media who could have access would be filtered. They offer an endless slew of such arguments.

Meanwhile, elections under the Ukrainian law should be prepared by the Central Election Committee. The region must be safe. Media access to it must be ensured. The base model has to be the same as in Ukraine. Besides, people who had to leave the Donbas should have their say on its future. These things are absolutely clear to everyone, but they are being challenged. As a result, we cannot even reach the general agreement on the principles of the elections. If we agree on at least some of them, then we can move on. But Russia is not ready yet.

Regarding the Free Trade Agreement: on December 21, a tripartite meeting on the issue was held in Brussels between Ukraine, the European Commission, and Russia. What was its purpose and what was discussed?

After Russia's decision that the FTA within the CIS would no longer work, I actually see very few issues to discuss. The European Commission asked us to complete the cycle of consultations with them. We had scheduled December 21 in advance.

Everything that Russia does and says is 100% politically motivated. Even its negotiators understand that Ukraine's FTA with the EU poses no problems from the technical perspective. Moreover, Moscow's actions are contrary to the logic of the WTO. According to that logic, if any issues regarding trade come up, you react. If they could come up potentially, you begin consultations. Russia has failed to prove either to us or to the European Commission that any problems may arise. In fact, we believe that our FTA with the EU would have a positive impact on Russia. But this issue is being consistently spun politically. The whole logic of the Russian proposal (such as a 10-year delay of the implementation of European standards in Ukraine) is nothing but abstraction. I once told the Russian minister (of Economic Development—**Ed.**) Ulyukayev: "Out of 27 sectors where we have to harmonize our standards with the European ones, 24 have already been harmonized." Even statistically, Ukraine's trade with Russia in the sectors where our legislation has already been harmonized with European standards is going better. But Moscow always makes some abstract requirements. It avoids obligations not to impose endless restrictions on Ukrainian exports—of agricultural produce, for instance. But our trade relations in this sector have already been minimized. At the same time, Russia seeks to somehow inspect our future system of monitoring compliance with sanitary and phytosanitary norms, and to do so unilaterally. Another example from the customs sector — Russia wants the EU to inform it about all goods exported to Ukraine. This is contrary to the EU legislation on data protection and may be used for breach of confidentiality and unfair competition. These are some examples of their requirements. For us, it is now important to implement and launch the completely free trade with the EU. Ukrainian companies and manufacturers need to understand their place in the system of European freedoms.

What is the current status and prospects of Ukraine's diplomatic relations with Russia?

I can't see any prospects of establishing relations with Russia based on trust. After all that has happened, and in the context of its continued aggression, I think we can certainly use the principles of international law. But Russia has committed every possible breach, from the temporary occupation of Crimea to the violation of the Budapest Memorandum. This makes it impossible to trust it as a country that abides by international laws. There is no longer political or any other credibility for it, and I don't see it emerge in the foreseeable future.

Therefore, my vision of relations with Russia is as a critical dialogue of sorts; as critical communication that is necessary within the Normandy Format, the tripartite Minsk consultations and energy talks. By the way, note that on most things, from FTA to gas and the Normandy format, we communicate with the Kremlin in a multilateral format. We almost never meet on a one-on-one basis. For me, this is a manifestation of our friends' and partners' support. There will be critical communications between Ukraine and Russia, but there will be no trust, and this is what should be taken as a premise.

By the way, I have been criticized in social media for shaking hands with Vitaliy Churkin (Russia's permanent representative to the UN—**Ed.**). I can say that at the Normandy meetings, I also shake hands with Sergei Lavrov (Foreign Minister of Russia—**Ed.**). I always said that I am ready to shake hands with an angel or a devil, if this helps to bring peace to Ukraine. But this is not a gesture signaling partnership or friendship: it is a certain ritual that indicates that we have established communication. And, unfortunately, it is not one of partnership- or trust-based relations. I don't see how this could change in the short term.

How should Ukraine attempt to protect the rights of its political prisoners in Russia under such circumstances?

I believe that our diplomats in Russia have done a tremendous job. It is extremely difficult for many people to work there now, especially for the diplomats. But we insisted on having consular access to these people, agreed with the EU about the presence of its representatives in courts (European diplomats have a special schedule of who, when and where goes to trials from Moscow), and worked with lawyers. We held numerous consular meetings to determine tactics and strategy on a number of political prisoners. After all, the Russian legal system is notorious, and everyone knows how courts work there. But we are not going to give up on this.

We have now found additional financing to help lawyers take care of the many Ukrainians who are currently in Russia. However, I am sure that all these practical things — no matter how well they will be done — will be insufficient if we do not ensure permanent solidarity on these matters, especially in the EU. When I talk to European ministers and MPs, I always say, that every time they speak with the Kremlin, their top three issues should include Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia. Most of them do this. If they stop reminding about it and putting pressure on the Russian side, we will find ourselves in a much more serious situation in this regard. But as of today, we have full understanding, and I think that diplomats really deserve the credit for this. ■

BOOKS IN UKRAINIAN
AND OTHER LANGUAGES
GIFT EDITIONS AND ALBUMS
MAPS, ATLASES, GUIDEBOOKS
CHILDREN'S SECTION
OPEN 09:00AM-09:00PM DAILY
PLACES FOR READING
CD/DVD SECTION
MUSIC, FILMS, AUDIO BOOKS
FREE WI-FI
LITERARY EVENTS
ONLINE BOOKSTORE: WWW.BOOK-YE.COM.UA/SHOP, WEBSITE: WWW.BOOK-YE.COM.UA



B O O K S T O R E S

KYIV

vul. Lysenka 3 tel: (044) 235-8854
vul. Spaska 5 tel: (044) 351-1338
Povitroflotskiy prospekt 33/2 tel: (044) 275-6742
vul. Lva Tolstoho 1 tel. (044) 383-61-49
vul. Velyka Vasylkivska 63 tel.: (044) 287-50-88

LVIV

prospekt Svobody 7 tel: (032) 235-73-68
vul. Halytska 9 tel: (032) 235-70-06

VINNYTSIA

vul. Soborna 89 tel: (0432) 52-9341

TERNOPIL

vul. Valova 7-9 tel: (0352) 25-4459

KHARKIV

vul. Sumska 3 tel: (057) 731-5949

DNIPROPETROVSK

vul. Hlinky 15 tel.: (056) 732-13-92

IVANO-FRANKIVSK

vul. Nezalezhnosti 31 tel: (094) 928-3141

VOLODYMYR-VOLYNSKIY

vul. Kovelska 6 tel: (03342) 2-1957

RIVNE

vul. Korolenka 2 tel: (0362) 26-39-41

LUTSK

vul. Lesi Ukrayinky 30 tel: (0332) 72-43-76

O N L I N E B O O K S H O P

WWW.BOOK-YE.COM.UA/SHOP

www.book-ye.com.ua



PHOTO BY REUTERS

Yuriy Sergeyev:

"The main thing is to ensure the Ukrainian issue is heard regularly at the UN Security Council"

Interviewed
by Anna
Korbut

The *Ukrainian Week* spoke to Yuriy Sergeyev just prior to his replacement as Ukraine's Permanent Representative to the United Nations. The diplomat, who held the position since 2007, discussed Ukraine's priorities as a non-permanent member of the Security Council for the next two years, mechanisms to protect human rights in the occupied parts of Ukraine and UN reform in view of new security challenges.

In 2016-2017, Ukraine will be a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council. Do we have a strategy for this period? Which steps and initiatives will be a priority? What will they give Ukraine in the short and long term?

The Security Council is a collective body of the UN, charged with solving global and regional security problems. That is why our delegation will be primarily involved in solving several dozen issues that have been on the council's agenda for many years (conflicts in Africa and the Middle East, the fight against terrorism, non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, etc.). The issues of the occupation of Crimea and aggression in Eastern Ukraine belong to the category of challenges to peace and security and are included in the agenda of the Security Council under the title "Letter from the Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the United Nations dated 27 February 2014" (we used this letter to convene the first meeting of the Security Council to try to prevent a dangerous development of the conflict in Crimea and later to discuss the aggression in Donbas).

We have a plan of action for the Council and tactical steps agreed with partners on both themes—global politics and the aggression of Russia against Ukraine. The main thing is to ensure the Ukrainian issue is heard regularly at the UN Security Council with a view to constantly attracting the attention of one of the highest UN bodies in order to find a lasting solution and bring the perpetrators to justice. The timeframe for achieving this goal will depend on the situation outside the UN and the solidarity of our partners.

To what extent could non-permanent membership of the Security Council help Ukraine to focus international attention on itself? It is currently being lost due to the Syrian crisis and the fact that Ukraine is far from being a "success story" that would make it impossible for allies and sceptics alike to dismiss us. The reason behind this is mainly the unwillingness of our government to conduct real and effective reforms.

As I said, the Ukrainian question is one of the Security Council's regular issues. The task of the delegation is to keep on raising it depending on how the situation develops. At least in the context of giving information on the status of the Minsk Agreements, human rights in occupied Crimea and certain territories of the Donbas. Apart from the Security Council, it's also important to use the platform of the General Assembly for various formal and informal hearings regarding an international legal assessment of the occupation and Russia's attempt to annex Crimea—the aggression against Ukraine. The Syrian theme is important at the UN, but it's not a barrier to

protecting our interests. The key factors to achieve our main goal—liberating Ukraine from occupation, stopping the aggression and bringing those responsible for this aggression to justice—must be the unity and solidarity of our main partners (EU, USA, Canada, Australia, Japan and others) in the understanding that the crisis in Ukraine is not a local problem, but a security and stability issue for the whole European continent. This is a challenge for the entire post-war world order.

Does the inefficiency of the Ukrainian government affect negotiating positions and the credibility of Ukraine at the UN?

I will not deny that our success in implementing reforms, strengthening the foundations of civil society and European integration is a key factor of national unity, a major component of our security and the motivation for international solidarity with us. But let's not forget that we're the victim of an international crime—the crime of aggression. And the international community, apart from adopting the important United Nations General Assembly Resolution "Territorial Integrity of Ukraine" on 27 March 2014, failed to stop the development of aggression and bring the international criminals to justice. The entire United Nations has not effectively fulfilled its primary role either. There are many reasons for this and they lie in the inefficiency of the UN's preventive mechanisms. Both the organisation itself and its Security Council are in need of significant reform. Our delegation will make its contribution to ensuring this as a non-permanent member of the Security Council.

At the Munich Security Conference in 2015, The Elders provided suggestions for possible reform of the UN Security Council. Have they been discussed? If so, then how seriously? Where is the biggest potential opposition to change?

Yes, the position of The Elders—made up of former UN Secretaries-General and prominent political figures—on UN reform have been taken into account and some of their provisions were included in the comprehensive resolution of the UN General Assembly adopted recently. This, in turn, has become a kind of road map for the organisation. Certain changes in the formula for electing a new Secretary General are one of its parts. Let's see how effective it will be in 2016, since the General Assembly has made a lot of valuable decisions in the past, but the implementation was lacking.

France previously made a proposal to limit the veto of UN Security Council members when there is a threat of crimes against humanity being committed. Was this move connected to the situation in Syria and the Russian veto? Nevertheless, it impacts Ukraine too. Have there been consultations with Ukraine or corresponding initiatives from the Ukrainian delegation? And can we hope that France will insist on this, given the fact that it is looking for cooperation with Vladimir Putin in Syria?

The French initiative to limit the use of the veto is widely supported in the UN General Assembly. This year, more than 100 countries have signed up to it, including Ukraine. When this becomes two thirds, and it's possible that this will happen at the next session, the General Assembly may be ready to adopt a corresponding resolution. This is a difficult topic, as it affects the rights of the five permanent members of the Security Council. But since it's not about abolishing the veto, only limiting its use, it's obvious that a consensus

Yuriy Sergeyev was born in 1956. He graduated from Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv in 1981 as a philology teacher. From 1992 onwards — head of the press centre of the Foreign Ministry of Ukraine, manager of the Foreign Ministry's Information Department, head of the Secretariat. Appointed Minister-Counsellor of the Embassy of Ukraine in Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 1997. Prior to UN mission, Mr. Sergeyev was Ukraine's Ambassador to Greece, Albania and France, as well as Ukraine's permanent representative to UNESCO. On December 9, former Ukrainian Ambassador to Russia, Volodymyr Yelchenko, was appointed new Permanent Representative of Ukraine to the UN.

is possible. As part of the Security Council from January 1, 2016, the Ukrainian delegation takes part in meaningful discussion on the reform of this body.

What is Russia's current position at the UN now that fighting in Eastern Ukraine has subsided somewhat and other distracting threats have emerged? Is there an attempt to somehow make peace with Russia through other points of contact?

At the UN, Russia is de facto recognised as a state that has occupied Crimea and initiated aggression in Eastern Ukraine. Therefore, it's isolated in both the Security Council and General Assembly. Unfortunately, due to imperfect legal mechanisms (or rather, perfect ones for protecting the interests of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council) Russia has not been de jure recognised a party to the conflict according to Article 27 of the UN Charter. So they continue to have their seat on the Security Council, and it's practically impossible to exclude them from the solution of certain problems. This goes for Syria too. I don't think it's about making up with Russia. It's more of a situational partnership in a particular crisis.

Does the UN have any tools to protect the rights of those in Crimea who are being persecuted by the occupation authorities, especially the Crimean Tatars? If so, then what should Ukraine do to activate such mechanisms?

Tools are available, but there are no mechanisms for their use in conditions where the occupation authorities of Crimea do not allow UN monitoring missions, OSCE and international human rights organisations to access the territory. That's why information about the real human rights situation on the peninsula is collected bit by bit from different sources. In conjunction with partners, our delegation, despite the resistance of Russia, has managed to secure the hearing at the UN Security Council of 10 reports by Assistant Secretary-General Ivan Šimonović on human rights in Crimea. We conduct almost weekly briefings, conferences and round tables on human rights violations in the occupied peninsula. The last such event was held at UN headquarters on 9 December. These are the only possibilities to consolidate the international community and form global public opinion based on facts. I hope that the collected evidence proving violations of the basic principles of universal human rights in Crimea will in the near future become materials for the International Criminal Court.

When will you return to Ukraine? Do you already know what your new position here will be?

My assignment is supposed to end with the arrival of a new envoy. For now, I'm continuing to prepare the delegation for work with the Security Council. After that, I'll ask for a holiday, then we'll see. ■■



Read the full version at ukrainianweek.com

Referendum Madness

Plebiscite-pushers have got Europe's voters hooked on the cheap rush of direct democracy



One dodgy referendum lost Ukraine Crimea. Another threatens to lose it the European Union. On April 6th the Dutch public will vote on the “association agreement” the EU signed with Ukraine in 2014. The deal cements trade and political links with one of the EU’s most important neighbours; the prospect of losing it under Russian pressure triggered Ukraine’s Maidan revolution. But last summer a group of Dutch mischief-makers, hunting for a Eurosceptic cause they could place on the ballot under a new “citizens’ initiative” law, noticed that parliament had just approved the deal. Worse luck for the Ukrainians.

