

international edition

The Ukrainian Week

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ONE LANGUAGE TOO MANY, ONE SPEAKER TOO FEW

STILL SPEAKER OF PARLIAMENT,
VOLODYMYR LYTVYN HAS A TOUGH
CHOICE TO MAKE. IT WILL BE CRUCIAL
FOR BOTH THE NATION AND HIS
POLITICAL FUTURE

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
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
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6 July

The 10th session of the Verkhovna Rada of the 6th Convention is closed, but an extraordinary session may take place on 31 July

A No-Win Situation

Author:
Heorhiy Hryshchenko

In all likelihood, the Presidential Administration viewed the meeting between Putin and Yanukovich in Yalta, in the context of the evident isolation of the latter on the part of the West, as an opportunity to prove that the blind alley, into which it has blundered and led the country into, is not actually so blind. What happened was the complete opposite. Mr. Yanukovich who was supposedly offended by the Europeans, saying that they were not ready for "equal partnership", was also demonstratively humiliated by Vladimir Putin.



Putin was deliberately over four hours late for the meeting. Even with his own governors, the President of the RF is far more punctual. In addition, the meeting itself appeared not to bring any results for Mr. Yanukovich. In spite of the attempt to save face with statements about "more than ten signed agreements", in truth, the issue is limited to either documents of minor importance, or the latest portion of declarations about intent. For example, a protocol was signed on the introduction of changes to the agreement on cooperation in the area of the certification of research and research-educational personnel at higher educational institutions, dated 21 June 2002, memorandums on cooperation in the fight against terrorism and cooperation in the Antarctic, an agreement on interaction in the prevention of emergency situations, fires and the liquidation of their consequences in populated areas where Russian Black Sea Fleet facilities are located, as well as cooperation in the area of air search and rescue. However, no agreement was reached on any of the problem directions of bilateral relations that are of benefit to Ukraine.

The Presidents signed a joint statement on the delimitation of maritime space of the Sea of Azov and the Black Sea, as well as in the Strait of Kerch. However, according to Mr. Putin, "the essence of the document lies in preparing our colleagues for bringing this work to a logical conclusion – the signing of a relevant agreement." Nothing more, at which, the terms are not determined. However Russian interests are provided for, as is the rejection of Ukrainian interests by Mr. Yanukovich. More specifically, the document stresses the intent of the parties to ensure the development of the Kerch – Yenikale navigation canal, which belongs to Ukraine, by establishing a Russian-Ukrainian joint venture, and in return, Moscow is ready to recognize Ukraine's sovereignty over the Island of Tuzla, which, even without this, is part of Ukraine. There is also a similar situation with the memorandum on integration and cooperation signed by the Ministry of Energy and Coal Industry of Ukraine and the Rosatom Corporation, which can only lead to the already existing virtually exclusive

The month in history

4 July 1893

Danylo Demutsky, photographer and cameraman who worked on the best Ukrainian classical films, **is born**


9 July 1659

The coalition of Ukrainian Cossacks led by Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and Crimean Tatars defeat the Russian army at the Battle of Konotop

12 July 1892

Bruno Schulz, a Polish writer and graphic artist, **is born** in Drohobych, Western Ukraine

10 July



Russian Wikipedia shuts down to protest against Russian legislation restricting Internet access

12 July



The Prosecutor's Office initiates a criminal case against Mykola Kniazhytsky, General Director of TVi channel

13 July



The police try to search the office of the united opposition in Cherkasy

18 July

LB.ua, a political online publication, stops working after its staff faces criminal charges

dependence of Ukraine on the Russian Federation in the area of nuclear energy. They also agreed to continue negotiations on the functioning and continued stationing of the Russian Black Sea Fleet in Crimea, on the territory of which the Kremlin is expressing great interest in updating its armaments.

Of course, one of the formal aspects of the Yalta meeting that has not been formally mentioned, albeit clearly seen, was the recent passing of the language law by the pro-government majority in the Verkhovna Rada. On the eve of the negotiations, this was viewed as one of the possible key arguments of the Ukrainian party for the conclusion of an unflattering deal with the "Russian language in Ukraine in exchange for a decrease in the price of gas" version. However, this version has not succeeded, at least, not so far. Mr. Putin was adamant, and said nothing, other than what he personally, Gazprom and the pro-Russian mass media had previously stated. Once again, he repeated to Mr. Yanukovich, that although no-one was forcing Ukraine to join the Customs Union, any kind of reduction in the price of gas can only be addressed after entry into this organization, in passing, expressing the following consideration: "The later someone becomes a member of any organization, the more complex, if possible, it is to revise its constitutional documents in the interests of the new member."

Having also been rebuffed in its East-oriented foreign policy, Mr. Yanukovich repeated as a mantra, that "the course towards Euro-integration remains an invariable priority of Ukraine's foreign policy," although actual steps in relations with the EU do not confirm this. On the other hand, immediately after the meeting with Mr. Yanukovich, which produced no results and was indicative of Vladimir Putin's lack of respect towards his partner, the Russian President visited the estate of his close friend, Viktor Medvedchuk, whose relations with Mr. Yanukovich have always been strained and who is now actively conducting an advertising campaign, directed towards the pro-Russian electorate, and at the same time, is ever more critical of the political repression being conducted by the Ukrainian government. Having said this, it is impossible not to mention the ultimatum supposedly made by Putin in the autumn of 2011 during a meeting with the Ukrainian president: "Either you are friends with us, or the electorate is not friends with you." The no-win situation in which Mr. Yanukovich finds himself is becoming ever more apparent, while every new effort to prove that this is not the case, has the opposite effect.

A Pinpoint Strike

When a chaotic rally to protect the Ukrainian language started on the night of July 3-4 in front of Ukrainian House at the European Square, virtually every group of protesters discussed what they would do if Berkut, a special-purpose unit of the Ukrainian police, attacked them. Two columns of police with helmets and batons did not inspire optimism. But the instruction to attack the protesters was not given from above. Viktor Yanukovich was supposed to give a big press conference at Ukrainian House the next day, but did not show up, giving no explanations. The rally stayed in place. Professional opposition members immediately declared that this was a victory and that "the overthrow of the regime" would follow shortly thereafter.

In fact, though, all of this played into the hands of the President. He had often been embarrassed at previous conferences by sensitive questions ranging from his mansion in Mezhyhiria to the persecution of the opposition. Therefore, Mr. Yanukovich may have taken the opportunity to stay away from the public eye.

Meanwhile, the clashes, most of them provoked by the police, were used as an excuse to launch criminal proceedings against activists. The severity of damages suffered by some police officers in the clashes that served as a basis for their appeals against activists was questionable. Still, at least five criminal cases have been initiated for the "resistance" of MPs against the Deputy Chief of a road police patrol unit who tried to prevent a minivan with sound equipment from driving onto the sidewalk in front of Ukrainian House, the infliction of physical injury on police officers and clashes that occurred on June 5th when people protested against the passing of the language law in the first reading.

The government has blatantly made every possible effort to provoke the conflicts. Why did the special-purpose police openly help the rally of supporters of the Russian language (mostly paid for being there, according to many sources), while forcing the protectors of the Ukrainian language onto the opposite side of the road? Why, a month later, were at least two special-purpose police officers brought to Ukrainian House for each protester in support of the Ukrainian language – most of them peaceful citizens, including women?

The assumption is that the government has once more used the scenario of the soft, yet consistent narrowing of citizens' rights to protest. The criminal cases are a perfect tool for pinpoint strikes against the most proactive protest participants. A similar scenario unfolded after the Tax Maidan in late 2010, even though the then president and premier personally guaranteed that the protesters would not be persecuted. Later, protesters said that the main purpose of these criminal cases regarding "damaged sidewalk tiles" was to "recruit" them for work with law enforcement agencies, rather than to detain them.

The passing of the language law in the second reading on July 3rd sparked a public outcry and the ongoing protest in front of Ukrainian House in Kyiv. Currently, four protesters are still on a hunger strike despite official announcements that the protest had ended. Protesters demand that President Yanukovich and Speaker Lytvyn do not sign the law.

13 July 1985



Serhiy Bubka, Ukrainian athlete, clears the previously unattainable 6.00 metres in pole vault in Paris

14 July 1894



Lviv and Krakow teams play the first ever football match on the territory of Ukraine in Lviv

16 July 1990



The Verkhovna Rada of the Ukrainian SSR passes the Declaration of State Sovereignty of Ukraine

17 July 1846

Nicholas Miklouho-Maclay, an explorer of aboriginals in New Guinea, is born to a family of Zaporizhian Cossack ancestry

Lytvyn's Choice

The position of the Verkhovna Rada's Speaker on the language law, regardless of his motivation, will determine his political future and his place in Ukrainian history



The confrontation surrounding the language issue, sparked by the party in power for election purposes (which they no longer keep secret), has taken an unexpected turn. After parliament passed the law, sponsored by Party of Regions MPs Kolesnichenko and Kivalov in blatant violation of the procedure, whereby recommended amendments were ignored and voting was conducted in the absence of Speaker Lytvyn at the session (he had previously sworn in public that he would not allow the vote), Mr. Lytvyn filed a letter of resignation and warned parliament that he would not sign the language law. The Verkhovna Rada (VR) did not accept his resignation (Party of Regions MPs referred to Mr. Lytvyn's emotional state and said that he may change his mind once the stress is over). As a result, the "parliamentary crisis" as Mr. Lytvyn himself described the situation was left in the air.

TRIED AND TESTED MATERIAL

Volodymyr Lytvyn first came to parliament 10 years ago as the person who would ensure agreement and balance out the interests of different groups and political forces within the pro-government ZaYedu (the full name of the party was "For a Single Ukraine" while the abbreviation sounded like "for food" in Russian) conglomerate and other parties and MPs loyal to the then President Leonid Kuchma. Later, Mr. Lytvyn attempted to do the same during the Orange Revolution and in the last 18 months of the VR's work in 2005-2006. For quite a while, he managed to find a balance between the representatives of the old and new governments and preserve both his seat, and his political weight. In 2006, his party

Author:
Oles
Oleksiyenko

failed to cross the parliamentary threshold, but he eventually got into parliament in 2007 after the early election, held as a result of the existing political crisis. The parliamentary crisis in autumn 2008 (caused by the mounting conflict between Mr. Yushchenko and Ms. Tymoshenko) allowed Mr. Lytvyn to come back as Speaker and remain so after Viktor Yanukovych was elected President, in exchange for joining the pro-presidential majority. Inspired by this success, Mr. Lytvyn often began to claim that there was no other person capable of re-



THE DAY AFTER THE LANGUAGE LAW WAS APPROVED, THE PARLIAMENT CUT THE QUORUM TO VOTE FOR ELECTION OF THE SPEAKER TO 226

placing him as the VR Speaker in the political reality of Ukraine, and that he would always be the Speaker. However, it has become apparent that the logic of the Presidential Administration's concept had determined a specific term and use conditions for the "eternal" Speaker Lytvyn. Once they were over, his balancing position became a burden.

The events of July 3rd signaled that the government had decided that it could live without Mr. Lytvyn. All sources of *The Ukrainian Week* agree that he was probably unaware of preparations for voting on the law (or that it had been coordinated beforehand in a very narrow circle). The main version is that the Speaker has paid a price for losing control of his political faction in parliament. Mr. Lytvyn himself interpreted what happened in parliament as treason by everyone, from the Party of Re-

gions and his party fellows to his close friends, including Adam Martyniuk, who put the language law to the vote in the Speaker's absence. His party's MPs offered two excuses for voting for the law at a party meeting on July 4th: they did not realize what they were voting for/against, or that they were informed that "Mr. Lytvyn had approved everything." The first group includes MPs oriented at FPTP constituencies in Ukrainian-speaking oblasts (MPs Vashchuk, Shershun, Cherniy, Tereshchuk and Shpak). Therefore, after the vote whether sincerely or not, they said, as did Mr. Lytvyn, that they did not actually support the law. The second group is made up of MPs who are happy for their votes to be counted and have no intention to request their invalidation. They are represented by the head of the fraction, Ihor Sharov, a former Party of Regions MP who still has common business with some current PR MPs. According to *The Ukrainian Week's* sources, the group also includes MPs controlled by the billionaire Party of Regions MP, Vasyl Khmelnytsky (MPs Pavlenko, Belousova, Shmid, Hryvkovsky and Remez) or MPs who are going to run in FPTP constituencies in Southern Ukraine (Hrynevetsky, Baranov and others). They no longer need Mr. Lytvyn. Instead, consent from the Presidential Administration for their being elected to parliament is crucial, and their support of the Russian language in parliament is definitely a plus.

VICTIM OR LIAR?

Commenting on his resignation and criticism of those who betrayed him, Speaker Lytvyn said that "emotions are always present in politics, but a great deal of thought has gone into making this decision and the decision was a rational one". What could have forced him to take such a radical move?

Firstly, it could have been the need for a move to save his political face and the prospect of being a stand-alone player rather than PR's servant. Emotion could indeed have reinforced this move as the ego of the "irreplaceable and eternal speaker" was hurt by the Party of Regions after he publicly put his name to the promise that parliament would not consider the law

until autumn and ensured everyone that "There will definitely be no surprises." In this situation, the lack of proper reaction from Mr. Lytvyn would show him to be a person who knows nothing about what is going on in parliament and limit his role in the VR to a purely nominal one, similar to Leonid Chernovetsky's role as Kyiv Mayor until recently.

