

WHY CANDIDATES WITH NO CHANCE
OF WINNING RUN IN THE ELECTION

THE THREATS
OF LANGUAGE SEPARATISM

RELIGIONS
AND PIETY IN UKRAINE

international edition

The Ukrainian Week

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
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ТИЖДЕНЬ

TRENDS & TALK

Assassination attempt on Kahrkiv Mayor Hennadiy Kernes. He was severely wounded and sent to Israel for treatment



Clashes in Odesa leave 46 dead, nearly 200 people injured

IMF decides to grant the USD 17bn loan to Ukraine



Separatists release OSCE inspectors kidnapped earlier. The Kremlin's propaganda presents this as its own successful diplomacy

Unruly Luhansk

During the course of a month, Luhansk Oblast has transformed into a criminal enclave, in which the official authorities do not act

On April 29, the separatists who had seized the Luhansk office of the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU), went on a new attack, taking administrative buildings in the city centre under their control. Only the Luhansk Oblast Police Department withstood the attack. Luhansk city centre transformed into something like Grozny in the 1990s – armed gunmen in camouflage with submachine guns have become part of the city's landscape.

Separatists' check posts were established around the city, searching cars and even intercity passenger minibuses. A friend says that at one post, his car was almost shot to pieces by the gunmen, when he failed to stop on their command. "They themselves were frightened by this situation. They said "don't you understand that we are armed?" I replied that "if I had a gun, would I also be able to stop anyone?"

There is currently no valid authority in Luhansk. Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov has appointed Iryna Veryhyna, Head of the local branch of Batkivshchyna, to temporarily fulfil the responsibilities of governor, replacing former Governor Mykhailo Bohdanovskyy. But this position in Luhansk is nominal – the building of the Oblast State Administration has been seized by separatists and officials cannot perform their responsibilities. In fact,

Author:
Koštiantyn Skorkin



Kyiv's authority does not yet cover Luhansk. Local government in Luhansk, comprised of the Oblast Council and the Mayor's Office, has already followed the separatist trend. While many local deputies actually take part in separatist actions, particularly active Communists, they hardly play a decisive role in them. It is more than likely that this is an attempt to straddle the wave, which is already breaking independently. (There was a funny incident with a highly-placed official, who is a representative of the Party of Regions, when his car was almost confiscated by separatists at one of their check posts and it was only with great difficulty that he was able to convince them that he was one of them).

Luhansk law enforcers have been demoralised and are prone to betrayal – the new Head of the Oblast Department of Internal Affairs, Anatoliy Naumenko, having obtained reinforcements from other oblasts, has not yet given in to separatists, but no one knows how long can he hold out. Detachments of the Ukrainian Army and National Guard are constantly blocked by bands of separatists, who actively apply the "human shield" of civilians.

The power vacuum that has emerged is being filled with self-proclaimed "otamans" – the position of People's Governor and Commander of the South-Eastern Army is held by Valeriy Bolotov, a former soldier, born in Stackhanov. In the

Draft law on the nationwide Ukrainian “consultative poll” about federalization and minority languages fails to get enough votes in the parliament



Verkhovna Rada adopts the law to resume annual conscription to the army abolished by Viktor Yanukovich in October 2013. Acting President signs the law

Donetsk and Lunansk Oblasts hold an illegal referendum to separate from Ukraine. Most citizens seem to ignore it

south of Luhansk Oblast – in the mining-industrial zone where Ukraine’s richest oligarch Rinat Akhmetov has his enterprises, are the people of another separatist chieftain, Oleksiy Mozhoviy, a former Gastarbeiter from Russia. He does not recognise Bolotov’s authority and is operating independently (he even said that Bolotov had given orders to have him killed). In Antratsyt County, the local head of the regional administration has decided to establish his own republic, having turned to Russian Don Cossacks for aid, who entered Ukrainian territory quite confidently through gaps in the border and brought a goodly amount of arms into the city. Another structure, operating in the Oblast Centre, is the Luhansk People’s Council, headed by Andriy Andreyev, who was formerly in charge of the city transport. This is a person who was formerly connected to with the Party of Regions MP Volodymyr Medyanik and the Communist Party of Ukraine. It is the self-proclaimed People’s Council under the leadership of Andreyev that recognised Bolotov as the legitimate head of the oblast and prompted city mayors in the oblast to conduct a referendum on the proclamation of the Luhansk Republic.

The curator of the separatists’ actions, at least the legal one, is the notoriously pro-Russian MP and ex-candidate for presidency Oleh Tsariov.

But the separatist scenario has long passed the boundary of local leaders blackmailing official Kyiv, and anarchy reigns as a result of the weakened situation. This results in the emergence of a “grey zone” and a “pirate republic”.

The coming to power of the separatists has caused panic in Luhansk – many representatives of the middle class and intelligentsia are planning to leave the city or have already done so. The push to leave does not simply lie in political convictions or patriotic considerations, but also in simple fear for property, families and personal

safety. The murder of a married couple – business owners in the Sverdlovsk County has gained quite a resonance (On May 9, separatists shot dead a married couple driving in two separate cars towards the Russian border. Their 10-year old daughter was severely wounded but is alive – Ed.). A true criminal revolution has begun in the city and the region – gunmen requisition cars “in the name of the revolution”, shooting and burglary have increased. By the way, separatists have also requisitioned cars from the garage of the Oblast Council, including the car of its Head, Valeriy Holenko, a dedicated Russophile. In the Stanychno-Luhansk County, unknown persons “expropriated” an armoured bank vehicle carrying UAH 1mn. Gunmen enter any shop and simply take goods without paying for them. There are instances and attempts at racketeering. It is difficult to establish how many of these crimes are committed by representatives of the separatist paramilitary and how many are committed by regular criminals, because their actions are beyond the law do not really differ.

A significant portion of public activists have also been evacuated from Luhansk Oblast. After the kidnapping of a leader of the Public Sector of the Luhansk EuroMaidan, Oleksandr Bida, and activist Hanna Mokrousova (both activists were subsequently released under public pressure and both fled the city), most of them do not feel safe and receive constant threats. In a small city, all “opposition” supporters are well known, so each is a potential target for kidnapping, beating and persecution.

The opportunity for journalists to work is extremely limited (with the exception of reporters from Russian and Kremlin-controlled channels). Journalist Tavakkul Abalaev was beaten during the storming of the Oblast Military Registration and Enlistment Office, his car confiscated. Journalist Yevhen Spirin was beaten – gunmen recom-

mended that he leave the city while he still could. Most journalists of the central mass media don’t risk appearing in places where there is a large group of people wearing “Colorado ribbons” (the name for St. George’s ribbons that are the Russian symbol of victory in WWII and now worn by separatists and pro-Russian citizens).

The triumph of this unruly oblast was the illegal referendum, held on May 11, on the declaration of the Luhansk People’s Republic. At 12 p.m., separatists were already cheerfully reporting a 65% voter turnout. The final turnout was about 75%, of which 96% voted for the LPR. Most of the eyewitnesses who participated in this so-called referendum said that there were all kinds of violations of democratic principles. You could vote on behalf of family members or neighbours. How the upstarts intend to lead their “state” remains a mystery. But as of May 12, they announced that any Ukrainian authority bodies, even the friendly Luhansk Oblast Council, have been stripped of their plenary powers. So Luhansk residents can expect difficult times under the authority of unknown persons.

At present, only the northern region of Luhansk Oblast, where the ethnic Ukrainian population is prevalent, is maintaining defences against the newly-declared unruly state. The local authorities and self-defence units are repelling the attempts of separatists to establish their order. But in view of Kyiv’s indecisiveness in conducting an anti-terrorist operation, it is difficult to know how long this defence will hold out.

The main problem lies in the fact that the chaos, pressure of propaganda and confusion of the average residents of Luhansk are preparing them for the recognition of Russian authority as an alternative to the lack of control and lawlessness. Even the local supporters of the new government in Kyiv have in all likelihood lost faith in getting help from Kyiv. ■

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Estonia: Why the Abkhazia and Transnistria scenarios did not come true



Author:
Erkki Bahovski

One of the biggest crises the newly re-independent state of Estonia faced was an attempt to establish an autonomous region in its northeast part in 1993. The region was mostly inhabited by Russian speaking people who had arrived during the Soviet period. Needless to say that very few of them spoke Estonian or were part of the Estonian culture.

The referendum in Narva and Sillamäe (cities in Northeastern Estonia) was initiated after the Estonian Parliament had passed the Aliens Act in the summer of 1993. The new Act declared all non-citizens aliens and regulated their life in Estonia. The Russian-speakers who were either stateless persons or citizens of the Russian Federation took it as a violation of their rights and felt their status in Narva and Sillamäe threatened. In addition, as could be expected, the Narva City Council and Sillamäe City Council were supported

by Russia who lambasted the Estonian authorities on every occasion. Despite the fact that the Estonian Parliament amended the Aliens Act after consultations with international organisations and politicians the attacks continued. The Estonian press reported of the concentration of Russian troops just across the border. In 1993, there were about 7,000 Russian soldiers based in Estonia even though none of them were situated in the northeast region.

By mid-July, it was clear that the Estonian government could not stop the referendum from happening. Many analysts pointed out that from the very beginning of the crisis, Estonian authorities never contemplated using force. Instead, the plan was to discredit the referendum and its results.

On July 16-17, 1993, the referendum was carried out both in Narva and Sillamäe. According to the city councils, more than of 50% of the inhabitants participated in the referendum. 98% of the votes in Sillamäe and 97.2% in Narva supported territorial autonomy. Nevertheless, international observers noted that less than 50% of Narva inhabitants cast their ballots. In addition, the Estonian press reported on the absence of a common electoral list which allowed one person to vote several times.

The Estonian Legal Chancellor had declared the referendum unconstitutional before it even took place. This created an aura of failure around the referendum from the beginning. At the same time,

it should be noted that the Estonian government was not prepared to handle a crisis of this scale, meaning that many issues were left to improvisation and the skills of the political leaders.

So the work on winning the hearts and minds of the Narva and Sillamäe people began. A representative of the Estonian government, Indrek Tarand, current MEP, had an opportunity to speak on the local radio. He explained to the people in Narva that the choice was actually very simple – either they secede from Estonia and switch back to the Russian rouble, or life continues with the Estonian kroon (Estonia's freshly introduced stable currency) within the state of Estonia. The Narva people could thus compare their current situation to the daily life in Russia since across the Narva river lied Ivangorod where the rouble time still continued. The people in Narva decided that they would not want to go back to those times.

The final nail in the coffin of the referendum supporters was hammered on July 23 when Prime Minister Mart Laar visited Narva. He ignored the local political leaders and went to meet the local entrepreneurs in the Baltiyets factory. Laar's bodyguards simply forced the main organiser of the referendum, Vladimir Chuikin, out of the meeting room. This was a language the local entrepreneurs understood well. The referendum failed. In autumn 1993, the first municipal elections were held also in Narva.

The vigorous action of the Estonian leaders certainly saved the northeast region for Estonia, but international support also played its role. The Estonian government never tried to handle the issue bilaterally with Russia but took it to the international level immediately. This is definitely one of the reasons why the Abkhazia and Transnistria scenarios never materialized in Estonia. Nor were there any Russian troops.

After the referendum had failed, the West started to take Estonia more seriously since the government had succeeded in avoiding violence and had been able to show that Estonia was part of the solution. The calls for Russia to withdraw her forces from Estonia intensified after the referendum (the troops were finally withdrawn in 1994). Estonia remained a unitary state without any autonomous regions. ■

**ONCE THE REFERENDUM
FAILED, THE WORK ON
WINNING THE HEARTS
AND MINDS
OF THE NARVA AND SILLAMÄE
PEOPLE BEGAN**

Déjà vu?

Ukraine risks returning to the post-Orange Revolution internal squabbles very soon

Despite hopes of another chance to completely reboot the country after the second revolution Ukraine is slowly entering the second round of squabbles within the once uniform Orange team. The leaders of the current presidential campaign are bringing back the groups of “Yulians” (after Yulia Tymoshenko) and “Victorians” (the former team of Viktor Yushchenko, now embodied in “Petrorians” after Petro Poroshenko), almost identical to those from the post-Orange Revolution years of

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Oles
Oleksiyenko

2005-2009. When Viktor Yushchenko was President and Yulia Tymoshenko was Premier, they had waged a deadly struggle against each other instead of reforming and strengthening the country.

In the current campaign, the top three leaders have been unchanged for a while now. According to a survey by Rating, a sociological agency, held on April 25-30, Petro Poroshenko enjoys the support of 43.4% of those polled. Yulia Tymoshenko has 13.9%. Serhiy Tihipko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko

and Mykhailo Dobkin would get 6.7%, 4.5% and 4.3% respectively. However, when GFK Ukraine held a survey on May 6-8, it revealed a surprising result where Tymoshenko's rate was much lower and Tihipko's was much higher. As a result, it would be Serhiy Tihipko, not Yulia Tymoshenko, with the best chance to run against Petro Poroshenko in the second round.

Two important facts to know about GFK Ukraine's data are that the poll was held via telephone exclusively, and its predictions were always the farthest from the actual results compared to all other sociological services in Ukraine in previous elections. This is probably because GFK Ukraine does not cover the entire electorate in villages and small towns whose citizens account for nearly half of all voters in Ukraine. And Tihipko always had better rates in big and mid-sized cities, while Tymoshenko's core electorate was in rural regions.



PHOTO: PHIL

The names of the final pair in round two may change given the fact that only 37% of those polled claimed that they were “sure about their choice” in the latest survey by Rating. Another 33% said that they “were sure but their choice could still change”. Tymoshenko and Poroshenko have the most confident voters – 54% of their supporters were confident about their choice. 12% of those polled have not decided on their preferred candidate yet.

However, it is other figures that look worrisome. If Poroshenko and Tymoshenko get to the second round, only 14% of the Donbas citizens are prepared to vote for any of them. Two thirds insist that they will ignore the vote with these two candidates in the second round, essentially boycotting it. 22% are still contemplating their choice for the second round. No other region in Ukraine has such extreme sentiments. Only 35% will ignore the vote in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhia Oblasts if these two candidates make it into round two, while 47% will not vote in Southern Ukraine. This could undermine the legitimacy of the election in Donetsk region and provide tools for speculations.

Despite the widespread Russian propagandist mantra about the government monopolized by Western Ukrainians, all top candidates come from Southeastern Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko was born in Odesa Oblast; Yulia Tymoshenko comes from Dnipropetrovsk Oblast;

Serhiy Tihipko used to live in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast as well, and Mykhailo Dobkin comes from Kharkiv.

THE COMMON AND THE DIFFERENT IN THE PLATFORMS

The platforms of two top candidates in this campaign look attractive for the wide audience yet they do not fit in the scope of powers the current Constitution grants the President.

Yulia Tymoshenko openly claims her “will for power” and intentions to concentrate it in order “to break the current system”. Petro Poroshenko speaks of the opposite, pledging to “become a guarantor of the newly reinstated parliamentary system... while not

claiming powers that exceed the ones I am elected for”. Meanwhile, people who talk to him in person insist that his aspirations for absolute power are identical to, if not stronger than those of Tymoshenko.

Tymoshenko’s platform offers more populism that pops up in some mutually-exclusive promises. For instance, she pledges to extend moratorium on farmland sale while ensuring the opportunity to sell state-owned farmland at the market price (which cannot be estimated without the land market). She also offers an inflated annual lease price of 10% of the farmland market price (which, again, is impossible to calculate in a non-existent farmland market).

Another pledge in her platform is to abolish special pensions and privileges for all top officials. This is, however, forbidden to do for the pensioners who are already getting them. Tymoshenko is promising to ban fines for late utility payments “until welfare rises significantly”. This will result in arbitrary debts on utilities and gas, deteriorating utility services, increasing burden on the budgets of all levels, and, eventually, a situation where disciplined pensioners will keep paying for the wealthy judges delaying payments yet confident of their impunity.

Petro Poroshenko is trying to distance himself from social populism, a trademark element in his key rival’s campaign. He claims that “all political platforms you have seen before were about pennies from heaven but they never come down” and “clearly, I support


the rise of wages, pensions and student scholarships”, but “we will spend money on all this as soon as we have it once we have built a new economy”. Meanwhile, Poroshenko’s platform suggests that he expects to transfer responsibility for the social-economic situation in Ukraine on the government, the one in charge of “running economic processes” under the current version of the Constitution. As a guarantor of the Constitution, rights and freedoms, the President should only “create conditions” for social justice and innovative economy, Poroshenko believes.

If he indeed does not intend to expand his powers, he and his Administration will obviously act as expert observers who “evaluate and instruct” the government “responsible for running economic processes” and the parliament responsible for passing laws. When Yushchenko did that as President after the Orange Revolution, he faced harsh criticism from the Party of Regions, then in opposition, and from the majority of Ukrainian society that votes for the President and expects him to ensure full-scale transformations (voters don’t care how he does that), rather than to merely advise to the parliament and government which turn out to be the bad cops.

Thus, just like with Yushchenko, Ukrainian voters will soon inevitably see the President as someone responsible for the state policy. His attempts to criticize the government or the parliament for ineffectiveness will most likely fuel another round of deep disappointment: the voters will interpret this as just another series of internal squabbles in “the single democratic pro-European team”. This will discredit Poroshenko and Ukrainian statehood overall, thus playing into the hands of pro-Russian forces and the Kremlin’s policy to subordinate Ukraine.

COGNITIVE DISSONANCE

Both Tymoshenko and Poroshenko support lustration and elimination of corruption in the state bodies, fair courts, honest law enforcers, lower tax pressure on the business and demonopolization of the economy. Meanwhile, both groups are being staffed with representatives of the former govern-



ment. Poroshenko has been criticized multiple times for actively engaging people from the tandem of Serhiy Liovochkin, Party of Regions MP and ex-Chief of Staff under Viktor Yanukovich, and Dmytro Firtash, the gas tycoon recently arrested in Vienna on FBI warrant, in the regions. Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna party voted in unison with the Party of Regions on acts that were not supported by the rest of the democratic coalition in the post-Maidan parliament. Svoboda members have blamed it for attempts to provoke their exit from the coalition so that the Party of Regions could replace them. As to oligarchs, Rinat Akhmetov seems to be the most interested one in Tymoshenko's presidency now, given his difficult record with Poroshenko in the past. So is Ihor Kolomoyskyi, the Dnipropetrovsk-based oligarch and owner of Privat Group, who is now actively gaining political weight under the rule of Tymoshenko's allies as interim government.

The most concerning aspect is obviously the Russian trace. Poroshenko is said to engage people related to Viktor Baloha and Volodymyr Lytvyn, Andriy Derkach and Dmytro Firtash. The latter two were always the key Russian lobbyists in Ukraine. Yulia Tymoshenko on her part has always been on good terms with the agents of Russian influence in Ukraine, such as Viktor Medvedchuk, his right-hand man Nestor Shufrych, Andriy Kliuyev (ex-Chief of Staff under Yanukovich), and Tymoshenko's one-time main advisor Andriy Portnov (ex-First Deputy Chief of Staff for Yanukovich). Acting President and Tymoshenko's ally Oleksandr Turchynov is known to have actively negotiated with Vadym Novynsky, Putin's "supervisor" in the Ukrainian parliament and business partner to tycoon Rinat Akhmetov. It is Tymoshenko's allies who were mostly blamed for the lack of adequate actions to restrain Russian aggression in Crimea and the Donbas in the first month after Yanukovich fled.

The recent deadly incident in Odesa adds to the Tymoshenko controversy: MP Oleksandr Dubovyi, close to Tymoshenko and Turchynov, is said to have

been involved in covering up separatist groups and making sure that police chiefs avoided responsibility for helping or doing nothing to hold back separatists. Ex-governor of Odesa Oblast Volodymyr Nemyrovskiy and ex-Interior Minister Yuriy Lutsenko have both blamed him for lobbying the appointment of the traitor police chiefs, Dmytro Fuchidzhi and Oleh Lutsiuk. On the other hand, Poroshenko raises doubts as his plants resume operations in Russia and his business operates uninhibitedly in the Russian-occupied Crimea. Some refer this to his deals with Firtash whose efforts in lobbying Putin's interests became obvious from his clearly pro-Russian stance during the EuroMaidan.

TIED BY HESITATION

Both top candidates have similar approaches to the language issue, and these approaches will do nothing to consolidate the nation or overcome the regional divide. Yulia Tymoshenko promotes Ukrainian as the only state language with Russian and other languages having the official status in the regions where the dominating majority wants that. This will subsequently lead to increasing Russification of a number of regions in South-Eastern Ukraine (see p. 24). Petro Poroshenko pledges to preserve the current status quo on the language issue, which means that the Kolesnichenko-Kivalov language law will stay intact in its current version.

