

DEALS WITH RUSSIA:  
DEFEAT OR VICTORY?

SCENARIOS FOR UKRAINE IN 2014:  
A YEAR WITHOUT SPRING

STORMY NIGHTS ON THE MAIDAN  
AND THE ART OF FREEDOM

international edition

# The Ukrainian Week

№ 23-24 (65-66) DECEMBER 2013

## A REVOLUTION OF GENERATIONS



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Тиждень



**Vitaliy Hayduk (pictured) sells Evolution Media holding, the publisher of Komentari (Comments) and the English-language Kyiv Weekly.** According to some sources, it was bought by people close to the government. Many aspects point at Serhiy Kurchenko

**Ukraine ends its OSCE chairmanship under a storm of criticism for violation of human rights through violent crackdown on protesting citizens**



**The offices of Batkivshchyna and several independent publications are searched. Law enforcers seize servers**

# Dangerous Liaisons

Author:  
**Yuriy Makarov**

So what are the December 17 deals with Russia? A victory or a defeat? They surely look like a bitter defeat at first sight. Viktor Yanukovich bypassed the EuroMaidan protesters blocking the runway for his airplane, flew to Moscow and brought back a suitcase with billions of dollars and a gas discount certificate. We will find out sooner or later what other debt liabilities, promises and dependences he brought back in that suitcase along with the money. What matters now is that our hopes for European integration were buried for long. Is this the end? Yes and no. Nobody said it was easy.

On Tuesday night, right after we heard the breaking news from Moscow, opposition leaders announced the list of EuroMaidan's victories accomplished so far. Virtually all people arrested after December 1 clashes were released; several top officials were under investigation for the violent crackdown on peaceful protesters, and the main thing: Ukraine did not enter the Customs Union! Obviously, politicians had to say something to encourage a dozen thousand people who came to the Independence Square after work; to tell them that they were there for a reason and not all was lost yet, but we should still be cautious and carry on with our struggle. It

may have encouraged some, but not many.

Yanukovich acted like a winner who outwitted Europe and Russia, and got USD 15bn for Eurobonds and cheap gas, by contrast to the opposition that had nothing to offer but promises. Why then Vladimir Putin looked so triumphant during negotiations and the signing of the deals? My fellow journalists from Russia who watch their president much more often than we do said that they had not seen Putin so happy in quite a while. He did not look like someone outwitted by Yanukovich at all.

So, what is it exactly that the Russian president celebrates? Resumption of serial production of An-124 airplanes? Construction of a bridge through the Kerch Strait in the Crimea? Access for Ukrainian sweets and cheese to Russian grocery stores? Or joint celebration of Taras Shevchenko's 200th anniversary mentioned by Yanukovich? This doesn't seem funny at all. Could it be about the fact that a loyal man stays in power in a strategic neighbour-country?

Indeed, Ukraine did not enter the Customs Union officially. However, the Europepause is similar to menopause in the Kremlin's eyes. It is irreversible. The main thing about all this is that Ukraine remains in the Russian orbit for an unknown period in future. "Russia and Ukraine agreed to coordinate foreign political steps more closely, primarily over strategic stability



and security in Europe and counteraction to new global challenges," Vladimir Putin said after negotiations with Viktor Yanukovich. In the morning that day, Russia's Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov spoke more harshly. He seemed to refer to European partners: Ukraine has to negotiate with the EU in a three-partite format... This seems like nothing but the new Kolomak Articles whereby Ukrainian hetmans were banned to establish foreign relations independently 326 years ago. Translated into comprehensible language, this means the loss of independence and sovereignty, nothing less.

The month  
in history

20 December 1753

**Russian tsar orders liquidation of internal duties and cancels customs border between Hetmanshchyna and the rest of the Russian Empire**



21 December 1988

**Antonov An-225 Mriya (Dream), the largest airlift cargo aircraft in the world designed by the Kyiv Antonov Design Bureau, makes the first flight**



22 December 1833

**Marko Vovchok (Maria Vilinska), Ukrainian writer, translator and author of Narodni Opovidannia (Folk Stories), is born**



**U.S. Department of State considers options to respond to the latest events in Ukraine, including sanctions against top officials, Spokesperson Jen Psaki says**

**Yulia Tymoshenko calls on Ukraine to rise and on the international community to stop the authoritarian regime in Ukraine through financial and visa sanctions:** "No talks with the Bankova; no roundtables with them. Immediate resignation of Yanukovich and his circle is the only option"



**Russian opposition leader Boris Nemtsov is banned entrance to Ukraine.** Ukrainian authorities do not provide any explanations

**Re-election to parliament take place in five troubled districts.** Opposition candidate wins in just one of them (see more on p. 6)



The quarterly revision of the gas price ratio means that Putin will have Yanukovich on a very short leash. The price will soar as soon as Ukraine's president takes one wrong step. It is now virtually impossible to do anything to further decrease Ukraine's dependence on Gazprom. The price of USD 268.5 per 1,000 cu m makes the LNG terminal in Odesa or any other diversification projects irrelevant. The only promising option left in this situation is continued long-term shale gas exploration by international companies. This is possible since the Family has personal interests in it.

The purchase of Ukrainian Eurobonds worth USD 15bn by Russia is a leash, too. Moscow will do it in tranches provided that Yanukovich sits quiet and obeys the Kremlin. Otherwise, a comparison to financial assistance from Western to Eastern Germany Putin mentioned many years ago will arise again: "they are paying for the unification of the nation, and what are we paying for?"

If Yanukovich manages to get through 2015 as president and tries to turn to Europe again, he will be given the bill immediately. By then, it will amount to USD 45-50bn of Ukraine's gross debt to Russia.

Now, Ukraine's obsolete industry faces no "negative implications" from European integration. Its modernization is postponed indefinitely. And we have yet to see how wide Russia will open its markets to Ukraine's uncompetitive goods. Over nine months of 2013, trade between the two countries shrank 15%, stifled by sanctions against dairy products and sweets, as well as pipes, vegetables, train cars and paper. In 2012, it went down 10% or USD 4.5bn without any efforts on the part of the Kremlin. Nobody can guarantee that the import replacement policy in Russia and the ousting of competitors from the Russian market will stop in 2014.

What is left for the EuroMaidan in this case? Well-informed sources claim that there will be no significant reshuffles in the top cabinets anytime soon. Even Mykola Azarov will remain in office despite everyone's reluctance to see him there. The situational majority in parliament the opposition was promising to get

soon will likely vanish. The pyramid of the regime has survived and hardly shaken. However, this does not mean that Ukrainians should stop shaking it altogether.

Maidan is not a mere demonstration. It is a long-term action. Clearly, the EuroMaidan – or Maidan Sich dubbed so after the Cossack Zaporizhzhia Sich - will not last too long. However, according to the Democratic Initiatives Foundation survey, 72.4% of its permanent participants intend to stay there "as long as it takes". Maidan will remain the factor of Ukrainian politics in the memory of Ukraine and international community, if not in the minds of those in power. Another crack-down on it will only fuel protest sentiments.

The authorities are most likely to launch individual crack-downs now (read more on p. 10 and 14). They will take revenge now. Revenge is inherent to their rules and concepts, so activists will face persecutions, interrogations, intimidations and mudslinging. But the experience of effective joint action will not vanish. People have savoured freedom, courage, responsibility and trust for each other. Communities of proactive citizens have to respond with local Maidans to every violation of human rights or abuse of power. No functionary or representative of the regime should now feel impudent.

What matters now is not how much longer political and civil activists will remain on the Kyiv Maidan. What matters is how long the individual Maidan of dignity, disobedience and trust for other citizens will live in every Ukrainian ignited by the big Maidan. ▣

23 December 1873



**Taras Shevchenko Scientific Society (NTSh since 1892) is founded in Lviv**

24 December 1798



**Adam Mickiewicz, Polish poet and activist of the national liberation movement, is born**

25 December 1989



**Special military tribunal convicts Nicolae Ceausescu of mass murder. A firing squad shoots him and his wife Elena**

26 December 1898



**Pierre and Marie Curie report the discovery of the radioactive element radium**

# Rehearsing the Defeat of the Maidan

The EuroMaidan lulled the opposition. As a result, pro-government candidates snapped up victory in four of the five problem districts

**T**he opposition was thrashed in the re-election in five problem districts, where the results of the 2012 parliamentary election were deemed invalid due to massive falsifications. District No. 197 in Kaniv, Cherkasy Oblast, brought the only victory for an opposition candidate. This is despite exit polls by the Rating sociological group that projected victory for opposition candidates in three of the four other districts.

It is easy to guess why this happened. The all-embracing euphoria of the EuroMaidan, plus faith in an inevitable miracle, played a lame

**Author:**  
**Roman Malko**

joke on the opposition. Many opposition politicians openly expressed confidence that revolution-inspired sentiments would guarantee their victory in the problem districts before the vote.

As a result, they ended up with a double defeat as the country is shaken by protests and most voters wanting a change of government. The latter, once again used a wide range of manipulations to ensure the victory of its candidates. Some voters were bribed with food packages and cash. However, this is nothing new and the opposition could have taken that into account. It didn't. It did not do a good job on

details, ideas and creativity. It relied on the awareness of the electorate and previous results, according to which its candidates should have won the race in 2012, high ratings of support and Maidan euphoria. But the devil is indeed in the details.

The opposition's helplessness in the re-election is not only about the loss of the five seats in parliament that it so badly needs. It signals that the opposition could lose the EuroMaidan within the next few weeks – or days, because it seems to have no strategy or understanding of the reality in both cases. ■

## Pervomaïsk: The quiet defeat of the opposition

**Most analysts predicted victory for the opposition candidate Arkadiy Kornatskyi in the troubled and heroic District No. 132 but the pro-government head of the Mykolayiv Oblast Administration defeated him. There will be no continuation of the scandalous election saga this time**

**Author:**  
**Stanislav Kozliuk,**  
**Pervomaïsk-Kyiv**

Life seems quiet in the districts. Pensioners are traditionally the first and most proactive voters. Numerous cameras embarrass them and they try to vanish as soon as possible. Meanwhile, the Party of Regions' "supporters of fair elections" have occupied all entrances to the district election commission. They turn away from cameras and hide their faces. They insist that they have come to "prevent the repeated use of force and falsifications of 2012". Meanwhile, a green military tent with a sign that says "Mobile Office of MP Y. Herzov" is at the sta-



# Kyiv Oblast: The cancelled registration of the opposition candidate gives the green light to violations

Election rigging was systemic in District No. 94 in Kyiv. Yet, the outcome of this round was easily predictable before it even started

Author:

Ruslana Velychko, *Kyiv Oblast*

The pre-election generosity of the winner, Ruslan Badayev, was comparable in scale to that of Oleksandr Onyshchenko, now a Party of Regions' MP who, as part of his election campaign, brought Jean-Claude Van Damme to Kaharlyk, a tiny town in Kyiv Oblast with a population of around 14,000, based on the 2001 census. He got town council deputies to hand out food packages in Obukhiv, Ukrayinka and Vasylkiv, the three towns that make up District No. 94 in Kyiv Oblast. He used taxpayers' money to promote himself by opening swimming pools, buying mobile intensive care units and paying for children's summer

holidays. He was openly promoted as a "candidate MP" on the Kyiv Oblast State Administration's website, despite the fact that the Law on Parliamentary Elections bans executive authorities from being involved in election campaigns. More importantly, he entered the race as a self-nominated candidate. Many of those who voted for him said they wouldn't have, had they known that he represented the Party of Regions. Still, these were not the key technologies that gave him 60%, 36% ahead of his opponent.

The outcome of the re-election in District No. 94 became clear after the Central Election Commission cancelled the registration of Viktor Romaniuk, an opposition candidate who had run in this district the first time in October 2012. Back then, he got 10,000 more votes over the pro-government Tetiana Zasukha, but the district elec-



tion commission deemed over 30,000 ballots to be invalid. Shortly after the district got onto the problem list, Romaniuk faced a criminal case on charges of economic crimes. He escaped persecution by going to Italy and stayed there for several months. His opponents used this time to their benefit. A few weeks before the re-election, the Kyiv District Court of Appeal cancelled Romaniuk's registration as candidate, based on the requirement whereby a candidate must live in Ukraine for the five years prior to the vote. The Central Election Commission carried out the court's verdict after the registration deadline. Thus, Romaniuk could no longer re-register so Badayev's victory was a given.

The opposition did not have a Plan B for this scenario. Moreover, this technology may well be used against Vitaliy Klitschko in the upcoming 2015 presidential election (**see I Shall Not Give Up! on p. 10**).

Several incidents that happened that day revealed the role of the police in the process. The officers on duty at the polling stations did not interfere when observers were being pushed out of the stations or were prevented from doing their job. They stayed away when someone knocked a camera out of an official observer's hands. This was done by election commission heads and members who must have been feeling pretty smug when doing so. One observer reported that clean ballots were taken out of the polling stations. Commission members said it was he who did this. ■

dium, a few dozen metres away from the district election commission. This MP is allegedly linked to Mykola Kruhlov, head of the Mykolayiv Oblast State Administration and a candidate in this re-election.

Next to it is a mobile kitchen, offering boiled buckwheat and hot tea. Those who are cold can stay in the tent for a while to warm up. Nearby stand the anti-EuroMaidan protesters but they don't look at all aggressive. "Come in, get warm, have some tea. Would you like a sandwich?" It feels like the EuroMaidan.

