

international monthly edition

The Ukrainian Week

№ 11 (23) DECEMBER 2011

NO MORE OPPOSITION IN UKRAINE



The
Economist

Featuring selected content
from The Economist

WWW.UKRAINIANWEEK.COM

FOR FREE DISTRIBUTION

THREE UNIQUE EVENINGS TO WELCOME IN THE NEW YEAR



The last night of the year is the perfect excuse to let your hair down and enjoy the company of friends and loved ones. Whether watching firework displays champagne-in-hand from our rooftop terrace at b-hush, celebrating with friends at Olivera with its life-loving Italian atmosphere, complete with Mediterranean buffet, or treating the family to an exquisite 5-course dinner in Comme il Faut, you will find that InterContinental Kyiv has the perfect evening already planned to suit your taste on this most special night of the year.



To reserve a table please call: +38 050 351 5527,
9 a.m. - 6 p.m. (Yevgeniya) or by email:
ICK_newyear_2012@ihg.com



INTERCONTINENTAL®
KYIV

In over 170 location across the globe including HONG KONG • LONDON • NEW YORK • PARIS

BRIEFING

The Government Breaks Bad: Erasing the Orange Revolution from history



4

FOCUS

The Triumph of Subordination
By voting for legitimization of the regime's polling rules, the opposition laid the groundwork for its own demise



6

POLITICS

Yulia Tymoshenko: A detailed history of defeat



10

NEIGHBOURS

The Chief and His Tribe: How the Donbas social background affects reshuffling of government ranks

14



Yanukovych Won't Stay Long: Boris Nemtsov talks about Yulia Tymoshenko's case and the mistakes of Russian democrats

16

ECONOMICS

Crisis of Vision: Top government officials admit public administration is ineffective in Ukraine

19

Till the Cows Come Home: Tough political reality could shatter Ukraine's handsome economic deals within the CIS



20

INVESTIGATION

Window Dressing in Kyiv: As it prepares for Euro 2012, the government wastes billions to build Potemkin villages



24



The Engorgers of Billions: Soaring costs and still too few hotels in Donetsk

26



The Sky Over Kharkiv: Kharkiv's headache with airport construction, opaque tenders and corruption

27

The Mysteries of Lviv: How tons of cash allocated for its preparations for the championship are (mis)appropriated



28

Police vs Football Fans: Why the police raid football ultras



29

SOCIETY



What the Young Have to Say: Students from Central and Eastern Europe meet in Kyiv

32



Andreas Kappeler talks about the concept of Europe and ways to forge European identity

34

CULTURE & ARTS

While My Violin Gently Weeps
Why Ukrainian classical music is still underground outside the country

38



HISTORY

Perfect Harmony on Paper: Artist Pavlo Makov decodes artistic images, symbols and concepts



42

NAVIGATOR

In Pursuit of Beer: Ukraine's most popular folk rock band's map of breweries that produce unpasteurized beer



44

The Ukrainian Week

The Ukrainian Week № 11 (23) December 2011
Founder: ECEM Media Ukraine LLC **Publisher:** The Ukrainian Week LLC
First published in January 2010
State registration certificate 16412-4884P of March 13, 2010
Bohdan Andriytssev, Director, ECEM Media Ukraine LLC
Roman Tsupryk, Chairman of the Editorial Board
Serhiy Lytvynenko, Editor-in-Chief, The Ukrainian Week
Natalia Romanec, Editor; Anna Korbut, Translator

Mailing address: PO Box 2, Kyiv, 03067
Publisher address: vul. Mashynobudivna 37, Kyiv 03067 Ukraine
E-mail: office@tyzhden.ua, **Tel.:** (044) 351-1300
www.ukrainianweek.com
Print: TOV SKIMP, TOV ART STUDIYA DRUKU; vul. Boryspilska 15, Kyiv
Ordering number: 851-11. Print run: 15,000
Sent to print on November 25, 2011
Free distribution

2 November

President fires the governors of Lviv and Zaporizhzhia

**3 November**

Yet another wave of protests stirs in Kyiv and several oblast centers including clashes with police in front of parliament

14 November

Chornobyl liquidators and victims take over the premises of the Pension Fund in Donetsk and go on hunger strike



QUOTES

MYKOLA AZAROV
makes teachers laugh

The Premier states that teachers' salaries were raised five times in 2011 at the recent congress of teachers, causing the audience to roar with laughter


OLEKSANDR KLYMENKO
heads the Tax Administration

The 31-year old comes from Donetsk. He has been in the Tax Administration since 2005. In his career, Mr. Klymenko largely focused on inspecting unearned income


VIKTOR YANUKOVYCH
is ready to take a break

The President is ready to "take a break from European integration right now." Optimistically, he says that similar breaks have happened before, too


ANATOLIY HRYTSENKO
in opposition to the opposition

His Civic Position party leaves the Committee of Resistance to Dictatorship to protest against the opposition's voting in favour of the Law On Parliamentary Elections



The Government B



Orange Revolution did not teach anyone anything. Not only does the Government turn a blind eye to people, but also demonstratively ignores the public and the law. Some NGOs had planned public events in Kyiv on 22 November to celebrate the seventh anniversary of the Orange Revolution. In accordance with the Constitution, they had duly notified the Kyiv City State Administration in advance. The latter

appealed to the court for a ban on any public events on that day. The appeal was far from being democratic, but technically legitimate. The court satisfies the demand, which it has the right to do under the letter of the law. The police and State Guard Department thought that public events on the Day of Liberty, as the anniversary is commonly referred to, would fuel clashes. Why would they, though? Moreover, the rallies at Maidan could get in

The month in history
4 November 1861

The first train arrives in Lviv from Vienna, heralding the beginning of the history of the Ukrainian railway

6 November 1951

The first Ukrainian television studio opens at 26 Khreshchatyk St., but Ukrainian television quickly becomes marginalized

9 November 1976

Ukrainian NGO to support commitment to the Helsinki Accords is established in Kyiv

15 November

17 November

22 November



All Euro 2012 finalists are determined. The group stage draw is scheduled for 2 December



The Verkhovna Rada passes the new Law On Parliamentary Elections. Most opposition members support the government's initiative



The Day of Freedom: the government uses all means possible to hamper any events for the celebration of the anniversary of the Orange Revolution

Breaks Bad



the way of the cortege of Dalia Grybauskaitė, the Lithuanian President, during her visit to Kyiv on the same day. The authorities brought in several hundred Berkut officers, internal soldiers and, according to various estimates, nearly 100 undercover plainclothes police officers to Independence Square. This was also perfectly legitimate, after all, the police was enforcing the court ruling. Surprisingly, though, the infamous

Party of Regions' Oleh Kalashnikov turned up at Maidan in the afternoon with his gang, officially known as The Joint Military Union, and held a full-scale rally. Brave Berkut, the troops and undercover officers suddenly suffered a memory loss as to why there were there in the first place: they just stood there and did not lift a finger to ensure that the court ruling was complied with. Quite on the contrary, they encircled Kalashnikov's group to protect it from the orange supporters. This travesty of justice arranged by the government on 22 November was painfully absurd. A crime makes sense in cases where millions are at stake. But what was the point of Kalashnikov's rally and the government's blatant neglect of law on the Day of Liberty? Would this add the 10% to the Party of Regions' popularity that it needs to win the upcoming parliamentary election? Quite the opposite, all Kalashnikov did was to humiliate the government and especially the Party of Regions.

This is showing a curious trend, though. The government does something equally stupid and illegal on quite a regular basis. To this day, Mr. Tabacnyk has not faced any punishment for his anti-Ukrainian statements, nor has Mr. Mohyliov for his anti-Tatar ones. On 9 May, just like on 22 November, provocateurs were delivered to the Honor Monument in Lviv with Victory flags despite the court's ban on any public events on that day. The police protected the buses. On Independence Day, the police violated the court's decision by preventing the public from marching across Volodymyrska Street in Kyiv.

The government can be democratic or not. It can be authoritarian or liberal. It can do what it wants and make unpopular decisions. There is just one thing it cannot do: break the law. A government that does not honor the law puts its own legitimacy in question. Yanukovich&Co have offered the public a dangerous game without rules. Today, they can ignore the law, while tomorrow, the law can become a superfluous formality for every citizen.

Andriy Skumin

NUMBERS

The Government is going to spend

UAH 4.95mn

to examine how efficiently public funds were spent over 2008-2009 when Yulia Tymoshenko was Premier

The upgrade of public utilities in Ukraine will cost

UAH 700bn,

estimates Anatoliy Blyzniuk, the Minister of Regional Construction

60%

of all public procurements in 2010 and the first six months of 2011 bypass tenders, says Audit Chamber

The Verkhovna Rada passes a law allowing goods worth up to

EUR 1,000

to be brought into the country duty free

As of 11 November, gas debt incurred by public heating companies constitutes

UAH 3.98bn,

reports SC Gas of Ukraine

According to the Center for the Survey of Judges, only

9.3%

of Ukrainian judges believe that the public trusts them

30%

of Ukrainians are afraid of the police and 57% do not approve of its actions, shows a survey by the Razumkov Center

15 November 1939

17 November 1994

22 November 1801

1 December 1991



The Ukrainian SSR Supreme Council passes a law to annex Western Ukraine to the Ukrainian SSR at the 3rd extraordinary session



The Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine cancels the Declaration of Crimean Sovereignty



Vladimir Dal, Russian lexicographer, folklore expert, Turkologist and writer, is born in Luhansk

92% of Ukrainians vote for independence in the referendum

The Triumph of Subordination

By voting for legitimization of the regime's polling rules, the opposition laid the groundwork for its own demise

Authors:
Andriy Duda,
Roostyslav Pavlenko

On November 17, 2011, Ukraine's Election of National Deputies law was passed. Both the ruling factions as well as the opposition voted for it, including 62 MPs from Yulia Tymoshenko's Bloc (ByuT) and 32 MPs from the Our Ukraine – People's Self-Defense bloc (NU–NS). Having achieved its goal, the regime is satisfied. The opposition was able to bargain for some procedural improvements, but in practice these will be of little help to them.

THE MYTH OF VICTORY

Despite assurances by opposition members that the passing of this law involved consensus and compromise, there are good reasons to believe that the regime has won an outright victory in the fight for election rules. The text of the bill was handed out to MPs right before the vote, which was finished in record time—less than an hour—leaving virtually no time to analyze the final version. Thus, given our parliament's long-lasting traditions, we can ascertain that a political choice was made behind the scenes by certain opposition members following negotiations with top government officials.

The gains from this decision were distributed accordingly. Of course, the ruling regime got the lion's share. The law preserves chief provisions upon which they will rely in achieving a majority in the next parliament. First of all,

this means winning half of the parliamentary seats in by simple plurality vote for specific candidates, enabling loyal people to be elected by means of administrative and financial resources—a situation analogous to the 2002 parliamentary election and 2010 local elections. It's no wonder the Venice Commission insisted that under current conditions, Ukraine's mixed system jeopardizes election fairness.

Secondly, despite the campaign promises of virtually every major party, the revised law retains the use of so-called closed candidate lists, i.e. those formed by political leaders. This means that seats will



QUOTE OF THE WEEK:

"We are witnessing the death of the old opposition"

Viktor Nebozhenko, director, Ukrainian Barometer social research service

continue to be sold. Those who buy such tickets to parliament will feel free from any obligations to their "own" party. Thus, the next convocation of the Verkhovna Rada will see more faction defections.

Raising the election threshold in addition to banning blocs would not merely curb the number of political forces that can be elected to Parliament. The higher the threshold, the more seats can be distributed as bonuses among the parties that successfully get past. This is just another reason that the November 17 vote for the election law is being labeled "a conspiracy against small parties."

Finally, the regime has won an important moral victory. The new election law, approved by 366 MPs, does not appear to have been imposed by the majority. In fact, by supporting it, the opposition legitimized in advance both this document and the violations it allows. Thus, Europe's future claims concerning foul play in campaigning and elections will be voided by an iron argument: the opposition itself supported this election legislation. This is exactly why its active participation in the vote was needed. The majority alone would have had the minimum 226 votes necessary to pass the law, but its legitimacy would have been less certain without minority support.

Ultimately, the "barriers against violations" supposedly included in the law by the opposition will be easily evaded. Even though the procedure for forming election committees has changed, the Party of Regions can easily secure a loyal majority in the committees by reanimating various puppet political projects. After all, representatives of Batkivshchyna, NU-NS, and other opposition forces are very likely to change their political orientation once they are appointed to the committees. The arsenal of coercion is well-known – administrative resources, graft, and intimidation. All this will effectively whittle down the "democratic amendments" to the election law.

What's the use of the parties' right to revoke defecting

members of an election committee? This doesn't happen automatically: the party has to appeal to the relevant committee to recall its representative. Yet at any stage of the election process, a higher level committee has the right to supersede a lower one. Thus, the Central Election Committee (CEC) can act on behalf of a district committee, while a district committee can supersede a local committee. This means that higher-level committees can delay decisions concerning replacement of election committee members following an appeal by an opposition party.

And what about the medical certificates required in order to vote from home? Medical institutions are totally subordinate to state and local governments, making the procurement of limitless certificates as easy as pie.

Thus, the 2010 local elections, based on the same model, demonstrated that the combination of legislative preference for the re-

gime, coercion, and result rigging will lead to a disproportionate presence of pro-regime forces in the parliament.

THE OPPOSITION'S USUAL PROBLEMS

Given these obvious issues, why then did some opposition forces (namely, BYuT, paralyzed after Yulia Tymoshenko's incarceration, and Arseniy Yatseniuk's Front for Change) agree to such collaboration? The answer partly lies in the "big parties vs. little parties" conspiracy.

However, many of the opposition MPs and faction leaders are veteran politicians. This "conspiracy" appears too inadequate a deal for them to collaborate with the regime. Thus what remains is a kind of private agreement between Tymoshenko's bloc, the Front for Change and the regime. Illustrative in this respect are reports of lively consultations on the bill held by





Double Coffee®
brewed properly.



Party Time
15% discount for all alcoholic cocktails
From 21:00 to 07:00

Kyiv, vul. Mykhailivska 6 (+38044) 206-6913	Kyiv, vul. Konstantynivska 6 (+38044) 206-6911
Kyiv, vul. B. Khmelnytskoho 42 (+38044) 234-6978	Kyiv, Moskovskiy Prospect 34 A BlockBuster Entertainment Center (+38044) 499-8343

Vice-Premier Andriy Kliuyev. More details concerning these arrangements will become evident in the near future: as the state turns a blind eye to the activities of certain companies associated with the BYuT and Front for Change; as these political forces launch their campaigns in territories which will serve as a springboard to the Verkhovna Rada; or as active negotiations resume between various groups in the government and opposition (for example, between Rinat Akhmetov and Yatseniuk, as the media have reported).

By taking part in such arrangements to secure personal benefits, opposition leaders have effectively agreed to a secondary, subordinate role and risk suffering a strategic defeat. Such subordination, the perhaps unconscious need for a senior partner who is at once a target for criticism but also a source of benefits in exchange for certain services, has long plagued our opposition. The developments of recent years have somewhat obscured certain servile moves by the Our Ukraine party, a faction of which is now attracted to Yatseniuk's party. For instance, Our Ukraine voted for Yanukovich's government program in April 2003, giving then prime minister Yanukovich an additional 335 votes and allowing him to claim the support of a "constitutional majority" and ignore the opposition's demands for legislative support. Another more vivid example is the vote that led to the privatization of the UkrRudProm mining association in April 2004. Only Our Ukraine's support allowed that decision to get the necessary 226 votes. As a result, metallurgy was monopolized by several oligarchs who now sponsor the Party of Regions, among them Akhmetov.

Tymoshenko's bloc is also given to backstage deals. Before her incarceration, Tymoshenko always pursued her own policies and at least did not allow her faction to be used as a pawn. Without its leader, however, the BYuT can become a source of votes for the regime's dubious initiatives, in exchange for favors for other leaders who are still free. In this context, the imprisonment of the former prime minister, despite protests from the West, gains a


BY CONSENTING TO ALTER THE ELECTION SYSTEM, THE OPPOSITION SURRENDERED THE ELECTIONS

An unwanted victory

Expected voting results for the closed lists, according to current rules: 450 MPs are elected from party lists, with a 3% election threshold ("None of the above" option allowed). The calculation is based on the following data*: approximate number of voters – 36.57 m) expected turnout – 65% (23.77 m) number of invalid ballot papers – 1.7% (404,000)

Level of support, %** (among those who intend to take part in the election)

Expected number of seats, party lists



cynical but viable practical explanation.

DO YOUR BEST

Thanks to this new legislation, it is now virtually impossible to prevent mass election rigging. But this does not mean that the opposition has to resort to its favorite pastimes of infighting and bemoaning lost opportunities. Recent statements indicate that a fraction of the opposition will never collaborate with the regime. Thus, there is a force that should ensure maximum transparency of the election process. Or, to put it more precisely, reduce violations to a minimum and carefully record episodes of fraud. Such records can provide support for well-grounded conclusions about the illegitimacy of elections – if the opposition is even motivated enough to defend the actual will of voters.


Here, the crucial issue is the formation of electoral committees. A true opposition should coordinate its effort to man committees (on both district and local levels) with competent, experienced individuals with good reputations and aversions to bribery and rigging. Such people are far more effective than so-called "experts in electoral procedures." It is already high time to start registering and training the people who will be delegated to election committees. It would be sensible to create a special coordination center for this among true opposition forces.

Such a center could also train and coordinate the activities of observers and other individuals who have the right to be present at election committee sessions and polling stations, such as candidate MPs, their proxies, authorized party representatives, and journalists. The next key issue for the

THE TRIUMPH OF THE MAJORITY

The party list-based election puts the regime in the minority, but it bridges the gap in the constituencies

Expected results of the vote by party list according to the new rules: 225 MPs are elected from party lists, while another 225 come from majority party constituencies, with a 5% election threshold. Blocs are excluded from the election, the "none of the above" option is not available.