Secondly, Mr. Lytvyn may have wanted to resign before parliament dismisses him, which the Party of Regions was preparing to do well in

SPEAKER LYTVYN HAS TAKEN A BREAK TO WEIGHT UP RISKS AND OPTIONS BUT HE DOES NOT HAVE MUCH CHOICE

advance, once it felt that the Speaker was no longer as accommodating as before. After the first fight in the VR over the language law in late May, Mr. Lytvyn suggested the dissolution of parliament. In response, the Party of Regions began to buzz with talk about re-electing the Speaker. Why hasn't this happened yet? Because the procedure requires a quorum of 300 MPs, who have to take the bulletins to vote for the dismissal of the Speaker of the VR. To prevent losing his seat, Mr. Lytvyn should have discouraged the opposition from supporting the initiative. However, the passing of the language law in the first reading on June 5th was accompanied by a storm of mutual criticism between the parliamentary opposition and the Speaker. Thus there were valid reasons to fear that the opposition would vote for his dismissal to punish him, provoke a split in the coalition and cast doubt on the existence of a pro-government majority.

On July 4th, the day after the law was approved, the ►



VR changed the procedure for voting for the resignation and election of the speaker, canceling the 300 MPs quorum and cutting it to just 226. Mr. Lytvyn may have heard of the majority's firm intent to support the new procedure shortly beforehand, on the day the language law was voted on, therefore had good reason to be nervous and start looking for an honourable way out. Perhaps, this was why he focused as much on the PR-sponsored amendments to VR procedure in his speech about the "treason of his brothers in arms" as he did on the language law being passed in violation of the procedure. This makes one wonder which of the two documents enraged Mr. Lytvyn more and became the reason, not the excuse, for his demarche.

COMPETENCE TEST

The Speaker has taken a break to weigh up risks and options. He has already said that his resignation would be "a direct result of the situation surrounding the language issue." In fact, though, he does not have much choice. He can either block any version of the language law entirely or subtly play along with the Party of Regions, having found a nice way out for himself. In the first scenario, he would have to enter into a real conflict with Viktor Yanukovich. But, in spite of the losses and risks, this move could actually give Mr. Lytvyn an opportunity for a political future as a re-

DEPENDANT ON HIS SEAT: "Business trips" and tens of millions of budget funds for the regions of the constituency he has chosen in the Zhytomyr Oblast have become the foundation of Volodymyr Lytvyn's election campaign

sponsible leader, who is capable of putting the prospects of Ukrainian statehood above his own personal interests. In the second scenario, he could go the way of Oleksandr Moroz, who betrayed the foundations of Ukrainian identity which, in fact, were innate to him personally and important to most of his voters. If he does that, Mr. Lytvyn could turn into a totally controlled tiny cog (as a result of the existence of compromising information himself having cast away his political prospects) in the president's machine which it can betray at any time.

Oleksandr Yefremov, Chair of the Party of Regions' faction in parliament, does not rule out an extraordinary session, which can be summoned on July 31st. In response to Mr. Lytvyn's letter of resignation and his refusal to sign the

tional court sent a letter requesting the VR's position on the issue on the very next day, July 6th. According to The Ukrainian Week's sources, the Constitutional Court is ready to fulfill the task set by the party in power in the shortest term possible to elect a new speaker at the extraordinary session on July 31st and sign all laws required by the authorities. However, Mr. Lytvyn has already sent a letter to the Constitutional Court saying that "the procedure for electing the Speaker of the Verkhovna Rada is an internal issue of the operation of parliament. It cannot be subject to constitutional control". Yet, given the chronicle of decisions by the Constitutional Court over the past two years, it is unlikely to rule against the party in power.

Under such conditions, the only chance for Mr. Lytvyn to save face and his political prospects is to refuse to sign the law sponsored by Kolesnichenko and Kivalov (even if it is passed in accordance with the procedure and including the amendments which even Viktor Yanukovich does not oppose for tactical reasons). Regardless of Mr. Lytvyn's motivation now and his role in the past, it is his decision to actually block the law or play into the hands of the government now, that will determine his place in history. The right move could give him the possibility to reinvent himself as a politician and gain new political opportunities. ■

STICKING TO FIRM PRINCIPLES WILL ALLOW MR. LYTVERN THE OPPORTUNITY TO HAVE A POLITICAL FUTURE

laws passed in his absence, primarily those concerning language and the procedure for the election and dismissal of the speaker, 51 PR MPs applied to the Constitutional Court on July 5th to have its decision on how constitutional the requirement of a 300-large quorum to re-elect the speaker is. With unprecedented speed, the Constitu-

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Endurance Test

The government is testing how Ukrainian mass media and society are prepared to protect freedom of speech

Author:
Yuriy Raikhel

The government does not like independent press. That is common for authoritarian and totalitarian regimes, but also for democracies where the leaders are not very fond of journalists. The crucial difference, though, is that civil society and the press have trained the governments in Europe, Japan and North America to an extent where the latter do not even think of persecuting or sending a tax inspection raid on newspapers and TV studios because it will turn against them eventually. Nor do they start court proceedings against newspapers and reporters.

The struggle for freedom of speech was quite difficult and severe in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and 2000s. The Czech government tried to take one of the national TV channels under control yet encountered nation-wide resistance from journalists all over the country and rallies with many thousands of protesters. This forced the government to step back. Something similar happened in Baltic States.

Sadly, the CIS had opposite processes that inspired no optimism. Russia has not had live talk shows for so long now that people began to forget about them altogether. Central Asia has left virtually no space for opposition media. Belarus does not remember what the opposition media are. The era of free press was over as soon as Father Lukashenka came to power. After 2005, only Moldova and Ukraine still had relative freedom of speech. Ukraine, though, is now witnessing its stable decline.

TAKING THE EASIEST WAY

It is getting worse as the election campaign draws closer and the media buzz with news about the

Party of Regions' plummeting rates. If this was in a democratic state, its spin doctors would be running to invent attractive slogans, election platforms the voters would like and flattering promotion. These are challenging tasks that require the best experts and many more elements, including thorough and consistent work aimed at long-term results as the crucial element.

However, the Party of Regions' leaders and officials of the Presidential Administration are guided by the totally opposite reasons. Instead of a delicate and well-thought campaign, they take chaotic moves to hush up both their political opponents, and independent press. According to second-rate spin doctors hired from Russia, it is free press that poses the biggest threat, and they recommend the most primitive way to avoid and overcome it. To begin with, the government should intimidate independent media and close them down if intimidation does not work. The latter should be done based on a court ruling. The processes of Yulia Tymoshenko and Yuriy Lutsenko are the perfect models to follow.

INDEPENDENT MEDIA: FROM RARE TO EXTINCT?

Ukraine has very few independent TV channels. As soon as Viktor Yanukovich came to power, the relations between the government and TVi, one of the few still standing, grew tense. To begin with, its broadcasting license was taken away from TVi and given to Inter owned by Valeriy Khoroshkovsky, the First Vice Premier of Ukraine. Now, TVi's signal covers only cable networks thus cutting back on its audience significantly.

The channel managed to survive the first tax attack on it. According to Oleh Radchenko, Deputy General Director for Legal Is-

sues, "TVi had undergone a tax inspection a year before and everything had been fine. This year they found some violations. We filed an appeal against their decision and won the administrative case on this issue last month." Indeed, tax inspectors would hardly have found any violations if the Ukrainian court had deemed the TV channel clean. Soon, Oleksandr Klymenko, Chairman of the State Tax Administration, issued a decree whereby he extended the moratorium on inspecting the media in the third quarter. On July 30, the election campaign would start extending the inspection-free time for the media. All in all, this would allow journalists and media managers to work without pressure until November at least. But that had been true earlier, even when Leonid Kuchma was president. With the current government, everything is different. The ban on inspections is window dressing for Europe to leave the government alone. Internally, the situation is quite the opposite. There is always a way to exert pressure on an independent TV channel. Moreover, even if the left hand does one thing, such as signing the moratorium on tax inspections for the media, the right hand, such as the Presidential Administration, does not necessarily have to follow instruction.

Tax inspection has raided TVi yet again. Reluctant to violate the effective moratorium, the authorities opened a criminal case against Mykola Kniazhytsky, the channel's General Director. The investigators seemed to care little about the lack of legitimate reasons for the case or the fact that the court had already deemed the opening of the previous case illegal. They have an order therefore they should turn around and march to the TVi office. This scenario is nothing new: they repeat the same procedure over and over again.





DRAWING BY IHOR LUKIANCHENKO

OFFSETTING FEAR

The government's actions have several reasons. Firstly, it does not understand the outcome of its moves even if well-thought and planned. This signals that panic is growing within the Party of Regions. If it feels that its prospects in the elections are threatened by a TV channel with limited access to the audience, their spin doctors must be in a really bad situation. The raid on the TV channel is a proof of the lost campaign, at least in the media. Purging the informational space in the era of Internet, Facebook and Twitter makes no sense at all. Leonid Kuchma had already tried this through *temnyky*, instructions to the media on how they should present political developments his regime used in 2001-2004. They did not help – quite on the contrary. Similarly, tougher con-

trol over the media did not save Qaddafi or Mubarak, nor is it very helpful to Assad.

Secondly, the government is acting brutally showing openly that nothing can stop it. It seems to follow the principle where winners are not judged. Therefore,

THE IMPRESSION IS THAT THE GOVERNMENT FEELS TRAPPED AND IS ACTING CHAOTICALLY

Ukrainians are likely to witness unprecedented falsification and rigging of the election. The impression is that the government feels trapped and is acting chaotically. In a situation this desperate, it can do anything.

Thirdly, the government is in a rush. As soon as the election

campaign kicks off, European entities will monitor many things, including the government's attacks on independent media. At that point, tax inspectors will no longer feel comfortable raiding the offices of TV channels and publications. While here, the case against TVi and its General Director was opened before the campaign begins, so there will be no violations of European standards regarding election campaigns, even if formally.

There is still hope that TVi will stand this attack. The key prerequisite to that is the solidarity of journalists in the first place, the way it was in the Czech Republic. If Ukrainians fail to jointly make the government respect at least some rules of the code of decent conduct, everyone will feel the impact. And a country that has no freedom has no future, too. ■

Freedom Under Pressure



Author:
Yuri Makarov

On July 18, the Prosecutor's Office of the Pechersk District in Kyiv initiated a criminal case on the publication of confidential information about PR deputy Volodymyr Landik on the internet publication, LB.ua. Since the latter made a written request to end the persecution of journalists, some deputies – members of the VR Committee for Freedom of Speech have already stated that this issue is all about ending the activities of the independent media.

It is impossible to be slightly pregnant. It is impossible to be slightly free. Either you are, or you're not. I wrote this – and stopped. Really? Freedom is relative, particularly when talking about freedom of speech and freedom of the press. It can be held in check by direct state sanctions, a phantom fear of these sanctions, the position of the owner of the mass media or even the personal inclination or superstition of the journalist. In short, there is no such thing as absolute freedom, as we were taught in the USSR.

All these complex cases of institutional, corporate or moral restrictions of freedom are being diligently researched by international organizations, based on which reports are written, it is possible to argue about them, conduct disputes and write theses, but in the specific situation that has emerged in Ukraine, such fine lines are worth nothing. Why measure finely-tuned interaction, when freedom is constantly being flattened under a roller?

The attack of the tax roller on TVi demonstrates the vector of the development of Ukraine far too transparently. The Ukrainian, let me say, “government” (as of June 3, I cannot bring myself to write the word without inverted commas), first and foremost showed the people its fear, trying to shut the mouth of virtually the last independent broadcaster. I am convinced that the issue is not about being exasperated or taking offence at harsh statements: I doubt whether the Presidential Administration watches anything on TV, other than “Nasha Rasha” (“Our Russia” – a TV show parodying life). It is hard to assume that political expedience was taken into account: the efforts of this “government” have driven the TV channel into a frequency ghetto. It can only be seen on the cable networks of several large cities and accordingly, the audience influenced by TVi is restricted in advance, both from the quantitative, and the qualitative point of view. No, this is fear.

In this instance, it's worth looking at prototypes, since the regime is diligently copying the best models of Ukraine's northern neighbour, and it appears that the former is extremely envious of the latter's success in constructing its vertical power structure. In the Russia of the year 2000, Vladimir Putin, who had just taken the presidency, loved to read the highly oppositional *Novaya Gazeta* (New Gazette) – this was said by a person, who at that time had access to the Presidential office. You see, he was amused by *Novaya Gazeta*. He also did not make light of the daring *Ekho Moskvy* (“Echo of Moscow”) radio station. Moreover, Dmitry Muratov, Editor-in-Chief of *Novaya Gazeta* and Alexei Venediktov, Editor-in-Chief of *Echo of Moscow* were regularly invited to various events at the Kremlin and their journalists were asked to presidential-prime ministerial pools. This ensured a showcase of freedom of speech. Thus television, which addresses millions of viewers, was essentially purged; there were no allusions to pluralism, but a newspaper for one percent of highbrow people and

a radio channel for office-official plankton – by all means, it's even interesting.

Problems began when the “plankton” began to come out onto city squares in an amount equal to the population of a megapolis. But even here, Cheka agents acted elegantly: the leaders of pluralism were not squeezed; merely several laws were passed through parliament, which raise a far from symbolic guillotine above the heads of any daredevil. More specifically, the Law On Slander provides for a fine of RUR 5 million for the publication of information on felonies committed by any person (such as: particularly large amounts being stolen by officials), if they are not upheld by the Pechersk – sorry, a slip of the tongue, of course, the Basmany! – District Court in Moscow, which is approximately USD 1,500. The Law “On the Register of Banned Sites” allows the closure of any internet resource if child pornography, announcements of the sale of drugs, instructions for committing suicide, etc. is found on them. It is enough to write “You can hang yourself” on the forum, for the lights to go out. For all their outward respectability, such measures are evidence of the insurmountable fear of dissent. Together with the draconian restriction of the freedom of assembly, they give a definitive diagnosis: panic.

