

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION AS A MERE PRECURSOR
TO UKRAINE'S POLITICAL REBOOT

ANDREI ILLARIONOV ON THE POTENTIAL
DISINTEGRATION OF RUSSIA

FOREIGN MARKETS FOR UKRAINIAN GOODS:
STEREOTYPES AND FACTS

international edition

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Тиждень

TRENDS & TALK

Central Election Commission announces Petro Poroshenko as the President of Ukraine and Vitaliy Klitschko as the Mayor of Kyiv



Terrorists strike a helicopter near Sloviansk killing 12 members of the National Guard and military personnel

Petro Poroshenko pays his first foreign visit as the President of Ukraine. He goes to Warsaw to meet with Barack Obama and Angela Merkel, among others

A strong explosion takes place near Luhansk Oblast State Administration killing eight, mostly civilians



In the “Almost” Mode

The developments in Ukraine change so quickly that every time we think we can end something with a full stop, the process proves that it is too early even for a comma.

We have a new President. All he still has to do to fully enter the top post is ceremonial formalities. But what will his powers be, and what majority in parliament will he rely on? Which part of the country will he be able to control *de facto*?

We have democratic elections. Almost. The presidential

Author:
Dmytro
Krapkyvenko

race did not generate any major complaints. The local elections, however, brought back the bribing of voters, and turned into a scandal in Kyiv where the new party Democratic Alliance got to the Kyiv Council only after its activists insisted on vote recount.

We have the war. Almost. Three letters of ATO (the anti-terrorist operation) are almost like Lev Trotsky's formula of “no peace, no war”: the Donbas is a place of full-scale war action with stricken Ukrainian aircrafts, cargos 200 flowing to peaceful parts

of Ukraine and through the Russian border, while the government only now moves to “considering the imposition of martial law” in the hotspot.

The military report about dispersed separatist checkpoints and proactive phases of the operation. It is almost an excuse for optimism. Meanwhile, generals' reports hide the reality where some units are essentially encircled by terrorists, and frontline soldiers complain of poor supplies of food, clothing and ammunition. Lunahsk border unit

An investigation is launched into the illegal arrest of Yuriy Lutsenko organized by the then Deputy Prosecutor General Renat Kuzmin in 2010



World Bank grants Ukraine USD 750mn as part of the First Development Policy Loan

Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan sign the agreement to form the Eurasian Economic Union

Petro Poroshenko and Vladimir Putin meet briefly at the D-Day in Normandy. Reportedly, they discuss negotiations on a possible ceasefire in Eastern Ukraine and economic consequences of the crisis

and National Guard unit in Luhansk have long been in the enemy-controlled city: separatists had long occupied government bodies there, as well as SBU and police oblast departments. That the border unit and National Guard unit would be the next targets was an easy guess. Yet, the generals overlooked that.

The Maidan has won. Almost. The regime has been toppled. Still, the Maidan is standing. Moreover, the previous government has its eyes, ears and other parts in Ukraine. And it has all that in the parliament. The games of yesterday's Party of Regions MPs suggest that the "Kurchenko group" is being established. Meanwhile, Kurchenko's media keep working while his capital is quietly flowing from Ukraine to the occupied Crimea. It took investigators three months to put another financial functionary of the regime, ex-NBU Chairman and Vice Premier Serhiy Arbuzov, on the wanted list.

The fatal "almost" haunts us in foreign policy, as well. The West has recognized the presidential election and is ready to help Ukraine. Almost. Indeed, Petro Poroshenko was welcomed in Normandy where the heroes of World War II were commemorated. Vladimir Putin attended the ceremony in the role of the key "successor" of that victory. As France hosted the commemoration ceremony, another gesture from Paris became more visible. Despite sanctions against Russia and countless "concerns", Mistral military ships made in France will reinforce the Russian fleet. More symbolically, they will be based in the Sevastopol Bay, not in the Pacific as planned earlier.

Ukrainian society and politicians are ready for the next snap parliamentary election. Almost. Noble motivations of "rebooting the system of government" and "cleansing the parliament" abound. Yet, the question arises: how will we choose MPs? It won't

work with the current mixed system. Election districts will continue to serve as a field for administrative leverage and falsifications for quite a while. An equally important question is about the territory of the actual elections. Without successful actions of the military in Eastern Ukraine, full-scale voting will hardly happen. Moreover, the legitimacy of the Central Election Commission is in the air: most of its members will soon have to leave office as their terms expire.

In fact, the entire previous 20-plus year "path of reforms" and "European integration" was full of small and big compromises, and numerous "almosts". Not a single government risked to implement effective changes because each one preferred to act as a good tsar, distribute privileges and subsidies, throw something to the potential electorate from the budget, promise improvements in the future and stabilize the situation (the favourite phrase of Viktor Yanukovich) in the face of yet another looming parliamentary or presidential election.

The current government is, too, tempted.

It has huge opportunities for the "almost" accomplishments. It can sit down at the negotiations table with Putin "for the sake of peace and agreement", seize military actions in the Donbas, and bless the establishment of Transnistria 2.0 there. It can "hear" Eastern Ukraine and provide it with exceptionally generous subsidies to the joy of the local oligarchs and yet another generation of those milking Ukrainian taxpayers. It can freeze the land market for another decade, keep health care and education underreformed, and get rid of unimportant low-level officials to present it as lustration. With skillful media coverage, all these actions can look like pragmatic compromises for the sake of "stabilization".

Ukraine's chronic diseases are so old that the only cure is deep surgery. The real frontline today goes along the verge of the compromise the politicians and society are ready to take. How serious is the President about his intention to sell his business? Will he just transfer it to someone formally, or will he actually sell his plants and TV channel? How willing is he to surround himself with "old professionals" and overlook stains on their reputation? How carefully will the Premier choose advisors for every ministry? Will he opt for professionals or those who only talk of goals, while hampering reforms and blaming failures on specific Ukrainian circumstances? Will the new government have a majority and a con-

THE REAL FRONTLINE TODAY GOES ALONG THE VERGE OF THE COMPROMISE THE POLITICIANS AND SOCIETY ARE READY TO TAKE

structive opposition, or will it remain an elite club for behind-the-stage deals and button-pushing? And will society fall into despair every time it can, or will it take proactive part in the reboot of the country, no matter how routine and boring the process is?

It is sometimes helpful to learn from your enemy. Ours is now acting in violation of any rule or law, and accepts no "almosts". Of course, we should not borrow the violence and cynicism of the state that keeps pretending to have nothing to do with the war on the territory of its neighbour. However, the Kremlin's uncompromising stance, as well as that of its agents in all self-declared republics, is something worth looking at. If you offer your hand to a beast, you risk losing it. Almost all of it. ■

PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

The Birth of a New Political Reality

Ukraine's presidential election was merely a prologue to the dramatic overhaul of the political landscape

Author:
Oles
Oleksiienko

The presidential election, the result of which was a foregone conclusion, was little more than the prelude to a more drastic shakeup of the Ukrainian political scene. Its outlines will be shaped in accordance with the public's expectations regarding the new president's first actions in office, the timeframe for an early parliamentary campaign and the way the situation in Donbas influences voting in that region. With this in mind, one should look beyond the name of the future president and instead view the prospect of carrying out the necessary state-strengthening reforms only in the light of the results of early parliamentary elections and subsequent changes in the government.

THE KEY TO CHANGE

Today, early elections to the Verkhovna Rada are welcomed not only by the majority of citizens (according to Rating Sociology Service, in early April 2014 68% of respondents supported the idea, only 21% were against), but also most major presidential candidates. And this concerned not only juggernauts like Petro Poroshenko and Yulia Tymoshenko but practically all the contenders whose popularity rating was above 1% (with the exception of Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko and the Party of Regions' ex-Governor of Kharkiv Oblast Mykhailo Dobkin).


Petro Poroshenko, even before his chances of dominating the presidential elections became obvious, announced that the Verkhovna Rada should be dismissed and new elections should be held. Opinion polls are highlighting a significant lead by the political alliance between Poroshenko's Solidarnist

(Solidarity) and Vitaliy Klitschko's UDAR (Ukrainian Democratic Alliance for Reform) parties in the hypothetical parliamentary vote. The opportunity to get the most powerful party in the Verkhovna Rada is much more attractive than cobbling together an unstable coalition out of unaffiliated MPs that can hardly be relied upon. Moreover, Poroshenko will have to work within the frameworks of the state system reformed into a parliamentary-presidential or perhaps even a purely parliamentary republic that some are trying hard to lobby into constitutional amendments.

At the same time, according to our sources, Yulia Tymoshenko had no illusions about her chances for the presidency and saw her presidential campaign as a launch pad for the future parliamentary elections. By opposing Poroshenko until the end in this campaign she was hoping to mobilize at least 30-35% of her electoral base to try to regain the status of the opposition leader. After the Verkhovna Rada is elected, she could end up leading a parliamentary coalition, which in the future may become considerably more powerful than the head of state. Moreover, early parliamentary elections provide a good opportunity for Tymoshenko to replace her current faction pieced together during her time in prison with a much more coherent and dependable selection of politicians.

On the other hand, Yulia Tymoshenko would benefit from parliamentary elections being somewhat delayed. In such a case, Petro Poroshenko will inevitably lose a considerable portion of public support as a person associated with the authorities in power. The phenomenon of Poroshenko's rapid ascent in popularity can be explained by Ukraine's traditional demand for new (or somewhat forgotten old) faces. Thus from a dark horse popular for features attributed to him by the voter, Poroshenko is to become a president that makes real decisions. Support for him will inevitably wane, as to a large extent Ukrainian society maintains messianic and frankly unrealistic expectations about politicians, even after generating two massive protests within a single decade, both of which were significant enough to go down in history as "revolutions".

While poll data indeed suggests that 71% of Petro Poroshenko's



supporters are one way or another prepared to "live through some difficulties today if it brings positive change to their life in the future", there's a catch: one would still have to persuade people that today's hardships will in the long run help change things for the better. Whereas in reality optimism tends to arise when social and economic problems are barely eating into the "safety margin".

When it comes to unpopular economic reforms, another unrealistic demand of the public, at least with the current parliamentary convocation, would be putting a fair share of this burden onto big business and the oligarchs. 42% of Petro Poroshenko's supporters are in favour of nationalizing all the large enterprises owned by oligarchs, and an additional 40% support the idea of confiscating at least those enterprises that were illegally acquired. Being an oligarch himself, the man often referred to as the Chocolate King (Poroshenko ventures include but are not limited to well-known confectionary business – **Ed.**) is unlikely to begin redistributing property let alone re-privatization on a mass scale. At the same time his ties with "old" elites are too obvious not to see the temptation of finding some kind of a "board compromise" with the former officials "for the sake of stabilizing the country". This will inevitably upset the public that voted for Poroshenko hoping for a "total reboot of the country".

Petro Poroshenko already promised to normalize relationships with the Russian Federation within three months. This issue will become a litmus test for the new president. The percentage of those who feel negatively about unequal cooperation with Ukraine's eastern neighbour is rather high among his supporters: 89% believe that Ukraine is paying artificially high prices for Russian natural gas. Even for Oleh Tiahnybok's and Yulia Tymoshenko's supporters this percentage is lower (86%), lower still for Serhiy Tihipko (67%) and around 50% for Mykhailo Dobkin's electorate. 81% of Poroshenko's supporters are prepared to conserve gas and heat if that helps to bolster the Ukrainian position in negotiations with Moscow (the respective number for Tymoshenko is 78%, 73% for Tiahnybok, 55% for Tihipko and 33% for Dobkin). 80%

of Petro Poroshenko's supporters are in favor of reducing or even halting the procurement of Russian gas altogether (only 50% of Tihipko's and 33% for Dobkin's supporters agree). Therefore the overwhelming majority of Petro Poroshenko's voters are expecting something more than normalization of relationships with Russia, there's no longer room for "business as usual". Instead the public is expecting Kyiv to take a stronger and more independent stance in its talks with Moscow.

"ORANGE" REVENGE

One can't help but notice that the pro-European camp is undergoing an resurgence of the "orange" flank that is retaking the positions gained by Yulia Tymoshenko's political force in 2006-2009. First the trend manifested itself through the growing importance of Vitaliy Klitschko's "UDAR" party which harboured plenty of refugees from the Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) party. In the meantime, Tymoshenko's own Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) was being taken over by former "orange" politicians led by Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Mykola Martynenko and Vyacheslav Kyrylenko. And now the "orange" revenge is crowned by the rise to power of one of Nasha Ukrayina's principal backers: Petro Poroshenko.

As *The Ukrainian Week* already noted in a previous publication (see *Dějã vu? Poroshenko vs Tymoshenko* at ukrainianweek.com), the struggle between the Poroshenko and Tymoshenko camps will become the biggest political confrontation over the next few years. Among the factors that will untie their hands in a way is the fact that pro-Russian political forces are looking weaker than ever. First of all, the pro-Eastern camp is lacking unity and is likely to be represented by two or three political entities. Secondly, these parties will find it hard to go through to the Parliament without the traditional support of Crimean voters, or, perhaps, even the voters of Donbas. The confrontation between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko may even prompt these two camps to seek alliances beyond the pro-European parties and look towards those who will inherit the electorate from the Party of Regions.

Based on current popularity ratings, the potential bloc com-

posed of Poroshenko's Solidarnist and Vitaliy Klitschko's UDAR (the alliance between the two was announced together with Klitschko's support of Petro Poroshenko's presidential candidacy) could gain 35.3% of support among those who are going to vote in the parliamentary elections. Batkivshchyna's rating isn't even half that (15.1%). By adding those numbers we can see those three forming a steady majority in the Verkhovna Rada. However, in such a case the role of coalition leader and Prime Minister would have to go to none other than Yulia Tymoshenko. Poroshenko would rather not venture for such a move, if only to discredit Tymoshenko by letting her carry all the load of "responsibility for the social and economic situation in the country". But in this case we are likely to witness a sequel of the 2005 situation with Tymoshenko's crusade against Yushchenko's "corrupt dear friends" (now labeled by her "the alliance of oligarchs") and the subsequent completely unpre-

YULIA TYMOSHENKO HAD NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT HER CHANCES FOR THE PRESIDENCY AND SAW HER PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN AS A LAUNCH PAD FOR THE FUTURE PARLIAMENTARY ELECTIONS

71%
of Petro Poroshenko's supporters are one way or another prepared to "live through some difficulties today if it brings positive change to their life in the future"

dictable aftermath as regards to electoral support of the pro-European demographic.

Another question as to the above-mentioned triumvirate is whether the alliance of UDAR and Solidarnist is solid enough. The key risk factor here is the influence of notorious oligarch Dmytro Firtash on Klitschko's party. His latest statements made while under house arrest in Vienna only reaffirm the view that he is playing in favour of the Kremlin's scenario for Ukraine's development (federalization, nonaligned status, etc.). So far Firtash has predictably supported Poroshenko as the enemy of his enemy (Tymoshenko). This, however, comes at a cost: allegedly Firtash is promised a considerable number of seats in the future parliament within the new bloc. Should Poroshenko disagree with this scenario, Firtash may try to lobby the

idea of UDAR running for Verkhovna Rada independently.

AGE OF THE NEOPHYTES

Thus potential problems of cooperation with Batkivshchyna and the uncertainty of an alliance with UDAR will force Poroshenko to look for alternative options to assemble his own coalition in the Verkhovna Rada, without which the president will be unable to determine the path of Ukraine's development. With this in mind, one other fact caught our attention: according to electoral polls, most of the second-tier presidential candidates turned out to be "spoilers" for the tally of Petro Poroshenko more than anyone else.

The aforementioned poll results state that if the presidential elections had gone on to a second round (should no candidate have taken more than 50% of votes in round one, the second round would be announced where the winner of round one would compete against the runner up – **Ed.**) in round two Poroshenko could count on the votes of 65% of Anatoliy Hrytsenko's supporters, 58% of Oleh Tiahnybok's supporters and 49% of Oleh Liashko's supporters. In that case Tymoshenko would get only 19% of votes from the supporters of Tiahnybok and Olha Bohomolets, 16% from Liashko and 6% from Hrytsenko. This means that in the future the above-mentioned politicians are more likely to win over the voters of Poroshenko rather than Tymoshenko. For instance Anatoliy Hrytsenko is currently the #2 choice for 14% of Poroshenko's supporters, and only for 8% of Tymoshenko's; for Bohomolets the respective ratio is 7% to 3%; 8% vs. 5% for Liashko and 5% vs. 2% for Tiahnybok.

However, in the context of putting together a coalition within a new parliamentary convocation, such a high level of support among the electorate of Hrytsenko, Bohomolets, Liashko and Tiahnybok bodes well for Poroshenko in terms of joining efforts with their political parties once they are elected to the Verkhovna Rada, or even forming a pro-presidential bloc with them before the elections (likely to be the case with Olha Bohomolets). Additionally, there's a good chance of seeing new political formations from the likes of Arseniy Yatseniuk,

This new political reality opens a world of possibilities for rapid growth in the popularity of lesser-known political parties perceived by most as new players. These are Anatoliy Hrytsenko's Hromadianska Poztysiya (Civic Position), Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, Olha Bohomolets' party and perhaps Vyacheslav Kyrylenko's new project

According to poll results, the prospects of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine are entirely dependent on whether the Donbas region remains in Ukraine's electoral field

Vyacheslav Kyrylenko and other former members Nasha Ukrayina. For them, joining forces with Poroshenko may indeed be more comfortable when Yulia Tymoshenko begins tightening the screws and consolidating Batkivshchyna around herself. At the same time, Petro Poroshenko, just like Viktor Yushchenko, will face the problem of finding a worthy leader for his party's parliamentary campaign. Without a popular leader, the force will inevitably fall short of its potential. One cannot exclude that just as in the case of Nasha Ukrayina in 2007 the campaign could be spearheaded by Yuriy Lutsenko. The head of the Narodna Samooborona (People's Self Defense) party from the way back when is now promoting his new movement called the "Third Republic". Given the active involvement of Lutsenko's associates in Petro Poroshenko's presidential campaign, this scenario is looking very likely.

This new political reality opens a world of possibilities for rapid growth in the popularity of lesser-known political parties perceived by most as new players. These are Anatoliy Hrytsenko's Hromadianska Poztysiya (Civic Position), Oleh Liashko's Radical Party, Olha Bohomolets' party and perhaps Vyacheslav Kyrylenko's new project. Considering the confrontation between Poroshenko and Tymoshenko and the probable loss of popularity by the president, these parties have a chance to gradually win over the disappointed supporters of both juggernauts.

THE PARTY OF REGIONS' LEGACY

According to poll results, the prospects of the Party of Regions and the Communist Party of Ukraine are entirely dependent on whether the Donbas region remains in Ukraine's electoral field. Without their traditional electoral stronghold in the East these two forces may end up with no seats in the Verkhovna Rada at all. In that case the only party to represent eastern and southern Ukraine will be Serhiy Tihipko's Sylna Ukrayina (Strong Ukraine) party. Its current rating shows it taking around 8-9% of the parliamentary seats. In the event that Donbas doesn't play a major part in the elections, this percentage would drop somewhat, but in the long run the party may

well steal votes from the completely hopeless pro-Russian parties and thus eventually broaden its electoral base to 20-25% (even without Donbas and Crimea).

So what are the chances of forming a coalition made up of different camps within this new political reality? Despite some notable attempts, such alliances failed to arise in the "post-orange" Ukraine, where a "broad coalition" used to be perceived as clear-cut treason by the majority of European-oriented voters. The new reality, however, has more preconditions for such formations, considering that the enemies, as in Viktor Yanukovich and his closest associates, are out of the game, and the Party of Regions with the overtly pro-Russian Mykhailo Dobkin and Borys Kolesnikov as figureheads (and with the number one oligarch Rinat Akhmetov pulling the strings) stands zero chance of retaining its dominant position among in the blue and white electoral field. Sociological studies clearly indicate that the supporters of Mykhailo Dobkin are fiercely opposed to the supporters of the more democratic and pro-European candidates, therefore the Party of Regions led by Dobkin is likely to end up in permanent opposition where it will join Petro Symonenko's Communist Party of Ukraine, or take its place in case the initiative to abolish the latter succeeds.

The party of Serhiy Tihipko, who was perceived as relatively pro-European within the Party of Regions, in such a case has the potential to become an acceptable coalition partner for one of the pro-European forces. Among Tihipko's supporters there are more of those whose number-two choice would be a pro-European candidate than those who would favour a pro-Russian one. 23% of his electorate would rather support Poroshenko, while only 4% would be willing to vote for Dobkin. Serhiy Tihipko makes no bones about his willingness to cooperate with the majority, to "constructively represent" the southern and eastern elites in the government, rather than being in opposition. "We could reformat the government to show some people representing the East and the South... To demonstrate that the public is influencing the appointments in certain departments and government bodies in those regions," he stated recently. ■

The Truth for History

François Hollande invited the newly-elected Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko to the D-Day ceremony on June 6, 1944. 2014 is especially important to that end because it is the 70th anniversary of that event.

2014 is also particularly important to Ukraine which gained independence over two decades ago but is now struggling to fully implement it by shedding the remains of Sovietism. This invitation ended the anomaly that had been in place since 1991. Ukraine and Belarus as the key parties to the war against the Nazi Germany are, just like others, fully entitled to be present at the commemoration of all allies against the Axis powers. Moreover, Ukrainians were directly involved in the Normandy landings: 10,000 Ukrainian soldiers fought in Canadian uniforms; 84 are buried at one cemetery in Normandy. Clearly, we know that Russia's claims about being the successor of the Soviet Union and thus being the sole legitimate representative of the fighters, heroes and martyrs of the Eastern Front (who were all "Soviet") are far from undeniable. A historical mistake does not turn into truth even after it becomes a banality.

I have written about the myths of the "Great Patriotic War", the muted facts and the lies that distort the history of Ukraine, historical memory and the mind of the entire Europe. Today, I would like to focus on convincing arguments in favour of Ukraine's participation in the D-Day events. The most obvious one is the huge number of Ukrainian soldiers who died or demonstrated courage in the fight against the Nazis in 1941-1945. The time count for them usually begins with 1941, not with 1939, and the French find this surprising. They remember the 1939-1945 war. In 1939-1941, the Soviet Union was Germany's ally. It entered the war only after Germany's attack. Therefore, the Soviet Union, followed by Russia later, stuck to its separate chronology. Unlike them, the whole world knows the war in 1939-1945, and these are the dates used for commemoration, including by the US which stepped in in December 1941.