Unlike the Crimeans in 2014, the Dutch will not be voting under foreign occupation. But nor are they likely to have familiarised themselves with the Ukraine agreement’s 2,135 pages. Jean-Claude Juncker, the president of the European Commission, says a Dutch “No” could unleash a “continental crisis”. That is a stretch: as the referendum is non-binding, the Dutch government could ratify the agreement anyway, and its most important provisions are already in force. But Mr. Juncker put his finger on something, because national referendums on EU matters are turning into a throbbing headache.

Margaret Thatcher once dismissed referendums as “a device of dictators and demagogues”. The opposite

was true for the central and eastern Europeans who joined the EU in the 2000s; their accession votes, usually passed with whopping majorities, marked the final rejection of tyranny. Elsewhere most EU referendums have turned on one-off issues, like joining the euro or ratifying an internal treaty. Negative votes, such as the French and Dutch dismissals of an EU constitution in 2005, have at least forced Eurocrats to pause for breath before resuming the march of integration.

But now the silly season is here. A few months before the Dutch referendum, Danes were asked to vote on whether their government should convert its “opt-out” on EU justice and policing matters to an “opt-in”. They plumped for the status quo, leaving their government with an awkward negotiation in Brussels. A few months earlier Alexis Tsipras, Greece’s prime minister, called a referendum on a euro-zone bail-out agreement that would expire before the vote was held. His mighty oxi (“no”) victory was quickly converted to humiliating assent when his government realised that tough bail-outs were the price of euro membership.

EU referendums are held for many reasons. The hapless Mr. Tsipras hoped to boost his negotiating hand in the euro zone. David Cameron, Britain’s prime minister, is holding an EU membership vote largely as a tool to manage his fractious Conservative Party. Some,

© 2016 The Economist Newspaper Limited. All rights reserved

more cynically, are called to provide a seal of legitimacy to something a government was going to do anyway.

But a growing number of referendums serve as brakes on European integration. If voters cannot throw out the bums in Brussels, they can at least lob rotten fruit at them. Politicians, too, find them useful: of the national referendums that have consequences for the entire EU (such as treaty ratifications), a third have been called for partisan rather than constitutional reasons, according to Fernando Mendez at the Centre for Research on Direct Democracy in Switzerland.

The trouble is that the politics of referendums cuts both ways. Two years ago the Swiss voted to restrict immigration from the EU. That directly contradicted free-movement agreements, and Swiss officials are struggling to square the circle. Brussels threatens to suspend a raft of bilateral agreements if the Swiss go through with it—partly to avoid emboldening the British, who want immigration concessions in their EU renegotiation. In turn, should Britain vote to leave, the EU will have every incentive to take a hard line when the British come back to negotiate their post-EU trade deal. Mr. Tsipras's gambit flopped because the euro zone could not allow the precedent of a debtor state unilaterally changing the terms of its loans.

NO REFERENDUM IS AN ISLAND

The tools of direct democracy are always controversial—at times, they have threatened to make American states like California ungovernable—but they are doubly difficult in the EU. First, in America federal law trumps state law, meaning no state can vex an-

other by placing a lunatic proposal on the ballot. But in the EU, which is not a federal construction, there is nothing to stop one member holding a referendum that causes trouble for the rest. When things go wrong, the usual remedy is to tweak whatever regulation or accord made voters unhappy (usually a treaty) and to seek a second vote that produces the correct answer.

A second problem is that the EU needs more integration just when many voters are turning against it. The euro zone and EU migration policy are both half-built ships. Each may require changes to EU treaties to allow more centralisation. But extending Brussels's powers into new areas will fuel the appetite for referendums that could scupper the changes. Moreover, notes Stefan Lehne, a former Austrian diplomat, these days EU politicians test the existing treaties to breaking point in order to avoid triggering referendums. The clamour for direct democracy thus fosters the legalistic jiggery-pokery to which it has been a reaction.

All this smells horribly undemocratic to some. But joining a club, or striking a deal with it, will always limit governments' room for manoeuvre. National politicians can shoulder some of the blame for not being clear with voters about what their arrangements with the EU imply. But too often EU officials seem wedded to the views of their founding father, Jean Monnet, who wrote that he "thought it wrong to consult the peoples of Europe about the structure of a community of which they had no practical experience". That may have worked when Eurocrats restricted themselves to tinkering with agricultural subsidies and fisheries policy. Not any more: the age of referendums is here to stay. ■



The only difference from home is waking up in a different continent

KLM presents its new World Business Class. With Dutch Design at its heart, it offers the perfect mix of comfort, individuality and personal space. The full-flat seats with smart privacy screens provide 207 centimeters of horizontal space. Together with the personal attention of our crew, the new WBC has all the comforts of home. Except home doesn't bring you to the other side of the world.

klm.com/newwbc

KLM
Royal Dutch Airlines
Journeys of Inspiration

Iryna Herashchenko:

"The militants and Russia have not fulfilled any requirements of the Minsk Agreements"

Presidential envoy for the peaceful settlement of the conflict in Donbas and member of the humanitarian subgroup in the Minsk Negotiating Team talks to *The Ukrainian Week* about prisoner exchange, the amnesty for militants and Ukrainian political prisoners in Russia.

What is the current situation with prisoners held by the separatists in the occupied areas of Donbas?

This is a very difficult question to which there are no simple answers. I can't afford to make light of the answer, because there are human lives at stake. My phone is full of text messages from the wives, mothers and sisters of our soldiers. There are chances for their release—I guarantee that we are doing everything in our power to make this happen. In fact, we will soon present the final report of the Minsk Negotiating Team, in which we will clearly talk about everything related to the release of prisoners. We use a list that is compiled and controlled by the relevant Interagency Centre of Security Bureau (SBU — Ed.). This list currently contains 140 people, including more than 50 civilians. The militants really try to blackmail us with the amnesty issue and always understate the number of people held hostage. Only recently, we've sent 21 queries regarding the fate of specific individuals, specifying the circumstances in which they were captured. We haven't received a response to any of them, which is the most striking evidence possible regarding the moral and human qualities of the people dealing with this issue on the other side. It's clear that this behaviour isn't even the position of the DPR activists themselves, but their leaders from the Kremlin, which behaves like a real terrorist, blackmailing us with hostages. They don't give the Red Cross mission access to our prisoners, which isn't even the case for prisons in Syria, Iraq and other countries that have been fighting for years.

What about the Ukrainians held in Russia?

Just officially at least nine Ukrainians are being held in Russia itself. These are political prisoners—hostages captured by a terrorist state. We work on the diplomatic front so that

Interviewed by
Bohdan Butkevych

the people who were taken from Donbas or Crimea with bags on their heads—and the whole world—understand what's happening. When people were forcibly given Russian passports to be tried under Russian law, like Oleh Sentsov. We have to prove that these things cannot be accepted as the norm, because then Russia will start to kidnap and torture citizens of other countries too. That's why our political prisoners in Russia are a challenge for the whole world. We use different methods to try to get them released. For example, everyone knows about the exchange of our hero "cyborg" Andriy "Rahman" Hrehchanov for a Russian army major, captured by the Ukrainian Armed Forces. But in order for this exchange to take place, the president pardoned this major, who, I remind you, had been sentenced to 14 years in prison. Can you see the legal conflict here? The Minsk Agreements demand the release of all those held illegally.

Accordingly, all the soldiers and civilians who were captured and tortured by militants in the occupied part of Donbas are illegally detained. At the same time, there are no people illegally detained on Ukrainian territory in principle—there are only offenders who have committed an offense and have had criminal proceedings opened against them. As for slavery, I don't have any information about that and can't afford to speak in terms of rumours. But we have two lists: hostages and missing persons. Ukraine as a state is obliged to find the bodies and identify them, or at least establish the circumstances of death, for those on the second list. Today, it includes 762 people—around 400 civilians, the rest are soldiers. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross finally took part in the last meeting of the humanitarian subgroup of the Minsk Negotiating Team; we had given them the lists the day before. Then after that, representatives of the occupied parts of Donbas said for the first time that they had started working on the missing people lists and had established the fate of 63 of them.



We are now waiting for their names and will carefully check the information on each of them. And we expect the Red Cross to act as an apolitical, unbiased mediator in the occupied territories. The militants have apparently agreed to this. We also constantly work with volunteers to find information about prisoners, because they often have access to the occupied territory. If it's possible to secure the release of prisoners on a lower level than Minsk, we will, of course, take part in such negotiations.

Have there been cases when a person considered missing was actually a deserter or even voluntarily went over to the enemy?

It's war and anything can happen. Of course, you only feel like speaking about the heroes. Again, in our negotiations we only use the information that is updated weekly by the Security Service. In particular, about the people that it was possible to find or release. According to recent figures, that's about 2,900 people. This includes both the dead and those among them who, well, were found under different circumstances. I think you know what I mean.

Is Ukraine ready for an "all for all" exchange?

If you're talking about changing the measure of preventive detention, then we're already doing that. But understand that the other side often makes paradoxical demands. For example, we recently got a request to release a man who was convicted of murder in 2003 and has already served 11 out of 15-years imprisonment. That is to say, people who have no relation to the current situation are often included on the exchange lists because they are mates with the bandits. Of course, we're still open to any possible options that would free our people. However, it doesn't always work out. For example, we've been fighting for the release of one seriously injured man for two months: two amputated legs, as well as an injured eye and abdomen injuries. We prepared everything for the operation, his wife was in an ambulance waiting to take him away. The militants refused and started to tell us that he's not there at all.

Then, when we go back to them with solid facts, they argue that, for example, the Red Cross apparently hasn't visited all the prisoners in Ukraine and that they want to see all the detained militants before giving us access to the wounded man. I'm telling you this so you understand the sort of bandits we have to deal with. They very often agree to give us a prisoner only when he is near death. One recently died who was released back in July—he was severely tortured and never recovered from the stab wounds. When they hand half-dead people over to us, the militants hope to absolve themselves of responsibility for their torture and death. I'm really scared for the inhabitants of the occupied parts of Donbas who have fallen hostage to such people. It should be understood that under the Minsk Agreements, Moscow should use all possible levers of influence on the militants for their implementation.

If we evaluate the Minsk Agreements in general, have the militants and Russia complied with anything at all?

They have not fulfilled any requirements of the Minsk Agreements. I repeat—none at all. The only

Iryna Herashchenko was born in 1971 in Cherkasy. She graduated from the Faculty of Journalism at the Taras Shevchenko National University of Kyiv (1993), the Diplomatic Academy of Ukraine (2011) and the law faculty of Shevchenko University (2012). From 1993 to 2003 worked in journalism and as spokesperson of the Directorate of the International Fund for Investment, in 2003-2006 — as spokesperson for Viktor Yushchenko, leader of Our Ukraine and later President of Ukraine. Ms. Herashchenko was head of news agency UNIAN in 2006-2007. MP of the 6th-8th convocations (Our Ukraine, UDAR, Petro Poroshenko Bloc). On June 17, 2014, Petro Poroshenko appointed her Presidential Envoy for the Peaceful Settlement of the Conflict in Eastern Ukraine.

thing that has been achieved is certain progress regarding the ceasefire. All the same, the Grad rockets are almost never fired, whereas before, when heavy artillery was consistently used, we lost 40-60 of our best people each time. Now they are mostly killed by mines, as well as reconnaissance and sabotage groups. That is to say, the open fighting has died down a little bit. We managed to implement some humanitarian projects to help specific people in the occupied territory. Our mine clearing work is also important. But in general, the militants do not comply with the agreements. Although it should be understood that Minsk II is still working, because the sanctions against Russia are tied to it. We clearly use facts to prove to the world that Russia has not fulfilled any of the requirements, so sanctions must

THE MILITANTS REALLY TRY TO BLACKMAIL US WITH THE AMNESTY ISSUE AND ALWAYS UNDERSTATE THE NUMBER OF PEOPLE HELD HOSTAGE

be continued. The whole world should stop Putin together, and the Minsk Agreements help us with this. Who will be next: Belarus, Kazakhstan, Poland, the Baltic States? Nobody in the world can feel safe next to a country that cynically violates all the norms of international law.

What is the situation with the amnesty that the militants demand?

Today, we are actively studying similar experiences in other countries, such as Croatia and Indonesia. But we have to understand that in those cases it was an internal conflict, while in ours it's a war provoked from outside. We'll still be forced to comply with this provision of the Minsk Agreements, because we want peace. But a key debate on the amnesty law will take place in Parliament, which will decide on the matter. I can declare that no document concerning an amnesty was discussed or drawn up by the political or humanitarian Minsk subgroups. Roman Bezsmertnyi and Volodymyr Horbulin from the political subgroup can confirm this. In general, Ukraine's position remains unchanged: an amnesty would only be possible after stabilisation of the situation, the disarmament of gangs and a sustainable ceasefire. Moreover, exclusively for those who did not commit serious crimes or crimes against humanity.■

18 Months is Not a Sentence But a Start

Stanislav Kozliuk

Sabotage and lack of resources notwithstanding, the investigation into the murders on the Maidan has been going on for 18 months now. The finish line is still a long way off



Extended investigation. In 2016, courts are likely to hear cases on new episodes of the Maidan: killings at Hrushevskoho Street and clashes on December 1 and February 18

At the end of 2015, court hearings were held in cases on the beating of students on November 30, 2013, the kidnapping of Ihor Lutsenko and Yuriy Verbytskyi, and the murder of activists on February 20, 2014. The court has also received evidence regarding the events of February 18 in the Government block but hearings have not started so far.

Still, it's hard to say that these cases have been fully investigated. The courtrooms in every case hear the names of new witnesses time and again and additional circumstances are added to the events. Even if the work of the investigators improves, it's unlikely that the situation will change because the quantity of information that needs to be gone over is enormous.

The victims and their lawyers have run into problems with the investigations from the very start. Evidence quietly gathered dust in the prosecutors' offices while testimony from eye-witnesses disappeared. The police failed

to organize proper internal investigations, whether over the disappearance of weapons and documents, or over illegal actions by enforcement personnel. It got to the point where Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) officials used the conclusions of investigations under discredited ex-Interior Minister Vitaliy Zakharchenko to claim that when the students were being driven off the Maidan, they attacked the special forces men and that "only a few individual officers" overstepped their bounds.

In July 2014, the "investigation" into the disappearance of Berkut documents was closed. Interestingly, the person who was deemed responsible for this was Berkut Col. Serhiy Kosiuk's deputy, Andriy Dydiuk, who had participated in the dispersals on November 30. According to statements made by the police at the time, they had been given orders to remove the documents, brought them down to the hall on the premises and... that was it. Nobody seems to know what happened to the documents after this.