Expected number of seats in single-member constituencies likely to be gained by the Party of Regions
(The Ukrainian Week's expert assessment)

	Total number of constituencies	Number of constituencies where Party of Regions candidates are likely to win
The Autonomous Republic of Crimea	8	8
Vinnitsia oblast	11	7
Volyn oblast	7	2
Dnipropetrovsk oblast	12	10
Donetsk oblast	17	17
Zhytomyr oblast	10	7
Zakarpattia oblast	5	4
Zaporizhia oblast	8	7
Ivano-Frankivsk oblast	7	1
Kyiv oblast	9	6
Kirovohrad oblast	7	7
Luhansk oblast	10	10
Lviv oblast	14	3
Mykolaiv oblast	6	6
Odesa oblast	10	10
Poltava oblast	9	7
Rivne oblast	7	2
Sumy oblast	7	6
Ternopil oblast	8	2
Kharkiv oblast	11	11
Kherson oblast	5	4
Khmelnitsky oblast	10	3
Cherkasy oblast	8	6
Chernivtsi oblast	4	3
Chernihiv oblast	7	5
Kyiv	7	1
Sevastopol	1	1
Total		156

opposition is ensuring expert training for observers and their even distribution among election committees and polling stations.

The presence of international observers at the 2012 election should become a special concern for the opposition parties. International monitoring of polling stations and election committee sessions, with the possibility of photo and video records, is a serious factor in reducing election fraud. That is why the opposition should send a collective appeal to the EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, and other international organizations and democratic powers requesting them to consider sending official observers to monitor the upcoming parliamentary election in Ukraine. Monitoring will only be effective if there are at least five to six thousand international observers in this country. In order to provide interpreters, the true op-

position must now begin looking for competent speakers of foreign languages among its supporters.

Special attention should be given to the counting of ballots at polling stations. We cannot rule out the possibility of using this practice when election committees ban candidate MPs, their proxies, and official observers from polling station premises on the grounds of alleged "illegal interference" with the session. With witnesses removed, the pro-regime committee can easily void ballots cast for opposition candidates, or rig the vote in other ways. To prevent this, the true opposition should place supporters outside polling stations after voting ends at 10pm, and also create a reserve pool of accredited journalists and official observers with the right to be present at polling stations.

Another item on the agenda is the parallel counting of votes. This

should not be a small-scale, amateurish "parallel count" by one party. Rather, it should be a large collaborative multi-party project carried out by the opposition's "Central Election Committee" on the basis of reports issued to local election committee members, with replicas issued to observers. Maximum transparency of the parallel vote count and media involvement in the process can reduce the risk of electoral fraud at polling stations.

The opposition parties must, on one hand, ensure the transparency of their election campaign and, on the other, persist in counteracting violations on the part of the regime. In doing so, they will have to overcome hurdles which they themselves helped to build by supporting the election bill. If the opposition fails to do this, its activities in Ukraine will be largely marginalized after the parliamentary elections in October 2012. ■

YULIA TYMOSHENKO: A HISTORY OF DEFEAT



Author:
Ivan
Halaichenko

Yulia Tymoshenko who was realistically potentially the next president of Ukraine has become a prisoner. Today, neither she, nor her political bloc can do anything for her release or her continued activity in politics. A mere two years ago, the project had virtually looked like the greatest political success in Ukraine. It now appears that there was no foundation under the shiny wrapper that could

withstand the test of political defeat, prevent destruction and guarantee revenge in the future. For both Ms. Tymoshenko, whose hopes for a happy ending in this slew of repression fade with every new case reopened by the SBU or the Prosecutor General, and other Ukrainian politicians trying to gain public support, it would be worthwhile to closely examine the mistakes that led Yulia Tymoshenko to the Lukianivska

prison instead of the top office at Bankova St.

"THE ONLY MAN IN UKRAINIAN POLITICS"

This has become the cliché for Ms. Tymoshenko's role in Ukraine's political establishment. It reflects her ability to act decisively without half-hearted moves or undertones, a quality that many Ukrainian politicians lack. She was persistent enough in 2000 to break down barter scams on the energy market, confident enough in 2004 to become the "power of the Maidan", and convincing enough in 2007 to secure an early election and return as Premier.

Yulia Tymoshenko's career has always been a spectacle, whether on the crest of the wave in top offices, running ambitious projects and putting on huge shows for the voters, or persecuted and imprisoned. This soap opera is crystal clear and easily understood by voters. It's the struggle between light and dark, good and evil, her against them. A simple story is always the best way to communicate with the widest audience possible, to gain sympathy and support.

In addition to the circuses, Tymoshenko was always concerned about the bread. Throughout her term as Premier, she always kept social benefits, salaries and pensions in mind. This ate up proceeds from privatization and international loans but none of her opponents would dare to publicly accuse her of the "inefficient use of funds". This approach seemed efficient in Ukrainian politics, boosting her popularity over 2001-2010. Eventually, Ms. Tymoshenko took any opportunity to strengthen her position or created them where none were available (see Victories and Defeats).

The above-mentioned image of "the only man in Ukrainian pol-

PHOTO: UNIAN

itics” was adorned with elaborate image boosters. Ms. Tymoshenko’s team buzzed with legends of her as a workaholic. She would give interviews late at night and hold meetings that lasted several hours. Her other virtue was the ability to learn. She transformed from a provincial businesswoman who had given movingly naïve interviews back in the mid-1990s into a charismatic orator; from a Dnipropetrovsk-born Russian-speaker into an essentially Ukrainian-speaking politician.

Yulia Tymoshenko had it all to win any political race, from self-confidence to an enormous ability to work and good intuition. The skillful manipulation of these qualities made her an invincible opponent in political battles. Even her opponents recognize her as a brilliant tactician. But this was not enough for true success. The form should have been underpinned by the essence and a well-thought logical plan of action, as a result of which, all Ukrainians would understand exactly how the shiny promises were to be fulfilled.

Long-distance races and strategic victories require more from a politician: in-depth and systemic knowledge; a team that cares about national interests, not only their own; and honest and consistent communication with voters.

THE ROOTS OF DISASTER

Ms. Tymoshenko’s problems largely stem from her own virtues. Her self-confidence made her believe in her own infallibility – the image of a “goddess”, which was mocked by her opponents. This belief was also fostered by her compliant entourage, both on the level of everyday flattery and public displays, ranging from grotesque shows, shows of communication with the media in a sugar-sweet format, to disastrous slogans, such as “SHE – is Ukraine”!

However, this non-critical approach to her own decisions damaged Ms. Tymoshenko’s image and crushed their efficiency. Given her origin and swift progress in big business and politics, Ms. Tymoshenko may not have had the time to acquire systemic knowledge regarding the strategy of social development, social processes or the specific features of post-soviet macroeconomics. After all, it is impossible to know everything and believing otherwise has been part of the problem of the “non-critical attitude towards self”. However, in such a case, the selection of a team, capable of filling the gaps in the leader’s outlook, is that much more crucial.

This was where Ms. Tymoshenko’s habit to “simply solve things”, stemming from the early 1990s and the behavior of her team played a nasty trick on her. BYuT coopted everyone who seemed capable of resolving ongoing issues: providing support in courts, ensuring media resources and financial support. In 2005, having seen in Tymoshenko a serious-looking politician likely to stay on top for the long haul, quite a few of her one-time opponents, including some very odious ones, decided to join her.

As the election drew closer, these people improved the “welfare” of political power and those who decided on the party lists. Mykhailo Brodsky “rolled” into BYuT in 2005, and in subsequent interviews, he disclosed several schemes for putting candidates on the lists, the price list and the role of Ms. Tymoshenko’s closest allies, particularly Oleksandr Turchynov, in the process.

The compiling of party lists for parliament and local councils, as well as the executive structure of BYuT us-

VICTORIES AND DEFEATS

Since their first days in politics in the mid-1990s, Ms. Tymoshenko and her party have been progressing, turning threats and failures to their benefit. Meanwhile, they have been accumulating internal problems, which were the cause of the defeat in 2010 with which BYuT was unable to cope

POLITICAL SYNDROME



December 1996–1999. Yulia Tymoshenko is a People’s Deputy and in an interview, confesses to “being infected with politics”.

December 1999 – January 2001. Vice Premier for the Fuel and Power Complex in Viktor Yushchenko’s Cabinet. The Government implements reforms on the energy market and makes considerable efforts to break barter schemes. It also channels proceeds from selling fuels to the budget. At this time, Ms. Tymoshenko gains dangerous political enemies

OPPOSITION-COALITION-OPPOSITION



9 July 1999. Former activists of Hromada (Community) who left the party together with Pavlo Lazarenko, more specifically Yulia Tymoshenko and Oleksandr Turchynov, establish Batkivshchyna (Homeland). In 2000, Batkivshchyna joins the pro-Kuchma majority in the Verkhovna Rada. The struggle against their opponents in the energy sector, particularly Ihor Bakal ends in a conflict with Kuchma’s circle

5 January 2001. The Prosecutor General initiates two criminal cases against Yulia Tymoshenko, her family members and friends who run the Single Energy Systems of Ukraine (YeESU)



19 January 2001. President Kuchma dismisses Ms. Tymoshenko

13 February 2001. Ms. Tymoshenko is arrested. In March 2001, the Pechersk District Court finds the charges groundless and cancels the arrest order. This boosts her rating from 2-3% to 6%. On 9 April 2003, the Kyiv Court of Appeal rules that the criminal case against Ms. Tymoshenko and her husband was initiated illegally and that all proceedings shall be terminated. On 18 November 2005, the case was also terminated by the Supreme Court

31 March 2002. BYuT gains 7.26% in the 2002 election, i.e. 22 seats in parliament. BYuT and Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine) led by Mr. Yushchenko agree to not compete against each other in the election and the opposition wins it via party lists. Later, though, it fails to nominate common candidates or set up an efficient system to prevent violations in majority constituencies. This nullifies their victory

POWER OF THE PEOPLE



September 2002. Ms. Tymoshenko tours Ukrainian cities in the “Rise up Ukraine!” campaign, showing her talent of capturing the audience with vivid speeches. Due to the lack of resources and coordination among its organizers including BYuT, the Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine, the campaign is not a great success

July 2004. Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko announce their coalition called The Power of the People, aimed at strengthening Mr. Yushchenko as the most popular presidential candidate among opposition leaders. Ms. Tymoshenko is promised the premier’s seat if he wins the election

22 November 2004. The Orange Revolution unfolds. Proactive Ms. Tymoshenko becomes one of the Maidan leaders due to her vivid speeches and decisive moves. Her popularity rises from 6-8% to 18-20% turning her into a top politician

VICTORIES AND DEFEATS

WAR AMONG THE WINNERS

4 January 2005. Ms. Tymoshenko is appointed Acting Premier. Her Cabinet's performance is questionable, as GDP growth slows down and the country faces a slew of what she considers to be artificially-created crises, including petrol, sugar, meat and bread crises while it is in power. The premiership reveals her political strengths, such as a striking capacity for work, a talent for finding allies, political intuition and an understanding of how important sovereignty is, as well as weaknesses, including inconsistency, no vision of the long-term consequences of her moves, her adventurous nature and belief in her own infallibility



8 September 2005. The political crisis caused by a conflict of interest between her and Mr. Yushchenko and their teams brings forth the most far-reaching consequences for Ms. Tymoshenko. Instead of seeking a peaceful solution to the conflict, Mr. Yushchenko uses his presidential powers to dismiss both Ms. Tymoshenko and the people involved in corruption scandals from his own team. In fact, he reveals the conflict within the Orange forces. Ms. Tymoshenko immediately goes public and communicates her interpretation, thus gaining extra dividends from the scandal, as supporters of Viktor Yushchenko and Our Ukraine switch to her side

March 2006. Criticizing Mr. Yushchenko's "conciliatory" attitude towards the Party of Regions, BYuT gains 22.29% of votes running second, behind the Party of Regions, with 132 seats in the 2006 parliamentary election. The unfolding political crisis steals public attention away from the fact that BYuT's lists swell with one-time Kuchma supporters. They join the party in exchange for providing some resources and being helpful in communicating with the neighbors, arranging media campaigns and putting on shows, and so on. As a result, the key elements of the party's activities end up in hands of opportunists who betray it whenever possible. By contrast, the leaders often keep the party's permanent activists away from such areas, thus compromising its organizational and mobilization potential and undermining the motivation of average and middle-level party members

August 2006. The Verkhovna Rada fails to appoint the Cabinet of Ministers, giving legitimate reasons for dissolving parliament. President Yushchenko agrees to a Cabinet with Viktor Yanukovych as Premier as long as Our Ukraine members continue to hold positions in several ministries. In time, most of them were dismissed by the Verkhovna Rada. BYuT finds itself in the opposition, but with a reputation of being Mr. Yanukovych's most consistent opponent

12 January 2007. BYuT votes together with the Party of Regions passing a law on the Cabinet of Ministers with more than two thirds of the vote, that reduces the influence of the President over the executive branch to a minimum. This is one episode of closer cooperation between BYuT and PR, strongly promoted by the pro-Medvedchuk wing that insists on dividing interests with the Party of Regions. This and further cooperation turns out unilateral: PR votes against the law on the opposition and continues to swell with crossovers. These maneuvers undermine public trust in BYuT

DASHED HOPES
March 2007. PR begins to set up a constitutional majority in parliament, luring over opposition MPs. Fearing a change of the Constitution, President Yushchenko dissolves parliament. This is the scenario actively pursued by Ms. Tymoshenko. BYuT conducts an intensive election campaign, based on populist promises to return the debts of the Soviet Savings Bank, create a professional army by 2008 and many others. This mobilized the electorate

30 September 2007. BYuT wins a record breaking 30.71% and 156 seats in the early parliamentary election. BYuT and Our Ukraine do not compete against each other publicly and end up with most seats in parliament and a coalition. After the election, BYuT stops long-term projects aimed at consolidating the independently thinking part of the electorate around the party and the work on the country development strategy. It has nothing to offer the voters when reality proves that shiny ideas are impossible to fulfill. This adds to public disenchantment



18 December 2007. 226 MPs vote to have Ms. Tymoshenko appointed as Premier for a second time. The coalition has a previously approved plan for priority reforms. The initial plan is to vote on crucial laws first, then the appointment of the premier. However, Ms. Tymoshenko strives to have the plan changed. As a result, most laws were not voted on. As a result, the coalition loses the opportunity to draft specific documents together, leaving the country without the promised reforms



ing such a scheme was slowly killing it. Firstly, odious activists added their own negative image burden to the party and ruined its reputation as a "new" spotless force. Secondly, their ways of dealing with things they were put in charge of, often caused more problems than they solved. One bright example was Andriy Portnov and his group who started quite a few conflicts that were hard to justify in the eyes of the voters. Thirdly, they had no ideological or organizational reasons to stay with BYuT so fled the party easily. Virtually nothing could stop them as they did not believe in common values while BYuT did not have the leverages to influence such people that the Party of Regions had. After all, the crowd of opportunists had a negative impact on those who joined BYuT not for their own personal benefit, but driven by princi-

ples or the desire to change things in the country. As a result, the latter have not had a real chance to communicate their ideas to the leaders and affect their decisions. They were squeezed out of responsible offices and the process of drawing up party lists. All this is a huge disincentive for people whose nature of making their way to the top is not through intrigue, flattery and holding cap-in-hand. Those who relied on their knowledge and skills have had fewer chances compared to the “useful” strangers and professional bootlickers. As a result, BYuT, like virtually all other political forces in Ukraine, ended up being packed with wrongly selected people, while the talented were cast off. This hampered proactive communication with social groups that could have acted as their natural allies on the local level, such as small and medium businesses, professionals and real community leaders representing the ideas of their communities, as opposed to the numerous “professional babblers” in the bloc. The party found itself cut off from effective local networks that could have helped it to stay in touch with society after it lost power.

The onset of consequences was swift. Rather than standing firm with Ms. Tymoshenko, to whom they had pledged loyalty just days ago and protecting her Government, having all instruments in hand under the 2004 Constitution that was still in effect, in the spring of 2010, the newcomers rushed to the winning camp. The remaining bootlickers were unable to offer anything helpful at that time. Not only did they not have an action plan, they did not have any fresh ideas whatsoever. This partly explains the confusion of BYuT and Ms. Tymoshenko and her leap from “demonstrative patriotism” to calls for social protest, which at

that point, were too late and obscure. She had missed the right moment for real resistance. From the time when court proceedings were initiated back in June and until the verdict surfaced in October, BYuT had a good opportunity to organize protests, with which it could have intimidated the current government. Now, it has neither a credible explanation for the public, nor the capacity to arrange such protests.

Ms. Tymoshenko's team is at fault in not having a structure behind the shiny façade. Ms. Tymoshenko herself is at fault for having people surrounding her that repulsed those who could really have been useful for her party and the country, which ultimately led to its collapse. Now, possibly for the first time in 15 years in politics, her fate lies beyond her control. ■

VICTORIES AND DEFEATS

September 2008. BYuT and PR pass a series of laws, restricting the President's influence on the executive branch. The Our Ukraine and People's Self-Defense bloc leave the coalition thus establishing the grounds for the dissolution of parliament, unless a new coalition is set up

8 October 2008. Mr. Yushchenko announces the dissolution of parliament, but the Verkhovna Rada refuses to enter the necessary changes to fund the election into the budget and administrative courts cancel the Presidential Decree. Some media blame this “attempt to hold on to power at any cost” on Ms. Tymoshenko's allies, who enjoy their current status and are reluctant to lose the privileges it provides. If an early election occurred at that point ending up with a Government led by Mr. Yanukovich, Ms. Tymoshenko would have had a far better chance of becoming president as an opposition leader, since 2009 was the peak of the financial crisis



grounds for the charges that ultimately put Ms. Tymoshenko behind bars

19 January 2009. After Ms. Tymoshenko meets with Russian Premier Vladimir Putin, Naftogaz and Gazprom cut a ten-year deal to supply Ukraine with Russian gas. The contracts are prepared behind closed doors and leaked to the Ukrainian mass media by Russian sources. This weakens the Ukrainian Government in negotiations, since it faces the consolidated position of the Russians but has no support in its own country. Doors open to criticize the contracts and the Premier who arranged them. The confusing process of drafting the contracts sets the

WEAK OPPOSITION AND ARREST

7 February 2010. Viktor Yanukovich gains a narrow victory in the second round of the presidential election with 48.95% against Ms. Tymoshenko's 45.47%

14 February 2010. The Central Election Committee announces that Mr. Yanukovich is the official winner of the presidential election. Some Western leaders greet him before the official results are declared

22 February 2010. Ms. Tymoshenko describes the election as dirty and refuses to agree to the outcome and Viktor Yanukovich as President. Earlier, she was forced to recall an appeal filed to the High Administrative Court, since the latter refuses to consider the most significant claims regarding the boosted register of voters and home voting for more than 1mn Ukrainians. Andriy Portnov, who is in charge of legal support for Ms. Tymoshenko's campaign, literally sabotages the claim against the results and subsequently joins the Presidential Administration. Meanwhile, one-time Kuchma supporters who had strived to join BYuT since 2005, quit their efforts and leave the party or switch to PR.

