

EUROPEAN CHOICE AS A STRATEGY FOR
YANUKOVYCH TO WIN
THE UPCOMING ELECTION

WHY THE DONBAS IS POLITICALLY INERT DESPITE
FREQUENT PROTESTS AND FRUSTRATION
WITH THE GOVERNMENT

FRANCIS FUKUYAMA ON THE ROLE
OF THE MIDDLE CLASS IN DEMOCRATIC
TRANSFORMATIONS

international edition

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THE LAST TSAR?



**WHILE RUSSIA IS REACHING OUT
FOR ITS NEIGHBOURS, ITS INTERNAL
PROBLEMS ARE UNRESOLVED
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BRIEFING



Who Will Win the Game? As the Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius draws closer, doubts fade that Kyiv and Brussels will sign the Association Agreement. The next question is how they see its implementation

4

POLITICS



European Choice for Yanukovich as a weighty bonus to help him in the next presidential election

6

The Klondike for the Opposition: Protest sentiments are escalating in the Donbas. Distrust for politics and inert opposition make the dissent purely pragmatic and local



8

FOCUS

After Gas: Heavy dependence on exports of fuels brings Russian economy to the verge of a deep recession



12



Resetting to a Cold Peace: Janusz Bugajski on what will be testing the temperature between Washington and Moscow in the near future

14



Leonidas Donskis on how Europe lost Armenia

17

Phantoms of Disintegration: The Kremlin's ineffective regional policy and the looming economic troubles fuel sparks of separatism



18

Derussification: Revanchist ambitions and the intent to retain Muslim peoples within its orbit aggravate ethnic and religious tensions in Russia



20

SOCIETY



Francis Fukuyama on middle class as the driver of democracy, the role of trust for the state and the end of history

21

HISTORY



The Cross Versus the Crescent Moon: The Battle of Vienna as the last chord in the Ottoman invasion to Europe, and Ukrainian Cossacks in it

24

CULTURE & ARTS

Harmonizing Ethno Chaos: DaxhaBrakha's Marko Halanevych talks about post-modernist folklore and music tastes in Ukraine



28

Dig Deeper: An intimate story of a solitary traveler from Gogol Bordello

30



NAVIGATOR

A Guide to Majestic Wooden Churches: Slender Gothic towers, lavish Baroque iconostases and pre-Christian domes hidden in the mountains along the Polish-Ukrainian border



32

Lucrative Lifesavers: The hopes and perils of betting on cancer treatments

35



Shell is authorized to start exploration then extract shale gas at Yuzivka Field in Donetsk and Kharkiv Oblasts



Russia launches a "milk war" against Lithuania



The mass media reports that the Science, Education and Youth Department of the Kyiv City State Administration compiles lists of school students whose parents are journalists. These dossiers may be used against journalists



WHO WILL WIN THE GAME?

As the November Eastern Partnership Summit in Vilnius draws closer, doubts fade that Kyiv and Brussels will sign the Association Agreement. How they see its implementation, is the question

Author:
Oleksandr
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The recent challenge from Russia has only reinforced motivation to sign the Association Agreement this November. The unanimity with which the European Parliament came out against Russian pressure and published a "practical support" initiative for Eastern Partnership participants, recorded in the September 12 resolution, is notable. During a discussion on the issue, the threat of a domino effect was voiced after the announcement of the Armenian President on Armenia's intent to drop EU Association in favour of membership in the Customs Union with Russia. Calls came to help stabilize the countries that are suffering economic and political pressure from Moscow. A number of formulations of the final text of the resolution, which Russian top officials have already characterized as a "hysterical reaction", prove that the Kremlin's actions have made the outcome of the Vilnius Summit more dependent on geopolitical resistance, as well as that the Kremlin is moving towards further confrontation. Under such conditions, the European Parliament called on the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) to take action to protect the EU's partners, and the EC and EU Council – to come up with specific and effective measures to support partner-countries by means of temporary application of relevant parts of the Association Agreement and DCFTA immediately after signing.

In their turn, Viktor Yanukovich has tamed the anti-European contingent in the Party of Regions, the Central Election Committee has rejected the Communist Party's request to conduct a referen-

dum on Ukraine's membership in the Eurasian Customs Union and the Cabinet of Ministers unanimously approved the draft EU-Ukraine Association Agreement. In addition, the Verkhovna Rada began to actively vote for laws that have to be passed before the signing.

Recently, when accepting the credentials of ambassadors, Yanukovich declared that: "... lately, we and our EU partners have come to the conclusion that Ukraine has achieved the criteria that comply with the Association Agreement which is currently being prepared for the signing in Vilnius in November." These words, however, tell more of the Ukrainian government's stance than the actual progress in the execution of Füle's list or the criteria determined by the EU Council last December. The Ukrainian government's compliance with these requirements is a pre-condition for the signing of the Agreement. However, the EU does not hide the fact that prior to the summit, which is ten weeks away, the Ukrainian government will not fulfil all the conditions and Europeans will want at least "progress" on this course. Yanukovich's view is that fulfilling several requirements, in full or in part, should be sufficient to demonstrate this progress. The biggest stumbling blocks are the approval of the Election Code and the resolution of the Tymoshenko/selective justice issue. The former should make it impossible to juggle election legislation prior to each election to fit

current interests of the government. According to the more pragmatic interests of Europeans, it should give more chances for a relatively quick change of the current authoritarian political elite in Ukraine through the next presidential and parliamentary elections scheduled for 2015–2017 accordingly, in what will then be an associated Ukraine. The release or medical treatment abroad of Yulia Tymoshenko is necessary. This will eliminate an important image-related irritant for European leaders, first and foremost, Angela Merkel, who used their authority to de-





The Central Election Commission rejects the Communist Party's request to hold a referendum on Ukraine's integration into the Customs Union. The official reason is violation of the submission



The Anti-Monopoly Committee allows Rinat Akhmetov to buy UkrTelecom, Ukraine's biggest fixed line operator

The Party of Regions elects six ministers and First Vice Premier Serhiy Arbutov to the party board. MPs Borys Kolesnikov and National Defence and Security Council Secretary Andriy Kliuyev are elected party deputy heads. These rotations signal the Family's growing influence in the party

mand the release of the imprisoned former prime minister. However, for Yanukovich's regime, the execution of these two conditions is obviously dangerous, because it could complicate his staying in power after 2015.

For this reason, worth noting is information on a possible change to enact several provisions of the Association Agreement temporarily prior to its ratification by all 28 EU countries. In the current procedure, the Agreement would only have to be ratified by the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine. According to the new information, the European Parliament will have to ratify it as well. The scope of the Association Agreement for temporary implementation will not be restricted to DCFTA sections, as previously anticipated; in all likelihood, it will also include a range of political sections. The EU

thus hopes to save face during the signing of the Agreement without full execution of the conditions demanded of Yanukovich. Its pretext is that the requirements can be fulfilled later as a necessary component of ratification by the European Parliament. The EU will fully control the situation after such agreement is reached. On the one hand, it can delay ratification by the European Parliament until official Kyiv fulfils as many requirements as possible. On the other – if the threat of Ukraine being drawn into the Customs Union comes to pass, said ratification will most likely go through quite quickly. After all, the EU understands all the problems that Russian special services and lobbyists can create during the approval of the Association Agreement under real or made-up pretexts, even if power in Ukraine goes to the current democratic opposition. So, the Europeans may be trying to maximally expand the portion of provisions to be enacted temporarily until all 28 member-states ratify the Agreement.

Equally interesting were the latest comments of Putin's adviser, Sergey Glazyev, who is responsible for drawing Ukraine into the Customs Union. In

an interview for the *Vesti* (News) newspaper, he commented on arguments supposedly made by Ukrainian officials in a discussion with their Russian counterparts of prospects of cooperation with the Customs Union once the Association Agreement is signed: "First they say that 'we shall not be executing this Agreement with the EU', then they convince us that 'it will not be ratified by European Parliaments' and so on." This can partially explain Yanukovich's recent demonstrative "European activity" (see p. 6). The potential expansion of his electorate thanks to voters who support European integration, the picture of success in Europe, and greater benevolence from the West in terms of loans for Ukraine may be accompanied by the government's sabotage of complete fulfilment of the Association Agreement and/or of the conditions necessary to have it ratified by all EU member-states. That will allow Yanukovich to shrug off all responsibility for it. He can

say that his team has done everything on its part, now it's just a matter of how quickly the Europeans will ratify the Agreement. Perhaps, he is thus seeking a version of a "European pause" which he would find much more convenient compared to the one he experienced earlier.

It appears that Kyiv and Brussels both count on the effect of the Association Agreement that will cause them the least troubles and offer them the most options for manoeuvre. Even under these conditions, the signing is extremely important and crucial for Ukraine's long-term interests and European prospects. ■





European Choice for Yanukovich

as a weighty bonus in the upcoming presidential election

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After a lengthy silence, Viktor Yanukovich has spoken. In an August 30 interview for several nationwide television channels he criticized Russia's stance on Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU and said that European integration is Ukraine's priority even if cooperation with Russia is not ruled out. On September 3, he spoke to legislators regarding the need to pass European integration bills, noting that "we must aim for success at the Vilnius Summit".

Active attempts to construct a new political image for Yanukovich prior the 2015 presidential race have been obvious. This comes as no surprise. Ukraine remains in a difficult socio-economic position; budget gaps are widening and the status of the Russian language – one of his election promises – was exploited in the parliamentary campaign, so he needs something new. Frustration in the president's base in

South-Eastern Ukraine is mounting as the "improvement of life today" – his key election commitment in the eyes of most of his voters – has not been achieved four years into his presidency, and is not likely to come anytime soon. Meanwhile, voters do not want excuses, whether justified or not.

In this situation, the ruling regime has no tools to halt the exodus of parts of its electorate to the Communist Party, the opposition (primarily Vitaliy Klitschko's UDAR), and pro-Russian projects. Moreover, the opposition has a good motivation to seek new voters in Yanukovich's core oblasts where people feel disenchanted with the ruling regime (**see p. 8**). Meanwhile, surveys paradoxically show a better dynamic for the Party of Regions and Yanukovich in Central and Western Ukraine, not south-eastern oblasts. Clearly, this is due to different starting positions. Yanukovich's spin-doctors may well be contemplating

further expansion of his electoral base in these regions. This is nothing new. Leonid Kuchma initially came to power thanks to his pro-Russian rhetoric and support of South-Eastern Ukraine but was re-elected in 1999 thanks to voters in Central and Western Ukraine.

Some local elites that found themselves out of the ruling conglomerate after the 2012 parliamentary election (Baloha, Poroshenko and others) have recently signalled that they would once again support Viktor Yanukovich if he had an attractive platform focusing on "European integration". Moreover, such a focus would rob the opposition of one of its defining elements. Until recently, it was European integration coupled with resistance to Yanukovich's anti-Ukrainian policies that distinguished the opposition from those in power (overall populism does not count). Opposition forces have often stressed that the president's anti-democratic policy is

the key obstacle to Ukraine's association with the EU. The new strategy to promote Yanukovich as a European integrator who is eager to resist Moscow's pressure and potentially sign the Association Agreement will negate this argument. The opposition's confused reaction to this new image confirms the suggestion: so far, their arguments have centred on Yanukovich's insincerity, but this will not work if Yanukovich backs his declarations with actions.

This does not rule out other possible scenarios. Perhaps Yanukovich is using this European integration rhetoric as a bargaining chip with Putin to get a better price for ruining the association process (like the one previously offered for entrance to the Customs Union). Perhaps the Kremlin will arrange a provocation through its wide net of supporters in various government bodies—a net that has expanded significantly under the current president. If so, Ukraine may follow the Armenian scenario. However, Russia has far fewer mechanisms of influence in Ukraine than it does in Armenia, which currently sees Moscow as the only guarantee of protection from the growing threat of Azerbaijan. And convulsions by pro-Russian lobbyists in the Party of Regions as well as their tough criticism of the party and national leaders' initiatives signal that the latter are serious about signing the Association Agreement.

Resistance to European integration among some junior Party of Regions MPs, including Oleh Tsariov, Vadym Kolesnichenko, Nestor Shufrych, Ihor Markov, Viacheslav Bohuslayev, prevented the passing of some European integration laws during the first plenary week. They claimed that the laws were "not finalized". As a result, Oleksandr Yefremov, head of the Party of Regions faction, had to ask Viktor Yanukovich to "talk" to the MPs. According to Yefremov, the concerned MPs are mostly the owners of companies oriented entirely toward the Russian market (Bohuslayev, for instance), as well as those involved in various Russian projects in Ukraine (Kolesnichenko, Tsariov or Markov). Meanwhile, party heavyweight Rinat Akhmetov who has powerful groups both in the faction and the government and is mostly neutral

in geopolitical issues recently said: "What happened on the border, I believe, will make Ukraine, Ukrainian business and every Ukrainian stronger. We should learn a lesson from this, and not depend on this... in the future." Ihor Prasolov, Minister of Economy and ex-executive in Akhmetov's business, made a similar statement at almost the same time.

Apparently, there will be no serious confrontation within the Party of Regions. However, a split in the party and the emergence of an alternative pro-Russian force, even if small, would damage the party's image of a "monolithic team". Ways to persuade the dissenting voices are known. Ihor Markov, Party of Regions' MP and leader of the Odesa-based radical pro-Russian party Rodina (Homeland), reported that the court might soon strip him of his mandate to "show everyone" that they should not confront the party line on European integration (High Administrative Court stripped Markov of his mandate on September 12). For whatever reason, Viktor Medvedchuk's old ally Nestor Shufrych threatened to leave the party, stating that it would be either him or European integration at the faction meeting, sources claim. Eventually, though, he had to publicly deny this and persuade journalists that he would vote for all bills required to sign the Association Agreement except for the gay anti-discrimination one. Demonstration of tools for maintaining discipline in the faction and the readiness to use them were not the only challenges that opponents of European integration faced this week. Kyiv District's Administrative Court banned the Communist Party's public meeting to discuss a nationwide referendum on joining the Customs Union announced by CPU leader Petro Symonenko and scheduled for September 8.

