

INVESTIGATION
OF THE ILOVAYSK TRAGEDY

ECHOES OF THE FAMINE
IN SOUTH-EASTERN UKRAINE

DONETSK SYNDROME:
VETERANS RETURN FROM WAR

international edition
The Ukrainian Week

№ 15 (81) NOVEMBER 2014

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Тиждень

TRENDS & TALK

Prosecutor General's Office accuses Headquarters General Viktor Nazarenko of neglect of duty that led to the death of 49 soldiers on board of the military aircraft shot down by the terrorists on June 14



Prosecutor General's Office claims that slow investigation of killings on the Maidan is a result of destruction of 90% of documents by the Yanukovych regime



Defense Ministry hires nine volunteers. They will be in charge of supplying the Army with clothes and medicines



Will We Live By Law?

The Ukrainian Week looks at the law enforcement and judicial reform proposed by potential coalition partners

The newly-published basic draft coalition agreement has anti-corruption campaign and judicial and police reforms on top of the agenda. This signals that potential coalition members realize how important these transformations are and how badly society wants them. However, they seem to offer a superficial fix rather than a profound reboot. The weakest spot is the proposed judicial reform, although effective courts are a vital tool to the transformations Ukraine.

Author:
Oles Oleksiyenko

mand staff will be educated in two post-secondary education facilities that will most likely be based on some universities that are already available.

To reinforce public control over police and allow easy identification of every police officer, they will wear unified personal ID tags on their uniforms. To make it easier for the relatives of those arrested to quickly find out where the detainees are, an automated registration system will be introduced and special terminals will be launched to provide access to this system for all citizens.

In addition to the National Police, the Interior Ministry will act as an umbrella for separate central executive entities, such as the National Guard (comprised largely of volunteers who are currently fighting in Eastern Ukraine – **Ed.**), the State Emergencies Service, the State Border Guard Service, and the State

Migration Service. The latter two may later be merged into the State Service for Migration Control and Border Guard. Citizenship and internal migration issues will be delegated to the Justice Ministry's State Registration Service.

Transport and Veterinary Police, as well as State Protection Service (protection of property and bodyguard services) will be abolished while the functions of the Traffic Police will go to the Unified Patrol Service. All anti-organized crime special units will be abolished, too. Their functions will go to the State Intelligence Bureau (SIB).

The SIB is planned as an analogue of the American FBI. Created outside the Interior Ministry umbrella, it is designed to combat corruption (other than in areas delegated to the National Anti-Corruption Bureau – those are listed

MAKE IT LIKE AMERICA

The coalition agreement entails a serious overhaul of Ukraine's law enforcement system. It will turn the Ministry of Interior Affairs into an entity that will develop policies to counter crime and ensure civil order, manage the state border, prevent illegal migration, ensure civil defense and fire protection, and manage emergencies. The enforcement of these policies will be delegated to central executive bodies under the Interior Ministry umbrella (see **Proposed Law Enforcement System**).

The proposed reform entails complete re-attestation of the police in line with new criteria adjusted to international expertise, replacement of police staff, and transparent competition to fill in chief positions in the law enforcement system. The "replacement of police staff", as per this agreement, means re-attestation and gradual hiring of new people rather than one-time replacement of all staff like in Georgia. Police officers will be trained in four schools based on programmes designed by the standards of the US, Georgia and other developed countries. The com-

Proposed law enforcement system

Ministry of the Interior
(key function: policy making)

National Guard

State Emergencies Service

State Border Guard Service

State Migration Service

National Police
(crime prevention and civil order)

Rapid response police units
(clear functions defined by law to prevent misuse)

Criminal Police
(investigations)

Court Police

Civil Security Police
(Unified Patrol Service and Local Police Inspection)

10,000 Hungarians rally against "Putinization of Hungary" in Budapest demanding resignation of Premier Viktor Orbán



Germany, Latvia and Poland expel Russian diplomats. Moscow expels or puts diplomats of these countries on a non-grata list in return



November 21 is the anniversary of the first day of the Maidan. A year ago, people gathered on Independence Square to protest against termination of preparation for the signing of the Association Agreement

below) and organized crime. The SIB will conduct pre-trial investigations in these two areas, as well as in grave crimes committed by law enforcers. The SIB should take over investigation functions from the Prosecutor's Office and SBU, Ukraine's Security Service.

The reform also entails the creation of the Municipal Police funded by local budgets and accountable to local authorities that will be outside the Interior Ministry umbrella, and Military Police accountable to the Army Headquarters. It will conduct pre-trial investigations of all criminal violations committed by the military as well as crimes committed by the military in areas of combat action under the martial law.

ANTI-CORRUPTION POLICIES

The agreement priorities include the establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NACB) to start operating from January 1, 2015. Amendments are proposed to improve the previous Anti-Corruption Bureau law passed as a compromise by the VR on October 14. These include decent salary for the Bureau director and employees to ensure their independence, and cancelation of mandatory ap-

proval of the Bureau director by the VR Speaker to prevent political pressure.

By mid-2015, the National Corruption Prevention Agency should be set up and the 2015 State Budget must entail funding for it. Other changes include the creation of a national e-system for submission and publication of income statements of officials and annual independent auditing of government authorities. The agreement proposes amendments to ensure transparency of party and election campaign funding in line with GRECO recommendations. A number of proposals in the agreement extend access to databases on land and land owners, property owners, public procurements, property and income statements by officials, Single State Register of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs and more, for the public. A special entity should be set up to ensure that people can actually access all this.

JUDICIAL REFORM

The anti-corruption and law enforcement reforms depend greatly on the efficiency of the judiciary. Declarations of intents to create a "non-corrupt, effective

and independent judiciary system" are barely backed by effective instruments and mechanisms though. The concept of the "judicial reform" entails "the establishment of a single politically independent body that will be in charge of appointing, promoting and dismissing judges. Most of its members will be judges elected by judges."

This approach overlooks the major flaw of Ukraine's judiciary – its profoundly degraded corporation of judges and its most pow-

THE WEAKEST SPOT IS THE PROPOSED JUDICIAL REFORM, ALTHOUGH EFFECTIVE COURTS ARE A VITAL TOOL TO THE TRANSFORMATIONS

erful members. They will never bite the hand that feeds them. The coalition's intent to upgrade experience and age criteria for judges will in practice only cement the current judges in their seats.

The more practical measures include transparency of the trial process and complete declaration of income and expenses by judges, members of the Supreme Council of Justice, and people involved in the appointment and evaluation of judges, as well as of their family members and other close individuals. "A key criterion for the judge or his family members would be for his income to match his expenses," the declaration suggests. An income-expense gap would be a reason for dismissal of a judge or prosecutor.

The efficiency of law enforcement and anti-corruption authorities will depend on people who enforce the reforms in practice. Sabotage by old staff can easily distort and discredit reforms, and make the law enforcement and judiciary systems even more unbearable for citizens, and anti-corruption entities – yet another link in the repressive system. ■

State Investigation Bureau
(outside of the Interior Ministry umbrella; combats corruption, except for issues within the scope of the National Anti-Corruption Bureau, and organized crime; takes over investigation functions of the Prosecutor's Office and SBU)

National Anti-Corruption Bureau

Municipal Police
(outside of the Interior Ministry and National Police umbrella, funded by local governments)

Military Police
(accountable to the Armed Forces Headquarters)

Ilovaysk Tragedy: Facts and Figures

A Ukrainian assault beret lies on the site where Ukrainian forces battled to escape the Ilovaysk Boiler. Photo from late September, 2014



PHOTO: PAOLO NETYSOV

Author:
Yaroslav
Tynchenko

In the aftermath of the Ilovaysk operation fiasco, the Verkhovna Rada formed a provisional commission to investigate this bloody incident. Promises were made that the commission's work would involve military experts who would provide professional assessments of the generals' actions at Ilovaysk. On October 20, the commission's interim report appeared on the Internet. It was lengthy but completely unprofessional, and seemed to have been the work of a journalist or an amateur in military affairs. Moreover, the author's main goal was not to find the truth, but to incriminate specific individuals. Even if the author had found the real culprits, he still could not answer the questions troubling the people of Ukraine: how many soldiers were killed and why did this happen?

POOR PLANNING

The Ilovaysk tragedy was the result of a plan developed in late June 2014 and widely promoted by Ukrainian politicians. According to this plan, troops would block the Ukrainian-Russian border, encircling Donetsk, Luhansk and other

cities where armed groups of separatists and Russian volunteers were concentrated. However, this strategy had two significant drawbacks.

First, it did not take into account the human factor within the Armed Forces of Ukraine. The plan's sponsors somehow believed (and many believe to this day) that a hastily-mobilized force comprised of civilians could be transformed into real officers and soldiers within a matter of weeks. The task of blocking the border was delegated to the 24th, 30th, 51st, 72nd, and 79th brigades, 70-90% of which were soldiers who had only recently been drafted into military service. After completing their first mission, these brigades were to move on to the second: surrounding the occupied eastern cities. The newly-liberated area would then be taken over by territorial defense battalions that were almost entirely composed of newly-mobilized volunteers.

According to international military training practices, a real soldier or commander should have at least six months of training. Hastily mobilized troops may find

themselves unprepared for combat, even when facing a smaller number of more experienced opponents. Clearly, in commanding such ill-prepared brigades, Ukraine's military strategists were not expecting to face serious enemy resistance. However, with the help of Russian volunteers, the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics (DNR and LNR respectively) not only put up strong resistance, but the separatists managed to seize a nearly 100-kilometre strip of the Ukrainian-Russian border.

Second, neither Ukraine's government officials nor its generals expected that Russian troops would take part in the armed conflict in the Donbas. The July 11 attack on Ukrainian troops near Zelenopillya using Grad rockets fired from within the Russian Federation was a complete surprise to all. Following this incident, the Anti-Terrorist Operation (ATO) staff repeatedly failed to react properly to Russia's increasing role in the conflict, believing that cases like Zelenopillya were isolated incidents that Putin would not dare repeat. Yet common sense suggests that if such a thing happens once, it will not be the last time.

By late July, it was already clear that the plan was a fiasco and a new strategy was needed. In early August, Ukrainian forces managed with great difficulty to free parts of the 72nd and 79th brigades from enemy encirclement. After that, most brigades were withdrawn for re-formation because they were demoralized and had lost two thirds of their heavy weaponry and vehicles. Several groups remained at the front: territorial battalions of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, volunteer battalions of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and Battalion-Tactical Groups - mixed units made up of several mechanized brigades that had not participated in the fighting. They were all very small. In fact, some volunteer militia battalions numbered 35-50 soldiers instead of 400-500, and the total number of the troops in Donetsk Oblast was only about 2,000.

Beginning in early August, the ATO strategy should have switched to active defense, or at least prepared for it, planning possible paths of retreat, strengthening defensive positions, forming a mobile

reserve, and so on. But despite the failure of the previous plan, the ATO leadership decided once again to attempt to surround the cities of Donetsk and Luhansk. In doing so, they ignored the following factors:

- Unlike the brigades that were withdrawn for re-formation, the volunteer militia battalions and territorial defense battalions were only equipped with firearms and traveled by bus or truck;

- After the Malaysian airliner disaster, a moratorium on the use of the Ukrainian Air Force was imposed and, therefore, our troops were denied assistance from the air;

- The army of the Russian Federation, taking an active part in the bombardment of Ukrainian brigades in the border zone, could boldly carry out attacks deep within the territory of Ukraine. But, as noted, the ATO leadership did not take this development seriously;

- There was no sense in surrounding the cities without having first closed the border, since the garrisons there would likely receive help from Russia within a matter of hours.

THE NUMBER OF LOSSES

Some have claimed that the number of losses sustained in the so-called “Ilovaysk Boiler” (of which there were in fact several) is classified information. This is not true. Without a formal declaration of war, “top secret” status can only be imposed by the National Security Council or the leadership of the SBU, Ukraine’s Special Service. Under the provisions of the Anti-Terrorist Operation, neither the military nor the police have legal grounds for such action. Today, there are at least two Internet resources (including a Wikipedia page) dedicated to meticulously documenting each of the deceased.

An alternative count was also conducted by a group of volunteers that from September 3 to October 10 removed the remains of dead soldiers from the area controlled by the self-proclaimed DNR. Overall, the remains of approximately 150 soldiers were retrieved during this period, over 100 of which were collected or exhumed within the Ilovaysk Boiler.

Initially, the rumoured number of deaths varied widely. Some said that about 200 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed in the Savur-Mohyla region, and another 600 in the Ilovaysk and Starobesheve regions. Fortunately, these numbers were not confirmed. For example, the remains of 20 soldiers were found in villages around Savur-Mohyla (a large hilltop monument-turned battleground near the city of Snizhne, Donetsk

Oblast), while none were found on the hill itself. A survey conducted among the last soldiers to retreat from Savur-Mohyla on August 26 convinced us that we should carry out an alternative count of the participants in the Ilovaysk operations and the losses suffered by Ukrainian troops. The group interviewed a large number of the battles’ survivors, including officers and local residents, in order to ascertain the locations of the bodies. As a result, »

THE FIGHTING IN SECTOR B

	Participated in the operation	Escaped from encirclement	Injured	Killed	Captured	Missing
Staff Operational Command “South” (Sector B staff)	20	10	5	3	1	1
92 nd Mechanized Brigade	275	226	15	1	3	30
93 rd Mechanized Brigade	293	90	47	36	42	78
51 st Mechanized Brigade	512	130	81	7	108	186
17 th Tank Brigade	82	45	20	2	4	11
121 st Communications Regiment	4		1	1		2
3 rd Special Forces Regiment	34	20	7	5		2
73 rd Special-purpose Naval Centre	30	19	6	2	3	
74 th Reconnaissance Battalion	18	5	9			4
502 nd Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Battalion	1		1			
91 st Engineer Regiment	20	19		1		
39 th Territorial Defence Battalion Dnipro-2	31	25	4	2		
40 th Territorial Defence Battalion Kryvbass	202	133	17	9	20	23
All Ukrainian military forces	1522	722	213	69	181	337
3 rd National Guard Battalion Donbas	220	11		6	130	73
Ministry of Internal Affairs Battalion Dnipro-1	78	23	38	13		4
Ministry of Internal Affairs Battalion Svitlyaz	40	31	1	2		6
Unidentified			18	121		
Total			270	211		

The table does not include data from the Border Patrol Service or the following Ministry of Internal Affairs battalions: Kherson (20 participants, 6 casualties), Ivano-Frankivsk (35 participants, 3 casualties, 2 missing), and Myrotvorets (74 participants, 9 casualties, one missing)

Analysis of this table leads to grave conclusions:

1. The total number of participants in the operations in Ilovaysk, Starobesheve, and Komsomolsk is strikingly meagre. Even if two territorial defence battalions (including Prykarpattia) had not deserted on the eve of the Ilovaysk operations, the situation would not have changed.
2. The presence of the 73rd Special-purpose Naval Centre at the front line indicates that the ATO staff had no reserves. This Centre is a small but unique military unit of highly-trained combat divers who receive years of training. If its personnel were used as ordinary infantry, this clearly indicates the absence of the latter.
3. The number of soldiers from Ministry of Internal Affairs battalions who were directly involved in the Ilovaysk operations (Donbas, Dnipro-1, Svitlyaz, Kherson, Ivano-Frankivsk, Myrotvorets – about 450) was insufficient for taking Ilovaysk. Even if they had managed to oust the enemy from Ilovaysk, the ATO staff would not have had enough forces to solidify success by taking Donetsk.
4. The groups defending the rear and flank at Ilovaysk (tactical groups from the 92nd, 93rd and 51st Mechanized Brigades) were also too small to contain the attack by Russian troops. Moreover, the tactical management of these groups was negligent, which led to their defeat.
5. One need not be a military expert to conclude that it is impossible to carry out an active offensive on an 80 km front with just 2,000 soldiers, no reserves or air cover, and a fully open right flank, knowing that the Russian army had invaded Ukrainian territory in the early hours of August 24.



PHOTO: PAOLO NETYOSOV

volunteers were able to uncover details about many of the clashes in which our men were killed.

All of the available data suggests that approximately 400 Ukrainian servicemen and law enforcement officers were killed in battle in Sector B from August 24-31. These findings were confirmed by a document that accidentally fell into the hands of one of the evacuation group members: a registry of soldiers who took part in the fighting in Sector B during the abovementioned period. The registry was compiled on September 14, when most of the data on casualties sustained from Ilovaysk to the border crossing at Katerynivkahad finally come to light (see **The Fighting in Sector B**).

Since then, several of the soldiers listed as missing have returned to their units. For example, the 92nd separate mechanized brigade currently has eleven soldiers missing and two in captivity.

A TRAGEDY THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED

The Ilovaysk Boiler could have been avoided if, immediately after receiving information that Russian troops had crossed the border, Ukrainian forces had abandoned the city and retreated toward Komsomolsk. Moreover, the ATO troops had at least two days to do this.

A few things should also be said regarding the role and plans of the Russian military contingent in the battles of late August. Unlike the general Ukrainian public or the temporary parliamentary commission investigating the Ilovaysk case, the leadership of the DNR and the Russian command learned details about the quantity and quality of our troops as early as

August 21. This is evident in an analytical article written by Russian military expert Mikhail Litvinov entitled “Ilovaysk as a mirror of tactical opportunities”:

“After interrogating a captured intelligence chief of the (Ukrainian – Ed.) 8th Army Corps, the militants’ eyes were opened wide, not only regarding the number of groups that oppose them in this direction, but also their positions, state of logistics and combat capabilities. The exceptional weakness of all these components, which had been evident already, became completely clear. Nevertheless, from August 22-23, while the militants’ forces were converging for a counterattack, their DRG (sabotage and reconnaissance group – Ed.) checked the information, but still could not believe what they saw: they did not find hundreds of Ukrainian tanks or columns of armored vehicles advancing beyond the horizon; they basically only found school buses carrying soldiers.”

The treacherous capture of an officer of the 8th Army Corps, who was holding a white flag in his hands trying to negotiate with the militants for the removal of the wounded, did in fact take place.

Thus, the Russians came to the rescue of the DNR knowing that the meagre Ukrainian forces would be incapable of resistance. This suggests that the Russian troops had only one goal: to help the DNR destroy the Ilovaysk battalions of the Ukrainian forces. If they had wanted to move further west beyond the Donetsk region, they would have done so, and no one would have stopped them. It is difficult to say just where and by whom a potential advance by joint Russian-DNR forces could be stopped if they dared to do it.

The remains of a destroyed Uragan rocket launcher system near Ilovaysk. According to Ukrainian military experts, the Ukrainian Armed Forces did not employ Uragan units in the Donbas

It is possible that some of our strategists are trying to “classify” this very fact. The paradox is that this remains a “secret” only to the people of Ukraine, not Russia’s military leaders.

HOW MANY DIED AND WHO IS RESPONSIBLE?

The data from September 14 shows 90 identified victims and 121 still unidentified. Obviously, the unidentified dead are also taken into account among the missing. By subtracting the 121 unidentified dead from the total number of missing, we get about 300. Of these, a certain number have returned from the territory of the self-proclaimed DNR or from captivity. Some soldiers have phoned from captivity or from other areas (Russia, for example) to state that they are alive. To date, the fate of about 200 people remains unknown. 70-80% of them are among the dead whose bodies have mostly been removed and placed in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia. Other missing persons may be in hiding or for whatever reason refuse to make contact. Thus, we arrive at a figure of 400 dead.

The interim report shows that three officials are responsible for this tragedy: Defense Minister Col. Gen. Valeriy Heletey (dismissed

THE ILOVAYSK BOILER COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED IF, IMMEDIATELY AFTER RECEIVING INFORMATION THAT RUSSIAN TROOPS HAD CROSSED THE BORDER, UKRAINIAN FORCES HAD ABANDONED THE CITY AND RETREATED TOWARD KOMSOMOLSK

October 12 – Ed.), Chief of the General Staff Gen. Viktor Muzhenko, and ATO Chief of Staff Gen. Viktor Nazarov. At present, this seems to be an accurate conclusion. More names can probably be added to this list, but each individual death of a Ukrainian soldier should be examined separately. We plan to do this in future articles in which we will describe in detail each battle, or rather, each slaughter of our soldiers by Russian forces... ■

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On the Brink of a Financial Abyss

How bad economic policies could set Ukraine back by 20 years

While Ukraine and the EU are in a state of euphoria due to the “pro-European” results of the parliamentary elections, the financial sector continues to be pervaded by dangerous tendencies that rapidly evolved thanks to the policies of the nation’s new leaders.