As to the beatings of Automaidan activists, there are still no admitted suspects in the case although the victims themselves identified the Berkut officers who had ambushed them on January 23, 2014. In November 2015, a list of names of possible participants in this “safari” appeared, but in the two months that have passed since then, the prosecutor’s office has not been able to agree about the suspected attackers. What’s more, some of these men have since been promoted and two of the Special Forces officers have even been given new posts as platoon commanders. Only one private, Serniy Tsynaridze, ended up in court: the Pechersk Court put an electronic bracelet on his wrist and made him give his word he would not flee. As to the court cases against his colleagues, they have effectively been closed.

OVERWORKED AND UNDERSTAFFED

Things with the Security Bureau of Ukraine are not much better, say representatives of the victims. When he was still in charge, Valentyn Nalyvaichenko announced that he would pass on information to the Prosecutor’s office regarding evidence of a Russian presence in the February events. To date, the investigation team has not received this information: not eavesdropping materials, not CCTV tapes, not interrogation records. Another question that remains unanswered is why the odious Viktor Medvedchuk has remained outside the scope of these investigations, when he clearly operated as the middleman between Viktor Yanukovich and Moscow.¹ So far, there has been no indication of any official suspicions or interrogations, at least not among the broader Ukrainian public.

The investigations began to move when a special investigative group (SIG) was set up and given the Maidan cases. However, the investigating officers there are extremely short-handed. For example, only 3 detectives are on the cases involving February 20 although there were some 50 killed, nearly 500 injured, and several thousand witnesses. The case involving events of February 18 is even larger, although it has been assigned only one detective and two seconded officers.

“Unless there is a serious improvement in the work of the enforcement agencies, this investigation will be impossible,” says Yevhenia Zakrevska, a lawyer representing some of the victims. “Even if only to speed up the process itself. We need five more detectives, enough computers and software, a single server with the database of evidence so that every person involved in this might look at photos and videos. The investigators shouldn’t have to run around from office to office looking for the disk with the necessary files. And they should also not have to queue up for a room in which to interrogate people! Anyone who works with huge volumes of data can see that this process is disorganized. The most we’ve been able to achieve so far is that all those involved in the investigation are in the same building. The logistical problems have not been resolved, however.”

Still, she says, the investigators are willing to communicate with the victims and activists who, in most cases, are playing an important role in the investigation. The court hearings have shown that the relatives of those who were killed often have collected an enormous amount of information, including photos and video recordings. Some have even looked for witnesses on their own.

“The Prosecutor’s Office and investigators are in communication with the activists,” continues Zakrevska. “If someone calls up a member of the SIG and says that they

have photo or video material, that they are prepared to come in tomorrow to answer questions, even if they don’t have the resources, the group will turn everything upside down to make it happen. However, it’s better that this information be in the hands of at least two people, just as insurance, such as the lawyer and the investigator. And after this kind of contact, it’s important to check on the state of your testimony, to find out what kind of status you have been granted.”

The prosecutors themselves admit that it’s impossible to investigate crimes quickly for objective reasons.

“You need to look at the circumstances: many victims and perpetrators who committed the crimes as a group,” says Oleksiy Donskiy, one of the prosecuting attorneys with the Prosecutor General’s Office. “The Zinchenko-Abroshkin case² in criminological terms is the same as a case against criminals that involved several criminal episodes. It’s on a scale with something like the case against the Marinchuk gang in Odesa. There were 30 instances of murder, armed robbery and theft in the course of two years, 1998-2000. The perps were arrested in 2006 and now we’re in 2016 but the appeals court still has not yet picked up the appeal in this case.”

Donskiy goes on: “You have to understand that, in order to investigate all the circumstances that exonerate or expose the guilty parties, all the available evidence needs to be sifted through. Otherwise, we will not get a fair judgment.”

**“UNLESS THERE IS A SERIOUS IMPROVEMENT
IN THE WORK OF THE ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES,
THIS INVESTIGATION WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE.
EVEN IF ONLY TO SPEED UP THE PROCESS ITSELF.
WE NEED FIVE MORE DETECTIVES”**

DERAILED BY REFORMS: THE ANTI-CORRUPTION BUREAU

Just before the New Year, certain events threatened to derail these high-profile cases, however odd this may seem, because of the overall reform of the law enforcement system in Ukraine. The Anti-Corruption Bureau (ACB) was set up, along with the State Bureau of Investigations (SBI) and a national police. Ukraine’s lawmakers simply neglected to include a mechanism that would determine who inherited the Maidan cases. They were supposed to be split up among these three organs. But given the huge volume of information that they would have to familiarize themselves with, it meant that the investigations would be stalled for, at minimum, six more months. Given that only the ACB was officially launched, this involved only former top officials: Yanukovich, Pshonka, Zakharchenko, Lukash, and others.

“The law establishing the ACB came into effect, but the Bureau is still not fully formed: it has neither investigators nor prosecutors,” explains Zakrevska. “Even if it were to collect all the material evidence, there are 10,000 volumes of the stuff. While they familiarize themselves, the terms for preventive measures and the seizure of assets will run out. And on top of there are the general timeframes for investigations. If the suspect has fled, the case can be suspended indefinitely. But if the suspect is sitting behind bars, under house arrest, out on bail or whatever,

¹ In addition to Medvedchuk’s track record of pro-Russian activity, Putin is godfather to Medvedchuk’s child.

² Two men suspected of participating in the murder of 39 activists on February 20, 2014.



Aggravating circumstance. The prosecutors say that investigation of Maidan crimes are taking so long because there are many episodes in each crime that need to be examined

we have only two months, after which the term has to be officially extended.”

Worse, the Maidan cases would once again be scattered among different agencies, which could wipe out all the efforts of the activists and lawyers who have been trying to collect all the cases together in one place. Because this is about a criminal system led by top officials who engaged in criminal activities in order to stay in power.

So, at the end of 2015, the Verkhovna Rada passed amendments to legislation that would allow law enforcement agencies involved in investigation to continue the work they had started. However, these amendments applied not only to the SIG, but to all investigations without exception, which could lead to new opportunities for corruption down the line. Activists say that domestic legislation lacks a mechanism that would help the ACB take on cases without the involvement of the prosecutor’s office.

THE SBI STILL IN LIMBO

With the setting up of the SBI, the situation is somewhat different. Although the Rada approved the necessary bill, it still hasn’t been signed by the President, although the deadline within which this should have been one has long been passed. Nor has the President vetoed the bill. It has simply ended up in limbo, which makes it impossible to make any changes to the text. The danger with the SBI is similar: the lack of rules that will determine who inherits which Maidan cases. Whereas with the SBI, Ukraine risked losing only corruption cases, in this situation, it risks losing all the cases involving Special Forces and police crimes on the Maidan.

“As soon as the law comes into effect, we have three months during which the Bureau must be set up,” says Zakrevska. “As we can see with the ACB, this is not realistic. And in those three months, the investigative bodies of the prosecutor will lose their authorization. Investigators and prosecutors alike understand that soon they might not have any connection to these investigations, which kills any motivation on their part. If we don’t do something here, then we will face a complete collapse of the investigation. All the cases involving the Maidan that have been charged to the special administration will be scattered among the SBI, the police and the ACB. The accumulation of information, contact among investigators, interactions between the cases and any understanding of them could all disappear.”

Zakrevska continues: “I’m not saying that it was a bad idea to set up the SBI. But someone needs to think what will happen with this one, unique, historic case. I think that this cannot be sacrificed, not even for the sake of the SBI. After all the investigators and prosecutors are committed to their work. It would be very unfortunate if this entity, one of the very few that is investigating the Maidan cases, were destroyed.”

A PROBLEMATIC CRIMINAL PROCEDURAL CODE

In the SIG, they say that since the militia was disbanded, they’ve been unable to be attached to criminal investigations because they aren’t considered operatives. As a result, the work on the Maidan case has stalled.

“I don’t think this was done intentionally, but lawmakers simply forgot to make the necessary changes to the Criminal Procedural Code,” says prosecuting attorney Donskiy. “Still, I don’t think the case is at risk of being derailed. All that has been stopped is the operational support, those actions that involve operatives. This means establishing the identity of individuals, their place of residence, and so on. To put it simply, the theoretical operative goes to the place where the individual is officially registered and determines whether they really live there or not.”

They tried unsuccessfully to replace the operatives by the K Department under the SBU. According to Donskiy, in most cases investigators were getting replies, but the orders were not being carried out for 6 to 8 weeks.

“We were being given responses such as ‘unable to establish domicile,’” says Donskiy. “But with operatives, this kind of problem never arose. So at the moment, the investigation is having a hard time of it.” He also explains that investigators have been having problems getting new suspects arrested. Among others, the police cannot arrest anyone without a court warrant.

“We’re also running into problems with the Portnov’s Criminal Procedural Code,” Donskiy notes. “It’s unbalanced... For instance, a serial killer can be arrested at the scene of the crime without a court order. But if we establish the criminal’s identity after a year, then the Code requires that we send a letter stating that the individual is under suspicion and provide evidence that we plan to turn to the court for an arrest warrant... So if we identify a new theoretical Berkut guy and he doesn’t flee, then the case will get to the court for a hearing.”

Finally, says Donskiy, “People are complaining that the case against highly-placed officials has not gone anywhere. There are some nuanced reasons. Firstly, an investigation may not continue more than a year. After this term has ended, any actions taken with regard to suspects are illegal. We can’t inform the person that they are under suspicion and we can’t take any preventive measures. In this way, someone like Yanukovych can theoretically return to Ukraine on a white horse and there’s nothing anyone can do about it.

“So what defense lawyers are doing is making sure that, whatever it takes, the prosecutor does not suspend the case. The point is that suspending the case is not the same as suspending the investigation. Yes, we don’t have the right to gather evidence, but we are obligated to continue to carry out detective work in searching for suspects. Moreover, the term for suspending a case is unlimited.

“And right now, all the cases involving top officials against whom we have a sufficient body of evidence have been suspended.” ■

Making Headway

Valeriy Kur, co-founder of Anti-Organized Crime Department and advisor to Interior Ministry

Having studied the experience of legal system reforms in various countries, I can say that even though I am critical about every process in Ukraine, still I am an optimist

Of course, it would be better to reform the law enforcement system by building it from scratch, as it was the case in Australia, New Zealand or the United States, amending and improving it gradually. Instead, we started from minor details, from a small step: police reform. Reforming and improving the MIA system should not start from there, because this is a "top down" reform. But this is almost the only way for the country, where destroying everything and building from scratch is hardly possible. Even if this small new police detachment is made of kids taken from the streets, still they have been selected by certain criteria: they are honest, just, pure, impartial, and not bureaucratized, which is very important. They have not been part of the system.

We have to be prepared to face the fact that all the processes taking place in the legal field, while our legal system is developing, will be accompanied with failures and huge overload. We have the mentality of the past. Therefore, we just need to take into account other people's positive experience to come to a general idea of what we need. The concept of the future reform should cover all branches of the system: from police, which is always nearby, to the Supreme Court.

The changes taking place today are not systemic. All major security agencies are still headed by those who served the previous regimes and presidents responsible for ruining the country. Therefore, the reform may take quite a long time. This is why we need purges at any price (I would agree here, regrettably for many of my friends with whom we have come a long and hard way and who are decent people). Police, public prosecution and courts have to employ professional, pure individuals who would be trusted by the society. These professionals should serve under contract, with no minister or even president having the authority to dismiss them, except by law. The managers who would oversee the reform and renewal of these structures should also be recruited in a similar way.

Ministers and generals will hold onto as much authority and as many subordinates as possible, because this is what defines their positions and ranks. Therefore, the first step would be to dismiss the heads of all security agencies, no matter how.

The purging should be technical, with the maximum involvement of public institutions, NGOs, and media. The civil society should decide who can represent the Supreme Court or the Ministry of Interior. Besides, the civil society should, at certain stages and to a certain extent, also be involved in the process of selecting local managers and choosing the ones they trust in rural areas and in the provinces. The authorities should under no circumstances be allowed to build a system the way they see fit. We should not be afraid to raise the issue of replacing the highest ranks entirely, including those that came after Maidan, even if they got their posts legally, otherwise the



A small step. Starting with the reform of police is a minor detail but almost the only way for the country, where building a completely new system from scratch is hardly possible

reform process will take a long time and will face resistance. We should not be afraid of leaving bare some ministry or department. That will not happen. Today we need to establish barriers that no one can overcome. Let's start from the simple things: no future president, minister, or head of the judicial, investigative, public prosecution or MIA structure should believe that they can keep their position and authority for life. They should be prepared to disclose all the information about themselves since birth. They would have to put up with publicity and transparency, with their every step scrutinized by the society. These people should be prepared to either accept these rules and abide by them, or to step down.

There can be no quota principle for the "portfolio distribution." Appointing a political figure the head of the Interior Ministry only because his political force has come to power is an absurdity. The more so if this figure has an ugly tail in the shadow economy and cannot serve as a role model for either law enforcement or the society. Special attention should be paid to the judiciary as a structure taking final decisions. After all, if an error is made at the initial stage by policemen or prosecutors, fair proceedings should ensure that justice prevails in the end. Frankly, I am even less concerned about the prosecution system, because it can no longer exist in its present form. Sooner or later, all its functions aimed at usurping power would be eliminated. Therefore, this is an artificial problem.

Tomorrow holds not the return to the past, but at least a tiny step forward. We have changed. The legal awareness of the society has increased tenfold, people have learned to value themselves and not to be afraid. This is extremely important. Undoubtedly, despite some progress, we still have a lot of work to do, but we will only move forward, however hard the way may be. ■

New Military Command Wanted

Yaroslav Tynchenko

How Ukrainian military schools should change to train efficient professionals

It is common knowledge among the military that the unusually large number of generals, lieutenant colonels and colonels in Ukraine's army is combined with the lack of junior officers. However, the contribution of the latter to the armed defense of Ukraine is difficult to overestimate. During the war in Donbas, 241 officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine in the rank of lieutenant-captain and another 94 in the rank of major-colonel were killed. The vast majority of the officers awarded military decorations are senior lieutenants and captains.

There is also other statistics. According to very conservative estimates, since Ukraine's independence, at least 80,000 officers graduated from military training establishments. Only half of them went on to serve in the army. Besides, we have a considerable number of officers who graduated during the Soviet era. These include all generals and almost all colonels. When in spring of 2014 the armed confrontation started in Crimea, the number of officers in the Armed Forces of Ukraine exceeded 60,000 (constituting about a half of the servicemen), including the so-called civilian personnel, that is, colonels of the Soviet mold that changed their military uniforms for jackets.

Despite this inadequately large number of officers in the Armed Forces, during the first phases of mobilization many more civilian reservists, gradu-

ates of military departments, were recruited. In half of the battalion task groups and most territorial battalions, reserve officers (graduates of reserve officer training departments) accounted for the bulk of the command staff. About half of the younger officers that were killed were these very graduates of the military training departments.