The Ukrainian Week talks to two protesters looking much like homeless people. "We've come from Kyiv. We were at the rally in European Square yesterday (The Party of Regions gathered supporters of Yanukovich's policy for a "Save Ukraine!" campaign at European Square in Kyiv on December 14-15. It brought "protesters" from all over Ukraine to the rally. Numerous sources said that people were offered money; many were public-sector employees forced to go by their administration — Ed.). They didn't feed us well, we were cold. Then, they put us in buses, drove all night, then stopped in Pervomaisk. Not a word about payment. But the food is better here," says Oleksandr, one of the protesters.

By night, news began to arrive about the first violation attempts at polling stations. Moldovan observers reported ballot stuffing in Arbusynsk County. Carousels, i.e. busloads of voters brought to cast ballots multiple times in different places, were noticed at another district election commission. "We have information that some people were offered money to vote for Kruhlov. Part of the reward was paid in advance, the rest — after the vote for the right person was cast and the fact confirmed," the opposition candidate tells The Ukrainian Week. "Yes, we do have confirmation of this information. We have contacted people who offered us money, around UAH 100, if we would give them our passport details," says Viktor Hlazko, an Open Democracy Committee server.



Go here to find out what happened in district No132 in the October 2012 parliamentary election

After the vote, the oblast election commission would find many problems with protocols delivered by members of district commissions, such as no notes on the number of delivered protocols, blank lines that should have been filled, data written in pencil, not pens, and so on. Most faults were found with district commissions where opposition candidates were winning.

12 hours later the Central Election Commission announced Kruhlov as the winner. ■

# Kyiv: No Freedom now

**The scale of obvious falsifications in Kyiv's District No. 223, including ballot stuffing, is currently unknown. But the re-election reveals some other reasons for the opposition's defeat**

**Author:**  
**Oleksandr Mykhelson,**  
*Kyiv*

**O**n October 31, 2012, Svoboda's (Freedom's) Yuriy Levchenko ran in this district against Viktor Pylypshyn who had been an investigator in the 1980s, a lawyer in the 1990s, and an MP and Head of Shevchenko District in Kyiv (District No. 223) in 2005-2010.

After Viktor Yanukovich came to power, Pylypshyn found himself under investigation on charges of abuse of office that incurred a UAH 17mn loss of state and Kyiv city funds. However, he ended up running for parliament as a formally independent yet pro-presidential candidate in a first-past-the-post constituency, not behind bars.

Svoboda's Yuriy Levchenko, 29, is considered to be one of the party's leading analysts. Educated in Germany and Great Britain, he has lived in Kyiv since 2008. In 2012, he actually won the parliamentary race against the experienced Pylypshyn, based on protocols with wet stamps disclosed by Svoboda back then.

Initially, the Central Election Commission did not see these arguments as being sufficiently valid and announced Pylypshyn's victory with a narrow 400 vote majority. Yet, facts forced them to include the district in the list of problem ones and scheduled a re-vote for December 15.

This time, Levchenko was supposed to win by almost 17%, based on the exit poll by the Rating sociological group. On December 17, the Central Election Commission offi-

cially announced Viktor Pylypshyn as the winner with 44.89% over Levchenko's 40.58%. Voter turnout was slightly above 46%. This means that the densely populated constituency with 170,000 voters will now be represented in parliament by someone who gained slightly more than 3,500 votes.

Independent sources point at blatant rigging technologies used in District No. 223, mostly in schools, although there are no documents to prove this. Commissions at polling stations located in schools were mostly made up of school employees. And the Head of the District Education Department, Yevhenia Yarova happens to be a relative of Viktor Pylypshyn.

As for Svoboda, the party is not exactly popular in the constituency stretching from the western suburbs of Kyiv to its poshest parts. It has a complex social structure and a range of political preferences. "Most people in this district hate Svoboda. Their tents and promoters are on every corner but these promoters are like religious sect activists. They talk their stuff and never think about whether anyone is interested," says Anna, a Kyiv-based journalist. She refers to Pylypshyn as Pilia, a nickname derived from the Ukrainian phrase for graft. "The population here is homo

## Cherkasy: The tune of victory

**The art of fooling voters, opponents and winning re-elections**

**Author:**  
**Roman Malko,**  
*Kyiv-Cherkasy*

**F**rom the very beginning, Mykhailo Poplavsky, the infamous President of the Kyiv University of Culture and Arts, was viewed with skepticism, since the opposition's single candidate Mykola Bulatetsky who had almost won the original election in 2012 was the likeliest winner of the re-election in District No. 194 in Cherkasy, Central Ukraine. Then – the surprise.

Nothing boded ill on the morning of December 15 when the final phase of the election marathon kicked off in Cherkasy. The city is generally inert. And it stayed that way all day Sunday. The pavements were covered in ice – nobody was going to clean them. Promotion posters for candidates were not removed as required by law; few people walked the streets; fewer cars were on the roads; and there was hardly a sign of anything like an election taking place in town. Voter turnout was below 50%.

The locals are not surprised by Mykhailo Poplavsky's victory. He was the most proactive candidate, whose campaign they will long remember. Unlike all other candidates who barely did anything to promote themselves, and unlike the opposition candidate Bulatetsky who tried to hold his campaign within legal limits, Poplavsky took a creative spin on his.

According to some sources, the local branch of his Kyiv-based University of Culture basically stopped all teaching activities and dedicated every effort to the election marathon of its President. It hosted his election office. Tutors and students were allegedly involved in the promotion campaign. Eyewitnesses claim that students initially worked for free, then were paid UAH 50 per day to stand in promotion tents and given modest daily meals. Poplavsky also gave the city several new elevators, cleaned up

the trees on the streets and talked local authorities into switching from a weekend to a workday public transport schedule on weekends. His most valuable tactic was to transport voters to polling stations. This technology actually played a key role in the re-election result.

According to the opposition, Poplavsky's team also bribed voters. It even set up special points where it bought up votes. One was found at an average drug store. People were allegedly paid UAH 200 before they voted for Poplavsky, and another UAH 150 after. Only the lucky ones got the second tranche. Special vans with cashiers who paid the rewards were noticed near some polling stations.

Overall, re-election day was pretty quiet and dull in Cherkasy. However, half an hour before the polling stations closed, four cars with big and clumsy police officers blocked the exit of



PHOTO: UNIAN

sovieticus. They don't need promotion. They need what Pilia has to offer: a patched hole in the road, a food package with Ceylon tea. That's it! I myself have asked Svoboda activists to deal with a grocery store built

illegally that spoils the life of everyone around here. They said I first needed become a member of their party" Anna complains.

"Voters were bribed, too," says Taras Chmut, coordinator of

OPORA, an election observation NGO. "We integrated our agent into the system. He worked at a university dorm. The scheme was as follows: you were to get UAH 50 for every person you persuaded to vote for Pylypyshyn before the vote, and UAH 50 after. Also, you could sell your personal vote. Prices reached up to UAH 200 before the vote and UAH 200 after". But not everyone was paid the "after" part.

"And we did find buses with *titushkas* parked near various district election commissions, as if in expectation of something," Taras expands. "Some said that they had come to 'protect results' for Pylypyshyn. He clearly did not need their services after all."

Taras believes that Pylypyshyn gained fewer votes last year because he had underestimated the potential of Levchenko and Svoboda. This time, he is well-prepared. Older Soviet-oriented voters who are the most proactive part of the local electorate were "motivated" with hand-outs all this time, while noisy agitation was all that was offered by the opposition. As a result, it shunned, rather than attracted typical local voters. Meanwhile, as ever, Svoboda refuses to recognize its defeat – or mistakes. ■



Mykola Bulatetsky's office. The police failed to explain the reason for this and escaped as soon as journalists arrived, but they did their thing. As a result of this raid, nearly 30 observers, including international ones, did not make it to the polling stations, where they

were supposed to observe the vote count.

Meanwhile, as the votes were counted, local *titushkas* – athletes hired for provocations or physical confrontation when necessary – as well as local deputies from the pro-govern-

ment party, arrived at the district election commission. When asked what they were doing there, they said that they had come to protect the will of people and prevent election rigging.

The re-election brought Mykhailo Poplavsky victory. "The fact that the police blocked the office half an hour before the vote count started, showed that nothing would stop those in power. They first turned a blind eye to massive voter bribing. Today, police were used to prevent me from controlling how fairly the votes were counted. Over 30 members of the election campaign including international observers, journalists, myself and my aides, couldn't make it to the polling stations. I see no sense in continuing this farce. I call on all commission members and observers representing the opposition not to participate in the scenario orchestrated by the falsifiers. Don't sign the lying protocol," Bulatetsky wrote on his Facebook page. "I don't want these gangsters waiting near the district election commission to kill any of my people," he added in a private conversation. ■

# I Shall Not Give Up!

If the EuroMaidan is neutralized and assistance is provided by Vladimir Putin, Viktor Yanukovich will prepare a wide range of tools to stay in power after 2015

The prospects of the Yanukovich regime largely depend on the future of the EuroMaidan. Even if it dissolves shortly after the New Year, he will still have to make great efforts to win the 2015 election. Repressions will not crush protest sentiments completely, since Ukrainians are now different and Yanukovich's current rating does not leave him the slightest chance of victory in a fair election, nor will it increase.

Undoubtedly, the 2015 presidential election will involve all the practices of election rigging that have been accumulated over the past decade, from control over the judiciary and law enforcers to restricting the participation of opposition candidates, the promotion of numerous opposition candidates to dilute the opposition-oriented electorate, and wide-scale falsifications. All these instruments will have a limited potential, should there be a clash between society and government, similar to the 2004 Orange Revolution and the EuroMaidan in 2013. So the upcoming presidential campaign may differ from that of 2004 in the following aspects: those in power may change the election law and amend the Constitution, dilute the votes of the opposition electorate, and bribe voters with "fat Russian cash".

The easiest way for Yanukovich to stay in power is to amend the Law on Presidential Elections so that there is just one round. This could be an easy task with the opportunistic majority of the Party of Regions and Communist MPs that has been passing laws convenient for the government in recent years. The lack of a single opposition can-

Author:  
**Andriy Skumin**



didate will be an integral component in this. Another, more sophisticated option could be to promote Petro Poroshenko as a presidential candidate. In actual fact, the latter has already launched a proactive campaign and could steal many votes from the opposition in Central Ukraine as his core electorate.

The next much debated option is to prevent Vitaliy Klitschko, the most popular opposition candidate, from running in the campaign. According to Art. 103 of the Constitution, a presidential candidate can only be someone who "has lived in

scenario to get rid of his most dangerous rival: Klitschko can be registered as a candidate, then this registration can be cancelled shortly before the election. This technology has been tried and tested on a smaller scale in the re-election in constituency No. 94 in Kyiv Oblast.

Used against Vitaliy Klitschko, this scenario would probably lead to obstruction from the international community, but Yanukovich has never been concerned about this, especially now, after he has ended up on Vladimir Putin's hook.

Yet another scenario that would keep the current president in power after 2015 would be to hold a referendum to extend the term of his presidency. This option will come into play if those in power have no confidence in the success of those listed above. With the current low rate of electoral support and explosive protest sentiments, this option could only work with massive and blatant falsification. This would essentially be a remake of the scenario used in Kazakhstan in 1995 when the president's powers were extended until 2000, or of Belarus' experience where the president's term in office was extended through amendments to the Constitution. A softer option would be to change the Constitution and turn Ukraine back into a parliamentary republic with just the first-past-the-post system being used in elections and Viktor Yanukovich as premier, who would then become the key person in the state. However, this would be risky, given Georgia's recent experience where Mikheil Saakashvili introduced a similar scenario and failed. ■

**IF THE OPPOSITION WASTES THE HUGE POTENTIAL OF THE EUROMAIDAN, UKRAINIANS MAY END UP WITH ANOTHER DECADE OR MORE OF DISILLUSIONMENT AND APATHY. THE GOVERNMENT WILL BE QUICK TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF IT**

Ukraine for ten years immediately prior to the election", yet the law is vague about the definition of "living in Ukraine". Those in power may try to prove that Klitschko has not lived in Ukraine for the past decade. On October 24, 2013, parliament paved the way for this scenario by amending the Tax Code to qualify holders of residence permits in other countries as non-residents of Ukraine. Vitaliy Klitschko has had a residence permit in Germany for the past ten years. Yanukovich's spin doctors may offer him the following

# What Happened to Ukraine?

**W**hat happened to Ukraine? Nothing that might have come as a shock. Russia applied a classical strategy, yet we would hardly know whether the sticks dominated over the carrots, or the other way around.

To put it simply, this would be the question as to whether the Kremlin promised to ruin Ukraine's economy – provided the Verkhovna Rada should have decided to pass all the necessary pieces of legislation needed to send a message to the EU and to Germany in particular that Ukraine qualified for the club the Vilnius Summit would be much of a formality, or whether it pledged its old allegiances to Viktor Yanukovich reassuring him that he remains the only choice of Russia's political elite or, to be more precise, of its power structure - the siloviki or law enforcers.

Whatever the case, this slap in the face of the EU as well as this blow to all European friends of Ukraine dealt by the Parliament and President of the country would never have been possible had the EU been more flexible, proactive, aggressive, and realistic. The humiliation that Russia inflicted on the EU was preceded by zero judgment and zero policies with regard to Ukraine from Germany, France, Italy, and Spain, to name just a few major players of the club.