TWO PROBLEMS

There are two interrelated and complex problems at play. The first is capital flight, which has several aspects, including the outflow of deposits from the banking system. In the first nine months of 2014, their amount in hryvnias decreased by 7.8% (households took away 18% of deposits). Deposits in foreign currency decreased by 21.9% (34.1% respectively). There has also been an outflow of money capital abroad. Although the net inflow of foreign direct investment (FDI) in Ukraine came to a surplus, gradually increasing from USD 161mn in June to USD 235mn in September, this is less than last year (on average USD 300-350mn per month) and significantly less than 2-3 years ago (USD 500-600mn, respectively). In addition, the rate of FDI does not fully reflect the movement of capital. Through trade credits (payment for undelivered goods) and other schemes, USD 1.9bn was withdrawn from Ukraine in the first quarter, and USD 1.6bn in the second (third quarter data is not yet available). Another manifestation of capital flight is the outflow of foreign currency in cash from banks. From January to September 2014, USD 2.4bn in cash was withdrawn from Ukrainian financial institutions, which is 2.7 times more than last year (the bulk of the withdrawals were made in January and February). It does not matter whether this

Author:
Lyubomyr Shavalyuk

money is in Ukraine under somebody’s mattress or it has been carried abroad in cases—either way, it is not in a bank and thus not circulating to boost the economy.


The second complex problem facing the financial sector is the printing of money, which also has a number of components. First, the state is rapidly losing a sense of proportion in borrowing, printing extremely large amounts of domestic government bonds. For ten months, the amount of government bonds in circulation increased by UAH 142bn, or 56%. Only a quarter of this amount was used to finance the fiscal deficit, the rest mostly went to patch up holes in Naftogaz (purchasing additional equity issues in exchange for government bonds in order to provide Naftogaz with liquidity) and, to a lesser extent, for VAT reimbursement and other purposes. External borrowing also increased rapidly, but it is required for

the return of old debts. Their peak payments will come in 2014-2015.

Second, Ukraine’s financial sector, especially banks, cannot acquire such a large amount of government bonds to its balance sheet because of depleted liquidity caused by capital flight. In nine months, the portfolio of government securities on the balance sheet of financial institutions increased by UAH 9.9bn, which is 57% less than in the respective nine months of 2013. That is why the vast majority of new government bonds are on the balance sheet of the National Bank of Ukraine (NBU) (**see The Pyramid of Debt and Cash**). Naftogaz directly appeals to the NBU in order to swap government bonds for the funds necessary to make payments to natural gas suppliers. This hidden money printing will last as long as there are imbalances in public finances. Third, the balance sheet of the NBU, bloated from the redemption of government bonds, is being balanced in two ways: either an increase in the monetary base when, for example, the NBU gives Naftogaz real money in exchange for government bonds; or through a reduction of foreign reserves when the very same Naftogaz buys foreign currency to pay for imported gas, not with the money received from customers, but with newly-printed hryvnias (this also places pressure on gold and currency reserves and the exchange rate).

The pyramid of debt and cash

The government is not addressing the imbalances in the economy. Instead, it is plugging holes in public finances, including Naftogaz, by issuing government bonds and buying them with freshly-printed hryvnias from the National Bank of Ukraine



THE NATURE AND SCALE OF THE THREAT

Both problems – capital flight and money creation – have their causes, side effects, and consequences, most of which are catastrophic and irreversible. In order to combat these problems, we must first understand them. For example, 85% of depositors made deposits under UAH 20,000, while 90% of bank customers have less than UAH 50,000 on their deposit accounts. According to the Ministry of Finance, only the richest 1.5% made deposits of over UAH 100,000, together accounting for 70% of all deposits. So when it comes to the fact that the financial institutions are losing clients who have already fled with a dozen per cent of the deposit base, it is obvious that the main reason for this is the rich. Most of them, without a doubt, cooperated with the Yanukovich regime, as it was otherwise impossible to earn large amounts of money. Thus, with the advent of a new government that is not always willing to compromise, they are so afraid for their money that they are not simply removing it from the banks, but from Ukraine entirely. Therefore, the outflow of deposits from financial institutions and transfer of capital abroad have common roots. There are serious doubts about whether the authorities should fight for the return of this money to Ukraine, because it would come back along with people with dark, anti-Ukrainian pasts and negative influence.

There is another category of wealthy who are afraid of losing their savings due to radical measures by the NBU, and are therefore withdrawing them in cash, primarily foreign currency. If the NBU shuts down dozens of insolvent banks and the prospects of even the largest financial institutions remain foggy, then it will be very risky for the rich to keep their savings in Ukraine (the Deposit Guarantee Fund (DGF) refunds deposits up to UAH 200,000, while the rest would be potential losses). One could always try to negotiate with a financial institution under a temporary administration, but they will have no guarantees anyway and the potential losses are large (it is rumoured that in order to remove investments from a “dead”

bank, “intermediaries” demand 50% of the amount).

Moreover, if someone keeps even a small deposit in foreign currency and their bank is declared insolvent, the DGF will compensate them in hryvnias using the exchange rate of the day that the temporary administration was introduced. For example, when a temporary administration was introduced at Bank Forum on March 14, the exchange rate was UAH 9.8 to the dollar, and by the time deposits of up to UAH 200,000 were refunded, the rate had increased to UAH 12-13 to the dollar. Given that the hryvnia depreciated almost every month in 2014, no one wants to keep foreign currency in banks, so as not to lose value on exchange in the event that the financial institution becomes insolvent (this explains the high rate of foreign currency outflow).

If the flight of capital abroad was led by the actions of the wealthy, sometimes objectively and sometimes provoked by the ill-advised actions of the NBU, then the printing of money is a result of imbalances in public finances and the lack of government response to them. According to the IMF's September forecast, the consolidated budget deficit together with the Naftogaz deficit will be 10.1% of GDP in 2014. This is at the rate of UAH 12.5 per dollar anticipated by the IMF for the end of 2014 in the latest forecast. Add to this a few percentage points for the capitalization of banks that the NBU will be forced to cover (the banks of I and II groups need additional capitalization that, in total, amounts to about 5% of GDP). The lower the hryvnia exchange rate, the more holes appear in the banking sector and Naftogaz. So the real deficit of the public sector may be close to 15% of GDP, most of which will be financed with government bonds—and in fact money printing—repurchased by the NBU. In this case, the situation will be the same as it was 20-22 years ago, when Ukraine had deficits measuring around 10% of GDP against the backdrop of a sharp fall in industrial output. We needn't be reminded of the consequences of that predicament.

WHAT CAN BE DONE?

First, the DGF should be required to refund foreign currency deposits from “dead” banks in foreign cur-

Net inflow of FDI in Ukraine came to a surplus, gradually increasing from USD 161mn in June to USD 235mn in September, but this is less than last year (on average USD 300-350mn per month) and significantly less than 2-3 years ago (USD 500-600mn, respectively).

rency or using the exchange rate of the day of payment. Second, it is essential to complete the removal of insolvent banks from the market as soon as possible in order to avoid sowing panic among the rich. Third, bank owners should be quickly motivated to add the necessary capital—in full or in part (including from the government and donors)—in order to show the wealthy that Ukraine has reliable financial institutions. Banks that manage to introduce capital first will win the larger portion of the cleaned-up market.

Most importantly, imbalances in the public sector must be eliminated. Naftogaz needs to become deficit-neutral, and the earlier, the better. Government spending should be reduced and the bothersome paternalism of Ukraine's politicians should be rejected. This is the only method by which it will be possible to implement structural



THE FINANCIAL SECTOR FACES TWO COMPLEX PROBLEMS WITH CATASTROPHIC CONSEQUENCES: CAPITAL FLIGHT AND PRINTING OF MONEY

reforms and expect positive effects that instantly stimulate the inflow of capital to the financial sector.

If the government continues to print bonds and the NBU continues to print money to buy them, this cash will eventually end up on the foreign exchange market. This will either raise the exchange rate to unprecedented heights or, if there are administrative constraints and a fixed rate, reserves will be washed away while capital flight increases, and the black market for foreign currency will be heated up to the point that it explodes and leads to a nationwide panic of unmanageable consequences for the financial system. That would bring a swift end to the post-election euphoria of Ukraine's leaders and trust in the people who, in a Western European country would have been forced to resign long ago for what they've done. If the euphoria does not end under such circumstances, then the people can “lustrate” their leaders, but this time by more violent means than tossing them in a dumpster. ■

From January to September 2014, the volume of deposits in hryvnias decreased by 7.8%, while foreign currency deposits decreased by 21.9%. According to the Ministry of Finance, only the richest 1.5% of depositors had deposits of over UAH 100,000, together accounting for 70% of all deposits

Jonathan Holslag:

“The EU is struggling with geopolitical disorientation at this stage”

Interviewed
by
Olha
Vorozhbyt

The *Ukrainian Week* talked to Jonathan Holslag, Professor of International Politics at the Free University Brussels, on geopolitical challenges for Europe, the change of the EU's role in international politics and why it should pay more attention to its neighborhood.

U.W.: You are an expert on Asia, but have connections to the EU, so you understand both parts very well. The global role of the EU is changing at the moment. Where is it heading?

I would say that at this stage we are struggling a bit with geopolitical disorientation. The EU is

really stuck between an aspiration to be a global actor and to have a role in even faster regions like Eastern Asia and Latin America. On the other hand, there is the fact that it continues to struggle more and more to maintain and strengthen its influence in the neighborhood (by which I



mean Northern Africa, Middle East, the Balkans and, of course, Eastern Europe). I think that is the main challenge at the moment. Another issue is that it is very difficult to build a consensus between the 28 member-states about where geopolitical priorities should be.

U.W.: What are the main obstacles on Europe's way out of this geopolitical disorientation? Can it change this at the moment?

I think that it is normal for a large entity like the EU to have different interests. What has to happen - and I think it's going to be a critical responsibility for the new European Commission - is to make member-states understand that being in this little corner of the vast Eurasian continent means also being between two very restless continents - Eurasia and Africa. We have agreed to work together and if, at times, the Italians face challenge in the south they will need to have support of the northern countries, and vice versa. In other words, different interests should not lead to disorientation, but to complementarities. I think it is an internal process that has to be started as soon as possible. My argument has always been that the external action service has to be more about internal action, about building consensus, about convincing the members that it is very important to invest in a strong neighborhood policy, for instance, towards Ukraine.

U.W.: 25 years after the Cold War, we see that the world is polarizing once more (Russian aggression against Ukraine is probably one reason). But it can no longer be bipolar since Russia is not USSR and the US is not a hegemony. Plus, we have China. So, where is it moving? What threats does the Russian aggression pose to the existing world order?

Annexation of Crimea and interference in Eastern Ukraine has put at risk some of the core principles in international politics since the end of the Cold War. One of them is that the sovereignty of the country is inviolable. Another key principle is that if there are differences that can be

settled, they should at least be mediated through negotiation, preferably multilateral. Indeed, the Russian intervention into Crimea has probably put into question some of these bedrock principles. But there is more. I think that for the time being the main trend is towards the emerging of a multipolar order. If you look at the United States, China, Russia, India, Japan, or the EU, they are all fragile in their own way and that mostly has to do with internal weakness, economic uncertainty, social and political fragmentation. That makes it (the world order - Ed.) very volatile and turbulent, but in fact as we see that it leads to more nationalism, to fears of power politics. It makes countries much more willing and determined to stand up for national and economic interests and defense of their political status, and to intensify territorial claims. I think that this is something which needs to be followed very carefully.

U.W.: So, the old rules of international politics were undermined. Who should agree on the new rules and is it possible to do so?

I am very skeptical about it, because even if you arrive at new rules, whether they contribute to stability or not still depends on their interpretation. For instance, in the realm of economics we tend to agree that free trade is important and protectionism is bad. In practice, however, you see that countries invent all sorts of different policies and instruments to support their industries while setting their trade tariffs. More and more of these cause trade disputes that can escalate into trade wars. Another example concerning sovereignty... Respecting sovereignty is one thing, but the question is what kind of arguments you can put on the table to claim certain piece of land or sea as your own. As we still have many disputed areas around the world, I don't think that the convention on the respect for sovereignty is going to guarantee their integrity because it leaves a lot of room for interpretation. Plus, if you respect sovereignty, people in the certain place, like Crimea, can change the status-quo.

U.W.: You said once that Asian Golden Age is almost over and suggested that Europeans should look for a Plan B. What did you mean by Asian Golden Age?

It is my belief that it is going to be an Asian century if only for the shift in terms of demography. More economic production will certainly shift to Asia, but it is not going to be golden Asian century. The West usually looks at Asia as region where people get rich very fast and a lot of jobs are created, so this will bring a new batch of strong states, leading powers to the forefront. What is very critical to understand is that even though



THE MOST TRAGIC MISTAKE THAT THE EU COULD MAKE IS TO FOCUS TOO MUCH ON ASIA AND TO NEGLECT OUR NEIGHBORHOOD AND PARTNERS LIKE UKRAINE

Asia registers high growth rates, about 6,5% on average, most of that growth is - like in Ukraine and many other places - erased by inflation. It is also being translated less and less into employment. So, despite Asia's fast growth, its people usually don't see many benefits from that. This leads to situations like in Indonesia, India, South Korea, and Japan now, where vast majority of people are highly dissatisfied with the state of their national economy and country.

So, even if we move towards an Asian century, I believe that it's not going to be necessarily a Golden Age, but probably a very turbulent century in which the gap between the expectations of Asian people and reality will grow, and pressure on their political leaders to stand strong and to defend national interests will mount. That increases the chance that many territorial disputes get out of control at some point and escalate into political tensions, or even military rivalry.

As to the EU, I think that the most tragic mistake that we could make is to focus too much on Asia and to neglect our neighborhood and partners like Ukraine. I think what Europe has to do is to influence its neighborhood. ■

BIO Jonathan Holslag is Professor of International Politics at the Free University Brussels, the author of books *How Europe Will Survive the Asian Century* (2014), *China and India: Prospects for Peace* (2010), and *Trapped Giant* (2011). In 2007 and 2010, he worked as leader of research group on China for the European Parliament. In 2014, Mr. Holslag became a Rockefeller Fellow of the Trilateral Commission, a member of the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific.

The Circulation of Politicians in Nature

The Ukrainian Week looks at the paths of the key heroes and anti-heroes of the Orange Revolution from 2004 to 2014

● Orange Revolution and presidency of Viktor Yushchenko ● Presidency of Viktor Yanukovych ● Present



Viktor Yanukovych

- Prime Minister, pro-government candidate in presidential election. Prime Minister. Leader of the Party of Regions
- President
- Hiding in Russia



Yulia Tymoshenko

- Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko MP in the 4th convocation, a leader of the Orange Revolution, co-chair of the Power of People coalition Prime Minister, leader of Batkivshchyna faction in parliament
- Jailed under trumped-up charges for seven years, serving her term in Kachanivka prison in Kharkiv Oblast. Released after Yanukovych fled Ukraine
- Elected to parliament under the Batkivshchyna party list



Viktor Yushchenko

- A single opposition candidate elected president in the third round
- Wins a meager 5.45% in the 2010 presidential election. Quits politics
- Stays out of politics



Mykola Azarov

- First Vice Prime Minister, Minister of Finance, Acting Prime Minister, Party of Regions MP in the 6th and 7th convocations. First Vice Premier and Minister of Finance in Yanukovych's Cabinet. Head of Yanukovych's election team in the 2010 presidential election
- Prime Minister, head of the Party of Regions
- Hiding in Russia



Petro Poroshenko

- Deputy Head of the Power of People coalition headquarters, sponsor of the Orange Revolution, member of Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) party council. Our Ukraine MP in the 5th and 6th convocations. Secretary of the National Security and Defense Council. National Bank of Ukraine Board Chairman. Minister of Foreign Affairs
- Minister of Economic Development and Trade. Independent MP of the 7th convocation. A leader of EuroMaidan
- President



Arseniy Yatseniuk

- Acting NBU Chairman. Deputy Head of Odesa Oblast State Administration. Minister of Economy, Deputy Head of the Presidential Secretariat, Representative of the President to the Cabinet of Ministers, NBU Board Member, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Verkhovna Rada Speaker
- Batkivshchyna MP of the 6th and 7th convocations. A leader of EuroMaidan
- Prime Minister. Leader of Narodniy Front (Popular Front). Elected MP under the Popular Front party list



Roman Bezsmertnyi

- Deputy Head of Viktor Yushchenko's election campaign team. Commander of the tent city at Khreshchatyk. Our Ukraine MP of the 5th convocation. Vice Premier for Administrative and Territorial Reform in 2005-2010
- Ambassador to Belarus
- Head of the Third Ukrainian Republic party, expert in Petro Poroshenko's pool



Oleh Rybachuk

- Head of Our Ukraine leader team under Viktor Yushchenko, Vice Premier for European Integration. State Secretary and Chief of Staff. National Security and Defense Council member
- Supervisory Board Chairman for Suspilniŭ (Society) foundation, founder and leader of Centre UA, an NGO, an initiator of the New Citizen civil campaign
- Continues his civil and business activities



Yuriy Lutsenko

- Member of the National Salvation Committee, Socialist Party of Ukraine MP of the 5th convocation, a field commander of the Orange Revolution. Chief Editor of Hrani Plus, a weekly. National Security and Defense Council member, Minister of the Interior, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense MP in the 6th convocation

- Jailed under trumped-up charges for four years, serving his term in Mensk prison in Chernihiv Oblast. Released pre-term in April 2013 based on an order from Yanukovich

- **A leader of Petro Poroshenko's Bloc, Advisor to President, elected to parliament under the Petro Poroshenko's Bloc party list**



Dmytro Yarosh

- A leader of Stepan Bandera Tryzub, a paramilitary nationalist organization

- Leader of Tryzub. Assistant to UDAR MP Valentyn Nalyvaichenko (currently head of SBU) since April 2013

- **Leader of Pravyi Sektor (Rights Sector), a nationalist organization. Elected to parliament in the 39th FPTP district in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast**



Yehor Sobolev

- Head of Kyiv Independent Media Trade Union. Later, host at Channel 5. Founder of Svidomo (Consciously), a bureau of investigative journalism

- Founder of Civil Freedom Svidomo NGO. EuroMaidan activist

- **Head of Lustration Committee, co-author of the law on lustration. Elected to parliament under the Samopomich party list**



Volodymyr Filenko

- Our Ukraine MP in the 4th convocation, a field commander of the Orange Revolution. Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko MP in the 5th convocation

- Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko MP in the 6th convocation of VR

- **Stays out of politics**



Oleh Tyahnybok

- Our Ukraine MP in the 5th convocation. Head of Svoboda (Freedom) party. Svoboda Deputy of Lviv Oblast Council

- Svoboda MP in the 6th convocation. A leader of EuroMaidan

- **Candidate in the 2014 presidential race. Svoboda fails to beat the 5% threshold in the recent early parliamentary election**



Viktor Baloha

- Our Ukraine MP in the 4th convocation, Viktor Yushchenko's confidante in Transcarpathia. Head of the Transcarpathia Oblast State Administration. Chief of Staff for Viktor Yushchenko. Head of the People's Union Our Ukraine party council

- Minister of Emergencies in Mykola Azarov's Cabinet. Deputy at the Transcarpathia Oblast Council, independent MP in the VR of the 7th convocation

- **Elected to parliament in Transcarpathia first-past-the-post district**



Yevhen Chervonenko

- A field commander of the Orange Revolution, Minister for Transport, head of Zaporizhia Oblast State Administration, Head of the National Agency for Preparation to Euro 2012

- Head of the Aviation Department at the Emergencies Ministry in Azarov's Cabinet since March 3, 2011

- **No longer involved in active politics**



Viacheslav Kyrylenko

- Viktor Yushchenko's confidante, Minister of Labor and Social Policy, Vice Premier for Humanitarian Policy, head of Our Ukraine faction in VR

- Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense and Batkivshchyna MP in two convocations of VR

- **Elected to parliament as member of Yatseniuk's Popular Front**



Natalia Korolevska

- Deputy of Luhansk City Council. Later, Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc MP in the 5th and 6th convocations, member of the Batkivshchyna council

- Expelled from Batkivshchyna for collaboration with the Presidential Administration of Viktor Yanukovich. Head of its political project Ukraina

- Vpered! (Ukraine – Forward!). Minister of Social Policy in Azarov's Cabinet

- **Elected to parliament under the Opposition Bloc party list**



Davyd Zhvania

- Member of the National Salvation Committee, deputy head of Our Ukraine headquarters, Minister for Emergencies in Yulia Tymoshenko's Cabinet

- Member of the Party of Regions faction in parliament from December 3, 2012, to December 2013

- **Lost the recent early parliamentary election as self-nominated candidate in Odesa Oblast**



Oleksandr Moroz

- Socialist Party MP in the 4th convocation. Head of Socialist Party, candidate in the presidential election. Supported Yushchenko in the second round, a leader of the Orange Revolution. Socialist Party MP in the 5th convocation. VR Speaker
- Elected honorary head of Socialist Party. Stays out of politics

• **Stays out of politics**



Oleh Liashko

- Chief Editor of Svoboda (Freedom), an opposition newspaper, in times of the Orange Revolution. Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko MP in the 5th and 6th convocations
- Expelled from the Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko in October 2010 for collaboration with Yanukovich's coalition. Elected MP in Chernihiv Oblast as a self-nominated candidate