If those in power succeed in portraying themselves as supporters of European integration and take credit for it, this will have a very visible effect on the prospects of Batkivshchyna and UDAR. They will then have to either communicate a clear alternative vision of reform and development for Ukraine or face the gradual loss of their political prospects. ■



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The Klondike for the Opposition



Protest sentiments are escalating in the Donbas. But distrust for politics and inert opposition make the dissent purely pragmatic and local

Authors:
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Kazanskyi

**Kyiv-Donetsk-
Horlivka-
Druzhkivka-
Kramatorsk-
Makiyivka-
Luhansk**

Over the past two years, big and small protests have spread throughout the Donbas. They have been more active and effective than elsewhere in Ukraine. The widespread stereotype in Ukraine has it that people in the Donbas are conformist, homogeneous and stand by their compatriots. However, they actually prefer more radical action to fruitless rallies in front of gov-

ernment institutions. Over the past year alone, they have stormed city councils, broken into plants, blocked roads, went on strike, took over mine administrations and more. Most of these protests had one thing in common: money or health. Their causes have been entirely local. So was the effect. Meanwhile, outrageous violations of human rights or corruption stirred hardly any reaction. The Ukrai-

nian Week goes to the Donbas to find out why it protests selectively and locally.

CHRONICLES OF DISSENT

The mining region is widely seen as being the most submissive one; the locals will work in kopanky – small illegal coalmines (**read more in Digging for Billions at ukrainianweek.com**) – for peanuts, but seem incapable of protesting against

anything. “Indeed, our people are apathetic,” says Mykola Zavarza, an engineer and member of the Druzhkivka-based initiative group campaigning against increased utility tariffs in town. “They don’t even read newspapers. But the authorities have crossed the line and we can no longer endure this. So the locals begin to protest.”

The Yanukovich cult that dominated Eastern Ukraine in 2004-2009 began to dispel as soon as Viktor Yanukovich became President and turned from a “solid manager” – as portrayed during his campaign – into a tsar, isolated from his voters. Having experienced the “immediate improvement” – a key point in Yanukovich’s election platform – the people of the Donbas were far from happy.

Some parts of the region stood up openly against the government that they themselves had elected. The first big rally was last year’s environmental protest in Mariupol before the 2012 parliamentary election. 5,000 – 10,000 people took to the streets demanding that authorities stop the permanent poisonous emissions from AzovStal, the local sinter plant. After the protest, its owner and the richest Ukrainian oligarch, Rinat Akhmetov, ceased its operations.

In early 2013, Ukraine witnessed the takeover of the Red Partisan mine’s administrative office by the miners’ trade union in Sverdlovsk, Luhansk Oblast. The mine is part of Rinat Akhmetov’s DTEK, an energy holding. The protesters had a list of demands for Akhmetov and the local governor Volodymyr Prys-tiuk. The main ones being concerned social guarantees and layoffs at mines. Nearly 24 hours after the campaign started, executives agreed to start negotiations and the miners left the office.

In spring, it was Donetsk Oblast’s turn to speak up. A wave of protests against shale gas production took place there. This was caused by the protesters’ poor knowledge of the production technology, but it signaled a growing distrust of the government. The most scandalous protests took place in Kramatorsk, a town with traditionally strong

The local branch of UDAR conducts the “museum of failed promises” rally in front of the Oblast State Administration Office in Makiyivka



PHOTO: OLEKSIY MITASOV

opposition sentiments. “People are completely disillusioned with Yanukovich,” comments Volodymyr Rzhavskiyi, Batkivshchyna’s representative on the city council. “But they have no alternatives.”

Summer agitated the Donbas with more notorious developments. Protests in Vradiyivka, Mykolayiv Oblast, against police officers who had brutally raped a local woman and tried to evade

terprises, at which the entire city worked.

Less than a month later, another burst of popular anger occurred in Druzhkivka, a town in Donetsk Oblast. The citizens of this industrial town – a long-time core electorate of the Party of Regions and the Communists – protested against a steep rise in utility tariffs. They blocked a central street and threatened to recall city council deputies. Any clumsy attempts by the local authorities to try the activists in court and get their relatives fired only resulted in strengthening people’s will to continue fighting. Eventually, the authorities were forced to cede and cancel the new tariffs. What pushed it though was not the public revolt but the well-coordinated actions of a group of activists who not only asked people to take to the streets, but offered a clear and legally reasonable action plan. “We are willing to go the distance,” says activist Vasylyna Dzhura. “We aren’t afraid and we want people to finally realize that



DONBAS PROTESTERS DO NOT WANT TO SEE POLITICAL SYMBOLS AT THEIR RALLIES

responsibility, sparked a protest against police violations in Donetsk. It was largely organized by bloggers through social media networks without the involvement of any politicians or government officials. Meanwhile, residents of Lysychansk stormed the city council several times. They demanded that the council holds an extraordinary session about the closure of most big en-



PHOTO: OLEKSIY MITASOV

they themselves should control the government.”

The latest act was the storming of the Makiyivka steelwork by the locals. Owned by EnergoCapital OJSC, a company allegedly linked to the Party of Regions’ Andriy Orlov, the steelworks produced emissions that affected people’s health. Desperate, they were ready to tear the plant apart, fought with the guards and finally succeeded in holding negotiations with the administration. A few days ago, even city council deputies supported their demands to stop the steelworks: they did not extend the land lease contract for the plant. “What is this? We can’t open the windows at home,” laments Oleksiy from Makiyivka, a town known as the citadel of the Party of Regions. “We believed Yanukovich, but he simply turned out to be a liar. Neither I nor my family will ever vote for him again.”

REBELLIOUS TERRITORY

Another stereotype of the Donbas, apart from its loyalty to the current government, is that the people there are all identical and think accordingly. In fact, however, it has several electoral zones shaped primarily by economic and ethnic factors.

In monotowns, i.e. towns built around one or several big enterprises, political preferences reflect those of the plant’s administration. Another factor shaping them is the presence or lack of opposing clans and political competition between them. The prev-

alence of ethnic Ukrainians or Russians also affects political sentiments, albeit less so. Given all three factors combined, south-western parts of the Donbas with about 90% of ethnic Ukrainians are traditionally opposition-oriented. National-democrats were strong there back in the 1990s. Kramatorsk has strong opposition sentiments. Home to the technical intelligentsia that settled there in Soviet times, it now has two Party of Regions rivals – Heorhiy Skudar and ex-Donetsk Oblast Governor Anatoliy Bluzniuk who ensure at least some political pluralism.

A port town with a free mindset, Mariupol tends to vote against those in power. Its long-time opinion leader was Volodymyr Boyko, the former owner of Illich (Ilyich) Iron and Steel Works, who sponsored the Socialist Party for decades. A Greek minority lives around Mariupol, which moved to the area from Crimea under Catherine the Great. This community has an original mindset, leaning towards free entrepreneurship. “I’ve been through Afghanistan and the bandit-ridden 1990s,” Oleksandr, an ethnic Greek from a local village, now taxi driver in Donetsk, recalls. “And I can’t remember a chaos like the one we have now. The Family grabs even small businesses from people. The tax authorities and the police chased a friend of mine for a year to make him sell his agricultural freight trucking company for a third of what it was worth.”

People in Makiyivka, a traditionally pro-Party of Regions district, protest against illegal operations of the steelworks

The mining region that includes the towns of Shakhtarsk, Torez and Snizhne in Donetsk Oblast and Krasnyi Luch, Antratsyt, Rovenky and Sverdlovsk in Luhansk Oblast is the most depressed and apathetic. The complete decay of its socio-economic infrastructure has crushed any enthusiasm for protest. Another quiet part that is easily controlled by the government through administrative leverage is the farming belt of the Donbas with Krasnyi Lyman in Donetsk Oblast and the northern part of Luhansk Oblast.

Overall, Donetsk Oblast currently seems less loyal to those in power than does Luhansk Oblast. Although the latter is in a difficult economic situation, there is no one to offer the frustrated voters an alternative to the Party of Regions. The oblast has not seen a single shift of the ruling elite since the early 1990s. In contrast to Donetsk Oblast where businessmen, even if controversial, are in power, Luhansk Oblast has had Soviet partocrats all this time. All they did was steal formerly state-owned assets and misuse any cash flow. The resulting poverty and hopelessness has completely broken the local population.

NO POLITICS OR PROSPECTS

Despite high social tension in Donetsk Oblast, any mention of politics lights up a NO bulb in the minds of most activists, let alone average people. “We are beyond politics,” says Andriy Nosarev, the Donetsk-based activist of the Dorozhnyi Kontrol (Road Control) movement against traffic police violations. “We want to change the entire system of law enforcement – that’s our key goal.” However, the movement stays away from any political platforms, i.e. it has no real instruments to significantly change the system.

The Donbas does not want to see political symbols at its rallies. Makiyivka was a rare exception: the local branch of UDAR once helped protesters and arranged a “museum of failed promises” action in front of the Oblast State Administration Office. Overall, the locals do not want help from opposition parties and insist that their protests



PHOTO: DENYS KAZANSKYI

are apolitical. However, they often lack the skills and experience to arrange effective rallies. “People still have this dead-end stereotype that any word against the government is automatically politics,” says activist Pavlo Ostrovskyi. “But most don’t realize that without politics, they can’t resist those in power effectively, even if it is for practical things.”

“The people of the Donbas are finally beginning to believe in their power as citizens”, explains Donetsk-based activist and writer Stanislav Fedorchuk. “But their traditional mistrust in politics dooms the best initiatives to failure because the most you can do without politics is complain about something in your kitchen.”

As a result, virtually all protests in the Donbas are sparked around the issue of health or money. Environmental issues, rising utility tariffs and prices, as well as unemployment will push people to the streets faster than corruption and the violation of their human rights and freedom of speech. “Today, people are unhappy about the government and Viktor Yanukovich but, to put it simply, they will only readily protest for food,” comments Kostiantyn Skorkin, a Luhansk-based activist and journalist. “In fact, this reminds me of the motivation of most Donbas citizens when they voted for Ukraine’s independence in 1991. They actually thought that separation from the USSR would let them roll in money. When this didn’t happen,

many in the Donbas felt nostalgia for cheap sausages in Soviet stores. That’s basically their ultimate motivation for protests so far.”

Thus, protests spark chaotically and fade shortly thereafter, without developing any clear algorithms. The Donbas has sufficient protest-ready electorate to rise for mass rallies with radical slogans but the level of its legal and political awareness is extremely low.

This is partly the result of the local government’s systematic efforts to ruin any opposition activities in the region. “Being an opposition activist in the Donbas is extremely tough,” says Oleksiy Mitasov, Deputy Head of the oblast UDAR branch. “Most businessmen tell us privately that they will happily support us “if all this starts” but they will never openly take the first step. We are building a structure right now that will be capable of competing with the Party of Regions. Our region is extremely important: a mere 20% here is equal to two oblasts in Western Ukraine. Missing this point means giving the Party of Regions a victory in advance.”

So far, there is no organization in the Donbas that could lead the local protest potential and send it in a constructive direction. Opposition parties are inert in their attitude towards this region, a key one in terms of the number of voters. “The so-called local opposition didn’t do anything from the early 2000s

AWAY WITH THE CON! AWAY WITH THE YANUKOVYCH REGIME!

Many voters in the Donbas no longer believe Yanukovich but see no alternatives

through 2012,” says Denys Tokar, Head of Batkivshchyna’s office in Horlivka. “People were taking money from their central office on the one hand, and on the other, made deals with the Regionnaires. What can you say when the former head of the party branch in Horlivka was once the local Chief of police? We’re trying to change this now.”

“For some reason, our opposition always thought of the Donbas as a hopeless place,” says Stanislav Fedorchuk. “They thought they could come here in an embroidered shirt, win their traditional meager share of votes and didn’t dare dream of more. The opposition never conducted any systematic work here, just leased its brand name to local

PEOPLE ARE UNHAPPY WITH THE GOVERNMENT BUT TO PUT IT SIMPLY, THEY WILL ONLY READILY PROTEST FOR FOOD

businessmen, who used it as they saw fit for their own benefit. Most often, these were people who couldn’t even get into the Party of Regions because of their stained reputation. That’s why people here have lost hope for any alternative to the Party of Regions. Now, they ignore elections and think that any political implications will kill any good intent. The opposition should think about this.” ■

AFTER GAS

Heavy dependence on exports of fuels has brought Russian economy to the verge of a deep recession


Author:
Lyubomyr Shavalyuk

Oil addition

Russian economy is heavily dependent on the price of fuels. So far, Russia has managed to avoid GDP decline thanks to the financial resources it accumulated earlier. How long will they last?

Russian authorities are busy seeking new sources to revive the economy and to avoid profound reform. Unlike Ukraine, Russia is much less dependent on exports. Over the past year, its share in the Russian GDP was 28%. However, it excessively depends on exports of fuels that accounts for over 16% of GDP and 58% of total exports. Stagnation of physical amounts of fuel exports and falling prices pushed exports down in H1 2013. Meanwhile, imports rose 7.9% in H1 2013. As a result, Russia's trade surplus is declining (see **Trade imbalance**).

This would hardly be a serious problem if Russia had been using its oil dollars more effectively. However, most of this cash ends up abroad instead of being invested into the nation's economy.



* Estimates are based on WTI crude oil spot prices and monthly prices of Russian natural gas on the German border
Sources: Russian Federal State Statistics Service, indemundi.com, own estimates

Firstly, money is massively pumped out into offshore zones. The top three recipients of most direct investment from Russia are Cyprus, Netherlands and


British Virgin Islands. According to the Central Bank of Russia, Russian FDI stock there amounted to USD 225bn or 65% of total overseas investment as of the beginning of 2012. Capital outflow exceeded USD 30bn in 2012. Some of this money returns to Russia as investment but most will stay abroad. Meanwhile, Russia's own economy remains cash-starved.