The fact remains that we in the EU did nothing. Our complacency and vanity merited the words of the French philosopher and writer Pascal Bruckner who described the EU as a vain and lazy political entity that lives in a fairytale refusing to confront the facts and to look reality in the eye. That Germany and France have no policy on Ukraine is too obvious to need emphasis. That the Eastern Partnership program was initiated primarily as a German compromise after the Russo-Georgian war is also quite evident.

That without the Baltic States (especially Lithuania with its presidency over the EU Council and passionate advocacy of the Association Agreement between the EU and Ukraine), Poland, and Sweden, the whole program would have been little more than sheer formality, is also a banal truth. The question arises then as to why on Earth the EU should have been so disappointed and shocked by Viktor Yanukovich's refusal to sign the Association Agreement?

No matter how strongly we feel against selective justice and corruption in Ukraine, the idea to make the entire Ukrainian nation a hostage of the Yanukovich-Tymoshenko war confining Germany to the decision of the Verkhovna Rada concerning the release of Yulia Tymoshenko from jail to undergo her medical treatment in Germany appears as a naughty joke or at best as a foolish political game with indifference of the public opinion in Germany with regard to Ukraine, merely simplifying the whole matter to a seemingly Manichean divide between good and evil,

which itself is nothing but nonsense. Nobody is and nobody ever was an angel in this story of hostility, rivalry, and political vengeance.

That the EU overlooked and missed an historic opportunity to foster the real rapprochement with Ukraine straight after the Orange Revolution when Ukraine was more European in its faith and value orientation than any other European nation in the so-called Old Europe, is obvious to anyone. However, there is little wisdom in self-flagellation and bitter self-criticism when a concrete action is needed right away. What is to be done then? Here it comes – an old good (or cursed if you will) Russian question.

The EU must immediately warn Russia that no Eastern Partnership country is its property or zone of influence in the old sense of this concept. Russia must reject its geopolitical fantasies to restore the Soviet Union without the Baltic States (or with them in the EU as a fast lane to deal with EU funds and projects). Failing that, the EU must question the status of Russia as a member of the Council of Europe. Otherwise, the future of Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and other Eastern Partnership countries will always remain uncertain due to frozen conflicts, intimidation, blackmail, and other means with which Russia

tends to torpedo any disobedient neighboring state.

At the same time, the EU has to apply different strategies and even vocabularies to Ukraine's political elite and civil society. Whereas the elite and the government need to be pressurized by the EU concerning their Eu-

ropean commitments and obligations, Ukrainian civil society, intellectuals, writers, academic, and students should benefit at last from visa-free regime and exchange programs. Future leaders and interlocutors of Ukrainian politics have to spend as much time in Europe as they want and can.

We should apply a softer and wiser approach to Ukrainian society in terms of freedom of movement. No Ukrainian citizen should feel like a poor cousin in EU countries. That's the only way we can overcome the internal divide of the country which is split into those who are craving for the EU, and those who are skeptical (and not without reason, to say the truth) about their chances to pass for fellow Europeans in the EU.

Up to now we have no Eastern European policies. The old German Ostpolitik was about the Kremlin, rather than Russians, Ukrainians, or any other nation that suffered under the duress of Soviet oppression. Germany is still emulating that same worn-out politics whose essence always was how to get as close to the Kremlin as once was Harold Wilson, Prime Minister of Great Britain.

Yet the time has come to reveal Ukraine, instead of trying to win the favour of the Kremlin. ■



**Author:**  
**Leonidas**  
**Donskis**

**THE EU SHOULD APPLY A SOFTER AND WISER APPROACH TO UKRAINIAN SOCIETY IN TERMS OF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT. NO UKRAINIAN CITIZEN SHOULD FEEL LIKE A POOR COUSIN IN EU COUNTRIES**

# Between Stability and the Instinct of Survival

The choice of scapegoats for the bloody dispersal of the EuroMaidan proves that Yanukovych is leaning towards the pro-Russian lobby

Author:  
**Oles Oleksiyyenko**

**A**fter the latest attempt to disperse the Maidan and the storming of the Kyiv City State Administration building on the night of December 11, oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov, Dmytro Firtash and Viktor Pinchuk publicly distanced themselves (in person or through official announcements of their companies) from the violent actions against the EuroMaidan. Premier Mykola Azarov set about publicly blaming oligarchs for the lack of informational support for the government (the TV channels of all three were surprisingly objective in their reporting of events at EuroMaidan). The threesome made every effort to demonstrate their innocence: they were “surprised” by the sudden change in the course of Ukraine’s foreign policy, publicly delighted in the EuroMaidan and condemned violent actions against peaceful protesters.

At the same time, sources in the Party of Regions unofficially admit that resistance has escalated between the “eagles” (people closest to the Family) and “pigeons” (largely representatives of big business) in the government team. The latter are very irritated by the blatantly provocative actions of the eagles at a time when protest sentiments escalate in society. The choice of scapegoats for the brutal dispersal of the EuroMaidan actually confirms these processes.

On December 14, General Prosecutor Viktor Pshonka named First Deputy Secretary of the National Security

and Defence Council Volodymyr Sivkovych, the Head of the Kyiv police Valeriy Koriak and his Deputy, as well as Head of the Kyiv City State Administration Oleksandr Popov, as the guilty parties. According to Pshonka, Sivkovych and Popov, “directly pressured the leadership of the Kyiv police to use force at Maidan Nezalezhnosti (Independence Square) on the night of November 30”. Yanukovych suspended them from work on the following day.

In other words, the government’s version of the events of November 30 appears to be that it was a spontaneous abuse of office or inactivity of mid-level officials, who were unable, or did not want to hinder the extreme scenario. Meanwhile, the way the scenarios developed, both on the eve of November 30, as well as later, on December 11, is evidence that these actions were thought out and approved in advance at a much higher level.

MP Hennadiy Moskal, referring to secret documents received from his own sources, stated that prior to the start of the dispersal an encrypted telegram marked “secret” was sent to all oblasts other than Zakarpattia and Ivano-Frankivsk, ordering them to transfer their Berkut units to the disposition of the Interior Ministry, not the National Security and Defence Council or the Kyiv police. At the same time, opposition members leaked reports on interrogations of Popov, Sivkovych and Koriak, conducted on December 13. According to the reports, Koriak gave evidence that on the eve of the tragic events on the Maidan, Vitaliy Zakharchenko, the Minister of Internal Affairs, personally phoned



It is finally possible to speak about the start of a confrontation between different groups of influence in the government, which, under certain circumstances, could lead to a reformatting of the majority in parliament to an opposition against Azarov’s government, or maybe to the “eagle” camp

him and ordered him to execute all the commands of Volodymyr Sivkovych. Oleksandr Popov stated that Andriy Kliuyev, National Defence and Security Council Secretary, had personally phoned him twice on November 29, to give him a similar order. The interrogation report for Popov suggests that it was Sivkovych who was coordinating the brutal battle. Interrogation reports for Sivkovych contain information that on the eve of the EuroMaidan operation he met with Andriy Derkach, who is known for lobbying Russian interests in Ukraine and has close ties with Viktor Medvedchuk. Medvedchuk is considered to play a leading role in the implementation of Russian scenarios through Ukrainian top officials.

This hints at a clear Russian trail. Kliuyev, and his Deputies Sivkovych and Derkach, not to mention Medvedchuk, have long lobbied the Kremlin’s interests in Ukraine, related in one way or another to Soviet and later Russian special services. This trail had been visible before, first in the disruption of the Association Agreement with the EU in 2011 when Yulia Tymoshenko put in jail; then in early 2013 when MPs visiting Tymoshenko at the Kachanivka prison were forced out right before the upcoming Ukraine-EU summit. According to the ex-Party of Regions’



MP Inna Bohoslovsk, Andriy Kliuyev assured her that the Association Agreement would not be signed even when everything suggested the opposite outcome. Meanwhile, he was closely involved in the entire process as one of the key negotiators with EU Enlargement Commissioner Stephan Füle. Now, Füle refuses to meet with Kliuyev under any circumstances. Perhaps, he has a good grasp on the situation.

Earlier, a lot of information was leaked to the mass media about Andriy Kliuyev's role in provocations of clashes during the May rally (see **Anti-Fascism & the Yanukovich Regime at ukrainian-week.com**) by the titushkas and beating of journalists in Kyiv. In other words, Andriy Kliuyev could well be a key figure in the implementation of Russian destabilization scenarios in Ukraine. However, he continues to hold a high state position, which allows him to coordinate the activities of all enforcement agencies. Therefore, the opposition has a good reason to insist on his removal from office and arrest.

Instead, the fact that the General Prosecutor's Office has cleared Kliuyev of any complicity in the provocation on the Maidan, could be evidence that Yanukovich and his Family trust Kliuyev completely and approve his actions. Moreover, if the

November 30 operation actually originated from Moscow, Premier Azarov and Vitaliy Zakharchenko, the Interior Minister loyal to the Family, had to be aware of it. The mass media, controlled by another Family representative, Serhiy Kurchenko, is currently providing the most active media support to the flock of "eagles" in the government. This gives grounds to include at least part of the Family in the list of those who are playing on Moscow's side.

Russia's operation to provoke the forced scenario could have aimed broader than just pushing Yanukovich into a dead end and preventing any alternatives but capitulation to the Kremlin (his behaviour does not suggest that he has realized this yet). People behind this scenario may also have counted on fuelling separatist sentiments in South-Eastern Ukraine. It is not without reason that this scenario has lately been gloated over by pro-Russian forces in Ukraine (Crimea, Sevastopol, Medvedchuk's Ukrainian Choice) and was savoured in Russia. More specifically, on December 6, in an interview on the Echo of Moscow radio channel, Viktor Medvedchuk stated that: "A division in Ukraine is inevitable. Moreover, I can prove this; politically, legally, based on life, on my fingers. The country is divided. Because this is the way it is territorially made up. Never will the mentality of Lviv be the same as that of Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv or Luhansk". He determined that Kyiv was closer to Western Ukraine in terms of mentality. On December 13, Russian Premier Dmitri Medvedev stated that Ukraine should "overcome the tectonic fault, which threatens the existence of the state". Meanwhile, through Mikhail Zurabov, the Russian Ambassador to Ukraine, the Russian side has already stated convincingly that the results of agreements from December 17 will help to stabilise the situation in the country.

At present, it is difficult to predict further developments in the ruling conglomerate: to what extent are the "pigeons" ready to compromise with the opposition and resist the "eagles" that play into the Kremlin's hands? When the opposition returned to the idea of a no-confidence vote against the government, it seemed to send a signal that at least a small part of the pro-government majority was willing to reformat parliament and

the Cabinet of Ministers. This initiative was failed on December 3: Only 186 of the required 226 MPs supported the no-confidence vote. However, the reaction of society and the West to the attempted violent dispersal of the Maidan on the night of December 11, as well as subsequent protests numbering many thousands on December 14–15, suggest that the problem will not be resolved on its own. On December 18, Arseniy Yatseniuk stated that the opposition is only three votes short for the no-confidence vote against the Cabinet of Ministers. A Party of Regions' MP assured *The Ukrainian Week* that "He's not really bluffing".

Meanwhile, the Family, too, appears to have switched to an attacking position. Information on possible resignation of three ministers who are considered to be close to Rinat Akhmetov leaked to the media may signal Yanukovich's response to the public demarche of his former chief sponsor.

It is finally possible to speak about the start of a confrontation between different groups of influence in the government, which, under certain circumstances, could lead to a reformatting of the majority in parliament to an opposition against Azarov's government, or maybe to the "eagle" camp. More specifically, with approval from Moscow, the Communists, who are controlled from Russia, will vote in favour of the resolution that they submitted before for the dismissal of Azarov's government. The Communist Party leader Petro Symonenko is already giving relevant signals in his statements. Escalation of this conflict between the different groups in the Ukrainian government could benefit Putin as it would make them more vulnerable to his influence. However, this game could be risky, since in time, it could lead to the formation of a pro-European majority. The results of Yanukovich's visit to Moscow could, on the one hand, significantly strengthen his position among disgruntled pro-government deputies, since Ukraine's financial-economic problems will appear to be resolved by the 2015 presidential election. On the other hand, they could force the pro-European lobby to be more pro-active, in order not to lose possibly the last chance to prevent sliding into the Russian orbit and further rise of the Family's authoritarianism. ■

Russia's operation to provoke the forced scenario could have aimed broader than just pushing Yanukovich into a dead end and preventing any alternatives but capitulation to the Kremlin (his behaviour does not suggest that he has realized this yet). People behind this scenario may also have counted on fuelling separatist sentiments in South-Eastern Ukraine

# A Year Without Spring

How the screws will be tightened should the EuroMaidan fail



**Author:**  
**Oleksandr**  
**Mykhelson**

**T**he failure of a revolution is always followed by the celebration of vengeance. Pro-government political forces have brought to light many initiatives, which have quite clearly outlined the contours of Ukraine-2014, in case of the complete victory of the Russian course in the interest of the self-preservation of President Yanukovych and his Fam-

ily, which is how they appear to see it.