The question arises: where were those tens of thousands of officers trained in military education establishments? For some reason, there are much less trained army officers in Ukraine than officers specializing in other professions that for the most part proved to be absolutely useless in the situation of hostilities in the ATO area.

The officer corps of NATO countries, including the USA, is built on entirely different grounds. The majority there are the officers of the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Forces, as well as pilots and naval experts.

Officer personnel of the US Army are recruited from three sources:

- Over 50% are graduates of three military academies;
- About 40% are graduates of civilian universities who attended military courses;



USA

Academic education

9 schools for officers with over 5 years of service and 4 schools for officers with over 10-15 years of service

Specialized training


U.S. Military Academy (West Point)

U.S. Air Force Academy (Colorado)

U.S. Naval Academy (Maryland)

Reserve officers training

Military courses in almost 600 civilian universities for reserve officers



POLAND

Academic education

National Defense Academy

Specialized training

Tadeusz Kosciuszko Land Forces Military Academy

Polish Air Force Academy

Naval Academy

Dabrowsky Military University of Technology

Military Department of Medical University

Reserve officers training

Military courses at officer schools and lieutenant schools

— 5.7% are civilian experts with a narrow focus, such as health care workers, chaplains, etc.

Being an officer in the United States is extremely prestigious: enrolment competition is usually 10 students per 1 student space.

The training of reserve officers at military courses offered by civilian universities (Reserve Officers Training Corps) is fundamentally different from what Ukrainian (post-Soviet) military departments can offer. Military training is provided at almost 600 US civilian education institutions. These courses are attended on a voluntary basis, and students are paid additional scholarships for enrolling on military courses. During four years of study at their universities, students are required to attend military training once a week. Following graduation, graduates are obliged to serve (to be listed at military units and periodically visit them) in the units of the National Guard or Reserve for eight years. Alternatively, they can join the armed forces in officer capacity. »



UKRAINE

Academic education

Chernyakhovsky National University of Defense

Specialized training

Hetman Petro Sahaydachny National Army Academy (Lviv)

Kozhedub Air Force University (Kharkiv)

Navy Department of Odesa National Maritime Academy

Military Academy (Odesa)

Korolyov Military Institute of Zhytomyr

Military Institute of Telecommunications and Information (Kyiv)

Guards Department of Kharkiv Polytechnic Institute National Technical University

Military Institute of Shevchenko National University (Kyiv)

Ukrainian Military Medical Academy

Military Diplomatic Academy



Military Law Department of Yaroslav the Wise National Law University

Reserve officers training

20 military training departments in various civilian universities, 3 emergency medicine and military medicine departments, 1 military training department of navy college



BOOKSTORE



www.book-ye.com.ua

Given the fact that American high school and college students do not face mandatory military service, military courses only attract motivated and patriotic students. The selection criteria for the courses are very strict.

Unlike their Ukrainian counterparts, American officers attend career development courses every few years. After serving in the army for five years, officers may choose to study in one of the military schools, focusing on special operations, radio and radio equipment, military intelligence and counterintelligence (including at the Joint Military Intelligence College), information and propaganda, navy, engineering, infantry, and special warfare at the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School.

After 10-15 years, officers may obtain another (in our terms, academic) degree in several educational institutions:

Command and General Staff College;

Air Command and Staff College;

College of Naval Command and Staff;

National Defense University (consisting of several colleges training specialists to work in the office of the Ministry of Defense and command headquarters).

NATO member countries having much smaller armies don't need to maintain numerous schools and advanced training colleges. Instead, they can send their officers to study either in the U. S. or in the joint regional schools and colleges in Europe (**in Italy, Estonia, etc., see table on p. 32**).

In Ukraine, the main burden of providing officers to the Armed Forces of Ukraine is carried by Hetman Petro Sahaydachny National Army Academy, Kozhedub Air Force University of Kharkiv, and the Military Academy in Odesa. Each year, they produce the same number of officers as the two telecommunications and information schools, whose reason for existence is doubtful: Korolyov Military Institute of the State Telecommunications University in Zhytomyr and the Military Institute in Kyiv (see Overlapping training).

The debate has been going on for over 10 years now: why do we need two basically similar schools? In NATO countries, the functions of these two institutions are performed by one or two departments. The pro argument was that a modern warfare largely depends on the means of electronic intelligence, electronic warfare, guidance systems, modern communications, etc. When the war broke out, giving a chance to the graduates of those schools to show their worth, it turned out that their education was useless. No one ever saw the high-precision weapons, about which the Ministry of Defense kept telling for 20 years. The invasion of the Russian troops on August 11-13 and 23-24 was not foretold. Ukrainian troops had to fight their way from the so-called Ilovaysk and Debaltsevo pockets haphazardly. Artillery and air pointers had to do their work the way it was done during the Second World War: often on foot, snooping around the theater of operations under fire. Even the simplest problems caused difficulties, such as ensuring connection using the old Soviet systems. At the beginning of the ATO, all hopes were laid on mobile phones, and the old means of communication were disregarded. But when mobile coverage in the combat area began to disappear, it turned out that not many people know how to use even the simplest portable radio sets.

Overlapping training

Departments at Kyiv Military Institute	Departments at Zhytomyr Military Institute
Telecommunication Systems and Networks	Radioelectronic Special Purpose Systems
Management Information Technologies	Information and Telecommunication Systems
Information Protection	Geographic Information and Space Systems
Military Training for Reserve Officers	Military Training for Reserve Officers

Each year, 650 to 1,000 officers of various technical professions graduate from Kyiv and Zhytomyr institutes. However, at least half of them in the years following the graduation leave the army under various pretexts to return to civilian life. Only a tiny percentage of graduates work within their specialty. Others fill vacancies in the State Border Guard Service of Ukraine, the Security Service and other power structures, irrespective of their profession.

But the main problem with these two universities is that they cannot provide knowledge based on the advanced technologies implemented in other countries (space industry, IT-technologies, etc.). To do so, they would need the technical equipment and the latest de-



IT IS NOT A SECRET THAT MILITARY TRAINING DEPARTMENTS OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS IN UKRAINE EXIST TO SPARE STUDENTS FROM SERVING IN THE ARMY

velopments of NATO member countries, which they obviously don't have. As a result, instead of front-line army officers, they train every year new Internet users wearing uniforms.

This might be a subjective view, but the modern Armed Forces of Ukraine don't need military institutes of telecommunications and information in their current form. This military training sector should be reformed to the standards and under the supervision of NATO experts. It would not be viable in any other form.

Besides the two institutes of telecommunications and information, the 'military computer geeks' are also trained at military departments of civilian universities.

It is not a secret that military training departments of higher education institutions in Ukraine exist to spare students from serving in the army. That is, they traditionally train people who are not planning to have anything to do with the military. Attending military training departments is mandatory. This is the radical difference from the American military courses, to which students enroll voluntarily. Another fundamental difference is the learning approach. At Ukrainian

military departments, students traditionally peruse outdated manuals and regulations, with occasional drill training. Students of US military courses do this only during the first two years. The next two years are dedicated to active field exercises, shooting practice, and physical training. Finally, the US military courses train primarily army officers, whereas in Ukraine they prepare specialists in the fields that are either completely useless or too specific for the Armed Forces of Ukraine.

Let's take the Military Institute of Kyiv National University. This institution is the largest military training department of all Ukrainian civil universities. It offers the following subjects: Psychology, Political Science, Journalism, Public Relations, International Information, International Relations, Translation, Finance and Credit, Law, and Geographic Information Systems and Technologies (topographical surveyors). First of all, most of these subjects are also offered by the Military Diplomatic Academy and other universities and military departments. Secondly, given the severe shortage of army officers, it is hard to imagine what is good of a 'military expert' specializing in political science or international media.

The general unanimous opinion of the officers of the Armed Forces of Ukraine is that most military departments are obsolete. Of course, some of the military departments could be preserved. But in this case, they have to prepare reserve army officers.



The curricula of military schools also raise many questions. But the management of most of those schools probably could hardly answer a simple question: what officers do they train? For instance, judging from the materials published on the website of the Odesa Military Academy, one can conclude that it is proud of its traditions rooted in the Russian Empire, its Red Banners, and Soviet awards. However, it conceals the fact of the participation of its graduates in the protection of sovereignty, territorial integrity and inviolability of the borders of Ukraine in 2014-2015. And this is despite the fact that among its graduates are several Heroes of Ukraine, and many of them have been awarded war decorations, including posthumous awards.

Only two universities properly honor their modern heroes: Ivan Kozhedub Kharkiv Air Force University and especially Hetman Petro Sahaydachny National Army Academy. As for the other schools, judging from the information available on their websites, they have nothing to do with the armed conflict in Crimea and the war in Donbas of 2014-2015.

NOT QUANTITY, BUT QUALITY

There is no need to prepare thousands of officers, only half of which at best would end up in the army and only quarter of which would make it to combat units. We do not need officers with civilian occupational specialty. We need ordinary infantrymen, artillerymen, pilots, paratroopers, and naval officers. These people should have patriotic beliefs, and not act like a few thousand Ukrainian officers who in spring 2014 exchanged their oath for Putin's promises.

The reform of the military education system could be modeled on the example of Hetman Petro Sahaydachny National Army Academy, with students from all over Ukraine and graduates who have distinguished themselves (alongside the graduates of Odesa and Kharkiv schools) defending the country. ■



Mowing Down the Mind

Kateryna Barabash, Moscow

How television paralyzes people

When the power blockade of Crimea began, what was the first thing those running the peninsula did? Did they set up power generators in every building? Did they organize free mobile power substations? Did they pull at their hair screaming “Crimea’s NOT ours!”? Nope, they sent out a fleet of trucks to towns around the peninsula that had huge television screens instead of trailers. Needless to say, all the screens were set to the channels of the Russian Federation where a cheerful Putin and sleepy Medvedev told Crimeans that soon they would be warm and well-lit.

TV, THE GOEBBELSIAN GOLDEN MEANS

It’s unlikely that the initiators of this popular event were aware who first thought of the propaganda role television could play and how to put it in the service of the state. In 1938, two years after the first TV station began operating in Germany, Magda Goebbels was struck by the idea that televisions could be set up in laundry rooms so that housewives wouldn’t be bored while waiting for their wash to be cleaned. Money for this was, of course, allocated by her husband, Joseph Goebbels, who was the Reichsminister for public education and propaganda—under one condition. That broadcasters would strictly adhere to his instructions and always serve the interests of the Reich.

A fanatic follower of Hitler and dedicated Nazi, Magda couldn’t agree more. So, the television channel she privately managed as the wife of the country’s main ideologue and an extremely active woman contained only those materials that might strengthen the spirits of viewers in their belief that Hitlerian initiatives were absolutely right. A typical schedule looked like this:

January 12, 1938. The Television Channel of the Third Reich

20:00 — Current news

20:38 — The Edmund Benke SS 8/75 storm troopers sing an old soldiers’ song against the background of the runic SS symbol.

20:39 — “A Word about What Matters.” A fighter from the SS storm troopers speaks.

20:40 — “Germany’s past lives.” A film made at the request of the SS Reichsführer.

20:45 — The Edmund Benke SS 8/75 storm troopers sing another soldier’s song.

20:48 — “The Führer’s Word.” Clips from the film.

20:49 — “Into Battle and on to Victory.” A film made at the request of the SS Reichsführer.

21:00 — Repeat of program.

At that time, television had already begun to conquer markets and minds in Europe and America, but with the start of World War II, none of the countries in the conflict was broadcasting regularly. Moreover, Ger-



Rescue team. When electricity blockade of Crimea began, a fleet of trucks was sent to towns around the peninsula that had huge television screens instead of trailers, broadcasting Russian channels

many, notably, turned off its beloved child only for two days: the eve and first day of its invasion of Poland. After that, German television worked without interruption to strengthen people’s belief in the Nazi idea. Who knows? Maybe if Germany had turned off this new medium, Hitler might have crashed earlier. In fact, it’s quite likely that that would have happened.

In short, Russia’s ideologists and propagandists have nothing much to brag about, given that their instruments had already been tested 80 years earlier by their teachers in the art of brainwashing.

20 years ago, sociologists and psychologists predicted the rapid demise of television as it was squeezed by a far more powerful, accessible and inexpensive media rival, the internet. But they were wrong. Television was and remains the main source of information as well as of entertainment and fun for the majority of people—not only among the victims of aggressive propaganda that residents of FSU countries have become, but also among citizens of highly successful and sated countries in Western Europe.

Possibly those experts who predicted that television would fall by the wayside did not take into account the inertness of people, assuming that the mind wants to select its source of information on its own, when there is no such thing. No printed media, no radio and not even the internet beats television when it comes to the power of suggestion, because television has a unique capability to blur the line between truth and lies, reality and fantasy. Sitting before the screen, individuals are affected in a very powerful way: their psychological defenses seem to be completely set aside. Moreover, this is true even for those who know everything about how television works

and whose ideological foundations are hundredfold more solid than in the average viewer.

Not long ago, a woman I know who is a firm liberal, and was a colleague and long-time friend of the murdered oppositioner Boris Nemtsov, complained: “I had to spend five days with my mother and she has Perviy Kanal [Channel 1] on all the time. It was scary, you know, because I suddenly found myself questioning the rightness of my chosen ideology.” It’s hard to know what would have happened to her if she’d stayed at her mother’s place for a month. So, not much needs to be said about what happens in the brain of someone who has no inclination to analyze when they spend all their spare time in front of the boob tube and leave it on in the background the rest of the time?

Two components form the foundation of television broadcasting that give it the capacity to be an indispensable weapon for propaganda: its persistence—the viewer need not select the news in this colossal flow of information—and its picture. The principle “better to see once than to hear 100 times” makes TV the king of propaganda, better not only than the radio but also better than the internet.

PROGRAMMING HATRED

Using Russian television as an example, it’s pretty easy to observe in how short a term the blue screen can bring up in the viewer the precise reaction needed for the government to maintain a certain level of trust. In January 2014, understanding that a free Ukraine was dangerous for a Putin dictatorship, Russia’s leadership reoriented the federal channels on stirring the most primitive hatred to that “brotherly” nation. And indeed, nothing was simpler: Russians who anyway did not suffer from a surfeit of benevolence, within days had forged a phenomenal hatred towards all things Ukrainian.

Nor did television broadcasters need to concern themselves to find new ways of dulling minds: simply to offer more concentrated and unconscionable versions of tried-and-true approaches. Those who watched news from Kyiv on Russian television will remember forever the ugly faces of the people on the Maidan, their nasty grins, their evils slogans like “Who won’t jump is a Moskal!”¹ and “Pike the Moskal!,” scary-looking men in camouflage under the black and red flag—while Russia’s speakers cursed Bandera, declaring him “the worst fascist of all times and peoples.”