None of them is prepared to take steps to protect Ukrainian-speakers from Russification in Southern, Eastern and partly Central Ukraine, let alone facilitate the actual rather than formal use of Ukrainian as the state language. Eye-witnesses claim that both Tymoshenko, and Poroshenko, as well as their families, speak Russian at home and in private life while switching to Ukrainian in public or to talk to the people they find useful.

Both candidates promise to facilitate Ukraine's defence capacity and European integration. Yet, none mentions NATO membership in their platforms. Poroshenko, as the most likely winner of this campaign, seems only willing to follow the crowd on the

issue of NATO as the only way to guarantee Ukraine's security in the face of continuous Russian threat, and even accept the veto of the pro-Russian fifth column in Southeastern Ukraine. Apparently, he will be the first one to lead Ukraine to NATO as soon as 70% of Ukrainians support the idea. When the share is 30%, he will not since he would thus risk losing Donetsk or Luhansk Oblasts, Kharkiv or Odesa.

Instead, both candidates offer useless options to replace NATO membership. Tymoshenko suggests an amorphous "European policy of common security", while Poroshenko offers a reinforced version of the Budapest Memorandum. Both support elimination of any aspect in which Ukraine depends on Russia, energy being the top priority. Meanwhile, both support friendly, equal and partner



WHILE SUPPORTING LUSTRATION AND ELIMINATION OF CORRUPTION, BOTH TYMOSHENKO AND POROSHENKO ARE STAFFING THEIR TEAMS WITH PEOPLE FROM THE PREVIOUS GOVERNMENT

relations with the "future non-Putin democratic Russia" which is hardly an option at all.

Both Tymoshenko and Poroshenko pledge to abolish local state administration and to delegate most of their functions to executive committees of local councils. In the current situation, however, this can only further fuel separatism and restrict ways for the central government to affect inefficiency in the regions. If implemented, this will hardly liberate the central government from responsibility for local problems, as Poroshenko expects in his platform, since most Ukrainians remain paternalist-minded, especially in Southeastern Ukraine. They will keep blaming the chaos in their towns and villages on the incapable central government. That will allow local authorities to fuel such sentiments via their loyal local media, while Russia will use this to aggravate pro-Russian sentiments. ■

It's Not the Winning, But the Taking Part That Counts

Why some candidates are running in the campaign without a chance to win it

Author:
Oles Oleksiyenko

The upcoming snap presidential election features 21 candidates. Yet, only half of them have more than 1%, and just the trio of Petro Poroshenko, Yulia Tymoshenko and Serhiy Tihipko actually stand a chance to win the race. Still, a few candidates may well gain a fairly good result in the first round and compete with Tymoshenko or Tihipko for a place in the second round.

Those who realize that they will not win the election are divided into two groups. One includes candidates whose rates are close to the 5% threshold in parlia-

mentary elections. The other one comprises people who have no chance to get anything serious whatsoever.

The former group includes Party of Regions' MP and ex-Governor of Kharkiv Oblast Mykhailo Dobkin, Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko, ex-Defence Minister during Viktor Yushchenko's presidency Anatoliy Hrytsenko, MP Oleh Liashko, Svoboda leader Oleh Tyahnybok and probably Olha Bohomolets, the well-known doctor and activist who took care of treatment for the victims of the Maidan, and Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Right Sector. The latter group includes other candidates, representatives of the Yanukovych regime among them.

For some candidates from the first group, this election will be the crucial opportunity to cement their political weight in the new post-revolutionary system. This will allow them to seek formats and money for



FOR SOME CANDIDATES FROM THE FIRST GROUP, THIS ELECTION WILL BE THE CRUCIAL OPPORTUNITY TO CEMENT THEIR POLITICAL WEIGHT IN THE NEW POST-REVOLUTIONARY SYSTEM

The rates of the least popular candidates who have no chance to win the election

Based on a poll by the Rating sociological group, Razumkov Centre, KMIS and SOCIS on April 9-16, 2014



an upcoming parliamentary campaign, or to negotiate a quota for themselves in exchange for joining a certain party. This option could be promising for Anatoliy Hrytsenko, Oleh Liashko, Olha Bohomolets and Dmytro Yarosh, provided that the latter steals some electorate from Svoboda.

Candidates from the second group will obviously have a chance to trade their quotas for representatives in district election commissions (see **A lucrative resource**). To some, such as Oleh Tsariov, the notorious Party of Regions MP who now seems to coordinate separatist movements in Eastern Ukraine, and Renat Kuzmin, Donetsk-born former Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council and former Deputy Prosecutor General, the candidate status ensured protection from criminal charges.

This election may bring a few surprises compared to current expectations based on results of sociological surveys. All candidates with over 1% of support have a good chance to gain a decent outcome from the voters that see them as their secondary choice

A lucrative resource

Without serious electoral support, a dozen marginal candidates still have their quotas for representatives in district election commissions, thus accounting for half of all member and head seats. This creates vast loopholes for trading their quotas to the top candidates, and could “adjust” the outcome of the vote in favour of those candidates who manage to make better deals

Candidate	% of representatives in district election commissions	% of heads of commissions	% of deputy heads of commissions	% of commission secretaries
Petro Poroshenko	5.63	7.55	7.04	5.63
Yulia Tymoshenko	5.63	5.66	6.57	6.10
Serhiy Tihipko	5.63	5.19	5.63	5.16
Mykhailo Dobkin	4.89	5.66	5.16	5.63
Oleh Liashko	5.61	5.19	5.16	5.16
Petro Symonenko	5.61	5.19	5.16	6.10
Anatoliy Hrytsenko	5.61	5.19	4.69	5.16
Oleh Tyahnybok	5.61	5.66	5.16	5.16
Olha Bohomolets	5.63	5.19	5.16	6.57
Zorian Shkiriak	5.61	6.13	5.16	5.63
Dmytro Yarosh	5.58	5.19	5.16	5.63
Oleksandr Klymenko (Ukrainian People's Party)	5.63	5.66	5.16	6.57
Vasyl Kuibida (People's Movement of Ukraine)	5.63	5.66	5.63	5.16
Yuriy Boyko	5.63	5.19	6.57	5.63
Mykola Malomuzh	5.55	4.72	5.63	5.63
Vasyl Tsushko	5.45	5.19	5.16	5.16
Vadym Rabinovych	4.63	4.72	4.69	4.23
Volodymyr Saranov	4.15	3.77	4.23	3.29
Renat Kuzmin	2.17	2.36	1.88	2.35

Source: Central Election Commission

(see p. 7). Thus, Mykhailo Dobkin and Petro Symonenko could end up with up to 7.1% and 5.8% respectively, while Anatoliy Hrytsenko could get 11%. After all, many voters in the Donbas and Kharkiv Oblast have not yet decided on their preferred candidate, intend to boycott the election or to vote against all candidates. The participation of the Donbas voters in the election will have a huge impact on the outcome since pro-Russian candidates have the most supporters here, compared to other regions in Ukraine, and the region is fairly densely populated.

Thus, a lot will depend on how effectively the Party of Regions uses its administrative leverage in that region. If it does to promote Mykhailo Dobkin as its official candidate, he may even get 16-18% and enter the second round.

Still, any openly pro-Russian candidate has no chance to win round two. The latest poll by four sociological companies

(Rating, SOCIS, KMIS and Razumkov Centre) shows that over 70-80% of people distrust pro-Russian candidates. However, they can prevent Tymoshenko from getting through to the second round. So can the dilution of her loyal electorate by Oleh Liashko, Anatoliy Hrytsenko and Olha Bohomolets in Central and Western Ukraine.

Most candidates, especially those that have no chance to enter the second round, have populist elements in their platforms. Very often, their promises do not nearly fit the scope of powers the current Constitution grants the President. With further restrictions currently favoured by the majority in parliament, the President could end up with very limited powers. Moreover, they have no chance to hold a snap parliamentary election, let alone to form a loyal majority of the like-minded MPs in the legislature.

For this campaign, Svoboda's Oleh Tyahnybok has switched his

traditional eurosceptical and anti-NATO rhetoric for support to “bilateral agreements with the US and the UK on urgent military assistance in case of armed aggression”, “real rather than declarative actions to integrate Ukraine into Euro-Atlantic security structures”, and “specific deadlines for Ukraine's possible entrance to NATO.” The platform of Dmytro Yarosh, the leader of the Right Sector, is similar.

Anatoliy Hrytsenko traditionally builds his campaign on his positive qualities, untainted reputation and military experience – something quite appealing in the current situation.

The candidates squabbling for the electorate of the previous regime seek contact with various parts of it, from radical pro-Russian voters to moderate supporters of stability or “improvement today”. After Oleh Tsariov withdrew from the race, Mykhailo Dobkin, the notorious ex-governor of Kharkiv Oblast and creature of Rinat Akhmetov, has been the most consistent agent of Russia's line in Ukraine. Petro Symonenko, the leader of the Communist Party, focuses on federalization, Russian as the second state language, and Ukraine's non-aligned status, while traditionally blaming oligarchs, neo-Nazis and the West for all troubles.

Yuriy Boyko presents himself as the successor of the previous government where he was Vice Premier, offering two state languages as well. Meanwhile, he is virtually the only one who publicly represents big business saying in

ANY OPENLY PRO-RUSSIAN CANDIDATE HAS NO CHANCE TO WIN ROUND TWO.
OVER 70-80% OF PEOPLE DISTRUST PRO-RUSSIAN CANDIDATES

his platform, unlike other candidates, that “the state should protect the interests of the big, medium and small businesses on the equal basis”. He does not insist on Ukraine's joining the Customs Union and promotes cooperation with all countries, the priority of economic integration with the EU and energy diversification. ■

Right, Left or Centre?

In their words and deeds, Ukrainian parties alternate between being radical, conservative and liberal, depending on the circumstances and the electioneering situation. Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna is one example

Author:
Ihor Losev

In contemporary Ukraine, discussions about political radicals, conservatives and liberals in Ukraine as counterparts of political groups in established Western systems appear to be quite scholastic, as in any unstructured emerging society. Roughly speaking, Ukrainian society is made up of oligarchs, bureaucrats, a thin stratum of entrepreneurs, the small and unstable middle class which has struggled to free itself from under the oligarchic-bureaucratic burden and a huge mass (primarily in Southeast Ukraine) of the dependent population that expects subsidies, donations and "bread and circuses" from any government.

As they compete for the electorate, parties are forced to keep these factors in mind. In their words and deeds, Ukrainian parties alternate between being radical, conservative and liberal, depending on the circumstances and the electioneering situation. Moreover, political parties in Ukraine have never been ideologically consistent. The main thing for them is to win votes, and if this requires a departure from their programmatic creed, so be it – to them, this is natural and necessary tactical flexibility.

In societies like Ukraine and some Eastern European countries, mass popular movements, such as Polish Solidarity or the People's Movement of Ukraine, are more efficient than parties. The People's Movement was a great force in the late 1980s and the early 1990s but

faded into insignificance after becoming a party.

However, such movements have to have a truly national, rather than narrow party-oriented, programme of fundamental social reforms that could unite millions of people who are divided on some other issues. (This is what causes the division of politically likeminded people into separate parties.) Then, acceptance of the key foundations of the movement becomes the criterion for leadership, even for non-members. The organization thus breaks away from the party quota principle which leads to mechanistic distribution of top offices among party members and puts party interests above national ones.

Meanwhile, we can see a liberal-radical-conservative mixture in the activities of most Ukrainian political parties. One case in point is Yulia Tymoshenko's Batkivshchyna (Fatherland) party. On economic issues, they are obvious liberals. In fact, it would be strange to see anything else from an organization in which business circles are represented so well. In the national and cultural sphere, Batkivshchyna seemed to be conservative, at least until recently when Tymoshenko decided to use the state language, Ukrainian, as a bargaining chip in southeast Ukraine. Her fiery anti-oligarchic rhetoric makes an impression that Fatherland is even radical.

The Svoboda (Freedom) party is liberal on economic issues (recognizing private property, the market and free competition), conservative on national and cultural issues and



radical in politics. It is hard to say anything definite about UDAR, except that it is a typical leader-centred party much as its allies in the coalition. The position of the leader here is more important than any programme.

The present circumstances demand energetic, precise and efficient actions rather than commonplace political PR, but Tymoshenko is a step behind in evaluating and reacting to events. Her actions are standard and more tailored to a peaceful time and evolutionary development. She is gathering some committees and setting up headquarters composed of retired generals and military men, promises to bring Crimea back to Ukraine and has travelled to the Donbas. However, all this activity does not involve any real steps that could affect the threatening developments in eastern Ukraine, even though she has the requisite leverage – not retired generals but her party members in the national government: Oleksandr Turchynov (her alter ego), Arseniy Yatseniuk, Arsen Avakov, Minister of Justice Pavlo Petrenko, etc. However, their actions have been such that, after Crimea was given up without a fired shot, the Czech defence minister said that the West would not be able to help Ukraine because it was passive in defending



PHOTO UNIAN

The performance of Tymoshenko's team in the government (formally, without her involvement) marks the downfall of Batkivshchyna, just like the downfall of the intrigue-based, behind-the-scenes, business-dominated brand of politics in Ukraine

chance in this election, does it mean that the country should be surrendered? Does it mean that Ukraine needs to have a weak head of state at this tragic hour? All for the sake of making Tymoshenko a strong prime minister in the parliamentary election – that is, if the country survives until autumn?

Acts of this kind committed during wartime smell of high treason. Ukraine, rather than Tymoshenko, should be on the leadership's minds. Instead of relishing her moment of glory, she may well become a political corpse – and not Tymoshenko alone but her entire party with all its members. Forever and irrevocably. They are now scrambling to draft a constitution of a de facto parliamentary republic (who needs a general presidential election then?) and want to scrap local state administrations, which would be an invaluable gift to the Kremlin and separatists.

The Ukrainian people, however, have acquired extensive political experience over these years – they see everything, which is a guarantee that there will be no prime minister from Batkivshchyna. Yatseniuk, who now holds the office, is increasingly acting like an extra minister of foreign affairs and Ukraine's unofficial ambassador to the IMF as he completely removes himself from, among other things, the anti-terrorist operation in Eastern Ukraine.

The performance of Tymoshenko's team in the government (for-

IN SOCIETIES LIKE UKRAINE AND SOME EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, MASS POPULAR MOVEMENTS, SUCH AS POLISH SOLIDARITY OR THE PEOPLE'S MOVEMENT OF UKRAINE, ARE MORE EFFICIENT THAN PARTIES

its own territory. Lithuania's defence minister explained to official Kyiv that preserving territorial integrity is Ukraine's right and duty. Tymoshenko's people in the government are constantly complaining of the bad army, unreliable police and questionable Security Service. However, Yuriy Lutsenko, ex-Interior Minister and counsellor to the acting president, says that Ukraine has enough well-trained special-task units, but they are not being used; there are a number of police units fully loyal to Ukraine, but they are not receiving adequate orders from Kyiv.

Ukrainian law enforcement officers are well aware of what has happened to their colleagues in the Crimea who switched their allegiance to Russia. They were first promised exorbitant salaries but later had to take tests which most of them failed. Former Security Service officers are now being given polygraph tests. Ukrainian military men who have betrayed their oath of allegiance are now told: "You will serve where the motherland will send you." This may be a place like Sakhalin, Wrangel Island, Altai or Kolyma, which means they will have to leave the sunny Crimea.

The situation with the power structures in Ukraine is alarming, but it is much better than the condi-

tion of the central government which is totally paralyzed either by fear or great responsibility. Winston Churchill once said: "Responsibility is the price politicians pay for power." If Tymoshenko believes that the catastrophically inadequate performance of her party will in no way affect her own political standing, she is being very naïve. She will be and is already being held responsible for all the party's failures. Her people surrendered the Crimea to Russia. The Ukrainian military held their ground there for nearly a month in extremely difficult circumstances, waiting for some sensible actions from Kyiv. They never came, and the military began to surrender.

Tymoshenko wasted the greatest chance of her entire life. If instead of ruling from behind the scenes without burdening herself with any formal obligations, she had chosen to be the prime minister and set about saving Ukraine with her characteristic zeal, she could become a national leader and this period would be her hour of triumph. However, she has gone the usual way of intrigue. The country is starting into an abyss, but Tymoshenko's friends concern themselves with ways of making the new president of Ukraine an absolutely powerless person and a largely ceremonial figure. If Tymoshenko stands no

mally, without her involvement) marks the downfall of Batkivshchyna, just like the downfall of the intrigue-based, behind-the-scenes, business-dominated brand of politics in Ukraine. Its first signs were seen in the Maidan in winter 2014 when the "leaders" showed they feared a wide popular movement and attempted to deny access to real power. Today, the country's leadership are acting contrary to the desire of the people to protect their country, hoping that the West will do more than Ukraine itself. ■

Arming the Enemy

Despite loud statements about ceasing military cooperation, Ukrainian plants continue to supply the Russian aggressor

Author:
Roman Malko

Ukraine's statehood may cost several million dollars. And this is not cash – only the sum of contracts which the country's government does not dare cancel even in the face of a genuine armed conflict.

Just by refusing to acknowledge the fact of war, Ukraine as represented by its current leadership is acting in a very strange and incomprehensive manner. This is not to mention the illogicalities that bedevil its clumsy attempts to restore order in the country. Initially, it could have been attributed to the inexperience of the new government or the sabotage of those loyal to the old regime. Now, the problem looks more like a state-level subversion. For over a month now, Ukraine has de facto been in a state of war which bears the marks of ethnic cleansing and essentially an annexation of part of its territory. Everyone understands that this is not the end. But does the government really want to stop the aggressor? That question remains open. Unfortunately, the entire situation is quite gloomy, and in spite of some local victories, news from the frontline offers no reason for optimism.

In late March, acting CEO of Ukroboronprom Yuriy Tereshchenko said that this government-run defence company had stopped supplying weapons and military equipment to Russia. The announcement came after two high-profile scandals. However, according to sources that have spoken to *The Ukrai-*



Motor Sich in Zaporizhia continues to produce engines for Russian helicopters

nian Week, the information is not quite truthful – cooperation in the defence sector actually continues as some signs suggest. A number of state enterprises are still honouring their contracts with Russia while pointing to a host of reasons why they cannot afford to do otherwise. The problems, they say, are social – if the production facilities are stopped, dozens of thousands of people will be thrown out into the street. However, it is not only about the people, one is tempted to suspect. There is something else that is hard to part with even in face of death – money. Severing some contracts appears to be very painful to the new government, because it involves huge losses. Ending several-million-dollar contracts is tolerable, but it is almost unreal to lose hundreds of millions. These contracts, despite declarations, have never been suspended, and no one can tell whether they will ever be.

Vladimir Putin has recently said that Ukraine has no alternative to continuing supply arms to Russia, because its military de-

fence complex will otherwise collapse. This problem does exist, and its roots go back to the times when Ukraine's economy was fully integrated with that of the rest of the Soviet Union. Many things have changed since then, but Ukraine's and Russia's military industrial complexes are still closely linked. For example, Motor Sich, formerly a state enterprise which now belongs to Party of Regions MP Viacheslav Bohuslaiev, produces the bigger part of engines for Russian helicopters. Motor Sich buys some parts for its engines from Russia, so these processes are closely integrated. A proportion of the engines go to other countries. To simply stop the plant will deliver a blow to its 20,000 employees. In Mykolaiv, Zoria makes turbocharged engines for Russian army assault boats and is in a similar situation.

The argument cited by bureaucrats is simple: across Ukraine, the stoppage of such plants may put over 50,000 people, an entire army, out of their jobs. The kind of close integration that Ukraine has with Russia will make it impossible to continue



PHOTO: UNIAN

Ukraine's defence industrial complex employs over **50,000 people**



THERE ARE HUGE ARMS DEPOTS IN EASTERN UKRAINE WHICH THE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT IS NOT GOING TO EVACUATE

making some of its products. Experts say that in some cases, cooperation will not cease for a minute – there is a problem of dual-purpose goods. For example, Ukraine and Russia are participating in joint programmes to produce boosters used to launch space rockets. Even though Australia and a number of other countries have refused to supply their satellites on Russian boosters in protest against Russia's aggression, Ukraine continues to participate in international space programmes. The reasoning goes that we cannot just slam the door, because things are very deeply integrated and will hurt everyone.

It is hard to deny that Ukrainian bureaucrats and entrepreneurs have no lack of the commercial savvy. Their iron-cast arguments would be reassuring if they did not come across as too cynical, if not senseless. Prior to the Second World War, the Soviet Union had very close ties to Germany, but after 22 June 1941, following Hitler's attack, it immediately discontinued all military cooperation regardless of how much it could hurt economi-

cally. No-one even ventured to say that the country's GDP would drop as a result. The sophisticated line of argumentation from the Ukrainian elites is worth nothing, because it prompts Ukraine's Western partners to wonder how sincerely the Ukrainian government wants to fight Russia and protect independence. With the US and Germany refusing to supply weaponry to Russia, this cat-and-mouse game looks nothing less than idiocy.