The generally excepted chronology of World War II fits today's Ukraine much better than the Soviet-Russian one. 1939-1945 fit the participation of Ukrainians in that war better, and their experience in it, too. Within 1941-1945, when the Nazi occupants were the enemy, Ukraine saw huge bloody losses measuring from 16.3% to 18% of its total population of 1940. Belarus lost 25% of its population, while Russia did 12.7%. Despite the fluctuations that are typical of the official Soviet Union history (from 7 million dead under Stalin's rigged post-war estimates to 20 million mentioned by Khrushchev when he revealed Stalin's "mistakes" in 1961, and to 26-27 million victims under the latest estimates), historical

research and recognition of historical memory have evolved for decades.

The figures are more accurate now, and different categories of victims by circumstances of their death are distinguished more accurately than they were right after the war when all "victims of fascism" were mixed together, for the lack of knowledge or propaganda purposes, while overlooking the nationality of soldiers, murdered civilians, devastated villages, the particularly terrible fate of European Jews (9.5 million, including over 5.5 million in the USSR and Poland, doomed to death by the Nazis), and the fate of 3 million Red Army war prisoners who died of man-made famine.

Each category has a huge, terrifying number of Ukrainians. These numbers push us to recognize Ukraine's role in that war. According to estimates by historians, from 6 to 8 million Ukrainians died in it. If we take 6.85 million Ukrainian victims, they will include 1.65 million soldiers and over 5.2 million civilians, including 1 million war prisoners killed by famine, and 1.5 million Ukrainian Jews. All of those 5.2 million civilians – men, women and children who were the victims of mass murders and man-made famine because they were hiding Jewish neighbours, their villages supported guerillas, or because they were Jews as Untermenschen for the Nazis – have to be present in the memory of the living on June 6.

And that will happen thanks to Ukraine's presence in the commemoration ceremony through its top officials.

The peoples of Central and Eastern Ukraine

went through terrifying sufferings in World War II, while Western countries accepted approximate estimates, mistakes and lies which cannot be presented without a pang of conscience today, too easily. We now know the figures we did not know then. We have evidence we did not have then. And our ignorance is no longer an excuse for us. Quite on the contrary, in the time when the last witnesses and participants of the war are passing away, new generations are even more obliged to stick to the truth and accuracy. And this is something not just intellectuals and professors, but average citizens should be committed to. The invitation of Ukraine (and Belarus) to the D-Day anniversary is not only commemoration of the heroes and martyrs, as well as those who survived World War II, but commitment to truth which we must introduce to our peers, and to our children. To me, as a French citizen, it is important to see Ukraine represented at the ceremony so that my children could hear the name of this country on TV, find out what had happened in that land, and learn about the struggle of Ukrainians in other battles, including the Invasion of Normandy. ■



Author:
Phillip de Lara

THE INVITATION OF UKRAINE AND BELARUS TO THE D-DAY ANNIVERSARY MEANS COMMITMENT TO THE TRUTH

The Revenge of the Proletariat

Russian weapons have transformed separatist-controlled territories into a battlefield. The locals support the rebels for promises of order and Soviet values. The region could quickly become the new Transnistria

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It took one month for the Donbas to change completely. At the end of April, it hosted a mass protest, an Anti-Maidan, its participants imitating protesters in Kyiv while expressing protest against Ukraine's new government.

Today, the region is witnessing a war. The action area is a triangle with around 200km on each side, around the cities of Sloviansk, Donetsk and Luhansk.

Between two and three million people live in this triangle. The roads are deserted. Life has ground to a halt. Most people do not go to work. By doing so, they are trying to protect their own homes and families. Shops are open for a couple of hours a day. It is still possible to buy food, there is water and electricity, and life goes on despite everything. But people live in fear. Everyone searches for any news and hopes that their buildings will not be hit with missile fragments.

A month ago, the vast majority of checkpoints on the roads were controlled by civilians with batons in their hands. There are fewer checkpoints now, but they have been fortified. They are manned by well-armed young men in camouflage and balaclavas.



EXPROPRIATION DONETSK STYLE. The Donetsk People's Republic supporters have plundered a few local supermarkets and robbed the ice-hockey stadium

The Ukrainian Army maintains control of the skies and holds several strategic positions, such as Karachun Hill, where the Sloviansk TV tower is situated, the civilian airport in Donetsk, the military airfield in Kramatorsk, and a number of significant spots on the roads. However, wherever it may find itself, danger is all around. There are constant attacks. The rebels have portable anti-aircraft missiles, which pose a great threat to helicopters.

A real war is a matter for professionals. Today, the backbone of the separatists is made up of experienced men from the Caucasus or Russia. They are helped by local volunteers. Offensive actions are conducted under the leadership of the Vostok (East) battalion, which seemed to appear from nowhere. Its fighters can be recognised by their grey chevrons. No one knows who this battalion is subordinate to.

Its members were seen in action on May 26 at the Donetsk Airport. They went on the offensive, trying to besiege the airport, using grenade launchers and individual weapons. It was obvious that the men are not afraid of fire. They move jerkily under bullets, are

able to take cover in problem situations and skilfully use their sub-machine guns, indicating that they are used to operating these weapons.

The Ukrainian Army, which had often been indecisive in the past, trying not to injure the civilian population, acted strongly during this siege. The Air Force bombed two armoured KamAZ trucks. Within several days, 34 bodies, wrapped in red fabric, were transported to Russia in a huge refrigerated truck, painted with red crosses.

However strange it may seem, Ukrainian border guards allowed this truck to cross the border without any problems, even though it contained evidence of foreign "volunteers" participating in the war. But no one thought that it was worth holding it.

The battle for the airport seemed to be the separatists' challenge to the newly-elected President Petro Poroshenko. The essence of the conflict is now becoming ever clearer: it is an attempt to organise a new Transnistria, unofficially supported by Russia, in order to weaken Ukraine for as long as possible. This new region can be called "Transdonbas" or even



ФОТО: СЕРГІЙ ПОНОМАРІОВ

the “Bermuda Triangle”, because in essence, it is a new black hole, where anyone can easily disappear, as has already been the case with several OSCE groups.

Military order reigns in the region, under the leadership of paramilitary formations. However, an alternative authority has also tried to establish itself in every town, trying to claim key positions. Coordination between these different structures is weak. Conflicts are constantly flaring between local separatist leaders, particularly between Vyacheslav Ponomarev, the self-proclaimed Mayor of Sloviansk, and those who are currently occupying Donetsk Oblast State Administration offices.

The author of this article actually witnessed one of these conflicts. Ponomarev holds a press conference every day at 5 p.m. in the city hall, which has been converted into a fortress, with sandbagged windows. He arrives in an armoured blue Mercedes, with the flag of the Donetsk People's Republic instead of the license plate, flanked by armed “guards”. Every day, he reiterates that he will win the war right now. Several days ago, when asked to comment on

decisions made by separatist leaders in Donetsk, he literally exploded: “The Administration is filled with liars! They have no right to speak on our behalf...”

This is what the atmosphere is like. However, there is no point in having any illusions. Although the leaders of the rebellion cannot find a common language and badly coordinate their actions, they use the same terminology and represent one political identity: they speak against the “junta” in Kyiv, against the “putsch” and against “the fascists supported by NATO”. This movement has its own ideology, which lies in the effort to revive a new version of the Soviet Union.

The separatists see themselves as the successors of the soldiers of the “Great Patriotic War”, who “must oppose America and Germany”, “Neo-Nazis” and “imperialists”. They also want to revive “social justice” and establish the rule of “people’s communities”.

In the first weeks of the conflict, this Soviet dimension was not particularly noticeable. Today though, it is becoming more obvious. “People’s courts” have already appeared in Donetsk and Luhansk that punish those who do not toe the line, as has a secret police force, which has modestly been called the “NKVD”.

The rebels dream of nationalising the local economy once more and destroying the oligarchs. This is where the indecisive attempt to seize Rinat Akhmetov’s apartment in Donetsk stems from. Locals smashed up several supermarkets and robbed the hockey stadium.

So, what we see is the revenge of the Donbas proletariat. In their view, the past 20 years have seen the “plundering of the country”. These people obviously gained nothing from the changes. For this reason, they hope to “confiscate from the rich that, which was stolen from the poor”.

The discourse finds a grateful listener among the local population. Brutality and disorder? Kyiv is at fault. Here, the Ukrainian Army is seen as a “foreign force”, which bombs local residents. “We are not terrorists, but we are being shot at,” the locals complain.

Olena sells dried fish on the market in the village of Karlivka, 30 km east of Donetsk. You can

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hear the same from her as you would from many others: “Yes, I voted in the referendum, but not in the presidential election. Kyiv is doing everything possible to divide, rather than unite people.” She continues her complaints by saying: “We can barely drag out a miserable existence. Just about all we can get for our hard work is a crust of bread.”

The barricade built by separatists is about 100 metres from the market. There was a desperate battle here on May 23, between the Donbas and Vostok battalions. The roadside café-restaurant burned to the ground. Having fallen into an ambush and without an advantage in numbers, the pro-Ukrainian Donbas battalion lost five of its fighters (see p. 12). Ukrainians were unable to retake Karlivka from the separatists.

We are turning off the highway, 3 kilometres away is Halysynivka, a former kolkhoz. The newest building here is the Karl Marx Palace of Culture. The engine of an ancient passing tractor bangs mercilessly. We ask the tractor operator, a huge guy, naked to the waist, with straw-coloured hair and an Orthodox cross on his chest: “Who controls the village? Kyiv or Donetsk?”. “God only knows,” he responds, after a minute of thought.

From this road, independent Ukraine seems to be a distant reality. But the separatists’ People’s Republic is also something abstract. Just like many others, this village is a no man’s land, which no one really turned their attention to in the last 20 years. Who will win it? No one can answer this question today. ■

Cargo 200. 34 bodies were transported to Russia in a huge refrigerated truck



ФОТО: МАРИЯ ТУРЧЕНКОВА

Semen Semenchenko:

"Developments in the Donbas are like nuclear chain reaction"

The Commander of the Donbas battalion talks about voluntary special forces, the Chechen trail and inevitable terror

Interviewed
by
**Bohdan
Butkevych**

Some call them heroes, others accuse them of anarchism. In more than a month of armed action, they have had victories, and a terrible uneven battle near Karlivka against the separatist battalion Vostok when more than six Donbas members were killed. Many military experts already compare the current situation in Eastern Ukraine with Croatia during the Balkan War, where such volunteers took the main burden of the most difficult initial phase of the war against the Serbs. These detachments are made up of people, who only yesterday lived a regular life, but who can no longer simply watch as bandits and terrorists tear their land apart. *The Ukrainian Week* speaks with Semen Semenchenko, the leader and organiser of the Donbas battalion and a native Russian, about the future of his military unit, the war and the entire Donbas. Semenchenko's prognoses are quite bleak: he, as did Churchill in his time, expects nothing but blood, sweat and tears.

UW: What are the short-term plans for your battalion? You previously said that Ukrainian police and military are very weak, which is why the entire burden of the war is often placed on the shoulders of voluntary units such as yours...

— Literally two days ago, we agreed with the Minister of Internal Affairs (Arsen Avakov – Ed.) to create a special force unit, made up of the battalion's fighters. After all, we have our own state. If we are dissatisfied with the way it is fulfilling its functions, we have to become part of it and correct the situation from within. Moreover, we no longer want to resist Chechen

hordes and all other terrorists with only rocks, clubs and small and light arms. So a decision has been approved to supply us with heavy weapons, provide three weeks of training and new tactics – then, off we go. We have a very simple purpose: to do everything possible to throw this separatist riffraff out of Ukraine. I think that our partners in the authorities have finally understood: we are volunteers and must kill our enemies. We do not have to be tortured with bureaucratic procedures, we are not interested in money, we are not mercenaries. And we want to fight for our country. If we are not given this opportunity – we'll just turn around and do it ourselves.

UW: How will you create your special forces and will you get heavy weapons? Will you become subject to the Ministry of Internal Affairs or the Ministry of Defence?

— I don't think so. We shall continue to exist as a voluntary unit and we shall be used wherever it is convenient and effective: in other words, our functions will include policing, maintaining civil order, as well as sentry duty at checkpoints. But our special forces, which we are in the process of establishing, will be used in places where it is necessary to break up enemies with force and work against saboteurs. This format is a compromise between state agencies and the voluntary movement. We want to change our country ourselves.

UW: You said that the commanders of the Anti-Terrorist Organisation did not help the battalion when it found itself in an ambush in Karlivka. Was your operation approved with the

military in advance, or was this an independent action? How would you estimate the combat capacity of the Ukrainian Regular Army, particularly taking into account the latest effective operations against terrorists at Donetsk Airport?

— We passed several of our checkpoints along the road to Karlivka. So, the military clearly knew about our plan. And anyway, you have to understand that this failure to help us is not the only one. There was a very similar situation several nights ago at the frontier post in Luhansk, where militants were trying to break through the border. In my view, the problem is in the structure of the military, which is archaic and clumsy, and in the absence of normal communication and coordination between different units. All of this must be immediately changed and cooperation between the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) and the military must be organised. This is better than to cry "no one helped us". Okay, so we didn't get any help, what now, do we shoot ourselves? Let's be honest. If a person is flat on his back, the fact that he made a couple of effective moves does not mean that he can win a lengthy and systematic war. Thank goodness that there are commanders that are conducting effective operations. But I would like to reiterate





this: in order to win and discourage the enemy from further intrusions, Ukraine needs a complete reboot of its entire security structure.

UW: How do you see the current developments in the Donbas? Is it a civil war, a war against Russia or a rebellion of the local elites? Have there been any changes in the last two-three weeks and is Rinat Akhmetov, who is often accused of organising the riots, controlling the situation?

– Yes, there have been changes. Unfortunately, the developments in the region remind me of a nuclear chain reaction. Initially, everything was done with the efforts of Russian special forces: they prepared everything for the bonfire, then lit it. But now, the reaction is going under its own steam – the local leaders of cities, home guards and gangs have felt empowered, they believed in their political future and are acting completely independently of their former patrons in the Party of Regions and even Russia. Also, Moscow, which sees the weakness of the Ukrainian state structure, continues to actively help the terrorists with arms and people, generally under placating statements that they are playing absolutely no part in the conflict. All of this is leading to a serious war, and it is necessary to prepare for the fact that the level of

brutality during such war will escalate, because it is now clear that it will be conducted with terror. Neither Akhmetov, nor Yefremov (Oleksandr Yefremov, the Party of Regions' MP and arguably the most influential figure in Luhansk Oblast – Ed.) will now be able to cope with the situation, which they themselves created. The terrorists include people who are better prepared and equipped than Rinat Akhmetov's structures. Anyway, he himself is not doing anything in the oblast to stabilise the situation, neither is Taruta (Serhiy Taruta, an oligarch recently appointed Governor of Donetsk Oblast – Ed.), who recently, all of a sudden, expressed the desire to help us. He promised to help the families of the fighters who died near Karlivka and to provide the latest arms, but so far, these are merely words. And the main thing is that the opposite side now has the motivation emerged to fight for ideals, not money. I personally stand for knightly rules of war, similar to those at the start of World War I, when mass butchery had not yet begun between enemies in the trenches. But when Bezler (Igor Bezler, aka Bes, the leader of the Donbas separatist militants – Ed.) himself called me and promised to hang me in the square, it was unrealistic to even dream about noble confrontation. It is the other side that has increased the level of brutality; they are the ones counting on terror and intimidation. Very soon, we will simply be forced to respond in

I THINK THAT PUTIN, TOGETHER WITH YANUKOVYCH, HAVE COMMITTED THE MOST TERRIBLE OF SINS: THEY HAVE SOWN THE SEEDS OF HATRED BETWEEN COUNTRIES

kind. This is why I repeat: first we will have a long and very bloody war, followed by many years of an Ulster-like scenario.

UW: One of the most unpleasant aspects of this conflict was the huge number of traitors among local security forces, who, in the view of many people, do not even deserve the right to be taken prisoner. Do you agree with such a view?

– Let's look at what our enemies are doing. The servicemen taken prisoner by them are released without arms and in civilian clothes. Officers, Security Service employees are exchanged like military prisoners of war. But volunteers, in other words, the soldiers of the National Guard and our battalion, are immediately killed and their bodies are returned to their families, literally in pieces. So you can deduce what we'll do with collaborators and traitors that fall into our hands.

UW: A noticeable force among the terrorists, are people from the Caucasus. How centralised is the process of casting them into the territory of Ukraine? What do you think about Russia's role in this conflict?

– These are volunteers who are hired using Yanukovych's money. But I'm concerned that when they start dying in large numbers, which is already happening (from the point of view of the Chechen clan system and the responsibility of family members for one another), in time, even official Chechen structures could be brought in, in the name of revenge. I absolutely don't understand why the heck Chechens are getting involved in the conflict. After all, Ukrainians helped them in the war against the Russian Federation. I simply cannot fathom when we became enemies. I am not an enemy of Russia, because I myself am an ethnic Russian. I constantly wonder how quickly and deeply the abyss opened, from which such terrible manlike monsters have emerged. They have no nationality. I think that Putin, together with Yanukovych, have committed the most terrible of sins: they have sowed the seeds of hatred between countries.

UW: How do you see your own future? Will you go to police, government or politics?

– Most of all, I want to rear my children. But I am currently receiving numerous threats against my family. For this reason, I first have to destroy the people that have blood, medieval brutality, dead bodies, terror and the like, on their hands. Once this task has been fulfilled, I shall make a decision as to my plans. But for the time being, my task is to lead my unit. ■

Wolfgang Ischinger:

Mr. Putin is challenging the very bases of the vision of European integration



PHOTO: ANDRIY LOHAKIN

Спількувалась
Ольга
Ворожбит

The *Ukrainian Week* talks to Wolfgang Ischinger, German diplomat who was the Representative of the OSCE Chairperson-in-Office for National Dialogue Roundtables in Ukraine, on his work, European and Ukrainian co-existence with Russia, and security threats of the current conflict between Ukraine and Russia.

UW: What was your strategy as a co-moderator and as an OSCE representative during the roundtables here in Ukraine?

First of all, the roundtables are something which should be in the hands of Ukrainians. The OSCE and I as a representative of the Chairman-in-Office are here to help, to support, this process and to give it some international visibility and legitimacy. I argued in favor of including of as many groups from civil society as possible, and not only elected politicians, but the church, of course. I believe we had some degree of success in creating an atmosphere of a dialogue, in creating a platform where citizens could be as-

sured of being listened to by the senior representatives of the Ukrainian government. Finally, I also argued in favour of Prime Minister and members of his cabinet participating personally in the round tables, because I thought if they were not there, some groups might think that the government is not taking the round tables as seriously as it should do. I am delighted to see that the Prime Minister was personally present at each one of the events that we have been able to organize so far.

UW: You said about inclusiveness. In the current situation, we have Russia which is very much connected to it. I have read that you invited Russia too. But I haven't seen them. Did they refuse to come?

I requested that the parties which met in Geneva in April the 17th, that is the US, Russian Federation and the EU, should also be invited to the round tables as observers, but participants are the people of Ukraine. This request was ac-

cepted by the Ukrainian organizers of the round table. Russia did not participate in the first event here in Kyiv, but it did participate in both subsequent round tables in Kharkiv and Mykolayiv. So, we had representatives of the Geneva parties as requested at these two final roundtables. Now, quite frankly, I would have liked to see even higher-ranking representation of parties to the Geneva talks, in particular as far as Russia is concerned. In Mykolayiv, for example, the American Ambassador came from Kyiv, the EU Ambassador came from Kyiv, and Russia was represented by its consul from Odesa. That is fine, but it was not quite what I had hoped for. Still, I have to admit that they don't have their ambassador here in Kyiv at this moment.

UW: Some experts say that just because Russia was not represented at the first roundtable, and was represented at a lower level during two other roundtables they have less legitimacy for foreign countries, because it leaves the impression that Ukraine has an internal conflict without any instigation from outside.

My impression has been that statements from the Russian government, statements made by President Putin, statements made by Foreign Minister Lavrov, for example, have indicated in recent days that what used to be full-scale skepticism regarding the roundtable idea changed somewhat. I believe that we were not unsuccessful in advocating Russia's participation, and Russia did participate. But you are right, of course, that Russia has said and believes that this is the Ukrainian problem and that they have little to do with it. However, that is the Russian position. I am not here to defend or to explain why that is the Russian position.

UW: I read your article written together with other diplomats where you appeal not to make Ukraine the next Berlin Wall. What did you mean by that?

This was written in March. Clearly, we wanted to make sure that everybody understands that dividing Ukraine or using Ukraine as a dividing wall between East and West would be the exact opposite of what Europe needs. Europe needs to be a continent free of dividing lines; free of walls, and hopefully

the Berlin Wall was the last one we had to tear down. That was the message. Now I think that Ukraine has a good chance of being seen as a bridge in the future and not as a wall, and I believe there is also excellent chance for Ukraine, leaving aside the problem of Crimea for a moment, to retain its territorial integrity. I have been impressed by the fact that I have not met a single serious person during these many days here who has actually advocated a division of the country. What I did find was sometimes harsh criticism of the current constitutional arrangement, of the method of government, of corruption, of other deficits in terms of good governance. But criticism of Kyiv is not the same as separatism.

UW: Timothy Snyder says that Russia, while instigating the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, at the same time threatens the whole Europe. What is your opinion on this and how do you as chairman of the Munich Security Conference would see the future security of the EU in these terms?