It became impossible to explain, even to educated people who believed that fascism had taken over in Ukraine, that they were being very thoughtfully fed highly selected seconds-long images taken completely out of context that bore no relationship to the overall situation. If you said “Don’t believe your television!” the response would be “Then whom should we believe?” And so, such a question could only be rhetorical in the light of what was going on: A state that made a point of conning its population every minute of every day and was condemned for its lies by everyone except deputies and corrupted officials suddenly became trustworthy on this one and only issue: the situation in Ukraine.

Was this paradoxical? Not really. The explanation was very straightforward: state television had begun to engage in psychological warfare, using every possible communication weapon in its arsenal. It started by filtering images and matching them with out-of-context quotes from people on the Maidan. It moved on to descriptions

of bloody episodes from the life of Stepan Bandera under the same image of men marching under the black and red flags and tryzub,² then to giving the still-nascent Praviy Sektor³ a hellish image. Once the Russian viewer had been warmed up this way, it was easy enough to buy into what came next: a ludicrous yet dangerous tale about a little boy who had been crucified by Ukrainian troops in revenge against his insurrectionist father.

This all could have merely made people laugh if not for the fact that, fed on hatred to Ukraine, Russians began through sheer inertia to despise everything that did not fit into their worldview: “the fifth column,” “liberasts,” Tajik migrant workers, “pindos-Americans,”⁴ “Gayropa,” gays, good books, interesting movies, classical music... It would seem that it was nothing—a few weeks of unconscionable professionalism by a bunch of propagandists on federal channels. But in those weeks, life in Russia changed beyond recognition.

THE EDUCATIONAL AND ENTERTAINMENT VALUE OF TELEVISION GIVES WAY WHERE THE CONCERN TO PRESERVE THE CORRUPTED GOVERNMENT COMES TO THE FOREFRONT. THERE THE MAIN OBJECTIVE OF THOSE IN POWER BECOMES PARALYZING THE WILL OF THE ELECTORATE

THE MAKING OF PROPAGANDA TV

There aren’t really that many ways of influencing a viewer psychologically—you can count them on the fingers of one hand and a bit. But when you multiply them by the main components of television itself—persistence and pictures—they are a killer app.

The key element is editing: selecting from all the available video materials only those that show the situation in the desired light. Using Russian television as an example again—what can one do: today this is the template for rabid telepropaganda—, Russian viewers were recently treated to a very telling picture. President Putin made a speech before the federal elections. Sure, he talked a lot about corruption, about the way that it really does exist in some places and some cases, although the government is, of course, busy weeding it out. Just as he said the word “corruption,” the cameras captured, from among several hundred viewers in the hall, the face of Russia’s Prosecutor General, Yuriy Chaika. Given that Chaika had become extremely visible to Russian voters after opposition politician Alexei Navalny’s investigation his family’s ties to organized crime and that federal channels would never merely amuse themselves in this way without orders from above, it was possible to presume that soon Mr. Chaika would be facing the music.

In another example, a report on pre-Christmas New York is accompanied by video snippets showing obese Americans wandering around downcast or homeless people begging—as if to say, take a good look: it’s not as great as you might think, there. This method, as old as television itself, was effectively used by soviet broadcasters in all the newscasts and the program International Panorama. Old but eternal.

Other methods for imbedding the necessary information is to pin labels using very specific jargon, one of

¹ “Moskal” originally meant a Muscovite, but has gained a largely pejorative nature and come to mean someone who is anti-Ukrainian, generally Russians but not only.

² The tryzub is a stylized trident used as the heraldic symbol of Ukraine.

³ Originally one of the defense brigades on the Maidan, Praviy Sektor or Right Sector was a nationalistic paramilitary group that eventually had battalions on the eastern front and also became a political party led by Dnipropetrovsk-born Dmytro Yarosh. It did poorly at the polls.

⁴ “Pindos,” from a very poor region of northern Greece, was used in the Balkans some 200 years to refer to undesirable migrants and has evolved to be used pejoratively against NATO soldiers in the same region, and to Americans in general today.

the oldest methods of all. Guess who said these words: "Opposition members are smearing our country with dirt, working for money that the West is paying them. These opposition people live off American dollars and are the trained dogs of their foreign masters. All these so-called opposition members, these enemies of our people, are being financed by Western plutocrats and live off their donations." Putin? Prokhanov? Surgeon the biker? Nope, not at all! This is from a 1938 televised speech by Joseph Goebbels. Try to find 10 differences between it and speeches by Putin or Lavrov. You can't? Of course. The language of the Cold War, like "external enemy," "soulless Europe," "America's foreign debt," "crisis in western economies," and "pushing foreign notions" has come back to the Russian screen, as though from the coffin, where we thought perestroika had buried it.

FROM RED HERRINGS TO ANONYMOUS STARS

TV professionals around the world are fairly enthusiastic about one source of influence over viewers called "the red herring." The smell of smoked fish can fool a dog's sense of smell so that it starts going after the wrong trail. This is a simple, unique and very effective way to distract people from really serious problems and to divert their sense of smell. It was most effectively described in American Berry Levinson's movie, "Wag the Dog." A team of PR professionalism is putting together a video about a war that isn't actually happening and successfully diverts world attention from a sexual scandal that is about to expose the US President. The movie was a blockbuster around the world, but it did nothing to enlighten minds: being incapable of generalizing and extrapolating, most viewers laughed and thought the movie brilliant, but did not "get it" that this was not just an isolated comic event in one country or that the consciousness of each of them sometimes becomes the stage for this kind of "performance."

For instance, Alla Pugachova's latest wedding makes the headlines on all the channels, while the real news should be that energy is getting more expensive, the price of Russian gas is collapsing, and the dollar keeps gaining strength. And if the red herring is spiced up with the right kind of language, the viewer finds himself with one less problem. Because you can always say, not "The ruble once again collapsed in trade" but "Today the ruble stopped strengthening." Oh, how nice!

Another favorite way to embed the right kind of opinions in the minds of the television audience is to use "star power." Using high-profile individuals who are not experts is the simplest of all because you don't need to write a scenario or to work seriously on language and images. An opinion-maker of this kind is usually a well-known, popular actor, director, show business personality, or athlete, whose word the naive viewer takes very personally, beyond criticism—or sense. If a news anchor states, "Most Russians condemn the US's attempts to dictate its rules to the world community," that will be a lone voice crying in the desert. But if internationally famous actor and director Nikita Mikhalkov says that he's in shock over President Obama's latest speech before the UN General Assembly, and right after that aging pop singer Joseph Kobzon talks about those mean Americans who won't let him visit his kids in the US, the viewer "gets it" that things are really bad there.

Even simpler is using anonymous opinion-makers who actually don't exist. "A source at the White House

reported today that there is a crisis of power in the US," "International experts have concluded that the Malaysian jet was shot down by Ukrainians," "Scientists at one of the top laboratories in the UK say that meat is harmful to the health." After which, you can flap your jaws as much as you want: the magic of any "authority," even one not backed by a name, but the words "international" and "leading" will have done their job. The beauty of it is that this is a tactic that is unpunishable—because there's no one to take you to court for misquoting them!

Of course, the news is the heavy artillery of television. But let's not forget that they amount to only around 11% of air time, compared to entertainment: serials, talk shows, comedy, and so on. Moreover, not all entertainment is equal. On Russian channels—other than Cultures, which has a very small reach—you will find neither classical music, nor distinguished films, nor theatrical performances.

The main entertainment form for viewers has become serials and talk shows. In the daytime, serials about the latest Cinderella with the face of an illiterate slut seeking love in the big city keep housewives enthralled, while in the evenings, somewhat better-produced shows about the lives of decent cops and brave special forces guys fill the screen. The greater Russia's isolation, the more desperately the government needs to turn the screws, the more TV epics we see about nice-guy enforcers. And lately this set has been expanded to include endless serials about the lives of movie stars who have died, such as Liudmila Gurchenko, Liubov Orlova and Valentina Serova, or about widely known figures from soviet times: Yekaterina Furtseva, Galina Brezhneva, Wolf Messing known for his telepathist skills and hypnosis, or faith healer June. It doesn't much matter what serials engross the viewer in Stalin-Khrushchev-Brezhnev times, but the soviet background against which the fates of these heroes are depicted is seen as completely benign. "What the heck do you mean? There's no politics here!" the authors laugh as they continue to wash away blood, dirt and lies of the soviet regime. Perhaps they think that it will come back one day, nice and spotlessly clean.

The educational and entertainment value of television typically gives way where the concern to preserve the corrupted government comes to the forefront. That's where the main objective of those in power—and therefore of television—becomes paralyzing the will of the electorate. This is where television turns into a massive, expensive lawnmower for the mind. A huge army of mowers tracks on a daily, hourly and by-the-minute basis to make sure that the least little bit of independent thinking has no chance of sprouting above the soil. As soon as they stick their little heads out, bang! A new Petrossian⁵ show is launched. Laugh your heads off, voters! The minute liberal opinion begins to be raised, kapow! A new political talk show is launched where the word "liberal" becomes the latest put-down. Argue your brains out, dear viewers!

This all brings to mind the naive dialog from the 1980 Oscar-winning soviet film "Moscow Does not Believe in Tears." "In time, television will turn all our lives upside down. There won't be anything. No movies, no theater, no books, no papers... just public television." "Don't you think you're getting a little ahead of yourself. Theater will soon die out, that I can agree with. But books? Movies?" "Just remember my words in another 20 years!"

Maybe this dialog wasn't so naive, after all. ■

⁵ Yevgeni Petrossian is a Russian stand-up comic.

Back at the Beginning

Yuriy Makarov

Things are bad. Even worse than that. Paradoxically, the Ukrainian Maidan failed to improve the state and status of the Ukrainian language in Ukraine. More than that, the issue was partially removed from the daily agenda and was put on the backburner of the social subconscious. From there, it can reemerge in a totally unexpected and undesirable form.

The post-Maidan society has with a certain sigh of relief (but without careful and focused debate) agreed by default to certain invariables of the new Ukraine: it should be a political nation where different ethnic groups and cultures co-exist, the state language has its formal status, while time will put (or has put) all things where they belong... The temptation to end up in the European coordinate system overnight induced wishful thinking.

The serious argument supporting the assumption that the language issue no longer matters in Ukraine came from the frontline: soldiers defending the country from its merciless, treacherous and hypocritical foreign enemy are to a great extent Russian-speaking. There are no statistics to confirm that, but plenty of individual cases do. Earlier the same was said about the Maidan, and this was also true. A surge of genuine, unorchestrated patriotism manifested in the huge popularity embroidered shirts, the anthem and traditions, and unprecedented social activism, could make one think for a brief moment that the problem no longer exists. Experienced western pundits report with joy and sympathy the current status quo – the real-life bilingualism that does not actually provoke conflict (or so it is perceived) is a model for other European states.

In 2015, Ukraine's President declared clearly state priorities in its language policy: all-encompassing support, positive discrimination in favor of Ukrainian and no compromises (plus, the learning of English everywhere!). However important such statements are when coming from the state's leader, no notable changes have taken place in practice. The ratios of Ukrainian to Russian-language content on TV and radio still tilt to the latter; Russian-language print press still dominates (there is no ongoing monitoring but occasional researches present a baffling result). Books in Ukrainian are slightly better represented in stores after the chains were sold to Ukrainian owners, officially at least. Russian-language products still dominate show-business, particularly music. Compliance with language education requirements in schools and universities is not monitored (instead, the delirium rhetoric of Russian propaganda about shutdowns of Russian-language schools is repeated over and over again, while in fact schools that nominally teach in Ukrainian were and still are de facto Russian-speaking in education). The soviet algorithm with its typical "only for show" principle is being recreated 25 years after the Soviet Union itself collapsed.



Some progress is present in routine life as more and more people in what looks like totally Russian-speaking cities in Eastern, Southern and Central Ukraine use Ukrainian, and the experience proves hardly traumatic emotionally to them. Personnel in grocery stores, banks, gas stations, state institutions, etc. (i.e. "points of contact") are more frequently addressing customers in Ukrainian. Unlike in previous years, people perceive this as something absolutely normal, even if some notorious exceptions still exist. Yet, despite all this progress, the conflict remains unsolved.

Before we continue to discuss the situation and look for solutions, it's worth taking a few steps back and once again outlining problematic issues, as well as revising arguments on each of them.

1. How is Ukrainian better than Russian?
2. Can Russian be labeled as the "language of the enemy" in Ukraine?



THE UKRAINIAN MAIDAN FAILED TO IMPROVE THE STATE AND STATUS OF THE UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE IN UKRAINE. MORE THAN THAT, THE ISSUE WAS PARTIALLY REMOVED FROM THE DAILY AGENDA

3. Why do Ukrainian-speaking Ukrainians feel insulted and discriminated against in the current situation?
4. Why do Russian-speaking Ukrainians not acknowledge their privileged position?
5. Are there any grounds, even if subjective, for talking about "oppression" of Russian-speaking Ukrainians?
6. Why is bilingualism not a solution?
7. What exactly is bilingualism? Does this concept adequately describe Ukraine's realm?
8. Are there more accurate and perfected models that would help understand the conflict and find a solution to it?
9. Why is it worth putting up resistance to the natural (is it natural, after all?) flow of things?
10. Should the state interfere in these processes?
11. Is it possible to apply the experience of any other country facing similar problems in Ukrainian conditions? What country would it be?

Trying to reject or avoid answers to at least one of the above questions will mean capitulation with all the consequences that are easy to foresee. In the upcoming issues of this publication, I will try to answer all of them as openly as I can (even if sometimes it will not be politically correct). ■

Donbas Military Fiction

Denys Kazanskyi

How books turned war into reality

The war that has been underway for almost two years in the East of Ukraine is commonly believed to be hybrid warfare. As such, it is waged not only in the trenches, but also in the virtual space. The role played by information technologies today is important as never before. A good soldier is supposed to be able not only to shoot, but also to spread information: by making a video or writing a post on social networks. Not only real military leaders, but also popular media persons are becoming the most famous commanders.

Another unique feature of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict should also be noted: its ideologists are in fact science fiction writers. They invented the war in the East long before it started in 2014. In numerous books on the subject that were trendy in the mid-2000s, various scenarios for the possible confrontation were developed and analyzed. Mostly pro-Russian writers professing chauvinism and imperial views wrote on the future war. The stories they offered were full of detailed descriptions of atrocities and torture. The Ukrainian side of the conflict, contrary to the long-established clichés about the "brotherhood of Slavic nations" and "eternal friendship," was demonized to the extreme.

Russian writer and literary critic Dmitry Bykov in his article *The War of Writers* published by *Novaya Gazeta* in July 2014, elaborated on this phenomenon. "Modern warfare is largely determined by PR strategies. Who, if not science fiction writers, can fabricate compelling and veracious models of reality?" he wrote.