3 March 2010. 243 MPs pass a motion of no confidence in Yulia Tymoshenko's Cabinet despite the fact that it enjoyed the formal support of the parliamentary majority of BYuT, Our Ukraine and the Lytvyn Bloc. In actual fact, the Lytvyn Bloc and part of BYuT switch to the PR. Ms. Tymoshenko's party ends up with virtually no leverage to prevent or halt the process

21 April 2010. The presidents of Ukraine and Russia cut a deal in Kharkiv to extend the stay of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol until 2042 in exchange for a USD 100 discount per 1,000 cu m of gas

27 April 2010. The Kharkiv deals are ratified. The opposition, including BYuT, declares its intention to prevent this. However, BYuT is unable to organize mass protests. As a result, less than 30,000 protesters turn up in front of the Verkhovna Rada on 27 April, according to the opposition's own estimates. BYuT MPs virtually refuse to prevent ratification at a crucial point in the Verkhovna Rada. This defeat reveals serious staff and organizational troubles within BYuT, undermining public trust in this political power as a capable opposition

5 August 2011. The Pechersk Court decides to arrest Yulia Tymoshenko on gas deal-related charges. The prosecution uses the interpretation of ambiguous legislation and the secretive and swift process of cutting the deals against Ms. Tymoshenko



August-September 2011. BYuT-Batkivshchyna announces protests with no deadline and sets up a tent city on the Khreshchatyk, consisting of almost 20 tents, but there are no widespread protests

11 October 2011. Despite tough negative reaction in the world and implicit promises to work out a compromise from President Yanukovich, Ms. Tymoshenko is found guilty of the abuse of power and is sentenced to 7 years in jail

PHOTO: UKRINFORM

The Chief and

The reshuffling of government ranks stems just as much from the Donbas social background as it does from the personal interests of the Yanukovych family and their inner circle

Author:
Serhiy Hrabovsky

New appointments in the government have hardly raised eyebrows. Inevitably followed by a shakeup within the top ranks of the Interior Ministry and State Tax Service, such appointments are a logical result of the personal ambitions of the President, his family and their closest allies, as well as the Donbas social framework.

The Donbas, or Donetsk Basin, is a unique territory both in Ukraine and the entire former Soviet Union. The turbulent progress in mining and heavy industry that began there in the late 19th century was accompanied by the less turbulent rise of a peculiar quasi-urban culture. Here, conservative patriarchal family relations were transferred to cities, industrial villages, and later to urban agglomerations. Although largely populated with ethnic Ukrainians, the Donbas was a creature of the Russian Empire at the dawn of its nation-crafting efforts. During World War I, the local workforce of miners and plant workers proved extremely useful to the Bolsheviks, known more commonly at that time as *bolshaks*—a word that refers to the patriarch of a big traditional family. After the war, the embarrassing village-like towns grew into more or less modern cities, yet preserved their obsolete industries and outdated social structure, thus cementing the region's soviet nature.

After WWII, the authorities began to forcibly relocate “special settlers” to the mine region, among them Gulag prisoners. The Donbas was mostly intended for

criminals and former police officers who had worked for the Nazis, as well as other “traitors,” while political prisoners were exiled to more remote places. Tradition prevailed: in the late soviet years, up to 35% of all men in some Donbas towns had been arrested or served a prison sentence at least once. Thus a special tribe appeared with its own taboos, tattoos, rules and slang.

Donbas lifestyle and identity are not Russian as many believe, but a mixture of soviet and local cultures. Most locals have no national identity whatsoever, for such an identity can only be formed within a community that is free or seeks to be free. The Donbas, however, is dominated by a regional or tribal mindset and identity that are expressed on all levels.

The classical concept of tribalism is focused on cultural, sociopolitical and cult tribal segregation and differentiation. It is a typical feature of societies that are in the process of transferring from archaic tribal systems to the early stages of capitalism. A common tribalistic practice is to give preference to people of a certain ethnic origin when selecting government officials, while discriminating against others. In unstable nations, tribalism uses a democratic facade to allow a certain ethnic group from a certain region to take control over the entire state mechanism. Voters elect politicians on the basis of their own regional loyalties rather than candidates' ideology and charisma. In postcolonial Africa and parts of Asia where tribalism is commonplace, selection of public officials based on ethnic and regional affiliations often

leads to separatism and civil war.

The Donbas is a place where locals commonly address one another as *zemlyak*, meaning “local” or “countryman,” and “real men” are valued for the uniqueness of their character. This is where the Party of Regions raked in 72.05% and 73.53% of the Donetsk and Luhansk Oblast electoralates in the 2010 parliamentary election. Seven out of the top ten PR members come from the Donbas. Add votes in support of Communists and Socialists, and nearly 85% of Donbas voters will have supported their native countrymen.

No other region of Ukraine could manage such a feat. The Crimean public has similar preferences but theirs are based on ideology more than anything else. They vote against “Bandera supporters”—as they commonly refer to Western Ukrainians—and in favor of brotherhood with Russia. Other eastern and southern oblasts were less enthusiastic about the Party of Regions, which won 43% of the vote in Kherson Oblast and 55% in Zaporizhzhia Oblast. The Yulia Tymoshenko and Our Ukraine-Self-Defense blocs failed to garner the kind of support that the PR received in its southeastern stronghold during the 2010 parliamentary election, even in the western oblasts where they have the most supporters. Halychyna, for instance, voted 50-52% in favor of Tymoshenko's bloc and nearly 36% in support of Our Ukraine-Self-Defense. Neither of the parties' top-five lists included politicians from Halychyna. Their leaders hail from an



His Tribe



array of different regions, unlike the Donbas hometown heroes in the Party of Regions and Communist Party. Western Ukrainian voters are more concerned with an all-Ukrainian ideology than with their candidate's origin.

The ideology that dominates the Donbas is hardly political. It is more of a tribal mythology centered around "the image of the Donbas as a model soviet region," according to Ivan Dziuba, a Donbas-born literature critic and dis-

sident who knows his fellow countrymen well. This idealized Donbas is "populated with skillful bogatyr¹s who walk the trail of life with heads held high." He interprets this as the original "Donetsk patriotism, sincere and misleading in some ways, but tragicomic mostly, based on the sense - even if exaggerated - of the Donbas's unique role as the sole support for the entire USSR, and now Ukraine." Amidst all this, reality never really mattered. "The popular slogan, 'nobody has ever put the Donbas on its knees and nobody ever will' was born exactly at the time when both the Donbas and the whole soviet country were down on their knees," Mr. Dziuba wrote.

Iosif Kobzon, a Donbas-born singer, businessman and Russian MP from the United Russia party, described this phenomenon from his own perspective. "The whole world knows what the Donbas is," he wrote. "Many say it has taken all key niches in Ukraine because the President was born there. That's perfectly normal. He knows the people he's hiring. He knows his compatriots, he trusts them and he's responsible for placing them in all key offices. God has placed an aura of sorts over the people of the Donbas. He protects us and shows everyone we are the chosen people. Until now, people said the chosen ones were from Israel, but I say they live in the Donbas."

The integration of the Donbas into the overall Ukrainian political and cultural environment is a separate but important issue, and will be impossible without overcoming homo sovieticus and tribalist myths. As it is now, most of the region's population has a tribal mindset which carries a number of consequences.

The first is the appointment of Donbas natives to all key positions. This occupation extends down to district police department heads all over Ukraine with majors and captains from Donetsk and Luhansk Oblasts serving in offices previously occupied by colonels alone. Being a countryman means being reliable. Needless to say, staff selection is based on relations among fellow countrymen rather than professional qualities, ignoring laws and generally accepted moral norms and following only the 'native versus stranger' rule.

The second consequence is the inevitable transfer of clan relations to the national level of state administration, as described above in regards to the shaping of Donetsk's character. The traditional mafia had a patriarchal pre-national basis and was imported to the US by immigrants from South Italy, predominately Sicily. Reluctant to dissolve in the American melting pot, they knew no other means of efficient interaction. It took over a century for the US to eventually assimilate them all.

The third consequence refers to various circles of trust and initiation that exist within the tribe of today. For instance, Donetsk-born members are privileged compared to those from Luhansk, Yenakiyevo or Horlivka. There are exceptions to this general rule, however, that depend on the extent to which one has proved his loyalty, by action, to the regional chiefs.

Ultimately, the group of chiefs inevitably produces the main chief, who is a living totem of sorts in the tribal community and the incarnation of its real and mythological virtues. The main chief seeks to hand over power as heritage to his family—sons foremost, and their sworn brothers. The recent rise of Yanukovich Jr. to the status of multimillionaire along with his energetic young cronies, as well as the swift promotion of other close supporters of Mr. President himself, is a plainly visible trend that proves this assumption.

What should be done about this phenomenon? Is everyone in the Donbas, let alone other regions, willing to live by the tribal rules of a barbaric world? ■

¹ Valiant heroes of Russian folklore

Yanukovch Won't Stay Long

Boris Nemtsov, Russian politician and a leader of the Solidarity opposition movement and People's Freedom Party (PARNAS), talks about Yulia Tymoshenko's case and the mistakes of Russian democrats

Interviewer:
Olena Chekan

Boris Nemtsov is a charming yet often controversial politician and one of Vladimir Putin's harshest opponents. He has called upon Russian voters to boycott the upcoming presidential election. According to independent surveys, his unregistered political force has the fifth highest rating in Russia.

KILLING TWO BIRDS WITH ONE STONE

UW: If you were to compare the current state of democratic institutions in Ukraine and Russia, to what extent are they similar?

— It's still different in Ukraine. Yanukovych is not Putin, and Ukraine is not Russia. The difference is in Russia's baggage of imperialistic autocratic traditions that Ukraine doesn't have. In addition, Ukraine still has a free press. Leaders in dictatorships have approval ratings of over 70%, unlike in democra-

different problem. As I understand it, many of your opposition members can't stand Ms. Tymoshenko. They jealously and enviously compete with her but miss one thing: it's not about Ms. Tymoshenko - it's about turning the country around. When a court in the country passes such an absurd verdict and the opposition remains silent, it gives Mr. Yanukovych the impression that he can keep tightening the screws. That's all. I'm not a big fan of Ms. Tymoshenko but I fully support her at this point because Ukraine is facing a real threat: it might simply start with Putin's style of political opposition, but it can expand to bold repression of common citizens using executive powers.

I still think Mr. Yanukovych will fail to implement the Putin model in Ukraine. Apparently, he would like to become a leader as powerful as Mr. Putin, with no political rivals as long as he lives. But that objective looks distant. The problem is not in the nation's strength or weakness but in its mentality - Ukrainians simply don't like bowing to this guy. That's not what they want. The societies of Ukraine and Russia are so different; their people have very little in common, even if much of the world thinks otherwise. Ukrainians don't feel the need to look at a strong tsar as head of their state. Mr. Yanukovych will lose the election next year and that's that.

UW: Are there any Russian "fingerprints" on the Tymoshenko case?

— I don't think so. Mr. Putin totally opposes the verdict. He does so because he sees it as a dangerous precedent, not because he supports independent courts in Ukraine. Once a Ukrainian premier is behind bars, what could protect a Russian premier from the same fate? That's first. The second thing is that the gas contract was important for him because Gazprom is his personal business. Clearly, sending Ms. Tymoshenko to jail for that contract discredits the whole deal, including Mr. Putin's business. I think the Ukrainian government's pressure on the court was politically motivated. Since the judge never summoned Mr. Putin as a witness, the verdict of the Pechersk Court was based purely on political interests rather than the law. Firstly, Mr. Yanukovych is afraid of losing the election next year if Ms. Tymoshenko is not in jail. She is still the most popular opposition politician. Secondly, he

SPECIAL SERVICE HAD BEEN UNDER TOTAL CONTROL OF THE SOVIET KGB AND ULTIMATELY LED FORMER KGB AGENTS TO THE PRESIDENCY

cies. Mr. Yanukovych's rating is now at rock bottom with 10-15%. I don't think he'll cling to his seat for long. The Ukrainian people have shown they'll say goodbye to a president just as easily as they fell in love with him. This, in my opinion, is a sign of a healthy nation. Ukraine has a

**BIO****Boris Nemtsov**

1959 – Born in Sochi

1990 – Member of USSR Parliament from Gorki constituency, now Nizhny Novgorod

1991 – Boris Yeltsin's trusted ally in presidential election

1991-1996 – Chief of Staff at Nizhegorodskaya Oblast

1993 – Member of the Federation Council, the upper house of the Russian Parliament

1994 – Authorized representative of the Russian President in Nizhegorodskaya Oblast

1997 – Vice Prime-Minister of the Russian Federation

1998 – Chairman of the Young Russia policy council

1999 – MP from the Union of Right Forces

2004-2005 – Chairman of the Board of Directors at Neftianoy oil concern

2008 – Co-founder of the Solidarity Joint Democratic Movement

2010 – One of the leaders of PARNAS, the People's Freedom Party

2010 – One of the first signatories in the Putin Must Go letter

thought he could score points this way by pretending he's fighting for cheap gas.

UW: What is your assessment of the policy of Ukraine's government as it attempts to maneuver between the EU and Russia as if wearing a mask?

– There's a nice proverb that says if you chase two rabbits, you'll lose them both. I think it's been tough for Mr. Yanukovich in Europe these days. He's been told quite openly to get lost, while in Russia nobody is awaiting him as an equal partner. With his imperial habits, Mr. Putin doesn't know how to work in equal partnership, so he wants a junior partner. Ukraine will hardly accept that option. That's why I think Mr. Yanukovich is now in a similar situation to that of Mr. Lukashenko: nobody's waiting for him in Europe and he's not willing to surrender to the Kremlin. This is an absurd situation with a dead end. In fact, Europe is absolutely the correct and natural choice for Ukraine. But that doesn't mean it should fight with Russia. Pranks like Ms. Tymoshenko's imprisonment, ruin Ukrainian identity. This was an Asian trial, not a European one. That's why Mr. Yanukovich is going

from one extreme to another. I think this will continue as long as he keeps breaking the law. Remember, Mr. Yanukovich is hugely dependent on Europe. Not only because Ukraine is a transit country between the West and Russia but because damaging or diminishing Ukraine's relations with Europe to almost nothing is not his interest, as it would make him more dependent on Moscow. Once Mr. Yanukovich behaves himself, the EU will talk to him again. The Western position in the Tymoshenko case remains the crucial point.

UW: What is the state of the Russian economy?

– It's a gas pipeline economy. It's a banana republic of sorts with Siberian oil and gas instead of bananas. Fuels generate over 50% of Russia's revenues, and their export represents the largest portion of the nation's income in foreign currency. Russia has grown more dependent on these income sources under Mr. Putin's reign. The proportion of proceeds from oil and gas in total revenues was 35% when Mr. Putin came to power. It's over 70% now. Engineering accounted for 11% then, compared to today's 5%. The tech industry earns Russia less than 0.1% of total revenues. Russia is a typical raw materials producer whose budget, living standard, pensions, salaries, and so on, rely entirely on oil market prices.

UW: So, all this talk about upgrading, streamlining and Skolkovo¹ is just a sham?

– These are buzzwords favored by Putin Jr. – that's Mr. Medvedev – it's all just talk, PR. Skolkovo is a Potemkin village rather than a Russian Silicon Valley. In fact, that's the place where oligarchs such as Abramovich, Prokhorov and Potanin live. The land there is more expensive than in Rubliovka, an elite residential area west of Moscow. The Kremlin has chosen Skolkovo for a good reason. Abramovich owns the land there and many people will earn a pretty penny on this. The high-tech talk is complete nonsense. With the price of real estate there ranging from USD 15,000 to USD 25,000 per square

¹ A planned Russian equivalent of the Silicon Valley



meter, no investment company or venture fund that deals in egg-head inventions will ever pay that much to rent an office there. Never! Clearly, some high-tech monsters such as Google, Yandex, Yahoo, Mail.ru and Microsoft can afford to build offices there, but everyone knows it's not these giants that keep the Silicon Valley alive. Its foundation is the small and middle-sized companies that lure a third of all venture capital in the US.

UW: Why have some in the Western establishment turned a blind eye to Russia's swift attack on civil liberties while lauding the order created by its tough power hierarchy?

– This is a classic example of double standards. They've imposed sanctions on the authoritarian Belarus officials by banning their entrance to the EU. They are now personas non-grata while similar Russian officials travel freely wherever they want. The reason is plain to see. Russia is a nuclear state. It has the fuels that Europe relies heavily upon. Of course, between gas and human rights, they choose the former. Merkel, Sarkozy and Berlusconi are all Putin's advocates. They don't believe Russia can be straightened out, but they need its oil and gas. They act like businessmen, not democrats.

BOOKS

The Provincial Man, 1997
The Provincial Man in Moscow, 1999
Confession of a Rebel, 2007

EXPERT REPORTS, CO-AUTHOR

Putin and Gazprom, 2008
Putin. The Summary, 2008
Putin and the Crisis, 2009
Sochi and the Olympics, 2009
Putin. The Summary. 10 Years, 2010
Putin. Corruption, 2011

UW: Will Russia be able to exert pressure over the entire CIS in the foreseeable future?

