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UKRAINE TO RETIRE FROM EUROPE AFTER 1023 YEARS

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Bohdan Andriytsiev, Director, ECEM Media Ukraine LLC

Roman Tsupryk, Chairman of the Editorial Board

Serhiy Lytvynenko, Editor-in-Chief, Ukrainskiy Tyzhden

Lidia Wolanskyj, Editor, Ukrainian Week International Edition

Anna Korbut, translator

Mailing address: PO Box 2, Kyiv, 03067

Publisher address: vul. Mashynobudivna 37, Kyiv 03067 Ukraine

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How not to lose Ukraine

At first glance, the news coming out of Ukraine offers little to be optimistic about. In just one year, the new Administration has dropped the country's ratings for human rights almost to the levels of the mid-1990s. Beyond state oversight yet helped at every step by state agencies, Ukraine's oligarchs are busy monopolizing entire branches of industry, grabbing stakes in the country's largest enterprises. Some Cabinet Members, such as Education Minister Tabachnyk, allow themselves to say things that are not only offensive to Ukrainians as a nation, but even echo racist statements by Nazi officials during the WWII occupation. Instead of battling widespread corruption, the government is settling accounts with political opponents and accusing activists of criminal activity based on patently absurd grounds.

The biggest danger is that, instead of making use of the current concentration of power to undertake promised reforms, today's governing elite are trying to rebuild Ukraine into a kind of zone of heightened comfort for the elect. A zone in which the rest of the country will be a source of labor and funds to cover budget spending. For those in power, the plan seems to be to swim in luxury and funnel the profits from enterprises under their control, not into modernization or infrastructure, but into the satisfaction of personal whims or the capitalization of private projects outside Ukraine, through offshore channels.

Needless to say, a state built along these lines is very vulnerable to external forces, especially Russian ones. First of all, its leaders need support and protection against its own citizenry and, secondly, they need investment so that their own plans can succeed.

On the other hand, the price of this kind of support will be giving up control over strategic assets in Ukraine's economy to the Russians—something Russian officials, from Vice Premier Sechin to members of the Duma are already openly saying.

These are assets that will generate sufficient additional resources for the Russian economy while supporting the Kremlin's plans in Europe—plans that are clearly set out in the Russian Federation's strategic documents: taking control over energy transport and distribution networks, expanding Russian influence over decision-making processes in Europe, and drawing European countries into deals that may be inconvenient for them but useful for Moscow.

The good news is that, in trying to set up a dictatorship along the lines of the one in Moscow, the key word for the current Administration in Kyiv is "trying." It has already bumped up against resistance from Ukrainian civil society, that is, the community of citizens who are capable of expressing and defending a political position.

For Ukraine's civil society is too European to allow itself to be used as a soviet tool. The very reaction of Ukrainians to the gauntlet tossed by their political leadership is typical of European societies with a sense of proper human rights and freedoms and the ability to defend these. Protest movements are happening at the national level, bringing together business people, who don't want to see small and

medium business destroyed, as well as students, who don't want to see education become completely commercialized and universities lose their autonomy. As a result, those in power have had to compromise.

These protest actions have also shown the solidarity of the country: participants come from across the land, without regard to language preferences or opinions about historic figures.

Opinion polls continue to show that Ukrainians consider freedom of speech, of assembly and of elections an intrinsic good and that they consider it unacceptable to restrict or take away such freedoms. The press continues to have highly-principled journalists who critically evaluate the government's actions and offer Ukrainian voters objective information about the state of affairs in their country.

The power of the state is seen by Ukrainians as coming, not from pure abstract "force," or the status of "superpower," or the ability to interfere in the affairs of one's neighbors, although this is typical for Russian society. Instead, the power of the state is seen by Ukrainians as its ability to protect the rights and well-being of its citizens.

When it comes down to it, Ukrainians prefer to resolve their political conflicts at the negotiation table and through free elections. Yet these traits are not merely the achievement of recent years. The qualitative difference between Ukrainian society and Russian is that Ukrainians have long embraced European values as their own. Because of this, Ukraine's identity has not disappeared into some "all-Russian" identity, despite several centuries under Russian rule—and many forceful campaigns by Russian imperial and soviet rulers to bring this about. The distinctiveness of Ukrainians from "Great Russians" lies not only in their language and historical memory, but also in their worldview, on the place of the individual in their society, and on the priority they give to different values.

In the end, even the current people in power in Ukraine are in no hurry to fall into the arms of the Russian bear: they would still prefer to run their territory on their own. Yet this idea is in conflict with the expansion of authoritarian practices. If Ukraine's leadership does not trust its own people but chooses to fight them instead, it will be very vulnerable, indeed.

For Ukrainians to complete their path to Europe, that is, to come back home, its leaders need to pass the challenge of Europeaness that their citizens are presenting them now. This means: talk to your opponents, include them in the decision-making process, discuss reforms in advance so that they can be appropriately amended, and don't set up any more feeders for your clique.

Ukraine's foreign partners should actively demand that its leaders opt for this way of running the country. To ignore the threat of dragging Ukraine into the "Russian world" is not just against Ukraine's interests, but against the interests of all of Europe. The bloody history of the 20th century has shown us all that the sacrifice of liberty in one European nation not only does not solve the issue of European security—it complicates things even more. ■



February 3

Blogger kikh0t1953 takes responsibility for **blowing up Stalin** in Zaporizhzhia



February 8

The Verkhovna Rada of Crimea no longer exists. It's now the "Vierkhovniy Soviet."



February 11

Hosni Mubarak resigns as president of Egypt and the army takes over

QUOTES

ANATOLIY BLYZNIUK demonstrates ukrainophobia

The Donetsk governor urges all those who want to speak Ukrainian and "play at democracy" in his office to ship out to Ivano-Frankivsk.



MYKOLA AZAROV loses his memory

A Government instruction cuts the staffing at the Institution of National Memory by 33%, "because of lack of funding."



HANNA HERMAN does not see any russification

"There's no russification in Ukraine. Even Premier Azarov is learning Ukrainian, although he never bothered to do this in 20 years of independent Ukraine."



OLENA VORONOVA loses a job

When the bilingual young Odesite says she wants to speak Ukrainian on the job, a Kyiv café manager says "Why do you need this language?" and turns her down.



North Prospect or

When the hammer is your only tool, all problems look like nails

Author:
Yuriy Makarov



A spider makes its web, not according to some existing plan, but because it doesn't know what else to do. Because it's programmed that way. So, too, Ukraine's current "reformers:" they squeeze SMEs, not because they understand economic mechanisms or IMF instructions, but because they're programmed that way. It's as simple as that: they don't know anything better.

The list of cruelties experienced these days, not only by Ukraine's flat tax payers, but by all business owners with no reliable "protection," is not limited to the novelties in the updated Tax Code. And although the government is making it seemingly attractive to register legal entities, the real daily practice of the country's fiscal and law enforcement agencies is all about inspections, fines and lawsuits. This is inexorably pushing business owners back into the shadows—and where there are shadows, relations are completely different and different "fellas" want an accounting—or pushing them to look for a better life abroad. Many of my acquaintances

are now thinking about immigrating.

They don't see and they don't understand. The President has just announced that he intends to increase GDP by 10% every year, an "Asian tiger" pace. Where will this wonder come from? Only from a "professor's" imagination. In rich countries, SMEs account for 50% (UK) to 80% (US) of GDP. In Ukraine, it's 12% tops, but nobody can give more accurate numbers and even this share is falling. Take a look at any newspaper and see how many new ads say "Legal services. Liquidate your company in a day."

Oh, inevitably, the government will wonder what's happening, increase the pressure, and blame "sabotage"—forgetting one thing: When the hammer is your only tool, all problems look like nails. Nobody argues that among "small" and "medium" sole entrepreneurs there aren't many slick operators who sell UAH 200,000-worth of furniture a month and pay UAH 200 in taxes. But the absolute majority are entrepreneurs whom the government abandoned on Day One. Many of these people

¹Viktor Yanukovich wrote in his application as candidate in the 2004 presidential race that he was once a "professor."

The month in history

February 8, 1914



The Noviy Svit Ukrainian publishing house opens its doors in Montreal

February 9, 1918



The Red Army occupies the capital of the Ukrainian National Republic; thousands of Kyivites are killed

February 14, 1956



The 20th Congress of the CP opens in Moscow and condemns the cult of personality and ideology of Stalin

February 12



Bad weather in Ukraine leads to 320 traffic accidents in Kyiv and 941 settlements suffer blackouts

February 17



The roof at the newly-built Sky Mall collapses in Kyiv. Insurance estimates are UAH 5 million of damage

February 26



A fire in Zaporizhia's Nova Linia hypermarket kills two people

March 1

Tickets for Euro-2012 games go on sale

Yanukovych Blind

would still be sitting in their drawing offices and design surface-to-surface guided missiles, but it turned out that the country didn't need this many weapons. And so these people went to the market rather than the unemployment office. They survived, though that was not what they were trained for. And today they—not Marx's proletarians—are the biggest potential opponents to the government. Do those in power even understand this much?

If you look through the CVs of Ukraine's top officials, they all have a higher education; some even have two degrees, including one in economics—if you didn't know how much an exam grade "costs" at our economics universities—and baldly "cash only," as our professors also want their piece of the pie. Indeed, if not for this, perhaps these professors would by now have studied modern trends in economics, especially the new institutionalists: Williamson, Coase and North. North has often written that "institutions matter," institutions meaning sets of rules, written or unspoken, rules governing actions, and codes of conduct. Of course, institutions force "transaction costs" on the economy. And this is the friction that hinders market relations and is eventually capable of stopping an economy. Meanwhile, Party of the Regions' ideologues and practitioners are diligently aping either the old so-

viet model or the new Russian one—because they like it and it's the only system they believe in. Then, as the old joke goes, they wonder why they all they ever get is a machine-gun at the end. Douglass North's Nobel prize was for reminding the world that history, traditions and cultural stereotypes are as real economic factors as production facilities, technologies, and resources.

WHERE THERE ARE SHADOWS, RELATIONS ARE COMPLETELY DIFFERENT AND DIFFERENT "FELLAS" WANT AN ACCOUNTING

The USSR's "real socialism" had a Russian face because it had absorbed the centuries-old traditions of a domineering state, omnipotent tsar, wasteful magnates, thieving bureaucrats, and servile plebes. This approach can undoubtedly work, if you leave out the cost of consumables—in this case, your country's people—but only if two things are in place: natural wealth and a system of repression. In short, the Russian economic model can target a missile at the US and even send a human into space—it is incapable of providing all its citizens with a roof over their heads and buckwheat in the stores—as long as it has export commodities and a Gulag.

Unfortunately for him, Mr. Yanukovych has neither. ■

NUMBERS

\$9.3 billion

is Ukraine's trade deficit for 2010, up from \$5.7 billion in 2009

over UAH 17 million

will be spent this year on chartered airplanes for government delegations and to maintain the President's helicopter

UAH 13.8 billion

has been budgeted to renovate the building of the security administration in Koncha-Zaspa, where top officials reside

UAH 33 million

is being allocated to renovate Syniokh, the Presidential estate in Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast

UAH 130 billion

is now owed by the government to Ukrainians who have sued it

70%

was the reported growth rate of Ukraine's stock market in 2010. It is expected to grow 30-40% in 2011

11.3 million Ukrainians

use the internet and ua.net visitors grew 30% in 2010

\$6.9 billion

was "invested" in Cyprus by Ukraine – actually just offshore deals

February 19, 1954



By decision of top soviet officials, **Crimea is transferred from the Russian FSSR to the Ukrainian SSR**

February 20, 1649



Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytskyi begins to negotiate the boundaries of the Zaporozhian Army with Poland

February 22, 1987



Andy Warhol, founder of Pop Art and American artist of Ukrainian-Lemko origins, dies

March 1, 1991

Donbas miners begin their first political strike, demanding Gorbachev's resignation

The Three-Martini Launch

Building an NLG terminal in Ukraine could be a move to diversifying gas suppliers—or just a waste of taxpayer money

This year, Ukraine's delegation was proactive as never before at the World Economic Forum in Davos. The President amused investors, while his officials hustled earnestly to diversify energy supplies. Watched by their Presidents, Viktor Yanukovych and Ilkham Aliyev, Ukrainian and Azerbaijan fuel and energy ministers signed two critical deals about transiting Caspian oil through Ukraine and supplying liquid gas from Azerbaijan. Ukraine's Minister Yuriy Boyko stated that Ukraine would get 2bn cu m of gas in 2014 and 5bn cu m in 2015, saying, "Ukraine will build a terminal and Azerbaijan will fill it with gas."

AN APPETIZING IDEA

The idea of building a natural liquid gas (NLG) terminal in Ukraine can only be welcomed, as it will allow the country to diversify energy sources. A resolution to build a terminal on the Black Sea coast was approved back in March 2010 and the Government expects the facility to go on line by 2014 with a capacity of 10bn cu m. It has also been announced that a state-owned enterprise called The National NLG Terminal Project, set up at the end of December, will be responsible for it. They are to prepare a feasibility study by September 2011 and construction will be tendered out by January 2012.

In their efforts to avoid energy dependence on Russia, most Old World countries built their own NLG terminals several years ago. Bulgaria and Romania both launched similar projects in 2010. The key advantage of natural liquid gas is that it is relatively cheaper than the gas piped by Russia. First, transporting NLG to the EU is easier from the Middle East and Africa than from Russia. Second, the cost of shipping and converting NLG, that is,

Author:
Iryna
Khodorova

Estimated cost of NLG terminal in Ukraine –
€1 billion



THE MAIN ADVANTAGE OF NATURAL LIQUID GAS IS THAT IT IS RELATIVELY CHEAPER THAN THE GAS PIPED BY RUSSIA

turning gas to liquid and then liquid back into gas, is lower than the cost of pumping and servicing pipeline systems and so on.

In 2008-2009, the price of Russian gas went up steeply while NGL spot prices plummeted and EU countries switched to this alternative fuel. Liquid gas put considerable pressure on Gazprom, whose export of fuel to the EU fell 11.4% in 2009, causing its market share to slip from 25% to 22%. Meanwhile, total imports of NLG to European countries grew by 25%. Qatar alone doubled its supply, although earlier it had been selling gas mostly to the US. In 2009, its NLG was selling for US \$80–90 per 1,000 cu m, while Russian gas ranged from US \$260 to US \$300 for 1,000 cu m, even for long-term contracts.

PICK YOUR PRICE RANGE

This year, however, buying from Qatar looks less attractive: after the country gained a foothold in the EU gas market, it stopped output at eight production facilities in 2010 and cut exports by 66%. Needless to say, this caused a spike in NLG prices on world stock exchanges: in August, NLG was US \$150 per 1,000 cu m. Still, even this is better than the US \$275 that the Russians charge for 1,000 cu m of natural gas at the German border.

British Petroleum projects that demand for NLG will remain stable in the EU in 2011, while supplies grow 32%. Moscow-based Prime Mark Asset Management,¹ estimates that, by 2020,

North Africa and the Middle East will be able to double liquid gas output to 476bn cu m, while the share of NLG on European gas markets could go up from 11% in 2008 to 36% by 2035.

Yet, most experts surveyed say that the rising price of liquid gas should not hamper the building of a terminal in Ukraine, since diversifying fuel sources is a strategic objective. "As long as Naftogaz buys gas only from the Russians, no one will be able to prevent Gazprom from dictating prices and, hence, politics," says Mykhailo Honchar, Director of Energy Programs at the Nomos Center.

The pricing policies of the Russian monopolist confirm this assumption—and those countries that have dared to start diversifying their sources have felt a definite easing. "As soon as European countries started to increase their NLG purchases, Russia loosened its price policy," says Oleksandr Todiyshuk, ex-CEO of Ukrtransnafta. Latvia is a typical example. It could not negotiate a discount from the Russians until it joined forces with Poland to build a common terminal.

Theoretically at least, Ukraine does need an NLG terminal. But this raises a slew of practical issues. What guarantees are there that huge amounts of public money will not be wasted, as with Odesa-Brody pipeline, which stood empty for several years after construction was completed? How much has official Kyiv considered the risks that relations with the Kremlin will grow tense, possibly leading to a steep rise in the price of Russian fuel while the terminal is being completed? How will these challenges be handled? At the moment, only experts are prepared to offer answers to these questions, whether directly or by pointing to trends.

In 2014,
2 bn
cu m
of NLG could ship to
Ukraine

¹<http://www.prime-mark.com/en/>

Meanwhile, the Government is counting money: the cost of construction is expected to reach €1bn and Ukraine will be able to buy NLG for \$190 per 1,000 cu m, including transport and re-gasification costs.

DON'T SWEETEN THE POT

The campaign to discredit the idea of building an NLG terminal in Ukraine started long before the deal in Davos. Last year, right after First Vice Premier Andriy Kliuyev announced that construction would start in 2010, a roundtable was held in Kyiv, called "Who will solve the problems of Ukraine's gas industry?" at which leading Russian oil and gas experts ostensibly searched for an answer to this question—and found one. "Europe's getting liquid gas at cost. That's not right... Nobody knows how much NLG will cost in four years' time," was the conclusion of Le-

British Petroleum predicts that supplies of NLG will rise

32%
in 2011

Gazprom could lose up to
\$12 billion
in annual income if Ukraine builds an NLG terminal quickly

onid Grigoriev, President of the Russian Institute of Power, a foundation. This kind of concern is understandable.

In 2010, NAK Naftogaz Ukrainy imported 36.47bn cu m of gas from Russia. Domestic consumption was an estimated 57.64bn cu m. For the Ukrainian market to shrink by 10bn cu m of gas would be a painful loss for Gazprom if the NLG terminal is eventually completed and filled as planned—especially against the background of plummeting gas consumption in the EU. Mikhail Korchemkin, managing director and advisor at East European Gas Analysis, converted this loss into cash equivalent and estimated "up to \$12bn in annual income." "The NLG market is developing too rapidly for Gazprom," says this analyst. Indeed, it was for this reason that the Kremlin tried pushing for a merger of Gazprom and Nafto-

gas and to get a chance to influence the choice of gas suppliers for Ukraine. Yet all it got from Kyiv were vague promises. The real maneuvers are yet to come.

"The refusal to use Odesa-Brody pipeline in reverse in 2004 was a purely political decision that had nothing to do with economics," says Oleksandr Todiyuchuk about the prospects of an NLG terminal in Ukraine and that it will be used as intended. According to this industry expert, interested global players have powerful leverage to "freeze" any national project, although that power is not unlimited. For instance, the Pivdenniy oil terminal near Odesa was completed despite the clamor raised by a number of Russian companies, who claimed that it would pose an environmental hazard for the entire marine zone.