Secondly, a lot of capital flows into the shadow. Russia's Central Bank has long been monitoring obscure transactions or settlements for fake imports or securities that are actually worthless.

Finally, Russia intentionally spends a share of its oil revenues to reinforce its influence in the world. Its financial sector (Central Bank is not taken into account) has accumulated almost USD 300bn worth of receivables from non-residents, half of this after the 2008-2009 crisis. This

Trade imbalance

Sluggish development of Russia's economy since the 2008 downfall has not allowed it to accumulate income from exports of fuels or other goods. Instead, the growing imports coupled with plummeting revenues from fuel exports pushes Russia's trade surplus down and undermines its financial strength



Sources: Central Bank of Russia, oanda.com

money is used to issue loans to other states, including Ukraine, and expand Russian banking chains abroad. It thus receives political dividends in these countries in exchange for keeping their financial sectors afloat instead of investing into its own economy.

If this lasts and Russia's trade balance continues to shrink, the Russians will either have to revise their oil dollar splurge policy or go through yet another increasingly painful crisis caused by every drop in fuel prices.

PUBLIC FINANCE AND BANKS

Russia's consolidated budget heavily relies on revenues from the oil and gas industry. In H1 2013, they shrank 3.3% compared to the same period of 2012. Despite current budget surplus and financial reserves accumulated earlier, this stagnation has some painful side effects. The Kremlin's policy is based on high social benefits. This splurge is financed through the budget (wages, pensions and social benefits accounted for 51% of consolidated government expenditures in H1 2013) and low taxes (basic personal income tax is 13% in Russia. This is one the lowest rates in the world). As a result, the Russians have been enjoying relatively high social standards that kept growing. Over the past four quarters, however, pensions have seen a minimum increase while prices grow almost as fast as wages do. This signals that the Russian government is adjusting social spending to the energy market. So far, the growing social benefits have kept the Russians away from massive opposition and protests. This may change if nominal pensions and salaries stop growing and devaluation of the ruble as a result of Moscow's reluctance to tighten its belts eats up most of people's income.

Meanwhile, a big share of the Russian budget goes to state administration, defence, security and law enforcement. In H1 2013, it accounted for 24% of all expenditures. Obviously, part of this is spent to support Russia's influence abroad. Plus, the Kremlin will hardly scrimp on keeping order and peace at

home. However, the plummeting budget revenues may force Russia to choose between quitting some of its zones of influence abroad and decreasing funding for them, or cutting social benefits at home and spending more to crush the resulting protests.

In this situation, banks would normally feed the economy. However, they are busy expanding their presence abroad and investing more into that rather than into supporting companies at home with credits. As a result, domestic demand in Russia is entering a stagnation that may soon grow into a recession.

THE REAL SECTOR

All this has already affected the real sector. In Q2 2013, GDP grew a meager 1.2%, and industrial output has been shrinking (**see Oil addiction**). Recession in the Russian economy has not begun yet, but some details signal that it will. Big and medium enterprises in virtually all industries reported a 23% decline in income in H1 2013. This affects productivity, profitability and competitiveness of most of Russian business.


Stagnation in cumulative demand has hit construction. Real gross value added the industry generated in Q2 2013 dropped 3.9% compared to the same period in 2012. This trend in construction reflects a decline of investment. A drop in the production of investment goods coupled with stagnation in the production of consumer goods has caused a 1.3% decline in the processing industry output year on year. Albeit insignificant, this figure continues the slowdown trend that started in 2012 and may aggravate further on.

A steep rise in fuel prices is Russia's only chance to resume brisk economic growth, but it is unlikely. Instead, Russian economy will likely see a further decline which will show how ineffective and reform-hungry it is. The Kremlin does not want to admit this. Perhaps, it is afraid since any transformations of the economic system now will inevitably lead to a growing middle class which will demand changes and threaten the stability of Putin's regime. ■





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RESETTING TO A COLD PEACE

Instead of dealing with its mounting internal problems, the Kremlin is mobilizing anti-minority, anti-foreigner and anti-American sentiments to stay afloat



PHOTO: REUTERS

Author:
Janusz Bugajski

Relations between Washington and Moscow have rapidly deteriorated in recent months and some analysts believe that a new Cold War has already begun. While both sides are trying to dispel such conclusions, there is little on the horizon for renewed collaboration and plenty of disputes to fuel further confrontation. Although Russia no longer has the capabilities to challenge the United States globally, it retains the capacity to undermine American and Western interests in several key regions. It may therefore be more accurate to describe the new relationship as one of “Cold Peace,” in which the bilateral political temperature continues to drop.

CONFRONTATION POINTS

Disagreements and confrontations between the U.S. and Russia are

driven by a range of disputes, including Putin’s support for Syrian leader Bashar al-Assad, the granting of political asylum to an American intelligence defector, and escalating violations of human rights inside Russia. When the U.S. Congress passed the Magnitsky Act in December 2012 imposing sanctions on Russian officials involved in gross human rights abuses, Moscow retaliated by banning American adoptions of Russian children.

The Kremlin has also rejected any further cuts to its nuclear arsenal as its offensive military strategy is constructed around the use of nuclear weaponry to supplement any conventional combat. Obama’s efforts were rebuffed in the pursuit of further nuclear disarmament agreements, following the signing of the New START (Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty) in April 2010 which

reduced the number of strategic nuclear warheads and missile launchers. Some Russian analysts close to the Kremlin have proposed that Moscow pull out of the nuclear test ban treaty altogether and conduct a demonstrative nuclear test in the Arctic to show that Russia is prepared to use nuclear arms in case of any NATO threat to its borders.

Having realized the limitations of cooperating with the Kremlin, Obama decided to push for a military strike against the Bashar al-Assad regime in response to the chemical weapons attack on Syrian civilians. Samantha Power, the U.S. envoy to the UN, accused Russia of holding the UN Security Council hostage as it regularly blocked resolutions on Syria. Obama’s decision to bypass the UN provoked grave threats from Moscow. And Obama’s statement on the eve of the G-20

Obama will be sorely tested on whether the U.S., NATO, and the EU can work more effectively together to strengthen the sovereignty of the remaining East European states

summit in St. Petersburg, that Assad cannot retain legitimacy in a country where he has killed tens of thousands of his own people, made Putin even more resistant to military action. Obama's logic applies to Putin himself, as he is also responsible for the death of tens of thousands of Russian citizens through the carpet-bombing of Grozny and other atrocities in Chechnya.

Moscow traditionally engages in hyperbolic threats when its strategic ambitions are challenged. Syria is Russia's closest ally in the Middle East and vital for its power projection. Relations with the Bashar al-Assad regime have thrived under Putin, as Syria hosts the last remaining Russian naval base in the Mediterranean and Moscow has forgiven almost three-quarters of Damascus's debt in order to lure lucrative weapons orders. In recent years, Russia has sold over USD 1bn in arms, including anti-tank and surface-to-air missiles as well as MiG 29/31 fighter aircraft.

Above all, the Kremlin views both Syria and Iran as important buffers against Western interests and America's regional presence. The Kremlin is not only concerned that its key Syrian ally in the Middle East may be ousted but that Washington no longer views Russia as a relevant partner. Even though the planned military strikes against Damascus are unlikely to overthrow Assad, Russia does not want to be embarrassed by its glaring impotence, as it was over Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. Following the NATO intervention in Kosovo and the declaration of Kosovo's independence, Moscow invaded Georgia and partitioned the country in order to demonstrate that it was still a major power. In the event of U.S. air strikes against Damascus, the Kremlin will seek new options to prove its credentials and damage U.S. interests.

Moscow will not challenge the U.S. directly in any military sense, but it will endeavor to cause maximum political damage and extract optimum political advantages. In addition to lambasting the U.S. diplomatically and acting as the self-appointed leader of all independent states allegedly threatened by American imperialism, Moscow will need to undertake actions that will resonate in the White House.

In Syria itself Russia can buttress the government by selling

more advanced weaponry and a missile defense system that would ensure the survival of the Assad regime. Moscow can also strengthen Iran, Syria's chief ally in the region, through the sale of S-300 air defense missile systems while blocking any further UN pressure on Tehran regarding its nuclear weapons program. It will also look for alternative "soft spots" where the U.S. can be challenged and harmed without provoking a direct military confrontation.

RUSSIA'S CHALLENGES

In addition to the Middle East, three regions will test the temperature between Washington and Moscow: Central-Eastern Europe (CEE), the Wider Europe, and the Arctic. The Russian Foreign Ministry has stated that any Western intervention in Syria will seriously damage relations with all NATO countries, including those of CEE. But what could this mean in practice? All NATO-Russian meetings will probably be cancelled and the rhetoric will become more heated. Moscow can also reinforce the Zapad 2013 military exercises later this month, rehearsing a war with the Baltic States and Poland, and thereby increase its threats against NATO members. Even more ominously, it may dangle the "Syrian precedent" in the former Soviet Union or the CEE region.

Mikhail Aleksandrov, head of the Baltic section of the Moscow Institute of CIS Countries, has proposed that the Russian government respond to "American aggression" against Syria by sending military units into Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. He also contends that Moscow must restore its military control over the entire South Caucasus. By deploying forces where Russia supposedly possesses strategic supremacy, it would make it clear that the West will pay a high price for any attack on Syria.

Such direct military actions are highly unlikely, as Putin will be unwilling to test the reality of NATO contingency plans for defending the newest members. Nonetheless, Moscow could increase various pressures to undermine the security of neighbors that it views as being too close to Washington. This can include positioning Iskander missiles and concentrating troops close to the Baltic borders, engaging in cyber attacks against national gov-

ernments, aggravating inter-ethnic relations within the Baltic countries through its proxies among the Russian minorities, and scaling back its energy supplies. To underscore its more assertive military posture, Moscow is building a new air base in Belarus that will figure prominently in future military exercises and possible combat operations.

If any of these actions were taken, the U.S. would become involved. Vulnerable countries exposed to a more aggressive Russia will call for Washington's assistance in defending their independence. Obama would need to respond and avoid sending any signal that Washington was unable to protect Europe's newest democracies and NATO allies. CEE capitals will want more regular NATO exercises and



ALTHOUGH RUSSIA NO LONGER HAS THE CAPABILITIES TO CHALLENGE THE UNITED STATES GLOBALLY, IT RETAINS THE CAPACITY TO UNDERMINE AMERICAN AND WESTERN INTERESTS IN SEVERAL KEY REGIONS

the construction of modern and effective national anti-missile systems, in addition to the U.S.-integrated Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense System. While the latter will be installed against possible threats from Iran and other aspiring nuclear regimes, the former would be designed as a credible deterrent to Russia's aggressive military posture.

The Wider Europe is the second arena for U.S.-Russia confrontation and some American congressional leaders want Washington to be much more ambitious. For instance, Republican Senators John McCain and Lindsey Graham have called for providing Georgia with NATO membership at the next summit in 2014. Although the Obama White House will not commit itself to such a decision, it will continue to develop military ties with Tbilisi and must enable the Georgian government to acquire the modern weaponry needed to defend itself against any future Russian military assaults.

Ukraine and Moldova will also be on the front line of future con-

In the coming year, foreign scapegoats could play an even more prominent role in the country's unfolding political drama

Although Russia's military capabilities do not match the Soviet era, the country could become a destabilizing presence if it undergoes new political turmoil and potential territorial fracture

frontations with Moscow. Moscow has increased pressures on Kyiv and Chisinau to terminate their ambitions to join the EU and enter the Russian orbit through the Customs Union. Moscow opposes any movement by post-Soviet state toward Brussels for three key reasons. First, it would undermine the project of Eurasian reunification under a Russian umbrella. Second, it would better defend these countries against Russian political and economic pressures. And third, it would challenge the Kremlin's opaque business interests, which are undergirded by corruption and criminality. In the case of Ukraine, Moscow will intensify its economic and energy blackmail as winter approaches. In the case of Moldova, economic and energy sanctions can be combined with outright support for partition through the formal recognition of Transnistria's independence, as was the case with Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia.

Armenia's President Serzh Sargsyan recently declared that Armenia should join both the Customs Union and the Eurasian Union. Such a move would abort progress toward EU association, free trade and visa liberalization agreements. EU officials describe Putin's pressure on Yerevan as "open blackmail" and a hostile move designed to sabotage the November 2013 Vilnius summit. There is also concern that Moscow's success in Armenia could embolden it to try and replicate its policies in Ukraine and Moldova.

Washington may be faced with new demands to help defend the independence of European states that are wavering between democracy and authoritarianism, between integrity and partition, and between Europeanization and Eurasianism. Obama will be sorely tested on whether the U.S., NATO, and the EU can work more effectively together to strengthen the sovereignty of the remaining East European states. This would necessitate much greater Western political investment in security, democracy, and institution building in countries that are stranded along Russia's borders.

Washington must also prepare for a new kind of Cold War in the Arctic, where rising temperatures will open up sea-lanes and access to fossil fuels, and simultaneously provide new potentials for conflicts.



Moscow often uses demonstrative military exercises to intimidate its neighbors

The U.S. Geological Survey estimates that 13% of the world's undiscovered oil and 30% of its untapped natural gas is in the Arctic. Shipping lanes could be regularly open across the Arctic as rising temperatures continue to melt the sea ice, thus raising the need for policing, border patrols, and military capabilities to enforce rival claims.

Military activities are rapidly increasing in the Arctic, with Russia, the U.S., and Canada having the biggest stakes. Russia, one-third of which lies within the Arctic Circle, has been the most aggressive in establishing itself as the regional superpower by rebuilding its Arctic military capabilities and increasing bomber and submarine patrols.

the U.S., Canada, and Denmark have also held major military exercises. The stage is being set for future confrontations with Russia, especially if Moscow chooses to pursue its far-fetched territorial and maritime claims.