In his article, Bykov argues that these writers were instrumental in fueling the war that has long been glorified in their works:

"The war in the South-East of Ukraine was triggered by reenactors, authors of *Zavtra* newspaper and science fiction writers: Strelkov himself admits that he brought war to this land. Besides fiction writers and passionate columnists, there was no one capable of igniting the masses."

Clearly, this is an exaggeration. Kremlin's state-run TV propaganda and local politicians stoked Donbas much more efficiently than those scribblers. And without the support from the Russian "military shops" and "holidaymakers," as the separatists call Russian weapons and servicemen, a protracted military conflict would be simply impossible. However, we should admit that the skeleton, which was later built up by the Russian television using lies and manipulations, was initially developed and first presented in fiction books. Their artistic value has traditionally been very low. However, this was not important to the Russian audiences driven by nationalism. This trash literature created for them the

reality, in which they would like to live and which distracted from the monotony of everyday life and the real problems, such as broken roads or dirty hallways.

It's hard to say whether the almost simultaneous release of several books about the war between Russia and Ukraine was the ideological sabotage planned by Kremlin technologists or a spontaneous creative impulse of independent writers. But the truth is that in 2009, several books were published and hit the shelves in Russia that told about the collapse of the "Ukrainian project" and the inevitable war between Russia and the West for the territory of Ukraine. At least three of them were written by today's public figures of DPR and LPR: Sergei Buntovsky, Gleb Bobrov and Fedor Berezin. Even if this was a government contract with the Kremlin, the contractors were, beyond doubt, idea-driven and devoutly and delightedly portrayed the destruction of the Ukrainian state and the "ascent of the red stars over Maidan."

However, most of these opuses had small circulations. Media most often mentioned them not in connection with their literary qualities, but because of their controversial content.

However, not all fiction writers limited themselves to producing texts. Some began to work hard to turn their scripts into reality. Fedor Berezin, a Donbas native who had published several books on

SCIENCE FICTION WRITERS DEVELOPED AND ANALYZED VARIOUS SCENARIOS OF RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFRONTATION IN NUMEROUS BOOKS THAT WERE TRENDY BACK IN THE MID-2000s

the Russian-Ukrainian war, in spring 2014 joined the ranks of the militants, becoming the deputy of the Russian terrorist Igor Strelkov in the capacity of the "DPR Minister of Defense." The novelist hasn't won honor in battle, but will be remembered for a phantasmagoric video address, in which he told about "armed Negroes" in Donetsk and NATO mercenaries marching on Slovyansk. It is a mystery whether these thrilling messages were for him another work of fiction, or Berezin sincerely believed in what he said.

Either way, he has become a cult character among fellow writers: he is the world's only fiction writer who has turned his fiction into life, even becoming a "dignitary" in the "state" of his dreams.

Long before the "Russian Spring," another writer who exploited the topic of the war in Ukraine became famous, a

native of Luhansk Gleb Bobrov. His book "The Age of the Stillborn" was the most successful among this kind of works. Unlike Berezin, Bobrov neither went to war nor held any high posts in the LPR structure. Nevertheless, he found a nice niche for himself on the information front. The writer is currently engaged in propaganda in Luhansk, overseeing one of Plotnytskyi's "official" resources, the Luhansk Information Center.

One can argue how much this literature has influenced the minds of those who took up arms to fight against the Ukrainian Army. Obviously, most Donbas residents simply did not notice it and were much more exposed to TV propaganda. Nevertheless, the release of the "prophetic" fiction in 2008-2009 had a significant effect on the reading public and the propaganda workers. They persuaded thousands of people in the inevitability of the future conflict and put the blame for the future war on the West and the Ukrainian nationalists.

In all Russian books on the Ukrainian war, NATO was the main aggressor. Of course, when the war in Ukraine broke out, Russia traditionally held America responsible. Despite the fact that the armed hostilities were obviously started by Strelkov's Russian fighters, the majority of Russians readily blamed the US and NATO for it.

To support their confidence, Girkin, Berezin and other directors of the apocalyptic scenario had to regularly lie about the "dead Negroes," NATO mercenaries killed near Slovyansk and the atrocities of American soldiers in Lysychansk. Despite the obvious absurdity, all these lies were taken for granted without proof by the readership of Bobrov's and Berezin's masterpieces, because they had read similar stories long before the war.

The fantasies of writers who had dreamed of carnage in Ukraine proved to be no less appalling when turned into reality. They brought nothing but hardship, suffering and death to the residents of Donbas so far. However, many gray area residents still believe that the war and devastation were the only way out for Donetsk and Luhansk, which otherwise would have faced the occupation by NATO mercenaries and the genocide of the Russian-speaking population of the region.

The credit for this should be given to books about the NATO aggression and the Russian-Ukrainian war published 5-6 years before the annexation of Crimea and the outbreak of the hostilities in Donbas. After all, the atrocities of NATO mercenaries were described in them vividly and lovingly. ■





PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

Gulnara Bekirova:

“Those who stay in Crimea and those who left are in an equally difficult position, albeit their tragedies differ”

Interviewed by
**Anastasiya
Levkova**

The *Ukrainian Week* is launching a series of interviews with Crimean intellectuals and civil activists. This is an attempt to understand what Crimea meant and what it means for Ukraine today; to look at important moments in the history of the peninsula and Crimean Tatars; to define the foundation of Crimean Tatar identity, and to analyze the prospects of Crimea's return to Ukraine and its position after de-occupation. Our first speaker is historian and political scientist Gulnara Bekirova.

How do you see the foundation of Crimean Tatar identity today?

— It stands on several pillars. The first one is territorial commonness: Crimea is the center of gravity for those who consider themselves Crimean Tatars. One of the tragedies of our nation is that Crimean Tatars who live in Crimea are a minority, while the majority of them are scattered all over the world—not only after deportation in 1944, but also as a result of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 1783. That one was followed by the massive emigration of Crimean Tatars. As a result, the people turned from a statehood-shaping nation into a minority in its homeland over just a century and a half.

No matter what, for those Crimean Tatars who currently live in Crimea—it's a promised land of sorts for all Crimean Tatars—the peninsula is a symbolic embodiment of our nation. Other pillars of identity are language, religion and culture and, importantly, common historic memory, particularly that of the deportation in 1944. I

think that most Crimean Tatars share the memory of deportation regardless of their political preferences.

Your first articles were published in the early 1990s. They were probably the first materials about Crimean Tatars since deportation. How much progress have Crimean Tatars made in learning their history in the past 25 years?

— Indeed, most episodes of our past had been kept secret for a long time. During the last years of the Soviet Union I wrote articles about the emigration of Crimean Tatars in the late 18th century and early 19th centuries and a thesis on the historiography of Crimean Tatars. In the process, I discovered many facts that I hadn't known before. Had I not studied in Moscow, I would probably have not had that opportunity: the Russian capital was the only place where certain documents were available. We, Crimean Tatars, didn't understand why nobody wrote about our nation, why other students would give us awkward looks in schools, and why people associated us with the Mongol-Tatar yoke.

After the deportation, Crimean history was profoundly falsified, while the list of ethnicities didn't even have the ethnonym “Crimean Tatar” after the mid-1950s. An unspoken ban existed for the admission of Crimean Tatars to humanities-oriented universities. The authorities were taking care of erasing historic memory. That forced us to do what I called “catacomb historiography”. That historiography was preserved in documents of Crimean Tatar national movement and in the statements sent by our activists to various institutions. A group that loses its

memory is exposed to the loss of orientation and doesn't know what to aspire to.

For this reason, the Crimean Tatar national movement always focused on the revival of historic memory. By the way, the first criminal charge against Mustafa Dzhemilev was for his "Description of the History of Crimea" book. The formal charge was imprisonment for refusal to serve in the army, but I found documents of the Prosecutor General's Office in the archives later indicating his history study as the reason. Thanks to such people as Mustafa Dzhemilev, human rights activist Aishe Seyitmuratova, leader of Crimean Tatar National Movement Yuriy Osmanov, Crimean Tatar philologist Refik Muzafarov and supporter of national equality for Crimean Tatars Rollan Kaliev our historic memory was gradually revived and preserved. In the Soviet Crimean studies, however, Crimean Tatars were either enemies or traitors or they were not mentioned at all. In 1975, Soviet historian Oleksandr Nekrich completed a book titled "Punished Nations" and sent it to be published in the West—the chances of publication in the USSR were slim to none. He was among the first to speak about the deportations under Stalin and had therefore to emigrate immediately. In addition to that, Nekrich did not rely on archive documents as they were inaccessible, rather on the testimony of our activists. After the 1989 Declaration on Repressed People by the Soviet Union Supreme Council, the ban on ethnonym "Crimean Tatars" was lifted. Then St. Petersburg historian Valeriy Vozgrin began publishing his works and they came as a revelation to us. In 1994, I defended my thesis on the historiography of Crimean Tatars from the late 18th century to the 1940s at the History and Archive Institute in Moscow. Crimean Tatar Professor Refik Muzafarov published the "Crimean Tatar Encyclopedia" in the early 1990s. While there were many inaccuracies in the publication, it provided a huge amount of facts.

We collected testimony about the 1944 genocide through our Unutma campaign: people sent us letters of their experience and photographs, and many interviews were taken. With the support of Lenur Islyamov, the owner of the ATR TV channel, we created a digital archive of materials collected during the campaign. I think the time of gathering facts is in the past. Now is time to summarize.

If Crimea returns to Ukraine, could the Crimean Tatar language become a fully functional one?

— At the moment, many Crimean Tatars are not fluent in their native language. However, I am convinced that this issue is not difficult to resolve and it should be done through education: everyone in Crimea should study it in schools alongside Ukrainian and Russian. Then we will have a full-fledged knowledge of the language and this, I am confident, will be beneficial for all. I'm somewhat in two minds about this next example, but I'll still give it: those who know the Crimean Tatar language can also understand Turkish and many Turkic languages. Prior to deportation the majority of Crimean residents knew the Crimean Tatar language—this proves that representatives of other ethnic groups can learn our language. Until 1944 the Crimean Tatar language was considered a "lingua Franca" in Crimea. If introduced as a compulsory language, it wouldn't be too difficult to learn. Of course, this is impossible under the current occupation of Crimea.

Gulnara Bekirova was born in Melitopol, Zaporizhzhia Oblast, and studied at the Historic and Archive Institute in Moscow. In 1994, she defended her thesis on "The History of the Crimean Tatar People in Russia in Russian Literature (end of the 18th century to the 1940s)". She worked for the First Crimean Tatar Channel ATR and is the author and anchor-man of Tarikh Syedasi (Echo of the Past), a program on history. Before moving to mainland Ukraine, Ms. Bekirova lectured at the Crimean Engineering and Pedagogical University. Today she resides in Kyiv. She is the author of 11 books. In 2009, she was awarded the Bekir Çoban-zade Award for her monograph "Crimean Tatars. 1941-1991".

The Crimean Tatar language today is an optional subject in schools, so we can't really speak of any compromise on the part of the Crimean authorities. On TV, you have news on the former state TV and radio company Krym in Crimean Tatar, while the hosts of Tilde, fikirde, ishte—birlik talk show only start and end it in Crimean Tatar. They can speak the language perfectly, so can their guests, such as publishers or editors of Crimean Tatar publications. But they speak Russian on air instead. At this point, I do not see any prospects for the Crimean Tatar language in Crimea. Does it have any future in mainland Ukraine? I don't know, but I would like to believe that it does. I think the Crimean Tatar Faculty at the Taras Shevchenko National University in Kyiv was quite popular this year.

FOR MANY CRIMEAN TATARS, THE ISSUE OF CRIMEA'S RETURN TO UKRAINE WILL ALWAYS BE ON THE AGENDA. THERE ARE OBJECTIVE REASONS FOR THIS, IN PARTICULAR OUR HISTORY OVER THE PAST 150 YEARS

Apart from feeble statements of Ukraine's and EU's officials about never recognizing it as part of Russia, do Crimean Tatar intellectuals have any reasons to believe that Crimea will eventually return to Ukraine? What would that take?

— I think that for many Crimean Tatars the issue of Crimea's return to Ukraine will always be on the agenda and there are objective reasons for this, in particular our history over the past 150 years. Naturally, the postulate that Crimea is a part of Russia is a lie and the international community understands this perfectly well. The fact is that Crimea is occupied. And the Russian leadership also treats it as an occupied territory. They treat dissenters just like the Nazis did in 1941-1944.

The top priority for any occupied territory is de-occupation. However, I believe that the return is impossible until Ukrainians realize that "Crimea is ours". Ask anyone in Russia, even a 5-year old boy: who does Crimea belong to? He will confidently respond: Crimea is ours. If you asked that question to any Ukrainian citizen two years ago, and especially today, the respondent would hesitate.

However, the transfer of Crimea to the Ukrainian SSR in 1954 was not a gift by Nikita Khrushchev. Crimea is a territory that we must struggle for as it is existentially Ukrainian. Currently, it is only the Russians and Crimean Tatars who are fighting for it in the political arena. The forces are clearly incomparable. Two more forces should join this fight: Ukrainians should say "Crimea belongs to us", while in the EU and USA, not only politicians, but

¹ Mustafa Dzhemilev, 72, is former Chair of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and currently MP at the Verkhovna Rada. A dissident in Soviet times, he was nominated for Nobel Peace Prize several times.

average people should be aware that Crimea is part of Ukraine.

Also, Ukrainians themselves should honestly comprehend the recent developments. We must realize that “the little green men” came to Crimea, not to Lviv or Vinnytsia. We should admit that they had necessary social ground, one that had been nurtured and nourished by the Ukrainian leadership for 23 years. In fact, it surrendered Crimea gradually and consistently. First, by resisting pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars. Second, by taking zero efforts to make the rest of Crimea pro-Ukrainian. Having five or six schools with education in the Ukrainian language on the entire territory of Crimea was a total joke. Meanwhile, the encouragement of Russian separatism only increased over the years. One of the tragedies of Ukraine’s Crimea is the fact that the biggest patriots of Ukraine there were Crimean Tatars. If Crimea had 500-600,000 pro-Ukrainian Ukrainians, would we be talking about all these things here now?

And, finally, why are people cooperating with the Russian government today? In short, those that sympathize with Ukraine and hold it in their hearts and souls remain in Crimea, but they see no efforts on the part of the Ukrainian side to return Crimea. This is a great discouragement for a pro-Ukrainian position.

Let’s imagine that Crimea will one day become part of Ukraine again. Do Crimean Tatar intellectuals have a vision of what it should be after that?