Nomos Director Mykhailo Honchar concurs: "It's inevitable" ■

MEGAPROJECT LIMBO



Odesa-Brody pipeline

Built to supply Caspian oil to the EU and Belarus, construction was completed in 2001, but the pipeline was never supplied with oil. Since 2004, it has operated in the reverse direction, sending Russian oil to Odesa. In December 2010, the facility started operating as intended, but still under capacity. The volume of oil pumped to Belarus is expected to rise to 8mn t by 2013, but even this most optimistic scenario is short of the pipeline's real capacity, 14mn t per year.



Kyiv-Odesa Highway

Widely advertised in 2003-2004 as Ukraine's first toll highway, this project was organized on a concession basis to include 36 roads, 15 bridges, 4mn cu m of asphalt and more. These works were partly funded, but in 2005 the government officially announced that the condition of the highway was unsatisfactory. The highway is now under reconstruction but work is going slowly.



Kyrpa's Bridge in Kyiv

Construction on the Darnytsia road and rail bridge was started in 2004, after a long-standing struggle for control over the project between then-Transport Minister Georgiy Kyrpa and then-Kyiv Mayor Oleksandr Omelchenko. The rail portion of the bridge was finally officially opened September 27, 2010. The road portion was opened three months later—but only in one direction.



that there will be obstacles facing the construction of an NLG terminal in Ukraine. Poland, for instance, had problems transferring the ownership of land when it wanted to undertake a similar project.” Moreover, the bureaucratized permits system in place in Ukraine today means that any project can be postponed indefinitely. In short, the Government needs to concentrate political will in order to make the NLG terminal a reality. “The biggest risk is that there won’t be available liquid gas on the market—a fairly realistic possibility, given the current NLG boom...” says Honchar. In this same context, Todiychuk notes that any deals with Azerbaijan could go sour if Turkey’s position and interests are ignored, as that country can and does restrict the shipment of hazardous cargo across the Bosphorus.

In any case, the deal with Azerbaijan will not be enough for Ukraine to maintain NLG supply levels. Kazakhstan, Belarus—

which is currently choosing between Ukrainian and Latvian projects—and even China, whose China Machine-Building International Corporation is interested in building a terminal near Mykolayiv as part of an already-launched project to build a new seaport, could potentially participate in the construction of this

“THE REFUSAL TO USE ODESA-BRODY PIPELINE IN REVERSE IN 2004 WAS A PURELY POLITICAL DECISION THAT HAD NOTHING TO DO WITH ECONOMICS”

terminal. Stinol Concern, recently purchased by Dmytro Firtash’s Group DF, too, has expressed interest in investing in the construction of an NLG terminal in Ukraine.

“From the economic perspective, there are no problems with building and using an NLG terminal,” says Todiychuk. “The fa-

cility can easily be hooked up to Ukraine’s existing gas transit system. Nor is there any need to connect the terminal to the main pipeline separately, since the purpose of supplying liquid gas to this country is certainly not to interfere in the transit of fuel from Russia to the EU.” Others, including Vadym Kopylov, former COB of Naftogas Ukrainy and now Ukraine’s Deputy Finance Minister, agree with Todiychuk, although Mr. Kopylov points out that only 2/3 of the capacity of Ukraine’s gas transit system is used currently.

Indeed, it’s not entirely clear why Ukraine has already turned down the option of transiting or even selling liquid gas to Europe, even as it plans to construct a terminal in its territory. Perhaps announcing the construction of a liquid gas terminal is Kyiv’s feeble attempt to talk Russia into a more reasonable price for the natural kind. And if Moscow suddenly concedes, the megaproject could be history. ■



Podil Bridge in Kyiv

Construction of the Podil Bridge over the Dnipro started in 1993, was suspended in 1994 and relaunched in 2004. By the end of 2010, only the first part of the bridge was done: the Havana overpass and the Naberezhno-Khreshchatytska access road.

Estimated cost —UAH 9.1 bn



Dniprovska HES

This hydroelectric station was intended as a reserve source of power in the event of an accident at another station. Construction actually began in 1983, but the project was frozen after the USSR collapsed. In December 2009, the first of seven planned facilities was completed. Construction continues.

Estimated cost —UAH 5.8 bn



Dnipro Bridge at Zaporizhzhia

Launched in 2004 and still unfinished, despite the major funding allocated to it from the State Budget annually. The current deadline for opening the bridge is 2012.

Estimated cost —UAH 5 bn

Terminal stumbling block

Ukraine's Government is using the idea of a liquid gas terminal as a powerful geopolitical card—one that it may not have the courage to play

For more than a year, the idea of building a liquid gas terminal has been hotly debated: how feasible it is, what Ukraine will gain from it, and what impact it might have on geopolitical relations with Ukraine's neighbors, both near and far.

In fact, the terminal has emerged as a new move towards greater energy independence and a major contribution to Ukraine's security. Strategically, this will allow Ukraine to diversify energy supplies, as the country now hugely depends on supplies of all fuels from Russia, extracting only a tiny portion itself. In economic terms, this strategy is right, as it will increase the country's security. The appearance of this new terminal could offer Ukraine's Government a nice bargaining chip when time comes to negotiate gas prices with Russia, following the suit of EU countries: they started dealing with Qatar several years ago and were able to get significant discounts from Moscow.

But first, a number of questions need to be answered: how much capacity will be used at the terminal? Will Ukraine find enough gas for it? This kind of project is much more complicated than your basic business plan. To launch a terminal, the Government must promote it on all markets, and then find the fuel for it to process and the markets for it to sell to. So far, it's just talk. And if talk does not become action soon, all available supplies could be taken. After all, it's not just Ukraine that is thinking about liquid gas terminals, but also some of its regional neighbors.

Another issue that arises is relations with countries in the Caspian basin. When the terminal goes on line, it will not change the situation dramatically – its planned capacity is not a strategic amount for Azerbaijan. During his visit to Kyiv, President Ilkham Aliyev mentioned that Azerbaijan could increase volumes to Ukraine severalfold, meaning that Azerbaijan had no problem with the concept, i.e., "You build the terminal, we'll work with you."

For Caspian basin countries this project is relatively minor. They will not place serious stakes on it or view their role in it from a geopolitical context in the same way as they would with major trunk lines like Nabucco or new Russian projects to transit gas to Europe. But without changing anything globally, the terminal could have enough local impact to change the relations between Ukraine and Azerbaijan, as well as between Ukraine and Russia. After all, it will give the country access to regional energy resources that had been unattainable earlier. This, in turn, should improve and reinforce relations with countries of the region.

**WHILE UKRAINE TALKS
ABOUT BUILDING A
TERMINAL,
THE NEIGHBORS WILL
CONTRACT ALL
AVAILABLE NLG**

Still, there is the possibility that no one really needs such a terminal. Ukraine has to talk it up so as to have a bargaining chip in negotiations with Russia. But this only confirms that there are no contracts in place yet, only memoranda, announcements and other improvised decisions. Even the deals at Davos have few details. So far, there is only a Memorandum of Understanding indicating that Azerbaijan could provide the fuel to fill in the terminal. Still, there is no actual agreement, a futures contract specifying a price and liability for carrying it out or failing to do so. There has been no feasibility study although promises of one have been in the air for some time.

Indeed, the site for the future terminal has not even been chosen. Meanwhile, the new Government has been talking about it since the last year and its predecessors were talking about it before that. This has been going on for nearly five years now. For these officials, the important thing is to keep saying that the terminal is on the way. They don't have to do anything, just to talk it up enough to gain something to trade with.

What will Ukraine actually gain? Essentially, it can demand whatever it wants if it plays this game in a few fields at a time. But does the current Government have enough skill and perseverance to substitute a terminal that the country really needs with something else of equal value? Everyone saw the way the Government agreed to extend the lease of the Black Sea Fleet for 25 years in return for some conditional discounts on gas that ultimately brought no benefits at all: the price of gas continues to grow in Ukraine because the previous

Government pegged it to oil prices and the price of oil is on the rise again. With gas getting more expensive, too, any possible discount is ultimately offset.

Some other examples include deals in the aircraft industry; the virtual giving away to Russian colleagues of the monopoly in the atomic energy industry; a decision to allow Russians to extract hydrocarbons in the Black Sea shelf without any tender; or the joint venture to extract shale gas with Russians who have no more expertise in this industry than do Ukrainians. Moreover, this was done, not in exchange for something, but for free. It's hard to understand what kind of national strategy lies behind giving away strategic assets in exchange for marginal tactical dividends. ■



Author:
**Valeriy
Borovyk,**
*COB, Nova
Energiya
Ukrainy*

Ideological Splits

The ruling party could be facing a showdown between its pragmatic and pro-Russian wings

Author:
Dmytro
Kalynchuk

After Party of the Regions won the VR election in 2006, its, then very much alive Yevhen Kushnariov, a member of PR's Political Council, shocked White&Blue supporters with a killer statement: "Ukraine should have one official language and that language is Ukrainian." Adding injury to insult for the pro-Russian contingent, he suggested cutting the salaries of civil servants who didn't speak Ukrainian 20% and adding 30% to the salaries of those who spoke only Ukrainian at work. All this brought a furious response from fellow PR member Vadym Kolesnichenko, a notoriously anti-Ukrainian deputy: "I think Kushnariov got it wrong... The Russian language should have official status in some oblasts—and that's just the first stage." Fortunately, the "first stage" is still only talk.

In 2004 election, Viktor Yanukovich's team for the first time violated an unspoken rule in Ukrainian politics by throwing divisive issues that had previously been taboo into the campaign. These included granting the Russian language official status, allowing dual citizenship with the Russian Federation, and

so on. In addition, Russian political handlers involved in the campaign organized visual propaganda that divided Ukrainians into "three sorts" and other hostile messages geared to splitting Ukrainian society.

After Yanukovich lost the election, Party of the Regions continued to actively exploit these issues as the opposition. Local councils elected in 2006 with a PR majority in Eastern and Southern Ukraine made a big deal of establishing "Russian as the regional language" and declaring themselves "NATO-free zones."

The situation changed radically after PR gained virtually complete power in 2010. Objectively, the party should no longer have had an interest in breaking the country up. Moreover, numerous protests, resentment among the Ukrainian intelligentsia and resistance in the opposition hold them back from keeping their language and humanitarian promises. The Yanukovich Administration is obviously not rushing to implement the most radical of these, even though it has all the leverage to do so: its people run the SBU, the Prosecutor's Office, the Interior Ministry, and the Constitutional Court, and it can easily organize a majority for any vote in the Rada. It looks like the pragmatic wing, at least, is trying to prevent further radicalization of Central and Western Ukraine, which means agreeing to certain ideological compromises.

But not everyone in the agglomeration called the Ukrainian

government shares this pragmatic and completely reasonable approach. Some characters cannot seem to back off, doing damage to the image, of not just their country, but of their own leaders..

NEITHER FISH NOR FOWL

Like most Ukrainian parties, Party of the Regions has no clearly defined ideology. In the time it spent as opposition, PR collected a crazy ideological cocktail made up of all the wishes of all those who might possibly vote for them, first among them, the pro-Russian contingent. Yet PR's moves in this direction came down to noisy words: the party rushed to pass the language bill, the obscure Declaration of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine "On Dignity, Freedom and Human Rights," and so on. In time, though, the language bill was set aside until "after the election" and never raised again.

While one PR man, Education Minister Dmytro Tabachnyk, declares that Halychians and Ukrainians are two different peoples, the Government and the President arrange grand celebrations of Unity Day January 22, commemorating the day when the Western and Central Ukrainian Republics joined together. VR Deputies Tsariov and Kolesnichenko crusade against commemorating OUN-UPA, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, while L'viv Deputy Ihor Hryshchuk calls on the public to donate money to complete the monument to Stepan Bandera, the most prominent leader of OUN. Donetsk Oblast Council Secretary Mykola Levchenko jeers that the Ukrainian language is only good for folklore and jokes, while the President's Deputy Chief-of-Staff Hanna Herman urges, "Protest when you're told you are not Ukrainians!"

DUELING OFFICIALS

"If it were within my power to appoint ministers, I would resign this minute and switch to freelancing or be unemployed just to see someone else as the Minister of Education."

Hanna Herman,
Shuster Live! TV show, January 28

PHOTO: PHIL

On the anniversary of the Battle of Kruty, where 300 students and cadets were mowed down by 6,000 Bolshevik troops, Kolesnichenko whimsically publishes an article entitled “The Kruty tragedy is not a myth on which the country can build its future,” while President Yanukovich addresses the people of Ukraine, saying, “With their courage and sacrifice, several hundreds of cadets, college and high school students set a true example for the next generations of fighters for independence.” Zaporizhzhia Governor and PR member Borys Petrov shocks some party faithful by suggesting that the Communist Party’s Oblast Committee should place statues of Stalin only inside its offices. When Ms. Herman announces that the President will never sign Tabachnyk’s draft education reform program, the Minister calls for her resignation.

This clash of “ideologies” within PR is leading to more and more conflicts. For the voters who did not support PR, the party remains an oligarch-run political force that steals state property and is ready to cut deals with Russia by crushing Ukrainian identity. Nowadays, PR diehards are beginning to talk about “political collaborationism.” The habit of saying one thing in the West and its near opposite in the East is yet more proof to PR supporters that they are being lied to. The expected “better life today” has not arrived so far, nor is it likely to do so. These days, PR voters are voting with their feet: in 2006, 60% of voters came to the polls in Sevastopol; only 41% did in 2010. In Kramatorsk, only 37% voted in local elections, while Melitopol broke the record for votes “against everybody”—25%.

THE KREMLIN WING

The PR members who want to avoid clashes within Ukrainian society—its business wing—or who prefer to look for compromises on cultural issues—Herman, Lavrynovych and Landyk—are finding themselves more and more estranged from those party members who are openly ready to serve Russian interests and Kremlin bosses. The “Kremlin wing” includes Tabachnyk with his belief that “Halychians and Ukrainians are two different peoples,” Koles-

nichenko with his “For a Russian-Speaking Ukraine” movement, who also arranged an exhibit called “The Volyn Massacres: Polish and Jewish Victims of the OUN-UPA”; Levchenko with his “Ukrainian is only good in folklore and jokes”; VR Deputy Oleh Tsariv, co-leader of the Anti-Fascist Forum of Ukraine, known best for his campaign to close Kryivka, a very popular UPA-themed restaurant in L’viv; and so on.

The Kremlin wing is known for its aggressive opposition to all things Ukrainian and for endlessly singing to the ideological tune played towards Ukraine across the Russian border. Nor are they looking less enthusiastic with time, despite protectionist moves on Moscow’s behalf that are having an adverse effect on PR’s business wing. With no serious business of their own and having built their image exclusively on being dead against all things Ukrainian, these PR members are now struggling to find their place. The Administration, in turn, uses this “Kremlin wing” largely to play the tunes that pro-Russian supporters in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea want to hear, such as the threat of “the vengeance of Banderites,” a “swift” solution to the language issue, and so on.

Nevertheless, the current position of PR leaders on socially sensitive issues is slowly turning its pro-Russian wing into a team of buffoons who, in the eyes of voters, are only capable of lying and manipulating. Borys Kolesnikov, who represents PR’s business interests, once openly called Tabachnyk “a cheap clown.”

A POLITICAL TIME BOMB

Since “A better life today” never materialized for most Ukrainians, voters are beginning to treat any new promises, such as “no unemployment in Ukraine in a year,” as science fiction; in exchange for extending the Black Sea Fleet, gas has become more expensive, not cheaper; education and arts ini-

tiatives are all still on paper alone. Given this, the political prospects for the Kremlin wing are anything but clear now.

Still, PR is unlikely to split over ideology just yet. So far, Viktor Yanukovich has managed to reconcile his oligarchs among each other. The PR’s business elite is consolidated as never before. But the Kremlin wing is unlikely to find a powerful sponsor anytime soon. Eventually, though, the PR oligarchs could start squabbling again. At that point, some “decent” sponsor might need the Kremlin faction and any deserters will easily find shelter in Moscow.

Hypothetically, there is the third scenario: before the next VR election the PR leadership will force a split. Yuriy Lutsenko’s Narodna Samooborona once grabbed the votes of those unhappy with President Yushchenko’s and Premier Tymoshenko’s policies, only to run in a bloc with Yushchenko’s Nasha Ukraina in a subsequent election. Similarly, the Kremlin faction can draw dissatisfied voters from PR, which would allow it to continue singing about “Banderite threats” yet set up a bloc with PR later... theoretically.

Yet the reality is that PR is in a political split as a result of its shortsighted ideological work when it was in opposition. It is constantly walking a fine line between further radicalization of Central and Western Ukraine and deeper disappointment in Eastern Ukraine and Crimea. And holding the splits for too long is not good for the musculoskeletal system. ■

**Dmytro Tabachnyk
on the steadfast
leader:**

“A local community can build monuments to whomever it wants for its own money. The government has no right to prohibit people from following any ideology they want, although it should stop any attempts to impose ideologies on others. When we talk about historical facts, Stalin was the leader of the winning army and of the nation that won the Great Patriotic War [WWII]. This has ensured him an important, unshakeable place in history.”
[in Russian]
(UNIAN)

PHOTO: PHIL

DUELING OFFICIALS

“There is a simple international practice: an official who does not agree with his President’s or Premier’s appointments should resign. That’s the easiest way out – and you save face, too.”

**Dmytro Tabachnyk,
Interfax Ukraine, January 30**

ETHNIC CLEANSING

World War II German police and Security Service reports*:

"The Kyiv Prosvita Society has managed to intensify its activities. They have set up a choir, a theater and art workshops, as well as a puppet theater, sewing courses for girls, a technical drawing school, a laboratory for visual manuals, a dancing school... Security police have more than once spoken against the continuing operation of Prosvita as an organization that operates all across Ukraine and could become a shelter for illegal Ukrainian national resistance groups."

"The German civil administration is indeed implementing a policy to destroy Ukrainian culture. This conviction will push more and more people into the radical camp and the radical movement, which was formerly exclusively a phenomenon exported by Western Ukrainians and emigrants who arrived on this territory with the German army. It is now likely to gradually cover the entire population and gain considerable influence... The German propaganda apparatus should immediately be purged of all Ukrainian nationalist elements. Local Ukrainian papers are still being run by radical ultra-nationalist Ukrainian elements."

"The Ukrainian intelligentsia is using the weakness of German positions whenever possible. Chauvinistic nationalism is on the rise and working for independence. Bandera's OUN is concentrating on sabotaging the process of sending workers to Germany through word-of-mouth propaganda."