• **Leader of the Radical Party**



Anatoliy Kinakh

- For Unified Ukraine MP in the 4th convocation. Candidate in the 2004 presidential election, supported Yushchenko in the second round. A leader of the Orange Revolution. First Vice Premier, National Security and Defense Council Secretary, Our Ukraine MP in the 5th convocation, and Party of Regions MP in the 6th convocation. Minister of Economy in Yanukovich's Government

- Advisor to President, Party of Regions MP in the 6th and 7th convocations

• **Lost early parliamentary election in Mykolayiv Oblast**



Volodymyr Lytvyn

- VR Speaker from May 2006, then from November 2007. Leader of the People's Agrarian Party, then of Lytvyn Bloc
- VR Speaker till October 2012, then independent MP

• **Elected to parliament in Zhytomyr Oblast**



Serhiy Kivalov

- Head of Central Election Committee in the first and second rounds of 2004 presidential election
- Party of Regions MP
- Elected to parliament in district 135 in Odesa as self-nominated candidate in the latest parliamentary election



Taras Stetskiy

- Our Ukraine MP in the 4th convocation, a field commander of the Orange Revolution. President of the National TV and Radio Company. Leader of PORA – PRP civil bloc, Advisor to President. Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense MP in the 6th convocation

- Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense MP

• **Expert activities (allegedly in Petro Poroshenko's pool)**



Serhiy Vlasenko

- Lawyer for Viktor Yushchenko in the case on massive fraud in the second round of the presidential election in 2004. Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko MP in the 6th convocation
- Batkivshchyna MP. Lawyer for Yulia Tymoshenko, Stripped of his mandate by the court under Yanukovich's presidency

• **Elected to parliament under Batkivshchyna party list**



Ruslan Kniazevych

- Head of the Central Election Committee Secretariat. Refused to authorize the protocol to recognize Viktor Yanukovich as winner of the presidential election in 2004. Later, Our Ukraine-People's Self-Defense MP

- Arseniy Yatseniuk's ally since September 3, 2011. Member of his Front Zmin (Front of

Change) party. Batkivshchyna MP

• **Representative of President Poroshenko in VR since June 3, 2014. Elected to parliament under Poroshenko's Bloc party list in the latest parliamentary election**



Taras Chornovil

- Confidante and head of election campaign headquarters of Viktor Yanukovich. Deputy Head of the Party of Regions election campaign team. Party of Regions MP in the 5th and 6th convocations. Left the Party of Regions in 2008

- Independent MP in the 6th convocation. Temporarily member of Reforms for the Future group of MPs

• **Stays out of active politics, acts as expert**



Serhiy Tihipko

- Head of Yanukovich's election campaign team in 2004 presidential election. Left politics after Yanukovich's defeat in the third round, started business, then returned to politics with a newly-established party Sylna Ukrayina (Strong Ukraine)

- Deputy Head of the Party of Regions

(2012-2014), member of the Party of Regions faction in VR

• **Candidate in the 2014 presidential election. Strong Ukraine fails to beat the 5% threshold in the latest parliamentary election**

Fireside Chats



Author:
Anna Korbut

November 21 is now our Day of Dignity and Freedom. The Ministry of Culture has planned a commemoration program with candles, photographs and songs. "It was an extremely difficult test... when Ukrainians demonstrated their European-ness, dignity, their aspiration for freedom," President Poroshenko commented on his Dignity Day decree. "I, as President of Ukraine, shall only confirm this documentarily and sign the Decree on the Day of Dignity and Freedom that Ukrainians will from now on celebrate on November 21."

Back in 2004, Ukrainians took it to the street against forged elections and Viktor Yanukovich to make the Orange Revolution. Shortly after, Viktor Yushchenko announced November 22 the Day of Freedom. As a result of the subsequent reckless politics of the Orange "democrats", Yanukovich became premier, then president, Yushchenko almost disappeared from the political scene, and disenchanted Ukrainians wearily saw both their freedom, and the respective Day, abolished.

Is it now the turn of dignity? How long will our dignity endure? Through the deaths of our soldiers and volunteers fighting in the East while majoritarian districts there are being manipulated to let representatives of the ex-ruling party get through to parliament to keep milking the local population and fueling hatred against Kyiv and Ukraine. Through neglect of IDPs from Crimea and Eastern Ukraine who return to their homes, angry and disappointed, while the government does not seem that fussed about their basic needs. Through the impoverishment and hunger for visible anti-corruption steps while we still learn about sabotage of efforts to recover cash stolen by the previous regime, hectares of land for Deputy Prosecutor General and growing bribes at the customs.

Through the vital need of reforms and lustration while we hear of squabbles for seats in Government and shifting of corrupt but loyal top officials from one crucial office to another. Through no clear explanations of all this from the President or Government.

When the US was tormented by the Great Depression in 1933, Franklin D. Roosevelt started his Fireside Chats. "I want to tell you what has been done in the last few days, and why it was done, and what the next steps are going to be," he would say to his citizens through radios in their living rooms where political sentiments were shaped. He explained in simple words why they shouldn't rush to withdraw their deposits from banks, what the purpose of the "bank holiday" was, and why it was safer and better for the economy to store money in banks rather than under the mattresses. He thanked his

people for their understanding and courage. Of course, he couldn't solve all problems, and there were many haters. But "people felt connected to him... because of his amazing ability to speak to the fears and hopes of Americans," American journalist Tom Brokaw will say many years later.

Ukrainians are facing their own Great Depression and fighting a war. The killings on Hrushevskoho and Instytuska exhausted our emotional charge, and fresh graves all over Ukraine still are. We see slow and reluctant changes and many old practices left in place. This is slowly wearing out the West and we are slowly wearing out ourselves, while Russia is expanding its propaganda war that hits the vulnerable minds and brings irritation and intolerance. We are facing our own Donetsk syndrome: our war veterans will return home, crippled physically and emotionally, with no jobs, motivation or ability to adjust to the values of peaceful life. We desperately need to show them what we have done here in the rear. All this lands on the shoulders of the active minority. The majority is often inert and will follow the activists. We have to go through all this and maintain our dignity. Daily confusion at the chaos of news and rumors, with no clear understanding of what the government is doing, doesn't help. Unlike in 2004, when we elected the president and thought that we could sit back

and relax lulled by the songs of glory and freedom, we are now angry, distrustful of politicians and experienced in grassroots organization. Therefore, mere decrees establishing days of dignity or freedom will not suffice. We would prefer to hear regular reports on what has been done and what will be done from the President, the Premier and the ministers. We do not want to see news pop up on Facebook as scandalous rumors, then spread like

fire and give rise to more unverified rumors and suggestions that further undermine our trust in the government and play into the hands of the Russian propaganda. We want to understand what we are facing. We want to see our leaders admit their mistakes and try to fix them. We want to see clear results of these efforts. That would be a nice gift for the anniversary of the Maidan. Official establishments of dignity days can wait. Until Ukrainians who have "demonstrated their Europeanness and dignity" feel that they can gather on maidans to commemorate the dead with a sense of accomplished duty, a sense that we are building the country desired by those who sacrificed their lives for it. Not to force the government hear us and speak to us over and over again because our voice falls of deaf ears otherwise. ■

**WHEN THE US WAS
TORMENTED BY THE GREAT
DEPRESSION IN 1933, FRANKLIN
D. ROOSEVELT STARTED HIS
FIRESIDE CHATS:
"I WANT TO TELL YOU WHAT
HAS BEEN DONE IN THE LAST
FEW DAYS, AND WHY IT WAS
DONE, AND WHAT THE NEXT
STEPS ARE GOING TO BE"**

Taras Chornovil:

"Ukrainians stopped falling in love with Tymoshenko and switched to Yatseniuk"



Interviewed
by Stanislaw
Kozliuk

Taras Chornovil is former Party of Regions MP, opponent of the 2004 Maidan, participant in the 2013 Maidan, and son of Viacheslav Chornovil, political prisoner in Soviet times and a leader of the national democratic movement in the 1980s-90s. He spoke with *The Ukrainian Week* about the post-Orange Revolution and post-Maidan governments, and the risk of repeating the same old mistakes.

U.W.: Why did you take part in the 2013 Maidan? You were on the other side of the barricades in 2004...

For me, the choice of European integration is holy. I had specific plans for future years in respect to diplomatic work. I had, let's put it this way, "the right to one visit" to Yanukovych. I wanted to ask for an ambassadorial position to some non-key European country. I can tell you that I knew Yanukovych well and I believed that the Association Agreement would be signed after all. It was a kind of insurance against Putin to him. And suddenly everything collapsed—for me personally and for all of Ukraine. After the first big rally on November 24, I didn't want to return to the Maidan. I was just discouraged by the politicians. And then the police forcibly dispersed the students. I understood that I couldn't but go there, but I felt like I was a hostage to someone else's game.

U.W.: How did this differ from 2004?

In 2004, I became a primary enemy of the Maidan (here Orange Revolution – **Ed.**) because I headed the Yanukovych campaign. I won't go into details, but Viktor Yushchenko was my personal enemy. In my view, he was indirectly involved in the murder of my father (Viacheslav Chornovil died in an obscure car crash in 1999 – **Ed.**), plus I knew he was a scoundrel. And when I began to struggle against him, people close to Yanukovych got on to me. I ceded. I understand the people who stood on the Maidan back then. Still, I viewed those on stage as petty thieves.

U.W.: Why didn't you collaborate with the Anti-Maidan under Yanukovych in 2004? They brought miners to Kyiv to support him, and there was rhetoric against the "orange plague"...

There were attempts to create an Anti-Maidan at the time, but they weren't led by Yanukovych's people. Leonid Kuchma, Viktor Medvedchuk, and Serhiy Tihipko were all involved in the structure of it. This came as a surprise even to Yanukovych. They brought people from the western part of the Donbas to Kyiv who had nothing to do with "Donetsk leaders". They were taken from their workplaces and sent to Kyiv. Train station, vodka, snacks. Then they led a march that ended in the centre. And then there was information that the Anti-Maidan might end badly. SBU agents passed on information that there were to be snipers who would shoot at the stu-

dents. After making some noise, the data was given to Jacek Kluczkowski, assistant to the President of Poland, who told this to President Aleksander Kwaśniewski. Yanukovych was informed, they turned the miners back to the train station where he spoke to them from the stage, and sent them home. Later, I saw a decision by the Supreme Court decision (not the one announcing the third round of the presidential election). That one said that both candidates (Yanukovych and Yushchenko) made grave violations of the law and created a situation in which it was impossible to establish the outcome of the election, leading to clashes and casualties. It proposed to recognize the election as not valid, annul the vote, and hold a new race in which both Yushchenko and Yanukovych would be barred from running. It was just a copy, but a few others besides me have seen this text. Fortunately, in 2004 no massacre occurred and the Anti-Maidan ended disgracefully.

U.W.: What did the 2004 and 2014 Maidan movements have in common?

They both were manipulated. Both were exploited but span out of control. In 2004 one platoon of special forces would be enough to end the protest. Here is one interesting point: In the summer when the presidential campaign began and Yushchenko was nominated, the buses that were departing from Lviv for Kyiv to support the nomination were blocked by the police. It was funny how much pressure

was put on them then given the insignificance of the cause. In the fall, columns of cars travelled freely from Lviv to Kyiv. Under pressure, it takes huge efforts to make sure that buses get to Kyiv. You have to call MPs, accompany the buses, deal with the police that block them, cover number plates. At one point, only 6-8 thousand people remained in the centre of Kyiv; they would not have been able to defend the Maidan in 2004. It was very easy to disperse it. In 2013, people were organizing on social networks and coming to the protest. On November 24, the first big rally met on the European Square. The opposition leaders were confused. They had trucked in their activists to Shevchenko Park and handed out their party symbols, flags, and ribbons to walk to the centre for the planned assembly. When the activists came down to the Maidan, they say that a lot of Kyivans had actually come out on their own. The then opposition was scared of such a mass of people.

U.W.: The protest faced a lot of opposition in 2013...

There are a lot of questions here surrounding the beating of students. First of all, the action was carried out very hastily. November 30 was the only night when there were no MPs with their immunity mandates on the Maidan. And did Yanukovych really need to 'clean up' the square? This is stupidity and folly. There's another possible variant of the story: Volodymyr Sivkovych, Deputy Chair of the National Security and Defense Council (chaired by Andriy Kliuyev at that point – **Ed.**) was involved in these events. I know Kliuyev, and these are not his methods. When fights broke out in the Parliament, Kliuyev would tell all MPs, "Just don't hit each other in the face, beaten MPs cost us more". It was the principle of "never beat those you can buy, and never disperse those you can dispel".

U.W.: So the attack was organized by ex-NDSC Deputy Secretary Volodymyr Sivkovych?

Everyone forgets one thing about him: he is Vladimir Putin's former boss. When Sivkovych was publicly disgraced (under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma – **Ed.**), Putin came on an unofficial visit to Ukraine. He went straight to the

residence saying he would only meet with President Kuchma after he's seen Sivkovych (who was about to be arrested). After Putin spoke to his ex-boss Sivkovych, the latter's troubles evaporated.

I think Sivkovych set up Andriy Kliuyev, and Serhiy Liovochkin (Advisor to Viktor Yanukovych, close to oligarch Dmytro Firtash – **Ed.**) played a role as well. On December 11, everyone was confused wondering why Yanukovych sent commandos to clear the Maidan with Victoria Nuland and Catherine Ashton around. In fact, he wasn't clearing it. The Maidan could have been disrupted entirely easily. Instead, it looked like someone was trying to create a certain image. There was a feeling it was a deal, but those on the Maidan side weren't quite sure what the deal was and who made it.

On the night of February 18-19, there was no assault; but it was preceded by a brutal massacre on Instytutska and Khreshchatyk that day. We arrived with a caravan to pick the wounded. The cars reached the Maidan. No one checked our IDs. There were just a few thousand protesters, and far more Special Forces officers. Again, the Maidan would have been easy to take. It looked like the protesters were being pushed to mobilize. Then Volodymyr Parasyuk appeared on stage with an ultimatum that gave Yanukovych 24 hours to resign. Next morning, Yanukovych ran off. The next day, the interior troops outnumbering the people on the Maidan fled. It was obvious that forces were being withdrawn. At that moment, troops were actually being sent to Kyiv but someone turned them around (**see Answering Many Why's on ukrainianweek.com**). And that someone was not Yanukovych.

U.W.: Why did they fail to arrange a separatist political assembly in Kharkiv immediately, like they did in 2004? (see Divide and Conquer at ukrainianweek.com)

They planned one well in advance. Yanukovych was still sitting in his Mezhyhirya mansion when he invited deputies of all levels to Kharkiv. However, at some point, Mikhaïlo Dobkin (former Head of Kharkiv State Administration – **Ed.**) and Hennadiy Kernes (Mayor of Kharkiv – **Ed.**) realized that they might be sidelined, because

sometimes counter-revolution takes sacrifice. That's why they refused to take part in that assembly. Putin did not anticipate that, just as he could not have guessed that Yanukovych would tumble and flee. And Yanukovych had a terrible phobia; he was afraid that he would be killed. As far as I know, he was supposed to ask the Russian Federation for help and say that there had been a coup in Kyiv.

U.W.: Can we say that the current government is repeating the mistakes of its predecessors from the 2004 Maidan?

Perhaps I'm too much of an optimist, but I wouldn't say that about the current situation. Yes, it is very unpopular to say something positive about Poroshenko, the President of Ukraine is always seen as a bad guy. Yet, people like Yatseniuk for some reason, even though we haven't seen any reforms or anti-corruption efforts. We are hopeless in that sense. People stopped falling in love with Tymoshenko and switched to Yatseniuk. The main problem is that during these nine months, there has been no attempt to make at least some adequate reform. That, for me, is like Yushchenko all over again. Yatsenyuk failed to immediately get what he wanted in the

PROTEST AGAINST BAD GOVERNMENT IS NOW A GAME IN PUTIN'S FAVOUR. WE DON'T KNOW HOW TO HANDLE THE SITUATION SO AS NOT TO PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF THE ENEMY

government and is now trying to get something. Meanwhile, Poroshenko does unpopular things, but in the right way. He understands the essence of "Russian-style politics". He realizes what might happen if we cross the red line in Luhansk and Donetsk. When the first attack was contained, Poroshenko re-divided the territories and broke them into several groups to have a foothold before the full-fledged Russian invasion. He's been playing a similar game with the laws on the status of the Donbas. It's essentially a diplomatic way of pressuring Putin into negotiations. ■

John Herbst:

“The international security crisis today comes from the Kremlin’s aggression against Ukraine and its broader objectives in the post-Soviet space”

Interviewed by **Hanna Trehub**

In his interview for *The Ukrainian Week*, ex-Ambassador of the USA to Ukraine drew parallels between the way Americans perceived the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Maidan in 2014, discussed the meaning of the Republicans’ victory for Ukraine and spoke about new components to be added to the new international security architecture.

U.W.: How did the US politicians and society perceive Ukrainian revolutions of 2004 and 2014? Any differences?

The Orange Revolution and what happened on the Maidan this year were perceived favorably in the USA because it looked like the people of Ukraine were demanding from their political leadership, democracy, economic reform and an end to corruption. We in the USA believe that democracy is good and that people demanding an end to corrupt, authoritarian leadership is a good thing. Ukraine also matters as a point on the globe. Ukraine’s decisive movement towards democracy and free society means greater stability in Europe and Eurasia. It also means benefits for the people of Ukraine.

U.W.: In 2004, Russia’s President Putin did not perceive the Ukrainian revolution the way he did this year, launching a war to suppress it. How would you explain this?

It is worth remembering that Putin intervened in Ukrainian elections in 2004. There are reports indicating that Russia spent more than USD 2mn in Ukraine to make sure that Viktor Yanukovich would win in 2004. And Putin immediately recognized the results of the fraudulent elections in 2004

that declared Yanukovich a winner. Of course, after Yushchenko won the presidency, Putin started the gas war against Ukraine in the winter 2005-2006.

So, we saw aggressive Kremlin policies then. Of course those policies are far more aggressive now since Putin launched his hybrid war against Ukraine last March. Moreover, this is Putin’s second war of aggression coming less than six years after the war against Georgia in 2008. So, his policy has become much more dangerous in the last five-six years.

U.W.: You served as Ambassador to Ukraine when the Orange Revolution took place. Previously, similar revolutions occurred in Serbia, Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan. In the end, though, most rolled back to authoritarianism and rejected reforms. Could it be that the post-Soviet societies, 23 years after the fall of Communism and 25 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, are still incapable of building democracy and robust civil society?

The structure of social life in post-Soviet space has not been conducive to democracy. In all post-Soviet societies – outside of the Baltic States – corrupt Communist elites became corrupt non-Communism elites. They have always been and remain a serious barrier to social change, a change towards democracy and new society. Yet, we have seen development of serious civil society organizations and NGOs in some post-Soviet countries – particularly, in Ukraine.

We have also seen the information revolution in the past 20 years. This makes it very hard for authorities to control how people live. Over time, the availability of

BIO John E. Herbst served as US Ambassador to Ukraine in 2003-2006. He is currently director of the Atlantic Council's Dinu Patriciu Eurasia Center. Mr. Herbst served for 31 years as a Foreign Service officer in the US Department of State. His writings have appeared in the New York Times, the Washington Post, The Atlantic, The National Interest, and Foreign Policy

information will encourage the development of open societies across Eurasia, but in Ukraine this is happening sooner because of its relatively vibrant civil society. Putin is fighting a desperate rear guard action against these trends.

U.W.: The US has just had the election, and the Republicans have won a big-time victory. They have been among the most proactive supporters of Ukraine in the current crisis while Barack Obama’s foreign policy is often criticized as weak. How will this new situation change America’s foreign policy agenda?

I think that Barack Obama has shown good leadership in this crisis in Ukraine in terms of sanctions. However, he has been very



PHOTO: UNIAN

weak regarding the provision of military support to Ukraine. It was a great mistake not to provide it. He has also been weak in guiding NATO to take rigorous steps in response to Russian aggression that is dangerous not for Ukraine alone. The Republican victory, I think, will increase support of military aid provision for Ukraine in the Congress. It is worth pointing out that many Democrats in the Senate and the House of Representatives support military aid to Ukraine, but the Republican win could make this support come faster.

U.W.: When do you think a conflict reaches the point where it can no longer be resolved without direct military action? For instance, conflicts in Iraq and Syria seem to have reached that point. What about Ukraine?

Some conflicts can be solved in military fashion, and some not. With Ukraine, the problem right now is that Putin's objective is to make sure that Ukraine can't move decisively towards an open society and closer relations with Europe. His way to prevent that happening is war. However, Putin has a serious disadvantage because the Russian people do not want their soldiers fighting in Ukraine, so he must hide the fact that they are fighting there. It is very important right now for the West to provide Ukraine with arms, so that the country can fight against this aggression. This will make it harder, more costly for Putin to conduct aggression in Ukraine, and will show the Russian people that he is doing what they don't want him to do.

Things are different in Syria or Iraq. In Ukraine, we have a party which, we are confident, share our values and is competent. This is the Government and President Poroshenko, who represents a majority of Ukrainians.