— The concept of the Ukrainian Crimea would clearly be Crimean Tatar national autonomy within Ukraine. This format is justified by the fact that Crimea is the only homeland of Crimean Tatars. This is the place where they were formed as a nation. The Crimean Tatar state existed on the territory of Crimea for more than 340 years. Crimean Tatars feel and remember their statehood. In fact, the Crimean Autonomous Republic existed from 1921-1945 exactly due to the fact that the indigenous people known as Crimean Tatars lived there. We know that if we don’t have this, we will lose all we have with time. A nation’s right to self-determination is actually exercised within a national autonomy. Many top officials in Crimea (for example, the head of the Central Election Committee or the Crimean premier) prior to being banished were Crimean Tatars. I found archive documents whereby a Crimean Tatar woman had chaired the Crimean parliament prior to World War II, in 1940.

We have no detailed roadmap at this point. But I assure you that all this can be outlined and organized within a month. Few groups here have the self-organization capacity equal to that of Crimean Tatars. Look at the civil blockade of Crimea. It was initiated by a handful of Crimean Tatar activists who later found out that they have many allies in mainland Ukraine. Skeptics said that the blockade would be over in a few days. Instead, it has been in place for four months and already gives results. This is testimony to the fact that people are taking responsibility for this territory. The main thing is to avoid distrust and prejudice towards Crimean Tatars from Ukrainians (that had been a case before), and others throwing up roadblocks along our way. All those prejudices and fears stemmed from the Soviet era when the authorities needed to impose some concepts to justify the deportation. The stereotypes include the idea that the Russians are always friends

and brothers, while Crimean Tatars are always enemies, even if the actual situation points to the opposite.

I have been promoting history for two decades now, and sometimes I wonder whether all these efforts are vain when the same old stereotypes stay in place for so long? The way people think takes very long to change. Actually, if it hadn’t been for the annexation, we would probably never have found out how poorly Ukrainians know the history of Crimean Tatars. In 2014, I began to lecture in Kherson, Lviv and Kyiv, and was shocked to find out that that all people in Ukraine know about Crimean Tatars are the stereotypes imposed by the Soviet and later Ukrainian textbooks.

Is there a schism between Crimean Tatars that relocated mainland Ukraine and those that remained in Crimea?

— This is definitely a problem that is clearly visible in social media, though I would not exaggerate its scale. It is more emotional in nature and such emotions are irrational. If to look at things objectively, life is difficult both for those who remain on the peninsula and for those who managed to leave Crimea. What makes the position of Crimean Tatars more difficult is that they struggled to return to their homeland after deportation and can’t just leave it now. This is precisely that imperative that despite all things keeps many people from leaving Crimea. The majority of pro-Ukrainians left for the mainland, but most pro-Ukrainian Crimean Tatars can’t do that. Desperate, many of my students and colleagues asked me in the spring of 2014: “What should I do? Leave or stay?” I said to them and say the same to all those who ask today: if you know that tomorrow nobody will come after you, that you are under no threat



THE FORMAT OF THE UKRAINIAN CRIMEA WOULD BE CRIMEAN TATAR NATIONAL AUTONOMY WITHIN UKRAINE. IT IS JUSTIFIED BY THE FACT THAT CRIMEA IS THE ONLY HOMELAND OF CRIMEAN TATARS

of being arrested and if you can just stand living there, then stay. If you have that possibility, live your life there, remain silent, have children and nobody will cast a stone at you because you’re under occupation. But some of those who stay in Crimea now say that life must be much easier for those who left. Is it? All those who resettled to Kyiv, Lviv, Kherson and Vinnytsia are renting apartments. They left everything they had behind. Some people can’t go back to Crimea because they will be arrested immediately.

I believe that those who stay in Crimea and those who left are in an equally difficult position, albeit their tragedies differ. For those who left the tragedy is that we cannot live in our own home. Those who stayed essentially live in a reservation. Intellectuals have only two options in Crimea if they want to stay alive or out of jail: they can either cooperate with the authorities or keep silent, so that nobody assumes that they think differently.

The only people I can’t accept are those who overdo it in an attempt to be liked by those in power today: they sling mud on those whom they praised just a year ago. They act as if not hoping to meet with us ever again. But will one day see each other face to face, and perhaps this will be in Crimea and very soon. ■

¹ Mustafa Dzhemilev, 72, is former Chair of the Mejlis of the Crimean Tatar People and currently MP at the Verkhovna Rada. A dissident in Soviet times, he was nominated for Nobel Peace Prize several times.

Jazz, Memory, and Freedom

Leonidas Donskis

UKRAINE-LITHUANIA: TIMOFEI DOKSHIZER

The Kaunas Jazz Festival. The jazz trumpet virtuoso Arturo Sandoval addresses an enthusiastic crowd: “Who among you know of the great trumpet player Timofei Dokshizer, who died in Vilnius?” (Dokshizer was a legendary Ukrainian-born trumpeter who lived in Lithuania, and who was known from childhood on for his unforgettable performance of the Neapolitan Dance in Tchaikovsky’s *Swan Lake*.)

The deathly silence was understandable, for no one came to Sandoval’s concert to discover unknown locals.

“Timofei Dokshizer was an exceptional trumpeter and teacher. I dedicate this composition to him. Is his wife in the hall?” A small, modest woman – Dokshizer’s widow – stands up. “Thank you,” says Sandoval. And here I think to myself. Memory comes from somewhere else. Memory comes from the Other. We only think that we preserve the memory of a place, when in truth it comes from elsewhere to preserve us. We need the sensation of being created, founded, and proclaimed to the world, when in fact it is others who bear witness about us to the world. The memory that saves us from non-being comes from elsewhere. Memory does not live here. Memory lives elsewhere.

LITHUANIA-ISRAEL: VYACHESLAV GANELIN

Vyacheslav Ganelin is a Lithuanian and Israeli composer, jazz pianist, and mentor. His is an entire school of jazz music and sensitivity that we can describe as the Vilnius School of Jazz. One of the fathers of Lithuanian free jazz, Ganelin has engraved his name as a major Lithuanian film composer as well.

The music Ganelin wrote for the Lithuanian film *The Devil’s Bride* (1973) was nothing short of a miracle in those days when the entire music life was closely observed and severely censored in the former USSR. The aesthetic of Ganelin’s film music led him close to other masterpieces of his time – yet the miracle was that whereas his counterparts lived in free countries never putting their lives and works in any major risk and danger, Ganelin had to struggle with various political obstacles.

Yet this has never diminished or otherwise disfigured his wonderful art of music. Ganelin’s music language was precious everywhere in the 1970s and later – Vilnius, London, Paris, Mexico City, Tokyo, and elsewhere. He kept building the bridges through his music – in the world torn apart by exclusive ideologies and disbelief in humanity. His native Lithuania symbolized for a long time the sad fate and isolation of Eastern Europe, which Ganelin’s music was destined to challenge and overcome; the country of his choice and destiny, Israel, symbolizes memory and its indestructibility – hence, much of Ganelin’s music dedicated to the Holocaust.



YET ANOTHER RUSSIA: THE ARSENAL KALININGRAD JAZZ ROCK BAND

When as a student I heard Arsenal, the jazz rock band of the Kaliningrad Philharmonic, I was dumbfounded: in Soviet times Russian musicians were playing music that jazz lovers at once identified as being under the influence of *Chicago* and *Blood, Sweat and Tears*.

The leader and spiritus movens of the band was the composer and saxophonist Alexey Kozlov. Later I got the same bang out of the Moscow art rock group *Autograf*: after two concerts I heard in Klaipeda and Palanga it was

LITHUANIA SYMBOLIZED FOR A LONG TIME THE SAD FATE AND ISOLATION OF EASTERN EUROPE, WHICH GANELIN’S MUSIC WAS DESTINED TO CHALLENGE AND OVERCOME

hard to believe they weren’t a British or American group singing in Russian. At times it even seemed I was listening to *Yes* or *Genesis*, still my favorite art rock representatives.

So that was a miracle what the Kaliningrad jazz rock band had done. Why Kaliningrad? In fact they were all from Moscow, but they had decided to register the group with the Kaliningrad Philharmonic only to make the Moscow censors and cultural establishment less antsy. They needed a place far off the beaten track in the boondocks – and Kaliningrad was it. The first time *Arsenal* sounded particularly impressive: not only a strong rhythm group but an excellent wind section as well reminded one of the powerful American fusion groups, the big difference being that *Arsenal* performed a lot of original music, a large part of which consisted of long conceptual compositions.

Several years later I heard *Arsenal* again in Klaipeda; the group had changed considerably. Probably it didn’t want to lag behind the times and deliberately eased off on the more demanding, academic, and conceptual music-making and veered toward a more melodious and popularly acceptable music. It was professional, nice but not as impressive as the first time. Still, there’s something that has to be singled out: the newly constituted band which even performed new wave and late punk rock music also added to its repertoire the American jazz pianist John Lewis’s composition “Django,” first performed by the John Lewis trio and dedicated the memory of the Roma-descended Belgian jazz guitarist *Django* Reinhardt (djang in Romani means *I awaken*). The young guitarist Viktor Zinchuk, who played the solo part and an improvisation, a decade later became a Russian guitar music star.

In any case, *Arsenal* and Alexey Kozlov came across as solid, world-league musicians proudly independent of the current power relationships. This was no less important than their musicianship. ■

Illusion of a Federation

Stanislav Kulchytsky

Russia broke up in 1917, but the Bolsheviks intended to restore the empire — as a springboard to create a "Global Soviet Republic"

Speaking to navy sailors in December 1917, Lenin said, "We are told that Russia will disintegrate and fall apart into separate republics, but we have nothing to be afraid of. No matter how many independent republics there are, we will not fear. For us, the location of the state border is not important, rather the preservation of the alliance between the workers of all nations for the fight against the bourgeoisie of any other nations." Establishing Soviet power in the national regions, the Bolshevik leaders were even prepared to give them the status of independent states. Although this did not radically change the situation, as every Soviet state was subordinated to the centre through the Party. Lenin knew that his strategy was more effective than the White generals' straightforward strong-arm tactics.

THE UNION, FORMAL AND INFORMAL

Immediately after the Bolshevik victory in the civil war, the former Russian Empire that they had seized was a country without a name. It consisted of nine formally independent states: Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Far Eastern Republic, Bukhara and Khorezm, as well as Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan, united as the Transcaucasian Federation. This conglomeration was connected with Moscow in two ways: 1) by the Party — through the committees of the rigidly centralised Bolshevik Party, 2) by the Soviet councils — security and economic structures on the periphery were directly controlled by the Kremlin.

Richard Pipes wrote the following about the tremendous possibilities of the Soviet political system's dual structure in creating ostensibly independent nation states that were fully dependent on the Kremlin: "Territories were reconquered and reintroduced into a new Soviet empire. They were given the functions of statehood, provided that their institutions were also controlled by the Communist Party. As for the party, Lenin had absolutely no intention of splitting it up on a national basis. The result was federalism with all the attributes of statehood, supposedly capable of meeting the basic requirements of the non-Russian population, but which concealed a rigidly centralised dictatorship with its centre in Moscow."

Pipes concluded that it was a "fiction of statehood", as he considered the soviet councils and party committees to be two separate political forces. But in reality, these two political forces did not exist. In Lenin's framework, the soviets were the part of the Bolshevik Party that disposed of full executive powers. The dictatorship was exercised by the Politburo of the Party's Central Committee, but the



Indigenous walls. The Party could tolerate some national identity, such as on the fresco at the Kyivska metro station in Moscow, but not much more

Council of People's Commissars stood at the top of the Soviet power vertical. Incidentally, it was headed by Lenin himself.

This meant that the soviets in the national republics were not fictitious, but a source of real power, controlled, of course, by the Central Committee. Nevertheless, life in the republics was not easy for the leaders of the centralised and disciplined party: they had to make sure they did not lose control of the national soviets and that the local branches of the Party maintained their loyalty to the centre. The party chiefs paid particular attention to Ukraine — the largest Soviet Republic by human and material resources.

Moscow saw only one way of turning a country without a name into a country with one: "absorbing" the independent republics into the borders of the Russian Federation, i.e. depriving them of national statehood. Such an attempt was made in autumn 1922, in the absence of Lenin, who was then hit by the first bout of his terminal sickness. The author of the "autonomisation" plan is considered to be the RSFSR People's Commissar for Nationalities and General Secretary of the Party — Joseph Stalin. However, Lenin described it as a "fundamentally wrong and untimely venture" in a letter on December 30, 1922. The provincial leaders were against autonomisation too, but not because they wanted to preserve the non-existent sovereignty of their independent Soviet republics. No wonder Lenin ironically called them the "independents", since he realised that they simply did not want their status to be lowered. He was worried about the long-term implications of "the notorious

issue of autonomy, which, it appears, is officially called the issue of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics". Since the question of establishing a single centralised state had already arisen, he offered his own plan for solving the problem and achieved its adoption. Analysing it today, we understand, first of all, the ingenuity, flexibility and treachery of Leninist national policy and, secondly, the mechanism of the Soviet Union's collapse in 1990-1991.

The conversion of independent republics into autonomous republics of the RSFSR de facto revived a "single and indivisible" Russia. The only difference was that some provinces were autonomous republics. However, there was a fundamental ambiguity for Ukraine under these conditions: would it become part of Russia as a single autonomous region not divided into provinces, or would the already announced approach for administrative-territorial division be respected, the republic vanishing from the map altogether. Soviet Russia found itself face to face with the ghost of the liberation movement: peoples who had gone through the furnace of national revolutions would sooner or later rise in defence of their gained and then lost rights of statehood.

That is why Lenin proposed to create a second-level federation, which would include "together and on an equal footing" the Russian and Transcaucasian Federations, as well as Ukraine and Belarus. This meant that the constitutional sovereignty enjoyed by the independent republics would remain in the newly minted Soviet Republics. Obviously, there could be no real sovereignty with the party dictatorship in place — it does not matter if a republic was independent or became Soviet.

When the Soviet Union was formed, a separate article in national constitutions declared the right to freely leave the union state. The Kremlin saw no danger in this, and it remained a part of all Soviet constitutions, including the 1977 Constitution of the USSR. However, this article took on real meaning in the late 1980s, when confrontation began between the Union and republican centres.

The formation of the USSR put the question of finding a centre for the union on the agenda. No new state arose in December 1922 — it was merely a ceremonial event, described in advance by the rules of the Central Committee's Organising Bureau. New power centres were not formed, rather the names of existing ones were changed: the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party became the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party, the RSFSR Council of People's Commissars turned into the USSR Council of People's Commissars. It is clear that the Bolshevik leaders did not want to create yet another seat of power in Soviet Russia, so they rejected the idea of uniting Russian party committees into a republican party organisation and simply placed them directly under the union centre. An RSFSR Council of People's Commissars nevertheless emerged, but it only had control over minor matters. Therefore, the formal status of Russia as a union republic was lower than the other republics.