"A broad range of the Ukrainian intellectuals and semi-intellectuals in Kyiv and other cities, who are, as a rule, influenced by Western Ukrainian instigators, are taking advantage of all our difficulties and mistakes to spread rumors that completely poison the chances of German-Ukrainian cooperation."

** Source: Central State Archive of Higher Government Offices in Ukraine*

TABACHNYK'S CLEAN SWEEP OF EDUCATION!

EDUCATION MINISTRY INITIATIVES AND POLICIES

Language

- Russian as the language of international communication (borrowed from the Law on Languages in the Ukrainian SSR)
- free choice of language of education, bypassing Ukrainian
- no language specified as the basic language of instruction in Ukraine
- canceling the state exam in the Ukrainian language for BAS

Literature

- focusing on "Slavic spiritual ideals"
- treating Russian literature as exceptional
- replacing works on the Holodomor with a section called "Ukrainian Russian-language poetry" in school programs

History

- rewriting history "under Russia" (an attempt to publish a textbook jointly with the Russian Federation, rejecting the Holodomor as genocide against Ukrainians, among others)
- ignoring the Orange Revolution as a historical event in textbooks

G, THEN AND NOW

Dmytro Tabachnyk, Minister of Education, Science, Youth and Sports

"The current Government has not managed to block all channels for the unlawful funding of nationalist organizations, such as Prosvita, from the State Budget, but the lively stream has turned into a trickle that could dry up at any time." (in Russian) **Gazeta 2000**¹

"The Orange compradors² are trying to turn Ukraine, with its glorious past that is inextricable from overall Russian and soviet history, into a colony of Halychyna³ where the supporters of Orthodox Slavic unity were persecuted for centuries... To this end, they cultivate lies at the state level, turning the people of Ukraine into an "imaginary society" devoid of historical memory and hence lacking any orientation in the present or the future. Despite the pathetic nature of these lies, it is essential to understand this very real threat and not be deluded by the notion that obvious propaganda is harmless." (in Russian) **Gazeta 2000**⁴

"Bandera and Shukhevych will remain in history as nationalists and organizers of massive killings and will always be tainted as collaborators." (in Russian) **Party of the Regions**⁵

"The people of Halychyna have very little in common with the people of the Greater Ukraine, in terms of mentality, faith, language and politics. We have different enemies and different allies. Moreover, our allies and even our brothers are their enemies, while their "heroes" (Bandera, Shukhevych) are killers, traitors and accomplices of Hitler's executioners." **Izvestia**⁶

- anti-Ukrainian anthropocentrism (ignoring military clashes between Ukrainians and Russians, denigrating the role of the Ukrainian National Republic and the UPA, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army)
- reverting to soviet historical terminology (the Great Patriotic War instead of World War II, among others)

Education

- denigrating independent external testing
- pegging tuition to inflation
- total Ministry control over curricula in post-secondary institutions
- granting "classical university" status only to post-secondary institutions with over 10,000 students⁷
- Ministry control over the election and appointment of the administrations of post-secondary institutions
- a reduction in quotas for state funding of post-secondary applicants
- restricting student governments and university autonomy

¹ <http://2000.net.ua>, September 17, 2009.

² Locals who collaborate with the colonizer. (!)

³ Sometimes called "Galicia," which is the name of a Spanish province.

⁴ Ibid., April 9, 2009.

⁵ <http://partyofregions.org.ua>, June 4, 2010.

⁶ The contemporary version of the soviet newspaper, September 23, 2009.

⁷ Were such a standard applied in the US, Harvard College would not qualify.



Parents to the Barricades

Donetsk officials are eager to close down Ukrainian schools even if they are 95% filled with students. But parents are fighting back



PARENTS AND KIDS.
In Donetsk, each generation has been deprived of the chance to go to Ukrainian schools

Author:
Stanislav
Fedorchuk,
Donetsk

Photo:
Stanislav
Fedorchuk

Ukrainian schools have always been seen as almost exotic in Eastern Ukraine. Yet, the remaining ones are disappearing one after another under the current government. The process in Donbas looks no different from raider attacks in business. First, rumors fill the town about possible plans to close down a certain school. The parents of first- and tenth-graders panic and start looking for alternatives immediately. These are not hard to find, but Russian will most likely be the classroom language.

The first to go was a school in Krasniy Luch, Luhansk Oblast, with a capacity of 1,200 students and only 300 left, followed by Public Schools #111 and #136 in Donetsk. Of course, the arguments for closing down Ukrainian schools bear no scrutiny whatsoever.

BLAME THE FOUNDATION

At the end of January 2011, Public School #136 in Budionovsk District, Donetsk, which has Ukrainian-language status, was given the thumbs-down signal: the county committee had decided to shut it down. This is the second Ukrainian school in Donetsk that officials decided should disappear, although its students have good grades and the school is considered one of the most prestigious facilities in the district.

PS #136 is supposed to be transferred to a nearby Russian public school, #120, although it remains unclear whether students will still be able to have their education in Ukrainian. On February 1, the Head of the District Department of Education met with the school's teachers to announce that the enrollment of first- and tenth-

graders this year was now banned. The teachers are certain that this is being done on purpose, as the school is currently operating at 95% capacity.

Viktor Kartsev, chair of the Budionovsk District Council, claims that the main reason for closing down the school is a crack in the foundation under the gym and the lack of hot water. He says that the choice was made in favor of PS #120 because it has a swimming pool and hot running water.

"The supervisor of the District School Board told us that UAH 400,000 had been allocated from the local budget last year to repair our school," says Svitlana Honcharuk, one of the teachers, "but the only thing they did was reinforce the foundation. The parents paid for roof repairs. We invited an independent architect to esti-

mate the cost of the work done. He said that the foundation work could not have cost this much. And now we get these explanations that the foundation is cracking even though it's all just about one single plate that needs to be fixed. This kind of thing doesn't cost UAH 1mn like the Department of Education boss says."

Mr. Kartsev agreed to meet with the parents in a discussion that lasted three hours. Mr. Kartsev insisted that streamlining was a normal process for education facilities and he supported it. Yet, this "optimization" left the parents' committee quite unhappy. One thing that bothered them was that the school that had partly been renovated for their money could now be handed into private hands. They even offered to set up a charitable account where they could donate money to repair the school's foundation, but Mr. Kartsev was not impressed.

A NEVER-ENDING BATTLE

In the late 1960's, all Ukrainian schools were closed in Donetsk. Later, students only had to learn Ukrainian on a voluntary basis. As a result, the Ukrainian language lost its prestige, not only in the city of Donetsk; it virtually disappeared from secondary education altogether in the region. In 1990, Leonid Hromoviy opened the first Ukrainian school, #65, in Donetsk, after Andrei Sakharov, the famed academic and human rights activist, raised this issue at the Council of the USSR People's Deputies. Today's russifying officials are not ashamed to repeat the practices of their "great predecessors." They simply replace the catchphrase "friendship of nations" with the more modern-sounding words like "streamlining" and "economizing taxpayer's money."

"My wife and daughter went to this school," says one of the defenders of PS #136 with great emotion. "And my granddaughter, too. It's important for us that this school remain Ukrainian. My grandfather used to have an important position and he was Ukrainian-speaking, but he was forbidden to use it on the job. Yet my granddaughter chose Ukrainian and this particular school."

"We chose this school among all others around for secondary education," says Larysa Petrova,

one of the parents. "Now, we won't get it. What can we do?"

"This is illegal," claims Rufina Ishchenko, another upset parent. "My six kids go here and my last daughter was supposed to enter this school this year but we were told that our kids would not be ad-

PLANS ARE TO SHUT DOWN 26 SCHOOLS. UKRAINIAN ONES ARE LIKELY TO BE THE FIRST TO GO

mitted to either tenth, or first grade. This means we have to look for other options. But we don't have another Ukrainian-language school in our district. This is not about the future of the school—this is about the future of 570 students!"

RESISTANCE PAYS

The unhappy parents, teachers and students finally decided to stage a protest in the schoolyard.

Nearly 400 people came. First, the school was closed and the administration refused to explain anything. But after an hour, the parents and students were invited to the assembly hall, where Viktor Kartsev and officials from the district school board had arrived.

On February 23, these efforts paid off and PS #136 was given a reprieve. For now.

The Ukrainian Arts College, which opened in Donetsk in 1992, in the flush of independence, could be the next victim of "streamlining." And it's not the last one on the list: the Department of Education's plan is to eventually close down 26 schools. There is good reason to suspect that these will mostly be those where Ukrainian is the language of instruction. If this kind of selective "purging" continues in the region, Mr. Tabachnyk & Co. will eventually create the "Russian-speaking Ukraine" that they so badly want to see. ■

**RUSSIFIED
DONETSK**

Total number of
schools in Donetsk
157

Ukrainian-language
schools
18



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Crooked Lawmaking

A “minor” violation of the Constitution grows into a scandal with criminal undertones

Author:
Oleksandr Mykhelson

On February 1, the Verkhovna Rada amended Ukraine’s Constitution to extend its own term until October 2012 and set the presidential election for March 2015. This latest “tweak” to the Basic Law clouded an unexpected storm that arose over the voting process itself. In fact, it looks like Ukrainian parliamentarism—however it is understood—is in a state of clinical death. In the past, voting on behalf of an absentee deputy who supported the proposal in question was not legal, but widespread. It was only one step from that to a situation where those pressing the button don’t even bother about having the deputy’s consent.

A GAME OF CARDS

According to the Rada electronic system, 310 of the mandatory 300-deputy constitutional majority passed Constitutional amendments extending the term of the Government and local councils to five years. The reporters who were watching the vote counted that, in fact, at least 25 deputies were not present at the time of voting but their votes were counted as “ayes” by the Rada system.

The scandal gained momentum late that same night when Volodymyr Arieiev, a deputy from Narodna Samooborona, informed the press that not only was he not in the Rada, he was not even in Ukraine when the vote was taken. To confirm this, Mr. Arieiev sent a shot of himself with his National Deputy card taken at the airport in Washington DC.

For starters, deputies cannot even register in the session hall without their electronic cards. Every morning, the Speaker announces how many deputies are present in the Rada, but in fact he is only stating how many cards were inserted into the terminals at each seat in the hall and counted by the electronic system.

Party and faction “bosses” tended to use this for their own benefit:

from time to time, they would take these electronic cards from their own legislators and the most reliable faction members would insert them into the terminals when a vote came up. This involved rushing up and down the row and hitting all the necessary “assigned” buttons within the 10 seconds given for voting. The process, known as “playing the piano” in the backrooms of the Rada, looks hilarious to journalists and visitors watching from the gallery.

Needless to say, this “piano playing” is completely illegal. Art. 3.84 of the Constitution states that “Deputies shall vote at the Verkhovna Rada sessions in person.” Back in 1998, the Constitutional Court issued Resolution №11-rp/98 to explain this item to those who, for some reason, didn’t get it the first time: “National Deputies of Ukraine shall not vote for other National Deputies of Ukraine during sessions of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine.” Now it was in black and white.

The catch is that it’s impossible to punish a deputy for violating the Constitution because there is no law governing this. “The system is not set right down to actual consequences,” says Viktor Musiyaka, Law Professor, and National Deputy of several convocations and a co-author of the original Constitution of Ukraine. Musiyaka believes that the penalty for “piano playing” should even be included in the Constitution itself, not in additional legislation.

Deputies have their own excuses for playing the piano. They say the legislature cannot operate efficiently without some kind of violations. For instance, when the scandal over Deputy Arieiev’s card emerged, it turned out that Mykhailo Polianych (NUNS) had once voted for Pavlo Movchan (BYT), at the request of Mr. Movchan himself, who was at Feofania Hospital at the time. Eventually, Movchan was expelled from the BYT faction, but he insisted that he had only exercised his Constitutional right to support a bill he believed was important.

Volodymyr Makeyenko, Chair of the VR Protocol Committee, has already spoken in favor of removing this requirement about personal voting from the Constitution. Obviously, this will raise a question that has been bothering many “little folk” in Ukraine for quite a while: in that case, why have 450 deputies, who cost taxpayers UAH 875m last year alone? Meanwhile, there are more specific questions to ask.

NO RIGHT OF TRANSFER

The first question is, what happened to Volodymyr Arieiev’s card? The most conspiratorial conclusion is that the Rada system has been hacked to make sure that the necessary voting

«PIANO PLAYER»:
Voting for absent neighbors has become standard practice in the VR



results without actual deputies and their cards. But the deputies asked by Ukrainian Week say this is not possible. If there were a way to do this and it were used on a regular basis, they argue, this would surface very quickly and eliminate the need to collect cards and rush around voting for others.

In fact, there are two aspects to this "card game." First, most deputies don't actually carry their cards with them. They leave them with their faction "overseers," who hand the cards in to the Rada Secretariat when the session is over. Second, each deputy has access not only to an "original" card but two duplicates. So, if a deputy loses or leaves the original card somewhere, he or she can request a duplicate, in writing. The VR Technical Support Department then blocks the forgotten or lost card and activates a duplicate.

But Arieiev's situation is not so easy. He reported the loss of his card several months earlier and had been using a copy ever since. In the Washington airport photo, he is holding precisely the №2 card. "I doubt there was some special opera-

tion to steal my card several months back," Arieiev told Ukrainian Week in a phone call from the US. "Most likely, someone requested a duplicate on my behalf and the VR Secretariat agreed to issue and activate it while I was still abroad."

This explanation looks fairly realistic. The final votes needed to pass Constitutional amendments were being gathered in the VR up to the very moment of the vote. According to the press, Andriy Kliuyev, the First Vice Premier, was personally in charge of this. Even though the amendments were passed with 10 extra "votes," no one could have been certain of that on the morning of February 1. So, anything could have been going on.

However, Arieiev believes this is no longer just about violating the Constitution, for which there is no prescribed punishment in law, but interference in the work of a public official. And Art. 344 of the Criminal Code of Ukraine calls for up to three years in prison for this—and abuse of office for this purpose is punished by three to five years' imprisonment.



AT THE HEART OF A SCANDAL. A special VR investigative committee will look into with the machinations with Arieiev's card

Technically, it's easy to find the guilty: the Rada system makes it possible to determine the terminal from which a card voted and surveillance videos of the session can show who used the card. Arieiev says that he filed the necessary complaints, not only with the VR Protocol Committee and Speaker Lytvyn, but also with the Prosecutor General's Office, while he was still in the US. Although, the PGO had not confirmed the receipt of his claim at the time of press, but once the deputy returned to Kyiv on February 8 he could always file it in person.

A GIFT FOR TIMES TO COME

The response of Arieiev's political opponents to his move was stormy. Deputy Makeyenko immediately stated he was sure Arieiev was not interested in the truth: "This is a new maneuver... a PR maneuver, nice going, but there's no complaint on file. And believe me, there won't be one. Because even if he does, it won't affect the vote; 310 or 309 votes doesn't matter."

Clearly, the pro-Presidential VR majority is confident that none of the other absentees from the fateful February 1 session will be prepared to admit that their cards were used illegally. But the VR Committee Chair is being disingenuous. According to experts polled by Ukrainian Week, a single violation of the voting procedure, never mind one this significant, is quite enough to consider the vote invalid. One classical example is last September's canceling of the amended Constitution, which had been in effect for five years, due to violations protocol at the time that it was being amended in winter 2004.

Moreover, the Constitutional Court's 1998 Resolution №11-rp/98, which refers to Art. 152 of the Basic Law, states clearly that voting for another deputy is a violation of protocol that entails declaring the voted law unconstitutional. According to Viktor Musiyaka, the opposition has to turn to the Constitutional Court with regard to this suspect vote. The Court will either have to cancel the results or overturn its own earlier ruling.

Who knows: maybe the machinations with Arieiev's card will be a nice gift for some as yet-unknown investigator in a few years. Especially, if the next Ukrainian Administration treats the current one with the same all-encompassing "attention" as the current one treats its predecessor. ■



PHOTO: PHL

In a Captious Land

Kyiv's policy towards the Crimean Tatars remains controversial and inconsistent

Relations between the Crimean Tatars and the Crimean government look like the erratic swinging of intricate clockwork by which it is impossible to tell the time, rather than like a smooth-working, consistent and reliable mechanism. In the 20 years since Crimean Tatars began to be repatriated en-masse, it has become typical of the Crimean government to respond to problems on an ad hoc basis rather than maintaining a strategy of dialog with the Tatars. The situation is both complicated and strange, given that the majority of issues for the Crimean Tatars are socio-economic ones that have long been overdue for a solution.

The first significant move in 2011 to integrate Crimean Tatars into Ukrainian society actually happened in December 2010. The country's executive branch was streamlined by Presidential Decree, resulting in the elimination of the State Committee for Nationalities and Religions. This institution used to manage Budget funds allocated to implement state-initiated programs for the settlement and provision of deported Crimean Tatars and other nationalities returning to Ukraine.

Now, the money will go to the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, although the Decree did not transfer the authority to work on integration and settlement policy to the Ministry's remit. Moreover, any government policy is not just about strategies and actions, but also about the real resources needed for implementation. Over 2006-2009, settlement and integration programs for Crimean Tatars and other nationalities were underfunded by UAH 103mn, and, in 2010, only UAH 35mn was allocated instead of the necessary UAH 108mn.

Politically, 2011 started with an ultimatum from Crimean Pre-

Author:
Yulia Tyshchenko,
Ukrainian Independent Center of Policy Studies

Photo:
Anatoliy Bielov

mier Vasyl Dzharty to Mustafa Cemiliev, President of Mejlis, the governing body of the Crimean Tatars. On January 18, it was disclosed that Mr. Dzharty had asked Crimean Tatars to voluntarily leave the land they had been squatting as this hindered the socio-economic development of the region and destabilized inter-ethnic relations. The document stated that the Crimean government "would not turn a blind eye to certain leaders of the Crimean Tatars who are prepared to ignore and disdain the Constitution and the laws of Ukraine. The law is only law when it is the same for all."

Yet the Crimean Land Committee reports that of all land that has been squatted, Crimean

Mr. Cemiliev's response was that Crimean Premier Dzharty had to go to the revived Council of Crimean Tartar Representatives under the President of Ukraine with his proposal, a body mostly made up of Crimean Tatars who are from organizations opposed to the Mejlis. Last August, President Yanukovych changed the format of the Council, which had been formed of representatives elected by the Crimean Tatars following their own procedure, to an appointment-based system. Right now, with 8 members vs 11, representatives of the Kurultai-Mejlis, the national council, are a minority on this Council, so the results of debates are easy to predict. Despite much talk about possible changes to this format, the procedure has not been revised so far.