In Syria, the most effective force fighting President Assad is ISIS. Al Nusra is also an effective fighting force, but it is extremist like ISIS. There is no effective force opposed to Assad that shares our values, and none that shares American or Western values. So, our choice is between going after ISIS and thus helping Assad, or going against Assad and empowering ISIS. In my opinion, ISIS is

potentially more dangerous than Assad. He is a nasty dictator; but he does not have the aim of creating an Islamic caliphate across many countries, which is ISIS's objective.

It is possible to act against both of them, but we do not have the will to do it seriously. If we did, we would have to be prepared to spend many billions of dollars and to commit American troops to fight in a way they do not want to. We do not have the ability to create an effective opposition that shares our values without committing many American lives and dollars.

U.W.: Russia's annexation of Crimea undermined international security architecture. Are there any discussions going on about how it should be restored? What new components should be added to it, if any?

The international security crisis today comes from the Kremlin's aggression against Ukraine and its broader objectives in the post-Soviet space. Putin's doctrine to protect ethnic Russians and Russian speakers may be applied to Kazakhstan and Baltic States. There needs to be clear and strong Western response to this. We have not seen one yet. We have seen the West's reasonable response in terms of sanctions, but again, it is not providing military assistance to Ukraine. NATO is only slowly defining the threat emanating from the Kremlin. Formally, it still considers Russia a partner as described in the NATO-Russia founding act. The NATO Summit in Wales did agree on temporary deployments in the Baltics as a warning to Moscow, but those deployments are modest. There is no indication that NATO has begun to work on a contingency plan for the appearance of the Kremlin's "little green men" in Narva. These are the things NATO must do to deal with the threat.

Providing military assistance to Ukraine would prove a serious obstacle to further Kremlin aggression because it would increase Russian casualties, something Mr. Putin is trying to hide from his people. If we can stop additional Russian aggression, Ukraine can stabilize, pursue reform and develop a strong society in the territory under the control of Kyiv.

Then we can use measures we used in the past in dealing with the Russian seizure of Crimea, including continuance of sanctions, non-recognition of the Russian aggression in Crimea and additional steps against any Russian individuals or companies doing business in Crimea. We could use these things to encourage Russia to negotiate with Ukraine about the status of Crimea.

U.W.: Is there a way to solve the Ukrainian crisis without creating a new frozen conflict in the region?

It will be hard to avoid a frozen conflict in some form in the short-term. The most important thing right now is to prevent the Kremlin from increasing its ag-



BARACK OBAMA HAS SHOWN GOOD LEADERSHIP IN THIS CRISIS IN UKRAINE IN TERMS OF SANCTIONS. HOWEVER, HE HAS BEEN VERY WEAK REGARDING THE PROVISION OF MILITARY SUPPORT TO UKRAINE

gression in Ukraine, from seizing more territory. The key is to stabilize the situation so that Ukraine can reform itself, move decisively towards democracy and a market economy, fight corruption and develop much closer economic relations with the EU. This is the first priority. Strong Western policy can make it very hard for Putin to conduct further aggression here.

After same time, once things are stabilized, we can make sure that sanctions are not lifted until Putin abides by all elements of the Minsk Accords. Russian soldiers, volunteers and military equipment should leave Ukraine. Ukraine should fully control its border with Russia to prevent additional supplies or weapons or Russians fighters from entering Ukraine. The Luhansk and Donetsk People's Republics would not be able to survive this because they are a Kremlin creation largely dependent on the Kremlin for money and fighters. If Russia fully implements Minsk Accords, there will be no frozen conflict in Eastern Ukraine. This is the best strategy to go forward. ■

Cold Comfort

Russia will be the biggest test for Europe's new foreign-policy supremo



All of Europe rejoiced when the European Space Agency deposited Philae, a probe the size of a kitchen appliance, on the surface of a comet 300mn miles (480mn km) from the Earth. It was like throwing a dart blindfolded across an ocean and hitting the bullseye. Philae fell silent soon afterwards, but not before dispatching reams of data and a shot of optimism to a continent that has had little to cheer. Closer to home the European Union finds it harder to exert influence—even over its neighbourhood.

Russia's intervention in Ukraine is providing an early test for the EU's new high representative for foreign policy, Federica Mogherini, who previously served (albeit briefly) as Italy's foreign minister. NATO is warning of a renewed build-up of Russian troops and kit in eastern Ukraine. The recent sham elections in two pro-Russian separatist regions in the Donbas were "respected" if not recognised by Moscow. The Minsk

ceasefire accords signed in September by Ukraine, Russia and the separatists are being honoured only in the breach. Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine's president, is preparing for "total war".

WITH EUROPE'S LARGER COUNTRIES FORGING THEIR OWN FOREIGN POLICY IT IS NOT CLEAR WHAT DIFFERENCE BRUSSELS CAN MAKE

How did Europe allow such devastation on its doorstep? EU officials cite the claim that, whereas in 1989 Ukraine was at roughly the same level as Poland, today it is three times as poor. The implication is that with the right policies Ukraine's turn from its European destiny may be corrected. It was this thought that inspired the brave protesters, many flying EU flags, who filled the Maidan in Kyiv a year ago. They sought not

just the downfall of Mr. Poroshenko's predecessor, Viktor Yanukovich, who had bowed to Russian pressure to reject an EU trade deal, but an end to the corruption and thievery that had defined their country since independence. The real battle-cry of the Maidan was for a modern, European-style state. Instead, Ukraine has become a bloody war zone and an economic basket-case.

Ukraine was always going to be difficult. By late 2004, when the Orange revolution brought pro-Europeans to power in Kiev, the EU had begun its expansion to the east. Then "enlargement fatigue" left poorer ex-Soviet countries like Ukraine in the cold. The European neighbourhood policy, designed to bring about political and economic change in the EU's neighbours without the offer of membership, was a dismal failure. It substituted technocratic gradualism for hard-headed politics and so failed to respond to the needs of individual countries and regions.

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But the trickiest problem is Russia. Vladimir Putin decided that a Europe-leaning Ukraine was a threat to Russian interests. His meddling, notably the annexation of Crimea and the invasion of the east, has been unpredictable and opportunistic, and emblazoned with nationalist ideology, whether revanchist talk of Novorossiia or attacks on America. His "Eurasian Economic Union" has ambitions to rival the EU, even if its membership is limited so far to Armenia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

The scales have certainly fallen from European eyes. On November 16th Mr Putin left a G20 summit early after being harangued by his fellow leaders. Soon afterwards Angela Merkel, Germany's chancellor, issued an unusually forthright assessment of the Russian threat, not only to Ukraine but also to Georgia, Moldova and the Balkans. Mr. Putin's willingness to escalate in Ukraine has outstripped Europe's ability to respond, notwithstanding the sanctions the EU has put in place. At their meeting this week EU foreign ministers agreed

merely to condemn the Donbas votes and to extend sanctions to a few more separatists.

This was also the first foreign ministers' meeting to be chaired by the redoubtable Ms. Mogherini. Many analysts, and even some EU governments, were against choosing her, fearing that she would exemplify her country's long-standing pro-Kremlin tilt. Some added that, like her predecessor, Cathy Ashton, she was too inexperienced for the job—though she has a long political and international background on Italy's centre-left.

As well as convincing naysayers, she faces the hard task of maintaining unity among EU member countries. Many chafe against the damage that they claim sanctions on Russia are causing to their economies. With Europe's larger countries, now including Germany, increasingly forging their own foreign policy it is not clear what difference Brussels can make.

THE TOOLS FOR THE JOB

Yet the EU is not toothless. Ms Mogherini has many "instruments", in the jargon, at her disposal, including a well-staffed, brainy diplomatic service and the European Commission's financial clout. She is a commission vice-president, who despite her peripatetic job promises to attend every weekly meeting of the college. She has some shrewd ideas about how to make best use of the EU's unwieldy bureaucracy. Senior officials hint that they are ready to provide more economic assistance if the Ukrainians get serious about judicial reform, business liberalisation and so on. Yet it is hard to think of a country in which Europe's money, or the power of its example, has proven transformative without there being an offer of membership, however remote. It is not clear if it can work any better in Ukraine.

Ms. Mogherini's best hope may be to buy time. Mr. Putin's endgame is not clear, perhaps even to himself. Some fear that he wants a land bridge to Crimea. Others suggest that, despite appearances, he may be starting to engage more with the West. Perhaps most likely is a continuation of low-level fighting, as the separatists try to secure or expand their territory. The EU's sanctions will remain in place until next spring, and may well be extended. Andrew Wilson, a Ukraine expert at the European Council on Foreign Relations, a think-tank, suggests that Russia may then be more vulnerable to pressure, particularly if oil prices stay low. But will Ukraine's economy last that long? ■



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Eliav Belotsercovsky:

"We are trying to help Ukraine in the spheres in which we have experience"

Interviewed
by:
**Olha
Vorozhbyt and
Dmytro
Krapyvenko**

The *Ukrainian Week* spoke to Eliav Belotsercovsky, the Ambassador of the State of Israel in Ukraine on the military and economic success of Israel, the position of his country regarding Russian aggression in Ukraine and the complications in the dialogue between Israel and the EU.

U.W.: The Israeli economy has the reputation of being innovative and oriented towards the intellectual resources of the country. In your view, to what extent is Ukraine capable of following this economic path and how close is cooperation between Ukraine and Israel in the area of new technology?

– When the State of Israel was established, it was not surrounded by the most friendly of countries, so in order to survive, we always had to be better. We had no choice. So we had to create an economy based on quality, since our population has always been relatively small. For the country to develop, we had to build our economic base on hi-tech. Let me give you an example that explains the success of Israeli agriculture. Today, it is considered to be one of the most developed in the world. Here's the secret. When the "pioneers" came to what was then known as Palestine, it was a desert. They had no experience in farming, because in the Russian Empire, and most of these people were from there and Eastern Europe, they didn't have the right to own land. At that time they understood that the secret of any economy lay in well-developed agriculture. So they turned to experts. This is how relations between professors and academics in the agricultural sphere and people working the land were established. One of the problems of agriculture is that farmers are extremely conservative and it's difficult to propose



PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

something new to them. The opposite is true in Israel – people are open to innovations and there is a strong base for the development of new agricultural technologies.

U.W.: You mentioned that Israel was surrounded by hostile countries... The growth of the economy was also interconnected with the development of military technology. The issue of the modernisation of the Ukrainian army has been raised today. Do

you think that Ukraine would be able to make use of something from Israel's experience?

– Israel has its own model, that is applicable in view of our specific character. I'm not in a position to advise Ukraine. I think you have a better understanding of what needs to be developed, and how. You need your own model, which is applicable for the situation in Ukraine. As for Israel, our army is built in such a way that in its centre is the soldier, a person. This is its

most important treasure. In Israel, the army is also designed to prepare young people for the "real" life. For example, the army offers very solid technical training, because Israel understands that a future war will be a technological one, requiring relevant personnel. These people will then become the core of Israeli companies and can use this knowledge in civilian life.

U.W.: Sweden recently became the first European country to recognise Palestine. How do you feel about this? How do you generally view the policy of European countries on the Palestinian issue?

– We have very close ties with the EU and collaborate in many spheres. We are the only non-European country participating in the European scientific cooperation programme. But at the same time, there are differences, one of which is its stand on the Palestinian issue. Unfortunately, we have recently seen that instead of focusing on negotiations, the Palestinian leadership is focused on declarations. They want their country to be recognised, instead of working on its building. We don't agree with this and have often proposed returning to serious negotiations to resolve the conflict.

U.W.: Israel knows all about the media war phenomenon. How do you resist the media campaigns against Israel that unfold in Europe?

– Israel – is a free country, with free access to information and everyone can see what is happening. We try to show that we don't hide our problems. We try to show the efforts that Israel contributes to the peace process. We don't hide our problems.

U.W.: Russian TV is still the main source of information for former citizens of Russia and the USSR in the EU. It is currently the source of propaganda, particularly as regards the Ukrainian issue. How do you fight against the influence of Russian propaganda in Israel, where there are also many former citizens of Russia and the USSR?

– When there was a vast emigration from the former USSR in the early 1990s, there were about 20–30 Russian-language media

channels – TV, newspapers etc. There are significantly less now. The new generation is now more integrated in Israeli society and uses more Hebrew and English languages. For those who are older when they emigrate, this process is more difficult, it lasts longer, or they simply remain Russian-speaking. These people watch Russian TV. But let me stress that Israel is a free country. Every person draws his or her own conclusions. We have not had any public opinion polls among the Russian-speaking community regarding their views on latest events in Ukraine.

U.W.: On the issue of Russian aggression against Ukraine, the position in Israel is equidistant. What is necessary to change the neutrality of your country to the situation that has emerged? Is Israel simply not interested in this process?

– Israel has very good relations with both Russia and Ukraine. Also, we have extremely close cooperation with Ukraine. For this reason, our position is completely understood by the Ukrainian leadership. We deeply regret that these two countries, these brotherly nations, have begun such a conflict. We ourselves have been in a state of conflict from the very creation of the State of Israel. So our traditional policy lies in our attempt to resolve our own conflict and not interfere in others. This is because we simply don't have the means, capability or interest, and we don't think it's right to do so. In other words, for the most part, we work on our own issues. We have Jewish communities in both Ukraine and Russia, and this also plays an important role. We also see the very high human price paid by Ukraine for what is going on. What we are trying to do, is to help Ukraine in the spheres in which we have experience. For example, we are conducting training for psychologists. There are very many psychologically traumatised people in Ukraine right now. Therefore, we are initiating projects, which will help local psychologists to provide necessary help to the victims of these traumas. Unfortunately, we have a lot of experience in such work. Another sphere – a project for the provision of emergency medical treatment. The Director General of MDA (Magen David

BIO
Eliaiv Belotsercovsky, Ambassador of the State of Israel to Ukraine, was born in 1963. He graduated from the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 1990, specialising in International Relations and the Middle East, and completed the master's programme of Boston University in Israel. He has worked at the Israeli embassies in Singapore, Cyprus, Greece, India, and was appointed to the post of Ambassador to Ukraine in August 2014

Adom – Ed.), the Israeli equivalent of the Red Cross, is supposed to arrive here in early December. He is coming here together with a group, composed of the Chief Nurse of the Israeli Ministry of Health and several other people, who will conduct training for people giving emergency medical aid. This programme is designated for a specific period. These people will initially work in the East, in the ATO zone, where the need for such aid is the greatest. We then hope to develop this throughout the country. I think that our current goal is to focus on the experience we have, which is necessary here. I think that by doing this, we shall be of greater use.

U.W.: A large share of the Israeli political elite is made up of people who have had significant military experience. Many of your presidents held high positions in the army. What is so special, when part of the political elite is made up of the military? What are its advantages and disadvantages? Are there currently certain trends that the military will take second-third place among the political elite of your country?

– There is a difference in generations here. The first generation of Israeli leaders are people who fought for independence and held high positions, first in the army, then in political circles. They include Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon... There has now been a change

WE ARE SEEING THE HIGH HUMAN TOLL BEING PAID BY UKRAINE

in generations. The second generation of leaders has also been in the army, because we have mandatory draft. However, they are not necessarily people who have extensive experience in command positions. For example, our Prime Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, was an officer in the army, but has never held a high position. The same goes for his predecessor, Ehud Olmert. There is a certain change in generations right now, and the people whom we regard as the founders of our country are being replaced with those who have to develop it. This is now a different specificity. We are becoming a more conventional country. ■

Giovanna Barberis:

"The protection of child health is about the future of the country"



UNICEF Representative in Ukraine Giovanna Barberis speaks about children in the Ukrainian conflict, a surge of violence against children and ways for private businesses to improve the situation.

U.W.: What impact does the armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine have on children? Is it unique or similar to wars and conflicts worldwide?

Clearly, any conflict has an impact on the life of children regardless of its magnitude. Children are always the ones to pay the highest price in any conflict. Ukraine, unfortunately, is no exception to this. Since the beginning of the crisis a considerable number of children have been displaced. We know that at least 127,000 children are officially displaced in different regions. However, we estimate that many more children and their families have had to flee the country and many still remain in the conflict area. It is very difficult to obtain exact data, but it is consid-

**Interviewed
by Hanna
Trehub**

According to the MICS survey conducted by UNICEF a couple of years ago,

61.2%
of children aged 2-14 years in Ukraine have experienced at least one form of psychological or physical punishment by an adult

ered that around one million children lived in Luhans and Donetsk oblasts prior to the conflict. These children have been affected by its painful consequences in one way or another.

Some have witnessed violence and are suffering from trauma and distress. Many do not have access to education and some are not guaranteed their basic rights, such as access to health services. It is definitely a grim situation for children in Ukraine.

Unfortunately, we are learning of an increasing number of deaths and killing of some children. Last week, UNICEF was quite vocal in condemning this kind of actions, and reminded all parties that children don't have anything to do with the conflict and shouldn't become victims or targets.

U.W.: Since recently, we have been hearing of diseases spreading in bomb shelters. Does UNICEF have any programs or recommendations on ways to

minimize the threat of getting infected during active warfare?

The question of sanitation and hygiene there is of crucial importance, especially when people live in a confined and crowded space. Improving sanitation conditions is of key importance. Therefore, UNICEF is bringing to the attention of all parties that we do need humanitarian access. Only in such way will we be able to support those in need of our help.

U.W.: What are the main problems of IDP families who moved from the conflict zone in Eastern Ukraine to other regions? Officially, the number of IDPs is estimated at around 500,000. How many of these are children?

There are at least 460-480,000 of officially displaced people in Ukraine today. At least 127,000 are children. Most of them live in accommodation centers which are not fit for the winter period. Some IDPs are hosted by local communities and relatives, but most are still in summer



PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

is a huge response among school psychologist to this initiative.

U.W.: In Soviet times, vaccination against poliomyelitis, whooping cough and tuberculosis was obligatory for children. Now, Ukraine has very low immunization among children even in peaceful time. We have had heated pro- and anti-vaccination debates. How would you comment on that? What problems can we expect as a result of the ongoing crisis?

It is difficult to have a complete picture. What we can say, is that the coverage rate for Ukraine in terms of routine vaccination has always been very low. It has been always an issue. The current situation and related challenges do not help obviously, as health services have limited availability of drugs and vaccines in stock, and the displaced population is putting an additional pressure on health services. This is an additional risk for a possible outbreak of infectious diseases, especially of those that can be prevented. Another problem is demand: many families, even professionals, resist vaccination.

Poliomyelitis, whooping cough and tuberculosis are fatal diseases, but these infections can have serious consequences even if the child survives one. It is important to work jointly on the right communication and awareness raising. I have children myself, and this is true that sometimes vaccination can cause some fever or general discomfort. It is scientifically proven, however, that vaccination helps protect child's health; it is the most cost-effective outbreak prevention measure.

U.W.: Ukraine has tuberculosis epidemic among adults. How serious is the situation with non-immunized children? Can you speak of any specific estimates?

Coverage rate of vaccination in Ukraine has been always very low, around 50%. Particularly such situation is with poliomyelitis. Based on the year vaccination schedule, we have estimated that around 1,5 million children aren't fully vaccinated against polio. This exposes children to the threat of possible disease. There is an additional risk with poliomyelitis because the virus was circulating in the Middle

BIO

Giovanna Barberis has been UNICEF Representative in Ukraine since July 2014. She graduated from the University of Rome (Italy) majoring in Social Anthropology. Prior to her appointment in Ukraine, Ms. Barberis served as the head of UNICEF offices in Senegal, Georgia and Moldova. In this capacity she was responsible for planning, implementation and evaluation of a broad range of UNICEF programmes, both developmental and humanitarian, benefiting children and women

East in 2011. The possibility that it enters Ukraine is very high.

Tuberculosis is also becoming a big issue. I know from my colleagues that this disease is very much on the rise. Again, BCG vaccine is not provided to all newborns. There is a shortage of this vaccine. The Ministry of Health is addressing this problem and has finalized a few tender processes lately. However, the state procurement system needs to be more efficient to ensure timely procurement.



IT IS EXTREMELY IMPORTANT TO PROVIDE ALL THE CHILDREN AFFECTED BY THE CRISIS WITH COUNSELING AND PSYCHOSOCIAL SUPPORT. THERE IS A HUGE NEED FOR SUCH PROGRAMS

UNICEF together with the WHO are advocating strongly with the government, Ministry of Health, partners and civil society on these issues. The humanitarian community in Ukraine is also very vocal about these problems, trying to push the reform of the procurement system. I think the Ministry of Health is doing all it can about procurements at the moment. The international community is becoming quite responsive and is aware of the risks. They are ready to step up efforts to overcome the deficit in the procurement of vaccines. We hope that this problem will slowly be resolved in 2015.