MP Yuriy Syrotyuk from the Svoboda party, who is a member of the parliamentary Committee on National Security, says he has appealed to bureaucrats regarding this issue on multiple occasions but has never been given a clear reply. "I have been concerned that our Arsenal enterprise continues to produce missile homing devices for R-73 air-to-air missiles. Motor Sich has never suspended cooperation. Artem makes R-27 midrange air-to-air missiles for Russian warplanes. In Malyna, Zhytomyr Oblast, warehouses were chock-full and ready to ship equipment. Even the workers protested against arming Russia, even though some of the country's leaders say [stopping cooperation] would hurt these people," Syrotyuk says. "I believe that the complete severance of military-technical ties between our countries would put Russia in a worse situation. The thing is that its entire nuclear arsenal is being serviced by Ukraine's state enterprise Pivdenmash, located in Dnipropetrovsk. If Pivdenmash stops working for Russia, this will greatly jeopardize the servicing of its nuclear missiles. There is no certainty that those missiles can fly as it is, but without maintenance they will turn into scrap metal and will be a danger to the Russians themselves. Then, Putin will have to either seek ways to reach a truce or conquer Dnipropetrovsk."

As they speak about excessive economic losses resulting from discontinued cooperation with Russia, Ukrainian bureaucrats are, in fact, not being altogether truthful. Ukraine needs to recognize that it is in a state of war and thus losses are inevitable. However, this economic dark cloud has a thick silver lining,

promising large dividends in the future. All Ukrainian plants supply 10% of Ukraine's defence needs at best, and the rest is imported. If these plants are forced to stop for a while, the country will have a real chance to forever break away from Russia's embrace and its defence goods market, which stands to lose at least as much as ours. Putin has acknowledged that to set up its own military goods production, Russia will need at least a year and a half, while expert say it will take no less than three years. If Ukraine stops trading in arms with the aggressor, it will be able to switch to NATO weapons and adopt NATO standards, ultimately breaking any ties with Russia in this sector. Considering our capacities, it will not take long for orders to start coming.

However, these prospects are

still too distant. Considering how Ukraine is struggling to protect its independence, they may even be unreachable. There is another interesting nuance, again having to do with arms, which may play a nasty trick against Ukraine. According to our security concept, we still expect enemy attacks to come from the West. That Russia may become an enemy has never been seriously taken into consideration. Hence, Ukraine's defence industry plants were built along the border with Russia.

If there is patent aggression in Donetsk and Luhansk oblasts, Ukraine will immediately lose part of its military potential. For example, the famous Kolchuga systems are produced in Luhansk Oblast. Ukraine's only ammunition factory is located in Luhansk. There are huge arms depots in eastern Ukraine which no-one is going to evacuate, either. Artemivsk hosts Europe's biggest military equipment depot. Hundreds of thousands of weapons may end up in the hands of the enemy in which case Ukraine will be facing problems even with small arms and ammunition. ■

Putin has acknowledged that to set up its own military goods production, Russia will need at least a year and a half, while expert say it will take no less than three years

Resuscitating Ukraine's Moribund Economy

Ukraine is currently at the bottom of an economic cycle, but some indicators suggest the first signs of growth. The government's ambitious reform plan gives hope that the country will bounce back

Author:
Lyubomyr
Shavalyuk

The new government is a little more than 50 days in office – too short a period to assess its performance, especially considering the events in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. But the important thing is that citizens look to the new Cabinet with hope for a better life, and this expectation has to be fulfilled. Fifty days is, however, enough time to be able to say that the new government is moving in the right direction despite having to overcome big hurdles and making multiple mistakes. These laudable efforts are the reason why Ukraine's economy, which is not in the best of shapes now, is showing the first signs of growth. These are only the first harbingers of change, but they give reassurance that if Ukrainians keep the government on its toes, their hopes may come true this time around.

REAL SECTOR

The volume of industrial production in the first quarter of 2014 fell five% year-on-year (**see Good as it is**). This negative indicator might seem to be merely a continuation of the last year's trend when industry lost 4.3%. As a matter of fact, it is an expression of a number of trends that will persist in the future. March data is telling, because this is the first full month under the new government: the decline rate rose to 6.8% from 3.7% in February due to certain factors.

First, the Russian blockade of Ukrainian-made goods is gaining momentum, causing Ukraine's industry to lose its positions in a number of areas. In January through February, Ukrainian ex-

ports to Russia dropped by 30%. This took place before power changed hands in Ukraine, but the scale of the drop-off is a reflection of Russia's continuing policy to replace Ukrainian imports with Russian goods launched long before the revolutionary events in Ukraine. The foreign trade data for March and subsequent months, when made public, is likely to be even gloomier but can already be seen in the industry's performance. For example, Ukrainian producers of freight wagons, most of which go to Russia, reported March figures that were just one-fifth of the production volume they had a year ago. They have experienced decline for many months due to the hostile Russian policy.

In March and April, the Kremlin greatly expanded the list of Ukrainian goods banned for import, which now included potatoes, dairy products, confection-


ery and so on. Facing a full-fledged trade war, our economy will take longer to bounce back, but there is a crucial positive aspect to the situation. By dealing with a fear of losing its biggest trade partner of the past, Ukraine has opened a way for rapid, unrestrained growth in the future. The economic situation now nearly completely depends on us, so after surviving a brief period of hardship, we will be able to embark on a trajectory of steady economic growth.

Second, industrial statistics reflect transformations that have taken place due to the replacement of the government. For example, coal production slightly rose in February (by 0.9% year-on-year) but fell 9.9% in March. On the one hand, this drop-off in a key industry may lead to higher unemployment in some of the most depressed regions in the country. On the other hand, the

Good as it is

In Q1 2014, despite a complicated sociopolitical situation in the country, the industry decline rate was not much different from last year's figures. Reassuringly, the downturn slowed down in the construction and transport industries, which are a step ahead of the overall economy.

Dynamics in Q1 2014 as compared to 2013



Source: State Statistics Committee

The new government is moving in the right direction despite having to overcome big hurdles and making multiple mistakes

underlying cause may be the discontinuation of shadow schemes in which charcoal was produced in large quantities in small illegal makeshift coalmines and "pits" and then sold for peanuts to coalmines and intermediaries who made millions on these transactions. This "business" provided jobs to many people, saving them from financial distress, but also wrecked or took numerous lives. The new government has to put an end to these kinds of schemes in the coalmining industry and elsewhere, which will postpone economic recovery and require offering alternative employment opportunities.

Third, the decline in some industries is of a purely seasonal nature or started long before power changed hands in Ukraine. For example, the metallurgical industry fell 11.1% in March and 10.7% over the first quarter of 2014, while it lost 5.3% over the previous year. This serious drop-off is caused by external factors, primarily the lower global demand for steel which has brought iron ore prices down by 18% since December 2013. The production of electrical energy, gas and water in March dropped by 8.3% only because the first spring month was much warmer in 2014 than last year. These kinds of factors will eventually have no effect on industrial output.

Construction and transport are two industries that offer hope. The construction industry posted a double-digit decline rate throughout 2013, dropped by 10% in January and February each but slowed down to 5% in March. Freight turnover in transportation companies fell 3.1% but the volume of goods carried rose by 2.6% in Q1 2014. These two sectors are growing faster than the rest of the economy and permit discerning economic growth where it is still hard to see. That the decline is slowing down and growth is seen in certain areas suggests that the economy may leave from the bottom earlier than the end of 2014, as predicted by the government.

FINANCIAL SECTOR

The situation in the finance department is ambiguous. On the one hand, a month or two ago Ukraine was having a hard time

finding resources to finance the huge budget deficit left behind by the previous government. The situation was further aggravated by the panic over deposits and currency fluctuations, which undermined the banking system. On the other hand, the new government fairly promptly reacted to financial challenges and rushed to fill the gaps. The methods used were not always optimal, but what we have today is a stable financial system. A number of reforms that are now at an early stage will determine the parameters of macroeconomic balance in the future.

The Ukrainian Week has already reported the first steps taken by the new governor of the National Bank, including a fully flexible exchange rate, temporary administrations in problem banks and light constraints on refinancing. These measures have already yielded a number of results worthy of closer inspection.

The key change in the financial sector has been the devaluation of the national currency. Even though it dropped to around UAH 13 per USD 1 by mid-April, triggering some apocalyptic forecasts, it regained, with equal ease, some ground by going back up to UAH 11.5/USD and has every chance of advancing even more. Most important, these fluctuations took place against the backdrop of record-high balances on banks' correspondent and transit accounts: UAH 29-34bn throughout nearly all of April as compared to UAH 25.3bn in the past year. In other words, financial institutions, which once were the chief currency speculators and now have excess liquidity, are not directing it to the currency market. And this is the first step towards restoring the crediting of the economy. In fact, the result came quickly. Loan interest rates spiked in February but went down in March (**see Inflation up, interest rates down**) and kept falling in April.

It is too early to say that the financial sector, primarily banks, is ready to pour money into the economy rather than milk it as was the case in the past years. The withdrawal of deposits is still continuing. Deposits in Ukrainian banks were at UAH 380bn and US \$26.5bn by the end of

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
March, having shed 10.1 and 14.0%, respectively, over the first quarter. This made banks reduce lending volumes. However, due to large-scale refinancing (the National Bank provided a total of UAH 24.2bn in refinancing for periods from one week to six months), this trend was essentially set off in March. By the end of April, the loan portfolio may grow. The devaluation of hryvnia, which brought the exchange rate closer to the market figure, also opened the door to Ukraine, particularly to its financial sectors, for foreign investors. They are so far waiting for a signal in the form of loans to the Ukrainian government from the IMF and other large international organizations and foreign governments, but as soon as they arrive, money will be poured into Ukraine's banking sector at a higher rate, interest rates will go down even more and the economy will receive a reliable and relatively cheap resource for growth.

Ukraine's state budget has also benefited from the hryvnia's devaluation. Initially facing huge problems with filling it, the government reported having some UAH 88.7bn (up by 5.8% year-on-year) in receipts for the first quarter. However, even the spending cuts undertaken by the newly appointed Cabinet are not enough to reduce the budget deficit to a minimum. Therefore, the government has resorted to the tried and tested option – sale of internal government bonds to the National Bank. In less than two months, the NBU purchased more than UAH 10bn worth of bonds, while foreign entities spent an additional UAH 2bn. In 2013, the NBU bought bonds worth a total of UAH 42bn. This approach will be effective if used only as a temporary measure. As soon as foreign money enters Ukraine, there will be no need to continue with it and additional inflationary pressure will be avoided.

The only players who lost, rather than gained, from the hryvnia's devaluation are, as is often the case in such situations, ordinary citizens. Initially, their income rose by 35-50% under Viktor Yanukovich with the economy staying almost flat, thus creating an illusion of a somewhat

Inflation up, interest rates down

The devaluation of hryvnia drove up the inflation rate, while at the same time opening the way for foreign capital. Interest rates initially shot up due to a bank run and then began to gradually go down



Source: State Statistics Committee

richer life. Now the economic system has restored justice as the income level remains unchanged, while the prices of imported products have skyrocketed. (For example, petrol is 44% more expensive than it was in early 2014.). The prices of domestic products are steadily growing, too, and will soon compensate for the devaluation. People feel hurt, and Yanukovich, acting like a buffoon in Russia, has even found evidence to accuse the new government of unprofessionalism. But here is a strange thing. How could Ukrainians, whose nominal salaries and pensions grew, while the prices remained almost the

IF UKRAINIANS KEEP THE GOVERNMENT ON ITS TOES, THEIR HOPES MAY COME TRUE THIS TIME AROUND

same, rise and carry out a revolution? And what for? For the sake of a lower purchasing power of their own income which resulted from this? This is the crux of the matter – the nominally increasing income level was coupled with severe curtailment of personal freedoms and opportunities for growth. So ordinary Ukrainians essentially swapped rotting in prosperity for an opportunity to grow and actually have a life but suffer from hardships for a while. This step is worthy of respect; it offers hope and negates the drawbacks of revolutionary time.

REASSURING RESULT

On balance, we have a fairly complicated but in no way hopeless situation. On the one hand, Russia's actions and the need to destroy the old shadow schemes are aggravating the crisis in the real sector and pushing producers to seek new markets. On the other hand, Ukraine is drawing close to macro-economic stabilization as it expects to receive significant financial and trade support from the developed countries and international organizations. Most of this money will go towards refinancing old debts and will simply buy time for the government. Sweeping economic reform will take a year or two to implement. If it succeeds, foreign capital will start flowing, because it is hard to put it to good use elsewhere in the world, considering record-high prices on the financial markets. In that case, the GDP drop-off may turn out to be much smaller than is currently projected by the government. If, however, the Ukrainian oligarchic monster of the past gets the upper hand and the reform is a debacle, the consequences will be ruinous for many years to come. As long as the government is taking the right steps and is ready for drastic changes and a shift away from the state's paternalism, which has never been a fitting paradigm for Ukraine's politico-economic system throughout the independence period, there is hope. For this hope to turn into achievements, all Ukrainians will have to work hard and relentlessly keep tabs on politicians. ■

The World According to Putin

Why should the Russian president's innovative attitude towards borders be restricted to Eastern Europe?

When Vladimir Putin justified his annexation of Crimea on the ground that he owed protection to Russian speakers everywhere, this newspaper took a dim view of his line of argument, pointing out that since linguistic borders do not match those of states, it would lead to chaos. We now recognise that this approach to international relations betrayed a deplorable conservatism. Since we pride ourselves on pushing the boundaries in search of a way to clamber out of the box and reach the summit of blue-sky thinking, we reckoned we should grasp the nettle of radical Putinism and run with it. We have, therefore, redrawn the world's boundaries

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according to Mr. Putin's principles. We think readers will agree that the resulting map has considerable appeal.

Under Mr. Putin's dispensation, things look up for the old colonial powers. Portugal gets to reclaim Brazil, Spain most of the rest of Central and South America and France most of west Africa, which would probably be fine by the locals, since many of their current governments are not much cop. A mighty Scandinavian kingdom comes into being—including Finland, although Finnish is very different from the Scandinavian tongues. Since Swedish is Finland's second language, the Vikings would have strong grounds for bringing about the sort of peaceful merger

based on shared cultural values for which they are famous.


A unified Arabia would stretch from the Atlantic to the Indian Ocean. There might be the odd squabble between Sunnis, Shias, Christians and adherents of archaic notions of nation; but united by a common tongue, the Arabs would be sure to get along fine, especially if they teamed up to smite the Persian-speakers on the other side of the Gulf. The two Koreas would become one, which might be a good thing—or not, depending on which system prevailed.

Since Hindi and Urdu are both a mutually intelligible mixture of Sanskrit and Persian, India could make a claim for Pakistan—and vice versa. The existence of nuclear weapons on either side would bring added spark to the debate over linguistic precedence.

Best of all, Britain would regain its empire, including—since it spoke English first—the United States. It would, obviously, give Barack Obama a prestigious position—Keeper of the Woolsack, say—and a nice uniform. Britain might, however, have to surrender some of London's oligarch-dominated streets, as well as Chelsea Football Club, to Russia. A sizeable minority of *The Economist's* staff also speaks Russian and would like to claim Mr. Putin's protection in advance of the next pay negotiations.

There is, however a hitch. Consolidation would be undermined by linguistic independence movements. Dozens of segments would peel away from Mandarin-speaking China. Mayaland would agitate for autonomy in Central America. Swahililand would demand independence in Africa. The world's 7 billion people speak more than 7,000 languages; in Russia alone there are more than 100. Perhaps, on second thoughts, Mr. Putin should quit while he is ahead. ■

Brave new world



Restraining Putin, not Russians

Western strategy is to try to focus especially on Putin himself and his entourage without arousing the blanket hostility and fear of ordinary Russians

Author:
Michael
Binyon

The deepening crisis in Ukraine is swiftly opening up a new gulf between Russia and the West. NATO is urgently reassessing its capabilities, reviving old arrangements for collective security and mounting large exercises in Eastern Europe. Sanctions have already been imposed on a range of Russian economic and political targets and more are being prepared. Western investment in Russia has stalled. Cultural, political and official contacts have been sharply cut back. And Western leaders are talking about years of strained relations with Moscow. Is the world embarking on a new Cold War?

HANGOVER AFTER CRIMEA

Russia today is particularly vulnerable to further Western sanctions. Its economy is slowing down, falling to lower growth rates than seen for more than a decade. It is more dependent now on exports of energy than during Soviet times, with these accounting for more than 70% of Russia's income. And Russia's economy is far more intertwined with global trade than it was 30 years ago. Any loss of international confidence in Russia would lead to a massive withdrawal of funds: already investors have dumped USD 70bn in Russian assets. Further withdrawal of investment and any moves to reduce Western dependence on Russian gas and oil could push the Russian economy into recession very quickly.

Already there has been a headlong retreat from the Russian market. Renault, the French car maker, has frozen plans to produce vans with ZIL, the Russian truck manufacturer as the weakening rouble has dampened consumer confidence. Japanese banks have withdrawn from deals and suspended credit lines, with two of the biggest

– Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation and Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ – stepping back from Russia. Western government credit lines to firms wishing to export to Russia will become harder to obtain. And recently two members of the US Senate said it was time to target industries critical to Russia's economy.

All this underlines the most important change that has occurred in the past two months: Western governments no longer see Russia as a global partner, and now regard it as a hostile power. Of course there is

no longer the sharp ideological confrontation between Soviet communism and Western capitalism. But in many other ways elements of the long confrontation between Moscow and the West have returned. Firstly, the Kremlin, and especially President Putin, regards East-West relations as a zero-sum game, and is therefore determined to deny any political or strategic advantage to the West, believing this will inevitably be at Moscow's expense. Secondly, the harsh authoritarian nature of Putin's rule and his intolerance of dissent, especially by



non-governmental organisations, begin to resemble the totalitarian atmosphere of Soviet communism. Thirdly, Russian nationalism is re-asserting itself in aggressive ways, especially in Moscow's dealings with smaller neighbouring countries. Fourthly, Russian espionage, both military and economic, against the West is as active as it was in Soviet days. And finally, although Russia has rejected militant atheism and again given the Church a powerful role in society, it is clear from both the Kremlin and from the pulpits of the Orthodox Church that Russia has deliberately rejected what it sees as "decadent" Western values (see p. 42). Indeed, senior Russian clergy taking part in Western conferences regularly denounce the European 18th century enlightenment, which is still the basic of secular values and society in Western Europe and America.

THE SOFT IRON CURTAIN

The West is therefore turning back to two key strategies it used to deal with the Soviet Union: suspicion and containment. The first results in a general assumption in Western

capitals that Putin is not to be trusted and is now actively working against Western interests – not only in Europe but in other key areas such as the Middle East. This is the underlying reason why NATO has rediscovered its original purpose: to prepare its members to act collectively in the face of present or future threats.

PUTIN RISKS STRONG DOMESTIC OPPOSITION IF THE RUSSIAN ECONOMY PLUNGES INTO RECESSION, IF WESTERN NATIONS MAKE IT HARDER FOR RUSSIAN TOURISTS TO GET VISAS OR IF RUSSIAN BUSINESSMEN ARE NO LONGER WELCOME IN THE WEST

This Western suspicion goes back a long way: even in tsarist times Britain saw Russia as its main rival, especially in Asia, when both governments were competing for influence in Afghanistan and central Asia. The French diplomat Talleyrand once said something to the effect that the problem with Russia is that it is both too strong and too weak at the same time. Recent events seem to show this is still true.

The policy of containment was first devised by the American statesmen George Kennan to deal with Stalin's expansionist policies immediately after the Second World War. In many ways containment is easier now. Stalin was not dependent on global trade, had many more allies and ideological supporters around the world and did not have to worry about public opinion at home. He could take global risks in confronting the West without risking domestic unpopularity. But although Putin can count on strong support from Russian nationalists at home for his policies over Ukraine, he risks strong domestic opposition if the Russian economy plunges into recession, if Western nations make it harder for Russian tourists to get visas or if Russian businessmen, oligarchs and cultural figures are no longer welcome in London, New York or Paris.

Military containment will also play a role – though here it may be harder to rally Western opinion

than it was 70 years ago. The West, and especially America, have become war-weary, disillusioned with intervention overseas and unwilling to spend more of their national budgets on defence. The main countries in Western Europe do not feel directly threatened by Moscow as they did during the Cold War. Newer NATO members in Eastern Europe will certainly want NATO to demonstrate a robust defiance of Russia and will be pressing for more military manoeuvres and exercises close to the Russian borders. But no one expects a full NATO mobilisation. Even Russian military intervention in Ukraine is unlikely to provoke an armed NATO response.

Although some hawks in the United States are actively encouraging a return to a harsh confrontation with Russia, few people in Europe relish a return to the Cold War. There are hundreds of thousands of Russians living and working in Western capitals – more than 150,000 in London alone – and many millions more tourists spend large sums while on visits to the West. For the past two decades Western governments have been encouraging more cultural and people-to-people contacts: school visits, language exchanges, visits of musicians, artists and educationists. The British Council, Britain's main international cultural organisation, has just launched a year of Russia-Britain culture and is deeply reluctant to curtail its programme because of worsening political relations.