– Russia is so wanton, aggressive and repulsive with its neighbors that none of them wants to deal with it. It could be very attractive, in theory, for Ukraine, among others. If Russia were a safe and friendly democracy, it would be a good partner for Ukraine. But the image that Mr. Putin has architected for his nation is that of a monster – cynical, violent, and teeming with terrorists and crooks, with zero civil liberties. Russia has lost everyone, other than maybe Armenia but it's also trying to keep a safe distance. Who would want to deal with a country run by KGB guys? I don't think Mr. Putin can get anybody on his side through sheer force. Yet, everybody would turn to Russia if it were a model of freedom and democracy.

**TO THE SIDELINES OF HISTORY
UW: What mistakes did democrats make to bring about what is essentially single-party rule in Russia?**

– We've made a load of mistakes. Firstly, we should have explained to voters the desperate situation in which Russia found itself in the 1990s, while we were mostly concerned with the economy and trying to save the country from cold and hunger. We should have explained why the

USSR had collapsed; why the command economy had gone broke; what decisions we were going to take to improve the situation, and how difficult they would be for the nation. Secondly, we should have struggled to strengthen the state. I'm talking about special services that had been under total control of the Soviet KGB and ultimately led former KGB agents to the presidency, as well as the Prosecutor General, Ministry of Internal Affairs and others. They all come from Soviet times and hamper Russia's progress greatly because Russia is essentially a police state run by outlaws—both in uniforms and not—rather than law. Thirdly, I believe that democrats should not have supported Mr. Putin. I'm not talking about myself, but there were many democrats who supported him during the 2000 election.

We still have a great chance to turn Russia back toward democracy. I believe that different political forces in Russia can work together. We need a united opposition and a common platform. But this takes time. Years, not months.

UW: What are your projections as to Russia's future?

– What happened on September 24th humiliated the nation. Putin and Medvedev didn't even bother to pretend that voters were entitled to an opinion or choice. This will have some serious consequences for Russia including the emigration of well-educated Russians, capital outflow and a collapsing infrastructure. Mr. Putin wants to be president forever, but he forgets where dictators tend to end up. Ben Ali in Tunisia, Mubarak in Egypt, Gaddafi in Libya. Actually, I'm not a fan of revolutions. But the Kremlin regime has banned public discussion in the country thus prompting people to take to the streets. Mr. Putin is like a professional provocateur, needing the Russian people to protest. And one more thing: there's no doubt Putinism is leading the country to collapse, but Russia can still avoid it. To do that, Russians will have to toss Mr. Putin to the sidelines of history, have a fair election and win back the rights taken from them. Russia can survive as a united state only if it walks the path of freedom and democracy. ■

Crisis of Vision

Even top government officials acknowledge the low quality of public administration in Ukraine. Their confessions are comically tragic

Global economic growth is expected to fall from 3.8% in 2010 to 3.2% in 2011, according to the latest report from the World Bank. In 2012, the trend will continue. Russia's growth outlook appears even gloomier: it will slip from 4.7% to 4.1% (IMF) or from 4.5% to 3.7% (World Bank).

Meanwhile, the Ukrainian government seems to be turning a blind eye to these global trends, despite the fact that its foreign debt service payments will peak in 2013. The Ukrainian government is doing the opposite of what EU economists recommend as a way of handling the crisis.

The first and foremost requirement on all EU members is stringent control over spending, primarily with regard to administrative, rather than capital, expenditure. In contrast, Ukraine has been increasing administrative spending since 2009. For example, funding for the Prosecutor General's Office has increased by 150% and for the Interior Ministry by 80%. The cost of presidential activities has nearly doubled. Worse still, the draft state budget for 2013 includes subsidies to Naftogaz and Ukrenergo to the tune of UAH 13 billion. Another typical requirement in the EU is limiting the country's debt burden. In Ukraine, the previous and current governments each borrowed \$15 billion.

Sooner or later, this money will have to be paid back. Ukraine's sovereign and guaranteed debt will reach \$62 billion (40% of GDP) by the end of 2011. The IMF set the critical level of our sovereign debt at 40% of GDP and in the summer of 2010, when this debt was at 36% of

GDP, Deputy Prime Minister Serhiy Tihipko acknowledged that "this figure was critical for us." And then what? To pay off its debts, Ukraine will spend UAH 89 billion in 2011 and nearly UAH 60 billion in 2012. With this in mind, one must remember that the country had a colossal negative foreign trade balance – \$6.67 billion in January-July 2011.

Whether we like it or not, the stability of Ukraine's national finances is directly dependent on IMF loans. Just like the German Bundestag decides whether Greece will default, the IMF plays that role for Ukraine.

Another EU demand is enhancing the quality of public administration, especially in the economic and financial sectors where a mistake may cost billions. For example, the EU suggests that Greece carry out a large-scale privatization program worth €50 billion by selling off key banks, electric energy monopolies, communications and gambling businesses. It is doubtful that Greece would sell its assets like Ukraine – through non-competitive procedures to a single bidder.

Even top government officials acknowledge the low quality of public administration in Ukraine. Their con-

fessions sound comically tragic, because they could fix the situation if they wanted to. For example, First Deputy Prime Minister Andriy Kliuyev recently said: "The paradox is that Ukraine ranks high in international ratings in terms of its natural, labor and intellectual potential. But when it comes to managing these resources, we bring up the rear in all ratings." For example, Ukrainian officials indulge in repeating that the country can potentially export 24 million tons of crops (\$6-7 billion), but this summer, the government inexplicably introduced grain export quotas which badly damaged Ukrainian exports – and this at a time when global prices were topping out. Only after they fell did the pro-government majority in parliament lift the quotas. This policy caused at least UAH 10 billion in damages to agricultural producers and the country in general.

Yet another fundamental EU recommendation is improving the economic climate. Again, Ukraine is moving the other way: it slid from 149th to 152nd place in the 2012 Doing Business report by the World Bank and the International Financial Corporation to find itself in the uncomfortable company of Liberia (151) and Bolivia (153). In the 2011 Economic Freedom of the World rating, Ukraine ranked 125th among 141 countries, one position behind Senegal. The govern-

ment's talk of a radical improvement of the investment climate is a bluff. After implementing the Tax Code alone, the number of Ukrainians wanting to open their own businesses dropped by 67%. According to Ukraine's National Bank, 30.5% of enter-

prises (down from 36%) believe their economic condition has improved.

A number of artificial monopolies have been set up in Ukraine most of which are utterly inefficient and are able to operate only because of very low wages and tax evasion. Excessive monopolization of the economy is not the same thing the EU criticized in Greece where 200 enterprises account for half of GDP.

The EU demands that Greece end unprecedented levels of tax evasion. For Ukraine, this is a two-edged weapon, but sometimes the figures are simply overwhelming. For example, the total volume of direct foreign investments in Donetsk Region is \$2.2 billion, while \$5 billion is withdrawn to Cyprus alone.

The EU members are paying more attention to managing the financial markets and bringing in stricter standards for banks, particularly regulations pertaining to equity capital. Since the onset of the crisis in 2008, financial institutions in Ukraine have shifted their problems to the state and by extension, to tax payers.

The EU recipes apply to Ukraine. Why not follow them and amend them to our situation? ■



Author:
**Andriy
Pyshnyi**

**THE GOVERNMENT IS
CASHING IN INSTEAD
OF CUSHIONING
THE COUNTRY AGAINST
FURTHER CRISES**

Till the Cows Come

Tough political reality could shatter handsome economic deals within the CIS



Author:
Dmytro
Vovnianko,
Volodymyr
Kuznetsky

The recent Free Trade Zone (FTZ) agreement signed by CIS leaders in St. Petersburg raised many eyebrows. Kyiv and Moscow wasted over a decade trying to work out an interpretation of the old FTZ agreement

drafted in 1993 that would suit both. Ukraine insisted on its purely economic purpose, particularly the greatest possible liberalization of trade, while Russia was largely interested in its political aspect that was to set up suprana-

tional bodies. On 17 October 2011, Ukraine and Russia reached an unexpected compromise and signed the FTZ agreement the following day. The only original copy in Russian sits at the CIS Executive Committee while the signato-

Home

CONFUSING
COMPROMISE.
The parties signed
FTZ agreement,
envisioning
different political
agendas



PHOTO: REUTERS

ries have, or are supposed to have, notarized copies. Meanwhile, the draft FTZ agreement has leaked into the mass media. According to Russian and Ukrainian politicians, as well as messages and interpretations offered by the media, for

the most part, it is identical to the original agreement. The first impression the document leaves is that it has been expertly drafted and is not purely declarative. Outlining the terms of the trade association between Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova and Kyrgyzstan, which are WTO members, and its potential members, first and foremost Russia and Uzbekistan, is a super-challenging task. The experts who drafted the FTZ agreement seem to have done a fairly good job. However, the agreement has been crafted professionally not only in terms of its legal aspects. If this is the same document that was signed in St. Petersburg, it means that the FTZ agreement in fact includes a customs union, at least partially, if not a full version thereof, that entails the unification of custom duty rates. Among other things, the FTZ agreement contains mechanisms to coordinate customs policy regarding third parties and some restrictions in members' rights to regulate settlements in foreign currencies. In essence, the trade regime, which could have been fixed in St. Petersburg on 17 October, was something in between an FTZ and a customs union. The agreement can be implemented if ratified by member parliaments.

Does the agreement benefit Ukraine? Yes. If implemented, it will not affect trading within the WTO from a purely economic perspective. This scenario is unlikely, though, given the prospect of political integration into a Eurasian Union recently outlined by Premier Vladimir Putin.

ECONOMIC ASPECT

Art. 2 is a key one in the FTZ agreement. "The Party shall apply no customs duty or other fees equivalent to a customs duty on goods exported onto the customs territory of another Party and/or goods imported from the customs territory of another Party, other than in cases listed in Add. 1, which is an integral part hereto," the Article says. Addendum 1 lists items covered by the customs duty. The list is short compared to the effective trade restrictions between Ukraine and Russia, yet contains some very significant items.

First and foremost, based on 2010 results, it covers fuels that

account for 73.4% of Ukraine's imports from CIS countries. According to the State Statistics Committee, this cost Ukraine USD 19.6bn. Russia was a monopolist supplier of natural gas worth USD 9.4bn. Oil and oil products imported totaled USD 8.1bn including USD 4.1bn from Russia and USD 1.5bn from Belarus. Under Add. 1, Russia is going to clear fuels within the limits established by the FTZ agreement using a "special formula," the same goes for Belarus. As a result, trade liberalization will not make gas or oil any cheaper for Ukraine. Art. 2.15 entails the gradual reduction of export duties listed in Add. 1 until they are fully cancelled. But Ukraine will probably have to enter a political marriage of convenience for this economic promise to be fulfilled.

All other items important for Ukraine are "fully or partially" in the agreement. The FTZ agreement will benefit Ukrainian steelworks. Pipe manufacturers exporting 71.2% of their output to CIS countries will be the luckiest. Moreover, export restrictions

FTZ AGREEMENT IN FACT INCLUDES A CUSTOMS UNION, AT LEAST PARTIALLY, IF NOT A FULL VERSION THEREOF


barely extend to raw materials for steelworks, as well as semi-finished and finished steel goods. Ukraine will restrict exports of chrome nickel steel, stainless steel billets and copper matte but their share in total exports is under 0.1%. Therefore, restrictions in this market will not affect the economy. Apparently, export tax on the above-mentioned goods is intended to first and foremost protect the domestic market.

The best news for all parties to the agreement is the exemption of customs duty for exporting and importing producers of mechanical, road-building and electric equipment, machines, mechanisms, vehicles and so on. The benefit this gives Ukraine equals or tops that from duty-free exports for steelworks.

Russia is one of the largest markets for Ukrainian food producers. Ukraine sells much more food to CIS countries than it buys »

FINDING THE RIGHT BALANCE

Ukraine's trade turnover with CIS and EU, USD mn



from them. In 2010, Ukraine imported pork worth USD 200.8mn, not one kilogram of which came from the CIS, while exporting produce worth USD 2.4mn to Russia alone. Figures differ slightly for poultry and other meats, grain, etc. Given the situation on the global food market, liberalized trade in agricultural products within the CIS opens vast opportunities for farmers. For instance, Russia exported 18.5mn tons of wheat in the previous marketing year landing 4th among the top 10 exporters, according to IMF data, while Ukraine ended up 6th having exported 9.3mn tons, followed by Kazakhstan with 7.87mn tons. Coordinating interests, which is an inevitable result of opening markets within the CIS, will allow all parties to strengthen their positions on the global market, let alone the European one, particularly compared to the total wheat supply from USA and Canada at 42.9mn tons and 22.1mn tons from the EU for the same period. However, earlier experience inspires little optimism in this context. Who can guarantee that the domestic market will not sink in deflation in a race for the image of

Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan exported
35.7mn
tons of wheat
in 2010 marketing
year

Russia
has been avoiding
meaningful
economic
concessions
to Ukraine for
17 years,
protecting its
domestic market

a bread basket or simply cash in the global market? This refers to Russia and Kazakhstan, not only Ukraine. Food prices have been rising for several years in a row now, with wheat price growing 84% in 2010 alone, coupled with increasing official and hidden unemployment. The risks, not just the potential of integration, are plain to see.

The CIS market is a Klondike for Ukrainian cheese producers, bringing them USD 425.5mn of the total USD 426.8mn earned in 2011, with exports to Russia amounting to USD 367.3mn; chocolate and confectionaries with a net profit of USD 667.3 of USD 756.4mn of total earnings; and alcohol-producers earning USD 300.7mn of total revenues worth USD 380.3mn. Only Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have restricted the import of Ukrainian vodka in the FTZ agreement. This does not include sugar, as Belarus, Kazakhstan, Moldova, Tajikistan and Russia have imposed a duty of USD 340 per ton for sugar imported from Ukraine. Kyiv paid them back by imposing a duty of 50% of the invoice amount. But this requires a separate analysis, bearing in mind the fact that sugar prices grew 55% in 2010, a trend that is continuing.

POLITICAL BACKGROUND

An important point is how the FTZ agreement conforms to Ukraine's WTO commitments. It should be understood that they are listed in a series of bilateral and multilateral agreements with other states, detailed down to specific goods. Liberalized custom borders within the CIS could turn out as both a pleasant and an unpleasant surprise for many Ukrainian partners. This does not mean that Ukraine's membership in the WTO prevents it from joining the FTZ with Russia. Moreover, FTZ agreement provisions are based on WTO principles and support them in many aspects. However, questions could arise at the FTZ agreement implementation stage, since it contains some awkward requirements. One is called "unauthorized re-export" to third parties referring to exporting goods without a written consent from a relevant authority of the country of origin. So far, though, this obstacle is purely hypothetical be-

cause the inspiring economic deals within the CIS could eventually be shattered against tough political reality.

The FTZ agreement contains no political provisions. Still, the flavor of politics can be felt in the background. Russia has been reluctant to make any economic concessions regarding Ukraine for 17 years, thus protecting its domestic market. Meanwhile, Kyiv has been offered alternative political projects, such as the Eurasian Economic Union, Single Economic Zone, and the Customs Union. Having no economic content whatsoever, these abbreviations and combinations of words have been an irritant to Ukraine's patriotic elite all this time. The signing of the FTZ agreement continues this course of the Kremlin. It has now come up with a new idea called the Eurasian Union. It is inspired by Russian Premier Vladimir Putin who, in one of his October TV interviews, said outright: "The Soviet Union has collapsed. But what was the Soviet Union? It was Russia, only with a different name." It appears that Kyiv has heard the innuendo.

"The signing of the FTZ agreement within the CIS and the Free Trade Agreement with the EU are two items of one agenda, intended to open Ukraine's economy to foreign markets," said Ukraine's Premier Mykola Azarov after he closed the deals in St. Petersburg. "This is necessary to maintain the sustainable economic development of our country." Such accents might be interpreted as Kyiv's attempts to revive the multivector strategy used by Leonid Kuchma. The Kremlin does not appear happy with this. "I think the threat to the FTZ agreement comes primarily from the draft Free Trade Agreement with the EU that Ukraine is currently working on," commented Sergei Glazev, Executive Secretary of the Customs Union Committee and Deputy Secretary General of Eurasian Economic Union, making sure everyone understood that this message was specifically intended for Ukraine.

Under these circumstances, the FTZ agreement that is of overall benefit to Ukraine, will most probably be shelved for a very long time. ■

Supply Side

A new index of bribe-payers highlights slow progress in curbing sleaze

Bribery involves two parties, not one. Lambasting officials in poor countries for their sticky fingers is usually easier (and less open to legal challenge) than investigating those who suborn them.


But on November 2nd Transparency International, a Berlin-based campaigning group, published an updated version of its Bribe Payers Index. Based on questions to 3,000 businessmen, this ranks 28 countries (accounting for 80% of global trade and investment) by the perceived likelihood of their companies paying bribes. Russia and China scored worst by a hefty margin. Dutch and Swiss companies were seen as the cleanest, with Belgium, Germany and Japan close behind. Construction and industries involving government contracts, unsurprisingly, were the dirtiest.

Disappointingly, the latest version of the index shows no significant change since the previous edition in 2008. That comes despite some big shifts in national legislation and international anti-bribery activity. Recent prosecutions under America's Foreign Corrupt Practices Act have sent culprits to jail for record terms. The former boss of an America-based telecoms firm, Joel Esquenazi, received a 15-year jail sentence on October 25th for paying nearly \$900,000 in bribes to Haiti's national telephone company. An accomplice received a seven-year sentence. But practical progress has been a lot thinner. Transparency

Britain has introduced a tough anti-bribery law too. Laurence Cockcroft, a British economist who specialises in anti-bribery campaigns, says the dozen recent prosecutions by the Serious Fraud Office belie its reputation for fee-

Givers and takers

Perceived corruption levels by country and companies' propensity to bribe



Source: Transparency International

bleness: "it's a huge improvement on five years ago."