I have worked in recent years with Russian, American, European leaders and intellectuals, former officials, like former Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov, former US senator Sam Nunn to describe a Euro-Atlantic security landscape which should be homogeneous where it would no longer matter whether you are a member of NATO or not. I believe that deep down, the fundamental security issues of Russia, of the West, Western Europe and of Ukraine have a huge amount of things in common. Unfortunately, we are currently in a situation where this vision of a coherent "common home" as Mikhail Gorbachev put it has tended to disappear again. We are, unfortunately, drifting back to a situation where we have a confrontation. At least a political confrontation, not a military confrontation between the West and Russia, with Ukraine being right in the middle. I hope you agree, I don't see a single reason why we should be blamed for it. All we have tried to do in Western Europe was to reach out and offer to Ukraine the same status we believe every European nation should have, namely, the freedom to choose. If Ukraine wishes to be a non-aligned country, fine, that's for Ukraine to do. If Ukraine wishes to become the

member of EU, that's fine, it is a legitimate desire. If Ukraine wishes to become a member of NATO, that should also be accepted as a decision of Ukrainians. I believe that Russia has decided at some point that for Russia's security to be safeguarded, a status of Ukraine that stays away from the West was important. I think that is exactly where we are at the moment.

UW: According to polls, the of support of NATO membership in Ukraine rose strongly after the annexation of Crimea. However, there are many talks in the EU, and, especially in Germany, that Ukraine can't be taken to NATO, because it will make Russia insecure. What is your opinion on this?

This is a complicated question that you ask. There is no simple answer. First, part of my answer is that NATO should invite as future members only countries that have a clearly defined, fully developed national consensus that this country wishes to be a member of NATO. It is not good if NATO membership question becomes a source of controversy in a future NATO member country. In case of Ukraine, my impression is that for many years now some Ukrainians have been advocating NATO membership, but other Ukrainians have totally rejected it. And I believe, as long as there is no full national consensus, NATO membership should not become an issue that is tearing apart Ukrainian society. So I think, that Ukraine is not quite ready for NATO-membership. That does not mean that Ukraine should not have the right to say that we want to be NATO members. But that is something all Ukrainians should agree on.

Second, NATO members should make sure that they do not make the country's security worse when they do invite it to join them. Do I believe that Ukrainian membership in NATO would guarantee the improvement of Ukraine's security situation? Well, only if Russia decided that this was not dangerous for Russia. Unfortunately at this moment that is the exact opposite of what Russia believes. Therefore, I believe we would risk creating the additional confrontation within Ukraine and Russia. You have intense historical, political, economic, social and other relationship within

BIO

Wolfgang Ischinger studied law at the Universities of Bonn and Geneva and obtained his Degree in Law in 1972. He continued his education at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and Harvard Law School where he studied law, foreign economic relations and history. From 1973 to 1975, he served on the staff of the UN Secretary General in New York. From 2001 to 2006, he was the German Ambassador to the United States, and from 1998 to 2001, he was Deputy Foreign Minister in Berlin. Ambassador Ischinger has been the Chairman of the Munich Security Conference since 2008. Wolfgang Ischinger participated in a number of international negotiating processes, including the Bosnia Peace Talks at Dayton, OH. In 2007, he was the European Union Representative in the Troika negotiations on the future of Kosovo which led to the declaration of independence of Kosovo and to the recognition of Kosovo by most EU member-states.

Ukrainians and Russians. Would Ukraine benefit from the closed border, gun towers and tanks from both sides? Probably, not. So, I appreciate the wisdom of Ukrainian leaders who have decided at this juncture, at this moment in history – not to apply for membership in NATO.

UW: Let's go back to Timothy Snyder and what he says. He says that Russia with this aggression towards Ukraine also splits up Europe; that this aggression in a way undermines Europe from inside. Russia supports right-wing parties in the EU. Plus, EU member-states disagree on the Ukrainian conflict, and on whether they should overlook the annexation of Crimea and other issues, or react strongly against Russia. What is your position?

I have read, of course, Snyder's works and I fundamentally share his concern that what we are seeing here is a very strange kind of group of bed fellows for Russia. Traditionally, you would have expected after the Crimean events the only people who applaud Russia's actions would be former communist parties, traditional far-left parties. That would not have been a surprise to me, but it was a surprise to me that far-right parties in Western Europe which are anti-EU and nationalist far-right did. They seem to have chosen Mr. Putin as their hero, because he is also the advocate of nationalistic cause. That is dangerous, because it tends to weaken the fabric of EU integration. The more anti-EU political parties, far-right, nationalistic parties we have within the EU, the harder it would be to stay on course in terms of European integration. Yes, I do share Snyder's concern that this is not only about Ukraine, this is about very fundamental questions of integration of the vision of Europe and that President Putin is challenging the very bases of that vision. So, what do I believe will happen? I believe this is not a war by tanks and airplanes, but this is a confrontation of minds and words. The idea of integration, the idea of not changing borders by force anymore in Europe, were violated here, but that does not mean that they are winning. I believe that we will win. Integration will win. The idea of a peaceful and border-free Europe will win. It may take time, but we will win. ■

Money of the Donbas

The unrest in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts has deep underlying causes. Unless removed, they make a prospering Donbas as part of Ukraine a mission impossible

Firearms, camouflaged and masked men, military equipment, shots and explosions, looting and robberies of civilians, checkpoints and burnt cars... Half a year ago, this picture was familiar only to those Ukrainians who had been to hot spots across the globe. Now, almost everyone knows about it, while the Donbas residents (Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts – Ed.) witness it every day. However, only a few see how these atrocities result from deep underlying economic problems that have been around for a long time and exploded as soon as the sociopolitical climate changed.

The current situation in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts is a heartfelt cry of the Donbas money. The problem here is not so much with the personality of Rinat Akhmetov, Ukraine's richest tycoon who controls the region, and other oligarchs, as it is with their businesses. After a new government came to power in Ukraine, the "business elites" of the region risk not only losing most of their assets acquired through corporate raids under the ousted ex-president Viktor Yanukovich. They can lose an opportunity to grow using their old ways. The era of extensive capital acquisition is coming to an end in Ukraine – there is no more room for expansion. Therefore, the drivers of this process – the oligarchs and thousands of goons that serve them – will become useless. They will have to either adapt to the new business climate or lose everything. These prospects perturb the enterprising and militant Donetsk and Luhansk businessmen, causing a well-known reaction to the revolutionary events in Kyiv. If the Donbas oligarchs saw the smallest opportunity for further growth under the new government, there would be no gunmen, separatism or Putin's hand in the region, just like there had been no Chechen or

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other fighters there in the stormy 1990s. In fact, it was the capital of the Donbas that forced Akhmetov to keep silent when the events in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts were only getting off the ground and made him speak when they reached Mariupol, where his company, SCM, has steelworks and the railway which transports their products.

Finance Minister Oleksandr Shlapak has said recently that Donetsk Oblast collected UAH 1.6bn in consolidated budget revenues last year, compared to the total expenditures at UAH 41bn. The oblast can cover a mere 40% of its needs, i.e. less than Luhansk Oblast (44%) or its own perfor-

bour resources who could then be employed in new sectors created with this investment. However, this scenario required the presence of strong government institutions, as well as intellectual and managerial talents among business owners. Clearly, Ukraine did not have either of these two preconditions, because the bloody 1990s put a premium on other qualities. Moreover, the uncertainty of private property rights which could be challenged by a killer or a corporate raider rendered intensive business growth pointless and opened the way for extensive growth. This was the turning point which led to the economic model in the Donbas and across Ukraine that the 2013-14 revolution fought against.

Capital started spilling over from the Donbas to other regions. This led to massive "investments" in buying power in Kyiv that opened access to cheap privatization and embezzlement of budget funds. Add to this the acquisition of assets across Ukraine, including land and real estate in Kyiv, and transferring of unused cash to offshore areas. Finally, the Donbas capital grew so much that it was able to buy and monopolize nearly all power in Ukraine, creating the preconditions for Yanukovich's presidency. As opportunities for extensive capital acquisition across Ukraine began to shrink, the Donbas barons proceeded to abuse power to take away businesses even from owners who did not want to sell it.

All these evolutionary stages have something in common – capital must grow, because this is its essence, as observed by Karl Marx a long time ago. Personalities are not important here, because it is not Rinat Akhmetov or others who control their businesses – on the contrary, business needs control them and determine their actions.

THE ERA OF EXTENSIVE CAPITAL ACQUISITION IS COMING TO AN END IN UKRAINE – THERE IS NO MORE ROOM FOR EXPANSION

mance in the past, such as 54% in 2011. Hence the conclusion suggested by the minister: contrary to what many believe, the Donbas does not feed Ukraine. It is in fact the other way around. This conclusion may fit many in Ukraine who do not mind the splitoff of the region. However, it is superficial.


FLOODED WITH CASH

When the initial division of assets came to an end in the Donbas in the early 2000s and the local elites seized their squabbles, it turned out that the majority of assets in the region had been divided. Favourable situation on the international markets stimulated the national economy, driving significant cash flows to the region. The money had to be used in some way or another. Under normal circumstances, this cash would have been invested to increase labour productivity, relieving some of the la-

If the Donbas oligarchs saw the smallest opportunity for further growth under the new government, there would be no gunmen, separatism or Putin's hand in the region, just like there were no Chechen or other fighters there in the stormy 1990s

The diverse Donbas

Statistically, Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts have different weights among Ukraine's regions. The new Ukrainian government needs to take them into account to understand what is actually going on there and eventually find the right "treatment".



Source: State Statistics Committee, the Ministry of Finance and author's own calculations

The important thing is that capital seeks paths of least resistance and fastest growth. The result is the series of shameful developments Ukraine is facing today. Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts send a mere 7.1% of consolidated budget revenues, while the region's gross product is twice as big at 15.7% (see **The diverse Donbas**). The Donbas is not sending taxes to Kyiv. Otherwise, it would not see its assets grow at the recent pace. Moreover, there are thousands of the rich there who are used to extensive capital growth – they cannot operate otherwise and do not want to sit idly. They oust other businesses from their region to avoid unnecessary competition (as well indicated by the disproportionately low share of direct foreign investments in the region), while they themselves do not know where to invest and, as a result, do not invest enough for the region to develop dynamically.

Their penchant for easy money and shadow business is evident in agriculture, which requires hard labour. The Donbas is not an agricultural region, but the proportion of agricultural products there is too low as compared to acreage under crops, even though it would have to be otherwise, given the presence of exces-

sive capital. Ordinary residents of the region are adversely affected by these processes: even though an average salary in the Donbas is higher than across Ukraine (by 15% in Donetsk Oblast), a large number of people have nowhere to use their energy in the region and seek employment elsewhere, particularly in Russia, or simply become criminals. At the same time, the local rulers use their capital not only to earn money and achieve self-fulfilment but also to control the lives of ordinary people, keep large paramilitary "security" units, etc.

The new government should channel the energy of the Donbas residents in a constructive direction. For example, if Donetsk natives learned to code, the city would very soon become one of Ukraine's IT centres, outpacing Kyiv and Lviv. The effort should not be limited to universities alone, even though IT-related enrolment should be increased. The authorities can launch numerous free-of-charge courses in programming.

The same goes for the capital of the Donbas. The government should amnesty assets as soon as possible and guarantee property rights, thus laying the foundation for intensive capital growth and

more technological and productive labour. Yanukovych's money should be neutralized and returned to the state coffers as soon as possible. A revision of the outcomes of corporate raids made under his presidency could take years – this scenario must be avoided, and swift action needs to be taken instead.

Moreover, the government should build a new system of institutions in such a way that the money and energy of Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast residents would not be able to break it by taking over budget money flows. Finally, Ukraine needs to open the Donbas to non-local capital. Foreign investors who, as the West promises, will start coming to Ukraine, should be directed precisely to this region, which will create competition on the labour market (salaries and employment will grow) and will also teach the local businesses to grow using intellect and ideas rather than bribes, violence and firearms.

Big money originating in the Donbas calls for special attention. Ukraine needs to offer Akhmetov and his businesses enough opportunities for growth that would serve as real alternatives to the embezzlement of taxpayers' money, underpriced privatization and monopolization of economic sectors. A list of offers has to be worked out so that this capital could stay in the country rather than flow abroad. Without consideration for the business interests of the Donbas and adequate solution for them, the region will not be successful either as part of

IT IS NOT RINAT AKHMETOV OR OTHERS WHO CONTROL THEIR BUSINESSES – ON THE CONTRARY, BUSINESS NEEDS CONTROL THEM AND DETERMINE THEIR ACTIONS

Ukraine or as a separate entity. If the government realizes that, the current manifestations of separatism, terrorism and banditry will be the last such occurrence in the history of the region. Otherwise the wound the Donbas has sustained from its own capital will continue to bleed for a long time to come. ■

Breaking Away From Eurasia

Previous trade rows with Russia have pushed Ukraine to reorient its key exports to the EU and other markets. This should save it from the disastrous effect of a looming trade war from Russia

Author:
Oleksandr Kramar

On 29 May, the agreement on the Eurasian Economic Union was signed in Astana, Kazakhstan. After it enters into force on 1 January 2015, integration in the current Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan will deepen with the free movement of not only goods but also services, capital and workforce and coordinated policy in the key economic sectors: energy, industry, agriculture, transport, etc.


Despite Vladimir Putin's all-out efforts, Ukraine has so far managed to resist being pulled into a modern version of the Russian Empire, if only economically. Instead, Ukraine has good chances of fixing itself in the European orbit. Ukraine may sign the economic part of the Association Agreement which envisages a comprehensive Free Trade Zone (FTZ) and harmonization of a number of standards in line with European, rather than Russian-Eurasian norms, as soon as on 27 June when Moldova and Georgia are scheduled to do so. (Immediately after Petro Poroshenko's victory in the presidential election became clear, Göran Färm, head of the European Parliament's delegation, confirmed the EU's readiness to sign the document as soon as possible.)

Moreover, the European Union unilaterally opened its market to Ukrainian goods and services on May 15 by cancelling some 98% of sales duties in line

No markets are irreplaceable

Permanent trade wars waged by Russia and its Customs Union forced Ukrainian producers to explore the European and other markets, while the importance of Russian and Kazakh markets plummeted

Major sales market for Ukrainian products, Q1'2012 and Q1'2014, %



Source: Estimates by The Ukrainian Week based on data of Ukraine's State Statistics Committee

with the Free Trade Agreement (FTA). According to expert estimates, the FTA with the EU can save Ukraine's producers nearly EUR 500mn in duties on the goods that are already being exported to the EU. Even if this advantage is viewed as an analogue of relieving the tax pressure on exporters by UAH 8-8.5bn, it is a serious economic boost.

But there is more in the Free Trade Zone with the EU for the future of Ukraine's economy and strengthening its independence from the Russia-dominated Eurasian Union – an opportunity to increase exports to the European market with its nearly 580mn consumers. Over 45% of all Ukrainian goods sold abroad already go precisely to this market.


At the same time, as soon as Ukraine signs the economic part of the Association Agreement, it should brace itself for another flare-up of a trade war with Russia. Moscow does not conceal its intention to resume the customs blockade it imposed on Ukraine in August 2013, as well as raise duties and essentially suspend the CIS Free Trade Agreement in regard to Ukraine. However, despite posing a significant threat to some Ukrainian enterprises, this kind of Russian reaction to Ukraine's economic rapprochement with Europe and the barriers likely to be set up by the Eurasian Customs Union will not spell disaster for Ukraine's economy.

COERCION TO INDEPENDENCE

Wise after the experience of the past years, the Ukrainian busi-

Casting off economic shackles

Russia's share in Ukraine's exports by groups of goods, 2012-14



Source: Estimates by The Ukrainian Week based on data of Ukraine's State Statistics Committee

ness is now much more prepared to face trade wars than it was a year or two ago. That Russia or the Customs Union are the biggest sales market for Ukrainian producers is a stereotype still bandied about by the media, but it no longer has anything to do with reality. In the past years, Ukraine's export volume to Russia and its closest economic allies, Belarus and Kazakhstan, took a nosedive. Paradoxically, Ukraine's economic dependence on the Customs Union market has decreased largely thanks to Putin's policy of coercing Ukraine to join in.

Trade wars forced Ukrainian producers to seek alternatives to the Russian and Kazakh markets, and they have had moderate success. In just two years, from Q1'2012 until Q1'2014, Rus-

sia's share in Ukraine's goods exports dropped from 28 to 19%. This was compensated by an increase in exports to the EU from 23 to 34%.

As a result, in Q1' 2014, Ukraine's exports to the EU exceeded those to Russia by 1.8 times. The EU Customs Union, including Turkey as a significant importer of Ukrainian products in addition to EU member-states, has reached 41% in Ukraine's total exports, while the share of the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan fell to 23%. Exports to just four European countries (Turkey, Poland, Italy and Hungary) outweighed the "vitally important" Russian market (see No markets are irreplaceable).

After permanent trade wars in the past two years, Ukraine's

exports to Russia went downhill: meat and meat byproducts, confectionaries, vehicles, railway transport, products of the shipbuilding industry and aircraft fell 60-80%; products of the ferrous metallurgy 40%, and dairy products and eggs 23%. In most cases, the losses on the Russian market were quite successfully set off by exports to other markets, particularly to Europe. On balance, total exports either slightly dropped or even grew (dairy products, eggs and the products of the shipbuilding industry), while Russia's share in it plummeted (see Casting off economic shackles).

In 2013, the exports of Ukrainian goods to Russia accounted for a mere 8% of Ukraine's GDP. Even in the worst-case scenario, which is losing over half of its exports to Russia, Ukraine's GDP may fall an additional 2-3%. This will definitely be palpable but in no way catastrophic – Ukraine survived a 15% reduction during the 2009 crisis.


Ukraine is also becoming less dependent on Russia in terms of exported services. At present,

TRADE WARS FORCED UKRAINIAN PRODUCERS TO SEEK ALTERNATIVES TO THE RUSSIAN AND KAZAKH MARKETS

Russia still accounts for more than a third of Ukraine's total in this category, but most of these services are payments for gas transit to the EU countries – USD 650mn out of the total USD 1.05bn in services exported to Russia in the Q1'2014. However, »

Achilles' heel

Russia's share in Ukraine's exports of certain types of machinery, 2013, %



Source: Estimates by The Ukrainian Week based on data of Ukraine's State Statistics Committee

the sale of Russian gas on the Ukraine-EU border, rather than Russia-Ukraine, despite the fact that Ukraine is a member of the Energy Community with the EU, is a vestige of the Soviet system that has to be scrapped as soon as possible. This will guarantee, among other things, energy security to Ukraine and Europe in general.

Ukrainian government officials regularly bring up this issue in negotiations with the EU. As soon as Gazprom is forced to sell gas on the Russia-Ukraine border, its further transportation and storage in Ukraine will become the concern of the European buyers, and a lion's share of Russia-bound services will de jure become what they de facto are now – services exported to the EU. Russia's share in this category will then fall to a figure comparable to that in goods exports.

Other countries of the Eurasian Customs Union are of little significance for Ukraine's exports. Kazakhstan, which receives 1.5% of Ukraine's exports, stands next to such small countries as Israel (1.3%) and Moldova and Azerbaijan (1.1% each). In its relations with Belarus, Ukraine has the obvious trump card of importing 2.5 times more than exporting. The Ukrainian market is much more important for Belarus than the other way around. Moreover, Belarusian products are non-critical imports that can be easily and rapidly replaced with imports from other countries in the case of war. Thus, supporting the Kremlin's trade war on Ukraine would hurt Minsk first, as Belarusian producers may lose USD 2-4bn a year. Clearly, Moscow will have a hard time compensating it with additional preferences on gas and oil. With this being not the least reason on his mind, Alexander Lukashenko tries to stick to an independent course on these issues.

UKRAINE'S SORE SPOTS

Ukraine's metallurgy and chemical sectors already little depend on the Russian market, even though its share in the exports of several foodstuffs and machine building products is still large. However, these industries and subindustries are not, with a

few exceptions, heavily export-oriented.

Ukrainian producers of meat, dairy products, eggs, sweets and other foodstuffs that keep running into Russia-imposed barriers now sell them primarily on the domestic market. Ukraine's car industry still exports 47.8%

a mere 15-35% of their products to Russia.

In machine building, Ukraine imports from Russia nearly as much as it exports there: USD 430mn and USD 190mn, respectively, in the car industry, USD 0.8bn and USD 1.1bn in electric machinery, USD 36mn and USD 46mn in aircraft and USD 100mn and USD 140mn in professional equipment.

A marked dependence on Russia and its Customs Union and the biggest challenges in diversifying sales markets are experienced by Soviet-era enterprises that together with other plants were links in closed production cycles in the USSR. The producers of locomotives, nuclear reactors, boilers and machinery indeed export up to two-thirds and sell nearly half of their production to Russia, with the rest going largely to other Customs Union member states.


TO THE DONBAS, THE EU CUSTOMS UNION IS ALREADY MUCH MORE IMPORTANT THAN THE EURASIAN CUSTOMS UNION

of its products to the Russian market, but because this industry works primarily for domestic consumers, Russia's share in car sales is less than 16%. The same goes for professional equipment. The shipbuilding, aircraft and electric machinery industries sell

The solid facts

Despite widespread stereotypes, the EU Customs Union is already much more important to the Donbas than the Eurasian Customs Union. This is especially evident in Donetsk Oblast

Major sales market for Donbas-made products, Q1'2014, %



Source: Estimates by The Ukrainian Week based on data of Ukraine's State Statistics Committee

Rail transport manufacturing is the biggest subindustry of Ukraine's machine building and economy in general which totally depends on Russia's market (USD 1.74bn in exports in 2013) and has failed to significantly diversify its sales markets since independence. However, in the future these enterprises may be involved in co-operation with the leading world companies, in the programmes to replace the rolling stock of the Ukrainian railways and metros, something that is long overdue.

In the face of a permanent threat to Ukraine's territorial integrity and sovereignty emanating from Russia, it is a matter of national security for Ukraine to discontinue any co-operation with the Russian Federation in the military industrial complex. Its products have traditionally accounted for a large part of Ukraine's exports of machinery to Russia. This industry needs to be re-oriented, where possible, to the needs of the Ukrainian army or co-operation with NATO countries.

EUROPEAN INTEGRATION OF THE DONBAS

Despite the widespread stereotypical perception that both oblasts of the Donbas region are pro-Russian, Europe is already much more important to them than the Customs Union of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan.