Western strategy, therefore, is to try to focus especially on Putin himself and his senior advisers, who are seen as the main drivers of Russia's aggressive new nationalism. The aim of all measures is to increase political and economic pressure on Putin's entourage without arousing the blanket hostility and fear of ordinary Russians – who have long memories of European invasions and Western military superiority. The West will therefore keep talking to Moscow as much as it can, using Sergei Lavrov as an intermediary. Even during the dying days of the Cold War, Soviet and American leaders kept their communications open. If there is to be a return to that chilly atmosphere, the West is determined that this will not mean a new Iron Curtain separating Russians from the rest of the world. ■

The most important change that has occurred in the past two months: Western governments no longer see Russia as a global partner



PHOTO: AP

Jukka Rislakki:

"It may be more difficult to lie about Ukraine compared to the Baltic States"

Jukka Rislakki is a Finnish-born journalist who now lives in Latvia. The fall of 1988 was the first time he came to Latvia, at the center of Europe. "I knew little about Latvia then, except that it was situated between Estonia and Lithuania, that its capital was Riga, and that many of its words ended oddly with the letter 's'," he writes in his book *The Case for Latvia. Disinformation Campaigns Against a Small Nation*. The book offers answers to the most widespread myths used in propaganda against Latvia, some of them strikingly similar to those Russia applies in its anti-Ukrainian informational war. **The Ukrainian Week** talks to Jukka Rislakki about the image of the Baltic States in Russian propaganda, the internal divide it fuels in Latvia, and ways for a small nation to resist it.

UW: What myths has the Russian propaganda created about the Baltic States, and Latvia in particular, in Latvia and abroad? Do they have anything in common with what we hear about Ukraine today?

Indeed, there are many. One is that the Baltic States were not occupied but joined the Soviet Union voluntarily. Another one I mentioned in my book is that Latvians are violent people who killed all Jews in their country before the Germans came and during the war. A myth that is particularly spread in the West is that the Russian minority is oppressed, has no human or political rights, and cannot choose its language. However, Russian is the language that can be used – and is being used – everywhere in Latvia.

Those Russians and others that have no Latvian citizenship cannot vote in elections, but getting Latvian citizenship is not difficult: one

**Interviewed
by Anna
Korbut**

just has to learn a little of the official language.


As the official language requirements, they vary based on the job one has. Someone who wants to work in the service sphere, for instance, has to speak Latvian fairly well. Those who want Latvian citizenship have to know the elementary, everyday language. I took that language test in Estonia and it didn't seem too difficult. I'm a Finn and our languages have many similarities, but I passed that test and almost every Russian in my group did.

UW: Is the language something that fuels a divide in society? How strong is it now, if any?

Inside the country, there is a big problem with that. We have big minorities – 27% are ethnic Russians. Almost 40% are Russian-speakers. They essentially use only Russian information, watching Russian or Russian-language TV channels which often spread misleading information about Latvia and the world in general. If they read anything, it is Russian newspapers.

These people include different generations. Some are part of the old Russian, Jewish or Tatar communities – and they are better integrated. Others Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians sent to Latvia by the Soviet authorities. The third group includes nouveau riches from St. Petersburg and Moscow. They are buying real estate in Latvia and getting residence permits. They, too, are not very friendly, nor do they understand Latvia well.

Latvian government speaks much of their integration into society, however it has not had much success to that end. Almost 300,000



in the small country are non-citizens, and many are Russian citizens. Many still don't speak Latvian although they have lived in Latvia for a long time. What bothers me is that even many schoolchildren who speak Latvian fairly well feel closer to Russia than Latvia. They say that they are not Latvian patriots.

UW: When you think about Ukraine, many say that the language problem would be hard to manipulate so much if Ukraine were better-off economically, and Russian-speakers would feel more loyal to it. Is that an issue in Latvia?

The Russians keep saying that they could feel closer to Latvia if they had a good government there. If Latvia were richer and not such a "failed state" as Russia puts it, they would feel more comfortable in it. Plus, the biggest party in Latvia is a Russian one. It says that we should forget history and language, and other things we disagree on, but focus on the economy and the future. But what will Latvia have left if we forget history and language?



Russian speakers mainly live in big cities and in Eastern Latvia. They are not farmers. Many are in businesses. The biggest ones that are doing well are real estate and banking. They are very dependent on Russia and Russians.

UW: In your book, you wrote "Europe will not understand us", quoting a line from a popular song played on Latvian radio in 2004. Ukrainians had the same feeling when the Maidan started and the Western media mostly wrote about radicals and right forces while missing the actual point of that protest. Is that line still accurate, after Russia's blatantly misleading propaganda in the West and the Maidan that urged many Western journalists to come to Ukraine and see the situation on the ground? Could this be a chance for the Baltic States to uncover Russia's propaganda about them, too, on this wave of attention to post-Soviet countries and realization that Russia often lies?

It may be more difficult to lie about Ukraine compared to the Baltic States. They were completely unknown, people were not too interested in them and all kinds of lies were spread about them. Now, the world's attention is focused on Ukraine. Many good journalists travel here. Now, the world also understands the Russian propaganda better.

The Finnish press, for instance, is doing a very good job of covering everything in Ukraine. They are getting better at understanding Russian propaganda. One of the problems is that many Western journalists don't know history, so they are unprepared to write about countries like ours.

In fact, Russia is constantly waging an information and psychological war. It has been that way in the Baltic States for a long time, now it has reached Ukraine. Someone here asked me whether Ukraine should also use lies and propaganda to counter Russia's. As a journalist, I still prefer truth. It will make its way some day. Even the Bible says, "You will know the truth and the truth will set you free". However, I'm rather pessimistic about opposing Russian propaganda machine which has so much money and people. In the Baltic States, some Russian TV channels have been closed down temporarily. The authorities are planning to es-

BIO


Jukka Rislakki is a Finnish journalist and non-fiction writer focusing on history, intelligence and pop culture. He studied political science at the University of Helsinki and reported for Helsingin Sanomat, the biggest newspaper in Finland, covering the Baltic States. In 2007, his book *The Case for Latvia: Disinformation Campaigns Against a Small Nation* was published in Finnish, then translated into English in 2008. In 2009, he was awarded the Latvian Cross of Recognition for selfless promotion of the Latvian image abroad and national patriotic education of youth. His latest book *Vorkuta!* focuses on the 1953 uprising in the Vorkuta GULAG. It will be published in Ukrainian soon.

establish a new objective TV channel in the Russian language. It would be a joint project of the Baltic States to share the cost. When the Russian channels were closed, Russia immediately said this was a violation of the freedom of speech. Inside Latvia, people who used to watch it were angry about it since that's their trusted source of information – and that makes me sad. The reason for the closing was gross distortion of Baltic history and Ukrainian crisis.

UW: What can a country do to improve its image abroad, especially if it's a small one? And what is Latvian government doing to improve the image of its country?

One way is through successful brands. For instance, I have lived in Estonia and Latvia. At some point, both countries were looking for their own Nokia, the local successful brand. It would be a good idea for the Baltic States to find one. Some say that culture could be Latvia's Nokia. I agree. The country has famous orchestras, conductors and opera soloists. This year, Riga is the cultural capital of Europe. It has already attracted many people, mostly from Eastern Europe and Nordic countries. And these tourists don't just come to Latvia for a drink: they try to understand the local history, architecture and culture. Russian tourists mostly come to Jūrmala which they remember from before, while Western Europeans prefer Riga. Another option for Latvia could be clean nature and food products.

When I think of a country – a post-Soviet one – that has managed to improve its image abroad, Estonia comes to my mind. It has gained a reputation of a small young democracy, an IT wonderland with young, fresh and honest politicians. Poland is another one. It must hurt the Russian elite to see a neighbour that is a democracy and has done so well in the EU and NATO. ■



No Home for Us Here: The Mass Annihilation of the Finnish Border-Hoppers in the Urals in 1938 (by Jukka Rislakki and Eila Lahti-Argutina)



The Case for Latvia. Disinformation Campaigns Against a Small Nation: Fourteen Hard Questions and Straight Answers about a Baltic Country

The Myth of Russian-Speaking Regions

If Russian becomes the second state language or even acquires official status in part of Ukraine's territory, this will aggravate the discrimination of the Ukrainian-speaking majority and will ease the Kremlin's expansion

Author:
Oleksandr
Kramar

On 11 April, in the course of his visit to Donetsk, Prime Minister Arseniy Yatseniuk declared that a referendum could be held about the status of Russian. Negotiations are continuing between members of the parliamentary majority and Party of Regions MPs about granting Russian official status in a number of oblasts. On 23 April, Donetsk Oblast Governor Serhiy Taruta again called for a referendum on this issue at a regional meeting.

The most recent opinion polls show that 59.5% of voters would support Ukrainian as the only state language. However, it will all depend on how the question will be phrased. And if the referendum is held, it will almost certainly reveal a divide between regions. The Rating sociological group survey carried out from September 26 to October 6, 2013, showed that supporters of bilingualism accounted for 85% in the Donbas, 69% in Southern Ukraine (including Crimea) and 57% in Eastern Ukraine (Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv oblasts). Understandably, differences of opinion in various regions would be perceived today as another reason to step up separatist activities.

At the same time, granting official status to Russian outside Donetsk Oblast is an unacceptable step that would lead to the discrimination of the Ukrainian-speaking population living in a bigger part of Kharkiv, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia, Kherson, Mykolaiv and Odesa oblasts.

WHY UKRAINE WILL NEVER BE BELGIUM, SWITZERLAND OR CANADA

Proponents of having two state languages or granting Russian official status in a number of oblasts usually point to Belgium, Canada and Switzerland as some of the countries whose experience Ukraine would need to emulate. By doing so, they gloss over, either ignorantly or deliberately, things that make the experience of these countries totally unacceptable to Ukraine. And these are not limited to the fact that Belgium and Canada have been teetering on the verge of a breakup for a long time now. The primary reason is that the concept of a "Russian-speaking region" in Ukraine is a myth, a fiction, a figment of imperial imagination.

A good place to start is Slobooda Ukraine (Slobozhanshchyna), especially its parts in such southeastern oblasts as Kharkiv and Luhansk.

In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian-speaking citizens predominate in just 9% of its territory – a relatively continuous area that includes Kharkiv, Chuhuiv, Chuhuiv County and a larger part of urban region around Kharkiv. However, the population of this compact territory (less than 3,000 sq km) is 1.71mn (62.5% of the oblast's total population), which is why the entire oblast is generally counted among Russian-speaking regions. This is despite the fact that the rest of Kharkiv Oblast (28,500 sq km, or 90%) with the population of over one million (which is similar to the number of people living in the


majority of central and western oblasts) speaks predominantly Ukrainian as the native language – over 80% (69–95% in individual counties).

A similar situation is in northern parts of Luhansk Oblast. Nine of its counties, which account for more than half of its territory (13,440 sq km, more than the area of Zakarpattia or Chernivtsi oblasts), also mostly speak Ukrainian – 80% overall and from 74 to 94% in individual counties. However, this large area does not have any significant effect on the entire oblast in terms of the population as it has 307,000 residents, or a mere 13% of the total.

The same is true of the southern oblasts, which Vladimir Putin has taken the habit of calling nothing else but "Novorossiya where our population lives" to suggest that these people found themselves in Ukraine by accident (**see p. 19**). For example, people living in nearly three-quarters of Zaporizhia Oblast speak mostly Ukrainian – over 80%, with individual counties ranging from 67 to 94%, according to the 2001 census data. However, the population of this area (537,000 as of 1 March 2014) is just 30% of the oblast's total, while nearly two-thirds (1.1mn) live in almost completely Russian-speaking cities (Zaporizhia, Melitopol, Berdiansk and Enerhodar) that account for 1.4% of the oblast's territory. This creates an illusion that the oblast is Russian-speaking. A quarter of its territory is taken up by Russian-speaking counties near the Sea of Azov, but a significant proportion

Myth about Russian-speaking southeastern Ukraine

The linguistic landscape of southern and eastern regions reveals that they are not as Russian-speaking as they are sometimes painted. Outside of Donetsk Oblast and southern Luhansk Oblast, as well as the counties near the Sea of Azov in Zaporizhia Oblast, Russian speakers dominate only in large cities and some medium-sized cities



of their residents are also Ukrainian-speaking.

This kind of linguistic landscape is also found in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast: the proportion of Ukrainian speakers exceeds 80%, sometimes reaching 90-95%, in each of its counties, while the Russian-speaking population is concentrated (and predominates) in a handful of large and medium-size cities. They are home to a majority of the oblast's population but account for a mere 3% of its territory and are scattered like dots across the map of the region.

In Odesa Oblast, more than half of its residents (1.23mn out of 2.4mn) live in Odesa and four portside cities (Yuzhne, Illichivsk, Izmail and Bilhorod-Dnistrovsky) where the Russian-speaking population is in the absolute majority. But, again, these cities together occupy just 2% of the total area. The linguistic situation elsewhere in the oblast is different: Ukrainian prevails in northern and central counties; Ukrainian, Russian, Bulgarian and Moldovan coexist in settlements along the Danube.

In Mykolaiv Oblast, the central city is, again, most populous (42.5% of the region's population) and mostly Russian-speaking, which leads some people to put the entire oblast in the category of "Russian-speaking". However, the proportion of Ukrainian speakers in all the counties outside Mykolaiv is 80-97%. In Kherson Oblast, predominantly Russian-speaking Kherson, Nova Kakhovka and Henichesk County occupy a mere 12% of the oblast's area but account for 42% of its population. This fosters a perception that the entire oblast is Russian-speaking, even though 80-95% of the residents in 88% of its territory speak Ukrainian.

Thus, there is no reason to label territories outside of Donetsk Oblast and parts of Luhansk and Zaporizhia oblasts as Russian-speaking. The rest of southern and eastern oblasts only have a dozen or so medium and large Russian-speaking cities. Those who have travelled to these regions know that it is not a matter of declaration: Ukrainian (with some Russian inclusions in

According to a survey carried out by the Rating Sociological Group in 26 September to 6 October 2013, official bilingualism was supported by

85%
of the respondents in the Donbas,

69%
in southern Ukraine (including the Crimea) and

57%
in Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhia and Kharkiv oblasts

speech) indeed predominates there outside large cities and urban zones. Most of this territory is populated by Ukrainian-speaking people who, if the functions of Russian are preserved or, even worse, expanded, will be doomed to discrimination and essentially forced Russification.

The paradox is that, according to a recent KMIS survey, the majority of those who believe that the rights of Russian-speaking citizens are violated in Ukraine live precisely in those oblasts where the Ukrainian-speaking population has been discriminated and Russification has continued throughout the independence period: 40% in Donetsk Oblast, 30% in Luhansk Oblast, 25% in Kharkiv Oblast and 20% in Odesa Oblast. This is not just a result of many years of Russian propaganda – these people want not so much more room for Russian as no room for Ukrainian in all spheres of life, at least in their regions. This is in line with what Mykola Levchenko, the current leader of the Party of Regions in Donetsk Oblast, once said: Rus- ▶

sian should be the only state language and Ukrainian only the language of folklore. They are demanding the status of a state language (in their understanding, the only state language) for Russian precisely to achieve this goal.

WHAT THE "DEFENDERS OF RUSSIAN" ARE ACTUALLY DEFENDING

The domination of Russian in large cities of what is nearly exclusively a Ukrainian-speaking state is an obvious consequence of the colonial policy pursued by the Russian Empire and the USSR. In different proportions it can be observed across the territory that was under the Russians and Soviets for an extended period of time. (This is why cities in Galicia are an exception here.)

As a matter of historical background, cities were small in the 18th century, when active Russification was launched. In 1742, Kyiv had the population of 20,000, including 129 Russian merchants (0.7%), and it was not exceedingly difficult to increase their numbers by 5,000-10,000. Given their privileged status and targeted state support, they were able to gradually Russify the city. Cities in Left-Bank Ukraine, eastern regions and especially southern Ukraine had even smaller cities or none at all, which made the mission even easier.

In late 19th century, the already Russified cities were facing an influx of hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian-speaking


How should Ukrainian and Russian coexist in Ukraine?



Source: Survey carried out by the Sociological Service of the Razumkov Centre jointly with the Rating Sociological Group from 28 March to 2 April 2014. The results reflect the attitudes of the respondents who intend to participate in a linguistic referendum


FICTITIOUS PROBLEM

Proportion of the respondents who positively answered the question: "Have you experienced cases of discrimination?"



Source: Annual national monitoring surveys by the NANU Institute of Sociology


In your opinion, do your children (grandchildren) need to study Ukrainian?



Source: Survey by the NANU Institute of Sociology and SOCS in April 2007

A mere fraction of the population in southern and eastern regions believes that the introduction of the second state language should be the top priority for the central government

Proportion of the respondents who believe that the introduction of the second state language is a key step to be taken by the central government in order to preserve the unity of the country



Source: Survey "Thoughts and opinions of the population of southeastern Ukraine. April 2014" carried out by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology in 8-16 April 2014

peasants who had just been released from serfdom, so the Russian Empire had to step up its assimilation efforts and stimulate settlers from ethnic Russian gubernias to colonize Ukraine. Ukrainian was completely banned from public use and education by the Valuev Circular of 1863 and the Ems Ukase of 1876. At the same time, unskilled Russian workers came in thousands to the newly created coalmines and plants in the industrial area along the Dnieper and in the Donbas.

In the totalitarian Soviet era, this process was drastically scaled up. Moreover, the 1920s saw the emergence of the infamous theory of the "fight between two cultures" in the Ukrainian SSR: "progressive proletarian" Russian culture and "reactionary petit bourgeois" Ukrainian culture. The totalitarian empire tried every possible way to break the neck of the latter. In 1926, there were a mere 3.2mn Russians in Soviet Ukraine (without western oblasts which were annexed later) and the Russians-to-Ukrainians ratio was 1:8.7, while in 1989, close to the breakup of the USSR, the proportion was 1:3.3. In 1959-65, some three million people (almost exclusively Russians) migrated to Ukraine from other parts of the Soviet Union. These were mostly young people who had children when they were already in Ukraine and some were married to ethnic Ukrainians, so the multiplication effect and

mixed marriages played a crucial part in the process.

In a situation when most schools in oblast centres and other large cities, even in Central Ukraine, were forced to switch to Russian as the language of instruction and when it totally dominated in the public sphere and mass culture, all these people of mixed Ukrainian-Russian origin became Russian-speaking. And then urbanization and suburbanization forced Ukrainian-speaking people to adopt Russian as the language of communication in a seemingly "natural" way. Their rapidly increasing numbers in cities did not Ukrainianize the latter, because as soon as they stepped outside of their homes, Ukrainian speakers would immediately switch to Russian, which was already predominant there. For example, opinion surveys among the residents of the capital and most other large cities continue to show, even now, the huge gap between the numbers of those who speak Ukrainian at home and those who use it at work and in public.

In public communication, Russian is still being used by default. Here is a situation familiar to most Ukrainians: when they first call a mobile network operator, enter a store or an eatery in Kyiv or any oblast centre in Southern, Eastern or even Central Ukraine, they usually hear something like "Such and such company is happy to welcome you..." – in Russian. Only if the

client insists – and even then not always – the operator or the staff will make a concession and switch to Ukrainian, which is, in fact, the only official language. This is, of course, if a native speaker of Ukrainian does not switch to Russian for reasons of tolerance or some other motives, as is often the case.

As a result, a public linguistic environment is formed in which the Russian is overrepresented as compared to how many people use it in the family circle. The Institute of Social and Political Psychology carried out a survey in August 2006, just before Viktor Yanukovich took over the government and Dmytro Tabachnyk the education sector, and found that 45% of Ukrainians believed that Ukrainian required state protection and 25% thought the same about Russian.

Sociological surveys clearly show that Ukrainian is much less frequently used in public than in the family, which is a direct result and compelling evidence of its continued discrimination in the public sphere. It shows especially when different regions and types of settlements are contrasted. For example, according to a survey


conducted by the NANU Institute of Sociology and SOCIS in April 2007, 57% of citizens speak Ukrainian at home and 54% in public. The corresponding figures are 78 and 74% in the central regions and 41 and 34% in the southern and eastern oblasts (except Crimea and the Donbas). In Kyiv, 44% of the people speak Ukrainian (or surzhyk, a mixture of Ukrainian and Russian) at home and a mere 35% in public; in other cities with the population over 250,000, the figures are 38% and 33%, respectively. This includes county capitals in Western Ukraine without which the gap would be much bigger. Tellingly, in Crimea and the Donbas, where Ukrainian speakers experience the worst discrimination, there was a drop-off, relative to other regions, in the proportion of those who “speak primarily Russian but sometimes Ukrainian” in public (see Consequences of centuries of discrimination).