Such "new approaches" to dialog could well be a result of Party of the Region's long political memory. Despite years of PR monopoly in Crimea, the Mejlis supported Viktor Yushchenko and later Yulia Tymoshenko in elections. Nor did the Mejlis' criticisms of the Kharkiv accords and public disagreement with the ex-

TOO OFTEN, THE CRIMEAN TATAR ISSUE IS USED TO MASK THE REAL SITUATION WITH LAND ALLOCATION ON THE PENINSULA

Of all the land grabbed in Crimea, Tatars have taken only
17%

Tatars have taken only 17% in the region. The rest has been grabbed by domestic and Russian business entities. Too often, the Crimean Tatar issue is used with regard to this problem to mask the real situation with land allocation on the peninsula. But why the local government doesn't like to give land to Crimean Tatars is not stated, as this is the place where corruption and ethnic stereotypes intertwine.



tension of the stay of Russia's fleet in Sevastopol fail to register in PR ears.

The January letter gained considerable publicity, not only for its list of problems and the ultimatum-like tone, but for the fact the Mr. Dzharty used the word "Mejlis" for the first time as the proper representative body of the Crimean Tatars in an official document. In 20 years of Tatar repatriation, no Ukrainian legislation has ever found place for the term. Nor for a law on renewing the rights of people deported for their nationality, which would include a mechanism for rehabilitation and compensation for deported peoples: the relevant bill has been shelved indefinitely.

Many other religious and historical issues are in a similar situation, including a return to Tatar place names, reviving the historical memory of Crimean Tatars, and constructing a mosque in Simferopol. This ultimatum from the Crimean government with respect to land allocation drew a lot of attention, both in Crimea and outside, because it is seen as a direct threat. And any suggestion that force might be used could become the real catalyst for a major ethnic confrontation.

All this leaves an impression that the Crimean government is clueless about such things. Its new Donetsk elite is not always


in the know about tricky issues around Crimean Tatar identity. Instead, they tend to prioritize the "economization" of politics. In practice, this often refers to the enrichment of specific officials and their friends.

Meanwhile, the government is downplaying the social and cultural aspects of Crimean Tatar identity. Indeed, the strategy for socio-economic development in Crimea, approved in late 2010, has just one sentence about the need to "harmonize ethnic relations and establish a multicultural dialog." It does not mention possible challenges that could emerge in the process of modernizing Crimea if the multiethnic nature of the region is not properly taken into account.

Today, the pendulum is swinging towards dialog once again. The Committee established by the Council of Ministers on January 31 to resolve the issues related to squatted lands and allocating land for houses for repatriated deportees and other people in Simferopol and the region should start working soon. This opens the door to dialog with the government. How this will change the ad hoc approach of government policy with regard to Crimean Tatars remains to be seen. ■

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Principle 1: Born experienced

Civil servants, prosecutors, judges, court experts, customs officers, NBU employees, National Deputies, Cabinet members, diplomats and journalists in state-owned media

Eligibility: **25** years of service, the last 20 or 10 in public service

PENSION = 0.8 × SALARY
Coefficient 0.8 equals 59 insured years of service

Calculated based on salary plus all bonuses at last position in service

Extra pensions for extra insured years in service calculated as:
EXTRA PENSION = SALARY × (YEARS IN PUBLIC SERVICE – 10) × 0.01*

* x 0.02 for prosecutors

INDEXATION: Pensions are recalculated as civil service salaries increase



Pension Inequalities

**BASIC PENSION = COEFFICIENT
OF INSURED SERVICE × SALARY**

Minimum monthly pension

UAH **750**

Principle 2: For services rendered

Service personnel, firefighters, police and SBU personnel, personnel in other military units

Eligibility: after **20–25** years of service

PENSION = 0.5 × SALARY
Coefficient 0.5 equals 37 insured years of service

Calculated based on salary plus all bonuses at last position in service

Extra pensions for extra insured years of service calculated as:
EXTRA PENSION = SALARY × (YEARS IN SERVICE – 20) × 0.03

INDEXATION: On a general basis of approximately UAH 20 for every UAH 100 rise in the average wage



Average pension
as of January 2011

UAH **1,327**

UAH **872**

Nearly **4,000** Ukrainians
get sky-high pensions over
UAH **10,000**

The highest pension,
UAH **45,000**, is paid
to a Hero of Ukraine test pilot

8.5 m Ukrainians (62%) have
a pension under UAH **1,000**

Tax pressure is skyrocketing due to the cost
of paying special pensions worth
UAH **5-9,000**

Principle 3: Almost average

Professors and teachers at post-secondary institutions,
the Academy of Sciences, scholars

Eligibility:		
Insured term	25 years	20 years
Academic service (insured years)	20 years	15 years

PENSION = 0.8 × SALARY


Coefficient 0.8 equals 59 insured years of service

Calculated: basic formula, counting only salary in academic
posts

Extra pensions for extra insured years calculated as:

**EXTRA PENSION = SALARY × (YEARS IN ACADEMIC
POSTS – 15-20) × 0.01**

INDEXATION: On a general basis



Principle 4: Blood money

Chornobyl victims, war veterans, children of the war,
long-term medical donors, residents of mountain re-
gions, and so on

**PENSION = COEFFICIENT OF INSURED YEARS × SALARY +
BONUS**

The coefficient of insured years and salary are calculated on
a general basis.

Bonus formula:

BONUS = C (coefficient) × MINIMUM PENSION
with C depending on pensioner category:

CATEGORY	C, %
Chornobyl victim	15–30
Special service to Ukraine	20–40
Veterans:	
- involved in military action	25
- war wounded	30–50
- war participants	10–15
- special service to the homeland	70
Heroes of Labor, Heroes of Ukraine, Full Cavalier, Order of Glory of Labor	200
Residents of mountain regions	20
Long-term medical donors	10
Children of the war	10

Extra pensions for extra insured years calculated as:

**EXTRA PENSION = MINIMUM PENSION × (ACTUAL
YEARS OF SERVICE – MINIMUM MANDATORY SER-
VICE) × 0.01**

INDEXATION: On a general basis



Demobilization 2011

A massive layoff of officers could leave Ukraine's army weaker and its police more corrupt

Author:
Dmytro Krapyvenko

A career in Ukraine's public institutions has little to recommend itself these days. To some extent, low salaries and the bureaucratic morass are offset by benefits and early retirement—and the opportunity to get involved in corruption. But social benefits are being cancelled one after another, and bribery is getting riskier. Until recently, early retirement at 40 remained the only guaranteed benefit. But the Government has now got its hands around the neck of this sacred cow by increasing the service period for those in uniform.

It didn't take long for those in the enforcement agencies to respond to this change to their well-deserved rest. According to different estimates, 10-12,000 army officers and 8,000 policemen have filed notices of resignation since December 2010, when rumors of this reform surfaced.

Once they reach 37, officers look forward to a public pension with enough time to get into a nice career in civilian life. Starting next year, though, the service period will be extended to 21 years, then to 22 in 2013 and so on, to reach 25. Officers also worry that they will only receive a small portion of their discharge benefit, which is currently UAH 20,000 and up, depending on their rank, unit and many other factors.

Until recently, the state was giving officers some benefits that were a great help to modest family budgets, including 50% off residential services bills and 100% reimbursement for apartment rents, extra vacation days, and food rations—all of which are now cancelled. Even the service period is now the same for everyone, unlike before, when one year in a peacekeeping mission counted as three, while service in a harsh climate, on battle alert or in the Chernobyl zone counted as 18 months for 12. In the face of these "reforms," officers are leaving the military in droves.

DROP YOUR GUNS

"This pension reform makes it clear that the military is not a priority for the government," says Valentyn Badrak, Director of the Center for the Army, Conversion and Disarmament. "Massive retirement will turn the Armed Forces into a ragtag band. The officers retiring now were trained in soviet military academies. Without any doubt, they have had better quality of training. Since independence, the government has spent little on large-scale maneuvers, shooting and so on. It's mostly the majors and lieutenants retiring now and they are a very important segment in the army. We can have great generals and rank-and-file, but without its mid-range command, the Armed Forces will never be battle ready."

The resignation of 5-7% of 148,000 officers is a felt loss. And that number could well grow. Today, only the officers who signed a five-year contract back in 2006 can retire without



NATIONAL SECURITY

If not NATO, then Russia?

The ability of the public purse to pay for defense is just one of the tests of its "non-aligned" status that Kyiv is failing

When the Verkhovna Rada majority passed the Bill "On the principles of domestic and foreign policy" on July 1, 2010, and the President signed it into law, they effectively cancelled the Law "On the principles of national security of Ukraine." In fact, the list of priority national interests no longer includes any provision on Ukraine's integration into the Euroatlantic security region nor any reference to the related treaty. Ukraine's lawmakers have confirmed Ukraine's "non-aligned" status.

It's too late to discuss what Ukraine lost when it rejected Euroatlantic integration and the drawbacks for Europe which, when it had a chance, did everything it could to prevent Kyiv from joining NATO Membership Action Plan. More important now is a different question altogether: How prepared is Ukraine to "carry" its non-aligned status? Neutral or non-aligned status is very costly and a country's budget has to cover the cost. Viktor Yanukovich's first year in power showed that nobody is planning to spend on defense—not

even a minimal amount, let alone increase its budget.

Ukrainian experts and the Ministry of Defense suggest a virtually identical sum that needs to be spent on defense every year: at least UAH 20bn. According to very modest estimates by the Ministry, the military needs UAH 27bn this year. In reality, President Yanukovich allocated only UAH 13.6bn, or slightly over US \$1.5bn, from the budget—half of what defense needs.

In fact, this amount will only cover the cost of living, including payroll, uni-



ALL FOUGHT OUT.
Officers are in a hurry to trade
undistinguished service for a
stable pension

complications. The rest have a problem: sources in the Armed Forces say that there is an unspoken rule to not release anyone who resigns for reasons of health but to find every possible excuse to turn them down. Quitting the military due to “default of contract obligations” is even harder: commanders come up with all kinds of documents proving that all social benefits have been available and, in theory, if they don’t keep their promises, the contract can be terminated. In reality, though, only a handful has actually succeeded in this—experienced military lawyers.

SHAPESHIFTER TIME

The Interior Ministry is also on the verge of colossal staff changes including a 30% staff cut announced by Anatoliy Mohyloiv and massive resignations of policemen over the pension issue. “Today, people can retire with 20 years’ service,” says an operational officer from one of district units in Kyiv. “For some units, this will not have much of an impact, such as, if a 40-year old prison guard is replaced by a younger person. But operational work is different. Experience makes a critical difference here. Moreover, young employees tend to think about what they get out of their position almost as soon as they get it. And I don’t mean le-

gitimate bonuses and benefits. At the same time, senior officers who are doing well through corruption are also on no hurry to retire. Their pensions are not a priority.”

Younger staff often acts as cannon fodder in the fight against corruption in enforcement agencies. It’s the inexperienced cops that the internal security service most often purges. So, lawmen who inherit the jobs of freshly-retired officers will not find an easy career path: young people keen to get something from their positions fill the ranks of those sentenced for corruption.

Meanwhile, a post-crisis labor market is unlikely to offer work to every retiree. “A lot of them won’t find their place in civilian life,” says Badrak. “Those who find themselves out in the cold could be drawn to criminal activities. Others who are disheartened by their fruitless job searches could join opposition political movements. Officers are people with outstanding internal discipline, but once they join a political party, they will work actively and decisively.”

In short, this wave of massive resignations could cost Ukrainian society a lot: the prospect of thousands of turncoats and soldiers of fortune is not promising. Ukraine already went through this once, in the 1990’s. ■

forms and food—but nothing on what one might call actual defense. By comparison, Russia, where territorial claims against Crimea and Sevastopol come up at various levels all the time, spent 2.84% of GDP for defense in 2010—RUR 1.274tn, or over US \$43.5bn—and is planning to raise that to 3.02% in 2011—RUR 1.517tn or around US \$52bn.

But Russia’s not the only good example. In neutral countries whose status is close to non-aligned Ukraine, the military is funded far better. For instance, Finland’s military budget was 1.55% of GDP last year, or US \$3.46bn, and defense spending is on the rise: Finland plans to spend US \$14.3bn over 2010–2013. Sweden, another neutral country, is one of the most militarized states in the region. In 2009, its defense budget was US \$5.5bn—and its population is 20% of Ukraine’s. Three years ago, official Stockholm was going to cut defense

spending considerably. But it changed plans radically after Russia’s incursion into Georgia. The Swiss defense budget, with 7.5mn people, is over US \$5bn. Military experts say it’s the most militarized country in the world, able to muster a well-organized army of 1.7mn troops within 48 hours.

The poverty of Ukraine’s defense budget has completely stopped the switch to a professional army. In his election platform, Mr. Yanukovich promised these changes would be done in 2011. Today, the Defense Ministry says unequivocally that the army cannot switch to a contractual basis for lack of funding. For now, Ukraine will keep drafting 25,000 conscripts every year, just as it always has. Judging by reports over the last month, the only “military objective” the Defense Ministry is working on now is feeding the troops. And the main question is—

which (correctly connected) company will get to do this.

The question of budget capacity to fund defense is just one of the non-aligned “tests” Kyiv is in the process of failing. The past year has made it clear that “neutrality” is not so much a matter of status for Ukraine, as it is a legal excuse to walk away from NATO and back into Russia’s orbit. Nor is the embarrassing prolongation of the Black Sea Fleet’s stay in Sevastopol for 25 years the only problem. Even such a long-mothballed option as joining Russia’s Collective Security Treaty Organization has been resurrected by Party of the Regions. Statements about the need for “closer cooperation” with this organization are already in the air. And that’s just a step away from sending Ukrainian boys to Russia’s hot spots.

Andriy Duda

Mr. Yanukovych goes to Washington

The Yanukovych Administration's image in the West is made by Americans, paid for by Ukrainians and watched closely by Russians

Author:
Oleksandr
Mykhelson

"They are unabashed liars, twisting facts, paying hirelings in Europe, the US and inside the country for stolen money..."
Viktor Yanukovych,
February 4, 2011

This angry speech about "hirelings" made by Viktor Yanukovych at the Poland-Ukraine Forum in Warsaw was, of course, about the opposition. Luckily for Ukraine's President, he is far from alone in fending off his "slanderrers." The Foreign Ministry is one of his most proactive allies, tireless in its use of diplomatic professionals, including Minister Hryshchenko himself, as mouthpieces to deny any criticisms directed at the current Administration in the Western press. Indeed, the Ministry has even taken to directing Western reporters with explanations about how they should "properly" write about this government (see <http://ukraini-anweek.com/politics/17707>).

Other allies in the cause of whitewashing the reputation of the Bankova¹ abroad are the Russian comrades whose role in the debate about Ukraine at the Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly last October was described by Ukrainian journalists. It was there that Yulia Novikova, PR Deputy and sister of Mr. Yanukovych's Chief-of-Staff Serhiy Liovichkin, discussed with Konstantin Kosachov, the head of the Russian delegation to PACE, and Alexander Pochinok, a member of Russia's PACE Monitoring Committee, how to force the Europeans to soften their resolution about the interference of the SBU, Ukraine's security service, with Ukraine's media. When President Nicolas Sarkozy awarded Viktor Yanukovych France's highest decoration, the Le-

gion of Honor, few days later, Alla Lazareva, a Paris-based Ukrainian journalist, revealed in her BBC blog that a French MP known for lobbying Russian interests had "arranged" this award for the Ukrainian President.

In addition to political connections, lobbying is also a useful tool. Common belief is that the purpose of lobbyists is to arrange meetings for their clients with politicians and state officials and that it's then up to the clients to promote their ideas. In the US, lobbying is a legal business and such companies are required to report about both their revenues and their clients. Lobbying firms miss no opportunity to monitor all such reports as they are keen to reveal any violations by their competitors. Meanwhile, politicians and other officials are well aware that they are the target of lobbying efforts and don't place much trust in blandishments. In short, expecting that lobbying alone will get the necessary decision made is not realistic.

Still, business is business. The key factor is to make the client believe that lobbyists are omnipotent. In the US, there are numerous PR agencies ready to take on image-making on behalf of a paying client, whether in the US, in the client's home country, or anywhere else in the world. A closer look at the way Ukraine's current Administration is operating in this area suggests more than a whiff of Russian influence.

OUTSIDER WAYS FOR THE HOMEBOYS

Ten years ago, Western PR tactics were new to Ukraine. Even party conventions looked like late soviet-style Party activist get-togethers: no carefully prepared scripts, professional lighting and transparent prompters for the speakers. It all started to change after Kuchmagate,²

when Ukraine's then-President found himself a pariah in the West.

Initially, there were some comic incidents, such as in the wake of election campaign 2004, when Kyiv journalists attended a grandiose press conference held by Bernard Whitman, the president of Whitman Insight Strategies. Mr. Whitman announced that his company had run an opinion poll in Ukraine and found that Candidates Yushchenko and Yanukovych had equal ratings. No supporting data about the survey were offered and shortly afterwards, it became known that Whitman Insight Strategies specialized in marketing and advertising and had no relation opinion polls.


Something similar happened in 2010, when the Azarov Government hired Trout Cacheris, a US firm, to audit the work of its predecessor, the Tymoshenko Government. Firstly, however, Trout Cacheris is a legal and lobbying firm, not an auditor. Company representatives announced that, for their UAH 23mn—US \$3 million—in taxpayer money, they would only "coordinate" the work of others. The "others" turned out to be Akim Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, an international law firm whose client list includes Rinat Akhmetov, and Kroll, the detective agency asked in 2001 to investigate Kuchmagate by Viktor Pinchuk, a multimillionaire and Mr. Kuchma's son-in-law. At the time, Kroll declared that "there is no basis to talk about Mr. Kuchma's part in the murder of Georgiy Gongadze."

Among the Western firms engaged by the current Administration to "persuade" Ukrainians is the mysterious American Institute in Ukraine. Over the past few years, it has held a series of roundtables and

¹Bankova refers to "vulytsia Bankova" or Bank Street in English, where the Presidential Administration sits in Kyiv.

²The release of covert tapes used to implicate former President Leonid Kuchma in the murder of journalist Georgiy Gongadze in late 2000, aka "Cassette Scandal."

LOBBYISTS, CLIENTS AND OTHERS



press-conferences in Kyiv to campaign against joining NATO. On January 31, 2011, Executive Director Anthony Salvia wrote an opinion piece for the Kyiv Post arguing that Viktor Yanukovich should be awarded Nobel Peace Prize for cutting the Kharkiv deal and bringing Ukraine closer to Russia. The original idea for this came, of course, from PR Deputy Valeriy Bondyk back in July 2010.