This is especially evident in Donetsk Oblast. For example, in Q1'2014 it exported more (14%) to the relatively distant Italian market than to Russia (13%). Turkey (11%) and Egypt (10%) were not far behind, either. Moldova, a small country which is now getting ready, just like Ukraine, to join the comprehensive Free Trade Zone with the EU, or the far-away Spain bought more from Donetsk Oblast than did Kazakhstan, the second most powerful market in the Eurasian Customs Union. In total, Donetsk sold 2.5 times more to Europe than to the Moscow-dominated Customs Union in Q1'2014.

Likewise, Luhansk Oblast sells more than half of its exports on the European market. Russia's share (35%) here is similar to that of Hungary, Poland, Slovakia

and Romania, whose total population is half of that of Russia (see The solid facts). Luhansk Teplovoz, the locomotive producer, is essentially the only completely Russia-dependent large plant in the oblast. If it is factored out, Luhansk Oblast's remaining exports to Russia are close to Ukraine's average. Noteworthy, the oblast exported railway locomotives worth some USD 660mn to Russia, which is less than what its coalmining industry received from Kyiv in direct subsidies. If these subsidies become unavailable, this may hurt the oblast much worse than even a complete cutoff of locomotive exports to Russia, which is unlikely in the medium-term and even long-term perspective for objective reasons.

Only Kharkiv Oblast exports to Russia and the Russian-led Customs Union more than any other eastern region of Ukraine with 45% and 53% respectively. This is 3-3.5 times more than it sells to Europe. However, this heavy dependence on Russia must be viewed in context: Kharkiv Oblast exports accounted for a mere 20% of its gross product in 2012. So, even if it loses half of its current exports to the Customs Union, there will be no disaster – its gross product may fall no more than 2-3%.

In general, claims of Ukraine's critical dependence on the markets of Russia and its Customs Union are greatly exaggerated. They are an outdated stereotype that has less and less to do with reality with each passing month. Ukraine would not benefit from a trade war with Russia, but nor would it suffer apocalyptic consequences that Russian propaganda likes to paint and that cause serious fears even in Ukraine's pro-European wing. Previous trade blockades aimed at forcing Ukraine to join the Russia-led Customs Union actually helped it build up the necessary immunity and encouraged producers to look elsewhere. Even in the case of the Donbas, whose production is largely export-oriented, the biggest threat is not losing access to the Russian market, but barriers to the European and world markets which are sure to arise if the region turns into a breakaway grey zone. ■



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Feigned Triumph or Concealed Capitulation

Russian leaders are certain their country will easily weather Western sanctions. Business disagrees

Author:
**Lyubomyr
Shavalyuk**



Some
**USD
200bn**
may leave Russia,
according to Russian
experts over the year
2014, causing its
foreign-exchange
reserves to fall
40%

The XVIII St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF), which closed on 24 May 2014, was not a great success. SPIEF has become a widely recognized platform for discussing regional and world trends and has welcomed 20 heads of state (some on multiple occasions) over 18 years. In 2013, Vladimir Putin was joined by German Chancellor Angela Merkel and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, while this year he had to go it alone trying to convince the world business community that Western sanctions will not have much effect on Russia and that his country had bright prospects of rapid growth. Ultimately, he was unconvincing. SPIEF was lower-profile than last year – not only because Putin was the only head of state in attendance but also because 20% of foreign guests did not come. This is according to guest lists. Journalists working for the Dozhd TV

channel claimed that, in fact, some 40% of foreign invitees declined. At the same time, the forum attracted slightly more foreigners who work in subsidiary companies that Western businesses have in Russia, but since their businesses already operate in Russia, they were likely more interested in the geopolitical, rather than economic, prospects and scenarios for the Russian Federation. Together with Russian businessmen and an army of officials who were invited in order to fill all the empty seats, they hoped that Putin's address would answer many questions. However, it made an ambiguous impression, polarizing the audience.

PUTIN'S ADDRESS

This was the key event at the forum. Putin was his usual self. He expounded his "truth" about the current geopolitical process, on multiple occasions pointing out

that the global community ignored Russia's "legitimate interests". In his opinion, a unipolar model of the world has exhausted itself. In this, China's Vice President Li Yuanchao supported him, saying in his address that a transition to a multipolar model was necessary. Indeed, it seems inevitable that several political centres will emerge across the globe, but they are likely to be formed around countries that themselves have good prospects for the growth of the economy, society and individuals and will create similar opportunities for others. If the world order was in the slightest degree dependent on an authoritarian country which curtails the rights and freedoms even of its own citizens, this would lead to a global uprising of free people, eventually turning into the Third World War. The events in Ukraine, where the Kremlin is trying to influence citizens who have liberated them-


selves, are a prime case in point. Thus, Russia's aspirations to geopolitical leadership, something Putin hinted at, appear to be unnatural and unconvincing, especially to the business community which knows for certain everything there is to know about how developed Russia's economy really is.

Commenting on the events in Ukraine, Putin stressed several times that a state coup took place there to overthrow and possibly eliminate the "legitimate" president, Viktor Yanukovich. And not a word on the people who stood for two months, regularly booing proposals voiced by opposition leaders, before events took a radical turn. Not a word about Russia's FSB men who whispered into Yanukovich's ear trying to sway him in favour of bloody suppression of the Maidan. Not a word about other aspects of the Ukrainian revolution that are unpleasant to the Kremlin. This is what Putin's "truth" is – complete disregard for ordinary people, whose individual development defines the power of any state and lays the foundation for geopolitical aspirations.

Speaking on economic issues, the Russian president acknowledged that the sanctions imposed by the developed world did affect Russia's economy. However, he pretended not to understand the rationale behind them, suggesting that the Kremlin only wanted its interests to be taken into consideration. In Putin's opinion, the impact of the sanctions will be temporary, while the proposed measures to stimulate the economy will completely eliminate the adverse effect and will secure rapid growth for Russian business in the medium-term perspective. Putin even attempted a joke about how the restrictions were applied against his friends, "two Jews and one Ukrainian", who allegedly had nothing to do with the events in Ukraine and Crimea and "transferred all their money to Russia even before the sanctions were introduced" anyway. These jokes came across as grotesque against the backdrop of weak tools suggested for economic growth which, as Russian analysts observed, have been copied from one address to another for three years now.

Putin clearly identified the key economic problem today – the deficit of financing resulting from the

Capital flight from Russia



sanctions. His recipe for dealing with it appeared adequate and multifaceted. It included the introduction of project financing in industry at a rate one per cent above the inflation rate, greater capitalization of systemically important Russian banks, budget financing of a technological upgrade of the economy, channelling money from the National Wealth Fund into the construction of infrastructure objects and government-backed loans for selected investment projects. However, all these elements converge on the federal budget, and it remains an open question where Putin is going to obtain money from if developed countries limit the purchases of Russian oil and gas, protected budget articles continue to account for a large part of Russia's budget and the agreement signed with China absorbs a sky-high USD 55bn in investments. Tested standard answers to this question – simplifying the launching and management of businesses and import replacement policy, which seems to suggest Moscow is gearing up for isolation – were not convincing.

ECONOMIC REALITIES

In general, the audience reacted with scepticism to Putin's courting address but turned out to be polarized. According to some forum participants, Putin was applauded about a dozen times in 2013 but only once or twice this year. Even though Russian officials were, as always, ecstatic about his statements and constantly beamed with joy behind the scenes, businessmen were more pessimistically minded.

Their gloomy sentiments are justified by macroeconomic trends. The money deficit is ubiquitous in Russia. First, the interbank rate grew from 6.7-7% last year to nearly 9% in May 2014. In the meantime, the Bank of Russia raised its interest rate twice – from 5.5 to 7.0 and then to 7.5%. The yield of ten-year federal bonds also jumped from 6.5-7% last year to 8.5-9% in March-May 2014. Second, in March month-on-month money supply fell for the first time since 1998. Given the devaluation of the rouble, this means that deposits are shrinking in Russian banks – the Russians are withdrawing their money from banks, possibly converting it into hard currency. This leads to increasing requirements that banks set before businesses and the population (mostly when issuing loans). Third, capital is fleeing from Russia in large amounts (see Capital flight from Russia). According to an estimate of the central bank, net capital outflow from Russia in Q1'2014 was nearly USD 64bn, which is more than in all of 2013. The events in Crimea and the Donbas erupted only in late February 2014. If this trend persists, some USD 200bn may leave Russia, according to Russian experts over the year 2014, causing its foreign-exchange reserves to fall 40%. Even the strict government-imposed limitations on dubious transactions used to transfer money to offshore accounts will not be of much help. Coupled with third-stage sectoral sanctions against Russia, this kind of capital flight may hamstring the federal budget so much that it will have a hard time making social payments to the population, to say nothing of

RUSSIA'S FEDERAL BUDGET MAY FAIL TO HANDLE LARGE-SCALE INVESTMENT PROJECTS

large-scale investment projects like building the infrastructure to export natural gas to China.

It is not surprising that a number of investment bankers were reported by Russian journalists as comparing that SPIEF 2014 to SPIEF 2008 when large business had misgivings of an imminent economic crisis. Their gut feelings are likely to come true to a larger or smaller extent this time around. ■

No European Joy Without Ukrainian Alloy

The EU is beginning to take concrete action against its excessive dependence on Russian gas

“We can neither confirm, nor deny your information” was the response that *The Ukrainian Week* got from the press service of the French oil company, Total. Similarly, Gaz de France did not want to speak to the press. Foreign colleagues, to whom we applied for help, did not get a clear response from Shell, E.ON, ENEL, BP.

The question was as follows: “Is it true that either directly, or through lobbying structures, your enterprise was demanding that Brussels remove the head of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, from the list of people subject to EU sanctions? Because his name was submitted on the initial list, but was not on the final one.”

Silence often gives consent. In professional journalism, this is not always the case. So let’s leave this game of hide and seek to the consciences of the leading energy enterprises of Old Europe, in which he who is not caught trusts that he is not the thief. One thing is clear: quite a few representatives of big Western business want to work with the Russian Federation: they want to invest in projects there and earn money in Russia. In pursuit of high income, they are willing to forget about Ukraine, geopolitics, fairness, moral principles and other non-economic matters.

In this case, everything is predictable. But it reveals an interesting alternative trend, together with the concrete pragmatism of big money. This is the search for a common European energy interest. The Ukrainian crisis has become a kind of catalyst for the process of finally creating a kind of an “energy NATO”, which Lech Walesa had futilely called for during his presidency.

Author:
Alla Lazareva



The name of Chief Executive of Gazprom, Alexey Miller, was submitted, but not approved on the list of highly-placed Russian officials that are subject to EU sanctions

The building of an efficient and self-sufficient system of European energy mutual aid is still aeons away. But the first humble concrete steps are being made. In recent days, the European Commission has granted a tranche of EUR 750mn to finance projects for the construction of common European infrastructures in the energy sphere.

As officials from the French Ministry of the Economy explained to *The Ukrainian Week*, “The Ukrainian crisis has convinced even the most die-hard sceptics that it is time to build a rapid interconnector system, which will allow the transfer of gas, say, from France to the Baltic States, which are very dependent on Gazprom supplies, or from Sweden to Finland, which is also currently highly dependent on Russian gas.”

Günther Oettinger, European Energy Commissioner, even used the word combination “gas as a weapon”, when assessing the actions of Russia regarding Ukraine. This truth has been obvious for many years, but has only now become clear to highly-placed officials in Brussels. “You have no idea of the uproar caused, when the circum-spect and cautious Oettinger spoke about the weapon,” an administrator, who works in the office at the European Commission in Brussels told *The Ukrainian Week*. “The Russians bombarded the Commissioner’s office with letters of indignation, and offices at all levels were inundated with phone calls.... This means that Oettinger unexpectedly hit the nail on the head.”


However, several days later, the European official softened his words. He began to explain that he only spoke “figuratively” about a “weapon”; that the Polish project for the establishment of a European energy union, which he himself had praised several days ear-

lier, still “requires considerable work by experts”. But a word spoken is past recalling. The European Commissioner was heard and a chain reaction ensued. EUR 750mn is already being allocated for the construction of an infrastructure, largely in the gas sphere, which will reduce the sphere of Gazprom’s economic dictates.

In spite of the change in Oettinger’s attitude regarding a European energy union, Poland sees the start of the development of reverse pipeline flow on the continent as its own minor victory. The Western press is widely quoting the Polish Prime Minister, Donald Tusk, who still hopes to convince the EU to conduct collective negotiations with Gazprom and demand a uniform gas price for all member-states – even if Brussels is currently demonstrating polite restraint.

According to information obtained by *The Ukrainian Week*, Polish diplomacy in Brussels is actively pushing a formula, which, as far as it is possible, would also allow Kyiv to join this common European Energy Security System. “Previously, Ukraine’s argument was only pertinent in the context of gas pipelines transiting its territory,” said a diplomat from the European Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. “They thought that if anything, this problem could be resolved via geographic means: by building the Nord Stream, then the South Stream, or Nabucco Pipeline. Today, the general European view has changed significantly. Europe has begun to see Russia not only as an economic opportunity, but also as a political and military threat. Hence the decision on the EUR 750mn. The discussion of means for reducing dependence on Russia, including the diversification of energy sources and the development of alternative energy, is planned.”

The first tranche of the European Commission, if efficiently applied, will allow the EU to increase its winter gas reserves from the current 30 day supply to one of 50–60 days. Within the framework of EU partnership, Ukraine could also potentially join such reserve schemes, which would mean that it would not be completely without gas, should there be another row with Russia. The prospects of this should be cleared up during a meeting of EU leaders in June. ■



Subtle Energy Independence

EBRD priorities are gradually shifting away from Russia. The investor is setting sights on Ukraine and has already renewed public sector lending

PHOTO: REUTERS

The EBRD president didn't show up at the Saint Petersburg International Economic Forum. Suma Chakrabarti explained his absence by the fact that Russia is seizing to be the priority for the organization.

High on the event's agenda were the reforms that should at least partially offset Kremlin's traditional energy trump card. And although Chakrabarti himself made it clear that EBRD wasn't about to break ties with Moscow (business is business), Russian officials are already feeling the relations cooling down. Over the last few months EBRD practically put all new projects in the region on hold, says First Vice Prime Minister of Russian Federation Igor Shuvalov. According to him, this came as a result of purely political stance of the directors from G7 states.

This year the Russians had little reason to stick around at the negotiations with the bank's top brass. Their section dedicated to investment prospects didn't even include a traditional Q&A session. "We had no time for that," abruptly explained Natasha Khanzhukova (EBRD Managing Director Russia), as she was chased by journalists down the corridor.

Meanwhile Ukraine, for which EBRD already was a notable financial investor, is to receive close to EUR 1bn from the organization by the end of 2014, which is twice as much as in 2013. In a way for Europeans the provision of financial support is a manifestation of trust. The trust, that Kyiv earned, among other

Author:
Slavka Kutsay

Suma Chakrabarti – is the sixth president of EBRD (since July 2012). Previously held a position of Permanent Secretary at the Ministry of Justice in Great Britain, Permanent Secretary at the Department for International Development, overseeing projects in former Soviet republics as well as countries of the North Africa. He specializes in economy, international development policies and implementation of state government reforms.

things by signing a memorandum of understanding concerning cooperation in fighting corruption. Chakrabarti emphasized that lenders are laying great hopes on this agreement and are looking forward to long-term cooperation, because some issues, he warned, would take time to resolve. Paramount among them is energy independence of Ukraine. As it says in the bank's strategy, the dependence of our country on energy imports is exacerbated by its low energy efficiency. EBRD committed to assisting Ukraine with energy diversification and avoiding energy-related threats. The Parliament already passed a law on attracting a USD 300mn loan for realization of large-scale programme to improve safety of nuclear power plant reactors.

Bankwatch, an NGO that monitors the activity of international financial institutions, EBRD in particular, voiced concerns that what looks like a goodwill gesture of providing financial aid may play against Ukraine in its struggle for energy independence from the eastern neighbor. The predicament is that Ukrainian nuclear power plants are to a large extent reliant on Russian equipment, uranium supply from Russia, as well as the eventual disposal of spent nuclear fuel and waste. On top of that, by 2020 12 of 15 Ukraine's reactors will have exhausted their service life. In 2004 the government took a decision to extend this term by 10-15 years.

According to EBRD president, the loan is intended specifically for improving safety of the reactors,

which is an aim that no one will object to. But, as Bankwatch pointed out, the same measures will allow NNEGC Energoatom, the operator of all Ukrainian nuclear power plants, to prepare old reactors for re-launch which may end up being a forced move for the country, considering the need to repay the loan. And with Ukraine's overall debt of UAH 800bn (more than 53% of GDP), focusing on the support of an industry, the reliance on which will only make the country more dependent on external political factors, is a controversial path to follow.

Chakrabarti agrees that old Soviet technology will only hold Ukraine back on its way towards independent future. There is, however, a Plan B proposed by the National Ecological Centre of Ukraine: to decrease energy consumption instead of increasing capacity. No doubt, this is a challenging path. Considering the lack of adequate electricity counting, many believe this is a pipe dream. However some calculations are available. According to data by BEST analysis centre, by focusing on efficiency in utilizing available resources Ukraine may save around EUR 11.4bn annually. Such economy translates into 30 billion cubic meters of natural gas per year, which is 4bn more than Ukraine imported in 2013.

Recently EBRD together with representatives of the German government unveiled their own concept of natural gas saving in Ukraine, which envisages modernization of public utility complex. The pilot project is a resounding success. Six associations of co-owners received UAH 2.4mn for façade work to seal panel joints and for installation of individual heat substations. The undertaking demonstrated that the investment can be recouped in a little as five years, with the resulting energy consumption almost halved.

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Andrey Illarionov:

"The aggression against Ukraine will inevitably end in a redrawing of Russia's borders"


 A large, slightly blurred portrait of Andrey Illarionov, a Russian economist, serves as the background for the article. He is wearing a light-colored suit jacket over a blue shirt.

012

Andrey Illarionov, born in 1961, is a Russian economist. He graduated from the Faculty of Economics of Leningrad State University in 1983. In 1993-94, he led the Analysis and Planning Group working for Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. In 2000-2005, he was an advisor to the President of Russian on economic issues and his representative in the G8. In December 2005, he voluntarily resigned from the office of Putin's advisor in protest against the Kremlin's policy. Since October 2006, Illarionov has been a senior fellow in the Centre for Global Liberty and Prosperity at the Cato Institute in Washington, DC.

**Interviewed
by Alla
Lazareva**

Andrey Illarionov, a former advisor to Vladimir Putin, talks to *The Ukrainian Week* about the prospects of Russian imperialism, the efficiency of Western diplomacy and the possible consequences of the Russian-Ukrainian war

U.W.: According to the latest opinion polls, 85% of Russians support Putin. How would you explain this? Could it be a form of mass psychosis or a collective inferiority complex that demands satisfaction? The figures are quite alarming, to say the least.

Indeed, never in the history of Russia has the government had this level of support – it would not be a mistake to say that this includes the last years of the USSR, at least after fairly adequate sociological measurements appeared. The figures are, no doubt, extremely alarming. They point to an excessive, colossal level of support for the aggressive imperialist policy pursued by the Putin regime, which creates an even bigger deadlock. If popular support during the Russian-Ukrainian war were much lower, there would be a chance of some compromise. Per-

haps not immediately, but in some reasonably distant future. However, the present level of support essentially means that the Russian government is forced to come into a conflict, which stands every chance of turning into World War IV, not only of its own volition but now also driven by the poll results. Unfortunately, this is another proof that the war is much more real than many of us would like to believe.

For interpretations of the causes underlying these developments, one needs to turn to psychologists, psychiatrists or spe-



PHOTO: REUTERS

precisely as such? The imperial system is economically inefficient and globally uncompetitive. However, Russia is stubbornly annexing new territories. Is this long-time inertia, or something else?

There are two key reasons here. One is rational, and the other one is relatively irrational. The latter includes factors that could be correctly described as ideological. Many things in the actions of the Russian government are dictated not by logical considerations about what would be most beneficial to the country, electorate and even the rulers themselves but by an irrational notion of how things should be. It is quite clear that the concept of the "Russian world" has been inculcated in the mind of Putin, not without his personal involvement, for a long time. It is all about "uniting" the biggest "divided" people in the world – the Russians. An attempt to bring them together under one state shield is, in fact, an exact copy of the concept professed by Adolf Hitler and Alfred Rosenberg in the 1920s and the 1930s regarding "uniting" the "divided" German nation. A similar notion was propounded by Slobodan Milošević in his argument about a "divided Serbian people". Hungarian fascists developed a similar theory during World War II as they justified their government's policy aimed at taking over the territories that belonged to Hungary prior to World War I. The consequences for everyone who tried to pursue this kind of policy, namely Hitler, Horthy, Szálasi and Milošević, are as telling as they are miserable. They are pitiful not only for the dictators but also for the people that became cannon fodder in their ventures and died in millions for the sake of imperial phantoms. This is the so-called irrational side.

However, there is also the rational one, if this term is applicable to Russia's current policy. You see, the easiest way to keep power in a strict authoritarian regime, which is now present in Russia, is to show an enemy to the people. It must exist not only in the propaganda fabrications generated by the rulers but must be obvious and convincing for the wide masses. In the past 15 years, the

The easiest way to keep power in a strict authoritarian regime, which is now present in Russia, is to show an enemy to the people. It must exist not only in the propaganda fabrications generated by the rulers but must be obvious and convincing for the wide masses

Chechens, Estonians, Georgians, sometimes Latvians, Belarusians, Lithuanians, oligarchs and others have been portrayed as enemies of the Russian regime. Despite the temporary success that these campaigns enjoyed, they have ultimately failed to enflame Russian society with hatred. Just like the Putin-inspired separatist campaign has failed to flare up in Eastern Ukraine, the likes of Estonians or Georgians as Russia's archenemies failed to command the attention of Russian society for long. And so, after numerous attempts to find all kinds of enemies, the Russian propaganda machine got back on its time-tested track, which is anti-Americanism. The anti-American campaign was elaborated in the traditions of Soviet propaganda that goes back several decades. The only force capable of exerting an impact on Russian society of any significance is a real threat – to the Russians, their society, the state, etc. And the only serious candidate for this role is the USA. Ultimately, it so happened that the immediate needs of Putin's regime itself and the brainwashing technology polished over the decades in the USSR and post-Soviet countries converged on anti-Americanism. To make things click, the ideology of anti-Americanism has to be continuously fuelled, which is what we

UKRAINE IS RAPIDLY ELIMINATING THE ENCLAVES OF SOVIET-TYPE THINKING IN ITS TERRITORY, WHILE ITS EASTERN NEIGHBOUR IS REVERTING TO ARCHAIC WAYS

see today. Therefore, there are both ideological and pragmatic, relatively rational and relatively irrational factors that have contributed to the restoration of Russian imperialism.