The Institute of Social and Political Psychology has studied why students avoid actively using Ukrainian and found the following: 1) unwillingness to stand out from the crowd and a lack of prestige associated with Ukrai-

Protection of Russian? No, destruction of Ukrainian

The proportion of citizens that complain that the rights of the Russian-speaking population are violated is the highest in the regions where Ukrainian, not Russian, has the least opportunities to develop. What these people want is not so much to expand the use of Russian as completely destroy Ukrainian, at least in these regions

Proportion of the respondents who believe that the rights of Russian-speaking citizens are violated in Ukraine




nian; 2) psychological and ideological stubbornness, i.e., ideological preferences and resistance to pressure; 3) a lack of a Ukrainian-speaking environment and the need to speak Ukrainian (“everyone understands Russian anyway”). This hierarchy of factors was especially prominent in central regions. Remarkably, Russian-speaking students, especially in southern and eastern regions, proved to be more stubborn in their unwillingness to switch when addressed in Ukrainian than Ukrainian-speaking youths, of whom 90% would switch to Russian if it was first used by their interlocutor.

In the course of generation shift, a large part of those who spoke Ukrainian with their parents and Russian in college or at work gradually abandon Ukrainian altogether when they grow up. Launched in this way, the process of Russification may appear to be objective to an outside observer. This mechanism, when it gains full momentum, erodes Ukrainians as a nation, at least in a large part of the state's territory. This is what “fighters against forced Ukrainization” are, in fact, fighting for. Consciously or unconsciously, all supporters of the “rights of the Russian language” in the post-colonial Ukraine are lobbying for the Russian World which is based on idea that the Kremlin has a legitimate claim to lands where Russian is used or dominates. ■

Consequences of centuries of discrimination

Discrimination of Ukraine in the public sphere has greatly reduced its use in public communication in comparison to family interaction



Source: Survey carried out by the NANU Institute of Sociology and SOCIS in April 2007

In Mykolaiv Oblast, the central city is the most populous (42.5% of the region's population) and mostly Russian-speaking, which prompts its categorization as mostly Russian-speaking. However, the proportion of Ukrainian speakers in all the Counties outside Mykolaiv is

80-97%

In Kharkiv Oblast, Russian-speaking citizens predominate in just **9%** of the territory

A Dangerous Compromise

If Ukraine's top officials are unable to adequately assess the fatal outcome of their efforts in compromise seeking with Russia for Ukraine, they have no right to head the country. If they do realize the danger of the linguistic concession they are about to make, they should be treated as actors in the Russian cultural and language expansion in Ukraine who intentionally undermine its constitutional order and national statehood

Author:
Volodymyr
Vasylenko

Russia's persistent yet ungrounded demands to make Russian the second state language in Ukraine continue to accompany its military aggression here. Moreover, Russian leadership has attempted to get Western countries involved in making Ukraine cede to these demands.

In negotiations with the US Secretary of State John Kerry in early March 2014, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov offered a plan to regulate the Ukraine-Russian conflict that would be ruinous for Ukraine's

unity and statehood if implemented. The demand to recognize Russian as the second state language in Ukraine was one of its points. Later, Lavrov's plan was outlined in the March 17 statement by the Russian Foreign Ministry proposing to set up an international "support group" to mediate in the crisis. Among other things, the statement said that "Russian will be granted the status of the second state language alongside Ukrainian while other languages will have the status envisaged by the European Convention for Regional Languages".

Western states refused to get involved in the anti-Ukrainian game imposed on them by Russia. Then, the leaders of Russian-instructed and armed separatist groups in Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts, echoed by their inspirers and ideological proponents from the ranks of the Communist Party and the Party of Regions, set about articulating Russia's demand.

Subsequently, Ukraine's leadership claimed ready to meet Russia's illegitimate demands halfway. In a joint statement from April 18, 2014, Acting President Oleksandr Turchynov and Pre-



mier Arseniy Yatseniuk announced that “oblast, city and county councils will be empowered to decide on granting an official status to Russian or other languages spoken by the majority in the given area alongside Ukrainian as the state language in order to accomplish peace and understanding”. “This statement was dictated by the agreement reached at the Geneva meeting between Ukraine, US, Europe and Russia,” Yatseniuk noted. When analyzed closely, however, the document entitled the Joint Geneva Statement on Ukraine from April 17, 2014, adopted by the parties to the Geneva meeting outlines only the initial steps to deescalate tensions, pointing only at the need to implement the constitutional process in Ukraine transparently, accountably, and based on a wide national dialogue that involves representatives of all regions and political forces and accounts for opinions and amendments offered by the community. The document does not hint at, or mention any concrete provisions of the future Constitution of Ukraine, including those concerning the status and the use of languages.

Why, then, do Ukraine’s leaders refer to the Geneva agreements to justify their approach to the language issue? Are they thus trying to make their stance look more

convincing, even if it is a strategic concession to Russia, runs counter to the Constitution and undermines Ukraine’s political unity and statehood?

Article 10 of the Constitution of Ukraine defines Ukrainian as the only state language. No other languages have any state or official statuses in Ukraine under the Constitution or Ukrainian laws. The terms “official language” and “state language” are identical. It is for this reason that European constitutions use one of the terms, but never both in one law.

WHY MULTILINGUALISM IS NOT AN OPTION

The constitutions of Switzerland, Ireland or Malta have the term “national language” alongside their “official language” to refer to one or more languages of their indigenous titular nations. The Constitution and laws of Finland only have the term “national language” which can be interpreted as the official (state) language.

The constitutions of states like Serbia and Croatia have “the language of official use”. Constitutions of some other countries say that the language of the state is the language of the titular nation without qualifying it as official or state language. One example is Article 2 of the French Constitution: “The language of the Republic is French”.

Another is Article 3 of the Constitution of Turkey which defines Turkish as the language of the state.

Constitutions of some countries do not mention the status of their language. These include uni-

THE INTRODUCTION OF RUSSIAN AS THE STATE LANGUAGE WILL CAUSE THE DECLINE OF UKRAINIAN AND GRADUALLY OUST IT FROM ALL PUBLIC SPHERES

tary monarchies, such as Denmark, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK, the latter having no written Constitution. The population in these countries is mostly comprised of one nation and the use of its language – Danish, Dutch, Norwegian, Swedish and English respectively as their official (state) language is a tradition that goes deep in history and is an obvious fact.

The authentic versions (English and French) of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages and the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities use the term “official language” to define the state language. Ruling No10-п/99 of the Constitutional Court of Ukraine dated December

SHOW-OFF PATRIOTS Most Ukrainian politicians see Ukrainian identity concept as something limited to exterior ethnographic symbols



PHOTO: VHAH



14, 1999, concerning the interpretation of Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution (The state language of Ukraine is Ukrainian – **Ed.**) also deems the “state” and “official” language as identical. Item 3 of the Ruling rationale says that “The state (official) language shall mean the language provided with the legal status of a mandatory means of communication in public spheres by the state”.

Thus, making Russian or other languages official ones as suggested by Ukraine’s Acting President Turchynov and Premier Yatseniuk will be equal in status to making them state languages. This runs counter to Article 10 of the Ukrainian Constitution. So does their intention to allow oblast, city and county councils decide on the status and use of languages locally, since under Article 92.4 of the Ukrainian Constitution it is the legislation exclusively that regulates that.

The stance of Ukrainian legislators obviously deviates from the practice of most European states whose Constitutions and laws entail the functioning of just one official (state) language in the state. Linguistic situations in countries with multiple official languages, such as Switzerland, Belgium and Finland where two or more state (official) languages are allowed, are completely different from the situation in Ukraine.

The Constitutional Court’s Ruling No10 stresses out that the provision on Ukrainian as the only state language in Ukraine is in Section 1 of the Constitution, the General Provisions. This section fixes the basics of the constitutional order in Ukraine. Therefore, the status of the Ukrainian language as the state language is an integral component of Ukraine’s constitutional order, and an important element in the organization of regulated state governance in all spheres of public life throughout Ukraine. Respectively, Article 156 of the Constitution defines a special procedure for amending Section 1 thereof to enhance protection of Ukraine’s constitutional order from opportunistic and arbitrary political decisions.

The status of Ukrainian as the official language is the key



Russia is demanding an official status for Russian in Ukraine to fragment it into linguistically separated regions and split the country apart in the future

framework component of the constitutional order of Ukraine as a European-type national state. Therefore, any attempts to implement other languages as official ones in Ukraine violate the Constitution, thus being an attempt on the constitutional order of Ukraine as an independent, self-sufficient, democratic national state.

UKRAINIAN LANGUAGE AND STATEHOOD

Unlike the languages of national minorities, Ukrainian is an element of state building. The use of it in all spheres throughout Ukraine is aimed at ensuring efficient operation of state institutions, control over mechanisms to guarantee national security, and political unity. The status of Ukrainian as the only state language does not deny the rights of national minorities to freely use any other language in social and private life. This is envisaged by

Russians or Russian-speakers in Ukraine face no discrimination for the language they speak whatsoever, so there are no grounds for granting Russian the official status here. In fact, it is the Ukrainian majority that faces linguistic discrimination in many regions of Ukraine (**see p. 24**). This discrimination manifests itself in the scarcity of Ukrainian-language schools and colleges, media, books or songs on the radio in places where they live.

The argument about the necessary official status for Russian in Ukraine in order to accomplish peace and understanding among its citizens does not hold up either. Despite the ongoing speculation on the language issue by the Russian “fifth column” and pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians, Ukraine has never witnessed any massive civil disorders or unrest on the language ground. Sociological surveys reveal that most Ukrainians are primarily concerned about personal safety, the poor quality of health care, and weak protection of their social, economic and environmental rights, not the status of the Russian language. The introduction of Russian as the official language and ruining of the country’s constitutional order cannot improve the quality of life in Eastern Ukraine.

The real goal of Russia’s claims for granting Russian and other languages the official status in Ukraine is to create a legitimate platform for total ousting of Ukrainian from use, not to protect linguistic rights of minorities. It aims at fragmenting Ukraine into linguistically separated regions

MINORITY LANGUAGES IN UKRAINE, JUST LIKE ANY OTHER COUNTRY, ARE NOT, CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE STATE-BUILDING ELEMENTS

Article 10.3 of the Constitution of Ukraine which requires the state to guarantee unrestricted development, use and protection of minority languages. However, minority languages in Ukraine, just like any other country, are not, cannot and should not be state-building elements, therefore they should not claim an official status in the country.

and splitting the country apart in the future.

Ireland's historical experience can serve as a warning to Ukraine to that end. At one point, Irish was the official language there, spoken by the entire population. Today, 1,656,790 out of 4mn Irish believe that they can speak Irish since they have studied it in schools. Only 380,000 are fluent in it, and just 20,000 of them list it as their mother tongue – they live in small northeastern parts of the country. This is the result of the radical political changes and tragic events of the 19th century in the Irish history, after it became part of the United Kingdom in 1801 and the Irish Potato Famine of 1846-1851, the disaster that killed 1mn Irish and forced another 2mn to flee the country. The domination of English as the official language in Ireland, coupled with the decline in the numbers of Irish-speakers, ousted their national language from the public sector as well as daily life in most parts of Ireland. After it regained independence in 1921, the Irish authorities have been taking efforts to support the Irish

language, yet the striking gap between English and Irish is growing, not shrinking every year. This was caused by the fact that, when the Irish national language and cultural space was destroyed, it passed the critical point after which the country found itself with continuing domination of English in public, daily and private lives. In this situation, even formal recognition of Irish as the first official language and English as second does not help. With two state languages throughout Ireland and English dominating there, Irish will face nothing but stagnation.

Ever since Russian was introduced as a state language in Belarus in 1996 alongside Belarusian, the range of spheres where Belarusian was used has shrunk abruptly, pushing it into decline and potentially complete vanishing from the European linguistic map.

Despite massive killings of Ukrainian-speakers in Holodomors (Famines), deportations and wars, and after lengthy Russification when Ukraine was part of the tsarist and Soviet empires,

The stance of Ukrainian legislators obviously deviates from the practice of most European states whose Constitutions and laws entail the functioning of just one official (state) language in the state

the language situation in Ukraine is still far better compared to Ireland or Belarus. However, the introduction of Russian as the state language will create the ground for the critical decline of Ukrainian to the level of Irish, leading inevitably to the gradual ousting of the language from all public spheres. Ukraine will subsequently turn into the Russified territory, easy prey for the constructors of the Russian World.

Therefore, any concessions to Russia on the status of Ukrainian as the only state language generate a threat to the existence of Ukraine as an independent national state and are unacceptable.

If Ukraine's top officials are unable to adequately assess the fatal outcome of their efforts in compromise seeking with Russia for Ukraine, they have no right to head the country. If they do realize the danger of the linguistic concession they are about to make, they should be treated as actors in the Russian cultural and language expansion in Ukraine who intentionally undermine its constitutional order and national statehood. ■



UKRAINIAN FOLK PERFORMANCE

Shynok – restaurant-museum of Ukrainian life

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Ukrainization: a bogeyman or a must?

The Ukrainian government has taken insipid steps to put a Ukrainian façade on the social life in the country – a process that was dictated by the official status of a formally independent state. This triggered a Russian propaganda onslaught launched by Moscow and its creatures inside Ukraine. Opponents to an independent Ukraine started calling Kyiv's extremely weak steps "forced Ukrainization". The permanent and deafeningly loud anti-Ukrainian campaign hit the target when the top government officials, who had never shown much of patriotic enthusiasm, got scared. Ukraine's internal integration and its mental unification were first suspended and then reversed. We are now witnessing its consequences as Eastern Ukraine has fallen victim to the steamroller of Russian propaganda.

MASKED RUSSIFICATION

Couched in comprehensible terms, the claims of the fighters against "forced Ukrainization" boil down to the statement that

Author:
Ihor Losev

all the consequences of the Russification policy pursued by the Russian and Communist empires should be inviolable; Ukraine should be divided into different linguistic-cultural zones with special, officially recognized status; Russian expansion should be welcome and Ukrainian expansion deprecated. This idea is

**UKRAINIZATION IS NOT JUST
A MATTER OF LANGUAGE –
IT IS MUCH BROADER.**

**TODAY, IT MEANS TURNING
A HOMO SOVIETICUS INTO
A UKRAINIAN**


Nearly
80%
of Ukrainian citizens
are ethnic Ukrainians
and
67%
consider Ukrainian
their native language

now coupled in practice with the regions' defiance of the central government, and the project has been dubbed "federalization". A conducive circumstance here is that the bureaucratic and business elite which is now ruling in Ukraine is utterly denationalized and cynical and has never perceived Ukrainian national iden-

tity and its components as something existentially important.

Under Yanukovich, de-Ukrainization has assumed monstrous proportions as it was clearly incited by the Kremlin. The ostentatious outrage over "forced Ukrainization" concealed, in fact, the restoration of Russification, creeping to begin with and later increasingly aggressive and defiant. The protests were the loudest precisely in places where there are hardly any signs of Ukrainian linguistic and cultural presence: the Crimea, the Donbas, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk, etc.

If layers of propaganda are peeled off the concept of Ukrainization, its meaning becomes clear – creating a national-cultural environment in the interests of the majority. Nearly 80% of Ukrainian citizens are ethnic Ukrainians and 67% consider Ukrainian their native language. However, this is precisely what Russian and pro-Russian



propaganda has interpreted as violence against Russians and Russified Ukrainians aimed at divorcing them from the Russian language and culture. It is hard to point to specific examples of this alleged persecution, but this has never stopped the propagandists in the Kremlin.

UKRAINIZATION = EUROPEANIZATION

In reality, Ukrainization today means offering everyone interested a genuine opportunity to learn the Ukrainian language, culture, history and traditions and live in this cultural space. This opportunity must be extended to everyone regardless of the region, and there should be no off-limits zones for the Ukrainian language and culture. However, such zones existed and continue to exist. Crimea is the leader here, a dubious distinction it has achieved with the silent connivance of official Kyiv. It was hard to find even Russian-language newspapers from Kyiv there, while the press from Russia was in abundance. Was this due to market factors? Not really. Newspapers from Moscow lay in yellow heaps; people were not really eager to buy them, but the press kiosks had to have them. If this is a market, it is a highly politicized one.

Ukrainization is also an opportunity to obtain education that is Ukrainian in terms of the language of instruction and the cultural component – from the kindergarten all the way to PhD studies. This is something that pro-Russian bureaucrats have sabotaged in Southern and Eastern Ukraine and in Crimea, while the central authorities preferred to look away and do nothing to unite the country mentally and culturally. Worse still, they exploited differences between regions to get an edge in elections. The idea of having two official languages was introduced and legitimized in public discourse by Leonid Kuchma as he brought up this dangerous topic again and again while already in the president's office.

Ukrainization is not just a matter of language – it is much broader. Today, it means turning a *Homo sovieticus* into a Ukrainian, a dignified citizen of a civi-

lized European state and, in this sense, a European. Russia's recent military aggression shows that the two countries are poles apart in civilizational terms and that the Russian political order and political philosophy is incompatible with European standards. Ukrainization is a key element of Europeanization. The more Ukrainian a region is, the more its residents lean towards the European path of development. Understanding this, the Kremlin's Cheka officers are frenziedly vilifying even the softest forms of Ukrainization. This is also why they are removing any traces of Ukrainian presence from the occupied Crimea, such as destroying Ukrainian monuments there.

NO ALTERNATIVE

It can be argued whether Ukrainization should be rapid or gradual, soft or strict, but there is no alternative to it if Ukraine wants to stay together. Numerous discussions focus on how the European and Russian orientations can be reconciled. However, incompatible positions, such as European vs. Asian and democratic vs. despotic, cannot be combined into a coherent whole. Only one of the two opposites can win. Likewise, to abandon Ukrainization is to take a step towards total, irreversible and merciless Russification. It is either Ukrainization or Russification. *Tertium non datur*. Ukraine's history since 1991 furnishes plenty of evidence in this respect. Figuratively speaking, if you don't want to be the hammer, you will be the anvil.

If Ukrainian citizens are not Ukrainianized, they will become targets of Russification, totally defenceless in the face of the Russian World, the Kremlin's propaganda vehicle.

If a Ukrainian citizen has at least elementary knowledge of Ukraine's history, culture and language, he will be able to resist and see Moscow's propaganda for what it is. In contrast, those who have remained alien to the Ukrainian cultural environment in the past 23 years are pathologically susceptible to the Kremlin's fabrications. Anyone with even passing knowledge of the history of the Ukrainian national

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liberation movement can easily expose Russian lies and historical distortions. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian government has done very little to promote historical knowledge among its citizens, and the leaders of an independent Ukraine have often exploited historical ignorance.

Ukrainization is dangerous to Ukraine's enemies, because it turns all citizens, regardless of their ethnic background, into members of one huge nation, imparting a sense of unity and membership in one family. Without it, many people in Ukraine feel they are strangers, internal migrants who are present in the country physically but are elsewhere spiritually.

Without Ukrainization, anti-Ukrainian forces will be able to keep masses of people under control, isolating them from the rest of the nation and putting them into a kind of cultural and informational ghetto.

VASSALS OF THE KREMLIN

Ukrainization is the easiest to implement in the government apparatus, primarily in such power structures as the army, the Security Service and the Interior Ministry. There is no need for agitation or persuasion there – just orders and strict discipline. However, even this has not been done. As the recent events have shown, the situation is much worse and the problems go deeper than a poor command of Ukrainian. Quite a few people there are still under the influence of Soviet ideology and support pro-Russian forces in elections. The army was in a better shape than the Security Service and the police, but it also suffered from the predominance of Russian, Soviet military traditions and imperial history. Education activities in the Ukrainian army have been based on the cult of the “Great Patriotic War” which remains the Kremlin’s most powerful ideological myth and the foundation of its great-power delusions. Moscow considers itself one and only proprietor of the “bank of war glory” and allows no competitors. Vladimir Putin once said that Russia would have been able to defeat Germany without Ukraine’s involvement.

Russian should not be granted any official status in Ukraine, because this will drive Ukrainian out from at least half of Ukraine's territory and establish two linguistic-cultural zones that will quickly distance themselves from each other, both politically and administratively

The situation is clearly such that everyone who supports the cult of the “Great Patriotic War” automatically becomes an ideological henchman of the Kremlin. And Moscow is fully convinced that the “liberation mission of the Red Army in Europe” gives it special geopolitical authority which violates the boundaries of generally accepted norms of international law.

Ukrainization involves a Ukraine-centred view on the Second World War instead of the Kremlin’s ideological proclamations. Otherwise, Ukraine would come across as Russia’s satellite country, a part of the Russian empire, and Ukrainian national history would be interpreted as a special case of the latter. Ukraine has no choice here if it wants to be an independent country.