MANAGING RUSSIA

The Obama administration has been pensive about employing Cold War phraseology for two main reasons. First, it does not consider Russia, unlike the defunct Soviet Union, as a major strategic challenger to the United States on a global scale. Russia can no longer project power on all continents, exert influence through numerous regional proxies, or pose as an ideological and political alternative to Western democracy and capitalism. And second, Washington believes that there will be areas of future cooperation with Moscow that should not be sacrificed because of the current cooldown.

For these reasons, the White House will seek to avoid outright confrontation but without abandoning fundamental American interests. At times, it will simply ignore Moscow if it feels compelled to act, as did the George W. Bush administration. At other times, it will need to assert its authority to dissuade Russia's destructive meddling. Hopefully, Washington's new realism will not put too much faith in allegedly "shared interests" where Moscow sees anti-Russian conspiracies around almost every corner and acts to undermine NATO and the U.S.



UKRAINE AND MOLDOVA WILL BE ON THE FRONT LINE OF FUTURE CONFRONTATIONS WITH MOSCOW

Moscow's moves have convinced other Arctic countries to resume regional military exercises that they had abandoned or scaled back after the Soviet collapse. In March 2012, Norway staged one of the largest Arctic maneuvers in history -- Exercise Cold Response -- with 16,300 troops from 14 countries training on the ice for everything from high intensity warfare to terror threats. The exercise near the Russian border was condemned by Moscow as a provocation and proof that NATO wants to strengthen its position throughout the Arctic. Since then,

How We Lost Armenia

What happened recently to Armenia was nothing more or less than a slap in the face of the EU. Russia proved once again a master of political intrigue making and geopolitical manipulations by making Armenia surrender in the game over strategic partnership for the future. It dealt a blow to the EU's entire Eastern Partnership Program.

The question arises as to whether we irreversibly lost Armenia or whether Russia issued a warning to other partners of this program including the major country without which this project is doomed to failure – Ukraine? I would argue that things are more complex than they appear at first glance.

First and foremost, Russia skilfully exploited Armenia's fears and insecurities. It is a secret of Polichinelle that Armenia has no genuine friends. At this point, this country which has a quite dramatic and tragic history resembles Israel. Russia is no friend to Armenia, it has never been so, and probably never will be. Russia will always use Armenia's fragility and vulnerability. Stability of and peace between Armenia and Azerbaijan does not serve Russia's purposes. Let's call a spade a spade. The same applies to Iran, which is an important player with a historically formed tradition to include an influential Armenian minority in its economic and public affairs, and which is a crucially important alternative source of oil and gas supplies should Armenia lose Russia's favour in trade and energy contracts. To put it simple, Iran is no friend of Armenia either. As far as friendship between Armenia and these two countries is concerned, Russia and Iran could best be described by referring to the Russian poet and actor Vladimir Vysotsky's song about those who are neither friends nor enemies, and who are standing somewhere between the two. Complications with Turkey are too obvious to need emphasis. Friendship with Azerbaijan looks like a dirty joke.

Even so, the reasons of this total failure of the EU lie elsewhere. Had the EU been keener on Armenia by offering it a vision for the future and persuading its political elite to seek opportunities, safety, and security for their nation in the EU, Russia would never have won the battle so easily. My own experience as an MEP suggests that we are now facing the consequences of our militant mercantilism, cheap rhetoric and complacency.

Anyone knowledgeable of EU policies is aware of the fact that Azerbaijan has been far more successful in winning the sentiments and sympathies of European policy makers than Armenia. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict between the two countries has split international opinion. Like in the Middle East where it would be pointless and preposterous to paint the world

black and white arguing that one side is one hundred percent right and other wrong, taking sides is counterproductive here, too. It is no option when the confidence building is pivotal for both nations in their conflict.

The wealth, luxurious receptions of MPs and MEPs alike, ambitions, and active diplomacy paved the way for Azerbaijan to the double standards, all-forgiveness, all-permissiveness, lies, and sheer demagoguery of European political classes with which they assessed an awful human rights record and the level of democracy in Azerbaijan. No-one is perfect there, quite far from it, and yet the fact remains that Armenia's human rights record was and continues to be incomparably better than that of Azerbaijan.

And here comes the most unpleasant fact related to my country. Since Armenia is seen by the majority of conservative Lithuanian politicians as pro-Russian, while Azerbaijan far more as pro-American, Azerbaijan won its propaganda-and-moral-support-war in the Baltic States. The enemy of my enemy is my friend – this logic can be grossly and dangerously misleading.

More than once I clearly saw how tendentiously Lithuanian politicians took the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. In a biased manner, they were using their skepticism to Armenia to express their negative attitude to Russia (which per se cannot surprise anyone who is not devoid of a sense of reality,

and who can see what is happening in Putin's Russia). Yet taking sides and turning a blind eye to the faults of your favourite is a mean adviser in politics. It always leads to a no-win situation.

Whatever the case, this guilt by association is a flaw of political reasoning and also a token of poor political culture. No matter what they say or what

they pledge, Armenia is as remote from Russia as Azerbaijan from the USA. Ultimately, every country pursues its own vital interests. We could have done much more to keep Armenia on the side of the EU. Yet our greed and obsession with oil, gas, energy, new political liaisons and quick benefits, red carpets, all this Vanity Fair led the EU to a shocking fiasco.

John Donne's Meditation XVII has never been as telling as it is now: "No man is an island, entire of itself; every man is a piece of the continent, a part of the mainland; if a clod be washed away by the sea, Europe is the less, as well as if a promontory were, as well as if a manor of thy friend's or of thine own were; any man's death diminishes me, because I am involved in mankind, and therefore never send to know for whom the bell tolls; it tolls for thee."

Never ask for whom the bell tolls. Ukraine got a clear signal that Russia will do its utmost to blackmail, frame, set up, bribe, or otherwise affect Ukraine before the Vilnius summit in November. ■



Author:
Leonidas
Donskis

RUSSIA PROVED ONCE AGAIN A MASTER OF POLITICAL INTRIGUE MAKING AND GEOPOLITICAL MANIPULATIONS BY MAKING ARMENIA SURRENDER IN THE GAME OVER STRATEGIC PARTNERSHIP FOR THE FUTURE

Phantoms of Disintegration

The Kremlin's ineffective regional policy fuels decentralization

Author:
Viktor Shatrov

This year may be a pretty bad one for Russia. Steep economic decline, huge outflow of capital, mounting decentralization sentiments in the regions and the growing interethnic and religious tension point at a serious internal political crisis faced by Putin's command democracy.

BACK TO THE ROOTS

In an effort to rescue AvtoVAZ plant in Kaliningrad Oblast from bankruptcy in 2010, Vladimir Putin imposed prohibitive duties on the import of used cars. This hit one of the oblast's major business sectors hard. The subsequent mass protests reminded local entrepreneur Sergey Pasko of the idea to transform the oblast into a Baltic Republic under the protectorate of the EU. The new state would formally be tied to Russia but have the European-type rule of law. The lack of it is seen as the main source of trouble in the region.

Sociologists also confirm the growing threat of separatism there. In March, the Russia Public Opinion Research Center conducted a survey where 10% of the local population said they preferred Kaliningrad Oblast out of the Russian Federation. Another 20% said this was a possible scenario.

Some even suggest establishing an independent state made up of Kaliningrad Oblast, St. Petersburg and western part of Leningrad Oblast. This is Ingria, the name of the region that had been a Swedish province prior to Peter I conquering it.

The Kremlin's functionaries took the demonstrations in St. Petersburg with the slogan Stop Feeding Moscow! and Ingrian yellow-blue flags very seriously. Fans of the local football club, Zenit, who hung up banners in support of this state project during a match against Moscow's Dynamo, also made a strong impression.

Another project of Russian separatists is the Ural Republic, with

its capital in Yekaterinburg. It existed in the early 1990s but survived a mere five months. The initiator was Governor Eduard Rossel who thus wanted to get more rights from Moscow. On April 25, 1993, in a referendum to declare the Ural Republic on the territory of the Sverdlovsk Oblast, 83% of the population voted in favour of this idea and turnout was at 67%. By contrast, only 51% of the populace in the region turned out for the 2011 parliamentary election.

During Putin's rule, this idea resurfaced. As local entrepreneurs say, the Kremlin's functionaries are literally robbing the Ural. And there is definitely something worth stealing there: the vast territory with a population of 15 million has 70% of natural resources. Most of its taxes and income go to Moscow, providing for its luxurious lifestyle. Meanwhile, a group called the Federal Republic of Great Ural registered in social media counts 8,500 participants. It stands behind the integration of the Great Ural regions divided between the Russian Federation and Kazakhstan, and the creation of a single economic, political and cultural space – from the Arctic to the Caspian and Aral Seas.

WE'RE ALL SIBERIANS!

The biggest threat for the Kremlin could be the initiation of separatist movements in Siberia. If separated, it would leave half of Russia's present territory. These trends were already apparent in about 2005 when Our Native Angar Land, a political movement, came in second in the local parliamentary election in Irkutsk Oblast. In 2006, some local leaders criticized the federal centre at a session of the Siberian Accord Interregional Association. The Governor of Tomsk Oblast, Viktor Kress declared that "it is vitally necessary for the regions of the Siberian Federal District to be aware of their own specific interests and to unite into a special Federation entity in order to protect and guarantee them."

Thus, the ideas of Dmitry Verkhoturov, the author of the concept of the Siberian nation and a Siberian Autonomous Republic as confederation with Russia, are of interest to some of the local elite, not just his supporters on regional web forums. It is with their support that he developed a Siberian language dictionary.

In June 2007, the leader of the Oblast Alternative of Siberia, Mikhail Kulekhov, posted a review entitled *Will the Russian Federation Survive until 2014?* on a Moscow-based website. He noted that according to the results of a poll conducted in Irkutsk and Bratsk by the local Who is Who agency, nearly 60% of those polled supported the autonomy of Siberia and 25% supported its independence. When asked whether they

STOP FEEDING MOSCOW: Anti-Putin rallies in St. Petersburg often involve the flags of historic Ingria, a territory of a number of Russian oblasts including Leningrad Oblast and St. Petersburg, and separatist connotations



considered themselves to be Russians or Siberians, 80% responded Siberians and only 12% referred to themselves as Russians. Between 30% to 50% of Irkutians have Buryat or Evenk roots – these are indigenous peoples of Siberia.

In the 2010 national census, many Siberian residents listed their nationality as Siberian. Since civil servants tried to list them as Russians, some took to the streets to protest, flying the white-green Siberian flag, an image of their federal district and the slogan “We’ll show Moscow what Siberia is!”

SEEKING SOVEREIGNTY

The Far Eastern Federal District is in a more difficult position. With the population of 6 million, it shares a border with the 110-million population of adjacent Chinese provinces. They are the source of intense demographic and economic expansion to Russia’s unpopulated eastern territories. Unlike their economically successful neighbours such as South Korea, Japan and China,

20% of the Russian Far East lives beyond poverty line.

To a great extent, this is the result of Moscow’s efforts to restrain the region’s development and exploit the territory along with China. It takes every effort to restrict options for Russian Far East *chelnoki* – shuttle traders – in China thus paralyzing the region’s economy based on shuttle trade. Plus, the locals remember the disruption of a protest in Vladivostok in the late 2008 with OMON, special units of the Russian police, brought from Moscow. The Kremlin took Japanese flags carried by the protesters as a separatist conspiracy. As a result, repressions against activists of the Fellowship of Proactive Citizens of Russia – the flagship of secessionism in the Far East – mounted.

The Fellowship’s goal is to return freedom to entrepreneurs and local governments, and have laws amended to match the specifics of regional cooperation with China. According to its activists, this is the only way to attract investors and halt migration to the

European parts of Russia. The Fellowship can boast the first success: Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia), the pro-Kremlin party, won 20% less votes in the latest parliamentary election compared to the previous one. Now, the activists speak more loudly of the possible creation of the Far East

ESCALATION OF SEPARATIST MOVEMENTS IN SIBERIA MAY BE THE BIGGEST THREAT TO THE KREMLIN.

IF SEPARATED, IT WOULD LEAVE THE RUSSIAN TERRITORY HALF OF WHAT IT IS NOW

Federation in cooperation with the Siberian Union.

Frustration also mounts among the non-Russian population in the regions. The North Caucasus is the most dangerous of them. Shooting and explosions is heard here on a daily basis, and a war of Islamists rages to establish the Caucasian Imamate. According to expert estimates, terrorists have killed 659 and injured 490 people, and committed 182 terrorist attacks in this region.

Secessionist sentiments are high in Tatarstan. *De jure* and increasingly *de facto*, it is not a subject of the Russian Federation. Russian Constitutional Court has been trying for several years now to force the republic bring its Constitution into conformity with the Russian one and remove the provision on sovereignty, but these efforts prove futile.

The Kremlin seems to not understand – or not want to understand – what really causes its regional governance crisis. Nor does it intend to decentralize its budget or tax systems to stop the subsidizing policy for regions and delegate more initiative to them in dealing with their problems. Instead of reforming its regional policy, Moscow keeps speculating on “the U.S.-funded separatist conspiracies” as a perfect argument in preserving strong central government and increasing repressions. This reaction will not solve the existing problems but will encourage new and more radical resistance to the Kremlin’s omnipotent hegemony. ■

According to sociological surveys by the Who Is Who agency in Irkutsk and Bratsk, two cities in Siberia, nearly

60%
of those polled support autonomy for Siberia and

25%
would prefer it to be independent



Derussification

Revanchist ambitions in post-Soviet countries and the intent to retain Muslim peoples within its orbit fuel ethnic and religious tensions in Russia



Author:
Andriy Skumin

Russia is seeing a rapid rise in the share of its Asian and Islamic population and a steep decline in the number of ethnic Russians and other Christian European peoples, including Ukrainians, Belarusians, Moldovans, Bulgarians and Greeks, that easily assimilate with the Russian culture and language.