U.W.: Regarding the efficiency of the Western diplomatic style with Russia, how adequate is it? Can tolerance overcome intolerance? Is it realistic to bring a non-democratic opponent to order using democratic methods?

In Europe and in the West in general, there are, of course, dif- ➤

cialists in mass psychic deviations. Of course, this is nothing new historically, but we are now witnessing phenomena which we used to know only from historical documents. In the late 1930s and early 1940s, Germany went berserk with its imperialist conquests, and similar processes were taking place in the USSR at the same time. From an academic viewpoint, this is all very interesting, but the situation is extremely painful to people who live in it.

U.W.: Why does Russia want to remain an empire and develop

ferent forces. There are those that sense the danger of revisionism and revanchism emanating from Putin's Russia. These people are steadily growing in number. Many can see what is happening in Eastern Europe and what a lack of an adequate response to imperial actions may ultimately lead to. However, it should be honestly admitted that a large part of the Western world stubbornly refuses to see the obvious. There are several reasons here: from ideological considerations among the left (and now among the right-wing parties abroad for whom Putin has de facto become a leader) to banal bribing. Moreover, a significant number of Western politicians, businessmen and experts believe that any kind of appeasement to the current leader of Russia and to Putinism is better than the fight against Putin's aggression.

U.W.: In your opinion, do Ukrainians have a chance to stand their ground in the armed conflict with Russia and preserve an independent Ukraine?

I have no doubt about that. I am becoming more and more convinced that this is precisely what will happen. It is clear that, in Ukraine, one can see a much higher potential for survival in society rather than in the rulers or government institutions, even though they, too, are taking small steps in the right direction. Over the 20 something years of independence, Ukrainian society has completed an enormously long journey in terms of development. It has changed, matured and become more serious and advanced in comparison to Russian society.

I remember the early 1990s when Russia came across as being far more advanced than Ukraine in many aspects of economic, political and national transformations. At the time, Ukraine appeared, I dare say, very backward and pro-Soviet and seemed to have no chance of catching up. Today, 20 years later, we can see that Ukraine is very rapidly eliminating the enclaves of Soviet-type thinking in its territory, while its eastern neighbour is reverting to archaic ways. On all important sociopolitical indicators (democracy,

civil liberties and human rights), Ukraine has been ahead of Russia in the past 20 years, and today Ukraine's lead is simply huge. It has never known mass murders of peaceful people, as was the case in Russia during the Chechen campaigns, or such severe harassment of the media as in Russia, even though the Ukrainian media experienced persecutions during certain stretches, such as under Leonid Kuchma and Viktor Yanukovich. But this pales in comparison with what was and is still going on in Russia. Today, your society is much more mature. The recent events, particularly the three months of the Maidan and the three months of the Russian-Ukrainian war, have helped soci-

undisguised Russian patriots of Ukraine. This is important evidence that Ukraine has come of age as modern, democratic and multiethnic society in which Russians as one of the biggest minorities play an important role.

U.W.: Is the war against Ukraine having an impact on separatist processes in Russia? Many researchers say that the encouragement, if not the organization, of a separatist movement in eastern Ukraine is going to encourage the peoples in the Russian Federation to break away. Others say, on the contrary, that the Russians are so used to a strict vertical social organization that no rapid shifts are to be expected.

I would put it in a slightly different way. The thing is that it is very hard to see what the immediate impact on events in Russia may be today, at least by looking at objective opinion surveys. However, in the medium-term and long-term perspective, the Russian-Ukrainian war launched by Putin will almost inevitably elevate the conflict to the level of the Fourth World War which will certainly end in the aggressor's defeat. History does not know cases when this kind of expansion, whether under the slogans of "genetic uniqueness" or "uniting a divided people", led to the victory of the aggressor. It was always defeated, its forces destroyed and the territory it controlled prior to the armed conflict was subjected to serious divisions at the initiative of the victors. Suffice it to compare the territory of the German Empire in summer 1914 and after the First World War, the Reich's lands as of 1 September 1939 and the German territory today, the borders of Hungary during and after the Second World War, the lands controlled by Milošević before and after the Yugoslav War and so on. Historically, aggression led to one and the same ending. This means that, by making war against Ukraine, Putin opened a Pandora's box for Russia. With time, it will inevitably become the cause of a tragedy for the Russian people, millions of Russian citizens, and will lead to a redrawing of Russia's borders. ■



THE EVENTS OF THE PAST MONTHS SHOW THAT THERE ARE MANY ETHNIC RUSSIANS WHO LIVE IN YOUR COUNTRY AND ARE ITS PATRIOTS

ety to rapidly mature and draw closer together and made people more involved in society and the state. This is a very important and valuable lesson, even though it came at a dear price.

It shows the complete inadequacy of Russian propaganda regarding alleged problems with the Russian language, because no more than 8-10% of people take interest in this issue at the level of opinion polls. All polls show tiny support for separatism. The things Russia has done to Ukraine in the past three months and the way it has done them have only boosted the desire of Ukrainians, regardless of their ethnic background, to preserve a united Ukraine.

Let me tell you one important thing. The events of the past months show that there are many ethnic Russians who live in your country and are its patriots. These are the people who speak Russian and feel they belong to the Russian culture but at the same time actively support an independent Ukraine. This is a very important phenomenon. There are some seven million ethnic Russians living in Ukraine. At least half of them, or perhaps even more, are

A significant number of Western politicians, businessmen and experts believe that any kind of appeasement to the current leader of Russia and to Putinism is better than the fight against Putin's aggression

Troops In

Barack Obama promises to increase America's military presence in eastern Europe

Poles can be prickly, especially when it comes to their own painful history. They often express dismay that the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989 is widely seen as the start of the collapse of the Soviet empire, when it was actually strikes the year before in Poland that pulled the communist leadership into "round-table talks" with Solidarity, the banned trade union, and which set off the domino effect of the collapse of communism. In the semi-free elections 25 years ago this week, Solidarity took all the winnable seats except one.

Under normal circumstances Poles would be feeling chuffed that America's president, Barack Obama, the leader of the world's most powerful country, and dozens of other international leaders, including the presidents of France and Germany, travelled to Warsaw to mark that 25th anniversary. But the unrest in neighbouring Ukraine overshadowed the celebrations. On his arrival on June 3rd, Mr Obama went straight to an aircraft hangar where American and Polish airmen serve together to announce that he was asking Congress for \$1 billion to finance troop rotations, bigger training programmes and joint exercises aimed at increasing America's military presence in Europe. To show that Poland is willing to do its bit, the Polish president promised to increase his country's spending on defence to 2% of GDP.

The "European reassurance initiative" may unsettle some western Europeans who are worried about annoying Russia, but it fell short of Poland's real, long-standing goal, which is a permanent presence of NATO forces on its territory. "Something very dramatic has happened: for the first time since the war a Euro-



PHOTO: REUTERS

Flags out for Obama

pean border has been changed by force. Poland wants NATO troops here. They don't have to be American, but they do have to be from NATO," says Eugeniusz Smolar, a foreign-policy analyst based in Warsaw.

Yet the idea of NATO troops in central Europe causes concern in parts of western Europe. NATO promised Russia in 1997, during its eastward expansion, that it would not base any troops in the region. But this agreement is not valid any more, argues Marcin Zaborowski, head of PISM, a think-tank in Warsaw, because the security environment has changed. In his view, the distinction between old Europe (where NATO troops can be stationed) and new Europe (where they cannot) has been blown away by Russia's annexation of Crimea and intervention in eastern Ukraine.

Poland and the Baltic states have been NATO's most hawkish members in pushing for a strong response to Russia's destabilisation of Ukraine. Leaders of all four countries have argued that Vladimir Putin, Russia's president, will go as far as he can with his territorial expansionism until he sees a firm red line laid down by the West. Poland's determination has cast a shadow over the Weimar triangle, a loose club of

Germany, France and Poland. Germany is more circumspect about sanctions against Russia, and wants NATO to keep to its 1997 agreement. France is at loggerheads with Poland (and America) over its plans to sell Russia two amphibious assault ships.

In recent years Poland has focused its foreign policy on improving relations with its European Union partners, particularly Germany. The Poles' bruising experience of taking part in American-led military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as disappointment with Mr Obama's decision to relocate and postpone a proposed American missile-defence shield in Poland and the Czech Republic, had cooled ties. Yet faced with the irredentist expansionism of Russia, Poland's old imperial master, and the EU's indecisive response, the Poles have again turned to America as their most crucial ally and protector against possible aggression from the east.

For Poland it is imperative that NATO moves some of its forces permanently from, say, Germany into Poland and the Baltic states. Mr Obama's initiative is not enough to satisfy Polish demands for an unmistakable message of deterrence, but it is a step in the right direction. ■

The Chronicles of Dignity

How the past six months changed Ukrainians, Ukraine and the Maidan

The first page of Ukraine's new history was turned on the night of November 21, 2013. It was raining, an EU flag frozen on the big flat screen over the Trade Unions Building reflected in the puddles. A few hundred Kyivites gathered on the Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Independence Square. Mostly youth, journalists, civil activists and "lifelong revolutionaries", they were people who had long been struggling against the Yanukovich regime. A few hours before, the Cabinet of Ministers had suddenly suspended preparations for the signing of an Association Agreement with the EU. Messages like "...well, here I am on the Maidan" went viral on social media. Only three days later, on November 24 opposition leaders called on the public to take to the streets.

"You can restore anything in the world from ruin, other than living blood, as we know already...", a Kyiv Mohyla Academy student recited a line by contemporary poet Yuriy Andrukhovych from atop a van. Then the floor went to Yevhen Nyschchuk, the Culture Minister-to-be. His speech was filmed by Dmytro Prykhno, a cheerful guy who would be beaten by Berkut officers a week later. In February, he would say goodbye to his parents on the phone and film an entirely different Maidan – a fire and smoke-covered hell with whizzing bullets and the song "Ukrainian insurgent, don't back down in the fight" floating over it.

It would be entirely different people. An entirely different country. And, probably, an entirely different world. But on November 21, 2013, nobody knew that yet.

"DO YOUR BEST, BIG BOSS!"

Peaceful protest. November 21-30

In the first days of the "chaotic" Maidan, most supporters came to Independence Square in the evenings after work. The only infrastructure was hot tea, songs and umbrellas. Opposition leaders were forced to occasionally appear in front of the Kyivites who had taken a false start on their own. One

Author:
**Valeria
Burlakova**

night, politicians headed to the subway to distribute leaflets and ask people to come to the Sunday rally.

The rally needed to draw 50,000 people. The government would then have to listen to the people's demands. Nobody knew that hundreds of thousands would pour to the streets, yet their voices remained unheard.

Clashes Began on November 24, the night after the first viche – an assembly – when activists were attacked near the Cabinet of Ministers by Berkut special police and hundreds of titushkas (paid thugs and athletes hired by the government to attack protesters and arrange provocations). The police were not yet using stun grenades or weap-

ons, just tear gas and batons. Still, the ratio of those willing to attack the police and those preferring to stay away proved that no one wanted to spill blood.

An opposition MP announced the headquarters' decision to leave the square in front of the Cabinet of Ministers in order to prevent the police from breaking into the protest-occupied European Square. It was there that the "political" part of the EuroMaidan, i.e. tens of thousands of protesters led by the opposition and flooded with the flags of opposition parties, would gather for the next few days. The Maidan would meanwhile host the apolitical EuroMaidan, mostly comprised of students singing, dancing and calling on protesters to avoid militant slogans like "Death to the enemy!"

On the night of November 26-27, the opposition decided to merge the two protests (whether it was to save money because, rumour had it, renting the stage equipment had been expensive until Ihor Kryvetsky bought the stage for Maidan; or because its leaders had grown discouraged by the lack of response to their speeches). People from the European Square went to the Maidan.

Many thought the Maidan would thus die down, eventually turning into a kind of "weird discotheque". However, the unexpected decision of the then government to launch a police crackdown on protesters who would have soon left the square anyway revitalized it.

This decision was a mistake for the President, and, as many said, played into the hands of the opposition. Yet, it was also perfectly expected from the Yanukovich regime which had previously ended the Vradiyivka Maidan and dozens of other protests in that same manner.

"TOO MUCH, BIG BOSS!"

Holding the fort. November 30-January 19

"Five minutes to 2a.m., someplace between Rivne and Zhytomyr. The gas station is busy as if it were rush hour. Drivers come in, take sandwiches and drive on toward Kyiv. They are not students, but rather men in their forties.

NOVEMBER 21-30

Demands

- Resignation of Azarov Cabinet due to betrayal of national interests

- Cancellation of decision to suspend preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement with the EU (or impeachment of Yanukovich if it is not signed due to betrayal of national interests)

- Release of Yulia Tymoshenko



SKETCH BY OLEKSANDER KAMAKHOV

Most probably have no Twitter or Facebook accounts, yet they got up and left for Kyiv. Because they have something to lose—they have people to lose. Hundreds and thousands are going to the Maidan “You’re finished, Yanukovich!—and they are not students,” Yarema Dukh, one of many Ukrainians heading to the protest, wrote on Facebook that night. Kyiv had already risen and gone to Mykhailivska Square to protest against the “bloody Christmas tree” (the installation of the Christmas tree was used as an excuse for the violent crackdown on students at the end of November). It was these days that changed the social structure of the Maidan, bringing everybody to the streets.

Though many did not support the march against the government (including the December 1st clashes on Bankova Street where the Presidential Administration is located or the forcing of Berkut officers to take down their masks after clashes near Sviatoshyn Court on January 11), no one rejected the fact that the Maidan had real enemies and had to protect itself from them. This was how it began to mature, sparking a similar process throughout the nation.

“When we gathered on Mykhailivska Square after the crackdown on the students on November 30, it got really tense. It was obvious that Berkut was prepared to do something. The injured boys and girls only proved this,” Andriy Parubiy, current Head of the National Security and Defence Council and the commander of the Maidan Self-Defence, told *The Ukrainian Week* later in his interview. “So, when we returned to the Maidan with a march of one million, major organization work began. Everyone realized that we would stay here awhile, so we had to organize things well. Security was our priority.”

As a result, Independence Square saw the construction of the first barricades, self-defence units, and dozens of tents. Later, protesters would take over the Trade Unions Building—now a black burned-out carcass, the October Palace at the beginning of Instytutska Street where snipers would shoot dozens of unarmed protesters, and the Kyiv City Administration Building occupied on December 1.

During the next viche on December 8, later named the March of the Million, Oleksandr Turchynov announced the blocking of the government district. The protesters moved there to set up the “borders” of the revolution, i.e. tent towns near government buildings. The Lenin statue on Shevchenko Boulevard was toppled.

NOVEMBER 30-JANUARY 19



New demands
- Return to the legitimate Constitution with curbed powers of the President
- Make sure that Yanukovich does not sign the agreement to join the Russian-led Customs Union (December 15 viche)

New checkpoints were toppled, too: protesters had to surrender them on December 9. “When we blocked the government district, we expected huge numbers of people there... But too few came,” Parubiy explained.

The night of December 10-11 when the police attempted to storm the Maidan was crucial. They broke the barricades and surrounded Independence Square. Kyiv heard St. Michael’s Church bells tolling in alarm. Then, thousands of Kyivites rushed to help the protesters. The Maidan survived the police storm.

On December 22, the All-Ukrainian Maidan Association was established. On December 29, the AutoMaidan visited Mezhyhiria, the mansion of ex-president Yanukovich. Despite ongoing clashes, bitter cold and repressions against dissenters, the protesters remained on the Maidan. Many thought this was not enough. “The Maidan has been here for a month, a million decisive people out in the streets. And the only result we have is ‘wild dances’. It’s not just me, it’s the entire million chanting: ‘We have to act!’,” Sashko Lirnyk, folk musician and storyteller, says.

Eventually, the Maidan generated an active resistance. It became obvious on January 16, 2014, the day when Ukrainians once again woke up to a “new country” of illegitimately passed draconian laws. Yet they did not scare or disperse the Maidan. The next day, people turned up wearing colanders instead of the helmets banned by the new laws, and the Maidan carried on—for three more days.



Go here for more info on Vradiyivka protests as the early signal of the Maidan

“WE’RE DOING OUR BEST, BIG BOSS”

The war. January 19-February 21

January 19. Yet another viche of people infuriated by the draconian laws escalated into a long heated resistance against the police on Hrushevskoho Street. The line between peaceful protesters and provocateurs was erased. Old grannies brought lemons and milk to the fire barricades to help the protesters deal with tear gas. Women dug up and distributed cobblestones and made Molotov cocktails. 17-year olds fought alongside 70-year olds, and ended up at emergency field hospitals together.

The first protesters were killed on January 22, Unity Day in Ukraine. One was Belarusian-born Mykhail Zhynznevsky. The other was Armenian-born Serhiy Nihoyan.

The murders did not stop the clashes on Hrushevskoho Street. The tires kept burning. The doctors were smoking by the emergency unit before it was smashed by the Berkut. New injured protesters arrived every 15 minutes. Most had eye injuries caused by bullets that had easily broken through the ski goggles worn by many protesters. At dawn of January 23, masked protesters hung a huge yellow and blue flag with “Freedom” written on the yellow part. “Or death”, the ending of the phrase, was missing, but everybody knew it.

The Maidan spilled over into the rest of the country. Oblast and city administrations were taken over throughout Ukraine. An active phase of negotiations between the opposition and the government began, yet it brought no results. It was clear that there was no way back. “If we lose, we lose everything. [...] We will de facto lose our independence. And we have nowhere to retreat to. We have crossed the point of no return. We have just one option: to win if we want to survive. If we want to live in a free country. Otherwise, we will all be thrown in jail, the active ones at least. And that’s the best-case scenario. In the worst-case scenario, we will be killed. Everyone knows this,” Ruslan Andriyko, commandant of the Kyiv City State Administration told *The Ukrainian Week*.

On February 18, the Maidan planned to peacefully march to the Verkhovna Rada where MPs were scheduled to consider amendments to the Constitution to curb the President’s powers. The thousands of protesters included opposition MPs, girls and women, boys in suits and ties who planned to go to their offices as soon as the march was over, grey- ▶

haired men, and Self-Defence members.

The march reached the Verkhovna Rada. Shortly after, clashes with the police broke out. They lasted for hours, quickly expanding to other downtown streets. The office of the Party of Regions and the trucks blocking the way to the government districts were set ablaze. The Maidan would burn that same night. People were dying—many more than were generally known: according to official data, 14 protesters were killed on the day of what was planned as a peaceful march. Yet 100 more are still missing to this day. Activists and MPs later said that they had seen the police taking away decapitated and deformed bodies. None of the known Heaven's Hundred protesters (people killed during the Maidan) had such injuries.

On the night of February 18, the government announced a violent crackdown on the Maidan. Loudspeakers told women and children to leave the Maidan since an "anti-terrorist operation" would soon begin there. The authorities pledged to hold one all over Ukraine.

Kyiv's subway was closed. Taxi drivers ripped off clients. Kiyivites who live on the Left Bank, a remote district of Kyiv, walked to the central square. People from other parts of Ukraine left for the capital and its main square. The authorities blocked the roads to Kyiv with sandbag barricades. The Trade Unions Building was set on fire. The Maidan continued to stand. "No fear, we're immortal," someone said from the stage. The second wave of protests rose in regions. People in Lviv and Ternopil stormed police headquarters. Kiyivites united in their districts to hunt for tushkas around their homes. In many cities, people arranged checkpoints to prevent their local police, internal troops and Berkut from going to Kyiv. Civilians lay on the railway in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast to block a train carrying troops to Kyiv.

Still, Yanukovich did not take any concessions. The Maidan felt alarmed, with too few protesters staying there—just the ones who were ready to die. "There weren't many protesters here during the first shootout," Vitaliy Zaporozhets, a villager convicted for shooting a policeman that terrorized his village, then released thanks to the Maidan, noted. "The night passed. Then, the day. Here, I thought, Kyiv would rise! Two hundred thousand people would be enough to defeat the Berkut. Nobody came... Until people from Western Ukraine arrived."

JANUARY 19 – FEBRUARY 22

- Abolition of draconian anti-protest laws
- Impeachment of Yanukovich



On February 20, dozens of protesters were shot dead. The Maidan turned into a cemetery littered with bodies draped with Ukrainian flags. The funeral service for them took place there later. Plyve Kacha, an old Lemko song performed by Pikkardiyska Tertsia, became the anthem of the Heaven's Hundred. It the favourite song of Mykhailo Zhynsky, one of the first protesters killed on the Maidan.

It was during this time that the system broke down. On February 21, opposition leaders signed an agreement to regulate the crisis in Ukraine with Yanukovich. Later at night, Volodymyr Parasiuk, a Self-Defence unit leader, announced that the Self-Defence would storm the Presidential Administration the next day if Yanukovich did not step down. Yanukovich fled.

On February 22, the Verkhovna Rada voted for his impeachment.

"VITYA, CIAO!"

The government forms. The Maidan becomes a marginal movement
February 22

The Maidan was flooded with candles and flowers. It was also dealing with the current challenges, forming a new government and formally suggesting candidates for ministerial seats at yet another viche. Then, on February 26, the protesters were presented with finalized appointments decided by the new government.

A Self-Defence unit leader got on the stage and demanded bios of all the candidates and their proposed first 10 steps in office. He suggested going to the Verkhovna Rada the next

day because the new government was betraying the Maidan.

"Nobody's doing that," another unit leader said. The Maidan that would host many more viches was slowly emptying. Paid activists replaced most actual protesters who left for home. Mykola Katerynchuk, a candidate for the mayor office in Kyiv, was among those who splurged on hiring activists. Supporters of Arsen Avakov, current Interior Minister unpopular with many, turned up, too.