PLEASING PUTIN

The current leadership of Ukraine, which represents the business elite, is reacting inadequately to the challenges posed by Russia and proposes solutions that are, in

MOSCOW WANTS TO HAVE A RUSSIAN-SPEAKING STATE INSIDE THE STATE OF UKRAINE SO THAT IT COULD CONSTANTLY “PROTECT” THE FORMER WITH ITS TANKS

The idea of having two official languages was introduced and legitimized in public discourse by Leonid Kuchma as he brought up this dangerous topic again and again while already in the president's office

fact, recipes for disaster. The proposals basically involve meeting the demands of Putin and his rebels in eastern Ukraine, including legitimizing a zone without the Ukrainian language and culture in Luhansk and Donetsk oblasts for starters. Oleksandr Turchynov, Arseniy Yatseniuk, Yulia Tymoshenko and Petro Poroshenko have already bought into this idea. They want to exchange the Ukrainian language for peace in eastern regions. A very naïve idea which, by the way, shows that to them, Ukrainian national identity is a bargaining chip rather than a cherished value. Businessmen-turned- politicians still firmly believe that any issues can be resolved through negotiations, bargaining and agreements. But this is not so.

Concessions to Putin’s agents in Ukraine will only losses and

no positive results to official Kyiv. Ukrainian leaders are already accepting federalization, promising to do away with state administrations and hand over authority to the local councils. In this case, problem regions may multiply. “Instead of one Crimea, we will have 26,” an MP quipped.

Russian may not be granted any official status in Ukraine, because this will drive Ukrainian out from at least half of Ukraine’s territory and establish two linguistic-cultural zones that will quickly distance themselves from each other, both politically and administratively. For obvious reasons, the Kremlin wants not so much free development of Russian in Ukraine (which is already a fact) but the official and political institutionalization of Russian. Moscow wants to have a Russian-speaking state inside the state of Ukraine so that it could constantly “protect” the former with its tanks (see p. 19).

However, Putin’s aggression and annexation of the Crimea have led to spontaneous Ukrainization and a surge of patriotism in Eastern and Southern Ukraine with millions of people suddenly sensing how valuable the Ukrainian state is for them personally. They have realized that, for the past 20 odd years, they have lived in a poor but relatively free country, enjoying much more freedom than Russian citizens do under Putin. Some of Ukrainian citizens who have found themselves in the clutches of the Kremlin’s “sovereign democracy” in Crimea already feel duped – the promised paradise has not come, while freedom, which they took for granted in Ukraine, is gone.

When Russian gunmen began to tear down Ukrainian flags from the building of the Crimean Tatar Mejlis in Simferopol, its leader Mustafa Jemilev said: “Under the Ukrainian government, no-one monitored who raised which flags. Now these [Russians] want to have their way in everything. This is a democracy of the Fascist kind.” The Prosecutor’s Office of the Russian Federation has interpreted a Ukrainian flag over the Mejlis as “extremism and fueling interethnic hatred”. ■

Pro-Ukrainian Donbas: Intelligent, Creative, Chaotic

Pro-Ukrainian forces in the Donbas neatly fall within the boundaries of the middle class and are in need of organization and government support

The recent events in Eastern Ukraine have raised the painful issue of whether there are any local residents loyal to Ukraine in the Donbas. Those who only yesterday believed that there are only “orcs, drunken coalminers and the Party of Regions” there have seen large demonstrations under Ukrainian banners and suddenly realized that there is a different kind of Donbas – creative, young and engaged. However, it has also turned out that these activists are in the minority. For certain historical and mental reasons, the Donbas experiences a significant lack of intellectuals who would be natural allies to the Ukrainian idea. At present, the Ukrainian state, which has done virtually nothing to foster a pro-Ukrainian environment in Eastern Ukraine, has no-one to rely on in its fight against the ag-

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Bohdan
Butkevych

gressive déclassé elements that are being utilized by Russia to suits its expansionist purposes. Patriotic forces in the Donbas are disjointed and lack adequate government support, so all their pro-Ukrainian activity is driven only by the efforts and enthusiasm of activists who often put their health and lives on the line.

THE MIDDLE CLASS DEFENDING ITSELF

On 17 April, a large number of people with national flags gathered together in the evening in Peremohy Park in Donetsk and were accompanied by about 1,000 policemen wearing helmets and wielding shields. The slogan “Glory to Ukraine!” was ringing, time and time again, over this commotion. This was the first pro-Ukrainian rally in the past month. The previ-

ous one, held on 13 March in downtown Donetsk, ended in a tragedy: driven by malice and impunity, rabid pro-Russian supporters attacked, with the police’s support, several hundred Ukrainian activists, cruelly beating and killing Dmytro Cherniavsky, representative of the local Svoboda (Freedom) party organization.

The first thing that caught the eye on 17 April was the huge numbers of young people and intelligent faces. There were many students and members of the so-called creative class: designers, media people and IT specialists. Another large group included men over 40, most of them with wives, who looked like typical university teachers, doctors, heads of departments, engineers, etc. Yet another group consisted of well-dressed businessmen who came in expensive cars. That was a

Pro-Ukrainian
rally in Donetsk
on 17 April 2014



PHOTO: UNIAN

picture of 3,000 typical middle-class citizens who were not afraid to come to a rally. These people simply could not fail to come, because they had a gut feeling that this was about not only territorial integrity or national identification but also the desire of the lumpen, who have nothing to lose, to seek revenge on their most talented fellow countrymen.

People came to the rally despite the police's warning telling them to refrain from any night-time assemblies when the negotiations on the conflict in Eastern Ukraine began in Geneva. The police expected provocations from the separatists. However, the degree of aggression against all things Ukrainian is so high in this group that they are ready to attack anyone even without orders from the Russian masterminds.

The most interesting things could be observed not on the stage but in the crowd: almost everyone had something in national colours. This may already be unsurprising to Kyiv residents, but here in Donetsk a person can be beaten up for wearing a blue-and-yellow ribbon. This is not to mention speaking Ukrainian in the street: passers-by would cast sidelong glances, some with curiosity similar to that with which people stare at roof jumpers, others with a concealed threat or fear. At the end of the rally, the participants stretched out a huge, several-dozen-metre-long flag.

These people who were brave enough to come out into the streets risking to be shot, stabbed or beaten up are worthy of every bit of respect. "We can no longer be silent," Andriy, a 25-year IT specialist, says. "I am a Donetsk native, and my grandfather worked in a coalmine. Now, my Fatherland is being stolen by some orcs who have drunk 200 hryvnias worth of vodka and grabbed submachine guns, feeling they are big boys for the first time in their lives."

"We are defending our country here," Oleksiy Mitsov, an entrepreneur from Druzhkivka and a political activist, says. "Heck, how can you surrender your city to people who are dreaming not so much about Russia as about robbing a neighbour who has a car or a flat? This group of losers and marginal elements predominates among those who favour Russia."

"We have already won by merely coming here and showing

that there is a different opinion," Anatoliy, a university teacher in Donetsk, says. "Of course, there is a great struggle ahead. And we don't believe Kyiv is really supporting us. We don't believe the majority of political parties which have simply struck deals with the Party of Regions here for the past decade. And now this same party wants to drag us into Russia's hands. But this will not happen."

A similar situation is in Luhansk. The only difference is that



IN CITIES AND COALMINERS' SETTLEMENTS, THE LUMPEN ARE THE MOST FERTILE SOIL FOR RUSSIA'S SEPARATIST SABOTAGE ACTIVITIES

for the past 20 years this oblast has been controlled by an even closer alliance of the party nomenklatura and criminal elements. There is also much less money here than in Donetsk.

UKRAINIAN STRUCTURE

All pro-Ukrainian activities in the Donbas are centred around a handful of political parties that barely have any life in them. "Cultural life in the Donetsk region has always resembled sad official ceremonies that no-one can fully understand," activist Denys Kaplunov says. "A Maria Oliynyk, the leader of the local Prosvita society, speaks at every Ukrainian holiday celebration, always after the local officials. In fact, the government's Ukrainian policy has been limited to this much all this time." In Luhansk, a more pro-Russian region, the situation is even worse.

In reality, the Party of Regions, which decidedly seized power here in 2002 after crushing the Communists, has intentionally fostered Ukrainophobia in the Donbas, and the results are now in plain view. However, the number of people supporting the Ukrainian idea has doubled in the region in the past years. "This has to do with generation change," social scientist Serhiy Strutynsky explains. "In the past years, the first generation that had studied in Ukrainian schools entered active life. Of course, the Donbas has a problem in that the Soviet genetic code continues to regenerate, but new Ukrainians have finally

appeared here, especially in large cities."

The pro-Ukrainian citizens here are plagued by a complete lack of coordination or a forum for interaction. Pro-Ukrainian political parties have never put in any consistent work here. Moreover, the central government has always given the Donbas into the hands of political adventurers who were unable to find a place for themselves even in the Party of Regions. The results were predictable. Add to this the complete domination of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Moscow Patriarchate), which has prevented other denominations from developing, especially the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, which are the traditional bulwarks for the Ukrainian project.

The events of the Maidan finally forced the local political players to step up their activities. Serhiy Taruta's appointment as Donetsk Oblast governor did not lead to any significant breakthroughs and, in all fairness, could not do so in the present conditions. However, the Committee of Patriotic Forces of the Donbas (CPFD) has been set up as a forum uniting the pro-Ukrainian forces. All political parties, except the BYuT (Bloc of Yulia Tymoshenko), are represented there, as well as several NGOs and journalists. Remarkably, patriotically minded Afghan war veterans and ex-military men, especially those who had been participated in the Maidan, started joining the CPFD. It was this committee that organized the rally on 17 April, and its members say they are going to do more. The number of spontaneous pro-Ukrainian rallies in the Donbas is growing. For example, activists raised the Ukrainian flag on the highest spoil bank in Donetsk. Rallies to support the unity of Ukraine are taking place in dozens of cities and settlements, but all these processes are not consolidated. The initiative to set up the CPFD has great prospects but requires government support. In Luhansk, Ukrainian activists hold pro-Ukrainian meetings in front of the oblast administration building on a daily basis in an effort to steer public opinion in the right direction.

Paramilitary pro-Ukrainian units composed of volunteers, such as the Luhansk and Donetsk territorial defence battalions, are also being set up. They have, at the time of

Opposition parties
polled
25%
in the 2012 election
in Kramatorsk. Many
experts believe that
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precisely there
because it recognized
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be able to swing this
region without
military intervention

writing, only several hundred people in their ranks and their combat readiness is dubious, but the very fact of their existence is important, suggesting that the situation in the Donbas is nothing like that in the Crimea, where the pro-Ukrainian minority turned out to be totally incapable of action.

DONBAS ZONES

The Donbas' greatest problem is that it has not experienced the full cycle of urbanization, even though its official urbanization level is the highest in Ukraine – over 90% of the population live in cities and settlements. All of the region's cities, except Kramatorsk and Mariupol, grew out of industrial settlements. Typically, a coalmine or a plant would be opened and a settlement would spring up around it, populated by its workers. When such settlements greatly increased in number, they were gradually joined to form cities. However, the original settlements continue to determine the mentality of their residents and the structure of the resulting cities.

"The true proletariat has never emerged in the Donbas," historian Volodymyr Nikolsky of the Donetsk National University says. "From the very beginning, there were certain anomalies in the way peasants were urbanized – instead of permanently staying in cities, they worked in coalmines from autumn to spring and then returned to the countryside to sow crops. In other words, most workers here were of the seasonal variety. In essence, this process started only after the Second World War. Prior to that, this kind of settlement nature of the cities allowed each coalminer or plant worker to still keep a kitchen garden and never lose connection with the land. Hence, a large number of Donbas residents stopped being peasants but never turned into urban dwellers in the full sense of the word."

Later, this circumstance led to some very negative consequences. The intellectual class – not engineers or technical specialists but the liberal arts intelligentsia – can only emerge in full-fledged cities. But there were just a handful of them in the Donbas with its population of seven million. Therefore, the creative class as such began to take shape here only after Ukraine regained its independence. Naturally, this class is the core of pro-Ukrainian

sentiments in the region but accounts for a mere 3-5% of the total population. Entrepreneurs are in a similar situation – most of them are interested in keeping the Donbas within Ukraine. In contrast, the lumpen and the dregs of society whose standard of living dropped after the breakup of the USSR associate Ukraine with hardship and poverty. In cities and coalminers' settlements, they are the most fertile soil for Russia's separatist sabotage activities. Remarkably, the countryside does not harbour separatist sentiments in the least. For example, seven village councils in Donetsk oblast asked to be joined to Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.

The Donbas can be tentatively divided into four mental-electoral zones depending on their economic structure. The first one is the classic central coalmining Donbas which begins in Krasnoarmiisk County and stretches all the way to the Russian border in southeastern Luhansk Oblast. "This is a region of coalmines, spoil banks and unskilled labour that consumes all of one's strength and time," Strutynsky says. "Hence, this region is ready to revolt over the price of sausage, as was actually the case close to the end of the Soviet era. This is why coalminers show no significant support for separatists, understanding that in Russia their coalmines would simply be closed as unprofitable as in the Russian part of the Donbas where only one active coalmine remains. The question of patriotism or national identity is not key to them." However, there are large numbers of the obvious lumpen here who are the main component of the crowds at separatist rallies.

The second zone is the industrial Donbas, including Sloviansk and Kramatorsk in Donetsk Oblast and Stakhanov, Severodonetsk, Lysychansk and Rubizhne in Luhansk Oblast. Its key feature is the near complete lack of coalmines and the presence, instead, of large industrial enterprises, such as NKMZ in Kramatorsk or Azot in Severodonetsk. "Unlike a coalminer, who does unskilled manual labour, a plant worker has a higher level of thinking," Nikolsky says. "Moreover, there is a significant proportion of the technical intelligentsia here." Interestingly, this region shows the greatest support for the opposition forces. For example, op-

position parties polled 25 per cent in the 2012 election in Kramatorsk. Many experts believe that Russia decided to start its aggression precisely there because it recognized that it would hardly be able to swing this region without military intervention. This is not to mention the advantageous geographical location of Sloviansk, which stands on the Rostov-Kharkiv highway, essentially at the juncture of three eastern oblasts. And then there was a need to immediately deliver a blow to a region that could put up

THE SITUATION IN THE DONBAS IS NOTHING LIKE THAT IN CRIMEA, WHERE THE PRO-UKRAINIAN MINORITY TURNED OUT TO BE TOTALLY INCAPABLE OF ACTION

resistance against Russian expansion.

The third zone is Pryazovia, i.e., regions along the Sea of Azov and near Mariupol, largely agricultural and very poor. Despite horrible repressions in Stalin times, there remains a very high proportion of Greeks and Ukrainians here. Separatism finds almost no support in this zone thanks not so much to the patriotism as to the indifference of the local population which only thinks about its own survival.

The fourth region is the agricultural belt of the Donbas which is both mentally and geographically closer to Sloboda Ukraine and includes Krasnyi Lyman and all northern counties of Luhansk Oblast. It is predominantly populated by ethnic and, importantly, nationally-conscious Ukrainians, and any annexation to Russia is out of the question for these people. In fact, there has been no separatist activity here. Moreover, according to recent communications, this is where the bulk of Ukrainian troops defending the Donbas are located. The locals are very loyal to the military and consider them protectors.

The Donbas is now in a state of uncertainty, but the distinct Ukrainian wave requires clear-cut government policy and an understanding, finally, of the need to work hard to create Ukrainian environment in the complicated and uneven region of Eastern Ukraine. ■

The pro-Ukrainian citizens here are plagued by a complete lack of coordination or a forum for interaction. Pro-Ukrainian political parties have never put in any consistent work here

Ukraine's Religious Diversity

The split in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church is ruining the authority of its official institutions and facilitates alternative trends

Author:
Oles
Oleksiyenko

Ukrainians are among the most pious Europeans. Data from long-term monitoring conducted by the NANU [National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine] Institute of Sociology from 1992 shows that the Church continues to enjoy the highest trust of the population. Most Ukrainians traditionally identify themselves with the Christian traditions of the Eastern Rite, but at the same time, they are tolerant towards other confessions. According to the poll conducted on October 11–20, 2008, by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology and the Social Indicators Centre, 61% of respondents completely or largely agreed with the assertion that different religious groups have equal rights in Ukraine, 75% – that it is necessary to respect all denominations.

COMPLETE UNCERTAINTY

The only statistically recorded criterion for the correlation of different churches and religions in Ukraine is the number of parishes. According to the Committee of Ukraine for Nationalities and Religious Affairs, as of the beginning of this year, there were 35,650. The Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP) had the most – 12,700, various Protestant Churches – more than 9,000, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP) – 4,700, the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church (UGCC) – 3,800, the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) and Muslim communities – 1,200 each, and the Roman Catholic Church (RCC) – 940. Over 2003–2013, the 25.5% growth of the UOC MP is lagging behind the 42.4% growth of the UOC KP despite large-scale state support for the former, lobbied by regional, and in the last four years, also by central authorities.

The attendance of services varies by denominations. Just a decade ago, the Ukrainian Sociology Service revealed in a research that 37.8% of all believers (belonging to any group) supported the UOC MP, while only 21.1% of those who attended the church at least once a


week did. For the UOC KP this proportion constituted 28.7% and 19.1% respectively.

UGCC was a leader in terms of attendance by its followers. It enjoyed 31.6% of support among proactive churchgoers, and 18.6% among all the faithful. Only the Roman Catholics (3% and 1.6%) and Protestants (7.8% and 21.8%) had it

but also increased at a rapid rate. The NANU Institute of Sociology found that while the increase in the share of active UOC MP parishioners constituted 32.8% in 2003 and 33.6% in 2013, the same index for the UOC KP went from 31.5% to 39.4%, from 38.9% to 67.6% for the UAOC, and from 67.7% to 78.3% for the UGCC.


Do you trust the church?

% of those polled



Source: Razumkov Centre

Confessions in Ukraine by region



higher, the latter landing second in the list of denominations with the most proactive churchgoers (attending sermons at least once a week).


Further sociological research shows that the church activity of the faithful of the UOC KP, UAOC and the UGCC did not simply remain significantly greater compared to the congregation of the UOC MP,

MANY CONFESSIONS, MANY MINDS

Similar disparities are seen between ethnic groups and regions. The share of Ukrainians who stated that they believed in God (76.7% in 2013) in a survey is significantly higher than that of Russians (65.3%). So is the number in the West (93.4%) compared to Central Ukraine (73.4%),


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If you consider yourself to be religious, do you belong to a specific confession? (%)



Source: Ukrainian Society 1992-2010. Sociological Monitoring


Why are there conflicts between the faithful of different Churches? (%)



Source: Razumkov Centre data from a survey held on 18-22 November 2010

Not all congregations are the same

Frequency of church attendance by the parishioners of different Churches, %



Source: Ukrainian Sociology Service 5-21 November 2003

In every region, the absolute majority (from 82.8% in the East to 97.6% in the West) consider Easter to be a truly major holiday. The share of people who say that this is a regular holiday or simply a day off in the West (0.8%) is 21 times lower than in the East (16.7%) and 13-16 times lower than in the Centre (10.9%) and the South (12.9%).

FROM SPLIT TO UNITY?


The split in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church and the absence of a single local church have led to the prevalence of “independent Orthodox Churches”. According to the Razumkov Centre, in March last year, 40.8% of citizens responded that they were simply Orthodox when asked “Which specific Orthodox Church do you identify yourself with?” Only 27.7% specified that they belonged to the UOC MP, 25.9% to the UOC KP, 1.2% to the UAOC and 0.7% to the ROC. Most of the people surveyed by the Razumkov Centre in 2010 were convinced that the reason for the inter-church conflicts in Ukraine was the struggle for property and buildings (34.8%) and power for hierarchs (29.5%). The vast majority of citizens have little concept of the essence of inter-church relations.

Thus, the long-drawn-out battle with the “opium for the people” in the USSR and the conflicts among different Orthodox Churches, which are not really understood by the vast majority, have led to most Ukrainians having very superficial contact with the Church. This has made the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church and various Protestant communities the most attended churches by the truly active followers who regularly attend church, make contact with the clergy, and are under their influence. Thus, Ukraine, traditional Orthodox in pre-Soviet times, is becoming ever more multi-confessional after gaining independence in 1991. ■

Deep disparities


The outcomes of opinion polls differs to the extent that it is almost impossible to see the actual proportions of groups

Which confession do you belong to, if any? (%)



Source: Ukrainian Society 1992-2010. Sociological Monitoring


Which specific Orthodox Church do you identify with? (%)



Source: Razumkov Centre survey of March 1-6, 2013

Eastern Ukraine (71.4%) and particularly Southern Ukraine (67.1%). At the same time, in the last decade, the most rapid growth of religiousness can be seen in the southern and eastern regions. However, this was largely formal. For example, an increase in the share of the faithful, who attend church services at least several times a month, was seen in

Western Ukraine (54.9% in 2003 and 57.1% in 2013) and Central Ukraine (20.7% and 21.9% respectively). In Southern (29% and 16%) and Eastern (21.5% and 13.1%) Ukraine, the percentage of such faithful was not only significantly lower (4.4 and 3.6 times lower, compared to the West), but has also seen a sharp decline in the last decade.