OUTSIDERS AMONG THE HOMEBOYS

US lobbyist Paul Manafort is arguably one of the best known unofficial Western advisors to Mr. Yanukovich in Ukraine. In 2005, Mr. Manafort and the consultancy in which he was a partner drafted a list of recommendations for Rinat Akhmetov's Systems Capital Management (SCM) to enter international markets. This was how the American lobbyist, who had worked for several Republican presidential candidates and been involved in an influence peddling scandal at HUD,³ met Rinat Akhmetov, the owner of SCM.

It was Mr. Manafort who made Party of the Regions, completely so-viet before, switch modern technologies in its commercials and rallies. He taught Mr. Yanukovich to smile in public and raise his hands in the American-style gesture of greeting when speaking in public. In a rare comment to the New York Times, Paul Manafort said that he was not just making money in Ukraine, but "trying to play a constructive role in developing democracy."

Bruce Jackson, President of the Project on Transitional Democracies, is another "builder." In an interview for Den', a national paper, on February 2, Mr. Jackson compared the "Yanukovich the Common Man" to the US President Harry Truman. He said that Mr. Yanukovich was building a Ukraine that is similar "not to the new Belarus, but to the new Poland," but he was getting no support and that Yulia Tymoshenko and her "organized" supporters were "destroying

³ Wikipedia entry on Paul. J. Manafort.

Ukraine" with their criticism of this Administration.

Mr. Jackson said in his interview that he had talked to Mr. Yanukovich for an hour that same day and was "moved" by the President's deep con-

IN THIS TIGHTLY-KNIT CIRCLE OF INTERESTS AMONG AMERICAN OFFICIALS, LOBBYISTS AND SPIN DOCTORS, RUSSIAN AND UKRAINIAN OLIGARCHS, VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH COULD FIND HIMSELF FAR FROM BEING THE KEY CLIENT

cerns about the high level of corruption in Ukraine. The American also met with SBU Chief Valeriy Khoroshkovskiy. The real purpose of these top meetings was not disclosed. Den' journalist Mykola Siruk insists that he organized the interview with Mr. Jackson at his own initiative. Among others, Bruce Jackson is a one-time American secret agent and former Vice President of Lockheed Martin, the aerospace company. He has close ties to the Pentagon and played an important role in lobbying NATO membership for the Baltic States.

According to the Wall Street Journal, which referenced official documents, a charity fund run by Mr. Jackson and his wife received US \$300,000 from Rinat Akhmetov in 2005. When Mr. Yanukovich visited the US at the end of 2006 as Premier, local papers wrote that it was Messrs. Jackson and Manafort who arranged his meetings with American officials, including Vice President Dick Cheney. Nothing personal—just business!

STRANGE WAYS FOR STRANGERS

Contacts between Republican Party hawks and Kremlin loyalist oligarchs can probably be considered the same kind of business. In April 2007, the WSJ disclosed an investigation into how Bob Dole, a Republican candidate in 1996 election, helped Russian aluminum tycoon Oleg Deripaska get his ban on visiting the US lifted. The Wall Street Journal states that Deripaska paid Mr. Dole, a well-known lobbyist at that time, US \$300,000 in 2005 as a retainer and another US \$260,000 when the Russian oligarch finally had his US visa.



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In 2004, Friends of Ukraine paid Barbour Griffith & Rogers US \$320,000, but no one knows what for

When Friends of Ukraine disappeared at that point, Foruper Group Ltd., a British offshore company, paid Barbour Griffith & Rogers US \$820,000

A charity fund run by Mr. Jackson and his wife received US \$300,000 from Rinat Akhmetov in 2005

The WSJ article also argued that cooperation between Putin's circle and US lobbyists was even more significant during the process of Montenegro separating from Serbia, when Russian oligarchs gained control over its industry and tourist coastline. The names are familiar here, too: Mr. Deripaska invested considerable capital in buying Montenegrin assets, encouraged by Mr. Putin, who wanted a foothold on the Mediterranean. In 2006, Russian oligarchs paid Rick Davis and Davis Manafort, the firm whose partner is Paul Manafort, several million US dollars to organize Montenegro's independence referendum.

Other lobbyists mentioned in the WSJ article include Leonid Reiman, one-time Telecoms Minister in Russia, who was considered one of the richest people around newly-elected President Putin in early 2000's. By mid-decade, Mr. Reiman, whose companies were being accused of money-laundering in the US, turned to Barbour Griffith & Rogers, another US lobbyist, through the Alfa Group. One of the founders, Haley Barbour, is now Governor of Mississippi. The company was paid the total of US \$2mn.

This is where our main heroes come back into the picture. In 2002-2003, Barbour Griffith & Rogers was working on behalf of an organization called "Friends of Ukraine." In 2006, American journalists discovered that the legal address of this unknown organization was at the offices of Barbour Griffith & Rogers, and one of its founders was BGR's Executive Director. Prior to disappearing as mysteriously as it had appeared, in 2004, Friends of Ukraine paid Barbour Griffith & Rogers US \$320,000, but no one knows what for. At that point, Foruper Group Ltd., a British offshore company, paid Barbour Griffith & Rogers US \$820,000.

The American investigative journalists also revealed via data from the US Department of Justice that this typical fly-by-night company was founded by an attorneys working for the infamous Semion Mogilievich whose gas deals once shook the West. Back then, the US press covered this, but not as much as the Russian press did. In 2005, Ukrainians were fingered in this case, too, including people rumored to have been involved at home in all these machinations for many years.

ALL HOMEBOYS?

In 2005, Barbour Griffith was paid an additional US \$98,000 through yet another offshore company. This time, US journalists managed to trace the payer. It was the now-defunct Republican Party of Ukraine led by Yuriy Boyko, Fuel and Energy Minister in both Yanukovich Governments, as well as today.

Nor did the notorious RosUkrEnergo co-owner and gas and chemical industry tycoon Dmytro Firtash miss the party. In 2004, Neil Livingstone, an American security expert, quoted the Wall Street Journal that the Yankee friends of Russian tycoons at Barbour Griffith and Highrock Holdings, a Cypriot company controlled by Mr. Firtash, are related.

On their own, all these connections don't add up to much. But 2002-2004 was when Russia first launched a serious attack on Ukraine's gas transit system (GTS). When the idea of a joint gas transit consortium failed—not the least due to pressure from the US—Ukraine became involved in some very opaque schemes, such as RosUkrEnergo, where Msrs. Boyko and Firtash figured as well, which eventually put the country's energy independence at risk.

In 2009, the "gas lobby," aka the Firtash group in Yanukovich circles, began to compete for influence with Mr. Akhmetov. This group ostensibly includes Chief-of-Staff Serhiy Liovochkin, who is in charge of the President's foreign visits, among other things. At the end of 2009, with Mr. Manafort's help, Mr. Liovochkin went to Washington to arrange a visit for Mr. Yanukovich, who was then in opposition. In the end, the trip never took place, but the efforts of his boys paid off for the PR leader when he traveled to the US in April 2010 as President. It was then that Mr. Yanukovich brokered a deal to transfer Ukraine's enriched uranium to the US and was treated to a photo op with President Obama.

The work of US lobbyists on behalf of the Yanukovich Administration is undoubtedly also appreciated. However, in this tightly-knit circle of interests among American officials, lobbyists and spin doctors, Russian and Ukrainian oligarchs, and ultimately Gazprom and the Kremlin, Viktor Yanukovich could find himself far from being the key client. ■



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Learning Democracy

German historian Frank Golczewski talks about political technologies from the WWI era, how to build a new empire and the benefits of pluralism

Author:
Olena Chekan

Photo:
Oleksandr
Chekmeniov

Frank Golczewski is a professor at Hamburg University and a renowned expert in the contemporary history of Eastern and Central Europe. Prof. Golczewski explores confluence of historical circumstances within where specific personalities acted, but his greatest interest is the factors that affect this system of “historical coordinates.” Golczewski likes to search for historical finds and paradoxes. And he believes that historical memory is part of our guard against the mistakes of civilization.

UW: Recently in *Der Spiegel* you said that Europe treated Ukrainians, a nation that has the right to self-determination, as something that the Germans invented during WWI. What did you mean?

—At that time, the Germans used a political technology of sorts. They put prisoners of war of a certain nationality in one place and worked with them. The prisoners were told they belonged to a certain nation and had to fight for their independence against those who were oppressing them. This was how they evoked a feeling of national identity to use the captive



soldiers for their own purposes later. Nationalism played a key role here, but it was never intended to support real sovereignty, only to serve the interests of others.

This kind of deliberate policy was not only applied to Ukrainians. Polish soldiers who served in the German army and fought against France were also involved in the experiment. When the French took them prisoner, they were put in camps and eventually turned into “real” Poles. This approach was used to create Jozef Haller’s army. And the Russians did the same, using captive Czech and Slovak Austrian troops to set up the Czechoslovak Army. The Germans put Ukrainian, Finnish and Georgian prisoners in different camps. Here, the Ukrainians studied Ukrainian language and history and were told that they were an independent nation.

But the Germans never helped anyone, nor did they want to. They just behaved more wisely during the WWI than in WWII because they knew that they could lose the war. And if that happened, prisoners of war would have come in handy as they were already trained to be patriots in their own countries and would be prepared to fight against Russia. This is the first part of your question.

The other point is that, after WWI, war broke out between Poland and Western Ukraine. The Polish were trying to get the support of Western Europe and to that end they started a propaganda campaign in Paris to the effect that Ukrainians did not exist as a nation but were just something the Germans had invented.

UW: Why does the UPA¹ bother the Russians more than ROA,² which also fought alongside the Nazis? Why does Russia get so enraged over Ukraine’s desire for its own identity?

– The UPA fought for Ukraine against Russia, while the ROA fought only for Russia. A different Russia, but Russia just the same. Nationalism as belonging to a certain state or nation is

very important to people. And once a national consciousness dominates, it doesn’t matter any more who is in power—communists or national socialists. This is what allowed Stalin to switch from communist slogans during WWII to “For the Fatherland! For Stalin!” These have nothing to do with communists or anyone else. There’s Stalin, the leader of the nation, and there’s the Fatherland, where I was born. Then people start thinking more in terms of their na-

IT’S GREAT THAT PEOPLE GO OUT TO THE STREETS AND PROTECT THEIR RIGHTS. BUT THIS IS NOT A WAR, IT’S A NEW POLITICAL CULTURE

tion than in terms of ideology. That’s exactly what is happening today.

UW: You mean that a new Russian Empire is being built?

– Yes. And it’s clear why Ukraine’s desire to find its own identity rouses this reaction in Russia. It’s very simple. “Kyiv is the Mother of all Rus Cities.” Only now it’s over there, in another country our mother has been stolen! Russians have a hard time accepting this, and perhaps they can’t. This belief is very firm in the people’s minds and Russia’s leaders encourage them to think that way.

UW: Do you think civilized relations between Ukraine and Russia are possible with such opposite visions of the future?

– Yes, of course. Such relations are possible, even necessary. But it will take some time and a lot of effort. Eastern Europe is used to a one-party system where coordination is critical, while the West, with its centuries of pluralism, needs no coordination whatsoever. There’s a nice saying: Let’s just agree to disagree. In the West, parties struggle for power: some win, others lose, but it doesn’t fundamentally change the country that much and democracy doesn’t disappear. That’s what’s missing in Russia. Everyone there has to have a common viewpoint, and only that viewpoint is correct. The viewpoint of a political opponent becomes a criminal offense. But for us, viewpoints are just viewpoints, numerous and different.

The truth is that democracy must be learned. There’s no other way. This may be the most important task facing Ukraine today. It needs to debate all urgent and painful issues and hold a dialog both internally and with Russia. Scholars should start the ball rolling because ordinary voters don’t know everything that really happened. Those over 30 today were educated in ordinary soviet schools and they still believe on some level in what they were taught there. They were not taught to analyze or that there are many truths. The truth is not invariable. It can be subjective. The values of my family are different from the values of another. And the views of different countries vary a lot, too.

UW: Ukraine is suffering post-colonial syndrome and most Ukrainians are afraid to lose independence...

– Fear is a very dangerous thing. People hypnotized by fear and the thought that someone might harm them deprive themselves of a normal life. You should do what Ukraine needs and what’s good for your country and not look at Russia and the West. In my opinion, there is no danger that Russia will attack Ukraine.

UW: What about Georgia?

– Mikhail Saakashvili thought the West would come to his aid. But he should have remembered 1968, 1956 and 1939. The West never supported anyone. Just look at Czechoslovakia, Poland, Baltic States or the beginning of the WWII. By the way, the Poles, too, think Germany might cut a deal with Russia, attack Poland and divide it for the umpteenth time, even though there are no conditions for this. In terms of Ukraine, I think, Russia will not attack it, either. But you are the closest neighbors and that forces you to search for ways to establish good neighborly relations. You have to come to terms with Russia somehow. Just like German did with France.

UW: Ukraine and Russia, France and Germany are two completely different weight categories!

– Not at all! Germany was very weak after WWII. In the first five or six years, France could have taken anything it wanted: the Saarland, for instance. Yet the French realized that

¹ Ukrainian Insurgent Army from WWII, which fought both the soviets and the Nazis.

² Russian Liberation Army

this policy would lead to a repeat of what had happened twice already: war. That means it's better to cooperate. It benefits both countries. But it doesn't mean friendship. Charles De Gaulle rightly said that two countries can never have friendship, only mutual interests. So, you need to find these mutual interests. And to remember that, in many ways, Ukraine and Russia depend on each other.

UW: Massive demonstrations, hunger strikes and labor strikes all over the world, all in the midst of a financial crisis and further Wikileaks disclosures. Is this some kind of new world war?

— The Cold War may be over, but now we have global terrorism. No one knows where these terrorists are, but their presence is the reality of these times. Moreover, today, people don't trust politicians as much as they used to. With internet, they have unlimited access to information, so everyone can find out what's going on. And there's nothing wrong with Wikileaks. Historians are well aware that nothing can be kept hidden or secret in the end. It's great that people go out to the streets and protect their rights. This is a new quality of politics. Today, those in power have to listen to the people more than ever before. But this is not a war, it's a new political culture. Your Orange Revolution was something similar. It was part of the new political culture, a newborn.

UW: What differences in mentality is there between East and West Germany?

— There is some radicalizing in East Germany, which you can see both in Russia, and in Ukraine, as well. This was inherited from the soviet or the Nazi past and it comes from the lack of political education. It took West Germany 40 years after the war to educate people about politics, that politics is a complex thing; that all the factors in a situation need to be studied and analyzed and only then conclusions formed; that you can't blame everything on someone else and think you yourself are innocent.

UW: Are the young people different from earlier generations in East Germany?

— Yes, they are. Young people have more opportunities to see the world, to travel and get whatever education they want. And still, East Germany has its depressed regions



"Democracy has to be learned. There is no other way."

with high unemployment. People are so inert there they don't want to move an inch; they don't care about finding a job. Even young people. In the past, they knew that the state and the Party would take care of them but would punish any initiatives. They just needed to be loyal to the state. Once Germany united, a lot of East Germans believed that West Germany had to give them everything. But it turned out that nobody owed them anything, nor was anyone going to give them anything. They had to look for a job on their own, be competitive, and take con-

trol over their own lives. Some people are still not interested in being responsible for themselves. They continue to blame others for their failures, Jews, dark-skinned races...

UW: We have depressed regions, too, as does Russia...

— In Russia, you either work or go to the mafia. The only difference is how much you make. And it's very risky because it leaves an impression that all those who work are stupid and it's much better to go to the criminal world, where money is much easier. I have an impression that a new wave of criminalization has started and is spreading over Russian society. I don't think this is happening in Ukraine so far.

UW: Is Germany tired of the daily feeling of guilty for the Holocaust and for starting WWII?

— No. I haven't noticed this. I can see this in my students and high school students. They are more interested in recent history. This gets us into talks, discussions and debates. In 1950s and 1960s, people didn't want to talk about the hard past because it was too painful. The society wasn't prepared for open debate of these issues. Feelings prevailed then. The younger generation has a more detached, academic approach both to recent and contemporary history. Moreover, if there's anything to learn, it's from historical mistakes. People need to see the consequences of war, greed for conquest and xenophobia. The Nazis ruined Germany and murdered millions of people. This we can never forget. If we forget, the followers of Nazism or this so-called communism will be able to dupe people once again...

Young Germans and ordinary people learned about Ukraine only recently. We had some refugees from Ukraine after WWII, but they mostly moved on, to Canada and the US, leaving no trace behind. The current immigration from post-soviet countries is purely economic in nature. Germans did learn about Ukraine during the Orange Revolution. It provoked interest in your history, too. We even organized an international conference entitled "Divided Memoirs—Competing Memories" at Hamburg University. Among other things, it focused on the Holodomor of 1932–1933. I must say our students and PhDs made a number very interesting, profound presentations. ■

BIO

Frank Golczewski, historian, expert in contemporary Eastern and Central European history, Professor at Hamburg University

1948 — born in Katowice, Poland. His family moved to Germany.

1973 — graduated from Cologne University with PhD.

1979 — defended his habilitation thesis

Worked as Fellow at the East European Section, the Federal Center for Political Education, Higher Pedagogical School, Rhineland, and at Osnabruck University.

1983 — Professor of East European history at Hamburg University (Bundeswehr) since 1994.

1981–2010 — Wrote numerous publications on 19th and 20th century European history, including Germans and Ukrainians **1918–1939 (2010)**; *Cologne University Professors in the Time of Nazism (1988)*; *Modern Societies in Poland*, co-authored with Willibald Reschke (**1982**); *Relations between Poles and Jews, 1881–1922. A Study of the History of Anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe (1981)*.

Co-wrote *Russian Nationalism (1998)*, *A History of Ukraine (1993)*, *Poland: the Dimensions of Genocide (1991)*.

The Source of Success

One of the most prominent and perceptive experts on the former Soviet Union, the French historian, philosopher and political scientist Alain Besançon, once suggested that “failure to understand the soviet regime is the principal source of its successes.” More than that, Besançon went on to add that it was difficult to find in any one Western country at any one time “more than a dozen minds capable of understanding the soviet phenomenon and of translating what they know into politically useable terms.”

Curiously, Alain Besançon’s disciple Françoise Thom, a history lecturer at Sorbonne, added fairly recently that never before has misunderstanding of Russia in Western Europe been as huge as it is now. According to Thom, a sort of self-inflicted blindness fuelled by sweet lies and the charms of self-deception, it results in shutting the eyes before the fact that Russia provoked the war against the sovereign state of Georgia, and then occupied and annexed parts of Georgia’s territory. No matter how strongly we agree that Georgia’s President Mikhail Saakashvili is hardly a model democrat, the fact remains that the West has swallowed this déjà vu episode that came straight from the geopolitical repertoire of the 20th century.