Today, people still bring flowers to the Maidan. The burned carcass of the Trade Unions Building still towers over it. Yet, Kiyivites no longer wake up in a cold sweat wondering whether the police are crashing the Maidan, whether it is still there, and whether they should rush to Independence Square. The revolution may be over in Ukraine, yet the war has only begun. In fact, however, the revolution never ends.

Very soon, flowers will only be brought to the Maidan once a year, to commemorate the Heaven's Hundred. The Trade Unions Building will be demolished or repaired. The tents will go away.

But to those who had been on the Maidan and supported it, it will last forever. Regardless of the change of leaders, signing of agreements or wars and European integration processes. It will last forever because the simplest, yet the most important demands of those days will remain. It is not "against Russia". It is not "for Europe". It is for a Ukraine without bribery. It is to make sure that the deaths of dozens of people with whom we were lucky enough to stand shoulder-to-shoulder were not in vain. ■

FROM FEBRUARY 22

- Public control over the government
- Remain on the Maidan until full reboot of the government





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The Maidan became both a tourist destination and a place where foreigners, who are not indifferent to the fate of Ukraine, gathered. The flags that flew above it were from various countries, not only those of Ukraine and the EU. The heroes of Nebesna Sotnya - the Heaven Hundred - also include the citizens of other countries. How did, and do, foreigners view the Maidan?

Author:
Olha Vorozhbyt

Marco Ferraro, Italy:

I came to Kyiv in January. In Italy, events on the EuroMaidan didn't sound like particularly important news, but I thought that the actual situation was unusual for Europe, because people were taking to the streets with EU flags. I was in Kyiv for a week, then again towards the end of February, immediately after the invasion of Crimea. I then became an activist of the EuroMaidan - Italy group, which spread true information and refuted Russian propaganda. Together with the "We are all Europeans. We are all Ukrainians" group, on the eve of the elections to the European Parliament, I conducted a social campaign to show that a lot of Euro-

pean politicians are friends with Putin. When I initially came to Kyiv, it was interesting to compare the protests going on there to those that took place in Turkey against the planned construction in Gezi Park, where I have lived for the last three years. I was on the Maidan during the peaceful period. To be honest, I don't know what I would have done if there had been an attack. I would probably have run to the barricades together with the protesters. Being in Kyiv was one of the strongest emotional times of my life. I wanted to talk about it to people in Italy, so I spread information. It was something beautiful. By say-



Marco Ferraro
is in the middle

ing "beautiful", I mean that the people on the Maidan were genuine and honest. I met some more Italians there. What drew us to the Maidan, was the battle against corruption. When the people on the Maidan spoke to me, I felt that I could trust them, because they proved their words with action. The last time I was on the Maidan was during the presidential election in Ukraine. The place now seems empty, as a friend of mine said, as if only those remain there, who have no real life. It has lost its energy. Of course, during a military crisis, it is difficult to put pressure on your own government. As far as the Maidan is concerned, in my view, it can have several options for development. One is to become a political move-

The Foreign Hundred



Anja Lange,
Germany:


I have lived in Ukraine for a year now. Until then, I studied in Leipzig and grew up in Dresden. I am currently teaching German at the Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. I was at the Maidan nearly every day, generally observing what was go-

ing on. At first, it reminded me of the European Football Championship, the final of which took place here a year earlier. Everyone had a good time, danced and there was an atmosphere of a public holiday, which lasted for a week, until November 30. After the attack by Berkut, it became more radical. I understood that everything was a lot more serious. Students went on strike. But with time, there were less and less young people on the Maidan. I was a little disillusioned with this. What's next, I thought finally.

At first, it was very important for me that the Maidan was a symbol of Ukrainian civil society. People were doing something for one another, free of charge. To me it seemed unbelievable that something like this was happening. Then there was the escalation in February, and I think that from that time on, only those who don't know what to do remain on the square. They want to live in tents and eat buckwheat.

For the German press, Svoboda and Pravyi Sektor - The Right Sector - were the main participants of the protests. My mother was the first to phone me, saying that there were only fascists on the Maidan. I told her that "I'm there too". Many of my family members phoned me, because while all the action was taking place on two streets and the main square, in Germany, they thought that the whole of Kyiv was ablaze.

The Maidan has already become a symbol of civil activity and cooperation, and this is how it should always be. However, right now, in my view, there are a lot of disillusioned people, because at first everyone said: "We aren't going anywhere until Yanukovich is gone", and when he bolted and a transition government was formed, the people decided that they would now live in peace, everything will be easier. But it is impossible to change everything in one go.



Filip Szymborski, *Poland:*

I am currently involved with humanitarian aid in Kyiv, together with the Open Dialogue Foundation. I came here with this organisation in February, but was here on my own in December.

I initially read a lot about the Maidan, following events on the Internet. I soon decided that I wanted to come here, but I was working and it was hard to leave my job, so I only arrived towards the end of December, when Christmas holidays started in Poland. It was very cold. My first impression was that nothing looked the way that I had imagined. It also reminded me of the democratic movement in Poland.

During the period December 26 – January 6, when I was first here, the Maidan seemed peaceful and vivid – something was constantly going on. I think that for the people who stayed on, it was a place where they could communicate freely and do something spontaneously.

At that time, Svoboda took me in at the Zhovtneviy Palats (October Palace). I did everything that everyone else did: took part in vigils, worked in the kitchen and helped to make decorations for the stage. I came back in February together with the Foundation, and we began to be involved in humanitarian aid and when cases were being heard against AutoMaidan activists. We reported on what was going on there.

Today's Maidan, as well as the one in December, January or February, is a single space. Probably a lot of the people on the Maidan today were also there in winter. It appears that this spirit has now spread throughout the whole of Ukraine, and that which actually remained on the Maidan – is for the people who stayed behind, for those who seemed to have nowhere to go, since they were either there too long, have nowhere to return to, or were not accepted into the National Guard ... but they should at least be allowed to continue living in the place where they stood at the very start.

The physical space of the Maidan should have changed. The road should not be open for cars to travel on, because too much has happened there. It would be good if Khreshchatyk and Maidan Nezalezhnosti were to remain a pedestrian zone, so that people would see where the barricades were located, where the stage was set up, so that these places could become a monument in honour of those events.

When talking about the Maidan, for me, the most important thing was that spontaneity; the fact that people opened up to one another and began to work. This is very important in my view – learning to work together and learning to have faith.



Kate Hiatt Mattila, *USA:*

I've been in Ukraine for almost a year. My first impressions of the Maidan ... I remember walking from the Ukrainian House on November 23 or 24, when cars still drove along Khreshchatyk. It was pouring with rain and a few people were standing under blue umbrellas with EU symbols on them. It was really great that they were fired up by something, because after the defeat of the Orange Revolution, everyone was very apathetic.

It would be good if the Maidan could remain a place for communication, discussion and also – memory; for Khreshchatyk to stay open. When people study

revolutions, they try to find similarities. As far as the Maidan is concerned, it is kind of unique, because it was peaceful for such a long time ...


The Maidan is of unbelievably huge symbolic significance for people in similar situations: if there is a system that should be changed, but you don't know how to do that, you will find a way out all the same. I think that the overall situation in Ukraine will improve, but that the spirit of the Maidan, its energy and dialogue, will extend and encourage politicians to make changes and have a sense of responsibility to voters, in order to prevent further conflicts.



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Organize or Face Disappointment

Without grassroots organization and political parties funded by membership dues, Ukrainians will find themselves disappointed once again by self-serving political leaders. Even worse, the country could face further degradation or loss of sovereignty

Автор:
Oleksandr
Kramar

Ukrainian politics has changed its façade constantly over the past two decades (i.e. leaders, parties, and governments) while leaving the corrupt oligarchic system at the core of government and business virtually untouched. Most Ukrainians have sought improvements, European standards, and accountable politicians. Many took to the streets for the Orange Revolution in 2004 and the Maidan in 2013-2014, demonstrating great courage and the willingness to sacrifice their own lives. Yet disappointment followed as the results failed to meet the public's expectations. This led to further discouragement and a feeling of having been exploited. It would take years and a generational shift to do away with this psychological state of disillusionment.

Politically, these sentiments manifested themselves in steep fluctuations in the level of support for particular politicians and their parties. As long as voters viewed them as "ideal", or at least "effective", "strong" or "energetic", but knew little of them in action, their ratings would skyrocket. Meanwhile, the "boring stuff" was often overlooked, including the actual platforms, means of responding to existing challenges, teams and sources of funding (as well as the party's or the politician's commitments to sponsors). Once a given political camp came to power and this information surfaced, infatuation quickly gave way to disenchantment.


Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine), the party of former president Viktor Yushchenko, garnered 23.6% in the 2002 parlia-

mentary election. Viktor Yushchenko himself had 39.9% in the first round of the 2004 presidential race. Both rates plummeted in the 2006 general elections when a mere 14% voted for Nasha Ukrayina. The party struggled to maintain this level of support in the 2007 snap general election, even after it united with Yuriy Lutsenko's Narodna Samooborona (People's Self-Defence) which garnered just a few percentage points in electoral support. By the time of the 2010 presidential election, Nasha Ukrayina had tumbled to 5.5%. In the 2012 general election, it was down to just 1.1%.

The Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko (BYuT) saw its rating grow from 7.3% in 2002 to 22.3% in 2006 and 30.7% in 2007. However, after almost 2.5 years in government (December 2007-March 2010),

Who's next?

Again and again, the unrealistic expectations placed on politicians and their political projects leads to disappointment among voters. Messianic illusions and a lack of accountability perpetuate the succession of politicians that are nearly the same as their predecessors.



her personal rating shrank to 25.1% in the first round of the 2010 presidential election (even though she used administrative leverage in at least half of the country) and 25.5% for Batkivshchyna, the successor of BYuT, in the 2012 parliamentary election (even after her party was joined by the leaders of other popular parties such as Arseniy Yatseniuk, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Viacheslav Kyrylenko). In the 2014 presidential race, Tymoshenko won only 12.8% of the vote (even with the Donbas and Crimea, her all-time opponents, missing from the vote).

Serhiy Tihipko, who rapidly climbed to 13.1% in the 2010 presidential election as a “new face”, saw his rate plummet to 4-5% after he joined the government of Mykola Azarov, Premier under Yanukovych. In 2014, he won 5.2%. Even though the Donbas and Crimea that would most likely have brought him more votes did not take part in the election, Tihipko could have easily taken the votes of one-time Party of Regions and Yanukovych supporters in central, Southern and Eastern Ukraine – something he did not have back in 2010.

Vitaliy Klitschko had just 2-3% a year before the 2012 general election. After the election, his party ended up with 14% even though many younger potential voters did not come to the polling stations. Before the Maidan, his rate grew to 20-25%. After Klitschko failed to present himself as an independent and energetic leader capable of steering the country during the revolution, his support began to plummet. By the time he withdrew from the race and endorsed Petro Poroshenko, his rate was down to 8-10%.

Svoboda also experienced increased popularity followed by a sharp decline over the past 5-7 years. Its leader, Oleh Tiahnybok, had 1.4% in the 2010 presidential election, while the party ended up with 10.4% in the 2012 general election. The 2014 presidential race showed that support for Svoboda had plummeted after it failed to meet the voters’ expectations during the Maidan or as part of the interim government. As a result, Oleh Tiahnybok got a mere 1.2% in the latest election (again, the anti-Svoboda Donbas and Crimea did not vote).

Today, we are witnessing the rise of new stars. Few voters are interested in their actual plans, platforms and mechanisms of implementation, their teams or sponsors. As the voters grew disappointed with the one-time opposition trio (and the newly-released Yulia Tymoshenko), the support for her radical former party fellow Oleh Liashko swelled. His party won 1.1% in the 2012 parliamentary election, while its leader ended up with 8.3% and the third place in the presidential race. Anatoliy Hrytsenko is another politician who has seen his rate skyrocket from 1.2% in 2010 to 5.5% in 2014.

The most telling example, however, is Petro Poroshenko. According to polls from fall 2013, a mere 3-4% supported his potential presidential bid. His greatest ambition thus was the Kyiv Mayor’s office. Less than six months later, he had become the most popular candidate, eventually winning the presidency with an unprecedented 54.7% in the first round. The key factor in this victory was the “fresh face” effect and its heightened expectations rather than any actual qualities or plans. Hoping Poroshenko will be willing and able to implement their aspirations, many Ukrainians are not looking at what he actually intends to do. This ignorance lays the ground for another wave of deep disappointment.

THE ILLUSION OF INFLUENCE

The logic of the Ukrainian political process suggests that this trend is bound to persist for as long as voters prefer to seek yet another messiah/whipping boy to whom they can ascribe perfect qualities, ignoring their real motivations and dependence on teams and sponsors, only to later topple them from Olympus and curse them for their broken promises. This provides little incentive for political parties and leaders to protect the interests of their voters, who are again forced to choose from the same old list of candidates. The “new” political parties continue to attract “professionals” moulded in the current system who are not going to break it, but slightly adjust it to their own interests. Moreover, they are backed by the same old sponsors, including oligarchs and

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


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What's wrong?

"If you believe that Ukraine's political parties do not meet democratic standards, what is the cause?", % polled



What information, if any, are you lacking?, % polled



big business. They realize that their political creatures will hardly last in politics, so they try their best to quickly earn back their investments while they are still in power, meanwhile preparing future alternative projects.

According to surveys, those unhappy with the current party system most often (34.1%-42.4% of those polled) point at the following failures: existing parties to not stick to their platforms and goals announced in election campaigns; they protect the interests of their leaders and financial clans, not those of the voters; their funding is obscure, mostly coming from oligarchs; and they have no internal democracy or adequate connection to the electorate (see What's wrong?).

Every successive failed chance for change, given the voters' increased effort and sacrifice, drives disappointment with not only individual politicians but the political establishment and system overall. As a result, voters tend to support increasingly radical, hot-headed and ruinous tactics that are used by the oligarchs kicked out of power, and the Kremlin.

GRASSROOTS PARTIES WANTED

Given these trends, it is important for Ukrainians to drop their messiah illusions and faith in the pos-

sibility of a "good tsar". Instead, citizens should organize into grassroots political parties and finance themselves through membership fees and mass voluntary donations from SMEs. These new parties should have no major sponsors that provide the majority of funding and expect members to

**НАЯВНІ ПОЛІТИЧНІ СИЛИ
НЕ БУДУТЬ ВІДСТОЮВАТИ
ІНТЕРЕСИ СВОЇХ ВИБОРЦІВ**

lobby their interests.

According to polls held before the parliamentary election in August 2012, 6.1% of Ukrainians claimed they were ready to pay dues to a party provided that it protected their interests. The average monthly fee they would pay was UAH 135, which amounts to over UAH 1.600 annually. Expanded to the 20 million working Ukrainians (plus pensioners, some of whom would eagerly finance parties), this makes at least UAH 1.2mn potential party members. The total amount of membership dues would thus reach UAH 1.9-2bn a year, or UAH 9.5-10mn per five year electoral cycle. This would suffice to finance 2-3 mass grassroots parties independent of major sponsors and accountable to their members. An-

other 10% of those polled said they were not sure about the motivation that would drive them to pay contributions. If such grassroots parties succeeded, part of that 10% would likely become party members as well. A similar poll before the latest presidential election showed that 10.7% of Ukrainians would financially support a presidential candidate if he made his election expenses transparent. Another 8.5% were uncertain.

Ukraine needs parties with real teams that will affect decision-making within the parties on the local (funded by membership dues), regional (funded with contributions from grassroots units of the party) and upper levels (party leaders would be funded with contributions from regional units). This would make party leaders at various levels financially dependent on party members and the results of their voting in party meetings. Such party teams should be motivated to get involved in the political struggle, realize their ability to affect decision-making at all levels within the party, and the ability to affect state policy through the party.

Today, party membership is mostly a formality, while party activists are either functionaries supported by the party with money from big sponsors (essentially, employees who depend on their employer) or unnecessary extras who do not feel related to their party.

By gaining power locally through grassroots organizing, then growing to regional and national levels, parties will give their fee-paying members an opportunity to distinguish between cheap populism and real platforms that can actually change the country. Alternative parties should not try to get everyone to like them – this is impossible. Rather, they should be consistent in their vision of steps that are necessary to implement the changes their voters want. A social foundation based on people who have no illusions or unrealistic expectations will create a firm enough safety net for the party to implement vital transformations nationwide. Professionals trained through various stages of progress within the party will provide the necessary human resources to replace the current bureaucratic system. ■

About Us Without Us

Live reports for foreign TV are much like navigating a minefield of alien stereotypes, alien influences, alien prejudices and alien interests. Things are further complicated by the spiteful foreign language that just keeps picking all the wrong words out of memory, as you feverishly fish for the right ones.

"Kyiv most learn the example of the neutral Austria", "to keep Putin calm Ukraine should never join the European Union", "Finlandization would be a good solution for Ukraine"... Such calls happily picked up and reproduced by the western media never seem to envisage an active position of Ukraine itself. Instead the country is given the role of a child quietly watching the adults, as they settle things among themselves.

So you begin to explain, object and resent. You argue that right now Ukraine finds itself in a completely different context compared to the post-war Austria or Finland. You argue that direct military aggression of a neighboring state calls for resolute defensive actions, for seeking allies where they can be found. And, first and foremost, you argue that negotiating to determine Ukraine's future with a country that has just brazenly annexed a part of its territory, while may be in-line with the legal standards of the 16th century, certainly isn't in-line with the 21st century ones. "So why have the right wing radicals been appointed ministers in the interim government?", condescendingly interrupts a French colleague. It is in moments like these when you fully realize how detached the reality of the Old Europe from ours actually is.

In recent months the population of "experts" in all-matters Ukraine has increased beyond reason. Keeping track of all the speakers invited to share their wisdom in TV discussions is becoming a struggle. Most of them, of course, have never been to Ukraine, but they know absolutely everything about the country, its past, present and future. These sociologists, political analysts from private consulting, professors and a whole bunch of other folk have become the consumers, carriers and transmitters of the mythology hastily fabricated behind Kremlin walls in what is essentially wartime.

The situation on TV is mirroring what transpires in big politics. Moscow is actively pushing its agenda, according to which, the future of Ukraine has to be discussed "directly between the global superpowers", as it was put by the pro-Russian Jacques Sapir during one of his TV appearances. Therefore the inclusion of Ukraine itself in such talks is seen as undesirable. At the same time there is a push for participation of Russia in the negotiations on the EU-Ukraine agreement. One of the prominent lobbyists of such an approach is

Jean-Pierre Chevènement, a former Interior Minister and current French Foreign Ministry's Special Representative for Relations with Russia. The entire ploy of Kyiv belonging to "Moscow's sphere of influence" is being played out on every possible level. "Ukraine for Russia is just like Mali for France", noted the Liberation correspondent Jean Quatremer. What must have been intended as witty remark one could play down as a bad joke, if it wasn't just another piece of manipulation that keeps popping up in one talk show after another.

Talking about Ukraine is now in vogue. It is on television, radio, at conferences... This is a relatively novel topic for the French expert community. And the selection of speakers picked for western audience often reflects that primeval fear of the so far unknown culture and identity that has been infixed in the public conscience by the descendants from the white immigration together with the red commissars of Comintern. Fears seek embodiment and demand drives the supply.

"Neo-Nazis at Maidan", "fascists in the interim government" ... Ukraine has never professionally worked on a state level to form its international image, and that's where a neighboring state has been glad to fill in. And although the Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs has produced a number of smart press releases over the last few months, these were merely a response.

When it comes to own initiatives, the successful ones, the ones to prevail, Ukrainian initiatives in the realm of communication are of much deficit.

The invitation of Petro Poroshenko to Normandy for the D-Day 70th anniversary

celebration (see p. 9) came as a welcome exception to the rule. The idea spawned within the Ukrainian community in France found its realization. Thanks to Bernard-Henri Lévy and other pro-Ukrainian intellectuals in France, President François Hollande agreed to break the old stereotype, according to which Russia had to be the sole representative of the former Soviet Union among the winners of the World War II. Fortunately in this case the Ukrainian logic based upon clear-cut calculation of losses proportional to the overall country's population had the upper hand. Our country, while not without struggle, is gradually stepping up to the international level where it can speak for itself.

Naturally, this situation doesn't sit well with the self-appointed "guardians" of Ukraine. Kremlin is not to end this information war while Vladimir Putin keeps the reigns. Plenty more battles are still to come. Thus Ukraine must learn not only to respond to the hostile initiatives of others, but to form and push own agendas and information strategies, to be proactive. ■

**IN RECENT MONTHS THE
POPULATION OF "EXPERTS"
IN ALL-MATTERS UKRAINE
HAS INCREASED BEYOND
REASON**



Author:
Alla Lazareva

Russia: Headlong Away From Freedom

The ability to travel or foreign channels on cable TV are failing to safeguard homo post-sovieticus from propaganda of hatred

Author:
Yuriy Makarov

Escape from freedom is a fixed expression and also the title of Erich Fromm's famous book, an *opus magnum* of the 20th century. The founder of modern psychoanalysis, Fromm was interested in a human being not so much as a storehouse of sexual traumas as man of free will wanting to find moral justification for his actions. After fleeing from Nazi Germany, the scholar dedicated his life to the study of the very phenomenon of totalitarianism. His conclusion is a sad one: to contemporary man (the book was published in 1941), freedom turns out to be such an unfamiliar and unbearable feeling that he "tends to escape into the severe comfort of totalitarian dictatorship".

Since that time, various nations have gone different ways: those that were initially more inclined to educate themselves and strove for maturity have joined the "golden billion", while those that clung on to their past, from Haiti to Somali, periodically go through stages of self-destruction. Adaptation to freedom, i.e., possession of personal, rather than collective, individuality should be recognized as a crucial-direction for the development of people as social beings.

So what does propaganda have to do with this? It is simple: the more socially mature an individual is, the more critical he is of information that comes from the outside world, particularly from the mass media, and the more sophisticated explanations he seeks. It is not an issue of some special perfection – just a matter of education. On this scale, *homo post-sovieticus*, aka *sovok*, is somewhere near the bottom. Paternalism, dependence, infantilism,

lack of initiative, a need for simplified relationships with the employer and the state and a tendency to see an enemy in whoever is different – these qualities are partly inherited from the traditional Russian cultural matrix and partly improved through totalitarian practices. They are imposed on everyone who has found themselves this way or another under the Kremlin's influence.