Oleh Pokalchuk: "The piety of today's rich is an old criminal tradition"

A sociopsychological analysis of the
"nomenclature continuity"
and top officials depicted on icons

PHOTO: PHL

Nigh on every year television and photo reports in Ukrainian media are brimming with faces of domestic politicians and important businessmen as they attend churches of various denominations. *The Ukrainian Week* talked to social psychologist Oleh Pokalchuk about the origins of the habit to publicize the allegiance to a religion shared by many politicians and officials, as well as their penchant for being depicted on icons.

UW: Why are the rich of the '00s so religious? Some donate to churches, others build cathedrals or buy icons. What do they need all that for?

— I'd say, it's an old criminal tradition. It has nothing to do with Christianity. They think that through formal activity for the benefit of the church they accomplish a certain act of clemency. Moreover the extent of each particular crime has to be compensated by the proportionate contribution into the church business. For instance, you murder someone, you give part of the money to the church. You steal something, you donate the church, say, an icon. So it's the tradition of paying a tithe from the particular crime committed. At the same time it doesn't preclude the existence of those that steal from the church. I think when the rich are donating something to the church, they are stealing from it on a higher level.

UW: As far as politicians and icons are concerned, when top state

**Interviewer by
Stanislav
Kozliuk**

officials are depicted on icons as saints, what is this indicative of? Is this a kind of narcissism?

— I don't think the politicians are the ones depicting themselves like that. I'd say, it is a certain kind of perversion and servility. A person given such an icon cannot refuse the present. There'll always be a few asinine clerics to consecrate it and provide a certificate. It's a kind of a bribe, or an addition to one, for which "we were treated nicely". The psyche behind the acceptance of these is in the pleasure from seeing your



**A CHRISTIAN IS SUPPOSED
TO BE A MEMBER OF A
COMMUNION, AND THEN
IT'S A PRACTICE THAT
PERVADES YOU 24/7.**

**WHAT WE HAVE IN 98% CASES
IN THE SOCIETY IS RITUALISM**

subordinates bend over backwards. The fact that they're lacking a morsel of morality or sense goes without saying, otherwise they wouldn't be who they are in the first place.

UW: Is this a part of their worldview?

— The worldview in which they are in the centre of the universe, the gods of the world. And their entourage by basking in the sunshine of this vanity and delusion is making this worldview a reality.

UW: Can this be considered a certain "nomenclature inheritance"?

— Only in case this person demonstrates allegiance to the system, and declares succession while taking the throne. The versed in knew: the Donetsk mob will first put "Papa" on the throne and then Sasha, and life will be peachy (Oleh Pokalchuk is referring to former president of Ukraine Viktor Yanukovich and his older son, the entrepreneur Oleksandr (Sasha) Yanukovich who made a notable fortune during his father's term — Ed.).

UW: Today's oligarchs, the likes of Akhmetov and Kolomoyskyi, are they practicing Christians?

— No. First of all the term "practicing" itself cannot be used to describe a Christian. One can practice yoga or diving. But a Christian is supposed to be a member of a communion, and then it's a practice that pervades you 24/7. That's Christianity. What we have in 98% cases in the society in general is ritualism, namely the compliance with certain rituals and the public expression of allegiance to certain cultural traditions. The majority has no clue what Christianity is and probably never opened a bible.

UW: Is it a tribute to tradition?

— It appeared as a protest behavioral model in USSR, a legal kind of dissidence. "I'm a communist, but I do go to church to commemorate my relatives once every three years and to realize my inner resistance". When it comes to the

rich, they need to label themselves religious to belong with the majority. Realizing that it really is complete bull from the standpoint of the paradigm in which they made their fortune, they'd be happy not to do this. But they keep practicing the ritual just like the red leaders followed all the communist rituals, attended meetings, the May Day, party plenums, reading the Pravda newspaper. It's a quasi-religion of a kind. Except it has more formal features that, of course, discredit the religion itself. It's an element of mimicry, if you will. Like a camouflage denoting an allegiance to a certain security force. Now there's a parallel of clear-cut idiocy in both cases. Take green camouflage, for example. It's complete nonsense to use it for disguise in urban environment where the coloring of the surroundings is completely different. Yet people are steadfast about putting it on and calling it "camo wear". But they're actually un-disguising themselves! And now every man and his dog are wearing it to show how super militant they are. It's the same with the religious types. They furnish themselves with icons, build churches, some even do that right inside their mansions to save themselves some walking, they buy own priests. Now that an old Russian upper-class tradition, where they don't become a part of a Christian communion and instead put on this religious camouflage to show that they are closer to God than everyone else. Like they have a master key, a back door or some kind of a special access code.

UW: So the politicians and top officials shouldn't declare their religious allegiance?

– I'd say it is impermissible for politicians to publicly display their allegiance to any denomination or religion. That is western standard of behavior. In the USA for example, state officials, in particular judges, are not allowed to give interviews, as they are functionaries and any kind of publicity demands opinionated statements, bias. Which is impermissible as it would disrupt their area of responsibility. Same goes for Ukrainian society, as the religion and church are in a state of complete chaos, and God help us maintain unity as we get through it and not to arrive at a split. Declaring religion may cause discord. Besides, when a politician pledges allegiance



PROSECUTOR'S VALUES: The luxurious mansion of ex-Prosecutor General Viktor Pshonka had quite a few valuable icons. The regime's functionary seems to have fancied some showy piety



to a certain church, as someone who studies religion I assure you: any question about the perception of the world would confound that politician in a matter of seconds. There are questionable areas in every religion that require additional explanation and special knowledge. That's why when a person pledges allegiance to a certain denomination or a religion even out of best of intentions, any journalist or a provocative person would be able to make that person look stupid in no time. It's a vulnerable position, especially from the PR standpoint.

So if some public figure is attending church, it is fine, as it is a personal matter. Religion and family are absolutely private areas. Unfortunately we put officials

and politicians in the same basket with celebrities. The latter made it their trade. They expose certain parts of their body, tell the stories of their divorce and marriage, it's a kind of business. That's what they sell, and people buy that. It's a separate area of public life. And we're putting politicians on the same plane as the personalities of the aforementioned segment of public life, which is unacceptable because it devaluates the entire essence of statehood and civil service. And believe me, the celebrities are gaining from not hiding anything and exposing all their good sides and bad sides. But officeholders do have something to hide and they have nothing to gain from exposing it, that's for sure. ■

PHOTO: EVGEN CHYBUK

PHOTO: YEVEN CHUBUK

Heresies and Sects in Russia

Was the West really the source of deviance for Russian orthodoxy?



Author: Ihor Losev

Back when Party of Regions "fought" for Ukraine's European integration, one orthodox priest from the Moscow Patriarchy in Luhansk Oblast threatened in an interview to excommunicate Oleksandr Yefremov, the head of Party of Regions parliamentary faction, for his very involvement in this "sinful" activity. According to the cleric, Europe and the West are the "Sodom and Gomorrah" from which all kinds of heresies and sects are spreading eastward.

But was the West such an inexhaustible source of religious deviance for Russian orthodoxy anyway? To start with, let's clarify the terms "heresy" and "sect", because very often protestant denominations that gained popularity in Eastern Europe were merely referred to as sects by their disgruntled mainstream rivals. Sure, the West is indeed home to Protestantism. But the West is also home to Catholicism which can hardly be called a sect. Secondly, denominational groups in Russia often emerged as a by-product of imminent development of the official church and their specific local ethnic rites.

Ethnographic sketches of "radeniye", a ritual practiced by the sect of "jumpers"

Therefore looking for any kind of "transgressions" on behalf of the West, all we find is the allure of protestant religious quests for those residents of Russia that failed to find their spiritual nourishment within the bounds of the their country's official Christianity. It was those that sought to advance beyond the ritualistic routine ended up becoming neophytes of western cults. In the late 19th century under the influence of foreigners first Russian Baptist communions emerged. This protestant church has its origins in 17th century England where it branched off from the Puritanism. Another movement rather popular in the Russian Empire was Pentecostalism that emerged in the United States in the early 20th century. While Mennonites for example, came into being in the Netherlands as early as 16th century.

However, Russian society proved perfectly capable of generating various national religious groups without any external influence. Way back in the 17th century communions of Christ-believers, Iconoclasts, Dukhobors (literally Spirit-Warriors) and Molokans formed in Russia as opposition to the official church. These denominations had quite independently

arrived at the tenets that were surprisingly close to the main ideas of western Protestantism: free and creative interpretation of the faith as the ability and the duty of its every bearer to satisfy own spiritual needs, to improve own spiritual world and behavior, the rejection of official solemnity of the church in favor of the communion of like-minded people. Members of these communions gathered in small cells seeking to realize their social ideals of brotherhood, equality and justice.

Christ-believers used to disregard the ritual nature of orthodoxy (while formally recognizing the official church) and believed in own religious self-improvement where a person "becomes Christ". The main form of Mass was "radeniye" (a syncretic activity consisting of singing, religious dances and prophecies) during which the believers reached a point of ecstasy perceived as the moment of "becoming one with the Holy Spirit". There were also uniquely Russian extremist cults among these "spiritual Christians". For example the sect of "jumpers" founded by Maksim Rudomietkin in 1840s. Their gatherings presented a particular exaltation where members would engage in furious jumping in attempt to achieve the "ascension of the Holy Spirit". Another example of a purely Russian ethnic religious sect was the Skoptsy. Adhering to extreme asceticism they practiced self-castration in the name of ridding oneself of all temptations. Their communions internally called "ships" were led by the so-called "elders". Skoptsy communions chiefly consisted of wealthy people and since they didn't leave any offspring, for obvious reasons, after death all their belongings would become property of the state. For that reason state authorities tolerated the cult for a while until it fell into disfavor after the Tambov Governor-General had come to a conclusion that Skoptsy had castrated themselves to skip military service. Curiously enough, Skoptsism never spread outside

Russia, not even to the neighboring Ukraine and Belarus, remaining a purely Russian expression of religious fanaticism.

In 1910–1912 a unique monastic movement called Imiaslavie (literally "praising the name") emerged in Russian orthodox monasteries on Mount Athos, Greece. Founded by Father Anthony (Bulatovic) the teachings of Imiaslavie were rooted in the traditions of Hesychasm and Christian Neoplatonism. The adepts of Imiaslavie believed that human beings due to their sinful nature are capable of glorifying only God's name, and not God himself. Tsar's government and the Synod saw the movement as rebellious and its teachings as heresy. Russian army has been deployed at Mount Athos (the territory of another state, no less!) whereupon hundreds of monks have been arrested and sent to Russian monasteries as punishment. In 1912–1913 they were excommunicated. This movement gained support of such theologians as Pavel Florensky, Sergei Bulgakov and Mikhail Novosiolov. And yet again, no real western influence to speak of.

And surely the West cannot be blamed for the uniquely Russian opposition religious phenomenon as Old Believers with its ethno-Manichaeistic worldview. The ancient middle-eastern religion of Manichaeism with its clear-cut division of the entire world on absolute Evil and absolute Good, and people onto the "sons of light" and "sons of darkness" indeed exerted considerable influence on Russian spirituality, all the way to extreme fanaticism when it comes to Old Believers with their rejection of the official Nikonian church.

Russian historian Igor Yakovenko wrote in his article "Criticism of historical experience": "Manichaeism of the Old Believers stemmed from Russia's everlasting fight with the West. The Evil for them had a western origin while the society was the field for the primal battle between the rich and the poor. Old Believers viewed as Evil any elements of utilitarianism, affection for worldly goods, gluttony which became the embodiment of vices". Weak attempts to Europeanize Moscow in the late 17th century were not embraced by Old Believers who opposed the official reforms. The state responded with

repressions, thousands of Old Believers were executed, tortured, jailed or exiled. The rest ended up having to look for ways of surviving under state oppression. Over time they formed clandestine structures and traditions of underground organization, antagonistic to the state, the official church and with its total rejection of the "sinful West". This highly explosive demographic was quite abundant, making 37 million in 1917. Among Old Believers were active members of Narodnaya Volya: Aleksandr Mikhailov, the Finger sisters, Aleksandr Solovyov (participant of assassination attempt of Tsar Aleksandr II), Sofia Pierovskaya and Ekaterina Brieskho-Brieschkovskaya. Some authors even suggest that the "Soviet" (literally "council") form of government has been borrowed from Old Believers as well.

At the dawn of the 20th century Old Believers owned 60% of all industrial capital in Russia. Among the outstanding figures belonging to their circles were such financiers and entrepreneurs as the Riabushkins, the Morozovs, the Tretiakovs, the Mamontovs and many others. By 1917 a number of Old Believer communion members are embedded in the Russian government: Guchkov, Sirotkin, Kartashov. Old Believer youth becomes interested in Bolshevism and some representatives of the cult such as Kurenin, Molotov, Rykov, Suslov make brilliant careers with the Bolsheviks.

That's where Russian ethnic Manichaeism doubled up with the Manichaeism of Marxism-Leninism with its ideas of antagonism between the labor and capital, a battle between two worlds: the bourgeois and the socialist. Ukrainian researcher Omelian Nestayko wrote: "In Moscovian mindset the evil personified in the West is carried as constant dominant through the centuries. What also remained constant was the loathing of the people that are the source of this evil and have to be fought until their complete extermination".

POLITICAL MANICHAISM

In early 1980s in the study of the head of social sciences department of the Sevastopol Higher Naval Engineering College I saw a map of the world hanging on the wall. The map had the USSR and the War-

"On this foundation of freely chosen unfreedom and despotism Russia has been built.

Afterwards rural communities gained power and restored the dictate of the majority over the individual, the rigid Manichaeist divide of the world onto the "ones of us" and "not ones of us" and the appropriately double standards for morality and norms of coexistence (for the "ones of us" and the rest). Therefore, essentially, the amorality gradually became one of the most striking traits of the national psychology, the traits that surely "cannot be measured by common yardstick," wrote Russian historian Yevheniy Vozgrin

saw Pact countries painted red with the rest of the world painted black. Illustrations of the Manichaeistic worldview don't get more graphic than that... Soviet papers loved to use headlines brimming with political Manichaeism: "Two worlds – two truths" and others of that ilk. In fact it still persists in Russia to this day. Moreover, it is becoming ever more grotesque. The wild hatred of the Russian society towards the "yanks", the "banderites" (patriotic Ukrainians) is resurrecting those archaic subconscious complexes of Russian mentality brilliantly described by historian Yevheniy Vozgrin: "On this foundation of freely chosen unfreedom and despotism Russia has been built. Afterwards rural communities gained power and restored the dictate of the majority over the individual, the rigid Manichaeist divide of the world onto the "ones of us" and "not ones of us" and the appropriately double standards for morality and norms of coexistence (for the "ones of us" and the rest). Therefore, essentially, the amorality gradually be-

THE ABSOLUTE MAJORITY OF RUSSIAN SHORTCOMINGS ARE VERY MUCH OF INDIGENOUS ORIGIN

came one of the most striking traits of the national psychology, the traits that surely "cannot be measured by common yardstick".

The absolute majority of Russian shortcomings are very much of indigenous origin. Europe and the Western civilization definitely have nothing to do with that. Practically all the sects and heresies in Russian orthodox originated from own ethnic and cultural background where any western influence was minimal and tangential at best. While naive desires for conservation and self-isolation from the outside world within the shell of the Eurasian kingdom or some kind of Customs Union is hopeless and futile, especially since the elites pushing these agendas are quite happy to enjoy all the benefits of the western civilization. Any kind of autarchy, be it an economical, a political or a religious one, is completely unworkable in the modern world, unless of course one is willing to follow the "alluring" example of North Korea. ■

At the dawn of the 20th century Old Believers owned

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Modern Ukrainian Conservatism

In 1918, Ukrainian conservatives tried to implement a reform agenda that was free of populism and relied on private property as the foundation of culture and civilization

Author:
Yuriy
Tereshchenko

Delegates
to the All-
Ukrainian
Grain Growers
Congress, Kyiv,
29 April 1918.
Viacheslav
Lypynsky, an
ideologue
of Ukrainian
conservatism,
1926.

In 19th century, as a result of revolutions and increasingly stronger positions of liberal parties, conservative governments in Europe stepped down or joined coalitions with other political forces. Liberalism was on the rise even in Germany and Russia where the monarchy recognized a number of liberal institutes. The advancement of modern industrialism also had an important part in upsetting old conservatism as it supplanted the worldview based on a conservative perception of the world.

Despite losing ground and in the face of a seemingly total triumph of liberalism and social and national radicalism, the conservative parties and movements in Europe were at the time seeking an answer to the question: Can man adequately react to the intrusion of industrial technology? Can man control his own creation of the industrial era?

According to Viacheslav Lypynsky, an ideologue of Ukrainian conservatism, societ-

ies revolutionized by the ideology of the "liberal bourgeoisie", disconnected from land and left without binding dogmas and conservative social and political institutes are "the most fertile ground for revolutionary efforts of non-productive, non-settled and nomadic elements". Under the slogans of communism and fascism, they speak against the ruling parliaments comprised of the fearful and profiteering "bourgeoisie" which has freed these elements from "all moral



and political bonds” through its liberal ideology and the republican-democratic system of governance.

Lypynsky emphasized that agricultural ideology had a prominent place in the post-war Europe. It sharply differed from other strands of thought but was, at the time, viewed as a vanquished and unimportant ideology. A farmer attached to land is, according to Lypynsky, the most eminent representative of settled man. “Cooperating and co-existing with nature, [he has] a distinct sense of differentiation and hierarchical organization of the universe” and is guided by the irrational metaphysical religiousness and faith in God, Lypynsky said. It is the idealistic universalism of farmers, he believed, that has to stand in opposition to materialistic universalism in order to save the European civilization. This way or another, conservatism tried to present itself as a tool for preserving traditional spiritual values and social institutes which were seriously endangered by the radical social upheavals of the early 20th century.

In Germany, the reaction took the form of the so-called conservative revolution. According to its spokesman, Edgar Julius Jung, it had to “restore respect for all the elementary rights and values without which man loses connection to God and nature and is unable to build a fair social order”. Unlike socialism or liberalism, conservatism did not offer mandatory political models to be applied universally. On the contrary, conservatives relied on specific historical traditions, experience, inherited customs, religion and social institutes which differed from country to country. (One example was the institute of the hetman in Ukraine.)

A number of European nations which were building their states on the ruins of empires also intended to implement conservative monarchic conceptions. Finland’s Ambassador to Ukraine Herman Gummerus recollected that his country “was moving along a previously chosen direction with Finnish stubbornness. We had to have a Ger-

man king, even if he was a brother-in-law to Emperor Wilhelm, despite the fact that the foundation of the Hohenzollern’s throne was already shaky”.

The traditional engine of Ukrainian conservatism was the countryside – a kind of a cell in the national organism which spontaneously preserved the language, faith, customs and traditional forms of family and public life. It included both peasants and the nobility. Both classes, despite complicated mutual relationships, laid the foundation for organized conservatism which had to be a conscious tool in preserving Ukraine’s national identity.

The close and enduring connection between the Ukrainian nobility and peasantry and the rich experience of joint economic activity gave Lypynsky reasons for a belief that landowners big and small “were capable, if they so desired, of turning into aristocracy by creating, at their own risk and expense, a political organization for their nation that would enable them to rule the nation”.

The social radicalism espoused by most members of the Ukrainian movement pushed the conservatively minded nobility, which never lost its national instinct. It was within this class that the worldview of Pavlo Skoropadsky, a future hetman, was shaped. He had close blood relations among numerous aristocratic Ukrainian families tracing their origins to the old Hetman State: the Kochubeis, Myloradovychs, Myklashevskys, Markovychs, Tarnovskys, Apostols, Zakrevskys and so on. “Despite serving in the military in Petrograd, I constantly studied the history of Little Russia,” Skoropadsky wrote. “I have always had affectionate love for Ukraine not only as a country of fertile fields and an excellent climate but also a land with the glorious past and a people whose overall ideology was different from the Muscovite one.” The emerging conservative conception in the political life of the country meant that liberal democracy and socialist trends in the Ukrainian movement lost their monopolistic position.



Viacheslav Lypynsky, the ideologue of Ukrainian Conservatism, 1926

This new development suggested that society was able to adequately react to the challenges of the time and strove for a balance of ideological and political priorities. The numerous slogans of a huge Ukrainian rally in Kyiv on 19 March 1917 included a call which caught the

THE EMERGING CONSERVATIVE CONCEPTION IN THE POLITICAL LIFE OF THE COUNTRY MEANT THAT LIBERAL DEMOCRACY AND SOCIALIST TRENDS IN THE UKRAINIAN MOVEMENT LOST THEIR MONOPOLISTIC POSITION

leaders of the national movement by surprise: “Long live an independent Ukraine headed by a hetman!”