Even countries best known as sources and recipients of corrupt payments are trying to meet international standards, at least on paper. Saudi Arabia has set up an anti-corruption agency. China, India and Indonesia have passed anti-bribery laws. So too has Russia, in what most observers think is an attempt to ensure membership of the World Trade Organisation and support a pending application to join the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), a Paris-based think-tank for advanced industrialised countries.

But practical progress has been a lot thinner. Transparency International complains that Germany, Japan and Saudi Arabia have not yet ratified a UN convention on bribery. 21 of the 38 states that signed the OECD anti-bribery convention, including Australia, Brazil, Canada, Mexico, South Africa and Turkey, show "little or no enforcement" of it. Attempts to get the G20 group of the world's biggest economies to tighten rules on transparency and bribery have also bogged down. The agenda for

a summit this week in Cannes was dominated by avoiding an immediate economic meltdown, rather than dealing, as the incumbent French presidency initially hoped, with financial mischief.

Robert Palmer of Global Witness, a London-based campaigning group, says that bribery indices, though welcome, fail to highlight the crucial role of intermediaries: banks that handle corrupt payments and lawyers who advise clients how to get around anti-bribery laws—for example by making "facilitation payments" which are a common loophole. He and other campaigners want new rules to make companies record payments to governments publicly and to publish accounts reporting their activity country by country.

But perhaps the biggest pressure is likely to come from shareholder ire. Next year Transparency International will publish an updated ranking of big global companies, highlighting their use of offshore finance and their perceived willingness to pay bribes. A plunging share price may be the biggest disincentive to the corrupters of the weak and greedy. ■



Window Dressing in Kyiv

As it prepares for Euro 2012, the government wastes billions to build Potemkin villages

Author:
Oleksandr
Zvorovsky

"The reconstruction of the Olympic Stadium is a landmark project for Ukraine's image," said Viktor Yanukovich at the opening of the renovated stadium. Kyiv authorities also report the successful construction of infrastructure facilities. Independent experts say corruption scams continuously boost the cost of Kyiv's preparations for Euro 2012, while the authorities fail to draw private investment and the quality of facilities under hasty construction is questionable.

AT ANY COST

The 70,000-seat Olympic Stadium has been under reconstruction for

over three years. However, 65% of all works have been completed since March 2010. The renovation has been going on in three shifts to finish the facilities on time.

Borys Kolesnikov, Vice Premier and Infrastructure Minister, who is in charge of Euro 2012 in Ukraine, estimated the total cost of the renovation at UAH 4.5-4.6bn (USD 570-585mn). This is almost as much as the GBP 390mn (UAH 4.86bn) London-based Arsenal needed to build the Emirates Stadium for 60,000 seats in 2006. For Arsenal, though, this was enough not only to construct the stadium but also renovate the neighborhood. Ear-

lier, Munich-based Bavaria and TSV 1860 München spent EUR 340mn (about UAH 3.74bn) to build the 70,000-seat Allianz Arena for the 2006 football championship. Such comparisons make Borys Kolesnikov nervous. To justify the cost, he says the stadiums in Europe were built prior to the financial crisis, unlike the Olympic Stadium. This is not convincing enough as the crisis knocked down the cost of construction materials and labor.

In pursuit of the successful completion of the "landmark project for Ukraine's image," as officials refer to it, the government turns a blind eye to numer-



PHOTO: ANDRIY LOMAKIN

ous violations in the course of Euro 2012 preparations. Oleksandr Bryhinets, Member of Kyiv City Council, says the construction of the stadium destroyed two ramparts of the Kosiy Kaponir (the Sloping Caponier), part of the Kyiv Fortification architectural complex. Vasyl Kostyrtsia, a Ukrainian representative of the International Labor Organization, claims numerous subcontractors illegally employed builders from Western Ukraine for the reconstruction, paying their salaries in envelopes undeclared.

LOST IN THE INFRASTRUCTURE

Tetiana Slyshyk, Head of Kyiv State Administration's Main Department for Euro 2012 in Ukraine, says most city infrastructure facilities, primarily roads, will be completed this year.

The administration, however, is not going to repair Kyiv streets on a large-scale basis. It does not have enough cash in the budget.

The Mayor is only planning the renovation of 19 streets surrounding the Olympic Stadium.

One of the roads completely renovated for Euro 2012 is Kyiv-Vyshhorod-Desna highway to the president's infamous residence in Mezhyhiria. Officials claim they have done this on UEFA's demand. In fact though, not a single facility that could be used for the championship is located along that stretch of road.

Kyiv authorities also intended to improve the health care system for Euro 2012. They have planned to repair some city hospitals and the Kyiv City Blood Center. "The money was allocated less than a year before the championship but the tenders have yet to be completed. The estimated budgets are

solution, the Kyiv City Administration is signing contracts with local colleges to use their dormitories, where they can accommodate nearly 60,000 guests, charging them EUR 30-40 per bed. Dmytro Zaruba, Deputy Chairman of the State Tourism and Resort Service, admits that dorm staff is totally unprepared to provide hotel-quality services, such as changing bedding and toilettries every day.

As an alternative, football fans will be offered tent cities near Kyiv. But even officials doubt this backup plan will work. "The most humble European tourists will still need something more than just an open-air field. They need a complete infrastructure with water supply, transportation network, nearby shopping and so on. I really doubt that all these improvised tent cities will ever meet these standards," Mr. Zaruba admits.

POTEMKIN VILLAGES

Kyiv authorities fear the government will stop funding the renovation of infrastructure facilities immediately after the championship, since it will no longer be an image-making thing. "The same thing happened in 1980 when Kyiv stores were stocked with deficit products for a short period during the Olympics in Moscow," says Oleksandr Davydenko. "Nothing has changed over the last 30 years."

Nor has Kyiv seen any meaningful investment into Euro 2012 facilities. Initially, the authorities hoped investors would largely lighten the financial burden of the central and local budgets. Hopes have been crushed, Oleksandr Holubchenko admits. "Investors are only interested in hotels," he says. "Other sectors have failed to lure any private investment." Analysts link this to the unfavorable investment climate in Ukraine. "Corruption, bribery, weak protection of investor rights, game rules that change all the time and other 'treats' scare off foreigners who are used to civilized conditions for conducting business," comments Volodymyr Ovadenko, Senior Analyst at UFC Capital. He thinks corruption has significantly increased the cost of Euro 2012 preparations. ■

THE AUTHORITIES HOPE TO HIDE THE DEFECTS BEHIND POTEMKIN VILLAGES THEY ARE BUILDING SWIFTLY

often hugely overpriced, while most of the planned work has not begun," Kyiv Council Deputy Oleksiy Davydenko complains. Officials have funneled UAH 5.5mn to buy a mobile hospital for the city, despite that fact that the Ministries of Defense, Health and Emergencies already have several. "For some reason, Kyiv authorities decided they wanted one of their own. They've reported the cost alone without a cost estimate, or a list of medicines and equipment," says Mr. Davydenko. "This means its medical supply will be adjusted, based on the funds available, not what Kyiv needs."

It has emerged that the city does not have adequate housing to host all potential visitors for Euro 2012. Their estimated number is at least 200,000. Local authorities have fulfilled UEFA's task to prepare nearly 8,000 rooms in 3-5 star hotels to accommodate the target groups but, just like before, there are too few to host all football fans. According to Andriy Stavenko, Director of TUI, the travel agency responsible for accommodating Euro 2012 fans, Kyiv lacks more than 12,000 rooms including 5,300 in the economy class category. As a

According to different estimates,

500,000-1,000,000

foreign fans will visit Ukraine during Euro 2012

At least **200,000** fans will attend championship games in Kyiv

Because of the shortage of hotels, authorities are going to settle

60,000 fans in dorms

Hoteliers anticipate that hotel prices could double or quadruple for Euro 2012, increasing to more than

USD 200

at certified hotels



FLYING HIGH?

Donetsk airport will cost taxpayers UAH 6.15bn (USD 769mn). The only question is who will get a chance to appreciate the spendthrift other than MPs and top officials who account for the lion's share of all airport passengers

The Engorges of Billions

Football gives Donetsk companies a fantastic chance to steal the taxpayers' money

Author:
Serhiy
Korobchuk

Markian Lyubkivsky, Tournament Director in Ukraine, has decided to remind the boys from Donetsk of the obvious shortcomings in Euro 2012 preparations. "Accommodation for target groups is the biggest problem in Donetsk today," he says. "UEFA requires more than 5,500 hotel rooms compared to the currently available 1,600."

Donetsk's shortage of hotels apparently stems from the reasoning that building such facilities for football fans, who will only come to town for a few weeks is too risky, even with government support. One discouraging example is the five-star Donbas Palace, one of Rinat Akhmetov's favorite toys, where lighted windows are a rarity. In 2009, only 23% of the hotel rooms were filled.

Meanwhile, local authorities were forced to take eight hotels out of the championship program, according to Serhiy Repin, Head of Donetsk Council Special Department for Euro 2012. Work has

come to a halt on the almost finished second phase of the Central hotel complex. According to official information from Donetsk Mayor, Oleksandr Lukianchenko, the owners have overestimated their resources and gone broke. But rumor has it, that the family of one-time MP Anatoliy Bohatyrenko who allegedly controls the Central, expected – and for good reason – to make a pretty penny out of the enormous tranches from the public budget, which were supposedly promised to it, but ended up with nothing.

Management Assets Company (MACO) owned by Oleksandr Yanukovych, the President's son, recently presented a construction project on the basis of the Druzhba hotel in Donetsk. Initially, following a good upgrade, this was supposed to be a cozy five-storey hotel for football fans. At least, that was the purpose for which the government supported MAKO in purchasing the facility. Now, Mr. Yanukovych Jr.'s firm has razed the building to the ground and an-

nounced its intent to construct a high-rise VIP office and residential complex, despite furious protests from neighboring communities. What's more, the deadline for opening the facility is at least a year after the championship.

SOARING COSTS

Another problem Donetsk must deal with six months before the championship is transportation. The new airport, a key facility in the chain, is growing at a rapid rate. And so is its cost. The Cabinet of Ministers has already donated extra cash for construction several times over this year alone, thus swelling total public spending on the transportation complex to UAH 6.15bn from the initial UAH 1.19bn. This sets a record of sorts, costing twice as much as the official cost of Donbas Arena, the key Euro 2012 facility in Donetsk that Mr. Akhmetov built at his own expense.

UEFA requires the future Euro 2012 passenger terminal capacity to cater for more than 3,000 passengers per hour. No one is pre-

Donetsk authorities
have bought

5

mobile toilets
for UAH

3.9mn

(USD 488,000)

pared to predict how such capacities will be used once the short championship comes to an end. Moreover, MPs and top officials who now account for a lion's share of routine passengers at the Donetsk airport have splurged another UAH 307mn on a separate VIP terminal for their own use.

The enormous amount of capital currently being invested in the airport and other football facilities in Donetsk go almost exclusively to Altcom construction corporation. Independent experts insistently link it to Borys Kolesnikov, Vice Premier for Euro 2012 Preparations. According to public sources, this year alone, the corporation received contracts from the government worth UAH 2.94bn.

Oleksandr Lukianchenko, the Mayor of Donetsk, claims that the city executive committee has already spent UAH 482mn of public funds on infrastructure, not counting the airport and is expecting to receive an additional amount of more than UAH 2bn in the near future. The most exotic purchases include five mobile toilets worth UAH 3.9mn and World War II tanks to decorate the museum grounds next to Donbas Arena. However, the lion's share of the funding will be spent on roads.

Currently, the only streets of good quality are a few central avenues. The asphalt on the rest looks like a military obstacle course. This surprises no one, since in the last few years, the efforts of local authorities and relevant budget funding have all gone to build a road to relieve traffic congestion around Mr. Akhmetov's private stadium. In the fall, it was named after the 75th anniversary of the Donetsk-based and Akhmetov-sponsored Shakhtar football club. This in itself is a paradox, as there are no actual houses under this address, since the highway cuts through a park, ruining the flood plain of the River Kalmius. This earned the omnipresent Altcom another UAH 250mn. The second stage of roadworks, due before Euro 2012 was estimated at UAH 279.79mn by the Capital Construction Department of the Donetsk City Council. The Cabinet of Ministers has just provided another UAH 500mn to complete the construction of a ringroad around the city. Take a guess as to who the subcontractor will be... ■



The Sky Over Kharkiv

The biggest problems facing Kharkiv include the airport construction, opaque tenders and corruption

Author:
Anatoliy
Mazhora

An unofficial translation of a letter signed by UEFA Tournament Director Martin Kalen and Markian Lyubkivsky, Director of Euro 2012 in Ukraine, addressed to Vice Premier Borys Kolesnikov has recently been leaked onto the web. It says that UEFA has doubts about the readiness of the runway and control tower at Kharkiv airport. "There is a threatening situation with the installation of lighting equipment along the runway as a result of failed supply deadlines," the letter says. The airport is being built at the taxpayers' expense and that of Oleksandr Yarovlavsky, the owner of Metalist FC who also funded the renovation of the Metalist Stadium. However, the runway and the control tower are the responsibility of the Infrastructure Ministry headed by Mr. Kolesnikov.

During his recent visit to Kharkiv, Mr. Kolesnikov assured everyone that the airport has all the necessary airfield navigational lighting and will meet the installation deadline. "In fact, the only problem anywhere in the world is money," Mr. Kolesnikov explained. "As far as supplies are concerned...If you have the funds - you'll have the supplies."

However this summer, the Ukrainian branch of NEXANS Group, a French producer of runway equipment, sent Mr. Kolesnikov a letter pleading for help. It mentioned a company called EnergosynteZ that had ordered lighting wires, supposedly for the Kharkiv airport, but refused to continue cooperation with

the French company and later cancelled the order. In spring, EnergosynteZ surfaced in the Ukrainian media as part of yet another scandal, concerning the supply of lighting equipment to the Zhuliany airport in Kyiv. Rumor has it that Anatoliy Kolisnyk, Chairman of the State Aviation Authority of Ukraine, helped the company win tenders to supply lighting equipment for the Kyiv, Lviv and Kharkiv airports.

The airport is not the only obstacle facing Kharkiv on its course to hosting Euro 2012 tournaments. The city is desperately short of hotel rooms. Andriy Stavenko, Head of the Agency for Accommodating Euro 2012 Fans, stated that Kharkiv lacks 3,000 economy class rooms.

Corruption scandals have also been aplenty in Kharkiv. Last year, Mayor Hennadiy Kernes instructed municipal authorities to buy subway benches at a cost of UAH 28,000 each for Euro 2012.

Kharkiv roads have an untamed appetite for cash. In August, Volodymyr Chumakov, Director of the Construction and Roads Department in the Kharkiv City Council, complained that the government did not invest any funds for repairing local roads. Apparently, this was far from true. In 2011, a company called Parking+ won tenders worth a total of UAH 273.13mn to perform some works in Kharkiv, of which UAH 95.09mn was designated for the repair the roads. Until recently, the above-mentioned Mr. Chumakov was CEO and co-owner of the winner of this tender. ■

EVERYTHING AS PLANNED?
Lviv stadium five
days before the opening



PHOTO: VOLODYMYR SHOSTAK

The Mysteries of Lviv

There is an aura of mystery concerning the way billions allocated for Lviv's preparations for the championship have been appropriated

Author:
Roman
Shostak

The construction of Euro 2012 facilities in the Lviv Oblast will cost UAH 13.1bn. The government promised UAH 8.6bn while local authorities and private investors are expected to pay the rest. 20 days before the official opening of the new stadium in Lviv, scheduled for 29 October, Oblast Council Deputies tried to find out how their subcontractors were spending budget funds. They applied to the administration of the Directorate for the Construction of Euro 2012 Facilities in Lviv, otherwise known as ZakhidInfraProekt a government-appointed enterprise that had ordered the facilities on behalf of the government, to provide this information at the Oblast Council session. After a week of reflection, they received a written response, which could be referred to the classics of worldwide bureaucratic creativity.

SILENCE, PLEASE!

According to the Instruction of the Ukrainian Euro 2012 Infrastructure Project (UkrEuroInfraProekt), the new name of the National Agency for the Preparation of the Euro 2012 Championship in Ukraine, issued this year, three months after the Law of Ukraine "On Access to Public Information", dated January 2011 came into effect, "the course of court proceedings related to the rental and privatization of state-owned property where UkrEuroInfraProekt is either plaintiff or respondent" is classified information "until the court announces its verdict".

The preparations in Lviv became this secretive when the Cabinet of Ministers and UkrEuroInfraProekt chose the Donetsk-based Altcom financial and industrial group as the executive contractor. To accelerate the work, it was allowed to hire subcontractors

and buy materials and equipment without conducting tenders. This launched a top-to bottom monopoly hierarchy. As a result, the Lviv Oblast ended up with slightly more than 500 vacancies on Euro 2012 construction sites, as opposed to the tens of thousands promised by the authorities.

Rumor has it that officials are now banned from disclosing the mere fact of the initiation of criminal cases related to Euro 2012 preparations, let alone subsequent court proceedings. Of late, all law enforcement officials have suddenly stopped talking about financial fraud during the preparations in public, which has surprised many experts, striving to ensure public oversight over the process. A year ago, the Central Inspection Authority (KRU) revealed the misappropriation of UAH 1bn, virtually all of it related to public procurements, resulting in the initiation of seven criminal cases, but no one knows their fate, or what the verdict was in the case initiated by the Oblast Prosecutor's Office on the recognition of the invalidity of an Agreement, as a result of which a foreign company was paid UAH 15.1mn from the state budget, although the actual value of the work executed, totaled all of UAH 180,000.

VANISHED CASES

Silence speaks louder than facts. The Lviv Oblast has a list of more than 90 facilities designated for funding, construction or renovation for Euro 2012. What is their future? The only person who could answer this question is no longer alive. 57-year old Stepan Lukashyk was Head of the Main Department for Euro 2012 and City Construction at the Lviv Oblast State Administration. He died of a heart attack on 3 May 2011, after nine months in office.