So, we can expect a gradual, but unwavering lessening of possibilities for “foreign agents”, as formulated in the relevant prohibitive legislation in Russia, to function on the territory of Ukraine. This pertains to foreign entities that directly operate on the territory of the country, as well as any domestic non-profit

organization, if the latter received financing from the West, however episodic it may be, particularly if it was indirect. There have already been precedents in Russia, when such organizations were subject to police searches and their operations were blocked, simply because an individual employee had won one grant or another, or even an award from European or North

American entities for human rights activities.

In Ukraine-2013 only fairly marginal movements (such as the pro-Russian organizations in the Crimea) and individual parliamentarians (such as Party of Regions' MP Oleh Tsariov) have ventured to promote such initiatives. But should the reactionaries win, such designs could well become laws, bylaws, and most importantly – standard practice, which in the Ukrainian reality, often surpasses even the worst law.

Another natural consequence of such a victory will be tighter control of public activity. First and foremost, this will bring heavier punishment for unauthorized street meetings, marches, etc. To achieve this, those in power have to introduce laws that make literally any gathering of more than three people illegal, based on the experience of Russia and Belarus, and the late Soviet era. Meanwhile, law enforcers and courts have to be given space to interpret the laws as they see fit.

The law on peaceful assemblies, which has yet to be approved by parliament, can (and will) be used to turn the screw in this sphere. Entering the necessary corrections to it is just a matter of a few minutes provided that the Presidential Administration gives the respective instructions. And provided that the revolution is quashed or dissolves on its own over the winter cold and Christmas holidays.

However, the authorities cannot ignore the power of self-organization in the internet, particularly if bloggers return to their computers from the Euro-Maidan shunned from the Independence Square by the police's batons or winter frosts. So there will be attempts to turn the screws here as well. It is scarcely possible that Ukraine, with all the talents of its programmers, will reach the heights of China, which has its own internet, reliably protected from the rest of the worldwide web. Ultimately, even Russia with its creative use of the police was unable to achieve this. Still, Vladimir Putin will apparently advise Viktor Yanukovich on IT issues, too, not just finance or geopolitics. He may have done just that already:

the Ukrainian government may survive by passing laws that will allow it to shut down mass media upon suspicion of extremism. Party of Regions' MP Vadym Kolesnichenko has already tested this in the stormy December days: he registered a draft law on counteraction to extremism. According to it, any public or critical expression of views regarding government representatives or its separate institutions could be recognised as extremism and the mass media could be closed. Add to this the Russian practice of punishing on-line resources, not even for their materials, but for comments (which can very possibly be written by provocateurs, hired by the authorities) – and the deal is done.


The third reaction, without doubt, has to be the tightest possible control of the income and property of citizens, particularly that of those who don't want to cooperate with the authorities. Once again, relevant initiatives have long been craved for by the financial section of the government, currently under firm control of the Family's Vice Premier Arbutov and the Minister of Revenues and Duties, Oleksandr Klymenko. So far, they have not dared to implement the full-scale control of not only the income, but also the expenses of citizens for a number of reasons. One is the dumb resistance of those who really have something to declare, but don't particularly want to. However, in 2014 all of this could become a reality under the slogan "quashing the enemy of the revolution" for some and "the implementation of civilised standards" for others. Of course, really wealthy people, whose business is closely intertwined with the authorities, will probably not experience these innovations. However, judges, prosecutors, police officers and other citizens, who live in palaces and drive luxury cars they would never be able to afford in a civilized country, will find another reason for loyalty to the government. And businessmen, who risk getting into a conflict with it, could lose everything in an instance.

How I wish the EuroMaidan did win after all. ☐





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# Bohdan Futey:

## “The beating we saw is not just physical, but mental, too. The government wants to evoke fear in people”



PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

**Interviewer**  
**Anna Korbut**

In his interview for *The Ukrainian Week* US Federal Judge, Bohdan Futey, talks about the violent dispersal of the EuroMaidan, American reaction to the latest protests in Ukraine, threats to Ukraine's independence and territorial integrity, and the new generation that is demanding a different state.

**UW: What do you think of the dispersal of peaceful demonstrations at Maidan Nezalezhnosti in Kyiv, where the government used force and special police?**

I was in Ukraine when it all began. The massive protests that began then, and continue today, signal that most Ukrainians want Ukraine to become a fully-fledged member of the European Union. This is a way

for them to ensure independence as well as a more secure and better future. I was not in Kyiv on November 30 but I saw how brutally Berkut dispersed the students, young and older people, who took to the streets to exercise their constitutional rights to freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. This brutal use of force against peaceful demonstrators was condemned by international and national organizations that are demanding punishment for the perpetrators. What took place later, on December 11, showed that despite President Yanukovich calling for a dialogue with the opposition, clergy and youth on the one hand, on the other, there was a series of tragic events. America's top officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry, senators, the Helsinki Committee, Hillary Clinton and Victoria Nuland, condemned them. Obviously, everyone was astonished by how deep Ukraine has sunk. Three Ukrainian ex-presidents made a statement about the unfolding deep political crisis that can have very serious implications for the entire state, its territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty. We, in the diaspora, stand by the right of the Ukrainian people to express themselves without fear of persecution, let alone physical abuse.

**UW: Who is responsible for this abuse of office and use of force against peaceful protesters and journalists?**

It surprised me when President Yanukovich invited the representatives of all political forces, the clergy, and representatives of civil society to a national dialogue, saying that everything should be in line with the law. As the guarantor of the Constitution, he pledged to make every possible effort to protect the rights and interests of every citizen. And then force was used on that very night – who is responsible for this?

Obviously, it is the President, the government, the Interior Minister, and Berkut. It is the President that has to protect the Constitution and human rights. Meanwhile, he says one thing and does the complete opposite.

**UW: In the current situation, is there any point in imposing personal sanctions against certain officials?**

Sanctions are a matter of diplomacy. Canada has already announced such possibility. According to the US Department of State, top officials here are also considering sanctions. Apparently, this should all take place within the framework of international relations and under a relevant recommendation from the National Security Council. Meanwhile, State Secretary John Kerry and Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland have called on Yanukovich to refrain from the use of force and law enforcers against peaceful protesters.

I particularly like the example recalled by ex-president Leonid Kravchuk. When he was the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada, students gathered on the Maidan for a demonstration. He went out to them and invited them to parliament. After his conversation with the students, Ukraine's premier resigned – voluntarily or not, but the problem was solved. It was solved through dialogue.

The White House is contemplating sanctions, since, as you know, there was a petition on this issue, with over 100,000 signatures. When that happens, the White House is required to react. Plus, there are resolutions by Congressmen on this. So, the case is serious and sanctions can be imposed.

What are these sanctions? Freezing assets, first and foremost. But the biggest blow to those in power would be a ban on entering the US. Other countries are also considering such a move. I think Ukrainian officials should give serious thought to this because the imposition of sanctions is very realistic. If you ask average Americans now – not just Congressmen or government officials – what they think about what's happening in Ukraine, they will tell you that they would not want to see people involved in the disregard and violation of human rights in their country (the US), and that sanctions are necessary.

## **UW: How different is the EuroMaidan from the Orange Revolution?**

I see changes. The Orange Revolution started as a result of a rigged election. People took to the streets to have the election results declared invalid and have a new, fair election. And they succeeded.

This time, the protest is completely different. It started as the EuroMaidan but has now grown into the issue of where we are going and what kind of a state we want to live in. Young people and students took to the streets – they are making demands, even though they don't always agree with politicians.

As a judge and member of various programmes on the rule of law, the huge problem I see in Ukraine is that there are constitutional guarantees – they are discussed, but not enforced.

So, people want to see a different state, a competent government that knows what it is doing and cares about the its people and compliance with the Constitution. These people have traveled to Europe. They have seen life in the West and the processes there. I had Ukrainian judges for internship here and I talked about these things with them. I talk about this in my lectures at the Kyiv Mohyla Academy. It's very important for people who were born after Ukraine gained independence to begin to see their state differently, in the way that the role of the state is seen in the West.

I don't know whether or not this should be called a revolution, but what is taking place signals that people expect a different life, a different government and a better future.

I am somewhat disappointed with Ukrainian diplomats, including those who served in the US and Europe and saw what was going on. Not all of them are in diplomatic service now. Some work in specific areas and are effective there. But when they were in the US, they proactively promoted Ukraine's integration. Now, when they have a real chance to continue this in Ukraine, they are silent and do not try to express themselves in any way – or we don't hear them do so.

But my biggest disappointment is in Ukraine's judiciary and judges. I don't see the independent judiciary that is guaranteed by the Constitution. Ukrainians and international organizations have very little faith in local judges. I hope I'm wrong but

**BIO**  
**Bohdan A. Futey** is a senior federal judge of the United States Court of Federal Claims, where he has served since 1987. He is the only Ukrainian among U.S. federal judges. Futey holds a J.D. degree and has lectured as a visiting professor at universities in Germany and Ukraine. Futey is a member of the American Bar Association and the Ukrainian American Bar Association, Ukrainian Assistance Coordination Committee. He has participated in judge exchange programmes and was an advisor to the Verkhovna Rada working group to draft the Constitution of Ukraine.

everyone believes that judges make their verdicts based on orders from the top rather than the Constitution or the law.

But nobody will respect judges unless they respect themselves. The same applies to diplomats, the president and ministers. They lead a country of 46 million people and they have to realize this.

I would like to call on lawyers to speak of all this and to be more proactive (the day before this interview was taken Ukrainian lawyers published an Open letter to judicial self-governing bodies and the Constitutional Court, in which they “expressed no confidence in the judiciary, which, due to pressure or other circumstances, protects the doubtful, unprincipled and dangerous actions of the government, thus running counter to the constitutional principle guaranteed by Art. 19 of the Constitution” and requested the Constitutional Court to “react to constitutional norms becoming unconstitutional as a result of actions of the current government, not its unconstitutional laws” – **Ed.**). For instance, in the US, there is the American Bar Association. It speaks strongly on all violations of human rights and dignity or the Constitution. There is the Ukrainian American Bar Association that has also expressed its position on this issue and criticized what is going on in Ukraine. But I think that, if the situation continues to evolve as it is now, Ukraine may end up in a stalemate position, as the President says one thing, then does something different.



## **MY BIGGEST DISAPPOINTMENT IS IN UKRAINE'S JUDICIARY AND JUDGES. I DON'T SEE THE INDEPENDENT JUDICIARY THAT IS GUARANTEED BY THE CONSTITUTION**

This could lead to a dictatorship. Then, there really could be a revolution in Ukraine.

And I have one more concern. When Mykhailo Horyn (human rights advocate, dissident and a leader of Narodnyi Rukh, the People's Movement – **Ed.**) visited the US, he met with then Secretary of Defence, Dick Cheney. Mr. Cheney was very positive about the talk of Ukraine becoming independent. Yet, Mykhailo Horyn reminded him

of Ukraine's dangerous northern neighbour. “What makes you say that!” Cheney said. “The rake has hit us on the forehead twice – first, when we signed the Treaty of Pereyaslav first, then, with the emergence of the Soviet Union,” Horyn replied. “We survived. The risk is whether we can survive if the rake hits us for the third time.” This risk is relevant today because Russia cannot be an empire without Ukraine. But it can with Ukraine, no matter what you call it – the Customs Union or a new “Treaty of Pereyaslav”. But people are beginning to see this – they are beginning to see the threat to their independence, territorial integrity and the future of Ukraine.

## **UW: How possible is it to reach a consensus with the President after what he has done? Does the West believe it is possible to negotiate and come to terms with him?**

As I said before, the problem is that he says one thing while his subordinates, including law enforcers, do the opposite. As a result, the concept of the rule of law, which he is supposed to guarantee, is absent. The beating we witnessed was not just physical. It was mental. Those in power want to invoke fear of the police in people. I think it's a mistake. If the President really wants to be a guarantor of the Constitution and preserve the rule of law, he must come to terms with the people, the opposition, NGOs and the clergy, discuss compliance with rules with them and seek a peaceful solution.

## **UW: If the government decides to use force to solve the current situation, who should join forces to resist it? Can the West support Ukrainians in more than just words?**

Before this conversation, I spoke to someone I know in Kyiv. He asked me whether I knew that the US Secretary of Defence had called Ukraine's Defence Minister on the previous day. A conversation at the level of defence ministers clearly suggests that they talked about refraining from using force against protesters. As for the US, even Vice President Joe Biden talked to the Ukrainian President.

Absolutely everyone opposes the use of force to resolve the current situation. If this does indeed happen, it will have very bad implications for Ukraine as a sovereign and independent state. ■

# The West's Painful Dilemmas

Why Western leaders and public opinion have hesitated to support mass protests against the Yanukovych regime

**Author:**  
**Michael**  
**Binyon**

Europe is watching the events unfolding in Ukraine with a mixture of hope, foreboding and weary cynicism. The crowds who have occupied Maidan for almost a month have inspired Western leaders with their commitment to democracy and their demands for closer ties to Europe. Western politicians have praised their courage and expressed outrage over the use of force against

demonstrators as well as Moscow's blatant attempt to blackmail the Ukrainian government. But at the same time many officials in the European Union know that Moscow sees the stalled EU-Ukraine agreement as a direct challenge to President Putin. And they have little doubt that Russia would not only be prepared to use force to support President Yanukovych but would relish an open confrontation with

the West over his pro-Moscow policies.