In Ukraine, individual attempts at imitation are coy so far, being conducted as a test. A court ruling on the prohibition of assembly was shown to hunger strikers on the European Square and subsequently quickly hidden away. Under the slogan of antimonopoly measures in the media (I wonder whether Khoroshkovsky was consulted on this issue?) and “reducing the possibility of using


the mass media as a key factor in the manipulation of social awareness and the personal views of the population to a minimum”, the Ministry of Justice is proposing the prohibition of the activities of television

UKRAINE IS TESTING RUSSIAN METHODS OF STRUGGLE WITH THOSE WHO HAVE A DIFFERENT OPINION



and radio organizations, the founder or owner of which is an offshore non-resident, as well as the establishment (reading between the lines of the relevant draft law) of personal responsibility of the editor of individual issues of printed publications for “manipulation” ... All of this fiction can theoretically be used in full, but for the time being, it is being used as a test shot. Criminal cases are a different matter. All that's left is to rely on the strong nerves of Mykola Kniazhytsky's colleagues and the self-preservation instincts of officials. But if no reputational risk stood in the way of the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister and the former Minister of Internal Affairs, why not add a journalist to them?

The fact of the matter is that based on mental capacity, the student-president does not differ in a positive manner from the teacher-president. No-one knows what will come into his mind, not to mention what will come into the minds of those controlling the puppet strings. Meanwhile, the roller is gaining speed and it appears that it has missed the turn to Europe. What road directions is Ukraine following? “Russia”? “Belarus”? ■



Another Carrot

The simplification of the visa regime and the initialing of the economic part of the Ukraine-EU Free Trade Agreement do not mean that the isolation of Yanukovych's regime has ended

EU Commission Trade Spokesman John Clancy said recently that Ukraine and the EU have completed the legal proof-reading of the text of the agreement on a deepened and comprehensive free trade area, and that the technical initialing will take place on July 19 in Brussels. Earlier, after much debate, the EU Commission recommended that the EU Council signs amendments to the agreement on a simplified visa regime with Ukraine. The simplification will embrace the issue of one-year visas to Ukrainians who are relatives of EU citizens, drivers working on international routes, technical crew accompanying journalists, or those accompanying sick people for treatment abroad. Also, getting a visa will be simpler for representatives of civil and religious organizations visiting EU member-states to take part in international events. The biggest privileges go to business representatives and journalists who travel to EU member-states on a regular basis. They will obtain five-year multi-entry visas and will be required to submit a shorter list of documents to confirm the purpose of their trips.

Author:
Heorhiy Hryshchenko

According to co-Chair of the Green Party faction in the European Parliament Rebecca Harms, the agreement is meant to improve the lives of ordinary Ukrainians who should not be punished for the bad policy of their government.

Such five-year multi-entry visas are supposed to be granted free of charge to MPs and oblast council deputies, judges of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court, as well as prosecutors on the national and regional level and their deputies. This has sparked a huge debate, since most of the people involved in the current political repressions in Ukraine are included in this group. Moreover, government representatives are already trying to interpret the completion of FTA initialing on July 19 and the signing of the Agreement on a Simplified Visa Regime, scheduled for July 23, as a sign that the EU does not have an isolation policy against the current Ukrainian government and the expansion of European integration, as Viktor Yanukovych constantly reminds us. Andriy Kliuyev, for instance, said that "Ukraine is continuing its European integration in specific everyday actions rather than words."

However, Viviane Reding, Vice President of the European Commission, and Elmar Brok, Chair of the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, have opposed the signing of the agreement on a simplified visa regime, to show their pro-

test against the violation of human rights in Ukraine. Why was this decision ultimately made, despite the current situation? In her comment on this to Deutsche Welle, Rebecca Harms, co-Chair of the Green Party faction in the European Parliament, said that simplified entrance to the EU will benefit Ukrainian democrats and she did not want citizens to be punished for their government's bad policy. However, there are also other considerations.

The European Commission's decision to recommend that the EU Council signs the simplified visa regime agreement with Ukraine is just the first step in a long chain of subsequent steps before the document becomes part of European legislation. First, it must be approved by the EU Council that consists of the relevant government ministers of all 27 EU member-states. It then has to be ratified by the Verkhovna Rada and the European Parliament. No intrigues with Ukrainian MPs are anticipated, but the decision of European MPs remains undetermined.

The situation with the initialing of the Association Agreement and FTA between Ukraine and the EU is the same, which the latter linked to the termination of political repression and the violation of other democratic freedoms in Ukraine. In fact, this will only be the completion of the initialing process that kicked off on March 30, 2012, when the parties only initialed the political section, as well as the first and the last pages of the economic section. Instead, according to the above-mentioned John Clancy, technical processes for the preparation of the document for signing, including the translation of the text into official EU languages, will follow. With that, the decision on the signing will depend on the political situation in Ukraine, just like before, he notes.

Both the recommendation to conclude the simplified visa regime agreement, and the completion of the initialing of the Association Agreement and FTA, signal that the EU is still waiting for Ukraine and is keeping the door open, ready for deeper cooperation at any moment. All Ukraine needs for this, is to change its government's policy or the government itself. The parliamentary election in October 2012, which is very much in the spotlight in the EU, will play a crucial role in this. ■

Preventing Poverty

A guide to eliminating corruption and establishing the rule of law with a limited set of resources at hand

The Rule of Law is the keystone of a good constitution, but is not well understood. Ordinary life is hazardous, confidence shaken, enterprise inhibited, prosperity destroyed, if officials are lazy, incompetent, untrustworthy and corrupt. I live from day to day, hoping that no policeman will demand a bribe not to book me for crossing the street at an unauthorised place; I keep my head down, lest some tax inspector turns up demanding alleged unpaid dues; I don't improve my farm for fear that it will be expropriated by some crony of the governor; foreigners refuse to invest because they know that they will not know whom to bribe and on what occasion. Without the Rule of Law a society is condemned to the impoverished tribalism of prehistoric times.


The Rule of Law has been difficult to defend because it has proved difficult to define. We are quite sure that judges should not take bribes, but there is a slippery slope from obvious venality to subtle pressures that are not quite above

Author:
John Lucas,
UK

board but seem an inevitable concomitant to effective government. It is not clear where the line should be drawn, and so there is constant pressure to extend the grey area which we find difficult to resist.

It is natural to start with the requirement that laws should be written down and published: then everyone can read them and know what he is required to do. But being written down is neither necessary nor sufficient: in Iceland the laws were not written but were recited from memory at a yearly meeting, and Draco's code, the first to be written, was repressively severe. Modern laws and regula-

tions are equally open to criticism, not only for being needless restrictive, but often for favouring one interest group, good at lobbying, over others which only seek a level playing field.



WHY DO WE NEED THE LAW?

It is largely our concept of law that is at fault. We have inherited from Greek philosophers and Roman jurists what may be termed the "Big Stick" theory of law. Laws exist to prevent and punish determined wrong-doers who will not be deterred by anything other than coercive force. The only alternative to the law of the jungle is to have a sovereign with a monopoly of coercive power, whose word is law – quod placuit principi legis vigorem habet. Against this dangerously untrammelled power of a sovereign there arose first mediaeval theories of natural law and then contract theories, most recently articulated by John Rawls in his *Theory of Justice*. Both capture important insights, but neither is adequate on its own. Natural law theories are based on the rationality of human beings. We can reason, and work out what is right. But even if perfectly rational and perfectly moral, I could not by reason alone always discover what I should do. I cannot discover by reason alone that I ought to drive on the left in Britain and on the right in Europe. Many features of ordinary life are like the

BIO



John Lucas is a British philosopher. Born in 1929, he was educated at Oxford where he later taught for 36 years until retiring in 1996. John Lucas wrote many works on the philosophy of mathematics, science, religion, political philosophy and more. In his best-known work entitled *Minds, Machines and Gödel* (1959), Mr. Lucas insists that an automaton cannot represent a human mathematician and refutes computationalism. He is Fellow of the British Academy. His main books include *Principles of Politics*, 1966; *The Concept of Probability*, 1970; *The Freedom of the Will*, 1970; *The Nature of Mind*, 1972; *A Treatise on Time and Space*, 1973; *On Justice*, 1980; *The Future*, 1989; *Spacetime and Electromagnetism*, 1990; *Responsibility*, 1993; *Ethical Economics*, 1997; *Conceptual Roots of Mathematics*, 1999; 2003; and *Reason and Reality*, 2006. John Lucas helped establish the Oxford Consumers' Group and was its first Chairman.

rule of the road: they depend on collective preferences, often ones that emerged gradually over the course of time. We need to be guided not only by the light of nature but by sensitivity to our social surroundings. Contract theories fail to formulate any plausible

WITHOUT THE RULE OF LAW A SOCIETY IS CONDEMNED TO THE IMPOVERISHED TRIBALISM OF PREHISTORIC TIMES

terms for the putative contract they posit, but capture the insight that government exists for the sake of the governed, and that the law-enforcer is not entitled to make arbitrary decisions, but has fiduciary duties that go with his office.

Law is not primarily a vehicle of coercion to suppress determined wrong-doers, but a common understanding of how to settle disputes. Only in a small minority of cases is actual coercion needed. It is important that it be known to be available if all else fails, but mostly simple adjudication is enough, backed up by social disapproval against reluctance to abide by disappointing judgements. The common law approach enables us to identify different requirements implicit in the rule of law. We require it to be administered without fear or favour. Judges must be independent of the powers that be, in order to know that they will not themselves suffer if they decide against some government protégé, and themselves not favour any litigant for any pecuni-

ary of personal reason. But we go further: if the law is a common possession of society for settling disputes, they should be settled by reference to actual cases, and not for extraneous reasons of state. There is nothing venal in deciding that it is expedient that one man should die for the sake of the people, but it is not a valid reason for condemning him to death. The Rule of Law requires not only that judgements should not be corrupt, but that they should not be taken for *raison d'état*. Britons are outraged at citizens being extradited to the United States to face criminal charges for actions which were done, are not crimes, in Great Britain. No doubt the government has reason to curry up to the United States, but that was not a reason for a British subject to be handed over to a foreign jurisdiction for something he had done that was not a crime where he did it. Not that considerations of public interest cannot enter into the law. Men can be conscripted and sent to their deaths in defence of the realm. Treason has always been a crime. Many laws are framed to protect the public. But they are laws, not covert pressures on the administration of the law in particular cases.

Modern thinkers often argue that laws, to be laws, must be enacted by a legislature. As a general account of the history of law, this is false. Custom and public morality have long been recognised as other sources of law. But there is a further argument from freedom that has greater weight. Laws legislated by a legislature are written laws; written laws can be read by everyone, and everyone therefore can know what is allowed, and what he can do without falling foul of the law. He has a freedom which in pre-Draco times was denied to ordinary members of the public. Unless judges are forbidden to dream up laws on their own, the citizen does not know where he stands, and cannot plan his future with confidence. But it is impracticable to tie down judges completely. The Code Napoléon tried to do so, but failed: in being guided by the written word, judges have to interpret it. In order to be reasonably sure about what he can get away with, the smart guy has to consult a solicitor, who has mastered not only the (often opaque) wording of the statute by a host of precedents »



about what it means in various sorts of case. The ordinary citizen can have a rough and ready knowledge of the law, and how to steer clear of trouble, but if he wants to sail close to the wind he needs an expert pilot.

A second argument for restricting morality from being a source of law arises from an understanding of the nature of morality. Morality is different from law. We sometimes say "There ought to be a law against it", which only makes sense if in fact there is not. There may be good practical reasons – the cost of enforcement, the avoidance of blackmail – for not making wrong-doing a crime. And there are deeper reasons too. Christianity taught that the public morality of ancient Israel was not by itself enough, and that one needed to go beyond public morality and commit oneself to much more. But individual commitment is individual, and ought not to be enforced on others by the law. I may give my body to be burned or used for medical research, I may give all my goods to the poor, I may devote my life to helping the poor in a Johannesburg slum, and these may be things I genuinely ought to do, but I ought not to compel other people to do likewise. From this it is argued, most famously by J.S. Mill, and more recently by H.L.A. Hart, that morality is entirely separate from morals, and that the only valid ground for prohibiting any sort of behaviour is that it is harmful to someone else, the mere fact of its being, wrong being entirely irrelevant. Mill's arguments do not hold water – 'harm' is too vague a concept to carry weight, and when investigated, turns out to involve moral evaluations – but should make us wary of reading too much into public morality. We need to leave room for different individuals to realise their different commitments, allowing a large measure of liberty in order to facilitate a flourishing autonomy of will.

But a large measure of liberty is not a complete licence. The issue came up in 1961 when a Mr Shaw had published a directory of prostitutes. In his defence it could be argued that there is in England no law specifically against publishing a directory of prostitutes, although there are many laws against procuring and the like. The

court found him guilty none the less, citing precedents establishing that public morality could be a source of law. Shaw's own moral principles might differ, but did not entitle him to set aside public morality. Nor was there a plausible argument from freedom: what he was doing ran counter to the general tenor of the law. He was trying to exploit what he took to be a gap in the law, and failed.


Law is not the same as morality, but law and morality, along with custom and convention, are the fabric which makes communal life possible. The way that law develops, often encompassing law and custom though not coextensive with it, is sometimes indeterminate, but in general clear enough to distinguish what considerations should, and what should not, enter into a judicial decision. We know what the Rule of Law requires. The difficult is to bring it about. Britain and America were able to do so, because in the wake of the Reformation there were a substantial number of men imbued with a natural independence of mind and a strong sense of integrity, so that judges, once freed from executive control, could be relied on to interpret and enforce the law impartially; and later in the Victorian age to secure the service or public spirited officials who, whatever their other failings, were honest and incorruptible. But the Indian Civil Service and the Colonial service failed to inculcate these attitudes sufficiently strongly, and in most parts of the former British Empire corruption is endemic, and one of the chief causes of their poverty and backwardness. The great question, there and elsewhere, is how to eliminate corruption and establish the Rule of Law with the limited resources available.