We are tempted to believe that Russia is on the way to reforming its economic and political systems. Yet we tend to forget, as Thom points out, that all the waves of modernization in Russia have come as a reaction to its defeats and losses. Peter the Great undertook his reforms after Russia was defeated by Sweden near Narva, Alexander II after the painful loss of the Crimean War, Nicholas II after the disastrous war against Japan. Let me add Mikhail Gorbachev to this chain: he had good reason to make a desperate attempt to modernize the military and economic potential of the Soviet Union after its disgrace in Afghanistan.

As with China and other Asian autocracies that try to combine free-market economies with zero political liberties and pluralism, “modernization” in Russia continues to be, as it has always been, the development of technology and military potential. True, perhaps for the first time in modern Russia’s history, the political and industrial elite of the country agreed to import new weapons and warfare technologies—just recall France’s Mistral, not to mention Israeli war intelligence planes, and so on—, rather than relying exclusively on exporting weapons, which suggests a paradigm shift in strategic planning and thinking about the future.

But it does not change the essence of this issue, as modernization, in Russia, is in no way related to such core Western values as the individual’s autonomy and dignity, fundamental liberties and human rights, political liberty and pluralism, subsidiarity and the rule of law. To put it simply, the model of what may well be

perceived as a potential club of emerging rival powers, from China to Russia, that position themselves as a new ideological and civilizational alternative to the West, is based on authoritarian capitalism, or capitalism without liberty, a sinister phenomenon of the post-Cold War world.

What does modernization signify for present-day Russia and its political elite? How does Russia’s President Dmitri Medvedev understand modernization? In theory, he appears to be a new modernizer, inclined to talk about the emergence of a new, democratic Russia, whereas the omnipotent Prime Minister, Vladimir Putin, avoids this word, preferring “stabilization”—and understandably so, as democracy will never “stabilize” the world in the sense that he is so fond of, that is, imposing a once-and-for-all order and arresting social and political change.

Unfortunately, never has the will to misunderstand Russia been as strong in the EU as it is now. If it had not happened to me in Brussels, I would never have believed that such a pearl of wisdom could come from the lips of a ranking official from the European Commission, yet this bureaucrat made himself very clear, and in presence of academics and exchange students, regarding the role of Russia as a “prime stabilizing factor in such areas as Caucasus.”

The EU has failed to understand critical aspects of Russia’s politics today. As in those old days when soviet dissidents were a lifetime ahead of all Western politicians and political scientists put together in terms of a clear understanding of the logic of power in the USSR, Russian journalists and human rights activists cannot stand the rubbish about Russia they hear in the EU.

One legendary soviet dissident and Russian human rights activist, Sergei Kovalev, once told me that the supposed naiveté of the West is merely an illusion.

They understand every-

thing. Didn’t they understand what kind of anti-fascist Stalin was when another anti-fascist, Lion Feuchtwanger, brought the West good news about the paradise-on-earth in the Soviet Union? They did, and their naiveté was just a trick and self-deception. And then Kovalev aptly summed it up, challenging Alain Besançon: “They do not tolerate fascism of their own, but they tolerate it elsewhere.”

A sincere belief that anything is so, makes it so, as William Blake’s winged phrase suggests. A sincere belief that gas and oil are more important than human rights can be supported by the theory that we have to respect “the people’s choice.” Yet we know that there was no choice—and that there never will be any, if we keep applying double standards, requiring legitimacy and respect for human rights only from the small, while thinking of the big and powerful as “trying to catch up and improve”—even when the record shows the opposite. ■



Author:
Leonidas Donskis,
EU MP for Lithuania

**THE WEST WON'T TOLERATE
FASCISM AMONG ITS OWN,
BUT IS READY TO TOLERATE
IT WITH RUSSIA**

The Land of the Nebbish

Russians have never been a free people. From time to time they simply changed masters



Author:
Kateryna
Barabash,
Moscow

Fierce: The same thing happened before the disaster: an owl screeched and the samovar howled without end.

Gayev: Before what disaster?

Fierce: Before freedom.

Anton Chekhov, The Cherry Orchard

150 years ago, on February 19, 1861, Alexander II of Russia signed the Manifesto on the Abolition of Serfdom. From that day on, freedom began ticking away, the same freedom that the inimitable Chekhovian Fierce called “a disaster.”

The longer I live, the stronger I feel that every time I step out onto the street, I enter the battle “for our and your freedom.” Every step I take towards my destination is an attempt to win back a small slice of my territory. But the longer this battle continues, the more obvious it becomes: people not only don’t want to give me a piece of my and only my territory—they don’t even know what it is. They wonder and take offense when I don’t want to let outsiders onto my territory.

I stopped taking the Moscow Metro long ago. Not because—or not only because—it’s sizzling in the summer and frigid in the winter and filled with drunken bums who stink to high heaven. But...I enter a car and see dozens of eyes, dumbly and mechanically directed towards my person. Not because I am unusually pretty or because my zipper’s down or something. These people don’t really see me. They’re just staring. That’s the way it is. They’ll glance at you and then turn away: you’re part of this temporary collective. As your station draws near, you move towards the exit. “Lady, you getting off??” looms from behind you, always in a displeased tone, from a fellow passenger planning to get off who, just for good measure, pokes you between the shoulder blades with an index finger. You shrug your back, trying to get away from that finger. “Don’t touch me, ok?” And then a tone of insult combined with injury: “Whaaat? Can’t I???? Oh, beeeeg your paaaaardon...”

Building socialism on your own was impossible. Only in a mass, only in a herd, shoulder-to-shoulder, hand-in-hand. The only way to get to that bright future was in groups with a tour guide. The plainclothes tour guides made sure that no free zones appeared among people—that could lead to undesirable thoughts and wishes.

That is the real reason why people here are so afraid of space, why any leeway scares them: what if it expands? what if I find myself alone? and then there won’t be any bright future for me. And because we are so afraid of unfilled, undesignated space, all public areas in Russia are filled with blasting music. After all, silence sometimes gives birth to thought. And what the heck do we need that for?

In Russia, a person was never considered a real person. A stinking peasant, a serf, from time immemorial until 1861. A member of the collective, a komsomol or communist, carrying out the missions of the great Lenin or Stalin after 1917. Between these two epochs was a mere 50 years. Then 70 more years, a brief entr’acte, and once again the country hears the sound of screws being tightened. The people simply exchange masters, the way their ancestors were once allowed to do on St. George’s Day.

The Russian has never been free. Russians are not used to being listened to, and are themselves not good at listening to others. They’re used to loud, derogatory tones and, as soon as such an opportunity arose, they began to pay back the world in the same coin. For many centuries, Russia, with its 90% serf population, was held in terror. Humiliation breeds humiliation. Only a free individual can respect the freedom of another. But that free individual cannot come out of nowhere, having never lived, having gone immediately from being a serf to being a comrade.

Once in a while, the serf is allowed to come closer to the master’s rooms—to become a lackey. How common those diminutive, affectionate suffixes have become in Russia in recent years! In the store, you are offered a little “blousekin” to buy, the cashier will make your day with a “receiptlet,” the doctor asks you to please open your little “eyesies,” the insurance agent wants you to buy a tiny “policiette,” and, of course, they’re all ever-so pleased to give you a teeny-tiny discount. Most understand this baby-talk as a form of courtesy. Lackeys do not understand true, internal courtesy, which has no need of “-kins” or “-lets.” In the primitive, servile imagination, the highest form of gallantry is “His lordship has deigned to taste a drop of vodka in his study.”

Being unfree is a genetic habit of Russians. It is the mother of all our flaws, as it destroys any glimmer of self-worth with a hot iron. Russian masochism is charming in its reliability and pride, which has passed itself off as Christian humility for

**FOR SERFS,
THE “STRONG
HAND” IS THEIR
BELOVED MOTHER**

many centuries. Serfs love to hang onto the neck of serfs like them, only bolder ones, and call them their national leaders—often in pairs, in tandem—, at the same time hating with passionate jealousy any outsiders. Serfdom is indeed insufferable, doomed by its very nature to see the world divided into so many identical cells, much like a honeycomb. Any other shape of eye, other way of thinking, other religion, other culture, other language—all that is “other” is immediately degenerate and should be whipped. Xenophobia and chauvinism are the favorite offspring of serfs, while the “strong hand” is their beloved mother. That’s why you will see so many people, even young people, at pro-Stalin rallies in Russia today. This Administration realized that a long time ago, when it had not yet come to power...

Poor, poor Fierce...they’ve forgotten the old man, but he knew what he was talking about. ■



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Dancing with bears

BP's Russian venture is already proving trickier than expected



TONY HAYWARD, BP's ex-boss, once moaned that he wanted his life back. That was after an oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico last year, which the British oil giant expects will end up costing it more than US \$40 billion. BP, too, is struggling to get its old life back, even after apologizing, helping with the clean-up, dumping Mr. Hayward and taking a huge write-off.

On February 1, it announced its final, awful results for 2010: a loss of US \$4.9 billion. That was BP's first loss since 1992, but the company fondly hopes that it will

now have an opportunity to move on. It would like to direct the world's attention to its efforts to improve safety, its plan to start paying dividends once again this year and its ideas for the future.

Alas, some of those plans are already hitting obstacles. Two weeks ago BP announced a new partnership with Rosneft, Russia's state-controlled oil giant, that will see the companies exploring a large and promising part of Russia's Arctic region for oil. The deal gives BP access to Russian reserves that are normally kept out of foreign reach.

Rosneft will get
5%
of BP's shares

Russia contributes
about
10%
of BP's profits

In return Rosneft will get 5% of BP's shares, making it one of the largest shareholders. It will also share BP's expertise and technology. The deal sparked a furious row between BP and its partners in TNK-BP, a Russian oil company run as a joint venture between BP and a few Russian oligarchs.

On the same day that BP's results were announced, a judge in London granted a request by Alfa-Access-Renova (AAR), the vehicle through which Russian partners hold their stake in TNK-BP, that the Rosneft deal

be put on ice until at least February 25th. AAR argues that TNK-BP is meant to enjoy an exclusive right to develop any further deals in Russia to which BP might be a party. It complains that BP has stiffed it. "BP is acting more Russian than a Russian firm," says one of AAR's largest shareholders. AAR has also moved to block a dividend from TNK-BP that would have yielded BP US \$900m.

At a press conference Bob Dudley, BP's new boss, said that it had been impossible for BP to talk to AAR in advance of the Rosneft deal because of the market sensitivity of the share swap involved, and that BP and its partners would be headed for arbitration on the matter regardless of the court verdict. He says he expects to come to a settlement quite easily, and that one of BP's strengths is its long history of involvement with Russia, which contributes about 10% of BP's profits. At least some of this history, however, consists of misjudging Russian politics and quarrelling with its partners.

When BP formed its joint venture with TNK in 2003, oligarchs seemed the partners of choice for getting things done in Russia. But in 2008, having judged that the ultimate power in Russia lay with state energy companies, BP went behind the backs of its private Russian partners to negotiate a deal with Gazprom, the state-controlled gas behemoth.

This did not go down well. BP underestimated the power of Mikhail Fridman, one of its oligarch partners. A self-made entrepreneur, Mr. Fridman got rich in the 1990s and then consolidated his business under Vladimir Putin while remaining his own man—a trick few have managed. BP's attempt to outplay Russian oligarchs at their own game of power politics failed.

Mr. Fridman pulled strings, Gazprom disengaged and Mr. Dudley, then the chief executive of TNK-BP, had to flee Russia. Purported diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks suggest that Igor Sechin, the deputy prime minister and chairman of Rosneft, BP's new partner, was co-operating with Alfa (Mr. Frid-

man's firm) and played a part in Mr. Dudley's ouster.

OF OIL AND OLIGARCHS

Now BP is in bed with Rosneft and has shaken hands with Mr. Sechin, who is widely seen as the architect of the attack on Yukos, an oil firm that was dismantled with scant regard to the law in 2004. Yukos's main shareholder, Mikhail Khodorkovsky, is now in jail. He was ostentatiously given a second prison sentence just as the BP-Rosneft deal was announced.

BP may become embroiled in the legal battle over Yukos's assets, which were swallowed by Rosneft. But first the British firm faces a fight with Mr. Fridman. If BP assumed that its partnership with Rosneft meant that Mr. Fridman would not dare to protest, and that Mr. Sechin would always take BP's side, it may have miscalculated. The legal challenge from AAR is said to come with the full knowledge and approval of the Kremlin. "BP has a very simplistic view of the power structure in Russia," says Mr. Fridman.

AAR does not have any interest in destroying Rosneft's US \$16 billion deal with BP. But equally Mr. Sechin is unlikely to stand in Mr. Fridman's way when he demands that BP compensate AAR handsomely. Rather than wanting to chase Mr. Dudley away again, the Kremlin—and AAR—are keen to draw BP deeper into Russian business and gain more influence over it. Rosneft wants to transform itself into a respectable global oil firm, using its relationship with BP as a stepping-stone.

BP must surely have its qualms about this; but all the parties' interests are at least aligned on one thing. They want those Arctic oilfields to make money. As Mr. Dudley affirmed this week, BP's long-term strategy is to keep searching for oil, which is more lucrative than gas. And with more and more of the world's oil being produced by state-owned oil firms, private ones need to go to greater extremes, both technologically and politically, to stay in the game. ■


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WHEN EVIL TURNS TO GOOD

Filaret, Patriarch of Kyiv and All Rus-Ukraine, talks about raider attacks on churches belonging to the Kyiv Patriarchate and the delusion of a “Russian world”

Interviewer:
Olena Chekan

Photo:
Anatoliy Bielov

Rumors are spreading in Ukraine that the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) intends to eliminate the Kyiv Patriarchate. *Ukrainian Week* asked Patriarch Filaret about the likelihood.

UW: Your Holiness, how true are rumors that the ROC wants to destroy the Kyiv Patriarchate?

— Actually, the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Moscow Patriarchate wants to fix the split in Ukrainian Orthodoxy.¹ We are also strongly in favor of a single Orthodox Church in Ukraine. But whereas we want to consolidate all Orthodox groups as a single, independent national Ukrainian Orthodox Church, the Moscow Patriarchate wants to unite our churches by subordinating them all to the Russian Patriarch. Moreover, Moscow’s plan suits both the policy of the Russian Federation, and ecclesiastic policy of Patriarch Kirill. Kirill believes that the split can only be fixed with the help of those in secular power, that is, through force. And in support of his ideas, he gives as an example the way that Stalin eliminated the Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in 1930 and 1944 by ukase and other instances when churches split in Russia, pointing to what those in power did to them. For Patriarch Kirill, the interference of the state in ecclesiastic matters is perfectly normal. He believes that the state should interfere with the

church and settle this issue—in the favor of Moscow, of course.

UW: How likely is the “Bulgarian scenario” to happen in Ukraine?

— The church split in Bulgaria when democratic forces came to power after fall of the USSR and discovered that the Bulgarian Patriarch, Maksym, had been appointed by the Communist Party, against all church canons. At the time, some bishops and the clergy spoke against him and the church split. When the one-time Tsar Simeon became Prime Minister of Bulgaria, he decided to take these churches away from Maksym’s opponents and give them back to the Patriarch in 2004. This made the impression that the government stopped a schism in the church. However, some priests appealed to the European Court of Human Rights in Strasbourg, which ruled that what the Bulgarian leader had done was illegal. The Court ordered the government figure out how to return the churches and pay compensation.

Someone wants to use this Bulgarian scenario here, too, that is, liquidate Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate with the help of those in power. Still, this is only the desire of those who oppose the Kyiv Patriarchate and think that, given Ukraine’s pro-Russian President, he should do what Moscow wants him to do.

Indeed, they began working towards Moscow’s objective all over Ukraine last year. Where they have more sense, local officials are keeping out of this. But where they want to demonstrate that they only support the church that the President attends, pressure is heavy and they’ve even started raider attacks to take away our churches. For in-

stance, in Kamianka, a village in Telmanove County, Donetsk Oblast, some businessmen showed up offering money to the parish and clergy to repair the church—on condition that they switched to the Moscow Patriarchate. Moreover, they were warned that, if they didn’t do so voluntarily, force would be used. These outsiders started a campaign in the village to draw the locals to the Moscow Patriarchate. But the local bishop, even though Russian, firmly stood his ground in favor of the Kyiv Patriarchate. He announced that if this kind of activity continued, he was prepared to die to prevent the church from being taken. This scared the raiders off for a while.

In Vinnytsia Oblast, some staff from several county administrations gathered the Kyiv Patriarchate clergy and demanded that they switch to the Moscow Patriarchate. You can see the same thing in Donbas. Our clergy say they are offered help, support and financial assistance, but they say no.

In Makariv County, Kyiv Oblast, some parishes were switched to the Moscow Patriarchate on the basis of faked documents about which the parishioners had no idea. This has all elements of a crime and some MPs have turned to the Prosecutor General about this (**see Digest #13 for more on this**).

UW: There’s now a bill to grant churches status as legal entities. Some experts say it will be easier for raiders to grab church property.

— Making churches legal entities is not a bad idea. But with how the church is split in Ukraine today, we are against this bill. It will allow the Moscow Patriarchate to demand property through the courts that they believe is theirs but is currently

¹ There are currently three Ukrainian Orthodox Churches: under the Kyiv Patriarchate (UOC KP), the Autocephalous (UAOC), and under the Moscow Patriarchate (UOC MP).



STALIN'S METHOD.
 "Patriarch Kirill believes the split can only be resolved by the government—and that means by force, similar to the way that Stalin destroyed the Autocephalous Church in Ukraine in 1930 and 1944."



under the Kyiv Patriarchate by the will of the parish. It's no secret that courts can be pressured and bribed. These squabbles over property could lead to a conflict resulting in religious intolerance. We remember what happened in Western Ukraine in the early 1990s: blood was shed there when one group attacked another with pitchforks and axes. We don't want this to happen again, let alone spread across Ukraine. That's why we asked the President, the Premier and the Verkhovna Rada to consider what this all might lead to.

UW: How many KP priests have switched to Moscow?

— Just two, so far, who switched to the Moscow Patriarchate as soon as it offered them some "financial incentive." But their parishioners did not follow them. Actually, Kyiv Patriarchate followers don't want to switch to the Moscow. Just look at Donetsk Archbishop Yuriy Yurchyk: in 2008, he announced he was switching to the Moscow Patriarchate but his parishes did not follow him, so Moscow turned him down and he was forced to go to the Greek Catholics. We are not too concerned when people who are not morally sound leave us. Even Jesus had his Judas, a traitor among the apostles He Himself had chosen. This actually cleanses the church.