For many people in the West, however, the barricades on the streets of Kyiv are very much *déjà vu*. The confrontation looks much like a re-run of the Orange Revolution of 2004 – only this time there seem to be no credible opposition leaders, no clear strategy by the demonstrators and no easy solution to Ukraine's long-term prob-



lem of national cohesion and identity. For this reason, the hopes that democracy will triumph and that the Yanukovich government will be forced out of power are tempered by concern that opposition politicians have proved themselves weak, factional and incapable of dealing with powerful oligarchs and the entrenched culture of corruption.

Western leaders were astonished by Yanukovich's last-minute decision to reject the EU Association Agreement. They believed that, despite pressure from Moscow, he was not ready to block all the long-term economic benefits the agreement offered. But the West was not prepared to keep quiet about Ukraine's poor human rights record or drop its demand that Yulia Tymoshenko should be released. Yanukovich's abrupt and discourteous decision not to attend the EU summit meant that Western leaders understood the brutal pressure Moscow was putting on his government. But his own subsequent behaviour in sending in police to beat and arrest the Maidan protesters meant that he then forfeited any hope of reopening talks with Brussels. No one in the West now trusts his word or is ready to offer him a second chance.

Nevertheless, the EU has been active in trying to find a compromise. Abandoning Ukraine to the Russians would be seen in the West as a betrayal of promises to help the former Soviet republics to embed democracy in their political culture. Europe therefore sent top officials to Kyiv to try to persuade Yanukovich to open talks with the opposition and curb his police. The fact that he actually ordered a new crackdown on the demonstrators while the EU delegation was in Kyiv was seen as a snub and led John Kerry, the US Secretary of State, to express his "disgust" – strong words from a Western politician.

But there are limits to the support the West is ready to give to the opposition. It cannot be seen to interfere openly in Ukraine's affairs. It has learnt, from bitter past experience in Hungary, Poland and Czechoslovakia, that promising to support anti-Russian protests but not giving any practical assistance is the worst of all options. It is better not to promise more than Western governments and public opin-

ion are ready to deliver. And the brutal truth is that public opinion in many Western countries cares little for Ukraine – and certainly not enough to risk an open confrontation with Moscow.

The second dilemma for the West is that it still needs to maintain workable relations with the Kremlin. Russia is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, and without Russian co-operation it will become very difficult to do anything to end the fighting in Syria or ease the crisis in the Middle East. But Putin is a prickly partner, deeply suspicious of Western intentions. His thinking has been moulded by the Cold War and his service in the KGB. And for him and his generation, as he freely admitted, the collapse of the Soviet Union was one of the greatest tragedies of history. His policy has always been to try to bring former Soviet republics back into Russia's orbit. This is the main reason for Moscow pushing ahead with the expansion of the three-nation Eurasian customs union. Ukraine is crucial to such a policy, and any Western attempt to lure Ukraine closer to the EU instead would be seen by Putin as a challenge to one of his most fundamental policies.

For this reason, Western leaders have been hesitant about promising support for the demonstrators – beyond saluting their courage and determination. This is especially true of a country such as Britain, which is just beginning to improve links with Moscow after six years of extremely poor relations following the assassination of the Russian former spy Alexander Litvinenko in London. David Cameron, the British Prime Minister, has said little about Ukraine. He is still hoping that Britain can benefit from more trade with Russia and persuade Moscow to take a leading role in setting up a peace conference in Geneva on Syria.

The media in Britain have been much more outspoken. *The Times* called in a recent editorial on Yanukovich to resign, saying that his rule had been characterised by the misuse of power, gross economic mismanagement and interference by Russia. *The Economist* said Mr. Yanukovich's choice of force was a moral defeat, which made his distance from mainstream Ukrainians clearer. "Even as it repudiates Mr.

Yanukovich, the EU must make it clear that, under a better government, Ukrainians' hope of joining the European family can eventually be realised," the influential weekly magazine said.

Marina Lewycka, a successful British novelist of Ukrainian origin, wrote in *The Guardian* that after the Orange Revolution, the opposition proved a big disappointment in government, and that Ukrainian nationalists had now "whipped themselves into a frenzy of anti-Russian sentiment". But she said the young people protesting in the square rejected the game of political tit-for-tat. For them, she said, the EU represented modernity, transparency in political life, an escape from the stifling embrace of the past and freedom from Russia's zone of power. Young Ukrainians saw themselves as part of the global community of youth. But she asked: "Is the EU ready for them?" She feared that Europe's



## THE BRUTAL TRUTH IS THAT PUBLIC OPINION IN MANY WESTERN COUNTRIES CARES LITTLE FOR UKRAINE – AND CERTAINLY NOT ENOUGH TO RISK AN OPEN CONFRONTATION WITH MOSCOW

politicians in fact were closer in style than they realised to Yanukovich and Tymoshenko.

Her answer underlines the hard facts about the West's reaction. It may sympathise with the protesters. But Ukraine has a long history of political crisis and government corruption that has made many Western investors hesitant to invest. The country has received less help and investment per head than most other former Soviet republics. There is talk now of imposing EU sanctions on the Yanukovich government. But Western leaders believe he may fall from power before that is necessary. The big worry is that whoever takes over, Ukraine will continue to be caught between Russia and the EU, and the country will remain internally divided and without strong leadership. That would never make it an easy partner for a European Union Association Agreement. ■

# Ways Out of the Po



**“The Ukrainian leadership needs a new approach towards the country and its people. It needs dialogue with the opposition and transparent decisions”**

**Dietmar Stüdemann,**  
*economist and German Ambassador to Ukraine in 2000-2006*

Being an optimist, I am convinced that Ukraine will after all find its incarnation as a sovereign, independent, democratic state. My optimism is fed by the growing amount of Ukraini-

ans who become more and more aware that Ukraine is not private property of the political elite, but that it is the Ukrainians themselves who form, represent and build the state. The Orange Revolution was and is proof of that, despite the fact that its leaders in a disastrous way did not live up to the expectations of the people. But this spirit of change, this determination to form one's own identity without interference from outside is as vivid as in 2004. I count most of all on the young generation, well-educated, intensively interlinked within the common information space, and keen to take over responsibility for the welfare of all. In order to get out of this trap, the Ukrainian leadership needs a new approach towards the country and its people. It needs dialogue with the opposition, transparent decisions and forces which demonstrate convincingly that the Ukrainians themselves are the main focus of the political leadership.



**“Dealing with corrupt, thuggish elites requires toughness and clarity”**

**Edward Lucas,**  
*British journalist, author*

*of the New Cold War bestseller (2008)*

Europe has learnt some important lessons. Sadly, the people of Ukraine are paying for this education. The first lesson is that dealing with corrupt, thuggish elites requires toughness and clarity. The EU approached Viktor Yanukovich as if he was a sincere and patriotic leader, who needed some help in bringing his country towards its natural European destiny. This approach worked fine with the governments of the Baltic States and Central Europe, who desperately wanted to join the EU, but needed a road map to follow. It did not work well with the Yanukovich clan, who want money and power above all.

The second lesson is that whether Europe likes it or not, it is engaged in geopolitical competition with the Kremlin. Even on the eve of the Vilnius summit, some European leaders and officials were still under the mistaken belief that if only they could communicate the nature of the Eastern Partnership to the Russian leadership, all would be well. What I hope Europe has now understood is that the Kremlin does not want “win-win” outcomes. It prefers win-lose ones. Russia wants a geopolitical hinterland of countries that are economically weak and politically pliable. The Eastern Partnership would make them economically strong and politically secure. Therefore it must be resisted.

The EU must now do everything it can to help the Ukrainian people integrate with Europe, bypassing the gangster regime around Mr. Yanukovich. Easier visas, scholarships, trade facilitation, cultural outreach and cooperation with friendly municipalities all require political willpower and creativity. But they are all possible. What a shame they didn't do it earlier.



**“The EU should seriously consider targeted sanctions against those individuals, who grossly violate human rights of Ukrainian citizens”**

**Winfried Schneider-Deters,**  
*German expert*

In the EU, it is considered legitimate for people to demonstrate against decisions of the government – provided that the government is legitimate - if they contradict the

interests of a large part of the population. Citizens do not have to wait until the next elections in order to express their dissatisfaction.

The European Maidan movement in Ukraine proves that President Yanukovich's decision to suspend the signing of the Association Agreement with the European Union is against the will of a significant part of the Ukrainian population – of those Ukrainians, who see their future in a united Europe, and not in a Eurasian integration project dominated by Moscow. Personal participation in protest demonstrations has more democratic weight than the unexpressed vote of the “silent majority” that remains at home.

The radicalization of the EuroMaidan is due to the fact that the government refuses to punish those police officers, who have brutally beaten young people peacefully gathered on Independence Square, while non-violent protesters are being legally persecuted. In any EU member-state the politically responsible Minister of the Interior would have resigned – or would have been discharged for that.

The EU should not only “keep the door open” for Ukraine, as its representatives keep repeating; the EU should seriously consider targeted sanctions against those individuals, who grossly violate the human rights of Ukrainian citizens.

# Political Crisis

Western experts comment on mass protests in Ukraine and reaction to them in the West



**"The Putin-Yanukovich agreement might buy both some additional time but fundamentally it addresses none of Ukraine's structural economic challenges and does not provide Yanukovich with any additional legitimacy"**

*Blair Ruble, Director of the Wilson Center's Program on Global Sustainability and Resilience*

*son Center's Program on Global Sustainability and Resilience*

Fundamentally, EuroMaidan represents a completely different form of social and political organization from Putin's managed democracy. Putin's system is one of hierarchical control (which can be viewed positively if one believes in a "strong hand" and negatively if one does not). The EuroMaidan represents a more transparent and horizontally organized social organization. Of course, reality on the square is more complex than that, but at the most general level this is the case. From my perspective, various technological and structural changes in the global economy require more open and horizontally organized social and political systems so personally I believe the Putin approach cannot succeed over the medium to long term. Clearly, there are millions of people around the world who disagree with me.

The Putin-Yanukovich agreement might buy both some additional time and space to maneuver but fundamentally it addresses none of Ukraine's structural economic challenges and does not provide Yanukovich with any additional legitimacy. If Ukraine was to run out of money in two months, now it might be six or nine. But the Ukrainian economy is still consuming more wealth than it produces and another day of economic reckoning is ahead. Unlike the EU, Putin is not demanding any structural reforms so the underlying economic dysfunctionality remains. More importantly, Yanukovich has lost his capacity to govern the country as somewhere over half the Ukrainian population no longer accepts the legitimacy of his Presidency. I am not clear how this will play out in detail but I very much doubt the Ukrainian landscape is going to look the same a year from now.

I reject the notion that Ukraine is a pawn in some battle between the West and Russia. Every society is trying to come to terms with new global realities, including the so-called "west," which isn't united either. The challenge for Ukraine is the position itself in a manner to benefit from the new rules of global economic, political, cultural, and strategic engagement. The reforms being promoted by the EU are reforms that are successful well beyond some mythical "west." The notion of a primal war between a mythical west and a mythical Eurasia led by Russia strikes me as a delusional hold over from the Cold War. Ukraine needs to change not for the west but for itself.



**"Washington needs to send a strong message to Putin not to interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs or risk repercussions"**

*Janusz Bugajski, foreign policy analyst and author*

President Viktor Yanukovich's decision to abort an EU association agreement and free trade pact for Ukraine and instead seek closer economic ties with Moscow has outraged citizens who want to be part of Europe and not an appendage of Russia. However, Ukraine itself confronts internal divisions that can precipitate conflict. This is evident in marked differences between western and eastern regions in support for pro-European demonstrations in Kyiv. The worst-case scenario could be reminiscent of Yugoslavia's collapse, whereby distinct regions no longer recognize the authority of the central government and push for autonomy or even separation. The Crimean peninsula in particular faces the specter of separatism, as the majority of inhabitants are Russians and the region hosts Russia's military fleet. Russian parties in Crimea can appeal directly to Moscow for assistance if new elections are scheduled or if Ukraine makes a clear European choice.

The Kremlin itself fears another Orange Revolution that would unseat Yanukovich through an early ballot with a victory for pro-Western parties pursuing closer ties with the EU. This would seriously damage Russia's agenda for assembling a Eurasia Union from the former Soviet territories. Moscow is also anxious about democratic contagion from Ukraine that could challenge Putin's authoritarian regime. Russia's propaganda machine is now in full gear claiming that the Ukrainian unrest is engineered by hostile Western powers. In response, Moscow may offer direct assistance to Yanukovich or demonstrate its "Slavic solidarity" with pro-Russian forces. Such a move could trigger an even more dangerous scenario, as the Ukrainian military will resist Russian incursions while some regions may capitalize on the opportunity to declare their secession.

Thus far the U.S. reaction to the Ukrainian upheaval has been subdued, as the Obama administration evidently fears alienating Russia, which it needs to pursue its Middle East policies. But Ukraine is not Iran or Syria. The majority of the population wants to join a democratic Europe and not an authoritarian Eurasia. Washington needs to send a strong message to Putin not to interfere in Ukraine's internal affairs or risk repercussions. It is time for the White House to specify its options, as Ukraine stands on the brink of outright conflict.