Although individuals are all too ready to favour corruption in themselves, they do not like it in others. Popular opinion is against it, and there will always be a majority who disapprove it in general, though not necessarily without exception. Public opinion is powerful prophylactic provided it is informed. Transparency spreads information, and small is transparent – in a small organization there is less

room to hide, and close colleagues are more likely to spot what is going on. Moreover, and most importantly, it is impossible to bribe a tradesman, say a plumber, to come and do a job, since, being his own man, any payment made to him is not a bribe but an above-board payment. In an economy of small operators there are fewer opportunities for corruption, and a greater climate of straightforward dealing. It is sensible therefore to downsize, so far as is possible. In particular, as little as possible

ORDINARY LIFE IS HAZARDOUS IF OFFICIALS ARE LAZY, INCOMPETENT, UNTRUSTWORTHY AND CORRUPT

should be undertaken by the State. This runs counter to the inclinations of politicians who want to be seen to be doing things. But in any society in which there is a dearth



of honest and conscientious men, we need to ration the appetite for having public officials, so that the available few are placed where they are most needed. Judges in Britain are, and are believed to be incorruptible, because they are well paid, and effectively irremovable. That may not be enough, but it is a good beginning. But they are few, and even if we down-size the State, other officials are needed, to issue licences, collect customs, and perform other duties that only the State can undertake. How can we prevent public officials becoming corrupt, if we must recruit them from a public that, while generally disapproving of corruption, is not committed to absolute integrity?

Corruption, because it is devious, takes time to develop, and can therefore be disrupted by timely changes. If officials are shunted around at irregular intervals, the cosy relationships that the outgoing incumbent has cultivated will not be immediately available to his successor. He will have to walk warily at first, because if he shows his hand to the wrong person, his venality will be known, and he will get into trouble. The straight and narrow is the safest path. And by the time he has discovered from whom he can safely demand a bribe, it will be time to move on.



A second remedy is to dualise. If the Government Inspectorship is entrusted to a two-some, it will be dangerous for either to engage in any dubious practice, since the other will be in on everything he does, and neither will be able to do anything that will not be noted by the other. If there is a further policy of having one official drawn from those who are familiar with the job and the other from a different department, there will be the added advantage that accepted departmental practices, and not only corrupt ones, will be

IN AN ECONOMY OF SMALL OPERATORS THERE ARE FEWER OPPORTUNITIES FOR CORRUPTION

exposed to critical scrutiny, leading sometimes to the elimination of encrusted waste and inefficiency.

The requirement to declare an interest is a third antiseptic. It is not feasible to extend to all the business transacted by officials the high requirement, imposed on the judiciary, that they should disqualify themselves if they have any connection with any party involved – often officials need to know the people they are doing business with. But if they declare an interest it alerts everybody else to the possibility that they are being unduly swayed by it, and puts them in the wrong if it turns out that there was an interest they failed to declare.

Measures such as these help to focus the general disapproval that most people feel for corruption into powerful sanctions against it. But they will not always work. Power tends to corrupt, and politics is about power. There will always be pressure from the top to bend rules to favour the friends of those in power, and to re-Rule the Law to fit their agenda. The West is as vulnerable as the East. Britain and America like to portray themselves as paragons of Gladstonian rectitude. But Britain is just discovering the extent of cronyism in 10 Downing Street, and the appointment of judges to the Supreme Court of the United States of America is becoming more and more a matter of politics. ■

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Uzbekistan's Demarche

Tashkent's decision to withdraw from the Collective Security Treaty Organization could lead to yet another surge of destabilization in the Asian region



Author:
Yuriy Raikhel

Uzbekistan's official note to terminate its membership in the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) has come as a surprise to everyone except experts. In December 2011, Alexander Lukashenko proposed that Nikolay Bordyuzha, CSTO's Secretary General, considers Uzbekistan's continued membership in the organization before its summit in Moscow. Back then, the Belarusian president asked CSTO to "tackle some internal problems, primarily those concerning Uzbekistan's position on some issues – and you can't get away from this; everybody knows it."

CSTO members include Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Tajikistan and

Uzbekistan. The Treaty, initiated by Uzbekistan, was signed in 1992 in Tashkent and ratified in 1994. Islam Karimov, the country's president at that time, was seriously concerned about the civil war that had broken out in neighbouring Tajikistan and was seeking ways of collective resistance to the Islamist movement that was expanding in the region.

The first public disparities surfaced in 1999 when Tashkent refused to extend the treaty, thus exiting the CSTO. Moreover, Uzbekistan joined GUAM (Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia and Moldova), viewed by the Kremlin as an anti-Russian entity, of which it was a

member until 2005. The tide turned abruptly after the Andijon massacre in spring-summer 2005. The West strongly criticized Tashkent for the violent crushing of protests that killed many people. As a result, Uzbekistan went back to the CSTO, becoming a fully-fledged member in 2006.

However, it was not long before Tashkent once more took its own position on various issues. It often opposed fundamental decisions and refused to ratify over 15 agreements and protocols, including the Protocol on the Procedure for the Formation and Operation of Collective Security System Forces and Means.

Vladimir Putin may well have tried to prevent Uzbekistan's exit from the CSTO during his recent visit to Tashkent. His meeting with Islam Karimov on June 5th only lasted a few hours. The official outcome was the signing of a memorandum whereby Uzbekistan joined the CIS Free Trade Zone Agreement. Yet, Russian observers claimed that Uzbekistan had been persistently backpedalling on all of Moscow's initiatives to develop the CSTO and Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

Once Uzbekistan issued its CSTO exit note, other member-states had no idea how to respond. Later, when Russia's top echelons learned more about what was going on, officials and experts close to the Kremlin were quick with their comments.

Most of them noted that this was Tashkent's attempt to move away from Russia and get closer to USA.

Vladimir Zharikhin, Deputy Director of the CIS Institute, shares this view. In the *Vzgliad* (Opinion) newspaper, he reminds readers that Tashkent has been actively trying to get closer to America lately, but without much success. "We realize that geopolitics has no room for romantic emotion. Therefore, there will be official rapprochement, but without any particular love or respect," he said.

Konstantin Sivkov, First Vice-President at the Academy of Geopolitical Issues, shares this view. "Uzbekistan's exit means only one thing: its government has taken the course of moving closer to the US and NATO." After rapprochement, the leaders will be replaced with those that are more loyal to Uzbekistan, he notes. "That's it. They've decided on their course, aimed at the emergence of a 'colour revolution' in the country. This is likely to happen in 18 months, or two years at most."

The French Revolution terrified the absolutist and feudal Europe of that time to the extent that its ghost haunted top ministerial cabinets for almost a century. The Rose Revolution in Georgia and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine still send shivers down Kremlin leaders' spines. But this is purely emotional; there is also a practical side.

The population of Uzbekistan is
29.5 million people



THE CSTO IS AN ORGANIZATION OF TALK AND DECLARATIONS, NOT ACTION

Uzbekistan's GDP (PPP) per capita is
\$3,302
placing it 133rd out of 183 countries in the world

According to Mr. Sivkov, Uzbekistan's withdrawal from the CSTO will have a serious impact on its relations with Russia. "This might not be visible initially, but Uzbekistan will subsequently implement an anti-Russian policy in the region, causing a deterioration of inter-state relations."

Damaged relations with the Kremlin signal improved relations with someone else. Clearly, in this case, with Washington, and that is the Kremlin's tragedy. The nightmare of Moscow's politicians and generals is coming true: the American enemy is getting ever closer. Uzbekistan could even end up with a US military base! To hear some Russian military officials, this would be tantamount to it being located somewhere just outside Moscow. No more, no less.

Looking at the issue based on the situation in Central Asia rather than from the point of view of the Russian elite's antiquated anti-Americanism, the CSTO is an organization of talk and declarations, not action. Alexei Malashenko, an expert at the Carnegie Moscow Center, told the media that "essentially,

throughout the twenty years of its existence, the CSTO has never tested itself in major incidents, related to ensuring security in the CIS. The most obvious demonstration of its helplessness was the second Tulip Revolution in Kyrgyzstan in the spring and summer of last year. There was bloodshed in this CSTO member-state, but the organization failed to respond to the situation and regulate the conflict, confirming its impotence. However, it's possible that it could have aggravated the situation, had it interfered. Can you imagine Uzbek military units trying to deal with protests in Kyrgyzstan?"

Tashkent has serious problems with virtually all of its neighbours. Its relations with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are very strained in connection with their plans to construct a cascade of

hydroelectric power stations. If they do so, Uzbekistan will get less water which will aggravate the existing deficit. Hopes that Moscow will help to resolve this problem have proved to be vain. Moreover, Russian organizations are participating in the construction of the most contentious dams, the Rogun Dam on the Vaksh River in Tajikistan and Kambarata Dam on the Naryn River in Kazakhstan. While oil and gas fuel conflicts in the world, water could easily generate one in Central Asia.

Regional leadership is another problem with the CSTO. Uzbekistan is trying to win it from Kazakhstan. Overall, Uzbekistan's regional-scale hegemonic intentions face intense resistance from its neighbours. For this reason, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan increasingly see Kazakhstan as a natural counterweight to Uzbekistan, which fuels regional rivalry, especially with the interference of external powers, such as China, the USA and Russia. Apparently, Uzbekistan has grown weary of all this and gone off in pursuit of happiness with others. This will not necessarily be Washington. Beijing is also not averse to putting a little pressure on the Kremlin.

Moscow and Minsk pretend that no harm will come from Uzbekistan's exit from the CSTO. Nikolai Makarov, Chief of CSTO Headquarters in Russia, stressed that there would not be a significant impact on the CSTO. In fact, this may not be the case. According to Dosym Satpayev, a Kazakh political scientist and Director of the Risk Assessment Group, guaranteeing security in Central Asia without Uzbekistan will be next to impossible. He claims that "Uzbekistan is one of the key states in Central Asia and ensuring regional security without it is difficult. But, Uzbekistan is a sovereign state that has the right to decide on which organizations and entities it wants, or doesn't want to participate in."

Clearly, Uzbekistan's decision on the CSTO will result in the further polarization of Central Asia and the region may well continue the arc of instability, which stretches from the Middle East to Afghanistan. ■

Troubled Neighbourhood



Wojciech Borodziej-Smoliński talks about modern Warsaw-Vilnius relations

Interviewer:
Oleksandr
Pahiria

Poland-Lithuania relations are the tensest in the EU. The countries often conflict over historical, national, cultural and language issues. This instability is caused by the district of Vilnius, which has one of the biggest Polish minorities (around 240,000 people) abroad. Moscow, which is trying to strengthen its influence in the region, profits from these conflicts that spoil any dialogue between the two neighbours. Lithuania has the October parliamentary race ahead and the party of local Poles is going to take part in the elections together with Russian forces. Wojciech Borodziej-Smoliński, a director of the Center for International Relations in Warsaw, spoke to *The Ukrainian Week* about the con-

flicts of the two states and their possible consequences.

U. T.: Relations between Lithuanians and Poles are the worst in the EU and are often compared to the cat and dog enmity. What is the reason for this? Don't you think Warsaw and Vilnius are hostages of their common history?

– This is all about politicians and media interpreting public views. Speaking about Polish-Lithuanian mutual comprehension; I would like to mention the following definition which has been used in our politics for the last several years: “a tough friendship”. And here, it is worth considering economic and political levels separately. I can say that it is getting better in economics: Poland is now one of four main partners of Lithuania and the Polish Orlen Lietuva Investment Company continues to fill the Lithuanian budget with more and more taxes. We have joint energy projects that should

strengthen the economic security of not just our closest neighbour, but also of Latvia and Estonia. The Lotos company plans to use its affiliates in Lithuania to search for and develop shale gas deposits within the territory of the country. Meanwhile PZU, the biggest Polish insurance company, intends to expand its affiliates from Lithuania to other Baltic markets. Of course, there are some problems in economic cooperation, but it is quite normal to have problems and we can solve them together.

It is much more complicated to analyze relations on social and political levels. Firstly, because of the issue of the national minorities, secondly, because of the unwillingness of the public and politicians to consider any other issues apart from education, language, street names, surnames and land restitution. The discussions of these issues are complicated by their politicization abroad and by the lack of dialogue between the societies

of the two countries. The issues of the Polish national minorities in Warsaw politics provide Poles with good reasons for debate. Poles like to talk about Poland's responsibility to support minorities and the necessary intensity of this support, as well as debate about political force being the best guardian of Poles abroad. I don't think Poland and Lithuania are hostages of their history. Let me remind you that the period from the 15th century to the beginning of the 20th century was marked with almost no wars between the two countries. It is modern times that have brought these conflicts with the consequences still fresh in our memory. Speaking of bad treatment towards their compatriots in Lithuania, Poles should better recall Warsaw's national politics in the Vilnius Region at the beginning of the 20th century and only afterwards make any proposals.

U. T.: What are the most sensitive issues in these relations?

– These issues are usually deemed to be the spelling of surnames, as Lithuania has forbidden the use of the Polish letters (ś, ć, Ń, ą, ę, w etc.); the return of land; reforms in education for national minorities and street names, though I don't consider these problems to be the most important ones in the two nations' relations. All these problems can be solved if the two parties, mainly Lithuania's Poles and Lithuanians, are willing to do so. But the lack of trust in relations is the decisive factor. The parties treat each other on the basis of prejudices and stereotypes. The main reason for this is that Lithuanian citizens of Polish origin are considered to be disloyal to the state they live in, always ready to betray the state and always waiting for neighbours' help. Lithuanians are very sensitive to this aspect and Poland should understand this delicate issue. It is slightly reminiscent of the Poles' distrust towards the Germans.

U. T.: Electoral Action of Poles in Lithuania (AWPL) has formed the Valdemar Tomaševski's Block together with the Lithuanian Russian Union on the basis of protection of national minorities against the state's coalition in power. Do you think AWPL is taking care of its own interests and

can it become an additional instrument of Moscow during the parliamentary race in Lithuania in October 2012?