I would say that, surprisingly, this all works in favor of the Kyiv Patriarchate. In theory, yes, these illegal actions and pressure could destroy the Kyiv Patriarchate, but what is happening is quite the opposite. All this has gained a lot of publicity, leaving people angry, not just in Ukraine, but also in Europe and the US where we also have churches. The faithful have been going to their governments for help, so this is consolidating communities around the Kyiv Patriarchate. I see Divine Providence in this: God is turning the evil into good. It's the same as 1995, when Patriarch Volodymyr died. Everyone remembers that "bloody Tuesday." (see sidebar) It was those terrible events that consolidated the public around the Kyiv Patriarchate and it has been growing rapidly ever since. Then-President Leonid Kuchma was forced to put us on an equal basis with the Moscow Patriarchate. So, we hope that Viktor Yanukovych, who calls himself President of all Ukraine, will settle this issue by treating all churches equally—not just in words, but in deeds. ■



UW: How about MP followers switching to Kyiv?

– In Poltava Oblast, an entire community decided to switch to the Kyiv Patriarchate but the government is interfering. Local officials faked a court decision, sealed the church, so that the parishioners had to pray outside it on Christmas. There is a similar example in Chernihiv Oblast. It's always the faithful who initiate a switch to the Kyiv Patriarchate.

UW: Can you count on support from the Ecumenical Patriarch?

– We don't lay much hope on the Ecumenical Patriarch because he can't help us. He doesn't have the power to do it. This should be regulated by a law entitling parishes as legal entities to voluntarily choose what church they belong to, while the state only has to enforce the law, not like it does now: if a parish is taken away from us by the Moscow Patriarchate, officials register this within a few days, even under fake documents, at the same time as they do everything they can to prevent a parish from leaving Moscow. The Ecumenical Patriarch could help if he recognized the Kyiv Patriarchate an autocephalous church. Then everyone could come to the independent Ukrainian church, even from the Moscow Patriarchate.

UW: Your Holiness, what do you think of what Metropolitan Volodymyr, Head of UOC MP, said at the recent Council of Bishops in Moscow? He no longer seems to want to be Kirill's puppet and most Ukrainian bishops support this.

– Patriarch Kirill's strategic goal is to deprive the Ukrainian church of the right to be independent and autonomous. That's why he wants the title of Kyiv Patriarch, to have his residence in the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra, and to become a citizen of Ukraine, although dual citizenship is against Ukrainian law. He wants more influence over Ukraine. When the church is independent, he cannot interfere in the life of the UOC MP, bypassing Volodymyr. Kirill has been coming to Ukraine frequently to show that he, the Moscow Patriarch, not Metropolitan Volodymyr, is the boss of the MP Church here. Kirill met with Viktor Yanukovych without Metropolitan Volodymyr, which is against protocol. He arrived and blessed the newly-elected President of Ukraine, even though we should have done this—or at least Volodymyr.

Last summer, when Patriarch Kirill visited Ukraine, he went to Crimea to meet with the President again on his own, without Volodymyr. That's why Volodymyr left Dnipropetrovsk when Kirill arrived there, and returned to Kyiv with most of the bishops following him. And that's what forced Patriarch Kirill to state publicly at Mass in St. Sofia that no one was planning to encroach on the autonomy of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Moscow Patriarchate. Clearly, there is an internal stand-off between Volodymyr and Kirill. Subsequently, Metropolitan Volodymyr spoke at the Council of Bishops in Moscow, where he argued that the independence and autonomy of the Ukrainian church is nothing new for Ukraine: it simply means returning

**RUSSIAN
ORTHODOXY**
12,000
parishioners

Nearly
100
bishops

67
eparchies

**UKRAINIAN
ORTHODOXY**
15,000
parishioners

Over
100
bishops

85
eparchies

to it the rights that were once taken away. This sounds like Volodymyr will continue to defend the independence and autonomy of his church. Kirill will have to back off, because Metropolitan Volodymyr has one ace up his sleeve if the pressure continues: join with Ukrainian Orthodox Church of Kyiv Patriarchate. This is Moscow's greatest fear.

UW: What threat does the promulgation of "Russian World" represent for Ukraine and its Orthodox faithful? Is the ROC's international expansion a reflection of shrinking numbers in Russia?

– "Russkiy Mir" is the same shiny coin that "A bright future with Communism" once was. Patriarch Kirill invented this concept to spur spiritual unification around Moscow first, followed by political and territorial unification. This is essentially reviving the Russian empire. But his objectives are impossible; you can't step into the same river twice. We are living in new times.

The reason for ROC's expansion in Ukraine is obvious. Today, the Kyiv and Moscow Patriarchates combined have more parishes

A BRIEF HISTORY OF UOC KP

June 1990. Local Council in Kyiv announces the revival of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church and the Kyiv Patriarchate and elects Mstyslav Skrypnyk, the Metropolitan of Ukrainian Orthodox Church in USA and Ukrainian Autocephalous Church in the Diaspora, the first Patriarch of Kyiv and All-Rus.

October 28, 1990. Moscow Patriarch Aleksei grants "independent and self-standing" status to the Ukrainian Orthodox Church at St. Sofia and consecrates Filaret, the Metropolitan of Kyiv and All-Rus, as the Primate of Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

November 6, 1990. Patriarch Mstyslav is enthroned at St. Sofia.

November 1-3, 1991. The Council of Ukrainian Orthodox Church chaired by Metropolitan Filaret unanimously decides that the UOC needs autocephalous (autonomous) status.

May 27, 1992. Summoned by the Moscow Patriarchate, the Kharkiv Council illegitimately removes Metropolitan Filaret from his office as Primate of UOC causing a schism in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

June 25-26, 1992. The UOC and Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAOC) unite into a single Ukrainian Orthodox Church of the Kyiv Patriarchate at an All-Ukraine Council. Patriarch Mstyslav becomes the Primate and Metropolitan Filaret is elected his deputy. A year later, Mstyslav dies.

October 22, 1993. Metropolitan Volodymyr Romaniuk is elected the new Patriarch of Kyiv and All-Rus at an All-Ukraine Orthodox Council.

July 18, 1995. "Bloody Tuesday." Police beat up participants in the burial of Patriarch Volodymyr outside St. Sofia after President Kuchma refuses to allow him to be buried on the cathedral grounds.

October 22, 1995. The newly-elected Patriarch Filaret is enthroned.

than the ROC does in all of Russia: 15,000 parishes in Ukraine versus 12,000 parishes in Russia.

Political analysts are already saying that Russia will no longer be a predominantly Christian country in 30 years. Today, Moscow's population is 9mn, but only 31% of it is ethnic Russian. If you add in Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians and other Christians, it's still only 49%, compared to 34% Muslims. But Muslims have significantly higher birth rates, so they will exceed the number of Christians in Moscow severalfold in just a few years. Last Christmas, only around 100,000 faithful attended church in Moscow, while 70,000 Muslims celebrated Kurban Bairam. This bothers both the Kremlin and the Russian Church. That's why they've latched onto Ukraine as their salvation.

UW: Father Ihor Yatsiv, press secretary of the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church, said recently that the government could provoke religious tensions by treating a single Church preferentially. Does this mean "the KP today, and the Catholics tomorrow"?

— That could be their intention. The Moscow Patriarchate and the Vatican are now in conflict over the Ukrainian Greek Catholic Church. That's why Kirill is not meeting with the Pope. The last Patriarch Aleksei did the same. They demand that the Pope settle the issue with Ukrainian Greek Catholics first—which means eliminating them by forcing them into Russian Orthodoxy. So, Moscow actually has two problems: the Kyiv Patriarchate and Ukrainian Catholics.

UW: With the State Committee for Religions disbanded, how does the State coordinate relations with various religions? Is it in dialog with churches other than UOC MP?

— This Committee did indeed help solve interconfessional conflicts. Now, nobody is there to deal with the squabbles that come up from time to time. Parishes are now registered at an institution that deals with all charters, while church affairs have been handed over to the Ministry of Culture. This diversification denigrates the status of churches, but the Church is the soul of the nation. ■

Après Husar, la deluge?

The new head of Ukraine's Greek Catholic Church will have to be a team player

Author:

**Taras Antoshevskiy,
RIS, Religions Information Service**

When I heard for the umpteenth time that His Beatitude Lubomyr Husar was deciding to resign from his post as head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church (UGCC), I barely stopped myself from responding, also for the umpteenth time, "The time isn't right." My worries about the Church concern several aspects, starting with the external situation and the fact that there has been no clear successor lined up to replace Lubomyr Husar. Still, Cardinal Husar himself has made it very clear that he trusts the Synod of Bishops to choose the right person and that external or political circumstances cannot determine the internal life of the Church.

In the 20 years since the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church emerged from the underground, it has gone through a number of phases. The primacy of Patriarch Lubomyr helped the Church to democratize and to rebuild its internal structure. The church has matured as the local Church of its people that cares for more than just religious services. Perhaps this is precisely why His Beatitude Lubomyr is confident of the bishops' choice: whomever they choose, the Church will continue to move in the same direction.

As to external challenges, here there are fewer reasons for optimism. The political and social situation in

Ukraine is already a challenge for any Church as a moral arbiter. So far, the UGCC was an example of the right way to co-exist with a government: when necessary, you work as partners; when necessary, you criticize it, even quite sharply. Immediately, certain speeches of Cardinal Lubomyr come to mind, back in 2002, when he criticized those who were not issuing wages to their employees and in spring 2006, when he took the Verkhovna Rada to task for its activities—then-Speaker Oleksandr Moroz even wrote a letter to Rome complaining about the bishop.

In his last public statement prior to resigning, Cardinal Lubomyr once again criticized the policies of the current Administration towards the country's confessions, focusing not on individuals but on systems and approaches. The day before that, the UGCC had turned down potential handouts from the government because of the strings that might have been attached.

The political goal of weakening the Church's influence among voters was one of the forces behind both a lefebvrist split and the activities of the Dognal sect.¹ The efforts of the latter merit particular attention, as they are being publicly and actively supported by certain of those who favor the "Russkiy mir" [Russian World] from the Russian Orthodox Church [including] one of Education Minister Tabachnyk's aides...

The new primate of the UGCC, whoever he may be, will find it harder to withstand pressure from the government, which seems to have finally understood that unless it can control the spiritual lives of its citizens, it will be difficult to maintain total control over the life of the country and its society.

It is no surprise that attempts to reconstruct an empire have been accompanied by manipulations at the spiritual level, by inventing and imposing civilizational, pseudo-religious formulations that are largely heretical and mythologized. The protest actions of Church dignitaries against the new authoritarianism is a major problem for its inventors. The leadership of the Church among other churches in the last decade has always been at the forefront of building civil society in Ukraine, so no matter who in particular is chosen, this will have to be a team player with a strategic development plan and a vision of its place in society. And this bears no relation to what today's government is building in Ukraine or the ideology of a "Russian World." ■




PHOTO: MAX LEVIN

² The expression can mean both "Russian World" and "Russian Peace," something akin to the historical "Roman Peace."

¹ Started by Czech priest Anthony Elias Dognal in 1970.

Raider of the Lost Patriarchate

PATRIARCH YAKYM
(1621-1690)
In 1685, the Patriarch
subordinated
the Kyiv Metropole
to Moscow

In its campaign against alternative Orthodox Churches, the Moscow Patriarchate's main argument is its own "canonicity" and the "non-canonicity" of all others. Followers of Ukrainian Orthodox churches are understandably skeptical

Author:
**Oleksandr
Kramar**

Last summer, when asked about a possible reconciliation with the Kyiv Patriarchate, Russian Orthodox Patriarch Kirill answered the question saying: "The word 'reconciliation' is not quite right here. Who will reconcile with whom? There are 15 national Orthodox Churches and not one has recognized the schismatic church of Mykhailo Antonovych Denysenko.¹ Reconciliation is only possible if this person comes back to the womb of the Mother Church, conscious of his error and ready to make public penance."

Meanwhile, followers of the Kyiv Patriarchate categorically reject this argument and see themselves as the successors of Kyiv Metropole, which has always been canonically aligned with the Constantinople Patriarchate. Indeed, it was joined to the Moscow Patriarchate in a very strange manner.

THE GHOST OF CANONICITY PAST

It all started back in 1299 with the then-Kyiv Metropolitan Maksym fleeing from "turbulent Kyiv" to the Russian Vladimir-upon-Kliazme. His successor Petro moved to Moscow in 1325, but neither they, nor their successors, were in a rush to drop "Kyiv" from their title, as this would cost them their legitimacy.

One hundred years later, everything changed. On December 15, 1448, the Council of Bishops of what was then Muscovy elected Ri-



azan Bishop Iona Metropolitan with neither the consent nor the blessing of the Constantinople Patriarch. Through sheer inertia, Iona still called himself "of Kyiv," but his successors later dropped it because it reminded them of the connection to Constantinople. At this point, they started calling themselves Moscow Metropolitans. Subsequently, the Moscow Metropole found itself out of the Mother Church and had no official recognition from any other Orthodox Church in the world for 141 years, from 1448 to 1589.

That's when the ROC first began to demonstrate its preference for aggressive, raider-like means towards its ends. Tsar Boris Godunov, then regent of Ivan the Terrible's son, invited Constantinople Patriarch Yeremiy (Jeremiah) II to move to Moscow from Constanti-

nople, which had been seized by the Ottomans. When the native Patriarch arrived for what he thought would be negotiations, Godunov essentially put him under house arrest, demanding that he recognized the then-Moscow Metropolitan Iova, whom no other Orthodox Church had recognized officially. The captive Patriarch was forced to concede. Even so, he granted the Moscow Patriarchate jurisdiction only over Russian dioceses not Ukrainian or Belarus ones. Ironically, the Moscow church gained its autocephaly or autonomy in a manner that was less canonic than the modern-day "schismatic" Kyiv Patriarchate.

Patriarch Iova, like most of his successor, was a typical acolyte of the Russian lay government and his rise was in the times of the infamous Ivan the Terrible (Grozny), who perse-

¹Patriarch Filaret. See interview p. 26.

cuted all clergy who opposed his tyranny and championed the traditions of the Orthodox Church. In 1571, the Tsar ordered Iova transferred to the Russian capital. In 1575, he became the Archimandrite or Senior Abbot of the Tsar's Novospasskiy Monastery, rising to Bishop in six years, and ending up Archbishop and Moscow Metropolitan in 1586.

THE SECOND RAIDER ATTACK

The subjugation of the Kyiv Metropole to the Moscow Patriarchate was even more controversial. Immediately after the Pereyaslav Treaty was signed in 1654, enormous pressure was put on the Ukrainian Orthodox Church to switch to the ROC. Just as with the Hetmans, Moscow used the principle, divide and conquer. First, the Hetmans of Left-Bank Ukraine, who were the Kremlin lackeys and brought to power with the help of the Russian army, refused to recognize Metropolitan Dionysus Balaban, who was elected in 1657. He was replaced by Lazar Baranovych (1659-1661), not without help from the neighboring army. Once it turned out that he was not prepared to act under Moscow's orders, he was replaced by a more compliant Mefodiy Fylymonovych (1661-1668).

The Kremlin considered its ecclesiastic revolution over only after it had acquired sufficient political influence in Ukraine. A series of political coups arranged by Moscow emissaries with the support of the Tsarist Army, which was stationed in Ukraine in the 1660's, brought the tame Hetman Ivan Samoylovych to power in 1672, setting the ground for a final and complete "acquisition" of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

In July 1685, Moscow launched its church coup. An illegitimate, non-representative Synod was summoned to elect the new Metropolitan. The Patriarch of Constantinople never gave his consent to this and most Ukrainian Bishops refused to participate for this reason. Yet, the legitimacy of this Synod did not concern Moscow overly much. The council elected a pre-agreed candidate called Gideon and known as Prince Sviatopolk Chetvertynskiy. Chetvertynskiy had been the matchmaker for Moscow-controlled Hetman Samoylovych, in the secular world. In November 1685, Gideon arrived in Moscow, where Patriarch Yakym consecrated him Patriarch in the presence of Tsars



YOSYP
NELIUBOVYCH-
TUKALSKIY
(1668-1676)
Kyiv

Metropolitan.
Ordered all
churches to stop
mentioning the
Muscovy Tsar as
Head of State.
Exiled Mefodiy
Fylymonovych,
the protégé of
Moscow, to a
monastery in
Uman



GIDEON.
Kyiv
Metropolitan
(1685-1690)
Abdicated
subordination to
Constantinople
and pledged
loyalty to
Moscow



LAZAR
BARANOVYCH
(1616-1693)
Acting head
of the Kyiv
Metropole in
1657, 1659-
1661, and 1670-
1685. Although
Moscow-
oriented,
Baranovych
opposed the full
subordination
of Kyiv to
Moscow.

Ivan and Pyotr. Without a slightest pang of conscience, the Russian Patriarch exempted Gideon of the obligation to be subject to the Constantinople Patriarch.

Meanwhile, Moscow was doing its work in Constantinople, too. Back in December 1684, the Tsar had sent the Patriarch 200 rubles and asked him to hand the Kyiv Metropole to the Moscow Patriarchate. The Patriarch refused. After Gideon was appointed, a new delegation was sent to first talk to Dositheus, the Patriarch of Jerusalem, who declared he would not bless this illegal affair "even for more money." Dionysius, the Patriarch of Constantinople also never recognized the raider seizure of Kyiv Metropole by the Moscow Patriarchate. A legitimate Synod of Ukrainian Bishops, convened with his blessing, refused to recognize Gideon as Metropolitan or the ROC's jurisdiction.

THE BEAT GOES ON...

But Russia's secular and ecclesiastic elites have never considered the attitudes of their subjects as something worth thinking about. The bishops who opposed the church coup faced persecution. As to the Constantinople Patriarch, Moscow ambassadors asked help from... Turkey, where his residence was. They offered peace in return for the Ottomans "persuading" the Ecumenical Patriarch. The Ottomans had control over Dionysius, as with

Yeremiy II in 1589. In May 1686, the Constantinople Patriarch finally officially recognizes the "raider attack" of the Moscow Patriarchate for 400 gold coins and 120 sables. The Bishops of the Constantinople Patriarchate declared Dionysius's actions illegal at a special Synod and dethroned him as Patriarch. Unsurprisingly, when he asked Moscow for help after this, he was told that "giving away the Kyiv Metropole is a trifle not worthy of special thanks."

Once in the ROC, it didn't take the Ukrainian Church long to feel some of the fine traditions of authoritarian Moscow, such as censorship at the Kyiv Pechersk Lavra publishing house from the end of the 17th century. By the time Peter the Great (Pyotr I) came to power, the Ukrainian Church had lost all vestiges of independence. The secrecy of the confessional was regularly violated and the church effectively turned into a branch of the Russian Empire's secret police. It acted as both a ministry for imperialistic propaganda and one of the key instruments for russifying Orthodox peoples conquered by Moscow.