# Tough Russia and Doubtful Europe

Western diplomats have expressed “concern” over the situation in Ukraine. They “invite participants in the conflict to negotiate” but have hesitated to state a clear stance. This is not without reason



Author:  
Alain  
Guillemoles

A friend in need is a friend indeed. Ukrainian democrats are facing this moment of truth as they meddle through the toughest political battle on Kyiv’s Maidan Nezalezhnosti in over 22 years of independence. As they take stock of their confrontation with the government, they have a chance to count their true allies. Some support came from completely unexpected sources, including well-known actor George Clooney. Old brethren in arms voiced their support, too. These include Georgia’s ex-president Mikheil Saakashvili; EMPs from the European People’s Party, including Poland’s ex-prime minister Jerzy Buzek, MP Jacek Saryusz-Wolski, and Head of Foreign Affairs Committee Elmar Brok. EC President Jose Manuel Barroso spared no effort, either. His condemnation of Russia’s pressure on Ukraine was surprisingly stern.

Yet, the list of friendly national leaders looks pretty short. US Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland handed out buns and sandwiches on the Maidan. German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle made a visible and important step when he came to the Maidan on December 4 together with Vitaliy Klitschko. Ukrainian protesters also have reliable partners in Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt and Polish Foreign Minister Radoslaw Sikorski. Both politicians stand behind the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme for six post-Soviet states.

US Secretary of State John Kerry said that Ukrainians “ought to be able to decide who they want to affiliate with” and that the US was “disgusted” to find out about the violent crackdown on protesters.

On December 9, Vice President Joe Biden called Yanukovich before publishing a press release in which he reiterated the United States’ “strong support ... for Ukraine’s European aspirations”.

On December 3 and 4, 28 foreign ministers of NATO member-states gathered in Brussels for the summit. In their final statement, they called on the government and opposition in Ukraine to engage in dialogue and refrain from provocations—a statement so diplomatically moderate that it is hard to imagine a weaker formulation.

Still, West Europeans and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov exchanged some heated remarks during the meeting. Official documents did not report on this, but according to a Western diplomat quoted by France Press, the argument was about

“not irritating Russia too much at a time when we’re all cooperating well on the issues of nuclear security in Iran and chemical weapons in Syria.” The Kremlin was not nearly as delicate. Since December 2, Vladimir Putin has been referring to the Ukrainian protests as pogroms, claiming that they were organized from abroad to destabilize the legitimate government. Western leaders swallowed this insolence. Nothing changed much by the time this article went to press. The sad conclusion is that the West does not see any effective mechanisms with which to influence the situation in Ukraine.

In 2004, European governments made much clearer statements. The Russian government, too, seemed to be more open to dialogue. But the war in Georgia followed in 2008; then Russia struggled for the right to build a nuclear power plant in Iran; then the world watched the Kremlin support a Syrian regime that bombarded its own cities and villages.

Vladimir Putin is the longest-standing president among the G8 leaders. He has been in power for 14 years, and is notoriously uncompromising. With him, there is no room for discussion. Russia stands firm on the positions it has taken and will not step back one millimetre. It confirmed this in July by providing temporary asylum to American whistle-blower Edward Snowden. Today, Russia is reluctant to give the West any concessions.

European leaders have come to terms with the fact that

**EUROPEAN LEADERS  
HAVE COME TO TERMS  
WITH THE FACT THAT  
THEY DO NOT HAVE  
EFFECTIVE LEVERAGE TO  
INFLUENCE EASTERN  
EUROPE**

they have no effective leverage to influence Eastern Europe. Some politicians are calling for personal sanctions to be imposed against some leaders of the Ukrainian regime, but a final decision has not been made. After all, it took 10 years of Alexander Lukashenko’s rule in Belarus for the EU to enact its first sanctions in 2004.

Today, European leaders see their task as waiting, gauging the opposition’s ability to make long-term efforts while stressing that the Association Agreement is still on the table. However, the deeper the crisis grows, the heavier their silence gets. It is time for Western leaders to clearly pronounce that a sovereign state much choose its own way. This fundamental truth should be expressed by presidents and prime ministers. That would help them shed their unfortunate image as Putin’s obedient underlings. ■

# Putin's Expensive Victory

Under its current government, Ukraine may be a prize not worth winning

**A**nother victory for Vladimir Putin, another defeat for the West. That is how the outcome of the battle for Ukraine, the country between Russia and the European Union, is being portrayed in Moscow and in many Western capitals.

On December 17, after a meeting between Mr. Putin and Viktor Yanukovich, Ukraine's president, Russia agreed to lend Ukraine USD 15 billion and to slash the gas price from USD 400 to USD 268 per thousand cubic metres, as a reward for Mr. Yanukovich's ditching of an association agreement with the EU. Unsurprisingly, the mix of money and political cover for theft and violence proved more enticing to Mr. Yanukovich than the EU offer of the rule of law, free trade, competition and reform.

Yet look closer, and Mr. Putin's victory and Europe's loss seem less obvious. Probably Mr. Yanukovich never intended to sign an agreement with the EU—certainly not without being paid for it. By keeping up the pretence, he was able to bargain with Mr. Putin, who has now agreed to provide money without Mr. Yanukovich having signed a deal to join his Eurasian customs union.

And neither Mr. Yanukovich nor Mr. Putin nor EU leaders factored in the response of Ukrainians, who have been pouring into the streets for the past four weeks. Angered by Mr. Yanukovich trading the country's future for his own benefit, they were bolstered when he used violence against students. What started as a modest-sized street action demanding a deal with the EU has turned into a national awakening and vocal rejection of a kleptocratic post-Soviet state. After Mr. Yanukovich's futile attempt to clear the streets on December 11, the barricades grew higher, the spirit on Maidan became more resolute and the split within the Ukrainian elite became more visible. The crisis has turned Mr. Yanukovich into a lame duck.

America's threat to impose personal sanctions against him, his family and his backers has restrained



Putin! We are your nightmare  
Don't take us  
into the empire

Mr. Yanukovich from unleashing further violence. He is hoping that the Maidan protests will simply fizzle out over Christmas and the new year. Given the weakness of Ukraine's opposition, this may well happen. Yet whereas the Kremlin's deal with Mr. Yanukovich stymies Ukraine's negotiations with the EU, it is unlikely to halt its political crisis. Nor will it restore Ukraine's bust and unreformed economy.

For the crisis in Ukraine is compounded by a looming economic collapse that will now become Russia's problem. Ukraine is running out of reserves and desperately needs cash to get through the winter and avert default. Having thwarted Ukraine's deal with the EU, Mr. Putin has little choice but to pay up. But it is unclear what he will get in return, which may explain why the gas-price cut will be reviewed quarterly. Given the dire state of the economy and Mr. Yanukovich's precarious political position, any help could be money down the drain. Unlike an IMF loan, Russian money (drawn mostly from its national welfare fund) comes with no strings attached.

Mr. Putin may have extracted a promise from Mr. Yanukovich to clear the streets of protesters and join the Eurasian union before or just after the 2015 presidential election. But Mr. Yanukovich's ability to honour such a promise without sparking a civil conflict is uncertain

to say the least. For a large part of the country, including Kyiv and Western Ukraine, joining the Eurasian union would be an existential threat. Yet for Mr. Putin, who once called the collapse of the Soviet Union the biggest geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century and who sees himself as a gatherer of Russian territories, no price is too high to keep Ukraine in Russia's orbit.

Mr. Putin also knows that, if Ukraine changed from being a corrupt autocracy into a competitive democracy, that would be a threat to his own regime, rather as reforms in Czechoslovakia were to the Soviet Union in 1968. Fearing the spread of revolutionary contagion, Russia has reportedly barred young Ukrainians who look like Maidan protesters from entering the country, despite visa-free travel between the two. But whereas the Soviet Union used tanks and ideology, Mr. Putin prefers to deal in money and nationalism.

Mr. Putin's talk of Russia and Ukraine as one Slavic people has been accompanied by vitriolic anti-Ukrainian propaganda from state television. His appointment of Dmitry Kiselev, a rabid anti-Western and anti-Ukrainian propagandist, as head of a new government information service to replace the old one, RIA Novosti, is a sign of degradation in the regime. As the Soviet Union found, it will also help to push the republics away from Moscow. ■

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# Stormy Nights on the Maidan

“What the hell are you doing?!” an emergency doctor yells at Berkut, special purpose police officers as they chase after people and beat them up in front of the Presidential Administration



**D**ecember 1. “I’m at a gas station somewhere between Rivne and Zhytomyr at 2 a.m. It has more clients that it usually does during the rush hour,” Yarema Dukh writes on Facebook. “People walk in, go to the bathroom, get a hot sandwich and get back in their cars to carry on to Kyiv. And they are not students, but 40-year old men. Most don’t have Twitter or Facebook accounts but they got up and are driving to Kyiv. They have things to lose. They have people to lose. Hundreds and thou-

sands are going to EuroMaidan. And they are not students. Yanukovich, you’re done – they are not students!”

Closer to noon we are in the metro riding to Kyiv’s city centre. The next stop is Universitytet, a downtown station. “Are you getting off at the next stop?” a woman asks people standing in her way in the crowded metro carriage. “Don’t worry, we’re all getting off here,” they reply.

Empty on an average day, Universitytet is crowded on December 1.

Almost all of the passengers get off and join the sea of people flowing to the escalator. They chant “The villain should go to jail!”, sing the national anthem, call their friends and tell them to get off at stations that are less crowded. All of a sudden, both escalators that go up stop. “Walk!” the crowd urges those who stop, confused. And they obey.

## HOW IT ALL STARTED

Hundreds of thousands took to the streets on December 1, after Berkut’s crackdown on a peaceful student

rally on the night of November 30-December 1. That night, Mykhailivsky Monastery (St. Michael's Monastery) gave shelter to 200 protesters behind its walls.

Just a week earlier, protesters felt excitement over the first massive assembly after many years of apathy (EuroMaidan started with small protests on November 21 when the Cabinet of Ministers announced the suspension of preparations for the signing of the Association Agreement, that grew into a 100,000-strong rally on Sunday, November 24 – Ed.). A week later, the crowd was filled with tension and anticipation. The new day brought new rules to play by. Over a hundred thousand Ukrainians who had gathered at the European Square a week before were going to the EU. On December 1, over half a million took to the streets with a different goal in mind: they demanded a change of government. It was no longer about “becoming Europe”. It was about “not becoming Belarus”.

Many expected radical steps from the opposition. As its leaders spoke from stage, angered Ukrainians in the back could barely hear them. Nor could they hear the noise from Bankova Street, where clashes were already taking place in front of the Presidential Administration.

Some of those who stormed the Presidential Administration that day were provocateurs. Some were carefully evaded by the infuriated Berkut as it chased after protesters. Some were football hooligans, right- and left-wingers standing side by side. And some were students who no longer wanted to dance.

After several hours of clashes with the police, Berkut stormed in to actually disperse protesters with tear gas and stun grenades, once there were enough injured police officers and excuses to justify its violence.

Injured protesters immediately filled the only ambulance, catering to the needs of the crowd of 2,000 people. Doctors could not help all – they had even run out of bandages. The ambulance remained at Bankova while Berkut chased after protesters. “What the hell are you doing!” the doctor yelled at the Berkut officers chasing after people, pushing them down to the ground and beating them. The officers then took pictures, with their feet resting on the heads of people lying uncon-



everyone. “You’re great,” he said. “You’re so great guys.” Doctors in hospitals were similarly welcoming.

“They’re still kids,” an old nurse sighs. “No war yet, and kids are already being injured.”

The weekend was over. Protesters went to lick their wounds and picket government buildings, staying at Maidan 24/7 in the thousands, putting barbed wire around barricades, and discussing the provocateurs and the opposition that had failed the revolution.

### TOUGH DAYS AHEAD

The next crackdown came on the night of December 10-11, after President Yanukovich met with EC Vice-President Catherine Ashton who called on him to refrain from any violence and before the visit of US Assistant Secretary Victoria Nuland scheduled for the next day. After the Pechersk Court issued a verdict to take measures to prevent the blocking of pedestrian areas and the road around the Maidan, the police and Berkut were brought in

scious on the ground, recalls Dnipetrovsk-based journalist Valeriy Harahutsa and others. Three doctors from the ambulance escorted the most seriously injured people to the car and tried to help them. Volunteers brought bandages. Passers-by walked a man to the van, his skull broken and deformed.

The injured were then taken to other ambulances that had finally arrived. The doctor taking them to the trauma unit shook hands with

and started their crackdown from three directions at around 1 a.m. **(photo 1)**. The protesters who occupied the Kyiv City State Administration premises took the women to a safer place and barricaded the building. Berkut stormed through the barricades from the side of European Square and pushed people out. Priests were praying on the stage all the time **(photo 2)**, the bells of the Mykhailivsky Cathedral ringing in alarm – in ancient times, they signaled danger. The Afghan veterans protecting barricades on the road from Instytutska Street, which leads to the Presidential Administration, repelled the attack. At this point, there were about 2,500 people on the Maidan and the situation was getting really dangerous.