»

Significant shifts in the conservative circles of the country took place when Skoropadsky became involved in political struggle. Contrary to the position of traditional Ukrainian political parties, his goal was to implement a programme of transformations that was free of populism and aimed at securing a socioeconomic order based on private property as the foundation of culture and civilization. The proclamation of the Hetman State was just a beginning of the state-political practice of Ukrainian conservatism which still had to go a long way to ideological and organizational perfection. The hetman and his close circle were fully aware of the fact. It was for a reason that Skoropadsky declared: "The Hetman State was the first shift towards a more moderate part of the spectrum, more natural and thereby stronger."

The complexity of the socio-political and economic situation of the time precluded a total victory of the conservative revolution. Ukrainian conservatism lacked sufficient organizational resources or a clearly defined ideology. The transformations launched by Skoropadsky were not exclusively conservative and were, to a large extent, complemented by liberal reforms. During the liberation struggle, so-called revolutionary democracy in Ukraine was in fundamental opposition to conservative and, in general, moderate representatives of the national movement and viewed them as objects of "class" hatred, barring them access to state-building efforts. Yevhen Chykalenko, a Ukrainian landowner and patriot, wrote in his memoirs referring to this situation: "With the outbreak of the revolution of 1917, I as a bourgeois or even a feudal lord was unable to take part in the construction of the Ukrainian State." Therefore, the Ukrainian conservatism of 1918 can be classified as liberal and such that was opposed to the radical social experiments of Bolshevism and Ukrainian socialists in the Central Rada, rather than to social transformations in general.

The most important strata that gave top priority to national



Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, 1918

liberation – well-to-do peasants, local council members, many officers, prosperous city residents, the clergy and numerous representatives of the scientific and cultural intelligentsia – were labelled "counterrevolutionaries" and were persecuted by Ukrainian socialists. This was the reason why Ukrainian conservatism, represented primarily by landowners of various calibres, implemented its programmatic theses in an alliance with the liberal bourgeoisie. Tellingly, many

UNLIKE SOCIALISM OR LIBERALISM, CONSERVATISM DID NOT OFFER MANDATORY POLITICAL MODELS TO BE APPLIED UNIVERSALLY

Cadets were members of the Hetman's government as they tried to implement the liberal programme of their party. Moreover, Skoropadsky sought, with limited success, to involve in his government also the representatives of liberalism, primarily from the Ukrainian Party of Socialists-Federalists. Lypynsky emphasized in this connection

that the union of Ukrainian conservatives with local progressives was to 'rejuvenate' the former, revive the nation and restore the Ukrainian state. "The Hetman government of 1918 was, in fact, this kind of a heroic attempt to rejuvenate and consolidate local conservatism," Lypynsky wrote. "It had to create one – common to both conservatives and progressives – local territorial government and, jointly with this government, restore normal relationships between conservatives and progressives in Ukraine."

The proclamation of the Ukrainian State in 1918 marked the restoration of Ukraine's national state tradition, an end to ruinous "socialist" experiments and the course on civilized reformism and interclass cooperation. Moreover, the Hetman government was a natural reaction of Ukrainian society to the policy of fomenting interclass hatred and antagonism pursued by the socialist leaders of the Central Rada. Their efforts to implement their class doctrine at any cost, even against the interests of the state, led to a deep crisis of the state organism. In this situation, the only solution was to set Ukrainian society on a new track by establishing class cooperation and social partnership, consolidating the nation and strengthening the independence of the Ukrainian State.

The restoration of the Hetman State was an effort by Ukrainian conservatives aimed at ending the attempts to implement the conception of Ukraine as an autonomy within a federation. Instead, the conservatives wanted Ukraine to resolutely and irreversibly separate itself from Russia. The 29 April 1918 Act was, essentially, the first state act that left no doubt about the question of Ukraine's independence and established the country's complete and final sovereignty. The legislative sejm, which was to convene later, would only have to establish its internal order. For the first time in history, the principle of the unity of Ukrainian lands was clearly put forward and fixed in the title of Ukraine's state leader – the Hetman of all of Ukraine. ■

The New Fascist International

In his book of correspondence with the noted French writer Michel Houellebecq, *Public Enemies*, the French journalist, activist and philosopher Bernard-Henri Levy wrote on present Russia: "Not only does this Russia inspire no desire in me, it fills me with horror. I'd go so far as to say that it frightens me because I see in it a possible destiny for the late-capitalist societies. Once upon a time, during your postwar 'glory days,' the middle class was terrorized by being told that Brezhnev's communism was not an archaism restricted to distant societies but rather a picture of our own future. We were wrong: it was not communism but postcommunism, Putinism, that may be the testing ground for our future."

How true! That Putinism is far from the madman's follies whose mention would suffice to prove the political and moral superiority of European values, is obvious to anyone not devoid of the sense of reality. Lion Feuchtwanger, André Gide, or Jean-Paul Sartre, that is, European writers and thinkers, infatuated with the Soviet Union as a rival civilization to the West (as Ernest Gellner once put it so aptly), are all old news. And the real and hot news about the Kremlin's new apprentices in Europe is not only about Gerhard Schroeder and what Edward Lucas termed the schroederization of the European political classes, but rather about the new disturbing phenomenon.

The former Soviet Union was a Shakespearean tragedy. The Second World War and the defeat of the Nazis unthinkable without heroism and sacrifices of Russians, Ukrainians, and other nations of the former USSR provided the Kremlin with a historical-political narrative which partly softened the horrors of Bolshevism and Stalinism.

After all, wasn't it the USSR which dealt a mortal blow to the Nazis and which had the greatest burden of WWII? After Stalin's death, a certain *modus vivendi* between the West and the USSR was worked out, and to equate Nazism or Fascism with the USSR, no matter how tempting it was to do after the Holodomor and all other horrors of Stalinism, was the last thing that European or American academics and journalist would have done.

The USSR won much sympathy and support from Europe's and America's Left in terms of their shared critical attitude to the iniquities in their societies, not to mention such core sensitivities of the Left as the working class people and their exploitation, down-and-out in big industrial cities, etc. Present Russia with its image in the West as a country of tycoons with their luxurious mansions in France and Spain as well as its billionaires so admired in London City as cash cows would have appeared in the old days of the USSR as the worst kind of nightmare, if not as a series of political cartoons in a Soviet magazine published with the aim to poke fun on the bourgeoisie of the West.

In addition, great Russian poets, actors, film and theater directors have greatly contributed to the sense of the

tragedy of Eastern Europe: whereas the USSR has richly deserved the immortal pen of Nikolai Gogol, Nikolai Leskov or Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin for its grotesque political life publicly depicted as genuine democracy and freedom, the geniuses of the 20th-century Russian culture, such as Sergei Prokofiev, Dmitry Shostakovich, Grigory Kozintsev, and Andrei Tarkovsky, have become the best antidote against the portrayal of Soviet Russia as a country of barbarians. It was a continuous tragedy of the nation whose politics was sinister, devilish, posing an existential threat to the entire world, yet whose magnificent culture was the best redeemer from the moral and political disaster created by the aforementioned state. Modern Russian culture appears to have been the best antidote against the tyrannical state of Russia and its political barbarity.

And now for something completely different: in Putin's Russia, we have a farce, instead of a tragedy. The murderous and unbearable banality of corruption, kleptocracy, mafia state and political gangsterism is concealed there by a program of the defense of every single Russian soul all over the world as well as by a revisionist state which walks in the disguise of the supreme Russian political agency that is bound to restore the unity and indivisibility of all "historic" Russian lands. This is far from plain nationalism and chauvinism; Vladimir Putin's speech on the 18th of March in the Kremlin was a sheer copy-and-paste version of the Sudetenland speech of Adolf Hitler in 1938: the concept of the Russian World (Third Reich) went hand in hand with the idea of the necessity to restore Russia's political influence and presence everywhere where the

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tinest Russian minority lives.

The specter walks in Europe – the specter of Fascism. No matter how difficult the political hangover will be for the EU and all those pragmatic, cynical, banal and shameless ways with which it used to proceed with Russia for the sake of its gas and oil interest, this is a fact that can no longer be denied. To defeat the new Fascism will take an immense amount of the concentration of courage, political will and commitment not only in the West and Ukraine but in Russia itself as well.

The most disturbing aspect of this horror story is the Kremlin new useful idiots whom it has found in Europe successfully fishing among far Right and populist politicians. Andrei Piontkovsky once made a joke describing the Kremlin's apprentices before the Second World War as a sort of collective Feuchtwanger. This time we need a different metaphor, as the new apprentices of the Kremlin and its Master today happen to be the leaders of the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), Jobbik, le Front national (FN), and the like. This is the New Fascist International with its headquarters in Moscow.

History repeats itself twice: first as a tragedy and then as a farce. Q.E.D. ■



Author:
Leonidas
Donskis

Museums Under Occupation

Museums holding over 917,000 exhibits are the price of Ukraine's cultural loss in Crimea. While museum workers there try to adapt to the new circumstances, Ukraine is looking for ways to keep valuable objects

The majority of museums in the Crimea welcome, at least in official commentaries, the changes with the hopes that Russia will be financing them adequately rather than on the leftover principle as Ukraine has been doing in the past years. To take just one example, the Khersones Tavriisky National Preserve (Tauric Chersonese National Preserve) received according to Ukraine's State Statistics Service, a mere UAH 217,000 in 2012, while no capital expenditures whatsoever were earmarked in the state budget for 2013. Meanwhile, the Russian mass media are keen to show how Kyiv "cared" as they flock to the Lesia Ukrainka Museum in Yalta and take pictures of the cracks in the walls and report about its overall poor condition. The museum's staff say they applied to various government agencies in Ukraine in an effort to keep the building from decrepitude but never received any aid. Meanwhile, the Association of Crimean Preserves and Museums emphasizes that museums are outside of politics but admit that they are now subordinated to Russia.

"The museums are apolitical and their main objectives are to collect, preserve and show. In any situation, the main thing is to preserve history, whatever it may be," the Association's Executive Director Serhiy Pushkarov said in a commentary for *The Ukrainian Week*. He says that the atmosphere inside the museums is calm and practical. New exhibitions are opening on the peninsula; the traditional conference is taking place in the Chekhov Museum; International Museum Day is going to be celebrated in Simferopol for the first time. At the same time, Pushkarov is critical of the idea of transferring any exhibits to mainland Ukraine or to Russia. "There are collections that were formed even before the revolution

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Oksana
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The Tauric
Chersonese
National
Preserve is a
UNESCO World
Heritage site

and have survived wars. We have museums that were established as far back as in 1811. The Kerch Historical-Archeological Museum was founded in 1826 and the Yalta Historical-Literary Museum in 1892. There are a few new ones, including the Crimean Ethnographic Museum, which has collected 11,000 exhibits in 20 years. And this collection was put together through the efforts of people rather than at the government's expense. These exhibits must remain in the Crimean mu-

seums. It is about the integrity of this collection or another. If split, they will lose their research value," he maintains. The majority of museum directors are satisfied with being annexed to Russia but admit off the record that visitor numbers have sharply dropped in the past months.



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MUSEUM WARS

Meanwhile, Ukraine and Russia have already engaged in a museum war, especially over exhibits that are luxury items. The highest-profile

case is the scandalous situation with the exposition "The Crimea – Gold and Secrets of the Black Sea" which is now in Amsterdam. The collection includes Scythian gold items, a ceremonial helmet, precious stones, swords, armour and ancient Greek and Scythian crockery. It is set to be returned after 28 May, and the fight over where it should go continues. Russia's State Duma Chairman Sergey Naryshkin insists it should go back to four museums in Crimea, while Ukraine's Minister of Culture

Yevhen Nyschchik believes that the exhibits should be temporarily kept in Ukraine. Ukraine's Foreign Minister Andriy Deshchysia says he has reached an agreement with his Dutch counterpart about returning Scythian gold to mainland Ukraine. Experts are divided on the issue. "I highly respect the principle of integrity and indivisibility of museum collections. Information about collections that have certain history (such as those gathered by the Khanenkos, the family of collectors of ancient Ukrainian, Greek

and Oriental antiques and art in the 19th century. Their collection is now displayed at the Bohdan and Varvara Khanenko National Museum of Arts in downtown Kyiv - **Ed.**) or belong to one archaeological complex, etc. is as precious as the individual objects they are made of. Moreover, I am convinced that collections should be kept and put on display as close as possible to the locality where the objects were used and/or found. However, I believe that in the present situation objects from Crimean museums that are now on display in Amsterdam cannot be returned to where they are permanently kept, because Crimea is an occupied territory now and no one can guarantee the safety of museum objects," Vladyslav Pioro, Chairman of the Board of Directors, the Ukrainian Centre for the Promotion of Museum Affairs, said to *The Ukrainian Week*. He believes that the decision to temporarily keep the exhibits in a museum in Kyiv after the closure of the Amsterdam exhibition is quite acceptable, because these objects are part of the state component of the museums' funds and belong to the people of Ukraine. "However, after the situation in Crimea, which is an unalienable part of Ukraine, stabilizes, these objects must, of course, be returned to their museums," he emphasizes.

Ukrainian MP Volodymyr Arieu caused a stir when he reported in late March that, according to his sources, Ivan Aivazovsky's paintings were being moved from Feodosiia to the Hermitage. The press service of the State Council of the Republic of Crimea denied this information, and the Aivazovsky Art Gallery, which hosts the biggest collection of Aivazovsky's paintings (417 items), said that all the paintings are in place. Ukraine's Ministry of Culture still does not know whether Arieu's report is true to the fact. A similar report about the closure of the Lesia Ukrainka Museum has been found false.

COMPLICATIONS AND INJUSTICE

There are real problems that the Crimean museums are already facing. The Russian occupation of the peninsula has had an adverse effect on their international cooperation. International archaeological expeditions, including Ukrainian-Polish research activities in the territory of the Kerch Preserve, have been suspended. "I am not sure that all of the museum workers in Crimea realize the complexity of the situation and what other problems await them in the future. In particular, we already know about the unjustified firing of Valeriy Naumenko, head of the Bakhchysarai State Historical-Cultural Preserve, who is a top-flight professional. His dismissal is, no doubt, a heavy blow to the preserve and to the cause of protecting historical specimens in the area. I am not certain that more generous funding will come from the Russian budget, as some of our Crimean colleagues are hoping. What is certain, however, is that the Crimean museums will attract fewer visitors, because the tourist season on the peninsula appears to be completely derailed," Pioro says.

According to MP Oleksandr Bryhynets, Crimea is experiencing difficulties with preserving cultural objects that contradict Russia's ideology. "These are the temples of the Muslims, the Crimean Tatars. I have doubts that Russia will be taking care of them," he said in a commentary for *The Ukrainian Week*. Meanwhile, First Deputy Minister of Culture Olesia Ostrovska-Liuta believes that the Crimean museum staff are facing the same problems as everyone else working on the peninsula. "The Russian Federation also has different kinds of museums: some are in a worse situation, while others are doing better. However, the Crimean museums are definitely having a hard time obtaining visas to take their exhibits to international exhibitions," she adds.

The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory has expressed its concern over the future of the State Archive of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea and asked the International Council of Archives (ICA), which has advisory status in UNESCO, to protect the historical and cultural heritage of the peninsula. According to Volodymyr Viatrovych, the institute's director, the Crimean archive funds contain unique documents that objectively describe Crimea's first annexation by the Russian Empire (in 1783), which led to a true tragedy for the Crimean Tatars. "As



The Russian mass media have made the Lesia Ukrainka Museum in Yalta hostage to their propaganda

Russia pursues its occupation policy which includes 'purging' the information space of Crimea, there is a real danger that unique archival documents may disappear from the State Archive of the Autonomous Republic of Crimea," reads the letter the institute has sent to ICA President Martin Berendse.

WHAT TO DO NEXT?

The key question for the Ukrainian government is having access to the valuable items and objects of cultural heritage in the Crimea. There is no singular correct recipe for resolving conflicts like this. Ostrovska-Liuta believes that the most important thing now is to constantly monitor the situation. "There is very important international experience. A similar situation was in Cyprus, Kosovo and Georgia. We are now talking to our colleagues in these countries. We are trying to stay in touch with

UKRAINE AND RUSSIA HAVE ENGAGED IN A MUSEUM WAR, ESPECIALLY OVER EXHIBITS THAT ARE LUXURY ITEMS

the museum workers in Crimea, but our communication has been disrupted for a while now. They are afraid of making very pointed statements, because it is an issue of personal security for them," she explains.

Bryhynets expects international lawsuits demanding that Russia pay for its use of Ukrainian museums. "If Crimea is legally the territory of Ukraine, while the Russians are using everything there, then there is, at least, a way to force them to pay for using our national property," he believes.

Experts believe that the crucial thing is to involve international intermediaries – a Council of Europe mission and UNESCO representatives. There is also the Hague Convention signed in 1951 by Russia which prohibits taking cultural valuables out from occupied territories. At the same time, Ukrainian and Crimean museum workers are convinced that, despite political issues, cultural cooperation needs to be continued and experience shared, and if difficulties arise, the parties involved should sit down and negotiate. ■

7 May – 8 June
(R)Evolution

National Art Museum of Ukraine
(6, vul. Hryshchivskoho, Kyiv)

A series of photographs by French photojournalist Eric Bouvet will be exhibited, dedicated to the revolutionary events in Ukraine from the end of 2013 until the beginning of 2014. The exhibition will include photos from the *Kyiv's Fatigue and Heroes of Maidan* series, as well as collages of pieces by the photographer. The programme of the arts project will also include a master class for Ukrainian photographers and a meeting of the author with the public. In addition to Ukraine, the list of hot spots where the photojournalist found himself includes Libya, Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, Israel, Afghanistan and Yugoslavia.


15–18 May
**NEW VISION
INTERNATIONAL SHORT
FILM FESTIVAL**

Zhovten Cinema
(26, vul. Kostryantynivska, Kyiv)

The best short films will be shown in Kyiv within the framework of the New Vision International Short Film Festival. The competition programme will have more than 40 films, including the participants and winners of prestigious international film festivals in Cannes, Berlin, Venice and elsewhere. The programme will feature the French melodrama *Just Before Losing Everything*, the Spanish animated film *She*, the Indian comedy *Almighty Allah* and many more. Some directors will present their work to the Ukrainian audience in person.


14 May, 7 p.m.
**Zemlya (Earth) by
DakhaBrakha**

Kinopanorama Cinema
(19, vul. Shota Rustaveli, Kyiv)



One of the most famous films of Ukrainian cinema, *Zemlya (Earth)* by Oleksandr Dovzhenko, will be shown in Kyiv. Filmed in 1930, it provoked a wave of criticism on the part of the authorities because of its excessive "naturalism". However the film was enormously successful in Europe. Confirmation of this success was a place on the list of the best films in the history of world cinema. The musical accompaniment for the restored version of the black-and-white film will be the live performance of the Ukrainian ethno-chaos group, DakhaBrakha. It has worked on compositions for the film since 2012.

23 May, 9 p.m.
PIANOBOY

Ocean Plaza
(176, vul. Horkoho, Kyiv)

The magnetic sound of Dmytro Shurov's (aka Pianoboy) voice and mood-setting sounds of his piano are bound to make the spring evening bright and full of unforgettable memories. The renowned rock pianist will



perform the songs and hits, which have already won him great popularity – *Vedma* (Witch), *Etazhi* (Floors), *Kozhura* (Skin), *Mertvyi Zvizdy* (Dead Stars), *Prostie Veshchi* (Simple Things), *Universal* (Vseleennaya) and others. Having been a member of Okean Elzy, Esthetic Education and Zemfira, Shurov has now found himself in a solo career, for which his fans are eternally grateful.

15 May, 7 p.m.
Ukraine in Ballads

Operetta Theatre
(53/3 vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)

Kyivans and guests to the city have the opportunity to hear the best Ukrainian ballad classics. The gala concert will feature folk songs arranged by world-renowned composers, such as Mykola Lysenko, Oleksandr Bilash and Platon Maiboroda, arias and songs from operas – *Zaporozhets za Dunayem* (A Zaporozhian Cossack Beyond the Danube) by Semen Hulak-Artemovsky or *Travneva Nich* (May Night) by Mykola Lysenko, the author of the world-renowned arrangement to the Carol of the Bells. In addition, the audience will have the opportunity to enjoy the best choreographic productions that convey the entirety of Ukrainian colour and traditions.


28 May – 1 June
Children's Film Festival

Kyiv Cinema
(19, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)

For the first time, Ukraine will shortly host an international festival of children's films. Seven full length feature films will be participating in the competition programme, the winner will be determined through direct voting by the audience. Festival events will take place simultaneously in several cities – Odesa, Lviv, Donetsk, Kharkiv and Dnipropetrovsk, with Kyiv as the epicentre. Organisers consider the retrospective of Charlie Chaplin's films, dedicated to his 125th birthday, to be one of the highlight of the programme.



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