– The question is not only about the coalition of AWPL with this force. It seems like representatives of national minorities have the will to, and can, cooperate. But one should consider this problem within the framework of Polish-

MUCH TIME AND HARD WORK ARE NEEDED TO OVERCOME THE DEFICIENCY OF OPENNESS AND TRUST IN POLISH-LITHUANIAN RELATIONS

Lithuanian and Lithuanian-Russian relations. Lack of trust between the partners, and that is the case in both relations, makes it difficult to overcome distrust and suspicion as to voting lists. Meanwhile AWPL is occupied in the race solely with the issues of the Polish minority and isn't really trying to increase its influence on the rest of the voters. That brings more suspicion. It is worth paying special attention to the partners chosen for election unions in the country where gas and oil reserves wholly depend on Moscow's politics and the internet and media are overburdened with Russian language.

U. T.: Russia is the only country in the region directly profiting from your confrontation. Why do conflicts on historical, educational and language issues undermine rapport between Lithuania and Poland based on the platform of long-term foreign policy objectives? What could this platform be like to counteract Moscow's attempts to increase its geopolitical impact in Central Eastern Europe?

– Politicians of both countries use old schemes. In Lithuania, Poles are surely considered to be enemies of the local statehood.

And Poles in their turn treat Lithuanians as obstinate opponents of the revival of Polish national life in the neighbouring country. The atmosphere of suspicion and politicization is pressurized by the media. Our people treat each other as opponents and don't want to listen to anything out of the stereotypes framework. De-facto we do not communicate with each other and have not created a platform for dialogue formed, for instance, within the last 20 years in Poland with Germany. The thing is that the Polish-Lithuanian conflict could be presented to the world as a dispute between a disobedient and uncertain party and another one dreaming of "A Great Poland from Sea to Sea".

First of all discussion is needed. Important issues of Lithuania and Poland should be taken into account, for example, their EU and NATO futures and the role of our countries in the Baltic region. It is necessary to find common objectives beyond politics.


U. T.: What levels can the two countries cooperate on?

– They already cooperate in many areas. Economic cooperation has become the best example of cooperation beyond politics, and has given considerable results. Much time and hard work are needed to overcome the deficiency of openness and trust in Polish-Lithuanian relations. Bridges can be built via programs, funds, projects, student exchange programs etc. But there can be no easy way out.

U. T.: Do you think the aggressive policy of Warsaw led by Foreign Affairs Minister Radosław Sikorski can undermine previous achievements in this area?

– Apparently the Foreign Affairs Ministry and Minister Sikorski are the only advocates of the tough line. Other participants of the public dialogue support peace talks and the gradual building of trust. Our country often forgets that it bears great responsibility as a powerful EU state, which is important for the region. We can't rely on the position of a superior state. Poland is not and won't be an empire, but it can be a regional leader. That means we have to be guiders instead of using power and forcing our partners to do something we want. ■

According to the 2001 census, there were a total of 553,000 inhabitants in Vilnius, of which



BIO

Wojciech Borodzicz-Smoliński is a deputy director of the Center for International Relations in Warsaw. He is a graduate of the National Defense University and the European Centre of Warsaw University. During the period of 2004-2009 he coordinated the Office of Janusza Onyszkiewicz, a Member of the European Parliament. He is a participant in numerous international projects. In 2004 he opened the Belarusian School of Journalism. In 2010 he led the Poland-Belarus Regional Partnership Forum. He is a specialist in foreign affairs and Polish Eastern policy.

The Man Behind the Velvet Revolution

Daniel Kaiser, author of *Dissident Vaclav Havel*, speaks about the first critical biography of the famed Czech politician and playwright

Interviewer:
Les Belei



DISSIDENT VACLAV HAVEL. While working on the book, Daniel Kaiser studied the documents in the Havel case kept by law enforcement agencies and held several extensive conversations with him.

The historical changes of the late 1980s and early 1990s are often viewed in Central and Eastern Europe as having taken place only yesterday. But time flies, and many of those who inspired these transformations are no longer with us. One key figure in those heady days was Vaclav Havel, the last president of Czechoslovakia and the first president of the Czech Republic. Journalist and historian Daniel Kaiser wrote his book while Havel was still living. He poured over his memoirs, compared them with archival documents and met with his subject multiple times. *The Ukrainian Week* talked to Kaiser before he set out on a tour across Ukraine to promote the first part of his study – the book *Dissident Vaclav Havel* translated into Ukrainian and published by Tempora Publishers.

U.W.: What sparked your interest in Havel?

Havel was interesting to me, just as he was to any Czech who cared even the least bit about politics. I began to watch him while I was still a teenager, i.e., in the second half of the 1980s. Because I was so young, I watched him then as an observer.

U.W.: A lot has been written about Havel. How is your book different from others?

I have always respected the man, but as I wrote about him, I decided to resort to a healthy critical method. I am the first person to have compared his old memoirs about trials and imprisonment with material kept in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, i.e., I contrasted Havel's own testimony with everything I could find about him. No-one else had done that before.

U.W.: You wrote the book in Havel's lifetime. Did he try to have any kind of impact on your work?

I had several long conversations with him in which he patiently replied to my questions. This was the only time he could have guided me in some direction, which would have been natural. Curiously, he remembered more details from his dissident years, even though they were more distant, and when he spoke about the more recent events during his presidential career, he was at times unsure and hesitated. He helped me in my work. For example, he contacted various people who had his letters, asking them to make them accessible to me. These people often demanded special consent, and he always helped me without hesitation.

U.W.: What do you think is the most important thing he left after himself?

Apart from several plays, Havel is also an example of how a person must conduct himself in difficult times without losing dignity. He indeed did more in the 1970s and the 1980s than during his presidency. His presidency is like repayment of the loan he issued to society when he was a dissident.

U.W.: Looking at Havel from a historical perspective, does he come across as a typical Czech politician? Or did he stand out in some way?

He was typical in only one respect: he wanted to do politics and had advanced power ambitions. But he never showed it on the outside and had to be constantly talked into things. It all had the appearance of being quite a sacrifice on his part. He played this part well. Czech poli-

ticians have a somewhat unfortunate trait of sentimentalising. Its roots go back perhaps to the 19th century or even the period of national revival. However, it was very good that Havel went into politics in 1989 and that he stayed there for the entire period that he won for himself. How was he different? Through his courage and honesty with himself.

U.W.: Can the Velvet Revolution be credited to Havel?

It all depends on how you look at it. The Communists would have surrendered power in that period even without the help of Havel or Charter 77. But he gave the Czechoslovakian autumn of 1989 an attractive visage and wrote the script for it. To many eyewitnesses of these events, this is their best memory.

U.W.: Do all Czechs view his political activity in the same way? Or is there some "anti-Havel opposition" in society?

Of course, Havel had many critics, and they included both communists and democrats. In the five-six years before his death, when he was no longer president and rarely appeared in public, even though his presence was somehow felt, a kind of quiet Havel revival took place. Here is a telling example for you. Four years ago I was at a wedding party. The celebration continued well into the night and the police showed up and accused us of being a public nuisance. Jokingly, we began to yell something about human rights and then chanted the slogan "Long live Havel!" This was, of course, a joke, but it had its effect on the police. They laughed, dropped the matter and left. After Havel's death, Czech society came to a cer-

tain consensus: despite all his mistakes and varying attitudes to his policies, Havel was a great personality.

U.W.: He was also known for his bohemian way of life. How do Czechs treat such public figures?

In general, positively. The reputation of a Czech politician will not be seriously shaken if a scandal involving his lover erupts or he is reported to have a large taste for alcohol. Social tolerance to celebrities and their private life is not Havel's merit, but he proved the rule.

U.W.: Are his plays still relevant today?

Yes, his plays are more important and topical than, for example, his political writings. In my opinion, some of the pieces he wrote in the 1970s are excellent analysis of the communist reaction to the events of 1968 and the way people behave in a totalitarian society.

U.W.: Havel is known to have been apprehensive about signing the law on lustration...

There was at least one person in his inner circle whom the state security service had forced into co-operation. This person did not wrong anyone, and it cost this person extremely great effort to sever connections with the security service. That is why Havel could not see such dramatic goal stories being analysed by MPs who were often young people of rightist persuasions. He was afraid of Jacobinism. However, he signed the law under pressure from his anti-Communist advisors and for the sake of a strategic union with the powerful right.

I believe lustration could have been somewhat more radical, but it was generally beneficial. Initially, Havel rejected lustration laws internally, even though he eventually came to think under pressure from his inner circle that they were necessary. They were first valid for five years but were later prolonged several times and are effective even now. Initially, opponents to this law protested, sometimes even hysterically, but later they put up with it.

U.W.: Do you think decommunisation is complete in the Czech Republic?

In general, yes. My generation, i.e., those who were about 20 in

BIO
DANIEL KAISER
(b. 1971)
received a university diploma in history and is a German linguist. He worked for *Lidove noviny*, a daily newspaper, in 1999-2001 and in the Czech office of the BBC in Prague and London in 2001-2006. He has been a political observer with *Lidove noviny* since 2009.

1989, are coming to power in the economy and public life with politics lagging a bit behind.

U.W.: Are Czechs satisfied with EU membership? How widespread is European skepticism?

Skepticism has been on the rise since the onset of the crisis in the eurozone. Today European skeptics are in the majority. Of course, in the Czech Republic these are not people who would want the country to pull out of the EU. They are simply doubtful about the need to harmonise legislation and oppose the euro and

unification of political power. Havel was not able to comprehend this paradigm shift, this crisis of European thought, i.e., the exhaustion of its capabilities. This is a different political world.

U.W.: You were planning to write Havel's biography in several parts. So far you have published the first volume about his dissident years. When is the continuation coming?

The next book is almost ready. I'm putting the last touches on it and if everything goes well, I will hand over the second part to the publisher this year. ■



The Real Wealth of N

A new report comes up with a better way to size up wealth


The balance-sheet of wealth

Inclusive wealth

Country	2008, \$ trn	1990-2008 growth†, %
United States	117.8	0.7
Japan	55.1	0.9
China	20	2.1
Germany	19.5	1.8
Britain	13.4	0.9
France	13	1.4
Canada	11.1	0.4
Brazil	7.4	0.9
India	16.2	0.9
Australia	6.1	0.1

Source: UN

Inclusive wealth per person
2008, \$ '000*



*Constant 2000 \$ †Average annual rate

"Wealth is not without its advantages," John Kenneth Galbraith once wrote, "and the case to the contrary, although it has often been made, has never proved widely persuasive." Despite the obvious advantages of wealth, nations do a poor job of keeping count of their own. They may boast about their abundant natural resources, their skilled workforce and their world-class infrastructure. But there is no widely recognised, monetary measure that sums up this stock of natural, human and physical assets.

Economists usually settle instead for GDP. But that is a measure of income, not wealth. It values a flow of goods and services, not a stock of assets. Gauging an economy by its GDP is like judging a company by its quarterly profits, without ever peeking at its balance-sheet. Happily, the United Nations this month published balance-sheets for 20 nations in a report overseen by Sir Partha Dasgupta of Cambridge University.

They included three kinds of asset: "manufactured", or physical, capital (machinery, buildings, infrastructure and so on); human capital (the population's education and skills); and natural capital (including land, forests, fossil fuels and minerals).

By this gauge, America's wealth amounted to almost \$118 trillion in 2008, over ten times its GDP that year. (These amounts are calculated at the prices prevailing in 2000.) Its wealth per person was, however, lower than Japan's, which tops the league on this measure. Judged by GDP, Japan's economy is now smaller than China's. But according to the UN, Japan was almost 2.8 times wealthier than China in 2008 (see charts).

Officials often say that their country's biggest asset is their people. For all of the countries in the report except Nigeria, Russia and Saudi Arabia, this turns out to be true. The UN calculates a population's human capital based on its average years of schooling, the wage its workers can command

and the number of years they can expect to work before they retire (or die). Human capital represents 88% of Britain's wealth and 75% of America's. The average Japanese has more human capital than anyone else.

Japan is also one of only three countries in the report that did not deplete their natural capital between 1990 and 2008. All of the countries except Russia nonetheless increased their wealth, accumulating enough other assets to offset the erosion of their natural patrimony. In 14 of the 20 countries studied, these increases in wealth outpaced the growth of their population, leaving per-person wealth higher in 2008 than in 1990. Germany, for example, increased its human capital by over 50%. China expanded its "manufactured" capital by an extraordinary 540%.

By putting a dollar value on everything from bauxite to brainpower, the UN's exercise makes all three kinds of capital comparable and commensurable. It also implies that they are substitutable. A

ations

country can lose \$100 billion-worth of pastureland, gain \$100 billion-worth of skills and be no worse off than before. The framework turns economic policymaking into an “asset-management problem”, says Sir Partha.

A country like Saudi Arabia, for example, depleted its stock of fossil fuels by \$37 billion between 1990 and 2008, while adding to its stock of school-leavers and university graduates (its human capital grew by almost \$1 trillion). In some richer countries, however, investments in human capital appear to have hit diminishing returns, the report argues. Perhaps governments should redirect their investment into natural capital instead, restocking their forests rather than their libraries.

The idea that natural assets are substitutable makes some environ-

mentalists (including some contributors to the report) nervous. Many of the services the environment provides, like clean water and air, are irreplaceable necessities, they point out. In theory, however, the undoubted value of these natural treasures should be reflected in their price, which should rise steeply as they become more scarce. A good asset manager will then husband them carefully, knowing that it will take an ever-increasing amount of human or physical capital to make up for further losses of the natural kind.

In practice, however, natural assets are often hard to price well or at all. As a consequence, the UN report has to steer clear of assets like clean air that cannot be directly owned, bought or sold. It confines itself to resources like gas, nickel and timber, for which market prices exist. But even these market prices may not reflect a commodity's true social value. Beekeeping is one example beloved by economic theorists. Bees create honey, which can be sold on the market. But they also pollinate nearby apple trees, a useful service that is not purchased or priced.