Between 1989 and 2010, the total population of Russia shrank by just 4.1 million, from 147 to 142.9 million people. The share of Christian European peoples dropped by 12.7 million from 126.9 to 114.2 million. Other nations, mostly Asian Muslims, grew in number from 20.1 to 28.7 million. In July 2013, Konstantin Romodanovski, Head of the Russian Federal Migration Service, said that Russia has over 3.5 million illegal migrant workers and another 1.8 million people have permits to work in Russia. Experts estimate the number of migrant workers in Russia at nearly 10-11 million. If this trend continues, the number of Russians and European Christians is likely to fall to 100 million or below 70% of the total population by 2030.

More challenges to the Russian traditional cultural matrix come from Vladimir Putin's post-Soviet

restoration projects. Central Asia is the only place where they actually have a chance to succeed. For instance, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, the main sources of migrant workers in Russia, have the fastest growing populations. If Russia succeeds in luring them into the Eurasian Union, the share of Russians and Russified Christian Europeans in this new formation may just exceed 50%. This is one of the reasons why Moscow is now making every effort to integrate Ukraine into this union.

MOSQUES VERSUS CHURCHES

The latest Russian Census did not have a section for religion, but sociological surveys signal that Russia is becoming less Christian and more Islamic. According to Levada Centre, an analytical survey company, the share of Russian citizens identifying themselves as Orthodox has fallen from 80% to 74% over the past three years alone. Experts estimate the current number of Muslims living in Russia at nearly 20 million.

The Akhmat Kadyrov Mosque officially known as The Heart of Chechnya, the largest mosque in Russia, which is located in Grozny, came second in the second round of Russia 10, a recent online project to choose the top ten visual symbols of the country through a national vote.

In the past years, the celebration of Muslim holidays in Russia involves tens of kilometres of blocked traffic around the Moscow Cathedral Mosque. On August 8, over 150,000 Muslims celebrated the Feast of Breaking the Fast in Moscow

According to the US National Security Council report published in 2012, the share of the Muslim population in Russia will grow from 14% to 19% by 2030. This may further fuel social and religious tension and xenophobic sentiments.

CAUCASIAN TIME BOMB

After the Putin regime liquidated the Chechen underground nationalist movement led by Aslan Maskhadov, Shamil Basayev and other nationalists, it essentially re-occupied the republic and set a time bomb under itself. The North Caucasus itself is a growing financial burden on Russia, and its detachment from the rest of Russia is becoming more and more obvious. In the spring of 2013, conscription to the Russian army¹ was not resumed in Chechnya and Dagestan. Meanwhile, Chechnya alone has nearly 80,000 young men ready to serve in the Russian military. So does Dagestan. The leaders of these two republics have asked Russian authorities to start enlistment there. However, only 120 Chechens and 179 Dagestanis were enlisted this spring. The former serve in Kadyrov's (Ramzan Kadyrov is the Head of the Chechen Republic. The office was introduced in 2003 when the Russian government regained control of the region in the Second Chechen War – Ed.) Vostok (East) and Yug (South) units in Chechnya, while according to *The Ukrainian Week's* sources, the latter are ethnic Russians.

Apparently, Russian authorities consider the population of these North Caucasus republics as foreign and dangerous – the citizens of occupied territories who are ready to switch to guerilla warfare at any time, and are thus reluctant to pay for the training of future fighters.

This is hardly a solution, though. The list of potential recruits in Chechnya and Dagestan has already hit 200,000, the equivalent of the army of a European state. Widespread unemployment will push these men to scatter throughout Russia or get military training in Islamist military units.

The Kremlin may keep what are essentially internal colonies attached by force and bribe their elites with generous funding. But it is not ready to recognize them as equal parts of its state. As a result, it is creating threats for the empire itself with its own hands. ■

¹Annual conscription for 12-month military service is mandatory for all male citizens aged 18-27

Francis Fukuyama:

Not all countries will become successful democracies. But I still think of liberal democracy as the only serious alternative

Interviewer:
Oleksandr
Mykhelson

Photo
Andriy
Lomakin



American political scientist Francis Fukuyama is well known in the post-Soviet world. In the late 1980s, Dr. Fukuyama worked on Palestine autonomy and Eastern Europe as member of the US Department of State. His article *The End of History* published in 1989 brought him fame and evolved into the book *The End of History and the Last Man*, out in 1992. In his intellectual bestseller, Dr. Fukuyama said the USSR collapse was a starting point for the triumph of liberal democracy as a system applicable to all the countries on the globe with no exception. On September 10, he visited Kyiv for the second time to deliver a lecture on state building in the modern world at the Kyiv Institute of Journalism. The next day Dr. Fukuyama spoke to *The Ukrainian Week*.

UW: Dr. Fukuyama, I can't help but start with a trivial question. Why had "the end of history" you predicted never happened?

(*Laughing*) I expected this question. Let me explain my term "the end of history". There is a process development over time, and Marx said it was going to be communism. My only observation back in 1989 was that it didn't look like we would ever get back to communism, and if there is an end point to that process it was going to be something like Western liberal democracy, plus a market economy. And I think that's still true, I don't see that there is any alternative point to which we are evolving. But actually getting liberal democracy is a pretty difficult process because it really requires the creation of institutions like state, rule of law, democratic institutions, which are hard to construct for a number of reasons.

UW: Can institutions alone transform a society? Post-Soviet states or, say, Africa have parliaments, courts and media that are formally independent. But all these institutions resemble the Western ones only in form. Political reality in which they operate is profoundly different.

There are a lot of cases where institutions get better. Even Africa has seen a lot of development. States have gotten stronger democratic institutions and there has been a lot of economic growth. Latin America has seen enormous ▶

strength in its basic institutions over the last thirty years.

Unfortunately, in Eastern Europe, the trend has been in the other direction: institutions have been weakening. Take Russia, for example. It's a very strong and despotic state but it is very weak in terms of being able to deliver basic services to the Russian people. The Russian state has not performed well in terms of education, health, and infrastructure. I would say, in many ways it performs worse today, than it did in Soviet times.

UW: Why is this happening? Many in post-Soviet states blame this on the local mentality...

I don't think that it's the mentality. There has been a big institutional and moral vacuum after the Soviet structure disintegrated. People filled it with just a lot of self-interests. Both in Ukraine and Russia, the elite have seen the state as an opportunity to enrich themselves and their families. Once the communist ideology was gone, there was no strong tradition of public service. That is something that needs to be reconstructed over time.

UW: What can serve as the foundation for such reconstruction?

There are a number of things. The United States of the 19th century was an extremely corrupt state. Basically, politicians just used their political offices to give favours to people who voted for them. There was no professionalism in public administration. As the country evolved over time, there was a larger middle class, there was a leadership to try to reform the state. The state began to get better.

UW: Some analysts believe, that democracy, or general election legislation, is the problem. They say that elections only reproduce corruption and lack of professionalism in governments in post-totalitarian states. They mention the 19th-century United States as an opposite model: at that point, voting rights were subject to property and other qualifications, and the voters who met them were voted more responsibly.

That's not true. In the 19th-century United States, politicians pandered to people by giving them jobs and basically bribing them to vote.



But democracy is not the source of the problem. That might be a problem in a country like Venezuela or Thailand, where elite are being undermined by populist politicians that are pushing destructive policies because they are pandering to voters. In Russia and Ukraine, the elite are the source of the problem, it's not the people that are corrupting the elite, it's the elite that are cor-

complete crisis even in the West. Do you think there is a crisis?

It's not a final crisis, although we can see some signs of political decay in the United States and other democracies, because there are a lot of powerful interest groups, polarization and difficulty in making decisions. It was a lot worse in the 1970s. There were popular protests, riots, economic decline... I don't think we're in anything like a final crisis of democracy.

The United States has a special set of problems. The country is highly polarized right now and therefore not able to make basic decisions. For instance, the Congress hasn't passed a budget in three years, and they haven't been able to very seriously address the long-term fiscal deficit that they need to do.



THE STATE HAS TO BE STRONG ENOUGH BUT PEOPLE HAVE TO TRUST THAT IT WILL USE ITS POWER ONLY FOR AGREED-UPON PUBLIC PURPOSES

rupting the people. I don't think people are willing to keep voting for corrupt leaders.

UW: Many say today that liberal democracy is going through a

UW: In your works, you focus on a strong state, the rule of law

and institutions of accountability as the three pillars of the modern political system. Where does trust stand in this system?

Trust is critical. The state has to be strong enough but people have to trust that it will use its power only for agreed-upon public purposes, not in a predatory or corrupt fashion. If citizens don't trust the state, they try to stop and block it. The United States is in that situation a little bit because of its strong tradition of distrust for the state. That's why we can't have a reasonable health care system: the citizens don't trust the state to manage it properly.

UW: Why then do you think Snowden's leaks did not trigger protests in the United States?

The explanation is that they are probably still scared by 9/11. A lot of Americans still think there are all these terrible terrorists out there and the government has to protect them from these terrorists by whatever means are necessary. However, public opinion is changing on this. People may start to get more upset and angry about this.

UW: Do you think that the United States may lose its world leadership if it refuses to act as "the global cop"?

What has happened in American foreign policy is that the Bush Administration launched two costly wars in the Middle East, neither of which really worked out that successfully. And so it has generated a backlash, where popular opinion does not want to get involved in another war. In effect, that is weakness. Both David Cameron and Barack Obama tactically mishandled the Syrian crisis. They could have avoided getting into this big mess that they're in right now. They should have been smarter in a lead-up to the crisis.

Basically, it looks like it is weakness. I'm not so sure, whether it is a long-term decline. I think these things come and go over time. After Vietnam, the United States didn't want to fight another war and seemed to be retreating. But then there was Ronald Reagan comeback.

UW: Speaking of Syria – don't you think the victory of Syrian rebels, many of them Islamic fundamen-

BIO

Yoshihiro Francis Fukuyama was born in Chicago in 1952. He is American in the third generation. His grandfather fled to the United States from the Russo-Japanese War in 1905. His father received a doctorate in sociology and his mother was the daughter of the first president of Osaka City University. Francis Fukuyama initially studied literature at Yale and in Paris but switched to political science later. He earned his PhD in 1981 for a thesis on Soviet threats in the Middle East. Over the 1980-1990s, he worked at federal think tanks and the US Department of State. In the 2000s, Fukuyama distanced himself from the neoconservative movement which he had previously supported throughout his entire career and admitted that he voted for Democratic candidates in the 2004 and 2008 presidential elections. His major publications include *The End of History and the Last Man* out in 1992; *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity*, 1995; *The Great Disruption: Human Nature and the Reconstitution of Social Order*, 1999; *State-Building: Governance and World Order in the 21st Century*, 2004; *America at the Crossroads: Democracy, Power, and the Neoconservative Legacy*, 2006, and more.

talists, is not the best motif for the United States to intervene?

You're right.

UW: So what could be done in this situation?

I don't know. I mean, this is a really difficult situation. I sort of think that if we had provided more weapons to the rebels two years ago, Assad might have been pushed out of power before the opposition got as radical as it is right now. But since we didn't act, things have changed. And now there are really no "good guys" on either side, and it is not clear what the right thing to do is.

UW: The expansion of religious radicalism is just part of perturbations developing in the Islamic world. What future do you see for Muslim countries?

This is a question that is very difficult to answer. I see certain parallels between what is happening in the Middle East right now and European nationalism in the 19th century. In both cases you had that underlying social change, a lot of modernization; urbanization of the formerly poor rural communities. This creates a big problem of identity. People don't know who they are and what they are supposed to believe. In Europe, it was fascism and communism to some extent that filled that gap. These ideologies served as ways of mobilizing people and were obstacles to democracy in Europe at that time.

In the Middle East, it's religion, I think. In many respects, religion plays the same social role that nationalism did in the 19th-century Europe. The real worry

right now is the spreading Sunni-Shia conflict that's going to divide a lot of countries in that region. This could lead to a prolonged religious strife in that area. Just like it was with religious wars between Catholics and Protestants in the 17th-century Europe.

UW: Do you believe that a global political system is possible? Would it be liberal democracy inevitably?

It's certainly possible. If you ask me whether all countries on the planet will become liberal democracies, the answer is probably no. But the question is whether there is a superior social model. What's important, in my opinion, is the ideal we're seeking to emulate. And I still think of liberal democracy as the only serious alternative.

Communism pretended to be an alternative model. Some point at the China model and its authoritarian capitalism. I think that's nonsense. First of all, nobody can imitate China other than a country that is culturally very similar. And it's not that attractive in the end. China is good in one dimension which is economic growth. But it's terrible in terms of the impact on the environment, food safety, property rights and basic dignity of citizens.

UW: Do you think political parties are still a necessary element of modern politics?

Political parties are now in trouble in many countries. That's a real crisis for democracy. Political parties have one function which is to win elections in a democratic system. No other groups can do that. Civil society groups, transnational corporations or labour unions can't do that. So, when political parties are weak and regarded as illegitimate, one of the fundamental institutions of democracy is missing.

UW: How could the relatively weak Ukraine respond to the pressure from Russia in an effort to stop Ukraine's association with the EU?

Ukraine has no choice but to get to the EU as close as possible, I think. That's good for Ukraine both in terms of foreign policy and in terms of domestic institutions. Association with Europe will help Ukraine reform its internal institutions. Now, Ukraine needs as much help as it can get from the EU and the U.S. ■



The Cross Versus the Crescent Moon

The Battle of Vienna took place 330 years ago. It was the final and most significant battle between Christian Europe and the Muslim East

Author:
Oleksiy
Sokyrko

The Vienna victory over the Ottomans on September 12, 1683, was a landmark event in the history of the continent for a number of reasons. By that time, the Ottoman Empire's expansion in Europe had already lasted for several centuries but the Sultan's army had never been as close to the heartland of the united Christian empire and the

legacy of the Roman Caesars – the Holy Roman Empire. The Ottoman seizure of Constantinople in 1453 was followed by the fall of a slew of European capitals and the defeat of many powerful armies. Christian Europe proclaimed that the advance of Islam was the biggest threat and God's punishment. However, it lacked the unity and agreement to join

its efforts in the struggle against the Porte. This lasted until the late 17th century when the conflict escalated to the point of life or death.