Ihor Markov, Director of the Social Survey Laboratory at the Private Initiative Support Center, has been holding surveys and polls on Euro 2012 for several years. He says Lviv will have the most criminal cases launched on the basis of the preparations for the championship. Of course, this will not happen before July 2012 when the European football champion will already be determined. ■

The estimated cost
of the Lviv stadium
was initially

UAH
750mn
(USD
94mn)

It has now
increased to

UAH 2.2bn
(USD
275mn)

¹ Western Infrastructure Project

Police vs Football Fans

Why the police raid football gangs



PHOTO: UNIAN

Author:
Bohdan
Butkevych

Over the past few months Ukraine has seen quite a few surprising incidents involving football fans. These recently climaxed in an open-ended strike against repression by police which was announced by the gangs of Donetsk. The moles, the nickname for the fans of Donetsk-based Shakhtar (the miner in English), are going to boycott all games Rinat Akhmetov's football club plays at home. In Simferopol, the police violently broke up the fans of the local Tavria FC, arresting over half of the crowd. **The Ukrainian Week's** sources claim the instruction to purge the fan community comes directly from the top cabinets. What drives the government is not so much the zeal to push football troublemakers into the backyard and keep Euro 2012 quiet. It is more concerned with the protest-

ready youth groups that are better organized and more effective than the fragmented opposition party teams. The fans claim the police are seeking the right to protect tournaments during the finals which will give the Interior Ministry access to almost UAH 1bn.

OUT OF SIGHT, OUT OF MIND

7 August 2011 was the D-Day. Dynamo Kyiv fans and Lviv Karpaty supporters started a fight on the jogging track of the stadium in Kyiv during the fifth round of Ukraine's Premier League. A guy named Andriy Salamatov tore down a flag with the portrait of Roman Shukhevysh, a Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) General, on it in the guest sector of the Lviv fans. It did not take long for the Dynamo fans to attack the provocateur and return the flag to their friends from Lviv. Later, Mr. Sal-

amatov turned out to be a ukrainophobe well-known on the web. He often makes ukrainophobic statements on the Internet and is a member of the Eurasian Youth Union extremist organization which was involved in vandalizing the trident at Hoverla, Ukraine's highest peak, in 2007. A few minutes after the incident with Mr. Salamatov, the sectors containing the Kyiv fans spontaneously shouted, "Thank you, people of Donbas for the President jackass!" Immediately the slogan became popular throughout the country. What happened later proves that this was the turning point in the government's attitude towards the fans as the video of them shouting the slogan turned into an online sensation and generated endless Internet hits, despite the clumsy attempts of the special services to delete it. »

Shortly after the tournament, the police initiated a criminal case for beating up the Shukhevyeh-hater upon charges of hooliganism. A week later they arrested Andriy Korenivsky, another leader and cheerleader of the Dynamo fan club. "They chose me for a reason, I think," Andriy says. "The militia knows I'm always with my megaphone and this case comes specifically from the chant about Donbas. But I didn't start it, it rose from nowhere. All the time I spent at the police department they kept telling me they would only release me if I admitted I was the one who beat Mr. Salamatov. The investigator played the video of the fight a million times and said, here, you hit him; admit it and we'll release you. On the video someone's jeans-clad leg is seen kicking Salamatov in the side, but I was wearing shorts that day."

After the interrogation, which lasted 12 hours, nearly 300 Dynamo fans and a few dozen journalists turned up in front of the police department. This made the police release Andriy under a pledge of house arrest, although they then changed his status in the case from witness to suspect. "You shouldn't have shouted all that shit," the officers said at the end.

"My investigator would often leave the room and go somewhere for advice," Andriy recalls. "He was very young and obviously inexperienced. Someone on top was supervising his actions. As for Mr. Salamatov, it looks like this guy had a very clear goal to provoke us and make the conflict totally political. That's why he mentions the infamous Victory Day in Lviv, where the 'hired Nazis from Kyiv' supposedly beat up WWII veterans, every time he speaks in public." Clearly, this situation could be a result of someone's efforts to discredit the fans by showing that they are involved in politics and pose a threat at the stadiums. The government has, for a long time, been trying to turn the fan movement into a laughing stock and show how the fans use every possible chance to express their "Nazi ideas" or cause mayhem. The reason for this, I think, is in the huge funding provided for Euro 2012 security. If the militia really wanted to find a quiet and peaceful solution, they would simply meet with local fans in every city and ask them to behave if they are so concerned with us mak-



PHOTO: UNIAN

AN INCIDENT WITH ANDRIY SALAMATOV. The fans are running after the provocateur who grabbed the flag with the portrait of Roman Shukhevyeh

ing trouble. This championship is like a short craze for Ukrainian fans, they hardly even need it. It's more of a circus that will come to town, put on the show and leave, while, as always, we'll be pushed out of sight as far as possible."

Andriy Korenivsky is facing four years in jail. Investigators say they are sending the case to court in November. Andriy says he hopes for the best but is ready if things go otherwise. "I'm only sorry for my mum," he says.

UP AND RUNNING

All fan clubs of Donetsk Shakhtar, the key opponent for Kyiv Dynamo, made an announcement through the media in mid-October: "Sadly, we are forced to go on an open-ended strike and suspend the proactive support or any choreography for football tournaments to prevent potential charges and provocations. Also, we will refrain from visiting home matches as a result of the growing repression of football fans by the police in Donetsk."

Donetsk fans that have talked to *The Ukrainian Week* insist unanimously that the problems started immediately after the Thank you, people of Donbas... chant. "We've never experienced this pressure before," Serhiy admits. "Security officers ransacked us like crazy at the very next game after the chant for no reason, taking all banners and posters and they got whatever was left after the game. Then they broke up the fan march and arrested several dozen people for, as they said, an unauthorized assem-

bly with radical intentions. Later, the militia 'invited fans for interviews.' They would just grab people from their front door in front of their families, or from offices and colleges. They did everything possible to exert psychological pressure on us. The interrogations were nothing but blackmail. Quit it or 'you'll all go to jail' they said. They wanted us to stop chanting what they referred to as xenophobic slogans, such as 'Long live Ukraine!' 'You'd better stay away from the stadiums and not spoil the fun for other people,' they said."

In response to this, the Interior Ministry highlighted "growing nationalism and xenophobia" among football fans. The Donetsk militia believe the geography of this radicalism is expanding throughout Ukraine from Donetsk to Mariupol, Kramatorsk, Sloviansk, Lviv, Kharkiv, Poltava, Mykolayiv, Luhansk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Simferopol, and Sevastopol. They tend to justify their anti-fan hyperactivity with the upcoming Euro 2012 and UEFA's requirements.

According to the official explanation of the dispersal of the fan march, "Donetsk militia stopped the unauthorized rally of a group of young people. They were marching in the city disguised as football fans and shouting slogans inciting ethnic hatred. When arrested, they said they were from Shakhtar and Metalurh gangs, although none of the football clubs were playing that day." This tone resembles reports of the Russian police after they had

dispersed one of a dozen Dissenters' Marches.

The boycott of Shakhtar's home games continues. The threat of repression overshadows inter-club animosity. The ever irreconcilable fans of Dynamo and Shakhtar cut a non-aggression pact during their last game. Kyiv and Donetsk fans shouted not a single insulting word at each other during the whole game.

"CLAMP THE SHITHEADS DOWN"

The Ukrainian Week's source claims fans are being summoned to preventive interviews everywhere from Lviv to Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Lutsk. Police officers use the same style and tone to pound their key message "to get lost and sit quiet" into the fans' heads.

"Actually, the current government is very sensitive about any organized groups that could be dangerous," says Serhiy Tarshynsky, a social psychologist. "Football fans are pulled together and well organized. Once they expressed their attitude towards the government, it responded in the only way it knows how; by ordering that they be rubbed out before they join the opposition. Thus, the instruction to purge the fans comes directly from the people in the team in power who supervise the social sector."

An officer of the Chief Investigation Department says anonymously there has been an order to find the person who started the Thank you, people of Donbas... chant as part of the Salamatov case. "We had a call from the Presidential Administration immediately after the video spread on the Internet," the officer claims. "The caller made it perfectly clear that 'we would either clamp the shit-heads down' or will find ourselves looking for a new job. In fact, we've been dealing with fans for a while now and have compiled a database of football fans in every city. But now there has been a clear order: they must shut up."

There is yet another side to the problem that is not so political. This is about who will provide security services during the 2012 championship. UEFA's requirement is to have so-called stewards, not police, at the stadiums. In the West, there are professional stewards, people who guard varying

public events. Obviously, Ukraine has none of these and the government will hardly train them for the tournament. Thus, talks started a while ago about having the police in steward uniforms guard the stadiums and the surrounding neighborhoods.

This craving of Ukrainian police to guard the championship matches is not so much about love for football as it is about the chance

stadiums will be like taking candy from a baby. The right to ensure security at the championship tournaments will be subcontracted to a loyal company that will further subcontract it to the police.

Unlike Russia for instance, Ukrainian fans have been surprisingly non-extremist and non-xenophobic until recently. Today, though, their image of aggressive people is intensely promoted in society. If the nation believes in the fan threat, the police will have a chance to return to the stadiums once again, for the first time after Dnipropetrovsk Berkut, a special-purpose police unit, violently beat up Kyiv fans at Ukraine's Super Cup game in 2007 and the police were kicked out of the stadiums. If they succeed this time, putting police officers as stewards in the stadiums and grabbing the cash will be a piece of cake, especially under the current tighten-the-screws concept in the government's relations with its nation. ■

FOOTBALL FANS RUN INTO TROUBLE RIGHT AFTER THE THANK YOU, PEOPLE OF DONBAS... CHANT

to get hold of the huge funding provided by UEFA and the Euro 2012 organization committee for security purposes.

Non-confirmed estimations have it at almost UAH 1bn (USD 125mn). Legalizing the police at the



O'BRIEN'S IRISH PUB

Live music

- The best breakfast in town (8.00-12.00)
- Business lunch (12.00-15.00)
- Traditional Irish dishes (8.00-2.00)
- Broadcast of football matches, on the big screen & numerous TV sets
- We take orders for parties & banquets

We accepted all kind of credit cards

17a Mykhaylivska str.
Tel. (+38044)279-15-84
www.obriens.kiev.ua

What the Young

Graduates from schools in Central and Eastern Europe took part in the fifth competition of debate, knowledge of current issues and the German language

The Kyiv-based International Youth Debate held this year included the winners of competitions among 2,300 students from over 140 schools in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine. The event was organized by the Goethe-Institut, Hertie Foundation, the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation, and the Central German Authority for Schools Abroad. The 2011 finals took place under the patronage of Vitaliy Klytschko. German Ambassador Hans-Jürgen Heimsoeth, Deputy Ukrainian Culture Minister Viktoriya Lisnych and other guests attended the final round. Hermann Otto Solms, Vice President of the German Bundestag, had planned to visit as well, but cancelled his trip in light of the political situation in Ukraine.

This debate is similar to school competitions popular in Ukraine. In addition to exercising participants' foreign language skills, the debate encourages students to learn democratic values. Defending opinions that are not necessarily one's own, trying to understand and listen to others while offering one's own arguments, and reaching compromises and convincing everyone are all crucial skills. It is the lack of these skills that leaves many problems in the Ukrainian political establishment unresolved. Public discussion could facilitate faster progress.

INTELLECT

"These finals were possible due to the fact that the participant-schools train their students in debate culture and rules intensively beginning in the eighth or ninth grade," Elke Kiesewalter, coordinator and advisor for the Germany Central Authority for Schools Abroad that deals with specialized schools in Ukraine focused on the

Author:
Inna
Zavgorodnya

Photo:
Andriy
Lomakin

The event was organized by the Goethe-Institut, Hertie Foundation, the Remembrance, Responsibility and Future Foundation, and the Central German Authority for Schools Abroad

German language, said. "We arranged four regional competitions for schools in eastern, southern, western Ukraine and Kyiv. Two winners from each region travel to Kyiv to represent Ukraine in the finals." Two Ukrainian students, Kateryna Komanchuk from Kryvyi Rih and Oleksandra Petrova from Kyiv, progressed to the final round.

The teachers who accompanied and supported their students at the competition are the key proponents of debate competitions in Ukrainian schools. "The debate should turn into a regular activity for senior school students in Ukraine," says Valentyna Orap, Deputy President of school 239, which focuses on the German language. One girl taking part in the finals attends this school. "Our school has been in this project for just two years. It was a great success for us to win first place in Ukraine. Debating in German is very challenging of course, especially for pupils who don't even do it in Ukrainian. So we held similar debates in Ukrainian last year and our colleagues supported us. The topic was Is Ukraine my future. The process has certain rules and time limits. This is great for training school graduates and developing their skills. In Poland and the Czech Republic we see that every senior school student knows the rules in their native languages. They have either participated in or watched debates at some point, so it comes naturally," she comments.

Germany has also borrowed the debates, but has been integrating them into their education. "The culture of debate began to evolve in Germany ten years ago," says Ms. Kiesewalter. "They are really popular but are not practised in every school yet. Historically, schools in the UK and USA have a much deeper tradition of debate. Germany has just started on this path."



THE DISCUSSION WE NEED

Some debate topics were taken from school life as their role for different countries varied. Among other things, the participants discussed the need of an "anonymous CV" when applying for a job that gives no name, age, nationality, sex or photo, but only lists education and working experience. This could prevent discrimination by age, sex or ethnic background. Other points included the right for disabled children to go to the same schools as healthy children and the ban on drinking alcohol for children under 18. Some topics were integrated to look for a single solution within Europe. Hypothetically, such decisions taken in the EU do not cover Ukraine automatically and this

Have to Say



could not but come up in arguments from Ukrainian participants. The debate trained Ukrainian students to think in terms of the future in a united Europe. Meanwhile, Western neighbors and diplomats involved Ukraine in the European debate. "For me, Ukraine is not that far," says Gabriella Vashatova from the Czech Republic. "We learned about your country in school. I don't care that much if Ukraine is in the EU or not. EU issues are global and affect the whole world."

"I think it's all about the nations," Ukrainian student Katia Komanchuk notes. "If the law bans Ukrainians from doing something they won't care a lot while Germans will think about it. We've dis-

cussed extremely interesting political and social things, such as whether all schools need a uniform or whether countries should authorize homosexual marriages. We even talked about selling chewing gums in schools. Sometimes, the issues seem quite petty, yet they still improve language skills. I love it. The attitude is totally different. At a school competition you just come and answer the questions while here you look at them from every possible perspective."

THE ATMOSPHERE

Gabriella Vashatova, a 19-year old, is a member of an organization that implements an anti-alcohol campaign yet has nothing to say against nuclear power. "It's no big deal for

INTERNATIONAL YOUTH DEBATE IN KYIV.

The winners of competitions were 2,300 students from over 140 schools in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine

me," she says. "We have two nuclear power plants in my country and have never had a problem with them. There have been some protests from the Austrian side as one plant is on the border. But no protests in the Czech Republic." The sensitive nuclear power topic was in the final debate, too. One of the discussion points was whether all European countries should give up nuclear power as soon as possible via legislation.

The issue is critical for Ukraine. Chornobyl is the first thing most Europeans think of when they hear Ukraine. The participants in the final often referred to Ukraine's experience when debating the issue. "We had something similar at the Kyiv final," Oleksandra Petrova recalls. "We debated on whether Ukraine should invest more into alternative energy sources. My opinion is that countries should quit nuclear power. But we're only talking about the near future. And that is impossible, especially with countries such as the Czech Republic or Finland investing in it."

In Ukraine, public debate on Chornobyl normally intensifies closer to the anniversary of the tragedy while some crucial events, such as the construction of two reactors at the Khmelnytska nuclear power plant, never get more than local publicity. Decisions on other construction that is no less significant and often just as controversial, such as the central nuclear waste storage in the Chornobyl zone and the nuclear power plant in Kirovohrad Region, are made in top offices with hardly any debate. But these things must be discussed. Consequently, a debate among young school students could be a good example for the entire Ukrainian nation. I asked Gabriella whether she changed her opinion on nuclear power after the final debate. She said she did not.

The winner of 2011 International Youth Debate finals was Annett Lymar from Estonia. "I enjoyed the debate, but it was very stressful. I had to prepare every single day. Still, I regret it's over. I'd say everyone should participate in it."

Ukrainian politicians themselves occasionally debate, but they clearly lack experience in this sophisticated intellectual activity. Our advice is to arrange this sort of competitions and trainings for adults, as well as teenagers. ■

European Optimist

Historian Andreas Kappeler speaks on the political concept of Europe and ways to forge European identity


Interviewer
Oleksiy Sokyryko

Photo
Oleksandr Chekhmeniov

An Austrian historian with Swiss citizenship who has worked in Germany and Russia, Andreas Kappeler has the goal of building bridges between Eastern and Western Europe. One of the advocates of Ukrainian history in the scientific world, he is a former director of the Vienna Institute of Eastern European History. *The Ukrainian Week* asked him for his professional opinion on problems with forging a new European identity and the future of national identities in Europe.

UW: Until recently manifestations of national identities in European countries were viewed as politically incorrect vestiges of the pre-modern era. Demonstration of and emphasis on the national identity of European politics were considered relapses of xenophobia and chauvinism. Is the era of nationalisms indeed in the past? Will national self-identification be replaced by something new?

– To answer this question, we need to look at a few episodes in history. The 19th century in Western and Central Europe was a time when national movements and separate nations began to take shape. The latter either took hold in the territories of countries that existed then (such as France and Denmark), formed as separate subregions (Germany and Italy), or broke off former empires (the Czech Republic and Ireland). In the second half of the 20th century, and all the more so after the First World War and the breakup of continental empires in Europe, new nation states began to emerge on the continent. Nationalism was not and is not a vestige of the premodern era. On the contrary, it has been an important element of the contemporary scene (modernism). This is proved by the fact that some nations



(Catalonia) have not been able to achieve their goals yet, while others have split off supranational entities (the USSR, Yugoslavia and the Czech Republic).