By 3 a.m. there were already twice as many people, as Kyivites arrived even though the authorities made every effort to prevent people from coming. They blocked bridges over the Dnipro and cut off routes to downtown areas. But people continued to arrive. From 4 to 6 a.m. Berkut was brutally pushing people around and using tear gas, yet people continued to resist. Afghan veterans broke through the Berkut line and cut off half of its troops from the rest of the unit. As the special police began to retreat, the crowd let the captured officers join their lot and got back the territory it almost lost. By that time, the number of protesters had grown to over 15,000. Provocateurs with iron sticks tried to break through to the Maidan and start new clashes but the Maidan security teams chased them out. A group of MPs, including Vitaliy Klitschko **(photo 3)**, stood with protesters. By morning, there were more than 20,000 protesters on the Maidan. They began to collect warm clothes and other stuff from the tents that had been brought down by Berkut during the night, when, all of a sudden, three bus-loads of Berkut fighters drove right up to the entrance of the Kyiv City State Administration where there were nearly 200 protesters, and blocked it. In response to Berkut's attempted storming of the building, protesters poured water over them **(photo 4)**. Meanwhile, people from the Maidan arrived and encircled Berkut, eventually forcing them to leave **(photo 5)**. The Maidan survived and more and more protesters arrived, despite regular warnings of bombs in the



metro and the closure of central stations.

By now, the tent town is still on the Maidan. Ukrainians continue to donate money for food and warm clothing and volunteers report where the money goes on a regular basis. Even though fewer people come around every night, weary after 27 days of protesting and wondering what they should do next, 72.4% of the protesters are ready to stay till the end, a survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation reveals. The opposition calls on people to not leave Kyiv's central square until all demands of protesters are fulfilled. Meanwhile, on December 17, Viktor Yanukovich signed deals with Russian President Vladimir Putin to get a loan of USD 15bn and a discount on gas, among other things. "This is essentially a full turn of the Ukrainian government to Russia. And it is no longer about the Customs Union, it is about the Eurasian Union into which Ukraine will obviously integrate in 2015 because the Moscow deals lead to this," Volodymyr Horbach, expert at the Institute for Euro-Atlantic Cooperation, comments. The deals give "control over Ukrainian economy, energy and defence system into the Russian hands" he claims. The price of the deals for Ukraine remains unknown. ■

# A Revolution of Experienced Youth

Does the EuroMaidan still exemplify the axiom that ‘revolutions are made by the youth’ now that it has become a movement against Yanukovych?

Author:

Oleksandr Mykhelson

The answer is both yes and no. *The Ukrainian Week* looks at the generation of youth born and raised after Ukraine gained independence. We compare today's youth with the generation that launched the history of independent Ukraine, a generation that had a chance to change Ukraine's path but failed for various reasons. They were young members of Narodniy Rukh – the People's Movement – a group that itself was young in the 1990s but was run by older people who had been freed from political imprisonment. This generation of youth staged the “Revolution on Granite” begun by Kyiv university students in 1990 that formed a crucial ingredient in the USSR's collapse. They are MPs in their early 30s who arrived with the previous parliamentary convention and could hardly fulfil themselves anywhere but in politics. And they are the so-called “blogger generation” who didn't trouble politics until politics troubled them.

A “political generation” is not necessarily about age; it is about one's mindset and practices. *The Ukrainian Week's* reporters were surprised to find that the average age of EuroMaidan protesters is well over 30. And it's not simply ‘peasants’ from Western Ukraine, as pro-government propaganda claims. A joint survey by the Democratic Initiatives Foundation and Kyiv International Institute of Sociology has found that over 2/3 of EuroMaidan participants have university diplomas. »



PHOTO: REUTERS

Over 50% are Kyivites. Over 1/3 speak Russian in everyday life.

This leads to several conclusions. First, those who have taken to the streets are not the “extremists” that the Yanukovich administration claims them to be. They are people who have succeeded in life to a greater or lesser extent and have something to lose. Still, they stand in protest. One possible explanation is that they are yesterday’s students who participated in the Orange Revolution nine years ago. The sociological survey did not include such data, but some aspects suggest that the 2013 Maidan is partly a product of those who had been here in 2004. Back then, they were the crowd. Now, they are the organizers, instigators, managers and sponsors. Will they pass the test? Time will tell.

What time has shown already is that the Maidan has changed. In 2004, Facebook was unknown to Ukrainians. Today, EuroMaidan is often called a “revolution of social media”. The exchange of information has become much faster, but so has the exchange of disinformation. Ukrainians hear each other better, but that does not mean that they understand each other better. The only undeniable fact is that the government has lost its

monopoly on information and this is irreversible, whether those in power realize it or not.

Today’s Maidan is different from the Orange Revolution in many other ways. As this article went to press, the author watched protesters reinforce barricades on the Maidan following a failed attempt by the Berkut special police to dismantle them on the night of December 10-11. Some were welding metal bars into fences, others were piling sacks with ice and snow into barricades. The teams of volunteers mocked each other, each saying that the other was doing the wrong thing. Then they got together, gave it all a little thought and joined efforts. As a result, a huge barricade emerged on the road to the European Square, and another one on the road to the Maidan from the Presidential Administration. It doesn’t matter how long these barricades will remain on the Maidan. What matters is that the protesters acted independently but joined forces when necessary. This is something they may have borrowed from social media.

The world is changing, growing tighter and more interconnected. The international press hardly noticed the Revolution on Granite in the 1990s. The Orange Revolution brought Ukraine to its

legitimate place in European geopolitics. Today’s EuroMaidan is a true test of European solidarity—a solidarity that has shown itself in horizontal social ties, but has not yet appeared in the world of top politics.

Top European politicians supported Yanukovich in 2010 and are now doing their best to keep from irritating Russia. For some of them, Ukraine is simply a bargaining chip. But things are more complicated than that. The blogger generation has a global, not just Ukrainian dimension. Western politicians today depend much more on public opinion at home where they have to struggle to maintain a positive image. We see Ukraine becoming a means of placing pressure on Western political elites by rival experts and politicians. A new solidarity is being born in the information era, and it has not yet uttered its final word.

Why did Ukraine fail to become a more aware Eastern European state back in the early 1990s when Poland did? Will the current generation succeed where previous ones failed? Below is the debate amongst representatives of different “political generations” and a sociological analysis of this issue. This may help you find an answer of your own. ■

“POLITICAL GENERATIONS”. OPINIONS



**Taras Stetskiy, 49**

*A leader of the *Tovarystvo Leva* (Lion’s Society) active in 1987-1988; a leader of the People’s Movement; Member of Parliament in several consecutive convocations; a field commander of the 2004 Orange Revolution*

I came into politics just like many of my peers did: we were suddenly allowed to do politics beyond the Communist Party and the Lion’s Society emerged as a result. There were other organizations, too. We all stormed into politics and didn’t look back.

Initially, it was only about culture. Then, we realized political independence was possible, too.

It was when Mykhailo Horyn, Viacheslav Chornovil (leaders of the People’s Movement) and Ihor Kalynets (a dissident poet) returned from prisons and exile. They were the Sixtiers; they actually served prison terms for Ukraine. They were absolute role models for us; moral role models. We had great respect for them, but were not in a “commander-subject” hierarchy. We even answered back sometimes. They still acknowledged us. When the People’s Movement emerged, they ended up on top but we young people got in as well.

Everything began to change once the People’s Movement turned into a political party. It’s natural. Its purpose as a civic entity was to a) gain independence for Ukraine and b) ban the Communist Party. Once these goals were accomplished, the need for the people’s movement vanished. Naturally, it began to transform into a party. It got almost 10% of the vote in the 1998 election. But in 1992, when Viacheslav Chornovil launched that

transformation, some thought that we should follow the path of the Baltic States which dissolved their people’s movements and created several parties on their basis.

We didn’t, and we had objective reasons for that. Independence was a super-goal in the post-Socialist East European and Baltic States. It wasn’t in Ukraine. We have to admit one thing: the People’s Movement was fundamentally popular in Western Ukraine, Kyiv and some parts of Central Ukraine. That’s all. So, when we struggled for independence, it came to a compromise. The Communists publicly supported independence in exchange for a silent consent of National Democrats that the Communists would remain in power. As a result, we now have one Maidan after another.

Still, I absolutely believe that the current generation will complete this cause. They are somewhat like us, but they are different, too. They have much stronger principles because they know what they want. They are immersed in the European world and realize what Europe is. I believe it is people like them that our generation lacked.



**Oles Doniy, 44**

*A leader of the "Revolution on Granite" in 1990 that contributed to Ukraine's independence. He is currently a non-aligned Member of Parliament*

I felt that I was a Ukrainian back in middle school, and by high school I had decided that the purpose of my life would be to struggle for an independent Ukraine. I entered Shevchenko State University hoping to learn the Ukrainian language there and find

the remaining fragments of the underground student movement. My first year at university showed me that there was no underground movement, nor education in Ukrainian.

It took me several years to find like-minded people. The first organizations emerged in 1988. Luckily, someone reported me to the police. This someone was Dmytro Vedeneyev, currently a well-known historian, SBU (Special Service of Ukraine – Ed.) Colonel, and Deputy Director of the National Memory Institute. He reported how I was undermining the USSR and described me as a Ukrainian bourgeoisie nationalist. This had an unexpected effect. After three years of searching for them, like-minded people from different departments suddenly began to seek me on their own ... Then we began to organize rallies, including the student-led Revolution on Granite.

Our generation found itself involved in the struggle for independence. Another thing was that we established the successful

youth rally as a trend for young people to follow. Today's protesters have borrowed an external element of our rallies – the tent cities. But the psychological aspects, such as the ability to coordinate efforts, to sacrifice and volunteer, and readiness for a struggle, are much deeper and matter much more than tents.

When I look at rallies today, including EuroMaidan, I am sometimes surprised. It is called a "student Maidan", yet there is not a single student among its leaders. All the leaders are between 30 and 40. When we were 19-20, we thought and did everything on our own. This is the difference between our generations.

Nobody could supervise us. We didn't ask anyone like people do today. They say there's no leader. We didn't have that problem. When we started our struggle, we couldn't name a single political prisoner. None of us know who Viacheslav Chornovil was. My impression is that the youth matured a little earlier at my time.



**Lesia Orobets, 31**

*Member of Parliament from the Batkivshchyna party. Daughter of MP Yuriy Orobets, who was killed in a car accident in 2006.*

People bring their kids to EuroMaidan today just like my father brought me to rallies

when I was seven. That was in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Politics has mattered to me ever since. I began to look closer at what was happening on TV, trying to understand what was happening and why. That's how politics entered my life.

I was twelve when my father was elected to parliament. Before that, he had gone through at least three rounds and each was declared invalid... So, I was very young when politics came into my life.

My belief is that our generation managed to do the most important thing: we persuaded everyone that we are not the "inert generation" in contrast to the widespread concept that has been around for the past 23 years. I hope there will be no party in the future that will ignore the young and their problems. Before EuroMaidan, the

generally-accepted voter target group that politicians paid the most attention to were pensioners because they are the most proactive voters. But this revolution was made by the young – my generation and even younger ones.

It used to be an insult to be called "the Facebook generation". Now, there is not a single faction meeting where Facebook is mentioned less than three to five times. People discuss what has been posted on it and why. In fact, there is not a single decent MP at the Rada who does not use social media.

The Facebook generation is a proactive generation. The first Maidan on November 21 was organized through Facebook. I really hope they succeed; we have no other options.



**Roman Shreik, 39**

*Founder of Durdom (Madhouse) website, non-partisan blogger, one of the ideologues behind EuroMaidan*

Before 2004, my interest in politics was confined to reading news. The Orange Revolution not only brought me to Maidan but to the Ukrayinska Pravda (Ukrainian Truth) on-

line publication as well. It was there that I got my idea to develop Durdom where I would collect all the funny things people write and draw about politics.

The new generation is a web generation, it does not recognize the "I'm the boss, so you're nobody" hierarchy common here. It prefers cooperation, is ready to support ideas rather than lousy cronies, and believes that problems can be solved by joining forces rather than waiting for orders from above.

Clearly, differences between young and old will always exist. Young people learn faster while older people use skills developed earlier. I believe this is reflected in attitudes towards independence, the orientation of integration (young people lean towards Europe), and the semi-soviet state of today's Ukraine (young people want change here

and now, older people are willing to wait patiently).

The key accomplishment of those who protested in the USSR was Ukraine's independence. They may have only been drops that wore away the stone. That stone eventually broke apart because it was already hollow inside, but they should be seen as heroes. The new generation of politicians should work for Ukraine to win democracy; not to get it as a bonus, but win it. Then, democracy will be valued and better immunized against fools.

This new generation is making itself seen on the web. It can be scorned for some things and praised for others, but it is here and it wants to have an influence. I think the best way to do this is to participate in Kyiv elections. But that's a goal for the future. Right now, we have to fight to ensure that there will actually be elections in our country.

# A Step Forward

**H**undreds of thousands of Ukrainians took to the streets to join a public defiance campaign. What forces and patterns are driving them? What do these people want? What does their protest, which came after a nine-year-long hiatus, signify? *The Ukrainian Week* talks about this with social psychologist Oleh Pokalchuk.