THE OTTOMANS MAKE THE FIRST MOVE... AND LOSE

A slew of failed European Crusades that were supposed to end Turkish aggression in the 15-17th



CHRONICLES OF OTTOMAN CONQUESTS IN EUROPE

1389 – Battle of Kosovo. Beginning of the Ottoman Balkan expansion

1396 – Battle of Nicopolis. The Ottoman victory over the coalition of European knights

1453 – Conquest of Constantinople

1521 – Siege of Belgrad

1526 – Battle of Mohács. The Ottomans conquer Hungary

1529 – the first siege of Vienna

1532 – the second siege of Vienna

1543– Siege of Nice

1678 – Siege and fall of Chyhyryn

centuries made it clear that none of the countries under the Ottoman threat could resist it on its own. Meanwhile, potential allies were torn apart by disputes and disagreements: France and Austria struggled for leadership in Western Europe and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth competed for leadership in Eastern Europe (the conflicts in the 17th century largely concerned Ukraine). The Ottoman Empire played skillfully on the ambition-driven squabbles of European monarchs.

In the second half of the 17th century, Istanbul eagerly helped Ukrainian Cossacks in their wars against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and Hungary in their struggle for independence from Austria. The Ottomans used their help to Hungarians in the 1681-1682 revolt led by Prince Imre Tekeli (recognized as the

king of the Upper Hungary by the Turks) in the protestant provinces that were disappointed with economic and church policies of catholic Austria as an excuse to once again invade the territory of the Habsburgs. In spring 1683, the Ottoman Army gathered in Edirne, marched to Serbia, crossed it and got close to Vienna. By mid-July, it had completely blockaded the city. Emperor Leopold I with his court and numerous refugees that outnumbered his army fled the capital and turned to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth for help. Luckily, the two countries had signed a joint anti-Ottoman action treaty a year earlier.

Polish King Jan III Sobieski initially planned to fight the Turks in Podilia and concentrated his forces in Lviv. After Leopold's plea for help, however, the army was sent to Krakow from where it

headed towards the Danube. Strategically, this was the correct decision, but less so politically, since Poland's eastern and southern frontiers remained under threat from Tatars and Hungarians. Thanks to this swift reaction, the allies gathered a huge army above the Danube that included nearly 21,000 Polish soldiers with 28 cannons; 18,500 Habsburg troops and 70 cannons commanded by Charles V, Duke of Lorraine; and almost 29,000 soldiers and 50 cannons from allied German principedoms, including Saxony, Bavaria, Swabia and Franconia, commanded by the Elector of Saxony, Johann Georg III and Prince Georg Friedrich of Waldeck. On September 3, the allies decided to delegate the command of this motley army to Jan Sobieski as the highest ranking person and the most experienced commander in wars against the Ottomans.

He came up with a simple and decisive plan to rescue Vienna: unlike the German and Austrian marshals who suggested luring the Ottomans as far as possible from the city and forcing them to withdraw with ongoing raids, the king intended to deal them a crushing blow in a general battle and force them to capitulate. The attack was to start from the side of the Vienna Woods so that the allies' left wing could cut through the Ottoman camp besieging Vienna and help the city garrison. The right wing, together with the

THE BATTLE OF VIENNA WAS THE LAST CHORD IN THE OTTOMAN ADVANCE, AS WELL AS ITS CONQUESTS AND POWER IN EUROPE

centre, was supposed to go in a general attack, engaging with the enemy's main units. When the battle began, the 80,000-strong Ottoman army looked like a dangerous opponent, albeit visibly exhausted: they had already been dealing with the city's desperate resistance for two months.

On the morning of September 12, the Ottoman commander, Grand Vizier Kara-Mustafa Pasha decided on a sudden attack against the coalition army to prevent the latter from taking conve- ▶

nient positions that would allow them to block his units. His biggest mistake though, was the plan for frequent intense attacks to force Vienna to capitulate. As a result, the troops he sent to attack the Polish-German-Austrian army were too few.

Initially, the allies' left wing moved too far ahead. The Ottomans followed and found themselves cut off from the Danube for a while. In the afternoon, the coalition's army corrected its positions, pushing the Ottoman cavalry on the right flank and was thus ready for the final attack. Thus began at 5p.m. with a frontal attack by the German and Polish cavalry. The Ottomans were pushed back along the entire frontline.

This cavalry attack, led by the famous Polish winged hussars and recognized as the biggest cavalry operation with over 20,000 people involved, was decisive to the outcome of the battle. The Ottomans began to withdraw, which rapidly turned into a chaotic retreat. The trenches and camps they built to besiege Vienna were the only things that saved them from being completely surrounded and destroyed. Although Sobieski's plan to wipe out the Ottoman Army failed, the outcome of the battle was fantastic: Kara-Mustafa Pasha lost 15,000 of his troops, the entire artillery and a huge caravan with generous trophies for the winners.

UKRAINE-RUS BETWEEN EAST AND WEST

At that time, Ukraine had a longer love-hate history with the East that traced back to the times when farmers and nomadic cattle breeders settled on its territory. Throughout the 16th and 17th centuries, constant contacts with the Crimean Khanate and the Ottoman Empire as its suzerain developed a very specific type of relations, in which hostility and resistance were curiously intertwined with completely peaceful pursuits such as trade, mutual borrowings and so on. Almost a third of the Ukrainian nobility, especially that from Kyiv, Left-Bank Ukraine and Podilia, had Turkic surnames. Prince Dmytro Vyshnevetskyi, one of the first Cossack leaders, was best known by his non-Slavic surname, Baida. Even



the word "Cossack" is of Turkic origin.

Over several generations, the Rus nobility and Ukrainian Cossacks got used to living in the steppes where military campaigns regularly alternated with trade transactions, while the buxurians – the Cossack name for



COSSACKS AND THE UKRAINIAN NOBILITY WERE AN INTEGRAL PART OF VIRTUALLY ALL ANTI-OTTOMAN COALITIONS AND MILITARY CAMPAIGNS, INCLUDING THE BATTLE OF VIENNA IN 1683

Muslims - were condemned but hardly treated as strangers. The steppe knights, given the title of the "forefront of Christian Europe" by European polemicists,

were more familiar with Turks and Tatars and better accustomed to wars with them than the West European military. This made Cossacks and the Ukrainian nobility an integral part of virtually all anti-Ottoman coalitions and military campaigns, including the Battle of Vienna in 1683.

Sobieski realized that he would not win this war without the assistance or at least the neutrality of the Cossacks in the spring of 1683 before the Turkish army began its campaign. With financial assistance from the Pope, the Polish king decided to hire three Cossack units of 1,200-1,500 people. However, the enlistment campaign kicked off too late and relations between the Cossacks and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were too unstable and ambiguous. As a result, only a small 150-strong unit of Right-Bank and Zaporizhia Cossacks led by Rittmeister Apostol-Shchurovskyi arrived at Vienna. The rest were crossing the Danube, having joined allied forces in Hungary, when the fate of the besieged Vienna was already decided.

Many units of the royal Polish and Lithuanian army were also late for the Viennese Ball. Yet, the Cossacks got in early enough to participate in the final phase of the campaign when the Ottomans were forced out of Hungary. In November 1683, Cossack units led by Vasyly Iskrytskyi, Semen Korsunets, Jan Myslishewski and Maksym Bulyha invaded the Hungarian town of Szechenyi, which was well-fortified by the Ottomans, in the avant-garde of the royal army and essentially made it surrender without resistance. In autumn of the same year, Cossack units helped Polish troops to defend Podilia which was being attacked by the Turks and Tartars in an attempt to pull part of the Christian coalition army out of there. Another victory overshadowed by the one in Vienna was a march to Moldova by Right-Bank Cossacks, led by Stefan Kunytskyi. After passing through Mohyliv, Yampil, Soroky and Chisinau, the Cossacks met Belgorod and Budjak Tartars (Belgorod and Budjak, as well as Kiliya and Ismail, mentioned below, are all in Odesa Oblast to-

INFO



The Old Pummerin. Casting bells out of trophy cannons is a forgotten tradition. Bronze and copper were very expensive at the time of the battle, but a reminder of great success and generous trophies were more valuable. Turkish cannons won in the Battle of Vienna were melted into a huge bell that weighted 22.5 tonnes in the early 18th century. It was hung at Stefansdom, the main cathedral of the city. Lavishly decorated with images of the Virgin Mary, saints and emperors, the bell had a low timbre, hence its name – boomer in German.

Similarly, in 1695, Cossacks melted trophy cannons to commemorate the siege of the Turkish Kezykermen fortress in Kherson Oblast into a bell for the Church of the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary, the main shrine in Poltava.

Royal constellation. The star atlas Firmamentum Sobiescianum by well-known Gdansk astronomer, Johannes Hevelius, had long been the most complete sky encyclopedia. Compiled in 1690, it immortalized Jan III Sobieski by naming a constellation after his family coat of arms - Scutum Sobiescianum or Sobieski's Shield. The scientist, involved in brewery and book publishing in addition to astronomy, was guided not just by patriotic sentiments, but also simple gratitude: the king was a generous patron and protector of the Gdansk observatory. Scutum Sobiescianum occupies an area of 109.1 sq. degrees and includes 28 stars that can be seen by the naked eye. It is the brightest part of the Milky Way.



ers to speak to each other, were dressed, armed and conducted warfare in a similar manner, and felt like members of one military community. The European cultural space was just coming into being at that point, developing its own system of orientations and contacts. Wars were virtually the only means of intercultural exchange. Fortunately, muses have gradually taken over cannons in the process. ■

day), who were returning from Vienna, scattering them along the Danube. On their way back, the Cossacks took over and robbed Kiliya and Ismail.

The contribution of the Ukrainian nobility in the Vienna victory was not so clear. In the late 17th century, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth included some Ukrainian territories – the Volyn, Podilia and Rus provinces. Cossack units controlled some of these while in others, the rule of the nobility was restored. Even though Right-Bank Ukraine was almost devastated after the bloody turmoil of the Ruin (a period in Ukrainian history between 1657 when Bohdan Khmelnytsky died and 1687 when Ivan Mazepa came to power – **Ed.**) and could not provide enough military, the local nobility still lived “on horseback”, at the ready, whether there was war or peace for several centuries. The ranks of the royal army were filled by the nobility who had moved from Kyiv and Left-Bank Ukraine to Right-Bank Ukraine during the Khmelnytsky Uprising. With little land and the urge to fight, these knights joined the elite Polish hussar and pancerny – armoured cavalry – banners (companies) that fought against the Ottomans near Vienna.

THE VIRGIN MARY, BIG POLITICS AND... COFFEE

Battles are won by commanders, while politicians take credit for the victories. The Vienna Victory was the last chord in the Ottoman advance through Europe, and the beginning of the end of Ottoman victories and the might of the Ottoman Empire. The war on the continent lasted another 16 years, ending with the Karlowitz Peace Treaty in 1699 that brought a time-out in the Ottoman threat but resulted in lengthy squabbles within Europe – the War for the Spanish Legacy (1701–1714) and the Great Northern War (1700–1721). The Habsburg Empire was ultimately unable to gain leadership on the continent, as neighbouring France was carving off the frontiers of the German world from the West while the Habsburgs fought against the Ottomans. This changed in the early 18th century, when Vienna signed a

treaty with Russia, a new European superpower. Two black eagles – Austrian and Russian – began to plot against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, their old ally in anti-Ottoman coalitions, to divide it between themselves at the end of the century and ultimately deprive Cossack Ukraine of its autonomy.

However, this was all yet to come, while in September 1683, Christian Europe was celebrating a triumph of the cross over the crescent moon. Pope Innocent XI designated September 12 as the Feast of the Holy Name of Mary to honour Our Lady of Częstochowa, the protectress of the Polish king and army in the anti-Ottoman campaign. Numerous trophies that came into the hands of the victorious allies played their part in history, becoming the richest collections of Turkish antiquities in Austrian and Polish museums. Others, such as coffee, ended up in the hands of Halychyna (Galician) nobleman Yuriy Franz Kulchytskyi (Jerzy Franciszek Kulczycki in Polish). It started the long-lasting coffee drinking tradition in Europe while Vienna became the first European city where coffee shops acted as clubs for the nobility and bourgeoisie, and the latest news was discussed over a cup of the aromatic drink.

Along with numerous Ottoman war trophies, Turkish musical instruments came into the hands of the European soldiers: cymbals, timpani, tambourines and horns. Legend has it that these instruments were the original basic set of wind instruments and drums for the classic military band. They also introduced Europeans to Turkish music, the motifs of which can be heard in music written by the most famous European composers of the 18th century.

The outcome of the Battle of Vienna was important for both East and West, and had a unique echo in Ukrainian history. Coffee as the “wine of Islam” as well as Turkish weapons, music, clothes and many household items had been widely used in Ukraine long before the battle. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth was equally accepted, as Ukrainian Cossacks and soldiers of the Polish crown did not need interpret-

Harmonizing Ethno Chaos

DakhaBrakha's lead singer Marko Halanevych talks about poor music tastes in Ukraine and post-modernist folklore



PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

Interviewer:
Bohdan
Butkevych

DakhaBrakha is the brightest, most avant-garde and original world music band in Ukraine. Started at the Dakh (Roof) theatre in 2004, it has since gained popularity worldwide. Over the past few years, the band has performed at most top world music festivals in Europe and beyond. Sadly, as is often the case, DakhaBrakha is little known in Ukraine. Most Ukrainians have not even heard of the band, since it does not fit into the miserable standards of domestic show business. In a brief break between the upcoming GogolFest, a contemporary art festival that will take place this weekend in Kyiv, and their tours, Marko Halanevych finds time to talk to *The Ukrainian Week*.