The model of ethnic differentiation of nation states was in total di-

saccord with the ethnic-territorial reality of Central and Eastern Europe. This situation was conducive to numerous national conflicts. Attempts to form democratic governments fell through in nearly all these newly created states, because prior

to the Second World War, dictatorships with authoritarian nationalist ideologies ruled over almost all of Southern, Central and Eastern Europe (except the Czech Republic).

At the same time, a totalitarian regime took shape in the Soviet Union, which included three Eastern Slavic peoples. The Stalin-led USSR stymied any attempts at nation building and generated Russian nationalist ideology, in addition to a communist one. At the same time, Germany, which started the Second World War in the name of racism and nationalism, carried out unprecedented mass ethnic cleansing which turned some multiethnic countries into mono-ethnic territories. Poland is one such example.

The experience of nationalism and chauvinism in Central and Western Europe forced people to seek new ideologies and international identification after the war. This showed in the idea of European unity which was to bury old conflicts and would unite states once in conflict under one umbrella. The eastern part of the continent, which was under the USSR at the time, did not find protection under the common roof. Hence, Western politicians did not perceive the experience of Soviet communism as something horrible and inhuman. These people were still shellshocked by the Nazi regime and the Holocaust, so some of them even believed that the Soviet regime in fact helped solve the national issue.

NEW CHALLENGES FOR EASTERN EUROPE

UW: The interest of Western scholars in Central and Eastern Europe sharply increased after the breakup of the USSR when the newly emerged states turned out to be a gray area for the rest of the continent. Has this newer Europe become more understandable to Western intellectuals and politicians?

– Little was known about the peoples and republics of the Soviet Union before 1989. They were viewed as parts of the Russian Empire. This applies also to Ukraine, which remained terra incognita for many years. I was one of very few Western historians who taught courses in Ukrainian history before 1989 and had an academic interest in these topics. The situation has improved since then but knowledge of this area is still on a fairly low

BIO

Andreas Kappeler

1943 – born in Zurich (Switzerland)

1962-69 – pursued Slavic Studies and studied history in the universities of Zurich and Vienna

1969 – defended his PhD in the University of Zurich

1970 – received a scholarship to study in Moscow and Leningrad

1971-79 – worked at the University of Zurich and completed his habilitation

1982-98 – Professor of Eastern European History at the University of Cologne

1996 – foreign member of Ukraine's Academy of Sciences

1998 – professor at the University of Vienna

2006-2009 – director of a doctoral-level research project "Austrian Galicia and its polycultural heritage." Author of books *Russia as a Poly-ethnic Empire*; *Mazepynitsi*, *Little Russians*, and *Khokhols: Ukrainians in the Ethnic Hierarchy of the Russian Empire*; and *A Little History of Ukraine*.

level. I'm talking not only about Ukraine but also about such EU members as Slovenia and Slovakia, which are often confused. Of course, today it is easier to understand the peoples of the Central and Eastern Europe. The obstacles are gone; there is plenty of information – at least professional mass media have access to it. However, many people are simply not interested. The Iron Curtain is still a certain barrier in the perception of many. As long as there are challenges emanating from China and the Muslim world, the issues of Central and Eastern Europe will continue to be in the background.

When the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc fell apart, Europe, which believed it had gotten over nationalism, faced new states and nationalisms. This turn of history did not fit in with the dominating public opinion of the time, so it was often perceived as manifestations of chauvinism. Bloody conflicts, which erupted in the former Yugoslavia and in the Southern Caucasus at the time, were graphic proof of this. Some saw them as attempts to revive national identity which had been suppressed by the Soviet regime. However, they led to bloody conflicts in some parts of Europe. Now it was not only about forming nation states but also the ability to control possible excesses and extreme behavior. Fortunately, the situation was not the same everywhere. For example, in the fairly homogeneous countries (after ethnic cleansing), such as Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovenia and Lithuania, it was easier to control the process of nation building than in ethnically mixed territories, such as Eastern and Southeastern Europe.

The lesson we can learn from the 20th-century catastrophes is that all nations and nation states experienced, during their maturation, the aggressive and ruinous influence of nationalism and tried to curb it. We can conclude that national society (it may be composed of several ethnic groups) is sending its roots more deeply than mono-ethnic manifestations of nationalism, which confirms that the concept of nation has been closely linked with that of democracy since the time of the French Revolution.

If we treat nationalism as a manifestation of chauvinism, I hope that its era is close to the expected end. This doesn't mean that an indi-

vidual nation should be viewed as an object of self-identification. If it lives by the principles of democracy and tolerance, takes into consideration the interests of minorities and rejects an expansionist foreign policy, it will certainly win the right to exist. At the same time, a nation should be not only the recipient of loyalty, but also a region, an entity of social inclusion, a democracy, a religion and a part of the world community, in particular Europe. In this case national identification will not be modified but will lose its importance.

THE LABORS OF EUROPEAN IDENTITY

UW: A lot has been said about an identity crisis of united European nations. In your opinion, has this project suffered a fiasco?

– The discourse of identity crisis is not new, and the list of critics of Europe is fairly long. Not surprisingly, the project to forge a united Europe will not be realized in such a rapid and problem-free fashion as was hoped after the Second World War. On the other hand, many changes have taken place which were previously unimaginable. For example, the authority of European institutions was expanded; a single currency was introduced (with all the ensuing problems); all borders were erased, enabling high human mobility. Most countries which once belonged to the Eastern Bloc and three of which were also Soviet republics are now EU members. They did not even dare dream of something like this 25 years ago. As you can see, I remain a European optimist, and this is why I have Swiss (non-EU member) citizenship along with my Swiss passport.


Shaping European identity is a slow process. It may be that it will not emerge as such, but instead we will develop various forms of European self-identification for individual nations, territories, religions, regions, etc. Problems arise when you stop and think: What do we have to understand under "Europe"? Geographically, Russia (its territory before the Urals) and Turkey (its part before the Bosphorus) are also parts of Europe, just like Ukraine and Belarus are. Historically, I believe that all of Eastern Europe and all Orthodox countries belong to Europe. Since antiquity, the overall history of Europe has been shaped in the territory be-

tween Rome and Constantinople. If we use the concept of contemporary Europe as the EU, some countries to the east are outside it, along with such Western countries as the USA, Canada and Australia. The issues of Europe's eastern border remain unresolved. At the same time, it is possible to define the criteria for the EU's capacity. There have been mostly political decisions along this line – for example, whether Ukraine and Turkey will be accepted into the EU. Equally political were the resolutions that granted membership to Greece, Romania and Bulgaria. I still believe that the Europe which has erected a new Golden Iron through its Schengen Zone is incomplete, because I view Eastern Europe as part of a large Europe. To me, without them the EU is not a true union of European countries. As a specialist in Eastern European issues, I see my most important mission in building bridges between Eastern Europe and the rest of the continent. These are the bridges that would enable mutual understanding and a victory over old superstitions. The world has changed so much over the past years that the question of European unity has receded into the background compared to global issues. Today less attention is being paid to the growth of a certain country inside Europe than to its status in the world.

THE SISYPHEAN LABOR OF A HISTORIAN

UW: After large-scale geopolitical crises and conflicts historians are often told to return to literature because their science is, it is alleged, chronically incapable of achieving its mission to be a “teacher of life.” How much substance does this view have?

– Historians are not prophets, just like politicians and social scientists, few of whom could even imagine that the Soviet Union would disintegrate. In general, politicians don't learn from history at all. One possible exception is the Second World War whose lessons had a great impact on postwar policies. But scholars did not contribute much to this, in fact. Today, compared to the 19th century and the Soviet era, historians as public figures are of secondary importance. Politicians and businessmen read few books written by historians. Nevertheless, studying the past



may help them read the current situation, see alternative paths of development or structures and perceive the long-term trends of progress and active traditions. Of course, I don't live in a dreamworld. We historians are not “teachers of life” and have have been. There has never been a historian who supported one particular nationalist ideology, legitimized dictatorship or approved of wars.

UW: You have considerable teaching experience. What kind of people choose the historian's profession these days? What motivates these young people? What was your motivation?

– History has lost some of its importance as a subject in schools and universities. One reason is that that the profession of a historian does not exist anymore. Few people earn their living by doing

and getting a salary comparable to that of graduates with degrees in economics, engineering or computer science.

However, the situation is not that tragic. Most history graduates realize themselves in many possible domains, particularly in the mass media and publishing business, museum work, as well as in the economic sector, social services and diplomacy. Flexibility and mobility are two requirements for young people today. In my opinion, it is important that historical studies today do not have to legitimize the existing order but form critical thinking. Evidently, history will continue to be viewed as a general academic discipline related to many other disciplines. This would be an answer to the question about whether a student of history can study something else.

As far as my personal motivation is concerned, I did not want to become a historian – I was dreaming of journalism. Earlier, I decided to pursue Eastern European studies. That I dared become a historian is accidental. I could have gone into Slavic studies or political science. After completing my PhD, I received an offer to work as a foreign editor with a newspaper and move to Moscow as a foreign correspondent. I declined and stayed in the university. That was also a spontaneous decision. I don't regret it, even though I sometimes say to myself that I could have achieved more if I were a journalist rather than a bookworm. ■



THERE HAS NEVER BEEN A HISTORIAN WHO SUPPORTED ONE PARTICULAR NATIONALIST IDEOLOGY

history, perhaps with the exception of school teachers. Nevertheless, a number of young people still select courses in history, which are optional in our university. In other words, it has not lost its attraction. The strange thing is that students who make a conscious choice of becoming professional historians know that after graduation they will have a hard time finding a job



Sri Lanka

new **non-stop** flight

Aerosvit Ukrainian Airlines
expands its Asian network

 **AeroSVIT**
UKRAINIAN AIRLINES
www.aerosvit.com

Christmas corporate party
from 530 UAH
per person (including beverages)

- Central location
- Recognized chefs
- Exquisite cuisine
- Yes I Can service

Radisson Blu Hotel

22 Yaroslaviv Val Street, Kyiv 01034, Ukraine
Tel. +38 044 492 22 32, Fax +38 044 492 22 15
conference.kiev@radissonblu.com
radissonblu.com/hotel-kyiv

Radisson 
HOTEL, KYIV

While My Violin Gently Weeps



Why Ukrainian classical music is still underground outside the country

Author:
Roman Horbyk

The 'I, Culture Orchestra' performed at the National Opera House on 27 October this year. A Polish-Ukrainian initiative, it gathered together musicians from Poland and Eastern Partnership states. This seemed a perfect chance to show cultural unity in the diver-

sity of this part of Europe. However, the playlist upset Ukrainian fans of classical music as the orchestra only played Polish and Russian classical composers, including Sergei Prokofiev, Karol Szymanowski and Dmitri Shostakovich. The repertoire featured no Ukrainian names, nor will it do so

in the foreseeable future. Therefore it looks like Ukrainian classical music will remain underground even for grant-sponsored projects.

TROUBLED MUSIC

A small playlist incident, that hardly looks worthy of any attention, seems to mirror the current role of Ukrainian classical music in the world. This would have hardly surprised anyone in the past when artists from most small European nations that had no sovereignty were doomed to stay in the shadows. Today, however, the Czech Republic cherishes its Leoš Janáček and Antonín Dvořák as global brands, Hungary promotes Béla Bartók and Lithuania glorifies Mikalojus Čiurlionis. Meanwhile, European music lovers have no chance to hear pieces by Ukrainians Lev Revutsky, Borys Liatoshynsky or Viktor Kosenko.

This fall, I, Culture Orchestra will play in the best European concert halls, including Berlin Philharmonics, one of the most prestigious stages in the world. Experts say it has the best acoustics in the world equaled only by the legendary Concertgebouw in Amsterdam. The Berlin Philharmonic Orchestra is also one of the dream orchestras of every conductor. Unfortunately, director Andreas Wittmann says the music of Ukrainian composers has never been played there.

"I don't think we have ever played Ukrainian music here," Mr. Wittmann tells The Ukrainian Week. "I'm not sure how that's happened. I guess there hasn't been a good occasion. But we would be happy to know good Ukrainian music better anyway."

Mr. Wittmann is unlikely to have this chance anytime soon. Volodymyr Runchak, conductor and composer, claims Ukrainian music created before the 19th century is largely known as 'Russian' in the West. "The post-Lysenko¹ music is hardly known in the West, too," Mr. Runchak comments. "One can find it in research sources and in Ukraine. But they are studied more often than they are played. Choir pieces by Oleksandr Koshyts or

¹ Mykola Lysenko (1842 – 1912), Ukrainian composer, pianist and conductor.

Mykola Leontovych face a language barrier since they are in Ukrainian, not the universal English. As a result of the language barrier, Ukrainian vocal, opera and choir music is hard to perform effectively."

Even modern composers who spend a lot of time in the West and have published their music there have failed to change the situation. "Yevhen Stankovych, Valentyn Sylvestrov and Myroslav Skoryk are hugely popular modern Ukrainian composers," Mr. Runchak says. "But success is only possible when they work with publishing houses that can offer music sheets to orchestras."

WOWING THE CRITICS

Maria Dolnytska is a Canadian-born professional pianist with Ukrainian roots. She is perfectly familiar with Canadian music life as an insider and is quite optimistic about Ukrainian classical music. Even though naming a Ukrainian composer can be hard due to the sporadic background of Ukraine's sovereignty, Ukrainian music is represented relatively well in Canada, unlike Europe.

"Toronto has been hosting competitions of Ukrainian music for a long time," Ms. Dolnytska says. "The pieces are even part of the academic programs at the Royal Conservatory of Music. Both Canada and the US commission music from Ukrainian composers. Therefore, musicians issue more and more records and get good reviews."

Still, Ukrainian music remains exotic for most fans. "I try to play Ukrainian pieces as often as I can," Maria comments. "The concerts are pretty popular. Very few people in the audience are immigrants; most are non-Ukrainians. After concerts where I play pieces by Lysenko, Revutsky, Ishchenko or Sylvestrov, people often ask me what they are and many discover these composers for the first time. US critics give positive reviews of my Ukrainian records yet what often surprises them is that they never heard of the composers."

PLAY YOUR MUSIC FOR UKRAINE!

"Indeed, Ukrainian classical music is not well enough known in the world," complains Myroslav Skoryk, one of the legendary trio

of modern composers. "It's not about the quality because the audience mostly likes it when it gets to hear it. The key problem is that promoting and protecting the copyright for classical music requires funding."

According to Mr. Skoryk, there is no system that could help Ukrainian composers offer their music to Western performers and get a reward for it. "This is a task for music managers, a profession that practically doesn't exist in Ukraine," the composer claims. "Most often, composers are the ones doing the job themselves while the repertoire of Ukrainian orchestras that tour abroad is determined by the inviting party."

Our political and historical background also contributes to the current situation. "Ukraine's post-colonial status and our inertness are in the way of Ukrainian music in the world," says Volodymyr Runchak. "There are no independent sources of information about it while the government, including the Culture Ministry and that of Foreign Affairs, make no efforts to promote it. Officials are only representatives, and they are often not professional enough."

Having said this, composers do have ideas about potential ways to improve all this. Mr. Runchak talks about big image-making projects. "One way is for the country's leaders to support concerts of elaborate music, not pop or low-quality ones," he says. "Normally, such concerts require a lot of money and advertising."

Myroslav Skoryk does not mind routine work and legal leverages to promote music. "Some countries demand that their orchestras play pieces by national composers," he comments. "Scandinavian governments are extremely persistent in this direction. Ukraine has a similar law of its own but the government does not enforce it effectively." According to Mr. Runchak, Ukrainian musicians do not earn enough to promote their music around the world. Their only way to earn a living is to play pieces by famous composers. "Clearly, Ukrainian orchestras can make a difference with their repertoire but in fact the market frequently affects them, not the other way around. They only play the music some-

one commissions them to play," Mr. Runchak states.

MUSIC THEORY

So what rules shape the Western market of classical music? Can the market of little-known Ukrainian music adjust and integrate itself into the Western one? "Marketing has nothing to do with the repertoire selection," Mr. Wittmann says. "An ideal combination would be that of popular and rarely played pieces, of course. But our key task is to create an environment where the audience can meet music. You need more courage and to play more music



PUBLISHING HOUSES HAVE A HEAVY IMPACT ON THE REPERTOIRE OF ORCHESTRAS

from various cultures to make people get used to the names they haven't heard before."

His Ukrainian colleagues view this as too idyllic. "Western orchestras fill their repertoire largely from two sources," Mr. Runchak explains. "These are classical music and pieces they commission from modern composers. These are not always popular with the audience but they boost the orchestras' quality rating and prestige. That means a combination of creative and commercial factors. Classics and celebrity soloists lure the lion's share of the audience." ■

BREAKTHROUGH ARTISTS



Solomia Krushelnytska

The legendary singer toured the world with hundreds of concerts from 1894 to 1929. She sang Ukrainian folk songs at each concert as a matter of principle.



Modeřt Mentsynsky

A well-known heroic tenor used his popularity in Europe to include songs by Mykola Lysenko and Denys Sichynsky in every one of his performances.



Stefan Turchak

Did all he could over his short, yet brilliant career as a conductor to promote Ukrainian classical music. European audiences had their first chance to hear Taras Bulba, an opera by Mykola Lysenko, when the Kyiv opera team toured Wiesbaden, Dresden and Zagreb in 1980s. It always won a standing ovation.



"In this system, publishing houses have a heavy impact on the repertoire policy of orchestras," Volodymyr Runchak continues. "They are the ones selling sheet music. In pursuit of profit, publishing houses promote them to conductors and orchestra directors. A little-known composer only has chances through personal contacts. Young composers often know well-known conductors or celebrity soloists who determine the repertoire and tell the orchestras they want to play a certain piece. The least efficient way is for composers to turn to orchestras on their own. Most often, they get no response whatsoever because the proposals come in by the hundred every day."