You may have seen this around the Kyiv, as well as elsewhere in Ukraine: we have launched a communication campaign trying to explain to the parents why vaccination is important. We believe that even in time of crisis and conflict there are opportunities for change and improvement. Protection of child health is about the future of the country. ■

camps with very unstable living conditions, lack of heating and poor sanitation. There are some concerns about access of IDP children to education. In this respect, the Ministry of Education reacted very quickly and now the majority of IDP children have access to schooling in their locations of displacement. But, of course, we are not entirely sure that all of them do have access. Some are certainly left behind.

Psychological trauma is another issue. It is extremely important to provide all the children affected by this situation with counseling and psychosocial support. There is a huge need for such programs. UNICEF is training psychologists, mainly school psychologists, who can support families and children. We target education institutions because they allow reaching the highest number of children. The problem is not just about IDP children (who are the priority, of course), but about avoiding tensions with the children of the host community. There

The Donetsk Syndrome

FIRECROSSERS. Ukrainian soldiers released from captivity at a press conference in Dnipropetrovsk



Authors:
Bohdan Butkevych,
Hanna Trehub

In addition to direct threat that every war poses, it also has terrible echoes. It is difficult to go to war, but it is more difficult to leave it. Particularly for those who have gone through the hell of combat, shelling and the death of friends. Instead of heroic memories, many of these soldiers will develop social and psychological disorders - from physical injuries to initially imperceptible, but extremely dangerous pathologies, which only become apparent after some time, in civilian life. All of these factors are widely known as posttraumatic stress disorder (PTSD), which was first researched after the Vietnam War in America. Until recently, Ukraine's own analogy had been the Afghan syndrome - a complex of injuries and shock experienced by those who fought in the War in Afghanistan. Today, when the Donbas and hundreds of thousands of Ukrainians are going through their own war, which we will likely end up the "Donetsk syndrome".

DONBAS VETERANS

Social psychiatry has various examples of "veteran syndromes" from the wars in Vietnam, Afghanistan, Chechnya, the Gulf Wars and so on. Any war is a great shock for people, since they find themselves in conditions that are not normal for the psyche. The American campaign in Vietnam became the breaking point, from which attention was finally paid to such things. In the first decade after this war, in peacetime, the USA lost nearly 20,000 people. It was calculated that the number of those who die in the first ten years after the end of military action exceeds the number of those who die during military action. Research has shown that the delayed consequences of war are far more significant than purely physical injuries, impacting more than just the mental health of servicemen. Psychological equanimity and the worldview of combatants, as well as their entire destiny are also heavily affected.

Professor Vsevolod Stebliuk participated in the Anti-Terrorist

Operation (ATO) as a volunteer-anaesthesiologist, saved about 80 people near Ilovaysk (see p. 6) and is now actively involved in psychological rehabilitation of servicemen. Ukraine is on the verge of its own "veteran syndrome" which stems from the Maidan, he says. "Ukraine has been in a state of permanent social stress for almost a year," he states. "The Maidan, particularly its hottest phases accompanied by violence, were the first to cause PTSD in a huge group of people. When the confrontation between protesters and the government reached its culmination in the centre Kyiv, we had three main groups of patients: Maidan activists, police officers, and families and close friends on both sides of the conflict. They all shared common clinical symptoms, including post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) and severe reaction to stress, as well as adaptation disorders."

"We will most likely end up with the Donetsk Syndrome," Serhiy Hryliuk, Director of the

Social-Psychological Centre of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. "I mean experience in the hybrid war. Another problem is that we had to re-build the consciousness of most servicemen. Many ATO servicemen found themselves in a state of psychological breakdown when they realised the reality of war against Russia."

Like in any war, Ukraine will have two categories of victims: the military and civilians. The military involved in the fighting include professional army personnel whose actual job is war. They are better prepared to cope with stress than average people. "In spite of the chaos in the Ukrainian army in previous years, this category of soldiers was probably ready for possible complications psychologically," Dr. Stebliuk describes them. "However, contract servicemen include many who went into service for stability and a salary. They did not expect that they would actually have to fight."

The next group includes mobilised reservists who have largely been forced to put on a uniform and take up arms. Of all Ukrainian servicemen in the Donbas, they are the most vulnerable to stress. "People do not become patriots and soldiers by force," Dr. Stebliuk notes. "So, this group of soldiers was already distressed before they got involved in military action. Complications on the front have led to their failure to adapt."

Another vulnerable group includes the police, particularly special units who experienced stress during the Maidan, such as Berkut and Sokil, as well as interior troops. For them, participation in the ATO is a compensation of sorts, the continuation of a stressful situation, which becomes "chronic" as they adapt to the war. Some of them fight in the ATO to get career growth, return to service after they were dismissed for violations or abuse, avoid responsibility for violations on the Maidan, or avoid lustration. These are definitely mature troops with strong adaptation skills.

Surprisingly, patriots from voluntary battalions regardless of their subordination have the highest resilience against PTSD. Participation in the ATO fits in

their life-long position allowing them to actually counteract crime and defend their country. For the most part, they are Maidan protesters, civil activists and the like. They are "people of war", who feel comfortable under stressful tension.

Civilians vulnerable to stress include IDPs and families of ATO fighters. The first group is stressed out by a change in their usual way of life, uncertainty of the future, financial hardships and by what they perceive as hostile environment. For the second group, stress factors include concern for the fate, and the death or constant danger of the loss of their loved ones. Dr. Stebliuk emphasises that the Donetsk Syndrome will probably show itself the most in the coming six months.

THE SYMPTOMS OF DISTRESS

Vitaliy Andronatiy, Chief of the Defense Ministry Medical Department, confirms that approximately 80% of the servicemen who returned from the ATO are being diagnosed with psychological disorders. At the moment, these are caused by physical injuries.

"We are seeing severe traumatic conditions, the threat to life or their physical state," says psychiatrist Andriy Karachevskiy, a lecturer at the Psychiatry and Narcology Department of the Bogomolets National Medical University, who is currently providing psychiatric help to ATO soldiers on a voluntary basis. "This causes insomnia, irritability and depression, and makes the survivors feel guilty for being alive. They have nightmares of cases where they faced mortal danger. The US psychiatrists qualify this as severe stress disorder for the symptoms that occur within the first month after the incident, and as PTSD when they continue after one month."

Not everyone who was at war and received a psychological trauma will subsequently have PTSD. "Of those who survived mortal danger, 10% of men and 20% of women can be diagnosed with PTSD, while of combatants – more than 30%," explains Andriy Karachevskiy. "Let's suppose that there are about 100,000 peo-

ple fighting in the Donbas right now. So about 30,000 will suffer from PTSD, of which 10,000 will be severe lasting for years. These people will be easily provoked to aggression, lack patience and could cause problems in society. They are also more prone to alcoholism and drug abuse, not to mention suicide."

War veterans are indeed a vulnerable group. According to statistics, they suffer more fatalities in road accidents, get involved in criminal groups, abuse alcohol and drugs, etc. The research of veterans who fought in Afghanistan in 2001 conducted by American experts revealed that 25% of them had PTSD.

Psychotherapists and occupational therapists feel that several types of these disorders are already visible among different groups of Ukrainian servicemen. The first

WAR VETERANS SUFFER MORE FATALITIES IN ROAD ACCIDENTS, GET INVOLVED IN CRIMINAL GROUPS, ABUSE ALCOHOL AND DRUGS

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type is active adaptation or overcoming stress through counteraction. "This type of reaction is specific to most "ideological" soldiers," notes Vsevolod Stebliuk. "It manifests itself in aggressive behaviour, uncompromising attitude towards enemies, diminished ability to communicate and an acute sense of justice. This category of victims uses virtually no alcohol or drugs to alleviate stress, since for them, nothing compares to the adrenalin rush of military action. The constant feeling of danger and the risk of death are a kind of psychological stimulator. It is difficult for these people to switch to civilian life; the meaning of their existence is battle." Potentially, they are an effective weapon of revolutions, uprisings and military coups.

The second type is protective inhibition. Experts feel that this is the best form of adaptation. This reaction develops in people with a strong, balanced nervous system. Protective inhibition reactions are the ones that allow them to fall asleep during shell-

ing, take rests, pull themselves together in the most extreme situations and perceive reality as if it is a movie. Dr. Stebliuk feels that this is also caused by the nature of military action in the Donbas, when there is no direct contact with fire but artillery shelling hardly stops. Constant shelling from mortars and multiple launch rocket systems forces this group to passively wait under cover. In civilian life, protective inhibition manifests itself in partial memory loss of the most tragic moments of military action. These people block out the most horrific events to protect themselves from re-living these experiences.

Anxiety and depression disorder is the third type. It is the most difficult and, unfortunately, the most wide-spread one, manifesting itself through insomnia, anxiousness, the premonition of dan-

ger, fear and severe depression, the loss of social and personal activity, no faith in the future as well as intents and attempts to commit suicide. This is most often seen in soldiers who have been maimed or suffered severe injuries. Attempts to battle such disorders with drugs and alcohol only exacerbate the situation.



THE DONETSK SYNDROME WILL MANIFEST ITSELF THE MOST IN THE COMING SIX MONTHS

Experts note that at present, the first, and to a certain extent, the third types of reaction are prevalent among those who have been in military action. Medics often face mixed symptoms, including anxiety and activation, sleeplessness

and the necessity to act, depressive disorders and inhibition.

THEY MUST FEEL NEEDED

According to experts, the Donetsk Syndrome will differ little from the Vietnam or Afghan syndromes, although what makes the Ukrainian case different is that people are not fighting on foreign soil. To a certain extent, the righteous protection of native land mitigates the effect of PTSD. The servicemen in Eastern Ukraine are protecting their land and clearly understand why they are suffering. However, it is not as simple as that.

On the one hand, mass media are popularising the heroism of ATO participants, regularly showing edgy reports filled with concern and alarm. On the other hand, the soldiers and volunteers see the completely peaceful exis-

EXPERIENCE

“Of course, I’m alive”

A defender of Mariupol speaks about how the war has changed his psyche

SLEEP

I sleep badly, even here, away from the front line. The expectation that there could be an alarm at any second still remains. Falling asleep, having already let go of reality a little, you think: on which side is the enemy? How far away is he? What can he hit us with?.. It's as if you can already see some movement, someone doing something. And you are always waiting for the cry: “Alarm!” Or a hit. You are simply waiting.

CIVILIAN LIFE

The fact that people here continue to live their lives, relax and have fun, is both irritating and not. I understand that we still have to go on living and motivate ourselves. In other words, our battle was not in vain, there is peace here. For me, this war is a war for my native land.

But the thought that people away from the action have absolutely no motivation is an irritant. In other words, it's not about their desire to still want to enjoy life and have fun in spite of everything. Absolutely not. Everything is well with them; they are not bothered about the war... It's a parallel reality.

But maybe this is normal. People are people. Civilians.

DEATH

No one can grasp this, and it will always be so. Only people who have lost friends, and not only friends... before their very eyes, can understand this.

There was a guy called Mykola. I didn't know him well... He made a big impression on me as a good person. There was something about him that I really liked.

Once, three of our guys went out to reconnoitre. Two were killed, the third was captured. This third person happened to be Mykola. We later found out that he was gone too, although we never saw his body, or proof of his death.

It was Mykola who later came to me in dreams, although I didn't know him best out of the three who died then. I dreamed of him many times. I saw him in my sleep again and said:

– Mykola, you are alive!

He laughs:

– Of course I'm alive. What are you on about?!

As if his death is a stupid joke.

I woke up distressed. Even when a person dies before your very eyes, you sometimes refuse to believe it.

PSYCHOLOGISTS

I only had dealings with a psychologist once in my life – when I faced the Medical Board during my medical examination for the army – and even then, I felt naked. It was a very unpleasant feeling. I will never go to a psychologist, that's for sure.

GUILT

When you are temporarily at home and find out from the news that lads are dying, that something bad is happening in the East, it's very difficult not to be there. You feel guilty.

“HERE” AND “THERE”

It's better there than here. It's best when you are experiencing something. You get out there. The situation already seems to be more or less stable there.

When I first realised what artillery shelling was, we had our headquarters in a very weak building. I stood guard on the first floor. I simply stood and realised that everything was out of my hands. We fell into an ambush within five hours. We killed so many of the enemy... And we had four wounded people! Minor injuries! There are moments when you understand that there is someone in heaven. And that he clearly loves us.

THE FINALE

Everything became more intense. The sense of justice and resentment became more acute... People will probably not notice this. But that's what it is... However, I think that everything

tence of the rest of society, the ongoing attempts of politicians to gain political dividends on the war, and bureaucrats who are trying to make money on this. This fuels internal conflicts in those fighting in Eastern Ukraine: "How is it that we are fighting for our country, for our land. We are losing the best and closest people to us, while the government and other people are completely indifferent to everything."

Psychotherapists and occupational therapists agree that psychological rehabilitation of ATO participants must already begin with preventive preparation of soldiers for battle fatigue in boot camp, before battle. However, the Ministry of Defence can hardly dress its soldiers, let alone be concerned with psychological aid. Moreover, the relevant department in the General Staff was

10%
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disorders

only established recently and is not yet operational. But the main thing is for soldiers to feel that they are needed, and that everything they experienced on the front was not in vain.

"It is important to understand that people with PTSD will not go to an in-patient psychiatric hospital, and they do not necessarily need hospitalisation. First and foremost, they need psychotherapeutic help, and in big cases – medication," says Andriy Karachevskiy. "At present, there is no interaction between all participants of the rehabilitation process, which should already begin at the stage of medical evacuation at a mobile hospital (this role is often played by volunteers) and must be continued on a more qualified level, at in-patient hospitals."

ATO participants must be under constant observation of

doctors, and undergo regular psychological testing for early detection of disorders, depression and suicidal tendencies. "We are only at the beginning of our struggle with the consequences of battle fatigue, and in the absence of relevant conditions, we will have a large amount of people who are not adapted to civilian life in the short-term," Dr. Stebliuk sums it up. "In addition, the danger of the escalation of these disorders and their consequences – bursts of violence and an increase in the number of suicides – will exist for a very long time. Based on my own experience and recommendations of a friend who survived Afghanistan, I can say that nothing cures failure to adapt like the sense of being needed, both as a citizen and as a family member to the ones you love." ■

depends on one's morale and will. A strong person will find within himself the strength to continue living. For them, the war will become important experience, which is even positive in

certain aspects. A weak person can sink into alcoholism.

Even more will depend on the finale; on how this war ends. It will be one thing if people come to the understanding that

everything happened with good reason. And it will be something completely different if we realise that it happened just so. That would be a huge blow for all those who fought in the East.



ONE ON ONE WITH PAIN.
A Ukrainian serviceman,
wounded during the ATO,
at the Dnipropetrovsk
Military Hospital

PHOTO: UNIAN

Occupation Talk

Stalin did not believe that Hitler would attack the Soviet Union. Moreover, at the moment when Hitler's army was already inflicting heavy blows across the territory of the USSR and was quickly advancing deep into the country, he did not believe that this was happening.

Historians say that it took him several days to come to his senses. However, judging by the way the situation evolved and his government's reaction to it, it took him significantly longer.

Hitler's armies were advancing. The Red Army, which received the order to give battle, but not enter the enemy's territory, retreated. Soldiers and officers found themselves encircled in traps, then in captivity. The lucky ones escaped and returned to their country, which, in turn, declared them to be traitors and punished them.

The Kremlin approved a mobilisation plan, created the Evacuation Council, ordered the destruction of the infrastructure, industrial plants that were not moved out and warehouses storing foodstuffs.

The authorities were not bothered by the fact that people remained on occupied territories.

Evacuation was chaotic, unsystematic and aimed at quick resolution of the "misunderstanding" with Hitler. As usual, the government was the first to flee. "The authorities left very quickly. The tiny town bristled at this. The flight of the authorities was more intensive than the German offensive. The wives of District Committee members ran around in their curlers, gathering suitcases from random people", Soviet and Russian writer Galina Shcherbakova wrote in her book *My Grandmother and Stalin*.

The archives say the same... "In some places, the authorities did nothing, sitting around all day. It took a bombing or a provocative rumour in such places, for the Second Secretary of the Kharkiv City Council and his inner circle to flee

Author:
**Olena
Stiazhkina**

NAZI-OCCUPIED
STALINO (NOW
DONETSK). The
nomenclature
and some
enterprises
were moved
out of the city,
while most of
the residents
were left to the
mercy of fate



with their personal belongings, while the people were left to take care of themselves ...Comrade T's assistants did the same, leaving the sick behind in their hurry to drive off" (Central State Archive of NGOs of Ukraine).

Strategic plants followed shortly after, or fled with them. They were moved out, carefully counting the big Berthas. I don't know what they are. But I do know how many were taken, packed and how many got to their destination. As for the people... Who ever counted them at any time? They did not wait for trains because the railway did not provide any. They found themselves under fire, died and hid in neighbouring villages... Some were, by chance, transported to another city. Some failed to leave. Some got sick, gave birth, and took care of the elderly.

THESE WERE ABANDONED PEOPLE

The USSR knew about Jews and what Hitler did to them. However, there was not a separate programme for their relocation. Why bother? It has to be said that there was also no separate programme for the relocation of regular com-

munists, although according to Soviet propaganda, they were the first to find themselves in the risk zone. Or second behind the Jews.

There was also no order, advice or guideline as to how communists should behave. Do you hide your party membership card? Destroy it? Do you admit to being a communist if asked? Is it better to hide this fact? How should you behave? No one knew.

Needless to say, there was a call to create underground and partisan movements. It was so resonant. Even authorisations for the creation of units were issued. Reports were demanded. Weapons were not provided – it had to be acquired in battle.

Of course, coordination, tasks and even supply of arms was put into place once the government really came to its senses and saw the whole tragedy. Small and large victories were won in the rear. But reports were demanded first, and there was no explanation as to how to hide facts of membership in the Communist Party from "friendly" neighbours, who rushed to inform the Gestapo before it began its operations on the occupied territory.

THE ARRIVAL OF THE NAZIS

The Nazis arrived. Discipline. "A new order". Bridges were rebuilt, water supplies restored and even trams were put into operation. For themselves, of course, not for the people.



Newspapers were opened. They contained "everything you wanted to know about Bolsheviks and the Jews, but were afraid to ask". There were no German correspondents – they were all locals.

They started on the Jews. In some places, initially a ghetto, then mass executions. In others – mass executions from the start.

Jews with their families appeared at collection points on their own, on the orders of the Nazi authorities. It is easier to think about it this way. "They went of their own free will, so they only have themselves to blame".

But someone made lists. Someone made sure that every Jew was in them. Someone consulted and gathered information. Snitching, snitching, and more snitching... Then, executions were followed by the plunder of newly-vacated apartments and homes. The locals of Berdychiv, Zhytomyr, Kharkiv, Stalino, Artemivsk, Vinnytsia and Kyiv gladly wore dresses and used pots and coffers of those executed.

The theme of the Holocaust is very painful. And not only because "they killed them", but also be-

cause "we didn't prevent it". Sometimes we helped sincerely.

We are the bad compatriots. This has never been contemplated, spoken out and lived through properly. This is the burden of the victors, not the defeated, because the sound of the fanfares deafened and blinded us. We failed to see some things about ourselves.

Meanwhile, schools opened under the Nazi occupation. Those very teachers who had praised Lenin and Stalin, obediently covered their portraits in textbooks, while a picture of Hitler hung on their classroom wall.

Traitors? Forced collaborators? Forced by whom? By the war, Nazis or the authorities, which left people to the mercy of fate, only to subsequently punish them in a demonstrative manner?

...Theatres, some higher education institutions and restaurants. The "Berlin" restaurant was opened in Kharkiv. At the same time, some of the local professors were going crazy from hunger. They died, saying that they were prepared to do anything for a piece of bread. Others did not die. They prepared lists of Jews, working in burgrad.

Should we generalise all of these people?

There were people throughout Ukraine, who greeted Nazis with bread and water – out of outrage against the Soviet authorities, which took everything away at one time, out of fear before a great multitude, or out of the readiness to serve and submit to anyone, because there was nowhere else from where to learn other social habits...

Some truly were the first pupils. Others weren't. But they registered at the labour exchange, received ration cards, confessed to their communist or Komsomol past... Meanwhile, they hid a Jewish child and treated a soldier who was not part of their circle. Or they wrote the latest information about their neighbours, who spoke loudly or in whispers about the victories of Soviet armies or members of the UPA (Ukrainian Insurgent Army).

Everyone survived as best they could. And the "can – cannot" line could only be measured here and now, not forever, but for individual situations. The daily existential choice. Every day saw a duel

to the death; a duel between their own human and animal instincts.

Who is to judge or prosecute them?

JUDGES

Judges came when the Nazis were driven out. Not necessarily from the battle-line. Many from their offices in the rear. Investigators, judges and prosecutors; sometimes in one person. Military tribunals operated like a conveyor belt. Death by hanging simply in the square, execution by firing squad, 10 years all in the camps, 15 years without the right to correspondence...