BEE COUNTERS

No one is more aware of these limitations than the report's authors. Their estimates are illustrative, not definitive, says Sir Partha. The calculations are inevitably crude, just as the first guesstimates of GDP were crude over 70 years ago. He hopes more economists will do the hard but valuable work of pricing the seemingly priceless. The profession does not really reward this work, says Sir Partha. But some economists do it anyway. Taylor Ricketts of the University of Vermont and his co-authors have even calculated the value of pollination, showing that one Costa Rican coffee-grower benefited by \$62,000 a year from the feral honey bees in two nearby patches of forest.

Now that economists have shown that such wealth can be measured, they must decide what it should be called. In his earlier academic work Sir Partha calls it “comprehensive wealth”. The UN report dubs it “inclusive wealth”. If the notion catches on, neither name may be needed. “Pretty soon,” says Sir Partha, “we ought to drop both adjectives and just call it wealth.” ■

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AUTO STOP?

A decline in manufacturing and the balance of trade reinforce Ukrainian car producers who expect privileges for having switched sides in politics

Author:
Heorhiy Hryshchenko

On June 6, Petro Poroshenko, the Minister for Economic Development and Trade, said that the government had almost approved the draft bill to raise the car import duty. He did not, however, mention the new rate, but he did hint that Ukraine would follow Russia's suit as he wondered, "Why is the Ukrainian market protected with a 6-10% duty compared to 20-25% for Russian car makers, which allows them to develop their production and draw more investment into the industry?" Earlier, news surfaced that those lobbying the move demanded an increase to 33.4% for 1-1.5 litre engine cars and 47% for and 1.5-2.2 litre engines, although recent data suggests that their appetites were tamed to 6.46% and 15.1% respectively, which will be added to the effective 10% import duty allowed by WTO rules.

CAR LOBBY IN POWER: TIME TO ACT

The "cold war" between Ukrainian car makers and importers has been raging for a while now, with the raise in duty having been debated for at least a year, ever since UkrAutoprom, the Association of Ukrainian Motor Vehicle Manu-


facturers, urged the Ministry for Economy and Trade to launch a special investigation. Earlier, *The Ukrainian Week* suggested that importers were the ones throwing rumours of an upcoming steep rise in imported car prices into the media as they tried to sell their dead stock, encouraging people "to get it, before it gets pricey." Clearly, the expectation of car prices going up by several thousand dollars is supposed to fuel demand and send potential buyers scrambling to buy an imported car or obtain a loan for that purpose.

In 2012, though, new appointments in the government seem to have had their impact on the situation. "After taking a lot of time to think about it", Petro Poroshenko, one of the most influential "orange" oligarchs, eventually joined the team in power. His interests in the car market as the owner of large car assembly plants, including Bohdan, a corporation that produces Bohdan buses used as public transport and assembles the Hyundai Accent, Elantra XD and Tucson models, is plain to see. Moreover, he has not received any business privileges since he joined the team in power. This new heavy artillery in the government boosts the impact of Taniel Vasadze, a long-time lobbyist of

Slowing down

Car sale dynamics in Ukraine

From open sources




the high import duty and the owner of ZAZ, Zaporizhzhia car building plant, who switched to the team in power last year. Obviously, Ukraine's major car makers are interested in raising import duties as market distribution is virtually the only chance for Ukrainian oligarchs to preserve their profits without both-

UKRAINE'S MAJOR CAR MAKERS ARE INTERESTED IN RAISING IMPORT DUTIES

ering to upgrade their facilities or product lines. The crisis has already knocked down their sales almost threefold and the threat of yet another decline is looming.

SEAMLESS ON PAPER

How likely are the higher duty campaigners to get their initiative passed and working, and how will it affect the car industry if they succeed? Extra duty on imported cars cannot be ruled out this time as Ukraine's trade balance is declining, and this is coupled with difficulties in filling the budget. The first problem can be solved by adjusting the hryvnia exchange rate, a move the Presidential Administration is reluctant to take before the upcoming election, or by making imports more and more burdensome by raising duty



rates up to the ceiling. In theory, the latter option can boost both budget revenues and kickbacks to the party in power for protecting grey imports. If presented properly to Ukraine's key top officials, these factors can play a major role in the passing of the decision to raise the duty currently being lobbied.

In practice, though, extra duties may have a negative impact on the state budget as energy import is the only segment that tops car import in terms of providing budget revenues. In 2009, a 13% extra on the existing 10% duty on imported cars knocked the revenues down 85%, eventually forcing the government to cede to car importers' demands.

Hopes to decrease the trade deficit may crash too. Limiting imports is technically easy, but boosting exports is extremely difficult. After all, higher import duties on cars may have an adverse impact on the amount of Ukrainian exports. The major car makers are in the US, Western Europe and Japan, and limited imports from G7 states may result in more restrictions for Ukrainian exports to the US and the EU.

Moreover, there is the pendulous Free Trade Agreement with the EU whose officials, including EU Trade Commissioner Karl De Gucht, have already made it clear

that they are not happy with the possible customs duty innovations in Ukraine. Of course, those lobbying for higher duties may use Viktor Yanukovich's anger at the demarches of European leaders, especially German and Czech, as a response to political repressions in Ukraine, and Party of Regions representatives have certainly been hinting at that. Yet, how reasonable is this sort of response and how can it affect the state and the oligarchs close to the government?

THE MOTHBALLLED INDUSTRY

Moreover, most of those who proudly call themselves "Ukrainian producers" are actually not. The last car completely assembled in Ukraine was the Slavuta model produced by ZAZ last year. Today, its facilities assemble a renamed

due to its Melitopol, not Opel-made, engine. Most parts of the so-called "Ukrainian" Skoda and Hyundai models are actually made at plants abroad.

Will this approach strengthen Ukraine's car industry and make it truly modern, rather than the just a rebranded version of European innovations from 20 years ago, such as the Lanos labelled the "nation's car" by its creators and designed on the basis of the 1993 Opel Kadett? Especially, when taking into account the fact that every generation of new car in the industry lives just five years. Ukraine is still a few decades behind other countries in its pseudo-Ukrainian industry of modern car making. So, should it continue to mothball its car industry rather than follow the example of the Czech Škoda brand, which has been fully reconstructed by the Germans?

Surprisingly, President Yanukovich's son was the one criticizing the Ministry's plans to raise the car import duty a few days ago. Perhaps, he said this for a reason. An established practice for his father is to keep his standpoint secret until the last moment to save space for manoeuvres in choosing which decision to support or presenting himself as the "nice Tsar" who stops "the plotting of the mean boyars." ■

HAVE ALREADY MADE IT CLEAR THAT THEY ARE NOT HAPPY WITH THE POSSIBLE CUSTOMS DUTY INNOVATIONS IN UKRAINE

child of the Chinese car industry selling at a price almost equal to that of American and European cars. The Lanos, for instance, is nearly 62% Ukrainian, while the Sens is slightly more Ukrainian

LIFE AFTER EURO 2012

Finally, Ukrainians had a chance to witness the European worldview – free of post-totalitarian fear, restraint, rudeness and anger

Author:
Natalia
Petrynska

Post-Euro 2012 Ukraine resembles an insecure girl who suddenly realized that she is actually pretty. The surge of masochism that swelled into a tsunami prior to the tournament abated after the first football games, erupting into a fountain of patriotism, if only temporary, formal and football-driven. A lot of Ukrainians did their best to appear civilized for foreigners during the football fest. As a result, the people – and not the Potemkin villages built by the authorities – were crucial to foreigners' impressions of Ukraine. Common Ukrainians did their best to help their country conceal its miserable soviet remnants and discouraging political situation.

Sometimes, though, the warm-and-fuzzy show looked too good to be true. Everyone in Ukraine knows that the outstanding tolerance of the police during Euro 2012 was only for foreigners. If a Ukrainian ever tried to urinate on a downtown flowerbed or put a policeman on his shoulders, as Dutch fans did in Kharkiv, he would end up in big trouble. The disparity in police treatment of Ukrainians and foreign fans is perhaps most striking in this example from Donetsk: a fan of Shakhtar, the Donetsk team, said that city police officers raped a local man with a baton. "The guy was just walking home after work," he added. "Meanwhile, foreigners can pee anywhere in the city center."

Wary of persistent tension between Ukraine and Europe and the plummeting popularity of the ruling Party of Regions, the Ukrainian government was clearly trying to prove its efficiency and stage a show of democracy. The police were apparently instructed to leave European guests alone, so they turned a blind eye to their misdeeds. However, it is unlikely that this experience prompted Ukrainian police to realize that spontaneous behaviour from young people does not constitute a threat to soci-

ety. Yet for those with a more flexible mindset than the "military-minded," Euro 2012 helped to shatter several stereotypes.

Ukrainians who rarely travel abroad have finally witnessed the European worldview – free of post-totalitarian fear, restraint, rudeness and anger. Kyivites were surprised when Swedish fans drank liters of beer and showed no aggression whatsoever. Nobody was trying to beat anyone up. Instead, they all smiled, sang and danced. "It's probably only here that they behave this way; they must be much quieter at home," some Ukrainians said at the Kyiv fan zone. According to sociological surveys, over 70% of Ukrainians have never been abroad. They do not know that spontaneity and respect for individuality dominate in Western Europe. Now, they have had a chance to see it firsthand.


Euro guests shared this sense of freedom with many Ukrainians, inspiring them to smile more often—a rarity in Ukraine. Young people dressed more creatively and tried to learn new words in English, while many Kyiv cafes played jazz, rock and classical music instead of the usual low-quality pop music and "chanson," romanticized prison ballads popular in the FSU.

Accustomed to foreign tourists, Kyiv and Lviv did not experience as much culture shock as Donetsk, an industrial city whose

citizens are not used to Europeans and still view them through a lens of soviet-era stereotypes: on one hand, they regard them as suspicious and unwelcome, and on the other as aliens from another planet, almost demigods. The tournament is unlikely to dramatically change their strongly entrenched views of the "decaying West", yet it may weaken the stiffened distrust for Europe as a mentally alien territory among young people. Kharkiv has an opportunity to de-sovietize a little more. Young people in the city demonstrated this throughout the tournament, even if only by mimicking the behaviour of Europeans. As one Kharkiv-based intellectual put it, their whole-hearted excitement with the Dutch fans was just a step away from growing into a sort of a cargo cult.

Euro 2012 will hardly bring economic or political benefits to Ukraine, yet its positive social and cultural impact is plain to see. Clearly, the government will list it as its own victory and speculate on the football topic throughout the entire pre-election campaign. But propaganda and Ukrainians will still live their own separate lives. If Ukrainians manage to realize who actually won this image contest and dispel at least one myth for themselves, it will mean that the champion-

ship was not in vain for Ukraine – at least for its four host cities. "We and they" have finally looked each other in the eye, bypassing the cliché-riddled media reports and political declarations. Europeans have realized that Ukraine is not a dangerous band of racists, HIV-infected prostitutes and stray dogs. Ukrainians have glimpsed a societal connection to Europe that will surface as soon as they overcome the soviet heritage of the "collective unconscious" that is currently holding them back. ■



Kharkiv: the world through orange glasses



PHOTO: REUTERS

Most locals had pessimistic expectations for Euro 2012, so finding out how wrong they were was all the more pleasing. Dutch fans turned their stay in the city into a spectacular feast, bringing more smiles, good humour and bright colours than the city had seen in a long time. The Germans, Danish and Portuguese contributed to the harmony but the Dutch became the locals' favourites. Kharkiv fans cheered for the Dutch football team almost as passionately as they did for the Ukrainian team, while the Dutch supported Ukraine in every game it played.

The exciting and friendly interaction between the Dutch and Ukrainians created an unprecedented atmosphere around the fan zone. The Dutch made posters with words of appreciation for Ukrainians while the latter made posters thanking the Dutch and hung them from their balconies and windows along the road to the stadium on the day the Dutch played their last game in Kharkiv.

Against this orange backdrop, many Russians who came to Kharkiv from nearby border towns were looking gloomy. "They are obnoxious and aggressive," Oleksiy, a manager at the car service station, told *The Ukrainian Week*. Raised in an atmosphere of East Slavic unity, Oleksiy was surprised by how rude the northern guests behaved at a Germany-Holland game. "The Dutch were the most numerous there but they were inert; must have wasted all their energy during the march. The Germans were fewer but they cheered better; they outscramed everyone. And these [Russian] drunks were always unhappy with something, walking through the rows, stumbling and falling, cursing at people. They hated the beer, the

stadium, the arrangements. Why did they come here at all?" Many Kharkivites share this opinion. Vladyslav, a business owner, believes that the locals should finally shape their "geopolitical preferences" after Euro 2012. "Now that everyone has seen people from the 'golden billion' countries, what 'Russian vector' are we talking about? It's only Europe now!"

More spontaneous, confident and friendly, the Dutch showed a totally different model of behaviour where love for your own is naturally combined with respect for others, without hypocrisy or opposition. They even sang the Ukrainian anthem in downtown Kharkiv. Designer Dmytro is surprised by how many of his friends changed during the orange week. His apartment is in a building next to the Dutch tent city in Saltivka. "Even the local gopnyky, young delinquents, who normally hang out around the benches here and steal people's cell phones did not touch a single foreign guest! Instead, they helped foreign fans buy beer in the local store, carry it back to their tents and hung out with them there. In the morning, they excitedly told everyone how cool these Dutch were and how nice it felt to talk to normal people. I have no idea how they did it but they had no language barrier whatsoever," Dmytro says.

One discovery in Kharkiv was that you can forget the rudeness and enjoy life and joke around any time, not just when you are drunk. How long will this emotional upheaval last, I wonder?

Author: Dmytro Shapovalov, Kharkiv

Donetsk: culture shock



Most people in Donetsk have met very few foreigners before, if any, and their reactions to the influx of foreign fans made this obvious. The locals, especially from districts far from the city center, stared at them wide-eyed, taking videos of virtually every foreign fan they encountered.