"Some publishing houses abroad often sign contracts with composers under unfeasible terms, pushing the latter to seek an excuse to stop such cooperation," says Myroslav Skoryk, sharing his experience after having spent a few years working in Australia. "I can't say my music is played very often even though I'm member of agencies that monitor where my music is played and demand royalties. They also send me data from abroad and transfer the royalties to my account."

IN PURSUIT OF SHEET MUSIC

"Music lovers in the West are very different," comments Maria Dolnytska on the preferences of the local audience. "The fans of modern

MUSICAL SELECTION. Conductor Peter Thomas auditions young musicians at Kyiv Glière Music College to participate in the I, Culture, Orchestra international project

classical music don't care that much whether a composer is from Ukraine, Japan or US. The same thing is true for other styles, only some of them sell worse without mentioning the country of origin. This refers to modern music, for instance."

Ms. Dolnytska says the popularity of some pieces is a result of promotion more than anything else. Due to technological opportunities and numerous records, musicians get to hear rare exotic music. "My impression is that the Western audience is hungry for new music which opens the doors for Ukrainian composers," she claims.

The collapsing status of music publishing houses in Ukraine and the shortage of widely-accessible Ukrainian sheet music prevent

UKRAINIAN MUSICIANS CAN'T AFFORD TO PROMOTE THEIR OWN MUSIC ABROAD

Ukrainian composers from catching these opportunities. "I often get letters from people all over the world, from the US to Hong Kong," says Ms. Dolnytska. "They are looking for sheet music to a specific piece by Ukrainian composers. Sadly, I often have to tell them I don't have one. I have a hard time looking for them myself. There is no database and

there is very little interest from publishing houses. Too few foreign musicians come to play in Ukraine." To change this, Maria recommends that the audience intensely share sheet music and look for new music while musicians should include Ukrainian pieces to their repertoires as often as possible.

UKRAINIAN SPRING

Meanwhile, enthusiastic fans do more for Ukrainian music than all the Ukrainian embassies have ever done. Over a period of slightly less than two years, virtually 1,500 music lovers have joined the Ukrainian Composers community on Facebook. Professional musicians and fans upload recorded pieces by Ukrainian composers on to YouTube and lately they have undergone a sort of breakthrough on the portal.

On 12 December, Munich is going to host a joint Ukrainian-Polish concert for Euro 2012, a project less pompous than the 'I, Culture Orchestra' event. This one is the initiative of musicians, not embassies or cultural institutions. Its budget just exceeds EUR 1,000 and this is mostly from organizers, says Taras Yashchenko, a Ukrainian pianist and composer in Germany.

Paradoxically, the lower the status of the project, the more space they have for Ukrainian music. A Polish soprano and Ukrainian tenor are going to sing pieces by Lysenko, Hulak-Artemovsky and Skoryk, in addition to Szymanowski and Moniuszko. The Polish Cultural Center at the German Consulate funded less than half the budget. The Ukrainian Consulate never responded to requests. "The Polish Institute is now helping to set King Roger, an opera by Szymanowski, at the National Opera here in Ukraine. Last year, it arranged hundreds of Chopin anniversary concerts all over the world. When will Ukraine have an institute of its own?" Mr. Yashchenko wonders.

As long as Ukraine does not care about its classical music, the quote from poet Pavlo Tychyna will hang over our heads like the sword of Damocles. "For God's sake, put on the cuffs and tell them something. 'Is there any culture that you have?' they ask." ■



Львівська
міська
рада



Польський
інститут
Київ



ГЕНЕРАЛЬНЕ КОНСУЛЬСТВО
Республіки Польща
у Львові



Alliance Française



AMIEŃS
METROPOLIE



GOETHE
INSTITUT



Virmenska
35



Фондація «TRANSKULTURA»
www.transkultura.com



Białostocki
Ośrodek
Kultury



CK



WARSZTATY KULTURY

XI international festival 1-11.12

JazzBez...

The biggest Ukrainian jazz festival
«Jazz Bez» presents this year
musicians from USA, Canada, Austria,
France, Greece, Israel, Germany,
Russia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine.

Jazz movement brings together
Lviv, Kharkiv, Sevastopol, Ternopil,
Lutsk, Ivano-Frankivsk, Rivne, Lublin,
Przemysl, Białystok, Krosno,
Rzeszów, Nowica.

«Jazz Bez»:

13 cities of Ukraine and Poland,
30 groups, over 100 musicians,
10 days of jazz!

info: www.dzyga.com

general sponsor



БУЧАЧ
СЛАВІМО ГАЛІЦІЮ!



Reikartz
National Network of hotels



general media partner



favorite radio



official media partner



jazz congeners



partner



graciously
hosting



Perfect Harm

Artist Pavlo Makov explains and decodes artistic images and symbols, modern phenomena and concepts



Interviewer:
Tetiana Teren

Photo:
Andriy
Lomakin

Pavlo Makov has a unique style. No other artist in Ukraine and very few painters in the world work in this manner. His works are more than etchings. They are reflections of time that are so accurate, that they first exude half-forgotten ornaments, routes, plans and schemes, and when you look closer – also individual details and symbols. Eventually, Mr. Makov's etchings become illustrations in books, parts of design and his own exclusive games, one of which is a glossary of symbols and meanings, compiled in cooperation with *The Ukrainian Week*.

BIO

Pavlo Makov

Was born in Leningrad in 1958. He lives and works in Kharkiv. Mr. Makov is a member of Royal Society of Painter-Printmakers UK and a correspondence member of the Art Academy of Ukraine. His works are exhibited at the Victoria and Albert Museum in London, the Metropolitan Museum in New York, the National Art Gallery in Kyiv, the Osaka Contemporary Art Center, the Tretyakov Gallery in Moscow, the Contemporary Art Museum in Ibiza, and in other collections. In 2009, Mr. Makov's works were put up for auction at Sotheby's.

Graphics. This is a rarely used and somewhat outdated term. It still exists in Germany and former soviet republics. The whole world uses another word for what I do today. They call it art on paper, which includes prints, water-colours and oil paintings. Paper is the key component of this style of creativity. When I say I'm a graphic artist in the West, everyone will think I work with a computer – this is what web-designers are called there.

Scandals. I'm not interested in causing scandals. The reality of our life is much more scandalous than art. Scandals generally fill voids in art, where there is nothing else to show. But remember, scandals are an important element of modern art.

Classics. In my view, there is no such thing. Leonardo da Vinci is an example of exaggerated classics in fine art. But every time I am lucky enough to view his paintings intimately, with not too many people around, I think of him as my contemporary. It does not seem as if there are five centuries between us. I recently had the great fortune to see Giotto di Bondone's frescoes in the Scrovegni Chapel in Padua. Are they classics or modern art? I would put it differently: it is that, which to this day, still has a huge influence on everyone. Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht, the German-born American literary theorist, has a similar impact on me. I know him personally and am a great fan of his ideas. Before him, nobody managed to explain such important things to me in words. Is he a classic or a modern? And who can be more modern than Gogol in Ukraine? So you see, "classic" is an obscure term. Art can be interesting or uninteresting, but certainly not classic or modern. Remember, it is time that always determines what is current and what is not.

Government. My attitude to it is very simple. I realize that art

has never changed a government, even if it has an obvious political undertone. Thus, my whole life is built in such a way, that I depend on it as little as possible. I refuse to hold administrative positions, titles or decorations granted by the government. I'm not an honored artist because I've never served anyone.

Culture. This is the ability to co-exist. Literature, music, painting and theater are only small instruments that help us understand how to continue living and find our course together.

The original. As far as my creativity is concerned, the existence of the original and absence of copies is related to the specific features of the production process. Over the past few centuries, as long as etching has existed, artists produced a plate and printed a number of copies from it. I work with plates, photographs and painting. It is impossible to copy any of my works. Even I can't do it. I know that Ilya Repin had made several copies of his "Zaporozhye Cossacks Writing a Mocking Letter to the Turkish Sultan" in the 19th century because it was hugely popular. But for me, this is a bitter page in the history of art: instead of creating something new, Repin was forced to earn a living. I would go crazy if I had to copy my own works.

Utopia. Ever since I first mentioned this word in my art to describe a non-existent country, it has continued to be relevant. A long time ago I thought former soviet states were undefined utopias. Now I see that this is also the case for Europe and the US. Gumbrecht described this in his book entitled "In 1926: Living on the Edge of Time". It's about a past that does not teach us anything.

The Kharkiv Art School. For me, Kharkiv art is Borys Kosarev, Vasyl Yermilov and Vitaliy


only on Paper

Kulykov. I consider the latter to be my teacher, but not in the sense of the existence of a specific local school. Kosarev was simply not given an opportunity to establish it during the soviet era. Yermilov lived in Kharkiv but couldn't influence art life in the city at that time, because it was the time when Kharkiv was a stronghold of socialism. It is not difficult to notice that the above-mentioned artists are completely different and the artwork of one didn't inspire that of another. If there is a Kharkiv school somewhere, I'd say that it's in the area of photography. There is the Borys Mykhailov generation, another is that of Serhiy Bratkov and there are many other incredibly talented photo artists out there.

An artist, is someone who paints professionally. That's it. Nothing extraordinary. It's a simple, routine profession - one of the oldest. People were painting and drawing before they ever learned to talk. Just do your work well and history will take care of the rest. ■■


BOOKS

- Donroza, 2011
Private Books and Diaries, 2007
Utopia. Chronicles 1992-1995, 2006
The Book of Days, 2000
The Anatomy of a Target and All Others..., 1999
Our Landscape, 1998
The Best of Print-making, 1997




Eastern Cross from the Gardens cycle, 2009-2010

Donroza from the Gardens cycle, 2008-2010



The Ukrainian Alphabet project, 2010-2011



For Every Thirst, a Beer

The leader of folk rock band Haydamaky tours Ukraine mapping breweries that produce unpasteurized “live beer”



Author:
Oleksandr
Yarmola

Poland, historically a country of beers, hardly offers any products from small provincial breweries today after monopolies swallowed them all up. Luckily, this hasn't happened in Ukraine. The tiny breweries that have managed to survive within their tough local economies have grown more and more popular over the past few years.

I've tried to omit widely-advertised brands from my “beer map” of Ukraine. Western Ukraine seems to have the most to offer, but for good reason. From the Middle Ages through the draconian soviet era, beer drinking traditions have largely

evolved in territories that had Catholic and Orthodox monasteries. The East, however, was still covered in steppes that would later give way to heavy industry. There, locals preferred horilka to beer. Thus, our route will begin in the western part of the map and move eastward.

We'll start out in Volyn, where the Prypiat river begins from lake Svitiaz. The most popular beer here is Pavlivske, from the village of Pavlivka in Ivanychi County. In addition to beer, the Pavlivske plant also produces mineral water. Perhaps this is one of their secrets, as beer production relies heavily on the quality of water

used. The brewery in Pavlivka was supposedly founded in 1904, or so says the date carved on a stone in the plant's lager cellar. When Volyn was part of Poland in 1922-1939, the plant was called Porytsk after the then Polish name of the village, and was owned by Earl Chatsky. Its trademark beer today is Pavlivske Light. I first tasted it after Haydamaky played a gig in Lutsk. The waiter brought us beer in liter pitchers which I think is the best size for light beer.

Now a word about Lutsk. The local brewery was founded in 1888 by the Czech-born Vaclav Zeman. It was nationalized when

the region became part of the USSR. In 2004, the plant began to produce Zeman beer named after its founder. Its main market is Volyn Oblast but some vendors in other regions also sell this particular brand.

The hunt for live beer takes us to Rivne Oblast next. Riven plant is the most popular producer here. The premises were built in 1900 by the Bergschloss Steam Beer Joint-Stock Plant. The major shareholder was an entrepreneur who had arrived in Volyn in the late 19th century with a wave of Czech immigrants. His production was based on the local homebrew available since 1849. Mr. Bergschloss designed the logo and produced unique bottles with embossed branding. In 1939, the soviet government nationalized the plant, producing the Zhyhulivske, Ukrayinske and Slovianske beer brands.

The next turn leads to Khmelnytskyi Oblast and its various popular brands. The first one on our way is the Slavuta Beer Plant founded in 1885. Kniaz Sanhushko is a brand that represents the brewery widely on the Ukrainian market. In Kyiv, admirers of this beer have been known to frequent the Trolleybus and Route 66 pubs. It's become one of my favorites, too. Kniaz Sanhushko is not a light or "neutral" beer—it contains 4.8% alcohol and has a unique taste with a wine-like aftertaste.

Another producer of live or "bottle conditioned" beer is the Khmelnytsky Brewery built in 1901. Its most popular beer is called Proskurivske Light, after Proskuriv, the city's former name.

Before turning westward to Zakarpattia, we will stop in Zhytomyr, whose Berdychiv Beer Plant is the region's most popular beer producer. The local brewery was first mentioned as early as 1798. The brewery on Bilopil'ska street—now known as Karl Liebknecht street—started in 1861, when Stanislav Czep, a Czech colonizer, bought a plot of land there and built a plant that included production facilities and an artesian well.

The ZhytomyrPyvo plant is another famous brand from this oblast. The spot where it is now located has a curious history. A German lady named Paulina

DISCLAIMER
This article is not an advertisement but the result of the author's aspiration to share information about alternatives to the widely-advertised beer brands that are produced with preservatives and feature long shelf lives.

Schultz used to own a mill there. In the 1870s, Makhachek and Yansa, two Czech entrepreneurs, transformed it into a brewery. Today, the plant produces Zhytomyrske Light and Zhytomyr Smooth Flow.

We now move on to Uman, the Cherkasy region's brewing center. The Uman Beer Plant produces Zhyhulivske, the most popular beer in Cherkasy and the neighboring Vinnytsia Oblast, and its Waissburg brand is well-known in other regions of Ukraine. Founded in 1878, the brewery was owned by a group of local merchants. In the early 20th century, the beer plant produced traditional Czech and Bavarian beers. In February 2009, the brewery acquired new German equipment and launched the production of Waissburg.

Finally, we get to Zakarpattia. There used to be a few small plants here but the Carpathian

heartland in Kalush. The local beer plant is among the oldest in Ukraine. It was long thought to have been founded in 1649. Later, archival documents were found that proved brewing had flourished in the town since 1565, and this became the founding date of the plant. Under Austro-Hungarian rule, the plant's products were sold to the far reaches of the empire. Beginning in 1870, the Kalush brewery was owned by the Muhlstein, Spindel & Weissmann company. In 1890, the plant built its own malt house that still supplies it with in-house malted grain.

Kalush beer has a malty taste and high density despite its relatively low alcohol content. You can't drink a lot of it, unlike Pavlivske or Berdychivske beers, but every sip is sheer joy.

Next we head to Ternopil Oblast. Mykulyntsi Beer Plant is an acclaimed leader in terms of the amount of live beer it brews, but the Opillia brewery in Ternopil is my favorite. Its namesake is shared by several geographic locations and towns in Belarus, Poland, Russia and Ukraine. During its 117-year lifespan, the brewery has had Austrian and Polish owners.

After we've had enough Opillia beer, we move on to Mykulyntsi. The local beer plant has stolen the spotlight as one of the first independent Ukrainian breweries. 1698 was long thought to be the plant's starting point. This was the date found in Austrian archives as the rise of brewery in Mykulyntsi. Polish archives later revealed a prior date in the late 15th century. According to the archives, Tieran, a German ally of Jan I Olbracht, King of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, stopped in Mykulyntsi and sent some beer to the king to try during the latter's military campaign against Stephen III of Moldova. This led to the belief that the brewery had been founded in 1497.

Earl Mechyslav Rei became the owner of Mykulyntsi brewery in the late 19th century. His family owned the plant until the mid-1920s. In the early 20th century, the facilities produced three sorts of draught and bottled beer, including Lezak, Original and Bockbier also known as Starkbier. »

TINY BREWERIES HAVE GROWN MORE AND MORE POPULAR OVER THE PAST FEW YEARS

Brewery in Berehove that makes Zip, a brand known all over Ukraine, is worthy of the most attention. Built using equipment brought from Hungary in 1997, it is one of the youngest brewing companies in Ukraine.

From here we move back across the mountains to Ivano-Frankivsk Oblast and its brewery







Later, the plant was bought by Averman, Tsikhovski & Co. In 1928, the new owners built an extra cellar, a dry house, and a malt house. When the communists arrived in Western Ukraine in September 1939, they nationalized all of the town's private production facilities. In 1993, the Rent Enterprise of Mykulyntsi Brewers was set up on the basis of the publicly owned plant. In 1995, it transformed into an open joint stock company and was given its present name Brovar, the brewer.

Lviv is a must for any beer tour of Ukraine. The restaurant network called Local known for its unique design, good selection of modern Ukrainian music and adherence to local culture, invites guests to taste live beer made by the First Private Brewery in Lviv. It is one of the youngest beer plants in Ukraine. In 2005, the owners installed new German filling line equipment. The plant supports an annual rock festival in Lviv called Stare Misto—Old City, after one of its beers.

Kyiv is the final stop on our tour. All local beer fans will declare the Kyiv Beer Plant at Podil their all-time favorite. The generally accepted date of founding is 1872, when merchant Mykola Khriakov bought a mansion and defunct steel works at Kyrylivska, now Frunze Street. Along with his partners he set up the Kyiv Brewery Society and launched production in the one-time foundry using equipment imported from Pilsen, a city in the Czech Republic.

Experts say that one of the secrets that make Podil beer so special is the water from an artesian well on the plant's territory. These same experts will also point you to a popular dive bar at the crossroads of Nyzhniy Val and Kostiantynivska streets that sells the beer.

There are some other plants known for their live beer, such as in Radomyshl or Poltava. Moreover, pubs brew numerous beers of their own, such as Brovarske, Kyiv Sunduk—Kyiv Trunk in English, or Hoiria in Chernivtsi. They are too many to list in one article but the above tour makes one thing clear: beer tourism in Ukraine is probably as good as in the Czech Republic or Germany. ■



B O O K S T O R E



ALL BOOKS FROM UKRAINE ONLINE

O N L I N E B O O K S H O P

WWW.BOOK-YE.COM.UA/SHOP