After the breakup of the communist system, millions of people were forced to paddle their own canoes – without having the requisite skills, a clear understanding of the rules of the game or social goals. Some of them adjusted after painful withdrawal; others joined a new pyramid; still others decided to seek easy fortunes in the world of crime, and for the rest the time stood still. Throughout these merciless, uncertain, cursed years following the "greatest geopolitical catastrophe", as Putin described it, the *sovoks* had just one thought on their minds – having someone to trust, rely upon and shift responsibility on. They found what they were looking for in one of the post-Soviet countries – Russia.

Despite a great measure of similarity and affinity, the old *sovoks* and modern-time *homo postsovieticus* are two distinct anthropological formations. The former were more skeptical and more fatigued, especially at the last stage. They could joke about Secretary General and despise the authorities, sincerely believing that they could do without them. The latter will not allow any self-destructive habits of this kind. Instead, what Russia has is a national leader with a record-high 82% support, artificial myths about both the distant past and

the recent times, obsession with military power, disregard for and hatred of all others, from Ukrainians ("bloodthirsty Bandera followers") to Americans ("stupid Yankees") – all these things serve primarily to remove uncomfortable psychological uncertainty. The Russian *sovoks* have now found firm ground – their "index of happiness" has shot up to the record-high 78%.

People still steeped in Soviet mentality ignore or tolerate any everyday inconveniences, broken infrastructure, the absolute power of bureaucracy, an enormous gap between the poor and the rich and shocking cases of indigence, especially in remote regions, which they explain, at best, by the perfidious actions of some mythical enemy: the Jews, the blacks, imperialists and now also Ukrainians. This betrays an abnormally high level of aggression among the *sovoks*. Aware of how vulnerable their position is, they are ready to cut their opponent's throat at the drop of a hat. In terms of sociopsychological makeup, the *sovoks* are not bourgeois or, even less so, proletarian, regardless of their financial status and place in society. They are déclassé elements, plebeians, lumpens, and their dominant position, regardless of their real numbers, poisons entire society by forcing it to accept their values.

The Russian and Ukrainian *sovoks* are somewhat different species. The former is a direct descendant of the "revolutionary" masses that quickly set up communist dictatorship. They feed on the continuous tradition of monarchy and serfdom. The latter are not a product of long-established evolution. On the contrary, they



SKETCH BY VOLODYMYR KAZANIVSKY

emerged after a forceful traumatic loss of tradition and replacement of their identity with an evil, contradictory construct. The difference between the two species is in their origins, but the result is the same – both types plead “Please send us back to the dark and damp place where father waiting with a belt in his hand!”

Since day one, the *sovoks* have craved for a simplified worldview. It can be incorporated into a certain doctrine and implemented in practice, and the *sovoks* will be pleased. This is precisely what the Russian authorities have been doing for the past 14 years at least. The foundation for imperial propaganda was laid down back in the 1990s: TV channels, which were then owned by individual oligarchs, focused on an apparently lofty goal – re-electing Boris Yeltsin, who could be tentatively called “liberal”, over diehard communist Gennady Zyuganov. In this way, muscles were built, cadres were educated, and technology was polished. When Vladimir Putin ascended to the throne, all this potential was deployed to serve the regime. TV channels were quite brutally taken over by more loyal owners and no longer criti-

cizes or even doubted official policies. The television completed its transformation into a brainwashing tool, plummeting to the depths of manipulation techniques and patent lies.

However, the press and on-line media outlets gave an illusion of independence for a while. In the early 2010s, Dmitry Muratov, editor-in-chief of *Novaya Gazeta*, Russia’s only opposition newspaper, quipped: “In Russia, there are two parties – the television party and the Internet party.” What he meant was that the passive, gullible TV viewers who were content to chew the propagandist cud mixed with patriotic series, dumb entertainment shows and sports broadcasts were opposed to the liberally-minded “creative class” that feeds on information from independent sources. After several mass protests in Moscow, starting from December 2011, the Kremlin turned its attention to this “territory of freedom”. Management was replaced in a number of nominally independent media outlets on orders from above; some media were charged with violations and disconnected from the Internet in the territory of Russia. Repressions also hit NGOs and think tanks, effectively putting an end to credible population surveys and analytics. The handful of media outlets that can be very tentatively said to be in the opposition were rendered marginal, and their impact was reduced to zero. The rest are controlled through a carrot-and-stick approach, i.e., a combination of strict content monitoring and increasing government financing of

called intellectuals who were only recently considered to be too far-far and odious (such as Sergey Kurnyagin and Alexander Dugin) have been involved in the latter activity. The entire thing is set up so adroitly that the duping of the Russian population is largely financed through market or quasi-market mechanisms – the volume of the advertisement market in Russia is nearly USD 10bn.

A person from the older generation who remembers Soviet realities has a hard time understanding the modern laws of propaganda. In the past, protest leaflets were copied by hand; banned literature was multiplied using typewriters or cumbersome copying machines that were hard to access – only a handful of institutions had them and they were closely watched. Any mischief of this kind entailed a risk of imprisonment. When the Iron Curtain fell, the truth about the crimes of the communist regime was published not only in specialized literature but also in the mass press. For example, the opposition magazine *Ogoniok* had the print run of 4.6mn copies in 1990. Moreover, the radio and television also exposed Soviet crimes. Since then, all classical works in political science, history and economics have been published in Russian translation. Many Russians are now able to read in the original, at least in English. Everyone who wanted to know the truth about the past learned it a long time ago. Truthful accounts of current affairs are only a few clicks away and are so far accessible to those interested. So the problem is not with access but with a desire to accept information. If average Russians believe that “bloodthirsty Ukrainian fascists” need to be stopped at the cost of the lives of their sons and grandsons and if 70% of respondents in Russia believe that their mass media are objective, it is their choice, whether conscious or unconscious.

The success of any propaganda lies not only in how skillfully it is crafted or how large an audience it reaches, but also in the internal readiness of the targeted audience to be duped. These people are voluntarily escaping from freedom and have, in fact, already done so. ■

THE KREMLIN TAKES A COMPREHENSIVE APPROACH TO PROPAGANDA, ALL THE WAY TO ELABORATING CONCEPTS OF NATIONAL IDEOLOGY

the mass media in the past years (over USD 2.5bn in 2013).

The Kremlin takes a comprehensive approach to propaganda, from government support for jingoist films and the formation of pro-government quasi-public movements to the elaboration of concepts of national ideology. So-

Peter Pomerantsev:

“Russia Today is a distraction for more subtle things that Russia does in the sphere of information”

Interviewed
by **Olha
Vorozhbyt**

The *Ukrainian Week* talks to Peter Pomerantsev, British television producer and non-fiction writer who spent nine years in Russia, on Russian state propaganda, new methods of informational war and how Ukraine should defend itself

UW: In your latest article you elaborated the idea of “non-linear war” which the Kremlin is now developing. What is the role of information and informational propaganda in it?

In general, for the strategy that Putin and Russia are pursuing, they have worked up ways to play the contemporary information game and they do it very cleverly. We all know about Russia Today (Russian English-language TV channel – **Ed.**), but Russia Today is almost like a distraction for more subtle things that Russia does. Russia is doing kind of a big maneuver to keep everybody busy, but the real influences work much more subtly. All these different think-tanks and experts who work in different roles for the Kremlin, spreading its influ-

ence and point of view. This is not a stupid lineal propaganda, like it was with communism. It's being done by different sources and different people.

UW: You said that those experts transmit pro-Putin propaganda from different angles, so that the propaganda component is not so obvious. But we live in the era of globalization and access to information on the Internet. Why is it then still so effective?

I think it's very naive to think that Internet equals freedom. For old-school dictatorships, if we think about 20th century dictatorships, they tried to control the society top-down – the Internet is obviously a threat, because it's a bottom up way of providing information and media. But the post-modern dictatorships in the 21st century, whether you talk about Venezuela, or Russia, or Qatar, are much more sophisticated. They don't try to crush their opposition. They try to sort of play inside their narratives and to manipulate from inside. That's what happens in Russia.

In Russia we have much less top down oppression than in the USSR; instead there is a relatively free Internet so far. Over the past three or four years, the Kremlin has been trying to play inside it and manipulate it from inside. The Internet is very easy to manipulate from inside. You reach down people's conversation on Facebook and start manipulating the conversation – it's much better than TV. For all the people who work for Vladislav Surkov (Assistant to the Russian President – **Ed.**), Gleb Pavlovskiy (political scientist – **Ed.**), or Konstantin Rykov (Russian businessman – **Ed.**) this is a dream. You reach down into the middle of the conversation and you start manipulating it. I think, it was very naive of us to think that the Internet equals freedom. The Internet is much more like a tool of manipulation.

UW: You are writing a book about Russia in the 21st century. How will the Russian media look in it?

If they do something stupid, they'll go old-school. There is a real chance that they will try to create a Chinese firewall. If the Kremlin wants to survive and be that clever dictatorship, it will let it function, but will manipulate it from inside. I think what we see so far is a much more aggressive casting of liberals. But it is more emotional than anything else: “Oh, those evil people at Dozhd (arguably the only independent TV, and now online media in Russia – **Ed.**). Look at them!” If they try to do a sort of 19th century approach: close everybody's blogs and start arresting people, that will actually be losing the strategy, I think. They will create a lot of resentment. So, it depends on how clever they are, we'll see whether their cleverness or their paranoia wins.

UW: Western media often spread clichés about Ukraine, there is a lot of pro-Kremlin thinking, such as “Ukraine is in legitimate interests of Russia”. How can Ukraine deal



with these clichés in foreign media?

I think disinformation is less of a problem compared to media clichés. You're quite right. The problem is the narrative. There is a whole bunch of narratives which are engraved in the West and actually support the Russian position. You know there is a big guilt narrative with regard to Russia, and it plays with it very well. "Oh, that happened, because we treated Russia wrong," the narrative goes.

There is also a neo-imperialist crowd disguising themselves as realists who like to think in terms of big powers. A lot of people in Britain still like to think in that way. Like Russia, we will carve up Europe between each other. This exists, especially in the Foreign Office. It's a very old kind 19th century way of thinking about things. This is a Yalta Conference kind of mentality and that's very seductive. Let's sit down with Russia and redraw Europe, because we all are important. That is also feeding the opposite side of emotions in the West – the sense of self-importance. Russia is very good at pressing on that button. The problem of Ukraine is firstly that Ukraine doesn't have media that broadcasts internationally. Russia has Russia Today, all these different smaller mechanisms. Ukraine doesn't have mechanisms to express itself internationally. So, I think it needs to set up, not just anti-disinformation which it's doing a little bit, but more of a public media campaign. Obviously you cannot afford Russia Today, but maybe just on the level of an internet website that would aggressively push the Ukrainian line – and not just the line, the propaganda – but the Ukrainian identity, Ukraine's right to a geopolitical narrative. That needs investment. Russia has spent hundreds of millions to gain an international voice. Ukraine needs to do something to counter that. So, that's the most important thing to start developing for Ukraine – its national voice. So far, you say "Ukraine" to most people, and they don't know what you are talking about.

This question, however, is deeper because there is also a lot of confusion inside of Ukraine as to what its national narrative is. That is probably what should be solved as well. These things come together. I

don't think you can do PR without content.

There needs to be a national narrative inside the country that is clear and coherent. I think these questions are connected: a) Ukraine needs to have mechanisms, but b) it also needs to sort out what its narrative is. Russia has decided what its narrative is. It's a horrible one, but Russia is pretty open about.

UW: Many people seem to not exactly support Putin in discussions on the situation in Ukraine, yet they still sound like it. These include non-interventionists in the US who think that the US should not deal with the current situation in Ukraine; radical right or radical left forces in Europe, etc. How can Ukraine deal with that?

There are so many such people, some of them are taken very seriously. Look at the latest piece by Anatol Lieven in *The New York Review of Books*. Lieven is a scholar of empire. You could never accuse him pro-Putin, but he consistently pro-Russian Empire. He thinks that Russia should be big and strong and that's better for the world and that any solution lies in a conversation between US and Russia. There are people like Rodric Braithwaite. He is a former ambassador to Russia. I don't think that he's paid by anyone. I think he genuinely thinks that great powers need to decide these things and that Ukraine shouldn't really have much voice. It's a small country that's not important. There are a lot of people who think this. I think it is necessary to have discussions with them. I think it's very interesting to talk to them, they are intelligent and have a worldview. There are others, demagogues, who you should just ignore.

But returning to my article, the research into this has to be institutionalized. Every time a British lawyer (I don't mean anybody specific) writes a "We should listen to Putin more" opinion piece in *The Financial Times*, there should be an organization that will point out very quickly and say "Hold on. He's on the board of Gazprom". This is happening all the time. We need to change our culture a little bit. And newspapers have to stop publishing pieces on the editorial level whenever someone gives an opinion, if he's financially connected to Russia.

We need to change our culture a little bit. We need to be much

BIO Peter Pomerantsev was born in 1977 in Kyiv. His father is Ihor Pomerantsev, a well-known poet and radio journalist. In 1978, the family moved to Germany, then to London in 1980. Peter lives there today. In 2001-2010, he worked in Moscow. He is contributing to Newsweek, The Daily Beast, The London Review of Books. Currently, Peter is working on a book about Russia in the 21st century

clearer and understand that people are connected. We need to have aggressive institutionalized approach to this – an organization that's sitting and tracking each politician that makes pro-Kremlin statements and checking what their connections are.

But then there are people who are useful idiots, demagogues, like Peter Hitchens (British journalist and author – Ed.) should just be ignored; they just try to show off. So, everything depends on the type of misinformation: there are serious ones with whom one should debate; I think there is a huge mass that have financial interests – and that has to be revealed, all this should be done institutionally. The idiots should be ignored.

UW: Putin does everything with mirror-effect, including the informational sphere too. How can that be resisted?

I think people understand that. He is a troll. Just keep on writing that it is a false mirror. To be honest, I have stopped letting myself get upset by Russian statements – a lot are designed to provoke and outrage. Again, there should be two

UKRAINE DOES NOT HAVE MECHANISMS TO EXPRESS ITSELF INTERNATIONALLY

components: the institutional one through response articles. You could have people writing to letters to editor, demanding a right of reply who are ready to say that they disagree with this. That's very important. That has to be a system. You can't wait for someone to start doing that. And that is worth doing. Each time a pro-Russian person is going on TV, a pro-Ukrainian one goes and says "No, this is untrue".

But I think these arguments are pretty obvious. I haven't seen any serious people who believe in that fascists have taken over in Kyiv or some such Russian propaganda. It works inside of Russia, for the Russian audience, because they need to hear that. They need to feel that their country is not evil, but I haven't seen people in the West who believe in that.

With that kind of information he is not kidding anyone. But Russia is fooling Western people with much subtler things. ■

Exporting Hatred

Human rights advocates and international experts are alarmed at growing xenophobia in Crimea and separatist-controlled territories

Author:
**Oksana
Khmeliowska**



Tatars, get out from Crimea!

Since 2008 an average of nine people were killed out of xenophobia every month in the Russian Federation. Year 2011 when 15 people lost their lives was a peak. Over the same six-year period, five such cases have been registered in Ukraine, according to the Congress of Ethnic Communities of Ukraine. The Sova analytics centre reported that 199 were injured of which 21 died in xenophobic incidents in Russia in 2013. The Moscow Bureau for Human Rights has reported similar figures – 205 victims, including 25 deaths. In contrast, 21 people were injured and no-one was killed in Ukraine in 2013, according to the Group for Monitoring Ethnic Minority Rights. That xenophobia is deeply enrooted in the Russian Federation is further confirmed by the “Grapes of Wrath” study carried out in Russia by the Centre for the Study of Ethnic Conflicts and the Clubs of Regions in September 2013 through March

2014. Over this period, 570 “ethnically motivated acts” were committed, ranging from publishing xenophobic content online to mass conflicts involving the use of firearms and ending in deaths.

It appears that the Russian invaders in the Crimea and the separatists in eastern Ukraine have decided to apply their “brotherly” experience to ethnic minorities in Ukraine. In the past two months, 20 cases of xenophobia-driven violence were recorded in the Autonomous Republic of Crimea, according to the Group for Monitoring Ethnic Minority Rights, while five such incidents were reported by experts from Sloviansk, a separatist hotspot in Donetsk Oblast. This count does not, of course, include neo-Nazi statements, the destruction of monuments revered by ethnic minorities and threats. “Since the time some Ukrainian territories were occupied by Russia, a large share of cases involving xenophobia and anti-Semi-

tism have been recorded precisely in these territories, and this is a hard fact corroborated by numbers,” Tetiana Bezruk, a representative of the Congress of Ethnic Communities, has told The Ukrainian Week. “The most problematic cities were usually Kyiv, Odesa and Kharkiv, where a large number of foreign students study. There are foreign students also in the Crimea, and there were cases when the police came to them to ‘talk’ for no good reason. Moreover, there were situations when the Crimean Tatars lost their jobs only because they were Crimean Tatars. But the kind of growing xenophobia we see in eastern Ukraine is unprecedented.” Yulia Tyshchenko, who coordinates programmes to develop civil society in the Independent Centre for Political Research, says: “In occupied territories, there are systematic violations of the rights of ethnic minorities and also the basic human

rights, which explains the growth of xenophobia.”

CRIMEAN TATARS ARE FACING A NEW WAVE OF REPRESSIONS

Despite Vladimir Putin's promises to secure the rights of ethnic minorities in the Crimea and the rehabilitation of the Crimean Tatars who were affected by Stalin's repressions (this amounted to nothing more than window dressing), the Tatars are being truly persecuted on the peninsula. According to human rights advocates, several Crimean Tatar monuments have been vandalized during the occupation, and those who refuse to take up Russian citizenship are fired. “Persecutions against the Crimean Tatars are on the rise. Chauvinistic attitudes have become stronger at the level of everyday relationships: neighbours are offending the Crimean Tatars for their political views, while school students commit violent acts against their peers, especially if the latter speak their native language,” Tyschenko says. Back in March 2014, unknown persons set on fire a hotel and two cars owned by Crimean Tatars in village Rybachye in Alushta County. The most high-profile case was the death of Crimean Tatar Reshat Ametov who had staged a one-man picket against military invasion in Simferopol and was kidnapped by gunmen. His body with evidence of torture was found the next day. Experts in the Group for Monitoring Ethnic Minority Rights tentatively suggest that it was his ethnic background that triggered more brutal tortures as compared to other kidnapped activists and eventually led to his death. If this assumption is correct, this is the first murder based on ethnic hatred in Ukraine since 2010, human rights advocates say.

An international scandal erupted when Crimean Tatar leader Mustafa Dzhemilev was banned from entering Russia for five years and later denied entry to the Crimea. The most cynical thing about this farce is that the Kremlin has not officially commented on the incident, while Putin lavishly decorated Crimean Tatars opposed to the Mejlis. In contrast, Dzhemilev's supporters who met him at the border crossing point in Armiansk on May 3 started being arrested and fined. According to the most recent data, Crimean courts have accepted

for consideration 55 cases involving the Crimean Tatars and hand out fines that are about 10,000 roubles on average. In this context, it is quite possible that the authorities will act upon the statement made by Nataliya Poklonskaya, Crimean “prosecutor” as appointed by the local illegitimate authorities, that “extremist activities will not be tolerated” and will ban the Mejlis.

OTHER ETHNIC MINORITIES

In addition to the Crimean Tatars, Russian separatism has afflicted other ethnic minorities, including the Roma and the Jews. The media have widely reported a recent case when anti-Semitic leaflets issued by the Donetsk People's Republic said that the Jews allegedly had to pay USD 50 each for registration and have a stamp indicating their religion made in their passports. “Anyone avoiding registration would be stripped of their citizenship and expelled from the Republic and their property will be confiscated,” read the leaflet. Moreover, several synagogues have been set on fire in eastern and southern Ukraine in the past two months and offensive inscriptions have been made on Jewish monuments and Holocaust victim memorials. Russian propaganda points the finger at “Bandera followers” or the Right Sector. However, representatives of right-wing forces are actually helping the Jews to restore the damaged memorials. “Inscriptions on the monuments of the Jewish community started appearing after separatists came to the Crimea. Prior to that, there were no problems of this kind in Ukraine. The atmosphere of terror is not conducive to tolerance,” Tetiana Khorunzha, an expert with the Congress of Ethnic Communities of Ukraine, says. It is no surprise that the Jewish communities and organizations in Ukraine have been unanimous in rejecting the claims of Ukraine's mythical anti-Separatism which the Kremlin has started actively using in its speculative rhetoric. They have appealed to Putin with a request to stop manipulating the “Jewish question”.

The Roma also suffered at the hands of Russian separatists. Their homes became the target of several pogroms in Sloviansk. “We can now speak about certain negative dynamics in anti-Roma attitudes. It pertains to society in general and

the territories that are under Russian occupation. The social atmosphere in Ukraine is steeped in conflict, so these attitudes are more likely to develop into an interethnic conflict,” Natalia Belitser, a researcher studying various categories of ethnic minorities and indigenous peoples of Ukraine and an expert with the Pylyp Orlyk Institute of Democracy, says. Zola Kondur, a Council of Europe counsellor on Roma issues, has stressed in her commentary for The Ukrainian Week that conflicts between the Roma and the local population became more frequent with the arrival of the separatists. “Such cases have been recorded in several communities where purely domestic conflicts grew into persecution of entire Roma communities. We have never seen so many conflicts between the locals and the Roma. In my opinion, this is happening because of a complicated situation in the region and the escalation of tension by Russian separatists,” Kondur has explained.

In fact, it is not only about ethnic minorities. Both in the Crimea

Some
20
violent acts of
xenophobia in the
Crimea and
5
in Sloviansk have
been registered



THE CRIMEAN TATARS, ROMA AND JEWS ARE BEING TARGETED BY PRO-RUSSIAN GUNMEN

and in Sloviansk those who speak Ukrainian or wear national symbols are being given hostile treatment. People like that are the first to be targeted by the gunmen who call themselves “fighters against Nazism”. ■■

On June 1, a group of armed criminal-looking men dressed as Russian Cossacks broke into the Intercession of the Theotokos Church of Kyiv Patriarchate, its press centre reported. The attackers ravaged the interior and occupied it, banning priest Ivan Katkalo from conducting a service. When the priest arrived, the men attacked him and broke his car. The parishioners who tried to protect the priest, including a pregnant woman and the priest's daughter with cerebral palsy, were injured, too. The police arrived three hours later and supported the attackers. “Kyiv Patriarchate conducts anti-Russian activities and it has no place in Crimea,” both the police, and the Cossacks explained.