This excitement often resulted in a desire to help foreigners during the tournament. The police did not record one fight between the locals and the fans, mostly British. Most people in Donetsk speak no English at all, yet they tried their best to help foreigners whenever necessary.

Following Euro 2012, people in the Donbas region are openly excited about their foreign guests. Unembarrassed to smile in the streets or show their emotions, the European visitors were a far cry from the NATO enemies and bourgeoisie still frequently portrayed in the local press. "I was expecting to see these rich bourgeois people and they're just average guys," said a woman who sold sunflower seeds next to the Donetsk fan zone. The UK fans' protests against Sol Campbell and other BBC reporters who warned the British that they would return home from Ukraine "in a coffin" sparked a furor among the locals. The fans, who actually liked everything about Ukraine—especially the cheap beer—bought a coffin, wrote "Sol Campbell: We'll do what we want!" on it and brought it into the city center. Initially, the locals did not understand what the slogan said and expected a fight, but rushed to hug UK fans as soon as they realized what they were saying—and that was even before Ukraine played the final game against England in its group!

Surprisingly, many young locals were irritated by the way the Russians behaved even though Eastern Ukraine still tends to look up to its northern neighbour, especially its TV shows. "No Ukrainian would ever behave in Russia the way these Russians did in Ukraine," Sashko complained. "Their behaviour in

Ukraine, a foreign country, was extremely obnoxious," Sashko's friend Kostia added. "One guy at a bar pushed me on purpose and just walked away. Later, the same guy harassed two more people. 'Why the **** are you staring at me?' he asked as I looked at him standing in the middle of the bar. How could he behave this way in a host country?"

Another positive effect the tournament had in Donetsk was the surge of Ukrainian patriotism as the city was filled with blue and yellow flags rather than the usual Victory Day stripes on cars. For the first time in the past 20 years, the emphasis was on Ukrainian pride, not Donetsk pride, and many locals wore blue and yellow T-shirts for the national team rather than the orange ones for their FC Shakhtar. 10 out of 10 people surveyed in the streets said that they were proud of their country without hesitation. Of course, this emotional upheaval would hardly last long. After the Ukrainian team left the tournament, many Donetsk fans said "Why do you need quarter or semi-finals? Come here and see some real football," referring to their home team Shakhtar.

"Culture shock is the perfect term for the reaction to Euro 2012 in Donetsk," says social psychologist Andriy Strutynsky. "Something very important has happened, though: the socio-cultural barrier created by the dominant groups in this region has been torn down. People have experienced the joy of international communication and the excitement of their city and country being in the world spotlight. Prior to the games, they had all expected something much scarier to happen. That was more important than the infrastructure or the wellbeing of average people, which hardly changed after Euro 2012. Changes must begin in the mind and this always requires a bit of a jolt. Euro 2012 was the jolt this time."

Author: Bohdan Butkevych, Kyiv-Donetsk

Kyiv: jealous about freedom

Despite being the country's capital and hosting many international games even before Euro 2012, this was the first time Kyiv welcomed so many foreign fans. Kyivites are hard to impress, but the Swedes and the Spanish taught them a good lesson in football cheering: you don't have to resort to aggression or limit yourselves to shouting 'Good job!' and 'Go Ukraine!' – try adding some creative elements such as dancing, singing and eccentric costumes.

"I was in a subway with English fans," says Mykola, who has never been to Western Europe. "All adult men, they looked like company directors and fathers, yet they were happy as kids, jumping and singing. They were not afraid to look funny. This is about being free inside. I was a little jealous because I can hardly be as spontaneous at 26 as they are at 50."

Iryna, a journalist, talked to a guide who took a group of Swedes to Kyiv's Pechersk Lavra. "They didn't take pictures of churches. Instead, they liked the huge puddle. They took pictures of each other jumping into it."

"I don't get it. How did the noisy, omnipresent and often drunk Swedes manage not to irritate anyone?" Serhiy comments. "It looks like Kyiv will miss them for a while."

Many locals, however, were more surprised by their compatriots than by foreigners. During Euro 2012, downtown Kyiv was crowded with beauties in revealing clothes inviting glances from foreigners more than ever. "We met several Swedes and went to a night club," Hanna says. "We talked and compared Ukraine and Sweden. Other girls in the club looked like they wanted to find 'love' no matter what."

Author: Valeria Burlakova, Kyiv



PHOTO: VALERIA BURLAKOVA

Lviv: good old friends

People in Lviv sound less excited when they talk about foreign fans compared to those in Donetsk or Kharkiv. After all, Lviv is a much more popular tourist destination even without sporting events. The locals thought that the guests who came for the tournament behaved in a different manner than average tourists. "The fans from other countries did not come for excursions during Euro

2012," *Ratusha*, a Lviv-based publication reports. "Instead, they focused on football and did not care about the cultural experience. The impression is that the fans that came to cheer for football turned off their intellect during the games. This is true both for Ukrainians from other cities, and foreign fans."

Many locals were happy to see familiar faces. "I've worked in Portugal for many years," Bohdan, a man in his 50s, says. "They are nice people. They were very nice to me."

According to small business owners, Euro 2012 did not meet their moneymaking expectations. "Expectations were too high," taxi driver Myroslav says. "Moreover, foreign fans did not splurge as many expected them to. I know that many hotels were half-empty. They went as far as knocking the prices down to pre-Euro rates or lower but that didn't help."

Lviv-born Oleksandra believes that the tournament did not change the way locals thought of foreigners. Instead, it will improve the impression of potential tourists. "Many people came. They will go back home and tell their friends who had never been to Lviv how nice it is. There will be many more people willing to come see the town and drink some cheap beer." Indeed, Lviv tourist agencies report an increased number of requests to visit Lviv in July and August compared to the same period in previous years.


Author: Serhiy Teren, Kyiv-Lviv



PHOTO: REUTERS

The Ukrainian Week continues its series about ancient peoples who once lived on Ukrainian territory and left their cultural heritage behind. This article tells about the Alans, the very first knights of Europe. Read more about Celts and Goths in issues No. 5 (28) and 6 (29) of *The Ukrainian Week* published in April 2012.

THE PREDECESSORS OF EUROPEAN KN



On their long way from the North Caucasus to Africa, Alans laid the foundation of medieval military tradition in Europe and inspired British mythology

Author:
Koŭstiantyn
Rakhno

In the heart of the Caucasus, in the eye-catching creeks running from the central mountain range and the adjacent plateaus below the mountains, a people known as Ossetians have lived since the mid-18th century. They are the last surviving branch of the numerous ancient tribes from the territory of modern Ukraine mentioned as Scythians and Sarmatians in Herodotus' and Ptolemy's chronicles. These people call themselves Alouni. Medieval Western chronicles mention their ancestors as Al-

ans, while in most Eastern writings they are referred to as Asi, As or Os. Alans are among the earliest points where the historical fates of Western Europe, North Caucasus and Ukraine came together.

FROM THE BLACK SEA TO THE DANUBE

Two millennia ago, Alans was the name for Iranian-speaking East Sarmatian nomad tribes. Tall and good-looking with fair hair and menacing looks, the Alans were more warlike than other ethnic

groups related to them. Old sources also describe them as an "untamable and brave" people who lived in the lower reach of the Danube, Northern Black Sea region, Fore-Caucasus and Central Caucasus. The territory inhabited by Sarmatians or Savromatians gradually became known as Alania, while at the same time ancient historians stopped mentioning other Sarmatian tribes in their works.

The tribes that lived in arid steppes mostly bred sheep and horse and therefore lived a no-

WARRIORS KNIGHTS



PAINTING ALANS IN A MILITARY CAMPAIGN BY AZANBEK JANAYEV

madic or partly nomadic life. The Alans had no temples or shrines. According to Roman historian Ammianus Marcellinus, they “stuck a bare sword into the ground following a barbarian ritual and worshipped it in awe like Mars, the protector of the countries they cross as nomads” similar to their ancestors, the Scythians. The Alan community had the ideology where the military elite was considered supreme and chosen by God. Noble people did not burden themselves with any physical labour.

Some warlike Alans joined the Huns in their western march. Jointly, they attacked the tribes of Goths in the Northern Black Sea region and, with the Goths now among them; they reached the

THE NATION OF MILITARY ELITE: The supreme social status of Alan warriors served as the foundation of the knights' cult

Danube frontier of the Roman Empire in 376. This catalyzed the Migration Period, also known as the Barbarian Invasions, provoking a steep twist in the stable and quiet life of the Old World. An image of an Alan warrior on a horse was one of the brightest symbols of that heroic epoch. Starting off from the territory of modern Ukraine, the Alans and their satellites crossed the entirety of Europe and reached the Pyrenees, its south-western frontier, ending their grand march on the Mediterranean coast of North Africa.

THEY, WHO DEFEATED ATILA

The Alans joined Sarmatians, their closest related tribes, who had headed for the west in the late 2nd century, on the Danube. This allowed them to break their union with the Huns and act on their own. In 378, their joint army defeated the Roman army in the Battle of Adrianople, killing Emperor Valens. This battle is considered an important milestone in the western art of war. It opened the era of a thousand-year long rule of Barbarian knights.

The Alans negotiated the status of federates, i.e. military-obliged allies, for Northern Italy and Gaul from Rome after they gained control over vast territories where they created their Southern and Northern Kingdoms in the areas of modern Toulouse and between the Loire and the Seine rivers with Orléans as the capital. Until 450, menacing king Goar ruled in Orléans, ordered by Roman commander Aetius to protect the city from Huns and Visigoths. Sangiban was his successor. He led the Alans in the Battle of the Catalaunian Plains in summer 451 that ended with a decisive victory for the Romans over the Huns. The Alan cavalry was put in the centre of the empire's army and defeated the dangerous army led by Attila, the Scourge of God.

CONQUERORS OF THE WEST

The Alans' pursuit of war, a decent opponent and heroic death was legendary in old times. But how did these tribes end up with such a military role and political impact in the West, so far from their homeland and most often among enemies? Clearly, their number or strength was not the answer.

They conquered the West with their military culture and outstand-

ing discipline. Their cavalry, clad in steel armour and arranged in tight rows, had the best skills of the time. German kings eagerly invited the Alans to serve in their armies, while their own subjects, mostly marching troops, learned horse riding and horse battle from them. The Alans impressed the arrogant Roman nobility so much that Emperor Gratian (359–383) invited them to his guard unit, reformed his cavalry based on their model and wore Alan clothes and armour himself.

Since the Alan society was mostly war-oriented, boys were taught horseback riding from early childhood. According to Marcellinus, Alan warriors considered it offensive for a man to walk. Isidore of Seville noted in the 6th century that they looked clumsy without their horses.

Horse breeding was the Alans' favourite occupation. Sarmathian-Alan horses were a special breed, popular in the West for their outstanding endurance. They shared the military fame of their masters, similar to the furious Alan war dogs. The breed is now known as Alano Espanol in the Iberian Peninsula.

However, new armour, horse riding skills, and special horse and dog breeds were not the only things the Alans introduced to the West. Their contribution to western culture was far more important than that, as they also brought the code of knight ethics and the ideology of a military class. Black Sea Sarmathians who reached the West in the late 2nd century, and the Alans who caught up with them in the 4th century, made a knight cavalry and changed obsolete ideas about the status of warriors and warfare.

The Alan epoch in European history features the initial model of Western traditions in the way the knights pursued religion and the starting point of the royal protection of the church.

The Alans mixed with the local European nations wherever they went, yet the memory of them remained in myths, legends and geographic names. Their language is clearly different from Romance, Germanic, Slavic and other languages of Western and Central Europe, therefore Alan names are easy to find in modern European maps. France and Northern Italy alone have nearly 300 towns and villages of Alan origin. The English



name Alan, and French Alain, are also part of the common legacy.

THE LEGENDS ABOUT KING ARTHUR IN THE MAKING

The Alans had a much deeper impact on the world's view of the medieval West, including its mythology, epic stories and aristocratic military rituals. Legends about King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table and the incarnation of knight ideals in European culture, were based on the Alan culture. Similar legends can be found in Ossetian epos about Nart knights.

The image of King Arthur's life and death have much in common with Batradz, the Nart hero regarded by Ossetians as the model of the key traces a knight should possess: courage in battle, modesty in eating and drinking and high respect for women. It has many other analogies, such as the well-known motive of a sword in a stone pulled out by Arthur, which was the central element in recognizing him as the king of Britain.

THE EMPEROR'S GUARD: The figures of Sarmatian warriors on horses is on the Trajan's Column in Rome

This is the sword of the deity of war worshipped by the Scythians and Alans.

THE ANCESTORS OF COSSACKS?

Ossetians often see traces similar to their own in the appearance of people in Central and Southern Ukraine. In fact, Sarmatian and Alan blood runs in many Ukrainians. The traces of Alan knight ethics and traditions are most visible in Zaporizhzhian Cossacks. Their lifestyle seemed to have come out of the pages of Marcellinus' chronicles.

Cossacks, too, were reluctant to live a peaceful life and work in the fields, and they pursued danger and wars far out in the world. Dying in battle was as prestigious and honourable amongst Cossacks as it was to the Alans, while men who preferred to grow grain instead were mocked and ridiculed in Zaporizhzhian Sich. Killing an enemy was something to brag about both among Cossacks, and the Alans. The distinct Cos-

sack way of arranging protection in battle by fighting from behind a circle of wagons placed tightly together also traces back to the Alans, the Goths and the Battle of Adrianople.

Also, Cossacks had the cult of cold weapons. Some sources suggest that the descendants of Cossacks in Katerynoslavshchyna, now Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, still prayed to old swords stuck in the ground in the early 20th century. This was a common Alan ritual of Ukrainians and the Caucasus Ossetians: their old men used to worship swords in their family shrines once a year, too.