DakhaBrakha started out as a theatre project. Vlad

Troitsky (Dakh founder and art director – **Ed.**) wanted to experiment with Ukrainian folklore, so launched a cycle of relevant plays for which he needed a musical accompaniment. What astonished him too was that communication between Ukrainian artists from different “workshops” was almost non-existent. So he launched what can be considered art parties at Dakh. People started to come and that’s how I met the girls. They were then singing in a band called Kralytsia. They were professionally trained in folklore and had been singing since early childhood. By that time, they already had a great repertoire.

As theatre people, we care a lot about our style. We realized from the very beginning that

we can’t perform in national costumes because, after all, we don’t play authentic folk music. We described our style as ethno chaos and realized that it flowed with the global river of world music. So we needed costumes to match. Look at our hats. They’ve become a unique element of our appearance. The idea to wear them came from our actress, Tetiana Vasylenko. We spent a lot of time searching other cultures for similar women’s hats – none did. There is something similar in Bulgaria, but they are men’s hats and only worn on certain holidays.

We don’t really invest in promotion. We may seem naïve but we believe that success and fame should come by themselves. We don’t see any sense in imposing ourselves on people from every billboard in town. We promote ourselves with what we do – music. We spent the past six months touring Europe and Canada. After our concert at GogolFest we are going on a month-long tour in the US. This is largely thanks to our participation in the huge WOMAX presentation fest last year, which took place in Greece. Any world music band can apply but the selection process is very tough. This music forum is oriented at promoters and producers rather than the average audience. That’s where they look at new bands and performers. Otherwise, you have to be a pop artist with someone investing tons of money into your promotion, although even this no longer guarantees success. Pop music is the same all over the world – you make music that fits the format, invest and earn it back. Ethnic music, on the other hand, is always unique and original to every nation.

We try to experience all our songs along with the audience. Of course, we want people to have fun at our concerts so we end them with quick and energizing tunes. But, we always play slow,

dramatic and atmospheric pieces as well, including those composed for the theatre. We don't play to impress people with our technique because we don't think of ourselves as virtuoso musicians, and music is not a sport. Instead, we want our sounds to create certain visual images in people's minds, and emotional experiences. Our main aim here is to open up to people, and encourage them to open up to us so that we part as friends at the end of the concert.

We're more likely to perform at a City Day in Stockholm than in an average Ukrainian town. Ukraine's show business has a very strict format: everything is paid for and kept for insiders. Since DakhaBrakha is not shown on TV, it does not exist for most people here. The Internet obviously creates an important alternative media platform, but television is still dominant in shaping the preferences of the Ukrainian mass audience. This year, young locals at Ethnosur, a huge Spanish world music festival, sang our songs along with us. I think they found our lyrics online.


Most Ukrainians have very poor taste in music. This is the result of our historical turmoil, of course. DakhaBrakha is primarily based on Ukrainian folklore, even if this is not that obvious or simple in our interpretation. Unfortunately, most people need something simpler. I remember playing at MED, a festival in Loulé, Portugal. We were happy to play there because we knew a lot of Ukrainians would come (Ukrainians make up one of the biggest migrant communities in Portugal – Ed.) and we would love to play for them. Indeed, they sat in the first three rows. When we started playing, we realized that they didn't understand our music at all. The climax came when a guy with a huge moustache yelled out, "Play kalinka-malinka!" "Are you really from Ukraine?" I shouted back. But this example clearly shows that even abroad, our people still relate to the simulacra imposed on them through decades of propaganda. They are not yet ready to accept something new.

Ukraine desperately needs variety in all spheres. We have

DAKHABRAKHA DISCOGRAPHY



Na dobranich
(Goodnight),
2006



Yahudky
(Berries), 2007



Na mezhi
(On the Verge),
2009



Light, 2010



Khmeleva
Project, a joint
project with
PortMone, 2012

to rethink and modernize our folk culture. In fact, as a post-modernist band DakhaBrakha is trying to give new life to our grandmas' songs. Authentic folklore is closely tied to specific actions or holiday seasons, such as harvest, Christmas, or Kupala Night. As authentic rituals disappear, the songs disappear as well and a whole layer of culture dies out. Even if you get a grandma on stage, everything in her will tense up and you still won't hear live authentic music.

Ukrainian culture is much more natural when it is created in the Ukrainian language. Russian-language Ukrainian culture will always remain on the periphery, especially when it comes to literature. That's why I don't really believe some of our Russian-speaking writers, who claim that it makes no difference what language you write in and that they have a better feel for Russian, but that it doesn't make them any less Ukrainian. What will the world consider them to be? Of course, one can feel like a citizen of the world, of the planet – as does Kira Muratove (Ukrainian film director – Ed.). In fact, we are all the citizens of this planet. But for DakhaBrakha, it is of the utmost importance to remain Ukrainian because we want our music to lift the spirit and boost the confidence of our people.

The European audience is much more open. People come to festivals and concerts with a positive attitude wanting to enjoy music and communication. By contrast, Ukrainians can only let themselves go when they are drunk. We

have so many insecurities, no faith in ourselves and are willing to listen to anything that comes from Moscow or America just because it's foreign. This is a broader social problem, not limited to music alone. Unfortunately, we lived as slaves for a very long time, so can't immediately be free. Currently, at best, we are at the level of freed slaves. It takes generations and the right focus of development to change this.

Some say that world music is becoming less popular; that the peak of its popularity was in the 1990s and that it is now hard to surprise Europeans. They have seen everything from Australian aboriginals to the Indians of Tierra del Fuego. But you have to book a camping spot at Rudolfstadt, one of the biggest folk music festivals in Germany, three years in advance, or you'll end up staying 30 km away. Despite the overall economic recession, the European festival movement is thriving.

DakhaBrakha wants to live and work in Ukraine. This may sound pompous (sincere words are always pompous), but this is our land, where our families live. This is where all the mental and spiritual power, which helps us create our music, is found. I've never seen really happy immigrants. They may have money and socialize well but I still think that people work most effectively in their homeland. Whenever possible, people have to take every effort to make life better for themselves and their children here in Ukraine. ☐



PHOTO: VADYM KULIKOV

Dig Deeper



That's the message of the sixth album by American punk-rock band Gogol Bordello. Yevhen Hudz, the band's leader, says that the new record *Pura Vida Conspiracy* is about human internal potential. Other musicians

confirm this: the lyrics on the previous albums focused on the world more, while in this one, Yevhen talks about what is going on inside him. The newest album still has the band's daredevil feel to it, but turns out more intimate and sincere. It seems like the vocalist finally got tired after five albums of craze and sat down by the living room fireplace to tell the real story.

The album was produced by Andrew Scheps known for working with the Red Hot Chili Peppers and The Mars Volta. This is Gogol Bordello's first album after three years of silence since their previous record, *Trans-Continental Hustle* produced by Rick Rubin that came out in

2010. Back then, the record landed ninth in the Alternative Albums chart and sold 67,000 copies in the U.S. alone. The new album, sparks contrasting reactions: some fans scream that the record is fantastic, especially the second part of

it. Others claim that there are no hits on this one compared to the previous record.

Ukrainian fans pay special attention to the band's music. Born in Kyiv Oblast, Yevhen Hudz left Ukraine but gave a breakthrough for its music in the world. The band plays to please both Ukrainian and international audiences – this must be the key to its success. For the Western audience, Gogol Bordello is relaxing controlled chaos that brings many back to the roots. For Ukrainians, the band's vocalist Yevhen is someone close and understandable, and a model of success. Gogol Bordello invades the music scene with a mix of

Hutsul notes, Odesa charm and unforgettable aesthetics. This authenticity makes it popular across nations.

Pura Vida Conspiracy translates Gogol Bordello's key message: be yourself and travel wherever you wish because borders are just scars on the planet's face, Yevhen sings in a new song. This seems true and authentic since the lead singer himself lives a transnational life. Authenticity is bound to reach out to people: most of them have a dream of freedom deep inside, where it's just them and the road, and nothing to hold them back. Sadly, nothing to return to as well – the violins and Yevhen's slight vibrato convey this sadness. This is the essence of the new record: if you dig deeper, you will find a serious grain under the buffoonery surface. Yevhen plays fool to share his personal pains. But he does this softly, as if after long all-night talks at home when all words are said and no longer matter. Even the sad songs like *I Just Realised* sound wise rather than hopeless.

Events

20 September, 7 p.m. — 20 September 8 p.m. — 21 September, 8:30 p.m. —

Jamala
Green Theatre
(2, Parkova Doroha, Kyiv)

The singer's fans and those who appreciate good music will have a unique opportunity to enjoy songs from Jamala's latest album, *All or Nothing*. It includes twelve tracks: eleven original songs and a beautiful Crimean Tatar folksong, *Unutmasan*. New vivid melodies, in combination with the incredible charisma and powerful vocals of the singer, will make the evening of live music unforgettable. In addition to songs from the new album, Jamala will be singing her well-known hits – *Smile, It's Me Jamala, You're Made Of Love* and more.



Z.OrangeDay
Sam's Steak House
(56, vul. Radyanska, Luhansk)

Daring improvisations, sound experiments and the best jazz bands of Luhansk – guests of the 10th Z.OrangeDay jazz festival can expect all this and more. The atmosphere of this year's festival will be set by the Michael Zuyev Group, Keep A Talk, Dagro and Friend's and the fans of old-jazz – Jazz&Son's. Jazzmen from Russia and Serbia will perform at Z.OrangeDay as special guests. Jam-sessions, which have now become a traditional element of the festival, will take place before and after the concert. A charge of positive and good energy is guaranteed on this autumn evening.



Marinita
(Ukraine-USA-Azerbaijan)
Atmosfera 360 (57/3, vul. Velyka Vasylykivska, Kyiv)


The multi-national band Marinita will be performing on the capital's stage within the Framework of the Art of Tolerance campaign. Renowned American bassist Teymur Phell, Ukrainian vocalist Marinita and Azerbaijani percussionist Orhan Agabeyli will give a concert not only to offer the audience some good music, but also in protest against xenophobia and discrimination in Ukraine. The ideal intonation of Marinita's singing invigorates the music, while the harmonious vibration of the instruments adds exotic and powerful ethnic overtones. This is what creates the depth of the band's performances - hard to explain, but easy to feel.



Civilization: There and Back

257 pieces by Daniel Chodowiecki are part of the Kharkiv Art Museum collection debuting in Kyiv this month. The painter of Polish origin worked among German elite in the epoch of Enlightenment. Following the spirit of his time, he created paintings affirming intellectual and moral values. Sophisticated in technique and naïve in plots, they represent German Realism. The show in Kyiv displays several series where Chodowiecki reflects on the habits of burghers and aristocrats, and illustrates texts by Voltaire, Rousseau, Beaumarchais and Lesage that were popular in his time. His realistic pieces are interpretations of the traditional *dance macabre* – dance of death – genre. Skeletons appear to take life from a king, a scientist, a prostitute and a pauper. Each piece will fit on a hand palm so you would have to get real close to see the details.

The public will also have a chance to see 10 works by American painter Rockwell Kent stored in the backrooms of the Khanenko Museum in Kyiv for fifty years. Pure colours and geometric shapes, authentic peace of landscapes



and philosophic compositions – Kent's artistic and personal life had much in common with a well-known painter and theosophist, Nicholas Roerich. Both traveled to unseen countries and lived with aboriginals untouched by civilization. Both viewed landscapes as expression of the transcendent. Kent visited Greenland, Alaska, Tierra del Fuego and Northern states of America. His paint-

ings portray the grandeur of this exotic nature. Kent was interested in many things apart from painting. He was also a

Both exhibitions are at the Khanenko Museum at 15/17, vul. Tereshchenkivska, in front of the Taras Shevchenko park. Daniel Chodowiecki's works are displayed through October 20 and Rockwell Kent's show closes on September 22

25 September, 7 p.m. — From 26 September — 28 September, 7 p.m.

Erisioni
International Centre for Culture and Arts
(1, vul. Instytutska, Kyiv)

The legendary Georgian academic ensemble is visiting Ukraine once more. It will present the public with one of the most large-scale, ethnic style shows. With the help of national songs and dances, the artists demonstrate samples of folklore from the whole of Georgia. By changing their costumes and shifting to different zones of temperament of the Georgian people, they also paint an image of the Georgian spirit. The ensemble's performances are acclaimed as all-encompassing, while the troupe itself – as a "folklore museum". And no wonder, the creative activity of the ensemble has continued for more than 100 years now.



Manhattan Short Film Festival
Kyiv Cinema
(19, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)

One of the major short film festivals will traditionally present a selection of ten best films-finalists, which were chosen from the 600 applications received from 48 countries of the world. The worldwide battle of directors – this is how the festival is actually referred to. This year's programme includes short films from France, England, Finland, Australia, the USA and Ireland. The range of subjects addressed covers the most diverse facets of people's lives – from a love affair in *No Comments* and family tragedy in *Friday* to portraits of Moscow, Pakistan and Quebec through the eyes of travellers in *Portraits de Voyages*.



Okean Elzy
Palats Sportu (Palace of Sports)
(1, Sportyvna Ploshcha, Kyiv)

The rock group's large-scale stadium tour to promote its new album will culminate with a resonant concert in the capital. The tour began in May with a performance at the Spartak Stadium in Mukachevo, Zakarpattia. In all, the band performed in 27 cities of Ukraine. They are planning a world tour in the future, to promote their album of twelve tracks. New hits, especially *Strilyay* (Shoot), *Z Neyu* (With Her), *Na Nebi* (In Heaven) and others, quickly found favour with their fans, while the album itself was well-received by both Ukrainian and foreign music critics.