**UW: How would a social psychologist describe the sentiments prevalent among Ukrainians today?**

This is revolutionary behaviour but not in the least a revolution as a complex phenomenon. So far it is not a situation of the leadership being unable and the grassroots not wanting, because the top officials are still quite capable of action, even though some have faltered. However, in the past years, the semantics of the word revolution has, in a way, evolved from bloody coups with executions to a kind of post-modernist happening, a tradition launched by the 1968 student revolution in France. Thus, when we talk about the revolutionary sentiments of Ukrainians today, we need to understand that this is a kind of manipulation strategy which is being used to mobilize young romantics, conservatives, artists and everyone else. This word is also a valve through which extra steam is being released, to the advantage of, again, all participants in the process – both those who, ignorant of the true essence of the protests, are finding self-fulfilment in them and those who are running the campaign, because it permits them to keep people under control. On the whole, Ukrainians are ready to react abruptly to metaphysical values like the European ones but no longer know how to act in the genre of an open uprising. This way, they create a certain protest space of their own. However, when things come to a head and they need to act like Bohdan Khmelnytsky did in his time, they flounder, because it takes personal responsibility. This is the reason why the majority of our people prefer to limit themselves to words, i.e., declarations of intentions, and

why we have few down-to-earth radicals.

**UW: But the 1 December events on Bankova Str. showed that Ukrainians are becoming increasingly similar to Europeans, who are ready to take the most radical action if their rights are violated. Through radicalism to Europe?**

The latest protests show that a new image of Ukrainians is taking shape before our eyes. The peaceful, dumb, hollow and shallow patriotism, which has for centuries been held up as the immanent Ukrainian character, is alien to this generation. These are people of a new world – they are true Europeans in terms of both their communicative prowess and ability to easily travel to the West. To them, Europe is not some out-of-reach dream as it is to those who view a trip to Poland as a great accomplishment. The question is not whether these young people are better or worse – they are indeed different, not burdened with Soviet legacy, and they are the ones who will form a new image of the Ukrainian man. He will lose a large part of his ethnographic traits. Of course, there will be ritual wailings over the status of a motley reservation of savages, but Ukraine – if it wants to turn into a European country in terms of the relationships between politicians and society and the attitude towards the former – must go this way. It is already taking steps in this direction, as the latest events suggest. Otherwise, we will continue to move ahead with our backs turned to Europe, i.e., trying to keep our archaic, traditional worldview which is no longer capable of effecting any changes. The current events are unique in that they are absolutely logical from the viewpoint of historical and legal development but are, at the same time, absolutely spontaneous, i.e., not orchestrated in a top-down fashion.

**UW: People in EuroMaidans, who are they – a**

**crowd or a mass of various personalities?**

Crowd and mass are different concepts, both semantically and psychologically. A crowd is a large number of people gathered in a space that is limited either physically or metaphysically. A crowd is always very springy; it has the energy of a spring that can be released at any moment. In contrast, large masses of people behave absolutely differently in different places: for example, there may be one logic in the centre and a totally different one on the periphery. It would be a gross mistake to believe that the human masses like those that came to downtown Kyiv on 1 December are homogeneous in their sentiments. You can control 100,000 people one way or another, but not 300,000, to say nothing of a million. And it's great that no one in Ukraine has mastered the art of ruling 100,000-strong crowds, because then we would be living in a totalitarian state. In general, the protagonist now is the new generation, which makes sense, because youth and rebellion are synonyms.

However, now these young people are fundamentally different from their predecessors in terms of their

**Interviewer:**  
**Bohdan**  
**Butkevych**



strivings, psychology and attitude to politicians.

**UW: They are smarter, don't take other people's word for it and are ready for the most radical actions to protect their interests? How would you compare the present situation with the 2004 events?**

The entire Ukrainian people is now turning into a political nation and very rapidly at that. Likewise, politicians are starting to accept the new rules of the game, because politics as a process is a certain protocol for adopting compromise decisions, and everything rests on this compromise. All participants in the present processes have made great progress as compared to 2004. I can see great changes in terms of their psychology. While people wanted a carnival back then, they are more educated now, because we have had discussions throughout these nine years dissecting what happened in Maidan back then and who took advantage of the situation. The Orange Revolution itself did not raise the political awareness of the people. It was the post-Orange period of depression and lost faith that enabled them to make a psychological connection to a very similar situation which we had in 1990 when a student revolution succeeded in forcing Prime Minister Vitaliy Masol to resign but his powers were then usurped by Leonid Kravchuk. Now we see a kind of backward domino effect – people have stopped yielding to euphoria and become much more calculated, competent and aware, even though they are saying almost the same thing as nine years ago. Moreover, there is huge information exchange taking place in society among all its segments, even those that are not in Euro-Maidans now.

The authorities have nothing to offer to the people of the new millennium. The leaders of this new generation with their ability to troll can become much more influential than the current leaders. In other words, new society with a qualitatively different attitude to politicians is being born in Maidan now.

**UW: To what extent are people defending precisely the European choice? The "against the authorities" negativist trend seems to be dominating.**

People want not so much to join the EU as to be in Europe as an ideological construct. And this is a great step forward in comparison, again, with 2004 when the majority came out with just one slogan "Away with the gang!" and pinned their hopes on a messiah ("Yushchenko – yes!"), which is something that does not require a great deal of intellect. Now the majority of people can formulate, at least in a couple simple words, what they want from Europe personally for themselves. The types of thinking and perception have changed from purely negativist, geared exclusive against something, to constructivist, wanting to achieve something. In essence, the fact that people have come out into the streets is an act of reflection, an attempt to analyse events, i.e., this is emerging European consciousness in terms of reacting to events. People are willing to fight not for some leader but for themselves as they filter ideas using their understanding and personalities.

**UW: Does it mean that bribery of voters and perception of politicians in terms of how much they have given to voters, which are standard for Ukrainians, are gradually losing relevance? Isn't this forecast too optimistic?**

Ukrainians are finally starting to depart from the clientelistic perception of politicians – instead of passively waiting to receive crumbs of merciful donations from the most noble rulers in exchange for their complete loyalty, people want to be able to influence politicians.

However, the authorities and the majority of opposition political figures are ignorant men of yesterday. It could not be otherwise in quasi-Soviet society. The current political parties are as much as afraid of true civil society and are not welcoming its formation, because if it emerges, individuals who have their own opinions will get together, solve their problems and go back to their lives. In stark contrast to this, politicians see people exclusively as entities at the foot of their throne who obediently go in the direction shown by the leaders. This does not mean that the present opposition is bad: it simply does not know any other mechanisms. These politicians cannot find a common language with the young people who start coming onto the stage, be-

In 2004 the majority came out with just one slogan "Away with the gang!" and pinned their hopes on a messiah. Now the majority of people can formulate, at least in a couple simple words, what they want from Europe personally for themselves. The types of thinking and perception have changed from purely negativist, geared exclusively against something, to constructivist, wanting to achieve something

cause they have fundamentally different systems of communication.

**UW: Does that mean that thanks to EuroMaidans, Ukrainians are starting to understand politics through their own interests rather than emotions?**

There are no simple processes in group behaviour. To Russians, the state is a large collective farm, while to Ukrainians, who still have the mindset of individual farmers and see economic benefit only in their nearest neighbours, the most important factor is the phenomenon of so-called local identity. It is countryside neighbourhood mentality if you wish. After the latest presidential and parliamentary elections, the residents of Ukraine's east and south experienced pretty much the same kind of euphoria:

**NEW SOCIETY WITH A QUALITATIVELY DIFFERENT ATTITUDE TO POLITICIANS IS BEING BORN IN MAIDAN NOW**

"We've shown them! Our guys have won!" It was the type of joy central and western Ukraine experienced after 2004. Moreover, these people expected to find themselves at the receiving end of a generous flow of money and benefits as "victors". It never materialized and disappointment began to set in. Strategically, it is much worse than protests, because the latter single out a clear, even if initially negative, emotion, which is then much easier to channel into something positive. I remember well how much people hated Yulia Tymoshenko: they called her a "gas thief" and the condemnation level was up to 60 per cent. Over time, the attitude was reversed, and those same people began to ardently love her. Let me repeat myself, emotion is above all. Now when there are no feelings whatsoever, there is nothing you can do about it. Viktor Yanukovich is no longer a hero in eastern Ukraine, even though he is still not considered a traitor or a patently negative figure there, either. The current events have simply given shape to all these processes. The people who are now protesting in squares will always be interested in what a politician thinks instead of accepting or rejecting him based on pure emotion. ■

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The current political parties are as much as afraid of true civil society and are not welcoming its formation, because if it emerges, individuals who have their own opinions will get together, solve their problems and go back to their lives

Politicians cannot find a common language with the young people who start coming onto the stage, because they have fundamentally different systems of communication

**18 – 29 December** ————— **Until 28 December, 7 p.m. - 2 – 19 January** —————

**Christmas Arsenal**  
**Mystetskyi Arsenal (Art Arsenal)**  
 (10-12, vul. Lavrska, Kyiv)

A holiday fair will be held at Mystetskyi Arsenal in the run-up to the New Year and Christmas. A lot of pleasant surprises await both adults and children, including the works of well-known handcrafters, master classes in the making of Christmas cards and New Year's accessories, as well as the presentation of the best art publications and children's books. Music accompaniment will be provided by the Kyiv-based *Shchedryk* children's choir. An innovative educational project Arsenal of Ideas will present interesting scientific and artistic projects to the young audience.



**Jazz & Lounge Festival**  
**Miami Blues Restaurant**  
 (114, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)



In the final phase of this five-week art project, multiple aspects of modern art from blues and electronic music to exhibitions, performances and theatrical productions, will merge within a single programme. Performers and artists from all over Ukraine have been invited to participate in the series of performances, to fill each evening with pleasant surprises. Ostep Stupka, Yuriy Yermolenko and DJ Mishukoff will present their international FACEVINYL project for the audience. Virtuoso bandura player Roman Hrynkiv will perform as a special guest.

**Christmas Concerts**  
**Kharkiv Philharmonic**  
 (21, vul. Rymarska, Kharkiv)

The Kharkiv Philharmonic promises the residents and guests of Kharkiv an unforgettable Christmas holiday. It is here that a range of concerts, featuring symphonies and chamber music, will take place. Participants will include not only the philharmonic's soloists and in-house ensembles, but also musicians from Poland, Russia, Greece, as well as from all over Ukraine. A Christmas night within the walls of the philharmonic will echo with the glorious sounds of the organ, since this is where the Stanislav Kalinin's Christmas Organ Concert will be taking place. The programme will continue with a concert by the famous saxophonist from Odesa, Hanna Stepanova, and much more heart-warming music.



**5 – 7 January** ————— **6 – 8 January** ————— **8 January, 6 p.m.** —————

**Christmas Dream Land**  
**Mamayeva Sloboda**  
 (2, vul. Mykhayla Dontsya, Kyiv)

For the sixth time, Christmas Dream Land will bring together Kyivites and visitors for a traditional Ukrainian Christmas celebration. The programme will include numerous performers, nativity plays and carol-singing, a live nativity scene, an ice figure competition, traditional Cossack treats and many other Christmas surprises. Oleh Skrypka and Le Grand Orchestra, Ethno Trio Troitsa, Foma and the Christmas Orchestra will be in charge of the music part. On 12-13 January, young people, dressed in folk costumes and as animals, will lead out Malanka, sing *shchedrivkas* and wish everyone a prosperous New Year by throwing wheatberries – an old Ukrainian ritual.



**Christmas in Lviv**  
**Downtown**  
 (Lviv)



The festival of carols, doughnuts, the making of a traditional sheaf of wheat, Christmas and charitable evening programmes – all this awaits the people of Lviv and visitors to the city over Christmas. In the courtyard of the City Hall, Voskresinnya (Resurrection) will organise a Christmas fairy play and present the *When Angels Come Down to Earth* performance. In addition, visitors will have the opportunity to taste traditional Lviv doughnuts and sing carols together with nativity plays. But the surprises don't end here – the programme includes numerous New Year's and Christmas events, dramatized appearances and unforgettable impressions.

**Music Meetings**  
**National Philharmonic of Ukraine**  
 (2, vul. Volodymyrskiy Uzviz, Kyiv)

When the winter holidays are in full swing, lovers of Christmas music will have the opportunity to see the 7th International Music Meetings Festival. The concert will begin with a performance by the Dzvinochok boys' choir – a winner of international competitions. This will be followed by the youth choir of the Tchaikovsky National Music Academy and the Laštivka children's choir. The evening programme will feature sacred music, carols and *shchedrivkas* – New Year's songs. The special atmosphere of the Christmas holidays is possible thanks to the unique sound of young voices, which are also a guarantee of a good mood.





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# Revolution in Art



The students beaten up by Berkut on November 30 – and all other protesters – have the tree they prefer and decorate



For Ukraine, for freedom, for our future!



The toppled statue of Lenin. "Yanukovich, you're next" the poster on it says



Markian, a student from Lviv, buys an old piano and delivers it to the Presidential Administration. Protesters play the "free piano" as the police listens. "The goal was to respond to the violence that occurred here with kindness and art," Markian comments



Holidays are coming!



Protesters reinforce barricades with boards and tires delivered by volunteers after Berkut's attacks



Protesters guard the reinforced barricade on the road to the European Square and get warm around the fire



Yanukovich is portrayed with the imperial Russian bi-headed eagle on his face. Next to him is the poster dedicated to the violent crackdown of the police on peaceful students on November 30 under the pretext that municipal services had to install the New Year tree on the square where the students were rallying at night



Thousands of protesters light up their phones as Ukrainian band Okean Elzy performs its old song *Друг* (A Friend). The panoramic video of the breathtaking action called EUROMAIDAN Day'N'Nite is available online

We are Ukrainians and we are sick of just being proud. We have started to act

**Ми українці - нам набридло пишатися.**  
**Ми почали щось робити.**



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