Ukrainization revised. Lazar Kaganovich's version of 'Ukrainization' heavily affected thousands from Ukrainian intelligentsia

The principle of "democratic centralism" on which the existing organisations were built ensured reliable control for the centre over daily life across the huge country, including the national republics. However, it was necessary to convince non-Russian residents, who felt like second-class citizens in pre-revolutionary Russia, that the Soviet regime would promote the development of their culture and language. In December 1919, Lenin prepared a resolution entitled "On Soviet Power in Ukraine", which was adopted by the 8th All-Russian Party Conference resolution. It stated that "Members of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine should ensure the right of the working masses to study and speak in their native language in all Soviet institutions, strongly opposing attempts to artificially push the Ukrainian language into the background by trying, on the contrary, to make the Ukrainian language an instrument of communist education for the working masses. Measures should be taken immediately to make sure there is a sufficient number of employees who speak Ukrainian in all Soviet institutions, and that all employees are able to continue speaking the Ukrainian language".

In October 1920, Stalin developed this thesis in his article "The Policy of the Soviet Government Regarding the National Question in Russia". In order to strengthen Soviet power in the national regions, he considered it necessary for all party and government institutions, educational and cultural establishments, and media to function in the language of the local people. Combining the national republics and Central Russia "in one state body" would be, in his opinion, "impossible without the widespread organisation of

THE GOAL OF "NATIVISATION" POLICY WAS TO INVOLVE THE NON-RUSSIAN POPULATION OF THE USSR IN THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM

local schools, as well as the creation of courts, administrations, government authorities and so on with people who know the language and way of life of the population".

The policy articulated by party leaders in 1919-1920 did not yet have a name. One first appeared at the first Bolshevik Party Conference after the formation of the Soviet Union: *korenizatsiya*.

KORENIZATSIYA

The goal of this policy was to involve the non-Russian population of the USSR in the building of communism. Meaning "nativisation" or "indigenisation", its literal translation — "putting down roots" — betrays the true intent: to embed the Communist Party in the republics as a carrier of dictatorial power, constructing a power structure of interrelated verticals: Party, State Security, soviets. Alongside *korenizatsiya*, other terms were derived from the name of the titular nation in each national republic or region (e.g. "Ukrainisation").

In the Soviet Union, the opposition between "titular nation" and "national minority" took on a »

qualitatively different meaning. Leninist national policy, as already stated, used the dual structure of Soviet power to transform the national liberation movements of oppressed peoples from an enemy to an ally of the Bolsheviks. For this purpose, Communist leaders renounced provincial divisions and adopted the principle of politicising ethnicity as the basis of their administrative division. National administrative units were created in all non-Russian provinces. They were given, apart from the district level, the name of the nationality that was in the majority there. Wanting to look like supporters of the most radical solution to the national question, Bolshevik leaders declared all such majority ethnic groups to be titular nations.

As a result, a hierarchy arose that was defined by the political and territorial administrative division. The Russians were at the top by default. To hide the key role of Russians in the creation of the multinational Soviet state, the name of this state was devoid of any indications of ethnicity (as was the name of the state party that served as its supporting structure). Second level titular nations created Soviet republics, the third—autonomous republics, the fourth—national regions and the fifth—national districts. Ukrainians were the titular nation within the borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, whereas Moldovans held this position in the Moldavian Autonomous Republic that was part of the UkSSR. People of one nationality were considered representatives of the titular nation within the borders of their administrative units, but representatives of national minorities outside them. The status of Russians in Ukraine was ambiguous. Officially, they were con-



UNOFFICIALLY, BOLSHEVIK LEADERS POSITIONED RUSSIANS AS THE TITULAR NATION OF THE ENTIRE UNION. AS A RESULT, RUSSIANS DID NOT CONSIDER THEMSELVES A MINORITY IN ANY OF THE NATIONAL REPUBLICS

sidered a national minority in the republic and the titular nation within the borders of their national districts. Unofficially, Bolshevik leaders positioned Russians as the titular nation of the entire Union. As a result, Russians had a specific view of their own national status: they did not consider themselves a minority in any of the national republics. Party leaders encouraged this belief, in so far as it reduced the danger of liberation movements springing up in the national republics by lowering the proportion of the titular nation in the population and increasing the share of Russians.

When Russians were treated as a national minority in the national republics, this was unusual for them and unpleasant for many. Many Russians asked themselves a question that was first formulated before the revolution: does the nation that considers itself titular in Ukraine exist at all? Is there a separate Ukrainian language? Here is a letter, dated May 7, 1926, from Maxim Gorky to Oleksa Slisarenko, director of the Ukrainian State Publishing House, with a protest against the abridgement of his novel *The Mother* in its

Ukrainian language edition. The writer and democrat expressed himself so frankly that it is worth quoting his arguments in full: "I think that a translation of this story into the Ukrainian dialect is not necessary either. I am very surprised by the fact that people with the same goal ahead of them do not only claim there is a difference between the dialects—trying to make a dialect into a 'language'—but also oppress the Great Russians who have found themselves a minority in the area of this dialect."

Recognition of titular rights for all ethnicities and the *korenizatsiya* campaign were not popular among the Russian intelligentsia. With great persistence, which, however, did not develop into political opposition, the Russian intellectual elite protested against the recognition of Ukrainians and Belarusians as individual nations. The presence of Ukrainian national statehood, no matter how ephemeral, returned to Ukrainians their own history, which had been usurped by the imperial nation.

But the Bolshevik leaders emphasised their internationalism and in the 1920s called Great Russian chauvinism the main danger for Party and state. In 1921, the five-person Politburo, in which all political power was concentrated, included only one Russian—Lenin. Does this mean that the Russian, and from 1923 Union, centre implemented its national policy from a non-national platform? It is appropriate to take a close look at the debate on national issues in the post-Soviet Russian Federation, which inherited its ethno-territorial division from the Soviet Union, but was freed of Communist Party dictatorship.

After the collapse of the USSR, the autonomous republics of Russia essentially obtained a national and state status that they had never had before. Pointing out the official status of national minorities and the lack of something similar for Russians, some politicians and political scientists proposed equalising their status. This could have been achieved either by leaving the autonomous republics responsible for nothing but cultural and language issues, or by creating a Russian republic within the federation. As is well known, Vladimir Putin's government chose the path of cutting the autonomous republics' powers.

The leaders of the Soviet Communist Party in its various guises were not faced with this dilemma, as their power structures were derived from the dictatorship of the party. Therefore, the Bolsheviks could claim to be internationalists. They branded the nationalism of oppressed nations "bourgeois" and even publicly talked about the danger of the Great Russian chauvinism that former bourgeois professionals, now Soviet officials, were imbued with. Nevertheless, Communist Party leaders in fact limited the powers of union and autonomous republics to matters of language and culture from the very beginning. Whenever functionaries or the national intelligentsia went beyond what was permitted, the "competent authorities" resorted to repression. Imperial ideology was implanted into all the chains of command that controlled non-sovereign populations.

The Russian people was also deprived of sovereignty, but was seen by the Kremlin to be the titular nation of the entire union, i.e. the social base for the communist state.



Official language. Ukrainian was not a rarity on the streets of pre-war Kharkiv

PETLIURAN VS COMMUNIST UKRAINISATION

As Soviet power took root in the national republics and regions, the campaign of *korenizatsiya* was scaled back, as it was starting to threaten the government. From the start, the Bolsheviks knew that this policy did not only have a positive side (embedding Soviet power), but also a negative one (the rise of national consciousness, which threatened an increase in separatist sentiment). At the beginning of June 1923, so almost immediately after the focus on *korenizatsiya* was proclaimed at the 12th Bolshevik Party Congress, secretary of the Ukrainian Central Committee Emanuel Kviring bluntly referred to the danger of communist Ukrainisation growing into its Petliuran equivalent. However, only 10 years later Ukrainisation was officially divided into Bolshevik and Petliuran variants in the Communist Party resolution "On grain requisitions in Ukraine, North Caucasus and the Western Region" dated December 14, 1932. The Ukrainian Bolshevik Party and Council of People's Commissars were obliged by this resolution to ensure "systematic party management and supervision of the Ukrainisation process". This required, according to the authors of the resolution—Stalin and Kaganovich—"the removal of Petliuran and other bourgeois nationalist elements from party and soviet organisations". A campaign was launched to combat the work of Education Commissar and leader of the Ukrainisation effort Mykola Skrypnyk, which in 1933 drew tens of thousands of representatives of the Ukrainian national intelligentsia into its maelstrom. A remark was made to the North Caucasian Regional Committee and Regional Executive Committee that the "frivolous and un-Bolshevik 'Ukrainisation', not resulting from the cultural interests of the population, of almost half of the districts in the North Caucasus, due to a complete lack of control over Ukrainisation of schools and the press on behalf of regional authorities has given a legal form for enemies of Soviet power to organise resistance to the ac-

tivities of the Soviet government with kulaks, officers and re-emigrants—Cossacks, participants in the Kuban People's Republic and so on".

It was required to "immediately switch the paperwork of Soviet and cooperative authorities in 'Ukrainised' districts of the North Caucasus, as well as all published newspapers and magazines, from Ukrainian into the Russian language, as it is more understandable for people in the Kuban region, and prepare for Russian-language instruction in schools by the autumn".

At the time of Lenin, Great Russian chauvinism was seen as the main threat to the national question. However, during the acute crisis of 1932-1933, party leaders started to see nationalism as the main danger, providing it with a class-based definition—"bourgeois". At a ceremonial meeting of senior party and state leaders at the Kremlin on May 2, 1933, Stalin stood on his chair (there were no microphones then) and pronounced a toast that included the following sentence: "The Russians are the main nationality in the world, the first to raise the banner of the Soviets against the whole world".

The third component of the politicisation of ethnicity (alongside the concept of the "titular nation" and the *korenizatsiya* campaign) was the legal recording of a person's nationality by the state (the "fifth box" on Soviet forms). In passports, which were introduced from 1933 for the population of cities and new buildings, this information was moved to fourth place, right after the surname, name and patronymic. To keep society under tight control, the state had to know two basic characteristics of each citizen: social background and nationality. Distinguishing citizens on grounds of nationality was not important in itself, but in order to establish their belonging to a titular nation. Ukrainians persecuted in Ukraine for "bourgeois nationalism" frequently fled to Russia, where they stopped being representatives of the titular nation, thus losing their political status.

The communist state was able to eliminate the horizontal links between people, deeply penetrate three verticals of power into society and prevent the emergence of any uncontrolled organisations. With millions of eyes and ears in the community, it knew about the real attitudes of citizens and responded to them by creating fictitious organisations with dissidents who were repressed. Ukrainians, however, perceived themselves as a nation even without organisational ties and demonstrated a particular hostility to socio-economic transformations of a communist nature. The social explosion in the first half of 1930, which forced Stalin to put collectivisation on hold for six months, was spontaneous, but in Ukraine it was constantly accompanied by the slogans of the 1917-20 national revolution. A new social explosion in the republic, which was brewing in 1931-1932 against the backdrop of famine across the Soviet Union, was neutralised by the creation of a state of absolute starvation—the Holodomor.

The central government tried to mask its repressive actions against the Ukrainian people with pronounced Ukrainophilia. A demonstration of this was the transfer of republican authorities from Kharkiv to the national capital—Kyiv—following the Holodomor. ■

January 13 - 31**Freedom Genome****Art Arsenal
(1, vul. Lavrska, Kyiv)**

A retrospective exhibition of one of the world's most well-known Ukrainian artists opened at Art Arsenal. The name of Ivan Marchuk is listed among the 100 living geniuses of mankind, and his paintings can be seen in art galleries around the world. The author is also famous for his unique painting technique which he calls "plyontanism" (from the Ukrainian word for "weaving, braiding"). The exhibition features 150 of Marchuk's paintings from the "Voice of My Soul," "Landscape," "White Planet 1," "White Planet 2," "Still Life," "New Expressions," and "A Glimpse into Infinity" series.

**January 19, 7 p.m.****Christmas****Ukraina Palace of Arts
(103, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)**

On the day of Epiphany, Jazz Kolo project will present in Kyiv their festive program with a self-explanatory title "Christmas." Guests will be treated to a rich musical evening with jazz-style Christmas carols and original compositions. The Christmas mood will be created by well-known jazz musicians: Aniko Dolidze (vocals), Oleh Pashkovsky (key-board), Ihor Zakus (bass) and Orkhan Agabeyli (percussion). Project's fans will have the unique opportunity to once again enjoy the performance of their favorite musicians, while jazz lovers will have a chance to listen to some really good music.

**January 21, 6 p.m.****Traditional Ukrainian Art****National Museum of the History
of Ukraine
(2, vul. Volodymyrska, Kyiv)**

The upgraded museum exhibit will display the objects of the everyday life of Ukrainians, reflecting the diversity of the country's spiritual and material culture. Traditional clothing, icons, towels, carved boards, woven goods and many other items collected from different historical and ethnographic regions of Ukraine provide the fullest picture of the life of Ukrainians in the 19-20th centuries. Visitors can make a tour of the exhibition with its curator and enjoy music performed by the band, the name of which is being kept secret.

**January 26, 7 p.m.****El Patio Flamenco****House of Actors
(7, vul. Yaroslaviv Val, Kyiv)**

All the passion of the magic world of flamenco will be presented in Kyiv as part of El Patio Flamenco project created by the joint efforts of the two music groups: ESO and VIVIR. Both groups are known for the high quality of their performance combined with a fine sense of rhythm and the dancing talent. Incredible guitar sound, sophisticated movements and light effects will take the audience to a flower-covered patio of a Spanish house in Seville, where flamenco was born.

**From January 28****French Cinema Night 2016****Kyiv Cinema
(19 vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)**

Movie goers will have a chance to see a selection of the most successful French films as part of the eleventh French Cinema Night festival. This year, the festival program includes five films: a drama about love and the power of friendship *Les deux amis*, comedy *Une heure de tranquillité* with Christian Clavier in the title role, a story of migrants called *Dheepan*, a drama thriller Maryland and a romance *Mon roi* directed by Maïwenn Le Besco. All films will be screened in the original language with Ukrainian subtitles.

**Through February 6****Baroque Supper****Ya Gallery
(49B, vul. Khoryva St., Kyiv)**

In late December, an unusual project by Olena Blank opened at Ya Gallery, featuring obelisks, pillars and stalagmites made of ceramic pumpkins, squash and cabbage. The variety of forms and meanings makes the viewer wonder what exactly the author meant to say by her exhibits. Pumpkins are miraculously transformed into something similar to monkey traps and reminiscent of the ample curves of the primeval Venuses. The author defines her project as ironic, lush, absurd, and gastronomic.





Gastronomic Dinners

• RESTAURANT •

Липський Особняк

2002

15, Lypska street, Kyiv | +380 44 254 00 90

www.lipsky.com.ua



SPA

AT HILTON KYIV

EXCLUSIVE PLACE.
UNIQUE EXPERIENCE.

30 Tarasa Shevchenka Boulevard,
Kyiv, 01030, Ukraine
+38 044 393 5410
kyiv.spa@hilton.com