A Guide to Majestic Wooden Churches

Slender Gothic towers, lavish Baroque iconostases, and solid timber domes that trace back to pre-Christian times – *The Ukrainian Week* takes you on a tour of the unique wooden churches scattered along the Polish-Ukrainian border

This year, UNESCO added 16 wooden churches to its List of World Heritage Sites—eight in Ukraine, eight in Poland. Lviv Oblast in Ukraine and Podkarpackie and Lublin provinces in Poland have four each; Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia Oblasts in Ukraine have two each. If you have enough time, you can see many other masterpieces of sacred wooden architecture along the way. Unfortunately, not all of Ukraine's antique wooden churches made it onto UNESCO's list.

Before applying to UNESCO, Ukrainian members of the initiative committee examined hundreds of wooden churches along the Ukrainian-Polish border, choosing eight that met UNESCO's criteria: they are unique, well preserved, open to visitors, and their congregations support their addition to the list. Overall, most of the wooden churches designated as architectural heritage sites in Ukraine are located in the west of the country. Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia Oblasts alone are home to 1,089 of Ukraine's 2,353 wooden churches.

IVANO-FRANKIVSK

We begin our tour in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast with its 462 wooden churches qualified as architectural heritage sites. The first town we suggest visiting is Rohatyn (1). It was the birthplace of Nastya Lisovska, the legendary Roxelana or Hürrem Haseki Sultan – the legal wife of the Ottoman Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent. The local church is one of the oldest preserved wooden churches in Ukraine, though its precise age is a matter of

Author:
Oleksandr Syrtsov



THE UKRAINIAN-POLISH ROUTE BETWEEN UNESCO SITES INCLUDES MANY MORE MASTERPIECES OF SACRED WOODEN ARCHITECTURE THAT ARE NOT ON ITS HERITAGE LIST

Lviv, Ivano-Frankivsk and Zakarpattia Oblasts are home to **1,089** of **2,353** Ukraine's wooden churches

scientific controversy. According to popular opinion, it was built in the early 17th century. The official date, however, is 1598: the local priest Ipolyt Dzerovych found the date carved on the northern wall of the central zrub – a solid-timber section. The shrine has one of the oldest and most beautiful Renaissance-Baroque iconostases in Ukraine

dating back to 1650. The church and its iconostasis attained their status as works of art at the time of Austro-Hungarian rule, when the shrine was first listed as an architectural heritage site. In 1963, it was added to a list of national historical sites for a second time. In the 1980s, it was restored by Ivan Mohytych, a top Ukrainian expert. Today, the church acts as a branch of the Ivano-Frankivsk art museum while also serving religious functions. The National Bank issued a memorial coin depicting the church in 2009.

The village of Nyzhniy Verbizh (2) in Kolomyia County is known as a crossroads of four mountain

rivers, including the mighty and turbulent Prut. It is also the birthplace of Hryhoriy Semeniuk, an ally of legendary Carpathian outlaw Oleksa Dovbush – a folk hero often compared to Robin Hood. Local lore claims that Semeniuk began construction of the shrine in his village. It is unique for its five domes built in the traditional Hutsul¹ style and covered with engraved tin. The church was actually built in 1808 but the interior still contains icons from the late 18th century. Regular services are still held in the church today.


ZAKARPATTIA

We move westward through Zakarpattia Oblast, home to 110 preserved wooden churches recognized as architectural heritage sites. One is the Church of Ascension or Strukiv Church in the village of Yasinia (3). Local lore claims that the village's founder, Ivan Struk, built the church out of gratitude to God for saving his sheep in a storm. The modern Church of the Ascension, however, dates back to 1824. It is one of the best examples of sacred Hustul architecture. Inside, there is an iconostasis from the late 18th century and a number of 17th-century icons. Perhaps the local lore is true after all...

The village of Uzhok (4) in Velykyi Bereznyi County is on the border of Zakarpattia Oblast near the Uzhok Pass where the river Uzh begins. The local Church of St. Michael the Archangel is one of the county's symbols and a popular subject for painters. It was built in 1745 in the Boyko² style. Similar churches are widespread in moun-

¹ Hutsuls are an ethno-cultural group of highlanders inhabiting the Ukrainian and Romanian Carpathians. They once spoke a distinct dialect of Ukrainian, but standardized education introduced by Stalin nearly wiped it out. All three Carpathian ethnic groups – Hutsuls, Boykos and Lemkos – have very distinct cultures and arts that are quite different from the rest of Ukraine. This has mostly survived in the Ukrainian Carpathians, especially in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast. Typical Hutsul churches were built in the shape of the cross with three or five flat layered domes.

² Boykos are an ethnic group that traditionally lived in the Carpathians. Today, most register themselves as Ukrainians and live in Ukraine or Poland. The wooden church architecture of the Boyko region typically has a three-domed design with the domes arranged in one line, the middle one larger than the others.



tainous parts of Lviv and Ivano-Frankivsk Oblasts. The Uzhok shrine stands atop a hill and fits harmoniously with the surrounding landscape.

LVIV

Across the Uzhok Pass is Lviv Oblast, home to 517 of Ukraine's wooden churches. The first one that we will visit is in the village of Matkiv (5) in Turka County, several kilometres from the border with Zakarpattia. The most beauti-

ful element of this village at the source of the Stryi River is the wooden Church of the Holy Mother of God re-consecrated in honour of St. Demetrius. Like the church in Uzhok, it is in the Boyko style, although it differs from Zakarpattian Boyko architecture. Built in 1838, the church houses an iconostasis from the 1840s.

Drohobych (6) is the largest town in this list, hosting a few dozen architectural sites. St. George's Church stands out in par-

ticular. In 1656, it was moved from the village of Nadiyiv, now in Dolyna County, Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast. The chapel of the Introduction of the Blessed Virgin Mary built over the choir balcony makes the shrine's structure unique.

Zhovkva County (7) in Lviv Oblast has two churches on the UNESCO list. One is the Holy Trinity Church in Zhovkva. Once a residence of the Polish kings Sobieski, the town will probably end up on the UNESCO list someday as well. ▶



Its church was originally built in 1601 but was destroyed in a fire, so the modern building dates back to 1720. It contains 18th-century murals and a five-layer Baroque iconostasis created by the masters of the Zhovkva Painting and Carving School under Ivan Rutkovych. Today, the building acts as a church and museum.

Potelych, a village on the Ukrainian-Polish border, hosts several architectural sites and a German military cemetery. The most interesting building here is the Church of the Descent of the Holy Spirit. Built in 1502 on the site of the former Church of Boris and Glib, its construction was financed with donations from local potters. In the 1970s, skilled Lviv masters Ivan Mohytych and Bohdan Kindzelskyi restored it.

POLAND

Once your tour of Ukrainian wooden churches is over in Potelyczy (8), cross the border at Rava-Ruska to the border village of Hrebennie. Very close to the border is the Polish village of Radruż (9) in

Lubaczów Powiat (County), Podkarpackie (Subcarpathian) Voivodeship. Built in 1583, its interior still contains icons from the late 17th century. Some are at the museum in the Łańcut castle. The church now acts as a museum.

Another wooden shrine near the Krakovets-Korchova border crossing is the Church of the Birth of the Blessed Virgin Mary in the village of Chotyniec (10). Until World War II it was a large village mostly inhabited by Ukrainians. Today it is part of Jaroslaw Powiat (County) in the Podkarpackie (Subcarpathian) Voivodeship. The main architectural site in this village is a church built in the Halychyna style in around 1600. The shrine still houses an 18th-century iconostasis probably dating back to 1671.

Smolnik (11), a village in Podkarpackie Voivodeship, was part of the Lemko-Rusyn Republic³ in the years of the national liberation struggle. The Republic existed from November 4, 1918, through January 23, 1919, and ended up part of Poland after a swap of terri-

tories in 1951. The functional Church of St. Michael the Archangel located there was built in 1791. This is the only three-domed Boyko church preserved on the territory of Poland. It is also interesting for its unique icon of the Assumption of the Holy Mother of God dating back to 1748 and its 18th-century murals portraying prophets from the Old Testament.

The village of Turynsk (12), a bit west of Smolnik, in Sanok Powiat, is home to another Church of St. Michael the Archangel. It is in the Lemko style, since many Ukrainian Lemkos used to live in the neighbourhood. Built in the early 19th century, it was rebuilt and expanded many times. Today, it is a functioning Polish Autocephalous Orthodox church. It also hosts unique 19th-century icons by Joseph Bukowczyk.

Four more wooden churches are located near each other in the Malopolska Voivodeship near the Polish-Slovak border (13, 14, 15, 16). Gorlice Powiat has the St. Paraskevia Church built in 1811. It is considered to be the best-preserved church in the Western Lemko style. Inside is a 1904 iconostasis by Mykhailo Bohdanovskyyi portraying saintly Kyivan Rus leaders Volodymyr and Olga.

Another piece of Western Lemko architecture is the Protection of the Blessed Virgin Church in the village of Owczary. Built in

The Renaissance-Baroque iconostasis of the church in Rohatyn is among the oldest and most beautiful in Ukraine



MOST WOODEN CHURCHES RECOGNIZED AS ARCHITECTURAL HERITAGE SITES IN UKRAINE ARE IN THE WESTERN PART OF THE COUNTRY

1710, its style has many Baroque elements, including an iconostasis painted in 1712 by artist Ivan Medytskyi.

Our tour of wooden churches on the Polish-Ukrainian border ends in Powroźnik, a village in Malopolska (Lesser Poland) Voivodeship where the Church of St. James the Less towers. This Western Lemko church was built in 1600 but changed considerably after being relocated in 1814. It has unique murals by Pavlo Radynskyyi dating back to 1607 – older than all other wooden churches in the region. ■

³ Lemkos are an ethnic group of Ukrainian highlanders who lived in the Carpathian regions that are now part of Poland. They spoke their own dialect of Ukrainian. The community was dispersed during forced resettlement in Operation Vistula in 1939. Their churches traditionally feature a dominating belfry tower over the western section, while the middle and eastern towers are each lower than the one preceding it, creating a dynamic composition.

Lucrative Lifesavers

The hopes and perils of betting on cancer treatments

New weapons are emerging in the war on cancer. That is good news not just for patients but also for drug companies. The biggest ones, faced with falling sales as their existing medicines go off-patent, are investing in smaller firms with promising cancer treatments under development, hoping to secure the next blockbuster.

On August 25th Amgen, the world's biggest biotechnology company by sales, said it would pay USD 10.4bn for another American firm, Onyx. The target firm's crown jewel is Kyprolis, a treatment for multiple myeloma, a type of blood cancer. The next day AstraZeneca, a British drugs firm, said it would snap up Amplimmune, an American firm working on ways to trigger the immune system to fight cancer.

Oncology is attractive for several reasons. First, the understanding of cancer is evolving rapidly. In the 20th century treatment relied on surgery, radiation and chemotherapy. These now seem rudimentary. Immunotherapy—getting the immune system to attack cancer—has gone from theory into practice. Genomics has helped scientists target specific mutations that promote cancer. Another area of excitement for cancer researchers is epigenetics, which alters how a gene acts without meddling with the sequence of DNA.

Second, regulators have speeded up their approval of cancer drugs. Of the 39 medicines approved by America's Food and Drug Administration (FDA) in 2012, 11 were for cancer. These included Kyprolis, which was granted "accelerated approval", based on a smaller clinical trial than usual, for use as a last-ditch

Big drugmakers are keen to develop their own cancer drugs, form partnerships with smaller firms that have promising treatments in the pipeline, and buy such companies outright

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The cost of combating cancer

Price of a full course of treatment in the US*

Drug	Company	Type of cancer treated	Cost, \$
Tykerb	GlaxoSmithKline	Breast	34,119
Pomalyst	Celgene	Myeloma	52,227
Zelboraf	Roche/Daiichi Sankyo	Melanoma	54,463
Tarceva	Roche/Astellas	Pancreatic and lung	55,218
Inlyta	Pfizer	Kidney	58,706
Xalkori	Pfizer	Lung	66,780
Bosulif	Pfizer	Leukaemia	81,813**
Revlimid	Celgene	Myeloma	95,390

*Selected cancer treatments approved since 2004

**Maximum: length of treatment varies by patient

Source: ISI Group

treatment for patients with multiple myeloma.

Third, and most controversial, cancer drugs can fetch exorbitant prices, particularly in America (see table). "The idea is that there's nothing else available, so you can ask for a high price," explains Howard Liang of Leerink Swann, an investment bank. A typical course of treatment with Kyprolis lasting, say, five months, can cost around USD 50,000.

Little surprise, then, that big drugmakers are keen to develop their own cancer drugs, form partnerships with smaller firms that have promising treatments in the pipeline, and buy such companies outright. Kyprolis was first developed by a small firm called Proteolix, which was bought by Onyx, now acquired by Amgen. In 2009 Bristol-Myers Squibb, an American drug giant, paid USD 2.4bn for Medarex, which had an experimental immunotherapy drug. That drug, for melanoma (a skin cancer), is now sold in America for USD 120,000 for a full course of treatment.

There are risks, however. Even a drug seemingly destined for fame and fortune can fall flat. The FDA has approved Kyprolis only

for patients who have already tried at least two other treatments. Its annual sales could reach USD 3bn, reckons Goldman Sachs. But that requires approval beyond America, and data showing that Kyprolis is worth giving to earlier-stage patients. AstraZeneca is buying Amplimmune largely for two cancer drugs still in early testing. "If you are not willing to take risks, you cannot be in this area," says Bahija Jallal, an executive at AstraZeneca.

The biggest question in the long term is whether health insurers and governments will keep paying up. Onyx and Bayer, a German firm, share the profits of Nexavar, a kidney-cancer drug. Last year Indian regulators granted a local firm a "compulsory licence" to sell Nexavar copies for a fraction of Bayer's price. The response elsewhere is less extreme. But companies face new scrutiny over their prices, particularly in Europe. In April more than 100 experts in chronic myeloid leukaemia (another blood cancer) signed a paper to protest against the high cost of drugs. For now, however, Amgen should be able to continue charging handsomely for Kyprolis. ■

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