Terrible things came to light. Dreadful things. It emerged that 80% of local communists registered at Nazi Commandant's Of-

NOW, WHEN WE ARE ONCE AGAIN AT WAR, IT IS THE SOVIET VIEW OF AN OCCUPATION THAT IS PREVALENT. SOMETIMES BY DEFAULT, SOMETIMES WITH GENUINE SURPRISE AND REPENTANCE

fices, a large portion destroyed their party membership cards, while some declared on record that they had only become party members to lead a peaceful existence and make a good living. There were enemies everywhere. They were killed quickly and mercilessly. Where did they get their information? Did it fall from the sky again?

Neighbours... Family members... They were the first to snitch to the authorities, before they were snitched on.

Yelysaveta Biriukova, a processing engineer in the fish industry, 27 years old, Mariupol. She was not evacuated because she was sick with scarlet fever. She went to work at a "German canning plant". Her performance was good enough to please the Reich.

In 1943, after the Nazis were driven out, information about her was brought to an investigator. It included everything: treason, "German prostitute" and "immediate execution by firing squad".

She wasn't executed, but was sentenced to 15 years. In 1948, other neighbours began to write letters to Stalin, Beria... "Comrade" ■

Biriukova transformed the plant into a “rescue camp”... She travelled to see POWs and took them into her home and to work. She said that they were the best experts, without whom the plant would never produce so much tinned food. She fed the family members of communists and Jews in the dining hall. She took food to some homes – to the sick”.

People wrote that she had saved 150 people. Yes, a Schindler’s list.

Saint Yelysaveta’s sentence was reduced. She was released. But they never removed the accusation of collaboration...

Harsh judges. A lot of work... Wherever you turn... She worked in a mine under the Nazis; sang in an operetta, taught children under a portrait of Hitler, was acquainted with a policeman. Who cares that she grew up with this policeman? She was guilty!

Vast occupied territories, populated with traitors and collaborators...

SHAME ON THEM!

When it became clear that it was impossible to imprison everyone, another “genius” solution was born. Application forms, filled out by Soviet people when applying for a job or when becoming a member of an organisation, included the following questions: “Were you ever on occupied territory? Were your relatives ever on occupied territory?”

If so, you were branded for life. You were a suspect for the rest of your life...

THRICE BRANDED. DAMNED...

The authorities were the last to return with their suitcases to occupied territories. From the valid, honourable evacuation. When everything was so quiet and cleared of mines. First of all, they found themselves housing. Not ruined, but intact and comfortable, with a sewerage system, or at least with running water... Those who lived there under the Nazis were thrown out.

NOTHING HAS CHANGED

In the Soviet system, thinking was so simple and clear that the current authorities do not have a greater temptation, than to imitate the “best” Bolshevik traditions, such as broad generalisations, major accusations, a low level of responsibility

**SNITCHING
ON ONE
ANOTHER AND
LYNCHINGS.**
These
indications of
an occupation
are clearly
registered in the self-
proclaimed
republics



and focus on the word of “Stalin”, with possibly a different surname, of course.

Yes, we have failed to break free from Soviet traditions.

A Soviet person, who is not the hero of a film or book, but one that is real, intimidated, prone to schematization, simplification and who is ready to play at being a functionary as opposed to serving the people, one that sees himself/herself as a cog that no one depends on, one that finds his/her place in government, because government is the only way “to immediately improve your life”... This Soviet person lives in each of us. I am acquainted with mine. I know the volume and scale of the ruin it



**TODAY, WE OURSELVES ARE
STILL BAD. BUT WE CAN
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ABUNDANTLY CLEAR**

can cause me... Not all, of course. Because you never know when and how it will crawl out... But that’s my personal challenge.

However, there is one that is not personal... Now, when we are once again at war, it is the Soviet view of an occupation that is prevalent. Sometimes by default, sometimes with genuine surprise and repentance. As if to say, how did I come to think like Stalin, after all, I was a decent person yesterday, but today, I am demanding personal reports on the satisfactory or unsatisfactory patriotism of people in Donetsk and Luhansk in the battle against the aggressor?

And this question is a good option for liberating ourselves from former Soviet thinking.

Because, “Saving Private Ryan” is not being undertaken because he behaved well, but because he is a citizen of the same country as you. Only a totalitarian society demands a certificate of participation in partisan detachments. A democratic society emerges from the presumption of innocence.

I think that society will learn. Not quickly, but gradually. Today, we ourselves are still bad. But we can already see how the wise avoid generalisations and do not require explanations, where everything is abundantly clear. Actually, the imprudent continue to beat themselves in their patriotic chests, not noticing that they are marching the same Soviet march, where everyone who is in step, is worthy and genuine, while the rest are outsiders....

And the authorities? Will they learn? Because it’s so convenient: to always be on top, hide your own helplessness behind “the difficulties of the revival period”, not to explain your actions, remove yourself and the big Berthas from the battle field, forgetting about people, and also branding them as traitors later...

...No one believed that Russia could attack Ukraine. There were people that warned of this, but none of the decision-makers believed it. Yes, a negotiation period was necessary for everyone. Yes, there were mistakes, because they were inevitable.

However, the time has now come to either remove the “soviet chip” from our heads, or honestly admit, that the authorities have invited us to an open lesson of “A short course in the history of the VKP(b)” from the history of occupation, which Ukrainian society has already undergone, but not learned from. ■

Without 1933, There Would Be No 2014

Author: Iryna Mahrytska,
Luhansk – Kyiv

I think that those few intellectuals in Ukraine and the West, who are well-versed in the subject of the Famine and its consequences for the modern post-genocide society in Ukraine, have little doubt that Stalin's extermination of Ukrainians in 1933 laid good foundations for Putin's hybrid war in the Donbas today. One bloody dictator inherited the cause of imperial destruction of Ukraine from another.

Everyone knows what is going on in Eastern Ukraine today. Only few truly understand what happened in Ukraine in the winter and spring of 1933.

WHY STARVATION IS THE WORST KIND OF DEATH

"Because it is the slowest," some will answer. They are right, but only partly. With no food but water available, a human being dies away in a month, the last week being in terrible physical suffering. There is another, worse aspect to starvation: it transforms a person into an animal, and a more monstrous one than the most merciless predators. This creature can eat its own kind, as well as its children.

I often cited Hryhoriy Bevez, a survivor of the Famine in a Ukrainian village: "Physiological changes of a starving person's body are accompanied by changes to his or her psyche. Intense and long-term starvation deadens or completely kills normal human senses and feelings. A starving person does not regard good and evil, truth and lies, justice and injustice, in the same way as a person who is not hungry. Natural values that are common to mankind appear secondary, unworthy. The prevailing desire is to eat. Feelings of patriotism, faith, friendship and love die, or cease to exist at all."

These feelings never recovered in many survivors of the



1933 Famine. Not only did these post-genocide peasants not bring a single flower to the mass graves in which their children, parents, husbands and wives were buried – they simply walked over their remains.

I learned this from eye-witnesses of the Famine who live in many villages in the Luhansk part of Slobozhanshchyna, a historical region severely beaten by the genocide. To this day, there are no signs on the mass graves where the victims were buried.

The Bolsheviks made sure that all Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks in the USSR were reduced to this animal state in 1933. Survivors often recalled how in that time, highly-placed Communist Party and Soviet officials drove into villages and asked their parents how long they had been without food, how many fellow-peasants were dying from hunger each day and how many had already died.

Peasants constituted about 75% of the population of the Ukrainian SSR at that time. The surviving victims of the Holodomor brought up their children and grandchildren in the resulting moral environment. Their descendants now make up most of the Ukrainian population.

It was only after 1933 that the ground was well-prepared for the imperial-Bolshevik myth of the two countries' age-old brotherly friendship to be imposed. This became possible after the red terror of Famine turned the mentality of Ukrainian peasants upside down

This is hardly my attempt to degrade my own people or my sick fantasies. According to James Mace, a top researcher of post-genocide society in Ukraine, mass extermination of the Ukrainian people wiped out its age-old ethical traits, such as hospitality, kindness, courtesy and responsiveness became a thing of the past, while indifference and heartlessness prevailed. There was hardly any room left for patriotism.

WHY MANY UKRAINIAN STILL REGARD RUSSIANS AS "BROTHERS"

Those same elderly survivors of the Famine in Luhansk Oblast assured me that prior to 1933, they never heard from their parents or

THE WORST ASPECT TO STARVATION IS ITS POWER TO TRANSFORMS A HUMAN BEING INTO AN ANIMAL CAPABLE OF EATING ITS OWN KIND AND CHILDREN

grandparents of a single case of a mixed marriage between young people from Ukrainian and Rus- ➤

sian villages, located just several kilometres away from one another.

At that time, Ukrainians viewed Russians as representative of a different, obscurely-hostile civilisation where the language of the entire rural population were dominated by swearing, the stink of home-made vodka was a constant presence, and vegetable gardens were overgrown with waist-high weeds.

It was only after 1933 that the ground was well-prepared for the imperial-Bolshevik myth of the two countries' age-old brotherly friendship to be imposed. This became possible after the red terror of Famine turned the mentality of Ukrainian peasants upside down. Another factor was assimilation with the Russians along the near border as a chance to survive. There was no distinct borderline between Ukraine and Russia in 1933. Ukrainians, dying from the artificial famine, saw that nothing of this kind was happening on the Russian side. The residents of all border regions of Luhansk Oblast, without exception, attested to this. Completely denationalized, the starving Ukrainian peasants saw no way to prevent yet another similar genocide other than to assimilate with the Russians. They were obviously not aware of the actual underlying reasons for the genocide arranged by the Bolsheviks. So, forging the closest ties possible to the Russians, or even pretending to be Russian, was seen as a tool of salvation. Hence the Russified Ukrainian surnames, such as -ov added to the originally Ukrainian surnames Matvienko (Matvienkov in Russian), Chepurnyi (Chepurnov in Russian), -in in Zozulin (originally, Zozulia, a cuckoo in Ukrainian), or -ev in Shamrayev.

Post-genocide mixed marriages brought up their children and grandchildren in the Russian-Soviet style spirit. Their descendants grew into a generation that detested and feared any manifestation of Ukrainian patriotism and "bourgeois nationalism", seeing in them a direct threat of another famine hell similar to what their parents had gone through. These descendants of denationalised post-

Without the Famine, there would be no LNRs and DNRs today, and Vladimir Putin would probably have to think twice before calling South-Eastern Ukraine "Russian land"



genocide Ukrainian peasants from Slobzhanshchyna and the Cossack steppe now constitute a narrow majority in all large cities of the Donbas. It is then no won-

gists primitively explain this as a result of predominating Russian-speaking or ethnically Russian population there.

In fact, all Ukrainian censuses demonstrate that this is not true. The language is not an issue as proven by many Russian-speaking patriots from South-Eastern Ukraine fighting in the Donbas today.

Imperial ideologists blatantly lie, when they claim that the Donbas mentality today is supposedly evidence of the fact that "Novorossiya" is a historical "essentially Russian province". This is post-genocide thinking.

Suffice it to recall the powerful peasant army of Nestor Makhno, whose fighters had the identity of Ukrainian peasants, to be convinced that prior to the Famine, the south-eastern part of Ukraine in no way differed from the rest of the country. Makhno's army was largely formed in Katerynoslavshchyna (Katerynoslav is the old name for Dnipropetro-

PEASANTS IN SOUTH-EASTERN UKRAINE SUFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY MORE FROM THE FAMINE THAN DID THE REST OF UKRAINIANS BECAUSE THEY LIVED IN THE BARE STEPPE REGION

der that many of them indicated that they were Russians in the latest census.

THE ROOTS OF THE DONBAS AND "NOVOROSSIYA"

The negative view of Ukrainian nationalism is similarly typical for most residents in the Donbas, and "Novorossiya" – South-Eastern Ukraine. The Kremlin ideolo-



PHOTO: UNIAN

vsk), a historical region covering part of Luhansk Oblast.

So, what was it that made the mentality in South-Eastern Ukraine so different from the rest of the country? The Kremlin documents from 1932–1933 do not mention any specific measures to organize an artificial famine in this particular region.

Historian Vadym Skurativskyi explains this phenomenon of deep denationalization. According to his observations, peasants in South-Eastern Ukraine suffered significantly more from the Famine than did the rest of Ukrainians, simply because they lived in the steppe region. When, towards the end of 1932, the Bolsheviks collected everything edible from absolutely all the people living in villages, those who lived in the forest or partially wooded steppe regions had a slightly better chance to survive than those living in the steppe regions. After all, the fauna of the steppe is sig-

The Bolshevik genocide in South-Eastern Ukraine was the most severe, causing irreversible mental changes in the consciousness of the locals

nificantly poorer than that in a forest.

These views are confirmed by the research of the famous American historian, Robert Conquest. In his popular-documentary book *Harvest of Despair*, he published his statistical data on the mortality of Ukrainian peasants in 1933 as a whole and by region. According to these figures, the Famine took one in four lives of Ukrainian peasants in northern oblasts, one in three in central oblasts, and roughly every other life in south-eastern oblasts.

Vadym Skurativskyi sadly concluded that “The deliberately directed and meticulously executed genocide of 1932–1933 made it impossible to consolidate Ukraine as a strong and powerful country on the European continent. This is precisely what the cunning action of Ukrainophobes was counting on.”

James Mace essentially confirms this. The study of political reasons for the Famine can and should play an important role when Western historians, politicians and statements are looking into not just Ukraine’s past, but into what is happening here today and could happen tomorrow.

The most denationalized region after the Famine was the Donbas. Plus, the concentration of ethnic Russians is the second highest there today, following Crimea. It would have taken a very balanced and wise state policy to return the national consciousness lost in the Holodomor to the people in the Donbas today, and to approximate its Russian ethnic minority to pro-European mentality.

Instead, all Ukrainian leaders flirted with local pro-Russian political elites, switching to the Russian language during their infrequent and all too fleeting visits to Luhansk and Donetsk.

They probably never read the warning James Mace left for them in the early years of this century: claims to Ukraine are deeply rooted in Russian political culture, and there is every likelihood that sooner or later, Russia will decide to implement them in deeds, not just in words. This is what is happening today – so far, only in Crimea and the Donbas.

Imperial Russia made full use of this political shortsightedness

of the Ukrainian political elite. Immediately after Vladimir Putin came to power in the Kremlin, a powerful ideological cleansing of the Donbas was launched. Ukrainian language mass media, schools, classes and university departments, which were already few and far between, began to close down.

At the same time, the Kremlin, not sparing any costs, strongly propagated the values of the “Russian World”, its own mass media, culture and television in this region. Apparently, in contrast to Kyiv, Moscow realized both the consequences of the Famine, and the benefits it could gain from it.

The results of such different approaches by Kyiv and Moscow to the post-genocide society in the Donbas turned out to be dire for Ukrainian statehood. Ukrainians, who were aware of their nationality in Luhansk in the last 10 years, represented a meagre minority – about a thousand people.

Last winter, they were the ones to come out onto the local Maidan, which was dispersed for the last time on March 9 by almost 2,000 titushkas hired from throughout the oblast by agents of the Russian special services. This was the first day of the pro-LNR (Luhansk People’s Republic) movement.

Now, let’s imagine that the 1933 Famine had not happened. At least 270,000 Ukrainians aware of their identity would now be living in Luhansk, as opposed to a thousand (descendants of the post-genocide generation who lived in the city prior to Russia’s current hybrid war).

At least several thousand of them would have come out to mark the 200th birthday of Taras Shevchenko on March 9. Before the Famine, every peasant home in both Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts had a Kobzar, Shevchenko’s most famous book of verses in Ukrainian. If it had not been for the Famine then, the 2,000 paid thugs would surely fail to spoil the celebration today. There would be no LNRs and DNRs. Without the Famine, Vladimir Putin would now have to think hard before calling South-Eastern Ukraine “Russian land”. ■

The Steel Carcass of a Nation

Israel is a perfect model of rational militarisation in conditions when agreements, treaties and world public opinion prove impotent

Author:
Ihor Losev

The prospects of any community largely depend on the level of development and values of its leaders and politicians. It is they, with their actions, or lack thereof, that determine whether the super-efforts of the nation will bear fruit, or go to waste. The nature of the national elite is almost always specified by its socio-historic origins, by when, how and under what conditions it emerged, the phases it has undergone and how it has reacted to challenges.

The Ukrainian elite was formed from fragments of the Soviet party, Komsomol, red directors, Chekists elite; businessmen who survived the bloody and bandit 1990s, and criminals. Virtually none of them perceived Ukrainian statehood as an individual value accomplished with their hard work, sweat and blood. None of the Ukrainian presidents has a heroic past like Vaclav Havel, Lech Walesa or Nelson Mandela, and hardly any of them struggled for independence.

This explains a lot about Ukraine's endless problems, political betrayals and total corruption. The two Maidans that have been deceived by "revolutionary" governments do not help.

"Let's leave the first President, Leonid Kravchuk, out," says Oleksandr Sharkov, the first Head of Intelligence at the SBU, Ukraine's Security Service. "After him, I blame Leonid Kuchma (the second President – **Ed.**) for the birth of the oligarchy and handing the country over to the mercies of the Nouveau riche. Viktor Yushchenko (the third President elected during the Orange Revolution – **Ed.**) frittered away all the trust delegated to him by the Maidan and did not

fulfill a single promise he made to the people. Viktor Yanukovych was a traitor."

The fact that the State of Israel has existed in a completely hostile environment for almost 70 years and has been a success story in the economy, social sphere, health, science and technologies, is largely thanks to its elite. Many of its representatives are descendants of enthusiasts, who left successful companies and banks in Europe, America and Asia in the early 20th century to travel to the Palestinian wilderness and malarial swamps, and fight for the establishment of Medinat Yisrael in wars with the Arabs and the British colonial rule.

Mostly intellectuals, these people eagerly did exhausting physical work for their ambitious goal.

The generals of the ZAHAL (Israel Defence Forces) and Special Forces hold a special place in the Israeli elite. This is understandable, since this country would have disappeared from the political map a long time ago without an army and the defensive consciousness of the entire nation.

Interestingly, ZAHAL was initially formed out of volunteer detachments, just like the new Ukrainian army in 2014. They were the ones to bring a new and patriotic spirit to it. From 1948, it won at least five wars and trained quite a few brilliant, victorious generals. In fact, Israel had no other options but victory because, as David Ben-Gurion, one of the founders of this country said, "we can win many wars, but only lose one". In truth, given its size and geopolitical position, the first defeat would have been the last one for Israel.

After military service, the Israeli generals switched to civilian life becoming presidents, prime



Moshe Dayan and Yitzhak Rabin during the Six-Day War

ministers, ministers, governors, diplomats and businessmen. They reinforced the ruling elite, adding stability to it in defending its national interests.

Israel's prime ministers Yitzhak Rabin, Ariel Sharon, Ehud Barak, Benjamin Netanyahu and others are all professional generals of the Army and Special Forces, but they coped very well with the responsibilities in government. After they personally risked their lives defending their country with weapons in

hands, devotion to Israel became an instinct.

On May 8, 1972, experienced Palestinian terrorists who specialised in the hijacking of passenger aircrafts captured a Boeing 707 with 99 passengers on board and forced the plane to land at Tel Aviv's Lod Airport.

It took a group of Israel's Special Forces 90 seconds to liberate

Netanyahu, is the current Prime Minister.

This is the political elite with a very telling biography and no room for notorious embezzlement of public funds, phenomenal corruption and betrayal of their country.

General Ariel Sharon, the Israeli Bonaparte, is also worth mentioning. During the Arab-Is-

near Kampala, the capital of Uganda, in June 1976, when liberating hostages captured by terrorists.

At that time, a long way away from the Israeli borders, Yonatan Netanyahu's commandos conducted a brilliant operation and saved nearly all of the hostages. Only the commander was killed on the Israeli side. After this, thousands of families in the country began to give the name Yonatan to their first-born sons, in honour of the hero.

The generals and officers of ZAHAL, Mossad, Shabak (counterintelligence and security service) and Aman (military intelligence) are similar to the steel armour of the Israeli leadership class. These people are represented in all higher structures, political parties and organisations. They do not give the elite the opportunity to forget their ultimate mission – to serve the country. The enormous prestige of Special Forces in society also promotes this. After all, everyone understands that Israel actually has only two true allies, which will never betray it: ZAHAL and the Special Forces.

However, in spite of the militarisation of its entire life, Israel managed to remain the only democratic country in the Middle East with high incomes of



the hostages and neutralise the armed attackers. Ehud Barak, the group's commander, later became Chief of ZAHAL's General Staff and Prime Minister of Israel. Danny Yatom, his deputy in the storming operation, became head of Mossad. A participant of the operation, Uzi Dayan – nephew of the celebrated General Moshe Dayan, later also became a general and Deputy Chief of Staff and in time, Head of the Israeli Security Council. Another participant, the then 23 year old Benjamin

raeli War of 1973, when the ZAHAL suffered heavy losses at the Suez Canal, he broke through to the West Bank, and with his tanks, positioned just a stone's throw from Cairo, caused Egypt to find itself on the verge of a military catastrophe. As a result, with the mediation of the USSR, Egypt immediately requested peace.