This trend intensified after the ROC replaced the institution of the Patriarch with a Synod in 1721. It was now controlled by the Supreme Prosecutor, the state official known as the Tsar's eyes. The official degradation of the Russian Orthodox Church into a state institution was complete. ■

UKRAINE'S AUTOCEPHALY LOST

Stalin's regime destroys the independence of the Ukrainian Church

In October 1927, the Second All-Ukrainian Orthodox Synod of the UAOC was called to review charges brought by the government against the All-UOC Council, especially Metropolitan Vasyl Lypkivskiy. Even when the charges of counter-revolutionary activities proved groundless, communist officials insisted that the Metropolitan be removed from running the Church. Administrative pressure forced the Synod to replace Vasyl Lypkivskiy with Mykola Boretskiy as Metropolitan. In 1929, arrests started as part of the Ukraine Liberation Assembly case, which involved individuals from the UAOC. In January 1930, most likely on orders from the NKVD, the Third All-Ukrainian Orthodox Synod was convened to "voluntarily" dissolve the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. It became one of the first victims of administrative command system.

BULGARIAN BRAVERY

On May 11, 1872, Bulgarian bishops of the Constantinople Patriarchate unilaterally declared their Church an autocephaly. The Constantinople Patriarchate and other Orthodox Churches rejected this move as schismatic and the Constantinople Patriarch did not actually recognize the Bulgarian Orthodox Church as independent until 1945. In fact, the ROC was the only Church to support this initiative of the Bulgarians and its Synod wrote a letter to the Ecumenical Patriarch saying, "What the ecclesiastic leaders did not wish to give Bulgarians in goodwill, the secular government did... Those without prejudice must agree that excommunicating Bulgarians from the Church and declaring them schismatic over such a minor disagreement would be unfair."

STRANGERS in Their Own Land

Ukraine's FM frequencies offer little—except third-rate foreign and soviet-era pop, sprinkled with a bit of classic rock

Author:
Oleksandr
Yevtushenko

A recent bill passed by the Verkhovna Rada to amend Ukraine's broadcasting law drops the requirement that domestic radio broadcast at least 50% music by Ukrainian composers or performers. The bill's sponsor, PR Deputy Olena Bondarenko used the European Convention on Television without Frontiers, which requires radio stations to play a lion's share of European music, as her reference point. She also argued that there are too few works by Ukrainians to set quotas on them.

In fact, Ms. Bondarenko is quite wrong in this. The problem is not a dearth of Ukrainian musical product, as the PR deputy seems to think, but the peculiarity of Ukrainian network radio, which mostly ignores domestic products and lives by its own strange rules. For instance, Ukraine hardly has any stations that

play the best in world music. Instead, there are dozens of FM stations with identical content desperately vying for the attention of listeners by chasing after the hottest hits from pop conveyor belt. The most coveted conveyor is Moscow's, with its predictably low—often below-the-baseboard low—quality of lyrics and music.


Radio stations that play classical music have no chance to become popular and sought-after among Ukrainian FM frequencies. Jazz and rock stations are successful elsewhere, where they have grateful listeners and happy advertisers. So far, just a few local FM stations that promote so-called "cultured chanson" fill the ranks of popular and "listenable," but their "Ukrainianness" is limited to their address. The most influential ones include network radio stations

like *Russkoye Radio*, that have proved their worth in the vast airwaves of Russia.

Today, Ukraine's airwaves are packed with product that in no way reflects Ukrainian mentality, identity or natural cultural needs. Indeed, the most infamous radio stations are beyond the law, violating all civilized norms. But that's no wonder, as getting around the restrictions of the National Radio and Television Council is a piece of cake.

THE ALMIGHTY FORMAT

"The key requirement for proper development is unconditional control over the country's media space and clear rules for the media owners," says Kyrylo Stetsenko, a community and artistic activist, teacher and well-known musician. "But these are mostly non-Ukrainians. They see this country as a territory for promoting their product. The



game is to not let Ukrainian product get to market or to do so under discriminatory conditions. This is why Russian pop culture dominates in Ukraine. If Ukrainians continue to be passive and the government does nothing to protect its domestic producer, there is a real threat that Ukrainian music will be completely eliminated from the market."

Today, Ukraine has several hundred FM stations, including some 40 in Kyiv alone. They are not aiming to be the "drivers of cultural progress," nor are they dedicated to discovering and promoting new bright talents. They are music boxes of sorts that are busy playing tug-o-war with the coverlet of Ukrainian advertising. Radio coverage is actually much smaller than TV advertising in Ukraine, so the first objective of any station is to get the best piece. And this determines the repertoire selection, centered on Mr. Format. The widespread belief is that sticking rigidly to a fixed music format brings both the listeners and the ads.

All this seems reasonable. But there is another side to this. Serving stereotypes makes radio stations depressingly monotonous, but the biggest drawback is total cosmopolitanism. It only becomes clear that a radio station is in Kyiv, not Tambov, from the news or advertising aired in Ukrainian—and not even always then. And only because the National Council for Television and Radio requires it.

LOST AIRWAVES

"I hardly listen to any Ukrainian stations," says Serhiy Kharchuk, Director of the Slavske Rock festival. "I always have a pile of new Ukrainian CDs in my car. That's what I listen to, because I can't hear what I like on our radio stations. Why should I, the citizen of Ukraine, be deprived of my right to listen to Ukrainian music?" Kharchuk defends his right by organizing music festivals and issu-

ing CDs of festival participants. Fortunately, there are many more like him. They all look for alternatives to just pressing the radio button.

What about Ukrainian musicians? There have been a few large rallies to gather signatures in open letters to the President, the Government and the NRTC regarding the pathetic situation in broadcasting. Everyone signed and protested. Many a spear was broken during talk-show debates. And what has that changed? Virtually nothing. Ukrainian songs were air-wave Cinderellas, and they still are. FM content directors keep spreading the myth about the lack of quality Ukrainian music. Yet, every month, Ukrainian labels issue dozens of CDs in a range of musical styles. The catalog of Nash Format (Our Format), an art agency that collects all newly-issued products, includes 1,500 audio and video items. How much more is needed? It seems that Ukraine simply failed to protect its media space in time.

"We've failed to build our own media database, not state, not private ones," says Roman Kalmuk, Director at FDR Radiocenter, a company that develops and distributes media products. "This is why there's such a huge imbalance between Ukrainian and foreign products." Seven years ago, Kalmuk was content director at the Stolytsia radio station. It was then the only station centered on high quality Ukrainian and Western alternative music. But one day, the owners decided to change its format in pursuit of richer pickings. Now, it is one of many run-of-the mill pop stations. The same thing happened to L'viv's Lux FM.

Kyiv-based Molode Radio plays only Ukrainian music. It was launched two years ago as a broadcast station but changed into one of the first online radio stations in Ukraine. "In developed countries, radio stations are very active on

OPINION

MUSICIANS AND MANAGERS ON THE DROPPING OF THE 50% UKRAINIAN QUOTA

Oleh Hnativ,
director, Perkalaba



— Dropping the quota is an obviously hostile move by fifth columnists in Ukraine to destroy an entire segment of Ukrainian culture. What else is new? It actually changes nothing, because Ukraine doesn't have any Ukrainian-language FM media. In Poland, the top radio stations, unlike Ukrainian ones, have perfectly balanced pro-European sources of information without being discriminatory about music.

Stanislav Shumlianskiy,
director, Molode Radio



— What consequences can this possibly have for an audience that hardly heard any Ukrainian music before and will have no broader access to it after? The problem is that, despite a number of attempts to set up at least one completely Ukrainian radio station, we still have none. Everyone agrees that modern Ukrainian music is out there and is growing as a real phenomenon. But there is not one station for it, just like before. Dropping the Ukrainian content quota could bother some young artists, the beginners. But it won't affect the well-known bands like Okean Elzy or Skriabin.

Maria Burmaka,
folk rock singer



— Ukrainian artists have found themselves in this idiotic situation for quite some time now. I mean the humiliating practice among radio and TV channels of broadcasting Ukrainian content late at night, as though we are a non-format in our own country. I'm not worried too much if they play my songs more or less. What bothers me is that passing this bill opens up a Pandora box. So far, all these attacks on the Ukrainian language, history, literature and music have had their limits. Today, we are looking at a situation where the Ukrainian music that was not on the airwaves *de facto* yesterday will now disappear *de jure*.

the internet these days," says Stas Shumlianskiy, Molode Radio's director. "So far, it's an innovation for Ukraine, but I'm sure we have a future."

The battle of formats and of totally commercialized media in tandem with a completely sterile cultural component reflects the lack of proper media policy and a strategy for developing the arts. ■

RUSSIFYING THE AIRWAVES

In the fall of 2010, the NRTC re-registered licenses for state-owned TRO Dovira (Avtoradio¹) and TRK NBM Radio (Radio 5 and Retro FM) TRK Ltd., because of changes in their content policies. These two companies asked the Council to cut their Ukrainian-language quota from 100% down to "at least 75%." Yet hosting their programs in Ukrainian was one of the condi-

tions of the tender under which these companies won their licenses.

The content director of Avtoradio explained that his company had polled its listeners. "Our network is predominantly in the eastern, Russian-speaking regions and our audience is grown-ups who were raised in the Soviet Union... They expect to hear Russian-speaking presenters and a lot of music."

Retro FM Editor-in-Chief used similar arguments, mentioning a regional poll as the basis for stating that 75% of his audience wants to hear more Russian. "Our core audience, people aged 35-50, grew up in soviet times, speaking Russian."

Prior to this, Europe Plus and Nashe Radio cut their Ukrainian-language quotas to 75%, too.

¹ Avtoradio is actually predominantly Russian-language, including its presenters.

Ukrainians vs Telev

Reason I: Online takes the field

Watch a movie or a TV serial without commercials anytime you want—what a deal! Most internet users in Ukraine today can afford to download a good-sized video. But it's not just about technology. The internet is gradually but steadily undermining television's monopoly, both in entertainment and information. No comedy show can compete with YouTube and no reality show can beat social networks. On the internet, you don't need to wait for the 7 o'clock news: it's available online in real time, 24/7. US statistics look pretty persuasive: according to Forbes, the average American spent over 12 hours per week with a remote and no more than 9 hours on the internet in 2005, by 2010, things changed dramatically in favor of online. Now, it's over 13 hours on the internet and slightly less in front of the TV.

Reason II: Reductio ad absurdum

From time to time, something reasonable or at least informative shows up on TV in between pop junk and political barking. At least, the previews would have you think so. But when you start watching a program like that, first you patiently sit through an introduction made up of facts you know from grammar school. Then you listen to experts and hear nothing but trivial and routine stuff. After that, you watch several dubious scenarios, and finally the credits come on. It takes some viewers years to realize that they can't expect anything intelligent from TV. TV marketing specialists are oriented on ratings and mass audiences because this guarantees revenues. No wonder the silver screen is filled with primitive, criminal and pseudo emotional programming. If the viewer is not prepared to swallow sensational claims about hangover-free vodka, magicians with extrasensory powers, or vignettes from the lives of pop stars, sooner or later any interest in television will disappear.

Reason III: Colonization

Russian expansionism is affecting virtually all areas of the lives of Ukrainians these days, but nowhere so strongly as on TV. In Ukrainian-speaking families, even five-year olds have been known to stymie their parents with: "Why is everything in Russian on TV?" Yes, indeed, Russian teleproduct has completely dominated the Ukrainian airwaves, to the point that, one national TV channel aired blatantly anti-Ukrainian trash, like "Мы из будущего 2" [We're From the Future 2], on the anniversary of the Holodomor or Great Famine of 1932-33. Ukrainian TV producers are proud of their expanding product. But most shows have more than a whiff of inferiority complex and colonial obeisance. Just watch any talent show: they all have at least one guest star from Russia on the jury. "The Russian movies and serials that flood our TVs have nothing but primitive plots, mediocre actors and mostly copycat versions of some Western hit," says Natalia Zaika, Communications Expert at Kyiv School of Economy. "On top of that is ongoing propaganda about the 'great and powerful' Russia. Russian pop concerts and shows are impossible to watch. The same people singing or talking the same lines over and over again. Comedy shows such as ProjectorParisHilton or Comedy Club often jeer at Ukraine. I don't think shows like this are worth airing at all, so I don't watch TV."



vision

Quitting the “boob tube” is becoming more and more justified for Ukrainians. Their reasons are many

Author: Dmytro Krapyvenko

Reason IV: The time factor

Big city viewers lose an hour or two traveling for an average 8-hour workday, leaving very little personal time at the end of the day—possibly 4-5 hours in the evening. According to GfK Ukraine, a sociological service, people spend 3:54 on TV in cities with a population over 50,000, while those who live in smaller towns spend 4:08 in front of their TVs. “I don’t have time for TV,” says Bohdan Loghvyenko, one Ukrainian blogger. “I’m surprised every time someone says something about Shuster Live! or some other nonsense like that! I don’t understand how the feuds of a bunch of bureaucrats with a limited vocabulary and even more limited subject range can be of interest to anyone.”

Reason V: A form of protest

People—mostly young ones—who want to stand out from the mass tend to do strange things. Some join the child-free movement, freeganism (an extreme movement based on the principle of eating only food from trash cans), or other exotic trends. Public abjuration of television looks like another such exoticism, one that is growing into a protest, a kind of non-conformism and a rejection of social stereotypes. But it’s not such absurd protest as it may look at first sight. As soon as censorship begins in the country, TV is the first to fall victim to it. When Leonid Kuchma was President, some opposition newspapers continued to publish, but criticizing him from the big screen was unthinkable. Censorship is rearing its ugly head again these days: the trend towards “guided” news on the majors, such as Inter, is obvious, as is the canceling of frequencies for the channels critical of the government. Some protest quietly and simply by not touching the remote. More aggressive activists can even organize performances about “Killing the TV inside yourself” or “Live, don’t just watch” with a climactic ending of old boob-tubes being smashed in public.

Reason VI: Sleeping with the spiritual enemy

Religious beliefs also make some people quit television. Most world religions don’t have outright restrictions concerning TV, although priests often exhort their faithful to spend less time watching TV. “Idols, celebrities, TV stars—these are all antipodes of Christian values,” says Roman Kulchytyskiy, a translator who considers himself an Orthodox Christian. “The viewer is introduced into the world of the 25th member of Singing Underwear.* TV raises a mediocre mass that dreams, not of salvation, but of big money and a pass to the world of the pop elite. For kids, television becomes the teacher of life wisdoms and robs parents of dialog with their offspring. The bright wrappings of TV values win the fight for family values, either directly or subconsciously.”

* an ironic pop band in Ukraine



Reason VII: Entertainment for the unhappy

Recently, Maryland University researchers published the conclusions of their 30-year study in the Social Indicators Research journal: people who feel unhappy spend the most time in front of their TVs, whereas socially active people who generally feel happy find time for sports, books and community activity. Miserable people don't look to be engaged, so they spend 20% more time in front of their TVs.

Yet those who sacrifice all their free time to the god of TV get little satisfaction from it. They watch TV because they can't come up with an alternative. The Maryland scholars interpreted this as an addiction, similar to drug addiction. It gives temporary satisfaction that fills excess time and the resulting feeling of discontent.

For Ukrainians, TV is also the companion of unhappiness. According to GfK Ukraine, TV watching grew 7.2% over the first five months of 2009. This period coincided with the heat of the financial crisis, falling incomes and rising unemployment.

Is there life after TV?

Ukrainian Week talked to artists about why they reject Ukrainian TV



"It stultifies viewers!"

Vasyl Herasymyuk, poet

I don't watch TV. I don't even have one at home. Sometimes I watch "The Arts" online or Channel 5, and one or two programs on UT1. That's it. For starters, our Ukrainian television isn't Ukrainian. And all these endless talk shows—who can stand them? They stultify the audience! There is nothing worth watching. Our Arts channel is broadcast on cable and it's one of the most popular channels in Poland! Croatia has two similar channels. I watch Polish Arts and always wonder how powerful and fantastic this channel is. Unlike them, Ukrainian television has the worst quality of all. When 1+1 started, it was at least dubbing good films in good language while Stanislav Chernilevskiy, the poet, worked there. Now it plays the same pop junk as every other channel. Movies are impossible to watch, no art programs at all, endless serials. My rejection of television is profound and pessimistic.



"This technology is stuck in the last century."

Oleksandr Yarmola, leader of Haidamaky

Personally, I haven't had a TV for five or six years now. I quit when I changed apartments last time. I just threw it away and never bought a new one. I had a used German TV set which I bought abroad in the early 1990's. But it wouldn't break, so I threw it out myself. This technology is stuck in the 20th century. All our band members have quit television: some threw their TVs away when they moved; others just never turn it on. We don't even know what they show there. When we come to do an interview, we're sometimes shocked by what we see in the studio. The internet is a much freer source of information. Only Ukrainians need to speak English, too, not just Ukrainian and Russian. It gives access to more information. The more information you absorb yourself, the better you can select objective facts using reason.



"TV eats our kids' brains with a spoon."

Oles' Sanin, filmmaker

It's been a year since I stopped watching TV. I have three sets at home but I use them as monitors. They aren't connected to cable. If a nuclear war starts tomorrow, I can read that online. And I haven't been interested in any programs for a while now. I download films and educational programs for my kids from the internet. The TV eats their brains with a big spoon and they'd rather read books. Quitting TV is easier than quitting smoking. It's a psychological addiction. It's like another family member who takes your life away. What for? I have a lot of friends who have pulled the plug. When they ask me "Have you seen this," I say "No," and that's the end of that. We easily find other topics to talk about. We live in a fantastic land of pirates. So far, we have access to everything, so there's no problem with that. My friends, directors who make TV programs and commercials, just don't have time for TV. But I don't think this has made them any worse as professionals!



"Watching TV just kills me."

Misko Barbará, leader, Merviy Piven (Dead Cock), actor at Arabesky Theater

I'm one of those snobs who can't stand to watch Ukrainian TV. Luckily, I can watch the History Channel, Animal Planet or BBC on cable. Oh, and tons of films. Sometimes, I go back to watching news on Channel 5, but it's just when I channel-hop. I quit Ukrainian TV because I can't stand it. Watching it just kills me. Everything gets on my nerves: it's totally unprofessional and corrupt and it's all lies. It brings nasty words to mind! Society doesn't have to be addicted to TV. Clearly, its stultifying effect is very powerful. And more and more people share my opinion. Young people don't watch it and they're absolutely right. More and more older people are turning off their TVs, too. Of course, this habit is a hangover from soviet times when everybody watched the 9 o'clock news to a man. Now we at least have some choice. There are channels where you come across an interesting idea from time to time.



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