A day before, on May 31, a priest of the Moscow Patriarchate visited Ivan Katkalo at home and demanded that he “frees” the church voluntarily because “these are your last days in Crimea”. Later, militants visited the church in search of the Right Sector.

After the incident, the Muslim Spiritual Directorate in Crimea expressed “deep concern about illegal actions of specific individuals against the clergy in Crimea, no matter what denomination they belong to. Crimean Muftiate appeals to the Crimean authorities to find and hold liable those who committed the act,” the Muslim Spiritual Directorate press-service said.

Ukrainian Banksy

Street artist
#Sociopath
talks about
social art



Interviewed
by
**Yaryna
Vynnytska**

Be careful with your dreams – they tend to come true. I remember spotting a placard saying “BANKSY, WE NEED YOU” in downtown Kyiv in mid-December 2013. Actually, the Maidan articulated the demand for social art for the first time in Ukraine.

Street art tests the limits of law. The Maidan itself was street art testing the limits of law and art, and it indeed badly needed Banksy, this scandalously famous, laconic and precise English painter. The Maidan needed its own street art master who would condense the experiences of all protesters, help formulate things they were not yet aware of and openly say things they were afraid to admit even to themselves. Street art is a kind of neo-cortex of society – its black-and-white or colourful dreams that appear on walls when the social mind has processed information and produces a solution in the form of a picture which then becomes an object of study for psychoanalysts and art critics and a tool of national therapy.

The graffiti made by #Sociopath exploded on Hrushevsky Street together with the first hand grenades when the violent clashes began in January and the first protesters were shot dead. Its pieces directly hit the heart: the trilogy Icons of the Revolution, Taras Shevchenko wearing a bandana, Lesia Ukrainka in a gas

mask, Ivan Franko in a construction helmet, etc.

I knew that that my encounter with #Sociopath would not be the last one. It had to be continued...

The next time I came across his graffiti was in my native Lviv, and I realized that the resonance emanating from the heart had huge power. Its strong wave reached the place where I live, and the graffiti by #Sociopath appeared on an old wall of a medieval building on the corner of Virmenska and Drukar-ska streets. The trilogy War signed Specially for Lviv from #Sociopath. Ukraine seems to have gotten its own Banksy.

UW: In my perception, your graffiti does not bear the marks of pathology. On the contrary, it helps society cure its chronic maladies. Why “sociopath” then?

#Sociopath reflect my sense of being out of the system as such. Starting from socially imposed vectors and ending with internal motivations to create artworks, the system forces you into its limits. It mandates and imposes, while art, especially social art, is free. My art is aimed at “curing chronic maladies” of social society, and if you so believe, then I am certain there was a good reason for choosing my pseudo.

UW: Why do you paint on walls rather than on more traditional surfaces?

I paint on record plates, fabric and canvas, but to a street artist, walls are the first and most accessible way to convey his social messages to the largest possible audience. Painting on walls (which takes place largely at night, because street art as a kind of art is unlawful in our country) injects a dose of adrenalin into your blood and gives you a sense of space. It’s exhilarating. When in the daytime I look from a distance at a mural I created at night in solitude, watch how passers-by stare at it and observe their emotional reaction, I can see that my idea resonates with what they feel and it gives me pure joy.

UW: What triggered your artistic activity?

I have always dreamt of painting, but I still cannot do it by hand. When technology such as computers and Photoshop arrived, I quickly mastered them. It gave me an opportunity to visualize pictures and ideas that came to my head. However, as it happens with many creative folks, “one decisive step” or “trigger” was lacking. I was fortunate to find it in Banksy’s documentary Exit Through the Gift Shop. I watched it and went to bed with a crystal-clear feeling that I knew how to paint. I remember I found old gouache paint the next morning, cut out my first stencil and the process got off to a start. The first thing was painted on a re-

cord plate. And then things were up and rolling.

UW: What is the background to your graffiti icons of the Revolution which became one of the symbols of the Maidan?

Icons of the Revolution is a tribute to heroes, both living and deceased. But these are not the first works I created in the Maidan. The first ones, painted on wooden constructions, burned down in a battle during an attack on the Maidan in February. The Icons were behind the lines of the Berkut riot police for a while after they advanced on Hrushevsky Street. I was worried about them but knew that even if they were destroyed, I would certainly paint them again.

I don't remember how I came up with the idea. It was inspired by the environment on Hrushevsky Street: people of indomitable Ukrainian spirit who held their ground in the fight for the truth even at 20 degrees below zero. I made the graffiti on February 10. It was cold outside and the paint took a long time to dry. There was virtually no light, because it would have exposed anyone to the police on the other side of the barricades and rubber bullets would have started flying immediately. But we had plenty of camaraderie: girls brought us tea; fighters helped hold the stencils; some shared their thoughts before TV cameras; others shared cigarettes. Four hours



#Sociopath
the social media:
[@therealsociopath](https://facebook.com/therealsociopath)
@therealsociopat

later, the graffiti was ready. The 12th Sotnia (company – Ed.) promised to put a glass casing on top to keep it as a reminder about the Revolution of Dignity.

UW: Where is the line between vandalism and art?

To me, this line is unambiguous and very obvious. If an artwork has a social and moral essence, it's art. If not, it's a sport and it comes close to vandalism. A commonplace example of vandalism is youths who write their nicknames with markers everywhere they go. Looking at vandalism or art from the viewpoint of defacing architecture, I believe that contemporary art on old walls emphasizes their uniqueness. The modern and the old are in no conflict whatsoever here. I choose walls for my graffiti depending on the location and the potential number of passers-by who will be able to see it. In this

also well-protected. So it turns out that painting it over would now be vandalism.

UW: Do you paint on commission?

I am convinced that art for the sake of money is cheap fraud. It is impossible to create art on commission. If you do something from the depth of your heart, your work will find its admirers. If you do it for money, you will have to involve advertisement and PR people and a bunch of other drones only to flog your work to someone, because you made it not out of a desire to create something but in order to sell it.

UW: If you were allowed to paint something on the parliament building in Kyiv, what would it be?

I would rather not paint on it. I would burn it down. A blind man can see, especially in the light of the recent revolutionary events and the electioneering campaign, that the Verkhovna Rada is a hotbed of scoundrels and the moral dregs of society. I believe that the Maidan has given all of us an understanding of what the rule of people is, while a bunch of 450 bodies in parliament is a travesty of representative democracy. Thus, they have to be disbanded and the building burned down. In its place, a national art centre for young people should be built, so that everyone could come and find a creative pursuit to his own liking there. ■

CONTEMPORARY ART ON OLD WALLS EMPHASIZES THEIR UNIQUENESS

case, the unwillingness of bureaucrats to restore architectural monuments is worse vandalism than my graffiti on their walls. In Lviv, I painted the trilogy War on an ancient wall with hardly any paint left which was part of a UNESCO heritage site, and later a friend of mine tweeted that my graffiti was now



Taras Shevchenko: The fire won't burn the seasoned

Lesia Ukrainka: Whoever frees himself will be free

Ivan Franko: Our whole life is a war



Myroslav Slaboshpytsky won three awards in the Cannes

Greetings, Young, Unknown "Tribe"!

New political turns at the Cannes Festival

Author:
Катерина
Барабаш,
Канни

In late May, an age-old buzz was heard from Côte d'Azur. It was the buzz of the 67th Cannes Festival, which suddenly appeared haggard and forgot its own recent extravagant past. The jury, presided over by the boring New Zealander, Jane Campion succeeded in giving out prizes correctly to a fault, predictable ad nauseam. And even the views of film critics coincided with the views of the judges, which is actually not quite normal. Once the film by Turkish director Nuri Bilge Ceylan, *Winter Sleep* took first place in the critics' rating, it stayed in that position until the very end, winning the illustrious Palme d'Or prize. Everyone immediately and unreservedly decided that Timothy Spall, who played William Turner in Michael Leigh's *Mr. Turner* deserved the Best Actor award. This never happens! Boring.

However, the decision corresponded with the very spirit of the current cinema forum. As always, there were plenty of good films, but none of them evoked either indignation or fierce journalistic turmoil after being shown when media representatives gather into groups and get into heated debates about the films shown. Their discussions often end at the nearest restaurant with a glass of wine – this is the way they generally

reach appeasement. But this time, everything was serious and trips for a glass of red wine were already of an amicable nature.

THE UKRAINIAN PAVILION

At the same time, it is not just a finger being held on the pulse: people here live in unison with this pulse. The new documentary film *Maidan* by Serhiy Loznytsia was shown at the height of the festival. Loznytsia, a former Kyivan, was filming a new film, *Babi Yar* in the Ukrainian capital, but with the start of the Maidan, understood that this fictional film could wait. History was more important right now. This resulted in a truly epic three-part tragedy. The national anthem resounds before each part – performed by a choir – made up of the people. Part One – everyday preparations for the turn in history. Volunteers prepare food, the future masters of Ukraine's fate wander around the Maidan, as do onlookers. Someone is dancing somewhere. Elsewhere, the national anthem is sung to the accompaniment of a guitar. Cauldrons of soup are simmering, girls give out sandwiches. The last part – the remembrance service held in honour of those who died. Between the two – action, where people rush around in the fiery blazes, the suffering eyes of the wounded pleadingly look at

rescuers, a layer of smoke clouds the sky. And, as befits a real tragedy, spreading grief, is regenerated into catharsis and hope, that the death of the heroes will cultivate new shoots of a free spirit. The film was generally recorded on a static camera, which seems to imprint revived frescoes. They reflect the being of the entire nation at a turning point for the country. This state is comprised of people and only them: the film does not show any politicians, they are not even needed here, because in the view of the director, the Maidan is a huge elemental force, which at a certain point, moved forward against lies, theft and for its own dignity in an organised manner

The entire Promenade de la Croisette loudly applauded Loznytsia, who climbed the famous red stairs to the accompaniment of a song from the Maidan: "Vitya, ciao! Vitya, ciao! Vitya, ciao, ciao, ciao!"

On the previous day, the Ukrainian pavilion presented foreign film buffs with several short films on the Maidan. Local TV channels aired several news items, in which viewers left the hall in tears, and on camera admitted that although they had heard a lot about the Maidan, they had not expected such upheaval. This was exactly the same reaction as that of the audience watching *The Tribe* by Ukrainian director Myroslav Slaboshpytsky. A drama about deaf children and their "internal realm", the film stars deaf actors who only speak in sign language. It is no wonder that the audience cried: the film which, by the way, does not have any subtitles or dubbing, won three prizes (including the Grand Prix) at the Critic's Week – one of the parallel competitions in Cannes.



The epic tragedy *Maidan* was predominantly shot with a static camera

BOLD THEMES

It is probably only the social-political theme that can explain the selection of the film by Michel Hazanavicius, *The Search*, for the competition: It deals with the second Chechen campaign, the search of a young boy for his family, which died in the tumult of an unjustified war. In this film, Russian Federal Armies are not simply painted in shades of black, but a huge evil caricature. It is a shame that Hazanavicius, who filmed the magical film, *The Artist*, for which he won the main Oscar two years ago and seemed to have made his mark on the global film horizon as the creator of attractive cinema, broke onto alien, unfamiliar territory, like a bull in a china shop.

By the way, at the press preview of *The Search*, there was an incident, which confirmed that the attitude towards Russia and Russians is steadily changing: from goodwill to previous cold rejection. As a rule, journalists at such shows, clearly determine their assessment of a film. In contrast to ceremonial premieres, where the public, dressed in tuxedos, makes lengthy standing ovations for any film (this is standard here), media representatives were not ashamed to whistle and "boo" their dissatisfaction, both during, and after the conclusion of the film. Whistling was heard in the audience as soon as the film's final credits appeared on the screen. No one knows who whistled, but for some reason, those present thought that it was Russian journalists, who were offended by Hazanavicius and his ill-disposed attitude towards their country. The words: "Shut up, Russians!" were shouted in the auditorium.

Hazanavicius was not the only one to step into uncharted terri-

The Tribe tells the story of the internal drama of deaf children



THE ESCALATION OF POLITICAL CONFLICT ON THE PLANET HAS DETERMINED THE INTEREST OF WORLD CINEMA FOR THE NEAR FUTURE

tory to the inevitable detriment to his own artistic image: the sombre intellectual-surrealist David Cronenberg switched to sharp social satire. And he also went seriously wrong. Filled with megastars (including Julianne Moore, Mia Wasikowska and Robert Pattinson), his competition film, *Maps to the Stars*, paints a picture of the downside of Hollywood, not to mention American bohemia, as well as (why mess with trifles) all society in the USA today. First and foremost, it reflected the stereotype of the subject. The director did not have enough regular provocations

and more interestingly than Cronenberg, who presented his film *Foxcatcher* in the main competition, which won him the Best Director's Palm. It is not understood whether the English title of the film should be translated at all, because this is the name of a sports team. While Cronenberg paints his satirical canvas with vivid colours that brim over with all the rhinestones in the world, Miller executes his work with drawn-in lips and a slightly discontented facial expression. This is the expression constantly worn by the main hero, the eccentric millionaire Du Pont (a heavily made-up Steve Carell, one of the most famous and most sought-after comedians in the USA, who unexpectedly appeared in a tragic role). The film tells the true story of the above-mentioned moneybags, who decided to sponsor the wrestling team and ultimately shot the trainer after the team's defeat in the Olympic Games. Du Pont is a real person, who had mental health issues as a result of difficult relations with his mother (played in the film by Vanessa Redgrave) and killed the team's coach, David Schulz for supposedly being part of an international conspiracy to kill him. Du Pont died in prison in 2010.

BEST FILM

Until the latest Dardenne brother's film, *Two Days, One Night* was shown, the Cannes Film Festival seemed, fairly decent, if not boring, European-style, with gallant displays of refined happiness on the part of the savvy cinema audience. They experienced delight in Michael Leigh's *Mr. Turner*: from both Timothy Spall, who played the lead role, and from the outstanding camera, which was able to capture the typical »



Serhiy Loznytsia showed the people in his *Maidan*, leaving politicians behind

for the satire to achieve its purpose. On the other hand, the screen also showed the absolutely stunning Julianne Moore, who embodied possibly the best of her screen images (the jury, which generally does not award prizes to Americans, singled the actress out for the Best Actress prize). In her 50+ years, Moore is so audaciously bold as an actress, and her readiness to appear in more than questionable episodes, from the aesthetic point of view, perturbs and enslaves to the extent that everything involuntarily nullifies any attempts to make fun of the "dream factory". Is there any spot for satire in a place where such bold women live and work? As for lies, deceit, insincerity and hypocrisy, we can allow ourselves to doubt in the supremacy of Hollywood on this path.

This was also confirmed by Bennet Miller, moreover brilliantly

Turner landscapes without the use of any computer tricks, serving as the backdrop for the action. It is here that everyone bowed to Mauritanian Abderrahman Sissako, who filmed a slow, but extremely expressive revolutionary drama on the life of victorious Islamic fundamentalists. Here is where people benevolently rubbed the nape of their necks, watching Tommy Lee Jones, who also directed the film, play the role of an ageing cowboy, wandering the prairies in the company of a group of women, in the strange film, *The Homesman*. People here were frankly disgusted after the terrible psychological drama *The Captive*, by the once bright Canadian-Armenian, Atom Egoyan. It was only when I saw *Two Days, One Night*, that I understood that the festival had actually begun. Without any

explain how much they need the EUR 1,000.

This round of her co-workers becomes Sandra's Golgotha, which she climbs on tortuous paths. Along the way, she formulates the text of a judgment on all modern society, and forces the audience to do the same. However, at the end of the journey, the Dardenne brothers suddenly make a declaration of love: to this society that has taken a wrong turn, and for each individual person that is a part of it. The simplicity and clarity of the concept, the absolute ability to transform a dialogue made up of five phrases, which don't appear to mean anything, a multi-layered picture, and a character wearing a pink T-shirt – into hope for humanism that is not yet dead. Who, other than the Dardenne brothers can do this? But giving the brothers

than, the story of a small entrepreneur, Nikolai, who lives in the polar regions, and tries to withstand all the misfortune that has struck him with dignity. The international press generated an avalanche of enthusiastic reviews, which unanimously promised Zvyagintsev a "gold". Observers split into two groups. One was persuaded that the Russian director would take the Palme d'Or: saying that in the current political situation, this would be the most significant decision. In the film, the Russian Federation is presented as a country where everything that lives, dies, where lies, hypocrisy, humiliation and crime rule. Others were convinced that even if Zvyagintsev does win for a third time, Russia has little to look forward to as far as Europe is concerned. The golden mean won: the



doubt, the Dardenne brothers had once more made the best film of the Cannes competition. What can you say?!

35 year old character, Sandra (the magical and engaging Marion Cotillard), has been laid off work. At which, this was done on the basis of voting by workers at the company where she works – 16 people facing a dilemma: either they decide to lay off their colleague and each receives a bonus of EUR 1,000, or she remains, but no one receives this additional payment. After some persuasion, the boss agrees to conduct a second round of voting, and Sandra spends the weekend visiting all the participants in the upcoming decision on her fate and trying to explain to them how much needs this job, what with two children to care for and a husband, who is not particularly successful. In response, they

a third Palme d'Or would certainly be a very atypical decision. So the jury took the traditional route. And with this in mind, it chose Ceylan and his *Winter Sleep* – a more than three-hour-long fragment of the life of a Turkish equivalent of Chekhov's *Uncle Vanya*. This director has already won two Grand Prixes in Cannes – the second most important prize, and awarding him with what is actually the main prize was such a logical step, that no explanations were needed. It is as if Ceylan grew his own Palm, having fertilised it in advance with its two less prestigious, but nonetheless significant awards.

CINEMA AND POLITICS

This year's Cannes Festival was short on intrigue: possibly the only one surrounded the Russian film in the competition: Andrei Zvyagintsev finally finished *Levia-*

The audience crowded the Ukrainian pavilion throughout the festival. The viewers cried as they watched films about Maidan

film was awarded the prize for Best Screenplay. *Leviathan* – is a biblical creature, symbolic of evil elements and the devil himself, present in the Book of Job. However, the film seems more relevant to Thomas Hobbes' views, who, in the mid-17th century, wrote a book of the same name about a state and its destructive force on an individual person.

At this festival, it became clear that the escalation of political conflict on the planet and the attempts of certain extremely large countries to return to the forgotten cold war state, have determined the area of interest of world cinema for the near future. Then everyone will probably understand: people, who as before, are ready to reproach art and politics for relations that are too close, most likely have no relation to either the former, or the latter. ■

4 June – 7 July**ZOOANTROPO****Ya Gallery
(49B, vul. Khoryva, Kyiv)**

"No longer an animal, but not quite a person" – this expression describes the essence of the anthropogenic exhibition by Tamara and Oleksandr Babak, painted by the "king of colour", Tiberiy Silvasi. The joint project of three mature artists originates with the Naked, a sculpture from the Babaks' wicker series. The next step on the road to the transformation of animal and human origins is the modelling of "three-legged creatures" by the artists. This is where Tiberiy Silvasi adds his creative element. The authors themselves describe their exhibition as a balance between ZOO and anthroponomy – ANTROPO.

**11 June, 7 p.m.****NAONI Orchestra****Sentrum
(16A, vul. Shota Rustaveli, Kyiv)**

The Academic Orchestra of National Instruments of Ukraine (NONI) will shortly present a unique concert programme, consisting of world-renowned rock hits. Kyivans and visitors to the city will have the unique opportunity to hear how the rock music of their favourite bands sounds when played on more than 40 Ukrainian national instruments. The rock orchestra will be playing the compositions of music legends, including Metallica, Queen, Deep Purple, Adele, the Beatles, ABBA, Dick Dale and others.

14 – 15 June, 11 a.m. – 11 p.m.**Street Food Festival****National Expocentre
(1, Prospekt Akademika
Hlushkova, Kyiv)**

The Sixth Street Food Festival will turn into a professional platform for creating new formats of street food. Through this event, organisers are hoping to show that it is not only in



expensive restaurants that gourmets can eat health and good-quality food, but also on the street. Young and active people will meet, and in a joint effort, create new delights. Everyone can both try something tasty, and participate in the event of culinary art. These festivals are places where people meet and successful ideas emerge.

17 June, 7 p.m.**Tori Amos****Zhovtneviy Palats
(1, vul. Instytutstva, Kyiv)**

American singer Tori Amos will be coming to Ukraine to present her new album, *Unrepentant Geraldines*. The pianist's new record was inspired by her numerous projects, particularly *The Light Princess* musical and *Gold Dust*, a collection of songs rearranged in an orchestral setting, which was released on the 20th anniversary of her music career. The artist is called the architect of sound, as she masterfully combines different music styles in her work. Every performance by the pianist is the unbelievable sound of piano-rock, blues and jazz.

**20 – 22 June, 10 a.m.****Reggae Festival 2014****Soicha Holiday Camp
Stariy Saltiv, Kharkiv Oblast**

The Third International Reggae Festival in Kharkiv promises to be a celebration of sun, music and good mood. More than 100 different music and dance groups and DJs will be performing on the festival's three stages over



the course of three days. Visitors can look forward to 50 hours of nonstop music, explosions of emotion and unforgettable acquaintances. The list of performers at the festival includes the Drum & Tuba Band, DMC Amarula, Chris Wann and Lecha Wojciech. Music for the dance stage will be created by DJ Dub-Guard, DJ Tata, DJ De Leu and many others.

27 – 29 June**Leopolis Grand Prix 2014****Downtown Lviv**

At the beginning of summer, Lviv now traditionally prepares for a special festival for car racing and vintage car enthusiasts. The organisers of this festival recreate the historic event not just to exhibit vintage cars, but also to revive and hold car races on the historic Lviv Triangle route (Vitovskoho-Stryska-Hvardiyska streets). The festival program includes many other events in addition to the car races, including a car festival for children, a sight-seeing navigation quest and various seminars.



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