The brother of the current Prime Minister, Yonatan Netanyahu, was the only Israeli soldier to die during Operation Entebbe,

PROFOUND MILITARISATION DID NOT PREVENT ISRAEL FROM REMAINING THE ONLY DEMOCRATIC COUNTRY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WITH RESILIENT ECONOMY AND EXTENSIVE CIVIL RIGHTS

citizens and extensive civil rights. Today, Ukraine is often called upon to follow Israel's example. But those in power here today are hardly fit for that. The only hope for the realistic revival of Ukraine's national elite is connected to the volunteers, soldiers and officers who are fighting in Eastern Ukraine and could hardly every want Ukraine to remain the pitiful reinvention of the Ukrainian Socialist Republic that it has been all these years. ■

Holocaust: Memory Paradigm

In order to become part of the European history Ukraine must first learn to cognize and remember own history

Author:

Vitaliy Nakhmanovich, *historian*

For centuries Ukrainians were made accustomed to inferiority, as though their history is nothing more than a history of a "borderland" of empires and civilizations. The history of Ukraine has always been but a chapter in the history of some foreign nation, a subplot in someone else's memory. To this day what we see is attempts to rediscover ourselves within the European or Eurasian narrative, to borrow the innermost knowledge from our "elder brothers", to be let in on someone else's wisdom. Ukrainian intellectuals are prepared to first and foremost remain students of the world history school, not even contemplating themselves as its full-fledged participants, let alone leaders. Thus, when it comes to the Holocaust usually there are two motives: 'this is what Europe demands' and 'for this we get Europe to remember our Holodomor'. Perhaps Ukrainians should revise the entire paradigm of memory about this tragedy of the Jews? The Holocaust is the first of the decisive moments in the history of the West, the epicenter of which unfolded in Ukraine. Jews accounted for a quarter of all civilian losses in Ukraine, and a quarter of all Europe's Jews that died in the WWII were from Ukraine. It weren't the Crusades or Humanism, or even Reformation and Enlightenment that fully integrated Ukraine into the history of Europe. The Holocaust did.

HISTORICAL MEMORY: IS IT ABOUT THE PAST OR THE FUTURE?

Sociologist Paul Connerton suggests, as common knowledge, that "our experience of the present very largely depends upon our knowl-



Alyona Dovzhyk, 11th grade, Kyiv. A painting from the Babi Yar series, 2012

edge of the past. [...] We will experience our present differently in accordance with the different pasts to which we are able to connect that present. Hence the difficulty of extracting our past from our present: not simply because present factors tend to influence – some might want to say distort – our recollections of the past, but also because past factors tend to influence, or distort, our experience of the present.”

Such a view is erroneous at its core. The past does define our present and our future to a great extent. However, it does so at the level of objective processes. While at the level of subjective reality it is the other way round: our actual historical memory is the projection of our desired future onto our past. There is the passive "baggage" of our knowledge of history, the accumulated information about historical events and global historic processes. From this aggregate our individual and collective memory picks out the particular things we view as models for the future, both positive and negative. In other words, they are things we wish to repeat or avoid depending on how we see our own future. Therefore historical memory is an ideologically actualized part of historic knowledge.

This interpretation allows us to break out of the vicious circle in which we are doomed to stay as long as we recognize the total psychological dependence of our future on our history. Of course, we cannot change what already happened, but from it we can consciously pick out the lessons we need for our future. If fact what we already do is exactly that. So we should stop pretending that our artificial memory formations are the historical truth itself, and that they are absolutely compulsory for others, or even for us.

Understanding this brings us back to the question: why does Ukraine need to remember the Holocaust? It is not about simply being familiar with the term. It would be odd to be unaware of the fact that one and a half million people of your country were exterminated less than eighty years ago. And the fact that the post-war USSR leadership did its best to eradicate every vestige of awareness about this tragedy is in itself a terrible crime of the Communist regime. But how

is this going to help in building the new Ukraine?

There are two key points in the established model of memory about the Holocaust. The first is its uniqueness is the world history. The second is that the Holocaust was the culmination of Europe's anti-Semitism.

However, viewing the Holocaust as a unique phenomenon automatically implies that it can never be repeated. The only field where it remains possible in theory is the history of anti-Semitism. Therefore the slogan "Never again!" that accompanies the research and popularization of the Holocaust history only implies not allowing the repeat of the genocide of Jews. Additionally, the dogmatic reluctance to try and understand the logic of the Nazi ideology, and to find, if not rational, then at least logical arguments Hitler used to justify his anti-Semitic policy, results in it being helplessly recognized as incomprehensible, or such that was brought about by artificial political manipulation. Therefore the Holocaust is turning into a historical paradox, a mysterious wild accident on humanity's path of progress.

Even in such a form the memory about the Holocaust has still found its place in the contemporary world. For Israel it serves as a justification for the right to exist and simultaneously the global purpose of existence, as the very creation of the Jewish state became possible only owing to the international support, which was fueled by the subconscious recognition by the Western powers of their partial responsibility for the extermination of European Jews. And the declared purpose of Israel's existence lies in the necessity to provide all Jews of the world a refuge should the need ever arise.

Jews as a people require the memory about the Holocaust as a critical uniting factor, as well as the marker of identity, especially in the time of total secularization. Today, the Jews that do not attend the synagogue, speak different languages and are citizens of different states are only united by the connection to the people that suffered through centuries of persecution and became victim of mass extermination in the 20th century during the holocaust.

Clearly, the State of Israel and the Jews in general also need the non-European memory about the Holocaust as a safeguard from anti-Semitism and the undefeatable argument in the struggle against anti-Zionism. But for how long can the non-European memory about this tragedy be fueled by the remorse of European nations alone? Could such a fragile underpinning backfire, giving way to rejection?

UNIQUENESS: CHALLENGES AND PROSPECTS

Viewing the Holocaust as a unique phenomenon in history narrows the options for spreading the historical memory about it for two reasons. Both are related to the fact that any unique phenomenon is locked within a certain place and moment in history. In common terms this means that the memory about the Holocaust is primarily that of a family, a personal one and

OUR ACTUAL HISTORICAL MEMORY IS THE PROJECTION OF OUR DESIRED FUTURE ONTO OUR PAST

therefore is based on the experience by the participants, witnesses or their close relatives. Obviously given the magnitude of this tragedy, a considerable enough human resource for preserving this memory will remain for awhile. But as time passes it will inevitably shrink, as the memory of a family is kept alive by the connection between the generations.

On the systemic level the concept of the uniqueness of the Holocaust locks the roles of "characters" in this tragedy. This precludes mental constructions and memory practices built on varying identification of oneself with different participants of the events. In other words, the Jews will forever remain the victims of the Holocaust, the Germans as its authors and performers, the British and the Americans as observing bystanders, and the nations of the Continental Europe as collaborationists. Only this kind of "rigid cast" can ensure the "correct" function of the Israeli-European model of memory about the Holocaust. However, it is this rigidity that presents the biggest challenge for the survival of this very memory. As it is

unclear, why, for instance, a contemporary resident of Israel must necessarily be forever seen as a victim of the Holocaust, while a modern citizen of Germany – as an executioner and a Nazi.

This problem is especially acute for Ukraine. Attempts are being made left and right to label Ukrainians as Nazi accomplices co-responsible for the Holocaust. This image of "Ukrainian fascist bourgeois nationalists" honed by the Soviet propaganda was to an extent carried through to the contemporary Russian propaganda. The European myth still sees Ukrainians as perennial "genetic anti-Semites and pogromists". In Germany, which seeks to get rid of its exclusive responsibility for the Holocaust, "scientific" theories are birthed alleging that the local population, in particular one in Ukraine, is responsible for initiating (!) mass extinction of the Jews.

The reluctance of Ukrainians to take up this prescribed role is backed up by its glaring inconsistency with historic reality. During the WWII Ukraine not only lacked its own statehood but even any form of true local self-government endowed with the right to pass decisions on behalf of the entire nation. Ukrainian lands were scattered among different states and administrative formations, and the fate of Jews in them dramatically differed. Ultimately, Ukrainians fought in the war and were part of various armed formations of different countries and political movements. Therefore a priori one cannot speak of a typical conscious behavior of all, or even the majority of Ukrainians during the Holocaust. Certainly, the number of those that were involved in extermination of the Jews by no means overpowers the number of those that helped the Jews either directly or by fighting against the Nazi regime.

On top of that, currently the Ukrainians are nesting a genocide victim complex of their own, the genocide being the Holodomor, a deadly famine organized by the Soviet regime. And this is where the systemic flaw of the uniqueness of the Holocaust concept rears its ugly head. In the Holodomor's case Ukrainians are the victim, but the rigid model of memory about the Holocaust



Yaroslav Lysenko, 8th grade, Putyvl, Poltava Oblast. Holocaust, 2011
Holocaust. Everyone has the right to live!

The illustrations are by the winners of annual school contests History and the Lessons of the Holocaust held by the Ukrainian Center for Holocaust Studies

does not envisage "changing the roles", therefore the Ukrainians "cannot" be the victims, because the role of the victim is permanently reserved for the Jews. As a result the memories about the Holocaust and the Holodomor become incompatible. They are conflicting instead of being complementary.

THE PLACE IN HISTORY

For the Holocaust to become an organic part of historical memory of different nations, it must first be returned to history. This means finding its place, firstly, in the general

historic process and, secondly, alongside other similar phenomena.

Analyzing the factors that led the Nazis to power in Germany, helped them to seize almost the entire Europe and eventually made the Holocaust possible is not the purpose of this text. As regards to the historic memory about this tragedy, a number of crucial things must be realized. First of all, anti-Semitism was not a collateral aspect, but in fact was among the fundamentals of the Nazi ideology, based on the theory about the hierarchy of races with their inherent civilizational features. Secondly,

this theory itself represented one of the versions of the post-Christian science-centric worldview that sought, and still seeks to replace the transcendental axis of Good versus Evil with a similar material axis, within which the eternal struggle takes place. Thirdly, the "abolishment" of God resulted in replacement of the religious set of ethics with the "scientific" one, under which anything that favored the "forces of the Good", be it a race, a social class, a nation or indeed an individual, was deemed morally acceptable.

The experience of Holocaust, much like one of the Holodomor, serves as undeniable proof that such large-scale historic processes are triggered not without the help of ideological factors. The extermination of the most successful and socially effective (economically) social classes took place in both totalitarian empires in accordance with the beliefs based upon nothing but ideology alone. Both experiments, the Nazi and the Soviet, were attempts to deny the practical experience of the humanity's development on the premise of nothing but purely theoretical "scientific" underpinnings. At the same time the overwhelming majority of the populace in both the Third Reich and the USSR were utterly captivated by these fallacies and had little reservations about renouncing human morality and common sense. Thus one can claim that from a global historical standpoint the Holocaust has the very same ideological origins as the Holodomor, or the deportation of the Crimean-Tatars, and in terms of morality stands in the same line as the Armenian Massacre and the tragedy of Hiroshima.

If we decide against treating the Holocaust as a unique historical phenomenon, it becomes "just another" mass killing, of which there were many in the modern history. But instead of being unique, i.e. exceptional and incomparable, the phenomenon turns into a "universal", and therefore an archetypal one. Much like the French Revolution is an archetype for all revolutions that preceded and followed it, the Holocaust must become an archetype for all genocides that happened before and after.

If fact this is already happening on a spontaneous and largely subconscious level. The term "Holocaust" is being broadened to signify

the extermination of all groups persecuted by the Nazis. The emergence of terms like "the Romani Holocaust" and "the Ukrainian Holocaust" (i.e. the Holodomor) must be viewed not as an attempt to belittle the significance of the Jewish tragedy, but as a recognition of its universal nature, its transformation from the specific historical to archetypal.

At this point we get to the next, perhaps, the most crucial aspect of all, one that ties us not to history or historic memory, but to our future. Recognizing the Jewish Holocaust as an archetype for all genocides puts firmly on the agenda the return to viewing the history of Jews as an archetype of the entire historical process. The "return", because it is exactly how Christianity, having labeled itself "the new Israel", initially viewed the holy history of Jews. By "renouncing" Christianity, the Enlightenment naturally renounced the biblical history along with it. Thus the Jews "turned" into a normal nation, while their history turned into just another, if perhaps somewhat untypical, history. And the Jews, who at that very time went the path of assimilation, were happy to see their history "normalized", and to this moment are striving to turn into a "normal" nation.

But the Holocaust and the recreation of the State of Israel serve as a testimony that a universal – holy – role of the Jewish people in the history did not conclude with the arrival of Christianity. Could this tragedy be a realization of biblical prophecies? Could the Holocaust be the consequence of renouncing the absolute morality, the origin of which is not the people, but their Creator? Could the attempt to fully replace God with human intelligence be the cause of the emergence of "scientific" theories that required their adherents to exterminate millions of innocent people? All these questions led to just one: are we prepared to find a place for God in our worldview without giving up on further discovery and cognition?

This does not imply "Medieval Renaissance", but rather an "Alternative Renaissance". The classical Renaissance appealed to the antique traditions, scientific and pagan, trampled by the march of Christianity. We, in turn, today need to come back to the point

The experience of the Holocaust, much like one of the Holodomor, serves as undeniable proof that such large-scale historic processes are triggered not without the help of ideological factors



FOR THE HOLOCAUST TO BECOME AN ORGANIC PART OF HISTORICAL MEMORY OF DIFFERENT NATIONS, IT MUST FIRST BE RETURNED TO HISTORY

Ukraine, which having survived both the Holodomor and the Holocaust is, perhaps, the only land unfortunate enough to have experienced the dark side of both "scientific" theories – the class and the racial – from two great empires, the Soviet and the Nazi.

Perhaps, there is a deep historic meaning in the fact that the nation, which for centuries had remained an object in the historical process, on the verge of its resurrection survived two of the most horrific tragedies in the human history? Survived only to return as a full-fledged member of the European family of nations, and to bring to these nations that know all about the infinite rise of the human spirit, its knowledge about its equally infinite fall. ■

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"I am ashamed that we are not free..."

The *Sturm und Drang* of Lesya Ukrainka: Viennese episodes from 1891

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"My hands are in chains, but my heart and mind are free..." – Lesya Ukrainka, in a letter to Mykhailo Kosach, February 25, 1891

"My only hope is on the open sea", wrote Lesya Ukrainka on March 3, 1891 to Mykhailo Pavlyk, editor of the Lviv-based magazine *Narod*, as if to sum up her six week stay in Vienna. She had come to the capital of Austria in hopes of undergoing an operation that would improve her health and finally end her disease. However, no miracle occurred: Professor Theodor Billroth would not operate on Ukrainka's debilitated legs, advising instead that she get used to the "apparatus" (prosthesis) and spend her summers in warm climates.

The disease began in Lesya's childhood, when a cold led to bone tuberculosis; it was so severe that in 1883 the then 12 year-old girl underwent an operation on her left hand at Kyiv University. However, her leg was in pain as well, prompting her to travel often to spend time "on the water": at the spas of Druskininkai (Lithuania) or the Khadzhybey Estuary near Odessa. When relief finally came, she was glad to trade her crutches for a single cane, without which she could not walk.

Treatment became a daily struggle. Now, in Vienna, Lesya decided that she'd had enough "warm baths", and needed the "open sea". Thus, a few months later in June, she travelled to Crimea with her mother and sister Olha.

LESYA UKRAINKA, GEORGE KENNAN, AND ANTON CHEKHOV

The forty days in Vienna were not in vain, having left a deep impression on Lesya's soul. She once

wrote to her brother: "Now more than ever, I have mastered '*Sturm und Drang*'" (a German proto-Romantic literary movement of the late-18th century – **Ed**). Lesya Ukrainka's letters from Vienna clearly illustrate the "storm and

stress" that she endured in early 1891. Only six of the letters survive today, but what expressive, spiritually rich messages they are! Three were addressed to Pavlyk, the rest to her uncle, brother Mykhailo, and sister Olha.



Lesya Ukrainka

At the time, Austria was electing envoys to the Sejm (regional parliamentary assemblies of the crown lands of the Austro-Hungarian Empire). Galicia, part of Western Ukraine with the capital in Lviv, was then in one of the crown lands – **Ed.**). Despite her illness, Lesya Ukrainka observed the political life of the country and its “electoral fever” with unabated attention. She had come from the despotic Russia of Alexander III, where, in the words of Ivan Franko, “society seemed to have gone numb”. The contrasts were immediately visible. “I look around at this Europe and these Europeans; certainly, one cannot see everything when sitting off to the side, yet even a glimpse would suffice”, Lesya wrote to her uncle in Sofia (Bulgaria) with a philosophical sorrow. “At first I had the impression that I had arrived in a different world – a better, freer world. Now I will have an even more difficult time back home than before. I am ashamed that we are not free, that we sleep quietly in our shackles. Now I’ve woken up, and it’s hard for me, it’s sad and painful...” (March 17, 1891).

She had already known that she lived under an oppressive regime, but now from abroad her “native” slavery became even more acute. No wonder the sinister image of the prison crops up so often in Lesya’s verses, poetry, and dramas – like a Carthage that she must destroy for the freedom of man and nation!

At the end of one of her letters to Pavlyk from Vienna, she added the following question in a postscript: “Why don’t you mention ‘Kennan’s Siberia’ in *Narod?*”, to which she added, “It would be interesting and useful for the Galician public”. Thus, in March 1891 Lesya Ukrainka must have been familiar with the sensational work of American traveler and publicist George Kennan (1845-1914), whose *Siberia and the Exile System* dealt with the life of Russian convicts. In order to write it, Kennan and artist George Albert Frost first traveled to Siberia from May 1885 to August 1886, with a specific interest in the system of penal servitude and exile. By 1887-1889, his articles on Siberia were al-

ready appearing in American magazines. In them, Kennan criticized the tsarist government and wrote sympathetically of revolutionaries, including “Grandmother of the Russian Revolution” Yekaterina Breshkovskaya and political exiles Lazarev and Volkhov, whom he befriended. Is it surprising that Kennan himself was arrested and his essays were forbidden by the Russian authorities?

George Kennan’s public lectures on “Impenetrable Siberia” also caused a sensation in the United States and England. In order to “bring his stories to life”, he even appeared on stage in shackles and prisoner’s rags!

Kennan’s book, or at least his articles, were familiar to Anton Chekhov as well. In May 1890, to the surprise of his friends, Chekhov had travelled to the island of Sakhalin to study the lives of convicts and exiles. At that time, Lesya Ukrainka was living with her family in the village of Kolodyazhne, Volhynia, and planning to head “to the water” for treatment. She wrote prolifically at the time, penning the stoic poem *Contra spem spero*.

“No, I have no plans to become a Humboldt¹ or even a Kennan”, Anton Chekhov assured Alexey Suvorin, editor of the *Novoye Vremya* newspaper. But he was sly nevertheless, intending to write something “Kennan-like”: Chekhov was also interested in the “other Russia”.

Spending three months and two days on the “convict island” (as he himself defined the period with characteristic self-irony), Anton Chekhov then travelled by steamboat to Odesa over the course of fifty days (!). He visited Hong Kong and the island of Ceylon, heading then to the Indian Ocean, then the Red Sea, and through the Suez Canal to the Mediterranean, ending at the Black Sea. On December 5, 1890, the steamer St. Petersburg carrying the future author of *Sakhalin Island* finally moored at the port of Odesa.

Lesya had “just missed” Chekhov, arriving in Odesa on August 23rd en route from Yalta, Crimea (where Chekhov himself would later settle) and leaving the city the next day.



LESYA HAD ALREADY KNOWN THAT SHE LIVED UNDER AN OPPRESSIVE REGIME, BUT NOW FROM ABROAD HER “NATIVE” CAPTIVITY BECAME EVEN MORE ACUTE.

Shortly after his trip to Sakhalin, Chekhov wrote the inherently tragic, anguished story *Ward Number 6* about a provincial insane asylum. Astute readers perceived the ward’s inhabitants as symbolizing Russia on the whole. Perhaps the most emotional impression came from writer Nikolai Leskov, a contemporary of Chekhov: *Ward Number 6* depicts our order and our personalities in miniature. Ward 6 is everywhere. It’s Russia”.

The country as prison, the country as asylum ... The story’s Doctor Ragin, also exiled to *Ward Number 6*, states in horror: “In twenty years I’ve only found one intelligent man in this city, and he is crazy”. These words express the depth, if not the hopelessness, of Chekhov’s anguish.

But Lesya Ukrainka used a different tone for her “Cassandra” predictions: her favourite image is the sword, while battles pervade her poetry. A common

theme is the willingness to sacrifice oneself in battle without hope that one’s grave will ever be adorned with laurels. In the poem *Dream* from 1891, she depicts the grandiose destruction of a prison and a decisive change in the “eternal order of the world”:

*A frightful uprising shakes
the earth.
And strong buildings fall with
thunder.
Great horror and great libera-
tion there shall be!
And the worldwide shackles
fall...*

And note that this image of a historical drama, a drama of “great deliverance” appeared in her work shortly after her stay in Vienna! *Sturm und Drang*, indeed...

Even more intriguing, it appears that George Kennan and

¹Friedrich Wilhelm von Humboldt was a Prussian geographer, naturalist, and explorer

Lesya Ukrainka had a mutual friend: Siberian exile Feliks Volkhovsky (1846-1914). Yet in truth, Lesya became acquainted with him several years after Kennan. She corresponded with Volkhovsky, who at that time had emigrated to England, and their letters had a conspiratorial nature, naturally discussing the political struggle against the autocratic regime in Russia.

"ELECTORAL FEVER"

But let's return to the "electoral fever" in Austria. Lesya Ukrainka took particular interest in the activities of the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, which is understandable because this essentially social-democratic movement was coordinated by her uncle Mykhailo Drahomanov, whom she considered her spiritual teacher. The party was founded in October 1890 and its 'maximum programme' was authored by Ivan Franko and Yevhen Levitskyi. These same Galician radicals founded the magazine *Narod* (People) with which Lesya kept in touch. The party programme stated, among other things, that "the Party aims to change the method of production in accordance with the achievements of scientific socialism. That is, it wants collective labour structures and collective ownership of the means of production".

Social-democratic ideas were gaining popularity. Following the events of 1905-1906, however, Ukrainka reconsidered her attitude toward socialism—so much so that her anti-utopian drama *Rufin and Priscilla* even includes a tragic warning about the future of "paradise". But so far we're still in 1891. And Lesya, like a real political scientist, is analysing the political situation in Galicia and her attitude toward the parties in a letter to her brother Mykhailo. She now looked at many things with different eyes. She ascertained that the self-proclaimed "populist" party Nova Era (new era)—that is, the "union of Ruthenians (i.e. Ukrainians) with the government and the Poles"—had no prospects. The Poles and Ruthenians, as before, "still don't trust each other and hide their best stones in their bosoms". Yulian Romanchuk, leader of the "popu-

lists", began to remind her of the "social types of the Ruin" (a historical period of the second half of 17th century – **Ed.**) losing credibility in the eyes of voters.

Lesya Ukrainka mentioned the "populists" compromise with bitter sarcasm: "Their crooked paths and quasi-patriotic shouting and bowing were detestable to the government", she wrote to Drahomanov on March 17. Adding a note not only from herself, but from a group of "young Ukrainians": "I was once assured that the only path for us was a crooked one – but the very sense of truth turned me away from that sort of 'loyal patriotism'. Those 'politics', with their 'loyalty' and crooked roads leading to the high ideals, their 'moderate liberalism', 'national religiousness' etc., etc. – this has all exhausted us young Ukrainians and we would be glad to finally leave this 'quiet swamp' for cleaner waters".

These words penetrated her voice of a new generation, including Lesya's circle of associates who rethink their relationship with the "parents". "We have rejected the name "Ukrainophiles" and are called Ukrainians, because that's what we are, there's no 'philia'," she explained the change that occurred in the minds of her peers to Drahomanov.

THOUGH LESYA UKRAINKA DID NOT WRITE ABOUT IT IN VIENNA, SHE UNDERWENT A PROCESS OF AESTHETIC SELF-DETERMINATION THERE

manov.

Another important brushstroke in this collective portrait is found in a letter to Mykhailo Drahomanov: "A kind of 'westernization' has begun among our young citizens, many have taken to learning French, German, English and Italian so that they can read other foreign books". These 'young citizens' wanted to see the outside world, but could they really break free from the pages of the "shabby Russian press"?

Lesya Ukrainka was "categorically" incapable of sympathy toward the Russophile party, always referring to them as "kat-

sapy" (a derogatory term – **Ed.**). Yet she was sympathetic to the radicals: "Of the three Galician (Ruthenian) parties, I find the radical one the most progressive and intelligent; I think that when a party handles its affairs intelligently, it has an easy time attracting common people".

Similarly, she is impassioned by the hope that this new political movement might bring energy to "our burned-out, battered community". She also wants to improve the magazine *Narod*, telling Mykhailo Drahomanov about the impressions of her Kyiv friends who had complained about the large number of reprints from the Russian press and translations of Tolstoy and Uspensky.

However, her passion is quite restrained: no "fraud in rural elections" or "crude bribery" of voters ("He who has more money has the stronger party") slipped past Ukrainka's watchful eye. A sympathizer of the radicals, she nevertheless does not seem to be particularly loyal to any party. Instead, she prefers to observe and analyse. After all, Lesya Ukrainka's letters from Vienna confirm her later self-reliance: "I am by nature inherently 'wild', and I always enter into genuine relationships as an 'ally' rather than a 'member'". Lesya would write these words in March 1903 in a letter to Feliks Volkhovsky in London.

SALON ARTISTIQUE

Yet it wasn't all politics for Lesya Ukrainka in those February and March days. The flat on Florian St. in which she and her mother lived quickly became a "salon artistique": local "cossacks" (i.e. Galician students who were members of the compatriot association Sich) visited daily to see the "women from Ukraine", and doctors Yaroslav Okunevskyi and Ivan Hrynevetskyi gladly stayed at the "artistic salon". Together they held conversations and discussions, sometimes singing to Lesya's accompaniment on the piano.

Many Sich members sympathized with the "radicals", and Lesya was surprised to note that their views on literature were sometimes similar to those of Russian "populists": "We some-

times have arguments here about things like ‘what is better—Schiller or a new pair of boots? The Venus de Milo or a sheaf of straw?’ and so on”. In her letters to her brother, Lesya refers to this ignorance toward fine art “anti-poetic and anti-artistic”. She goes on to describe how she “quarrelled with the Sich members over Neo-Romanticism”, arguing that “in literature, portraits have value, not photographs, [...] for without inventiveness, there is no literature”.

In her quarrels with these “ultra-realists”, Lesya’s thoughts on Neo-Romanticism are of particular interest: though she did not write about it in Vienna, she underwent a process of aesthetic self-determination there that endured for her entire creative career. “For better or worse, literature is my profession”, she had confessed to her brother two years prior.

It was also in Vienna that, thanks to the gentle guidance of Mykhailo Pavlyk, Lesya Ukrainka discovered the work of writer Olha Kobylanska. Pavlyk sent her the story *Lorelei* by the young Olha from Bukovyna, and soon thereafter, Lesya sent him a long letter describing in detail her impression of the piece. “The beauty of this story is not in its ideas, but in the deep, subtle, logical psychology of the heroine Natalka”, Lesya wrote. “Reading the story of Natalka’s thoughts, I saw before me the story of all of our unhappy intelligent women”. By association, she recalled George Sand’s prose, with its yearning for the emancipation of women. Lesya even proposed to Pavlyk that, rather than publish *Lorelei* in *Narod*, he should send it for publication in the “women’s” collection that was to be a continuation of Kobrynska and Pchilka’s *First Garland Almanac* (1887).

She instinctively felt she had found a kindred spirit in the writer Kobylanska, one that was quite familiar with the “New School, a Neo-Romantic”...

Occasionally, Lesya came to admire Vienna. She and her mother lived almost in the very centre of the city, next to the Town Hall, the residence of the Emperor, a park, the Civic Theatre, and Parliament building.



Lesya was amazed: “There is perhaps no city more splendid than Vienna in the entire world”.

Mother and daughter, these two mysterious “women from Ukraine”, frequently attended the opera. The element of music so fascinated Lesya that once she even confessed to her uncle: “I sometimes think that I would make far better music than poetry”. Perhaps, if not for her disabled arms.

In her letters, Lesya often mentions operas that she attends. In just a few weeks, she had amassed quite a repertoire: *Die Meistersinger von Nürnberg* and *Siegfried* by Richard Wagner, *Othello* by Giuseppe Verdi, *William Tell* by Gioacchino Rossini, *Jewess*, *The Prophet*, and the *Ballet Fairytale Dance*. Then, she went together with her mother to see Rossi, the “Italian star” in the role of Ivan the Terrible (play by Alexei Tolstoy). “Let’s see how these Italians portray ‘katsap’ tyranny in Italian!”, Lesya wrote to her brother playfully.

And see she did: “Just imagine, Olha, that Italians performed ‘Ivan the Terrible’ in Ital-

ian!”, she wrote to her sister. “It was funny and wonderful, and their costumes were also odd and they couldn’t behave like ‘katsaps’, only the one playing Ivan the Terrible looked like a ‘katsap’ despite being Italian”.

The irony of her theatrical (and other) “commentary” is quite often noteworthy: it was not in Lesya’s nature to accept pathos and sentimentality! Thus, upon looking around the auditorium during a performance of *Othello*, she thought “*Desdemona* sang the song about the willow and “*Ave Maria*” so well that I almost cried, and some German ladies cried so much that it was frightening. The Germans here often cry in the theatre; as soon as something is mournful, they fall down with sorrow, and I just think, why are they bawling so?!”.

She herself was not one of those who “bawled”. Clearly the Drahomanov family line played a role here: both her mother and uncle were strong-willed, sceptical and sharp.

Several of Lesya’s letters also focus on the issue of shame. “I am ashamed that we are such captives, that we sleep quietly in our shackles. Now I’ve woken up, and it’s hard for me, it’s sad and painful”, she wrote to Drahomanov on March 17, 1891. She was also ashamed for the Galicians who professed the motto of a “new era” for the “populists” while “bowing to the government”. She also felt “ashamed of [herself] (as the citizen of a prison country! – **Auth.**) in front of a free people” (Austrians)...

It was the shame of an inwardly free person who sees slavery all around her, ashamed of her nation’s captivity, ashamed of her compatriots’ habits of humiliation and obedience.

Returning from Vienna where she had celebrated her 20th birthday, Lesya Ukrainka could not have known that almost half of her life was already over. Having survived *Sturm und Drang*, she felt like her life was only just beginning... ■

Lesya’s mother, Olena Pchilka in Vienna

Orpheus Descends Into Hell

Artist's responsibility before the society has moved from art into everyday life

Author:
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Recently a peculiar video generated a great deal of hype on the internet. In it a Russian celebrity actor Mikhail Porechenkov with "PRESS" in large text plastered all over the back of his helmet and moronic elation all over his face sprays the environment with machine gun fire. It should also be noted that the footage was made in the now infamous Donetsk airport, and the actor arrived there to present his brand new film "Pod-dubny", which was recently banned in Ukraine.

And since the event occurred on the eve of Halloween, one could treat this performance as the very fitting arrival of evil critters, while Porechenkov's head made a decent enough impression of a hollowed out pumpkin. The military helmet market "PRESS" served as a perfect metaphor for the role of the Russian media in this war.

All fun and jokes aside, Porechenkov should have simply been kicked out of the country in such a way that would have him forever forget what Ukrainian state border even looks like, and that would be it... There is, however, one other point to be made.

Neither among his defenders (and there were plenty of those even among non-Putinists), nor among the critics there was one who would say: 'It's not even about the fact that at war one cannot wear a helmet marked "Press" while firing out of a machine gun. Neither it is about the fact that posing in front of the camera with that weapon is not in the best of taste. It's not even about the fact that in such a difficult moment for your supposedly beloved Russia (it is becoming a marginalized outcast in the eyes of the entire world) any

move towards escalating the situation could have the most unforeseeable consequences. All of these points are valid, but the main crime you committed is that you marred, buried the entire idea of artist's responsibility before the society. Even of such a lousy artist as yourself'.

The word responsibility itself seems to have maintained its meaning only in legal context, and even then only if it's on paper. On one hand the cultural and artistic community still aspires to inspire and to move our souls, yet on the other, they act as though these souls do not exist.

The more various sophisticated gadgets appear, the more aggressive the social networks become at "catching" people, and the more open their life gets, the more vulnerable their brains become, so does their soul as a result. The soul has an inherent weakness for all that glitters and wows the imagination, but today's high-tech world throws more temptations at it than ever before. And one of the main temptations for any normal human being remains the hidden desire to be deceived, from which art prospered in all times.


The more religious the society is, the less responsibility before the society is required from an artist. Religious society has strict moral guidelines and doesn't require extra gods to tell the good from bad. In a society where faith is a usual and integral part of the public consciousness an artist has a somewhat different function, compared to one in the society that abandoned faith. The faith and love that in a pious society are re-

served for god, in a secular one are channeled onto an artist.

One doesn't have to be very knowledgeable about art to know that talent is a god-given gift, and thus, by getting into art you get to touch the divine. For a layman an artist presents a mysterious creature, blessed by god, one that brings us the much-

needed perception of ourselves as beautiful creations of nature. As Ortega y Gasset put it, 'culture is not life, but rather its perspective, when life reflects in itself obtaining shine and elegance'. And humans need this shine and elegance as much as they need salt and sugar, thus the reverence to any performer is immense.

This explains a layman's overly sensitive attitude towards the exploits of the men of culture. Artist's divinity is more of a latent notion. Hardly anyone in the public is conscious about seeing a piece of God in an actor and, if suggested, most would certainly discard such an idea. As would they discard the thought that in their view each and every artist is a bearer of some secret knowledge, one that is unattainable for the mere mortals. In reality, however, more often than



not the cherished actor is merely executing the will of the director as a professional reader of others' words amidst the appropriate setting. Yet few are aware of this.

The machine-gun-hugging Porechenkov is supposed to be much more than a brawny dimwit called Misha overcome with glee from holding a real weapon, but a person that channeled the characters of Bulgakov (Myshkaevsky in "White Guard"), Shakespeare (Polonius in "Hamlet"), Vampilov (waiter in "Duck Hunting"), Lev Tolstoy (Pozdnyshv in "The Kreutzer Sonata"), a person that played Aleksandr Kuprin. This artist's behavior in the Donetsk airport erodes the viewer's faith not only in the artist in question, but in the divine itself.

A long time ago, in another era, in what now seems like a different galaxy altogether, getting behind the scenes or to the make-up room

of an artist used to be a privilege completely beyond reach, unless you were lucky enough to have an aunty working in the box office, a cloakroom attendant uncle, or a prompter granny. In there, behind the scenes was an altar, one was allowed to bring flowers and to silently stare in awe catching every sound that comes out of there.

But technical progress is unrelenting. Just like the 1917 revolution enabled the shagrags to smash the locks off cathedral doors, the technological revolution broke all the locks off yesterday's mysteries. Secrets are vanishing one after another: paid excursions are visiting backstage; the make-up rooms turned out to be nothing but little cubbyholes tucked-away and scarcely redecorated, if at

all; the flair of mystery has been vacuumed away to cover the bank accounts of "public servants", while artists ended up singing the backing line for politicians from rostrums, at rallies and corporate events of the powers that be.

Officeholders did not get to their offices by being naive. Even

EVEN WITHOUT READING BOOKS AND KNOWING NEXT TO NOTHING ABOUT ART, A DICTATOR IS CLEAR ABOUT ONE THING: BY GETTING HIS HANDS ON AN ARTIST, HE GETS HOLD OF THE PEOPLE

The cult of art is slowly dying these days, which doesn't necessarily mean that its role in the life of society disappears. Art simply takes up new functions

without reading books, knowing next to nothing about art, the cunning dictator is clear about one thing: by getting his hands on an artist, he gets hold of the people. That is why in any totalitarian state artists are the first to be courted by the regime.

Art is a territory of freedom. It is able of showing people the road to escape slavery, which is precisely what any government fears the most.

The government is wary that people may experience the taste of freedom, that's why the it makes sure to deal with the culture first. Plenty of methods exist for this. There ones that are old and crude, like censorship, for instance, direct banning of undesirable works, persecution of artists. Andrei Makarevich and Diana Arbenina that dared to voice their support of Ukraine are now, at least as long as Putin is in power, restricted to perform in more underground establishments, and in doing so turning their owners into dissidents. This is by far the most conventional, perhaps even prehistoric, method. The fancy term for it is "ostracism", but in layman's terms it is basically "Sic'em!". Harassing these musicians, especially Makarevich, the media relentlessly sling mud at them using paid trolls, but people, as we know, still have faith the printed word.

There is, however, a more sophisticated method: to take a renowned and popular cultural figure of the nationwide scale and making the most of his or her av-



erage intelligence as well as political promiscuity get the artist to utter things that would seem like too much even if said by politicians. Take Russia's Iosif Kobzon, for example. They sent the old man into Donbas, let him sing a few songs of his own there and listen to others, then brought him back and staged a press conference. The delighted Orpheus descended into hell, safely popped back and then uttered whatever was required of him. "Ukraine is dead", "Obama is fighting in Donbas", "America brainwashed all of Europe" and other aggressive absurdities voiced not by the Foreign Minister, by the military or by a scandalous politician, but a person whose voice provided the legendary soundtrack to the cult film about Stierlitz nearly made even Putin's critics break a tear. The masses believe that singers simply sing songs, rather than perform to the public, so Kobzon's wild revelations are perceived as genuine and a priori sound.

Wherever you look, the cult of art is slowly dying these days, which doesn't necessarily mean that its role in the life of society disappears. Art simply takes up new functions. A lot of young people are unfamiliar with the smell of a newly printed book, the sound of pages being turned. They get their literature through e-book readers. To many of them one would struggle to explain why films should be seen in a theatre regardless if you happen to have a high quality version on your hard drive or a disc. Gone is the cult of cinema as a sacrament in which you are alone in the dark, one on one with the big screen. And it isn't coming back, all of it, just like the mystery of the backstage and artist's make-up rooms. All has been blown open. Everything is allowed. And this presents a humongous temptation. Especially for the artists, who spend their life mindful of how exceptional they are, how needed and important they to the rest of the world, with the sweet realization of the fact that millions of eyes and ears are there to catch their every move and every word.

Having exited the make-up room leaving the altar's door left open for the spectators to rush in, an artist realized what awful fate awaits him: becoming one of the others. Forgotten are the times

Having exited the make-up room leaving the altar's door left open for the spectators to rush in, an artist realized what awful fate awaits him: becoming one of the others

when impressionable young men used to take their lives having found out that their beloved and oh so otherworldly ballet dancer in fact did the number two just like the mortals, not to mention the number one. The tireless paparazzi sell to the tabloids countless photographs of popular artists yawning on their balconies in nothing but a pair of pants, enjoying a rampant bar-night, pushing strollers with crying babies, and buying dairy in supermarkets. Photos of this kind often result in lawsuits for invasion of celebrity's privacy. But the real reason seems to lie elsewhere: celebrities really don't care all that much where and with whom they get photographed by a greedy snapper, it's the thought that they may be seen doing what regular people do. It's being seen wearing regular people pants and going to regular people shops is what really hurts them. The society has no right to think of any celebrity, as though they are just one of us.

Therefore those who used to find cure for satisfying their ego in constant appearances on television, awards ceremonies, in the demand they are in wherever they

lebrities views are heard left and right about the great problems of humanity. Meanwhile their western counterparts, without as much talking get to the business and join the cause of their choosing. Jeremy Irons is fighting against plastic bags that pollute our planet, Sean Penn – against the war in Iraq, Eric Clapton – against alcohol addiction.

Practice suggests that the more prosperous is the country, the less outspoken are the cultural figures. Which is why, for instance, in Russia artists seem to struggle keeping their mouths shut at all times spewing rubbish about the fascists and horrible consequences of Maidan. Some do it more quietly by signing various joint letters in support of Putin, or gazing at him open-mouthed in front of TV-cameras, catching his every word about the naughty Ukraine. Some, like Kobzon, Porechenkov or Govorukhin put on their anti-fascist hat and saith the world about atrocities of the National Guard in Donbas. The powers that be are rubbing their paws in delight.

And nobody can tell these second-rate artists: 'Guys, you're being used. Your every word is another nail in the coffin of peace and harmony. You aren't actually interesting to them beyond your use as a new type or weaponry'.

As was aptly put by Albert Camus, 'a writer's fame these days is in being adored or despised without being read'. So the harder the times for a country, the more artist's silence is gold.

At this point some will surely argue: but how about those artists that raise their voice in defence of the common sense, swimming against the current of public opinion and government policy? Are they supposed to button up too? Their words can become a thousand times more valuable than their silence!

To this I'll answer: in a totalitarian regime any train of thought that strays from the official party line is by its nature sound and honest. Nobody is implying that artists have no right to share their views. It's about not letting the authorities to use you in your country's toughest moments. That is exactly where the main responsibility of an artist lies... now that it moved from the artistic domain into everyday life. ■

ONE DOESN'T HAVE TO BE VERY KNOWLEDGEABLE ABOUT ART TO KNOW THAT TALENT IS A GOD-GIVEN GIFT, AND THUS, BY GETTING INTO ART YOU GET TO TOUCH THE DIVINE

care to turn up, ever since the internet, surveillance devices and ultra-sensitive cameras broke into our world, began to appear in front of the audience directly, bypassing the works of art.

Actors, musicians, dancers, circus performers, began publicly speaking about life in general and the life of their homeland in particular. We found out what Alla Pugachiova thinks about the moral outlook of her country [Ed. note: Russia], Filipp Kirkorov's views on climate change, Illya Glazunov's thoughts on the decline of Europe, And Zurab Tsariteli's on the healthcare system. In this celebrities of the former Soviet states differ drastically from those in Europe and the America. The further East you go, the louder ce-



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