All these, as well as many more ethnic, cultural and language similarities encourage us to believe that the contribution of the Sarmatians and Alans into the establishment of Ukrainians is far more significant than was ever assumed before. A lot of features of Ukrainian culture can be traced back to the Alans, the very first knights of Europe. ■



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Destined to Fly Higher

Ivan Kavaleridze as the founder of historical monumental cinema in Ukraine

Author:
Yuriy Shlapak

Ivan Kavaleridze had a long life and an extremely prolific career. In 70 years of artistic activity he made about 20 monuments, hundreds of “easel sculptures” and 10 films. He also staged 10 theatrical plays, wrote a book of memoirs and worked on a number of other projects that ultimately remained unrealised.

He was evidently destined to achieve even more. If he, like his fellow student and friend Alexander Archipenko, had spent most of his life abroad, he could have reached a higher artistic level. The problem of his worldview lay in the vicious circle of relationships between an artist and a totalitarian system.

FROM SCULPTURE TO CINEMA

By the time the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, Kavaleridze had graduated from a Kyiv arts college and completed one year in the Russian Academy of Arts in Saint Petersburg and a six month European art course at Naum Aronson's workshop in Paris. His artistic genius won recognition even before World War I: a four-figure composition of a monument to Princess Olga, apostle Andrew the First Called and Cyril and Methodius, built to his design, was unveiled on 17 September 1911 in Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv. He then worked as a make-up man and sculptor in the Moscow-based Thiemann & Reinhardt film factory (1911-15) with Yakov Protazanov and Vladimir Gardin.



The Ukrainian Week writes about prominent people in Ukrainian cinematography, who were forced to work and make serious life choices under the pressure of the state communist system. The next two articles look at the life and legacy of Ivan Kavaleridze, sculptor, director and writer; and Danylo Demutskiy, cameraman who, in spite of his brilliant work in films, was convicted by the Stalin regime and forced to adapt to the aesthetic demands of the soviet government.

Kavaleridze was especially prolific during the revolution and the New Economic Policy periods. Under Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky, a monument to Taras Shevchenko he designed was erected in Romny (now Sumy Oblast) in 1918. Under the soviets, the artist tried to combine na-

tional motifs with patent Bolshevik propaganda. In the 1920s, he made monuments to itinerant philosopher Hryhoriy Skovoroda in Lokhvytsia and Bolshevik leader Artem in Bakhmut and Slovianohirsk. The latter two are massive, pompous monuments in the style of constructivism which

contrasted with his other works. There were also two more monuments to Shevchenko, in Poltava and Sumy. Then came a break in sculpture, and he switched to cinema, exploding with films like *Zlyva* (Heavy Shower, 1928, lost), *Perekop* (1930), *Shturmovi nochii* (Storm Nights, 1931) and *Koliivshchyna* (The Koliivshchyna Rebellion, 1933).

Everything seemed to go smoothly as far as Kavalieridze's artistic activity was concerned. But then he made the film *Prometheus* (1935) which was deemed undesirable by the Communist Party. It became the target of devastating unfair criticism in a *Pravda* editorial entitled "A rough outline instead of the historical truth". The editorial was written on direct orders from Stalin. He said on this account cynically: "He will be all right. This strong Georgian will bear the criticism, and we will see his new films. But we need to help him." The article of the party newspaper was discussed for four days by the staff of the Kyiv Film Studio. This was the beginning of a campaign against the "anti-historical" character of Kavalieridze's works. He was banned from working with young artists and making historical films, which he saw as his main mission.

Times changed, and this film, like the artist's total cinematographic production, was re-evaluated. A memorial plaque with the inscription "Ivan Kavalieridze, founder of Ukrainian historical cinematography, worked here in 1934-41 and 1957-61" was unveiled in 2002 in the Oleksandr Dovzhenko Film Studio. Film critic Oksana Musienko writes in her 2009 book *Ukrainian Cinema: Texts and Context*: "This is how the authorities cut off one of the most fruitful branches of Ukrainian national cinematography. The return of *Prometheus* to the context of Ukrainian cinema of the 1930s drastically changed the artistic landscape of this cinematographic period and Ukrainian filmmaking in general."

Barred from making historical films, Kavalieridze created the first Ukrainian film operas: *Natalka Poltavka* (1936) and *Zaporozhets za Dunaiem* (Zaporozhian Cossack beyond the Danube, 1937).

INSPIRED BY CAMERA: Kavalieridze tried to take his avant-garde search for new forms in sculpture into his films

BIO

Ivan Kavalieridze was born in 1887 to the family of a Ukrainian mother and a Georgian father who was a descendant of a Georgian princely family. He studied in the Kyiv Arts College in 1907-1909 and the Russian Academy of Arts in 1909-1910. He improved his artistic skills in Naum Aronson's private workshop in Paris in 1910-11. Kavalieridze was mobilised to the Russian tsarist army in 1915-17. He worked in the Department of People's Education in Romny (1918-28) and as a director in the Odesa Film Studio (1928-33), the Kyiv Ukrainian Film Studio (1934-41) and the Oleksandr Dovzhenko Film Studio (1957-62). He died in Kyiv on 3 December 1978.



Prior to World War II Kavalieridze staged, under pressure from the Stalinist regime and the watchful eye of the NKVD and with his arms twisted, an inapt military agitation piece called *Stozhary* (The Pleiades) with an improbable plot about Andriy, a Ukrainian tractor driver, who decided to replace his brother, a border guard in the Far East, who had been killed in action.

PERSECUTED

Kavalieridze might have been able to return to his favourite historical themes in 1941 when he went to the Carpathians together with a film crew to shoot *Oleksa Dovbush*. However, war broke out, and he was able to return to Kyiv only in the autumn. During the occupation, Kavalieridze refused to cooperate with the Nazis (even though he headed the Department of Culture in the Kyiv City Administration – **Editor**) and helped the local intelligentsia survive. Among other things, he saved cameraman Volodymyr Voitenko who shot the Leonid Bykov film *V boi idut odni stariki* (Only Old Men Are Going to Battle) in 1979.

Kavalieridze had an interesting experience under the Nazis – a man dressed in the SS uniform showed up at his house and proposed that he make a bust of Hitler. The artist replied that he made sculptures from life only. When the Red Army returned, it turned

out that the man had been a Soviet agent in disguise.

After the war the authorities reminded Kavalieridze in their peculiar fashion that he had lived under German occupation, the film studios evicted him from his flat. Theatre actress Liubov Hakkebush accommodated him in her home on 17 Velyka Zhytomyrska.

Despite the persecution he faced, Kavalieridze continued to sculpt. He made a comeback to cinema 20 years after his last film was released in the 1930s. He directed *Hryhoriy Skovoroda* (1959) and *Poviiia* (The Prostitute, 1961), starring Oleksandr Hai and Lyudmila Gurchenko, respectively. The films were warmly received by the public and the press, but Kavalieridze was no longer his old self and did not exhibit the innovative, sculptural vision he used to command.

When Khrushchev replaced Stalin at the helm of the USSR, he said, speaking to writers and painters in 1962: "There was this sculptor Kavalieridze, an author of horrible works. I mean his monument to Artem in Bakhmut." In this statement Khrushchev referred to the living Kavalieridze as if he were dead and also provided an "exhaustive" evaluation of his oeuvre.

Kavalieridze did not like public arguments, even less did he want to argue with the head of the state. So he quietly carried on with his



PHOTO: UNIAN

THE YOUNG ARTIST with his second wife Nina Kalynovska in 1920

work. But film critic Nonna Kapelhorodska, who had a daughter-father relationship with Kavalieridze, suggested sending a telegram to Moscow saying: "Living, healthy, working." The artist had to go to the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Culture to receive a reply and a low-level bureaucrat explained to him: "There was a mistake. Mr. Krushchev was misinformed."

Kavalieridze worked as a sculptor and playwright to the end of his days. In the post-war period several monuments he designed were

KAVALERIDZE CONTINUED TO WORK EVEN WHEN TRAPPED IN THE VICIOUS CIRCLE OF AN ARTIST'S EXISTENCE IN THE TOTALITARIAN SYSTEM

erected: Bohdan Khmelnytsky in Chernihiv (1956, designed jointly with Halyna Petrashevych), Petro Zaporozhets in Bila Tserkva (1971) and Hryhoriy Skovoroda in Kyiv (1977). At the same time, his plays *Perekop*, *Votaniy mech* (The Sword of Wotan), *Persha borozna* (The First Furrow), Hryhoriy and Paraskeva were staged by theatres in Sumy, Kharkiv and Ternopil as there was an unwritten ban on his plays in Kyiv. ■

FILMS DIRECTED BY IVAN KAVALERIDZE

Zlyva (Heavy Shower) or Kino-oforty do istorii Haidamachchyny (Cinema Etchings to the History of the Haidamaka Movement, 1928).

This was a silent film shot at the Odessa Film Factory which did not survive to our day. According to those who watched it, it was an attempt to combine the art of sculpture with cinematography. The film consisted of static compositions which replaced each other in sequence. The director had the grand design of telling the history of Ukraine spanning the past 200 years. He used a generalised metaphorical approach to portraying events.



Perekop or Pisia pro Perekop (The Song of Perekop, 1930).

This silent film was made towards the 10th anniversary of the Bolsheviks' victory over Pyotr Wrangel's Volunteer Army in the Crimea. The director departed from synthesis of sculpture and cinematography in favour of the film epos, a genre in which he reached wide-ranging historiosophic generalisations.

Shturmovi nochi (Storm Nights, 1931) is a silent film about "socialist construction" in the 1920s and the early 1930s. This film epic focused on two gigantic projects of the first five-year plan – the Dnieper Hydroelectric Power Plant and the Kharkiv Tractor Plant.



Koliivshchyna (The Koliivshchyna Rebellion, 1933) was Kavalieridze's first sound film. He had to revise the script 17 times under pressure from party bosses. This was a perfectly shot historical-revolutionary drama with unique symbolic language constructed using the principle of associative montage. Initially, it received thrilled reviews and was pronounced "needed" by the people but was later criticised for "formalism and naturalism". The role of Ukrainian national heroes who participated in the Koliivshchyna Rebellion was subjected to an unexpected interpretation in the film. Cossack Semen Nezhyvnyi returns to his native village which lies ruined and poverty-stricken. Unable to put up with the oppression by the landlords, he incites the poor to a rebellion which Cossack officers Maksym Zaluzniak and Ivan Honta utilise for their own purposes, betraying the ideals of the people. The film earned Kavalieridze the fame of a prominent director. This was the first part of a projected trilogy that would span the history of Ukraine from the mid-18th century to the first decades of the 20th century. Had it not been for numerous revisions under the pressure of censors, The Koliivshchyna Rebellion could have been the first Soviet sound film.



Prometheus (1935) was one of the central films in Ukrainian cinematography in the 1930s. It was personally lambasted by Stalin as "bourgeois nationalist" and banned. In it, Kavalieridze tells the story of his own family. Ivas, a young peasant, is mobilised and sent to the Caucasus. The landlord forcefully puts Ivas's girlfriend in a brothel. Inspired by the heroic resistance of highlanders against the regular Russian army, Ivas returns to his native village and launches a rebellion. The film, shot with epic scope by legendary cameraman Mykola Topchiy, gathered dust for decades.



Natalka Poltavka (1936) is the first film in the genre of film opera invented by Kavalieridze. He used Mykola Lysenko's opera with the same title and involved noted Ukrainian theatre actors who sang their parts themselves. The film was commissioned by the Soviet Communist Party which sought to monopolise the national classic opera heritage. Ukrainian emigrants in the USA began to work on their own version of Natalka Poltavka a year earlier, and Kavalieridze was told to produce a Soviet version in record-setting time. That is why Natalka Poltavka premiered in New York in 1936.



Hryhoriy Skovoroda (1959) is a biography of this "Ukrainian Socrates", a favourite of Elizabeth's imperial court and singer in a court choir who ultimately preferred the life of an itinerant wise man to the luxury of Baroque palaces. Set in plush Saint Petersburg interiors and lush Kyiv vegetation, the film recreates the timeline of the golden period in Ukrainian culture – the Baroque.




Poviiia (The Prostitute, 1961) is a psychological drama based on a Panas Myrny novel in which a young Lyudmila Gurchenko played one of her first noted parts. Khrystia, a village girl, hires herself out to a landlord and happens to see him kill his wife. She is unfairly charged with murder and thrown behind bars. Upon being released, she becomes a dancer in a local café chantant. The life of a social animal does not make her happy and disappointed, Khrystia decides to go back to the countryside, which she associated with her idyllic childhood years. But her life takes a different turn.

PHOTOS PROVIDED BY THE NATIONAL DOVZHENKO CENTER

The Philosophical Instrument of Danylo Demutskiy

Soviet authorities awarded the Ukrainian cinematographer with three arrests, deportation, imprisonment and the prestigious Stalin Prize



Author:
Vadym Skurativskiy

On the eve of the modern age, European civilization invented an entire system of tools, which at that time, were called philosophical instruments. They ranged from the microscope and telescope to the photography of the 19th century. During the nation-formation era, Kyiv became the Russian Empire's capital of artistic photography and the centre for a huge number of talented photographers, from experts in daguerreotype to artists of the World War I period. There was a kind of aesthetic instinct, related to the observation of the world through "philosophical instruments." In time, photography was followed by filmmaking, which subsequently resulted in the formation of the Kyiv school of cinematography, one of its representatives being Danylo Demutskiy.

PEOPLE THROUGH THE PRISM OF THE CINEMA

Danylo Demutskiy came to cinematography in a very individual and unusual manner; not only through photography which was the passion of his youth (he was a member of the Nadar Kyiv art union, named on behalf of the French photographer of the 19th century), but also through the world outlook perspective.

Danylo's father, Porfyriy, was one of the representatives of the Ukrainian social movement, a noble and a doctor. He dedicated his life to collecting and studying Ukrainian folklore and organized a village chorus. But sooner or later it was necessary to actually see the people, not only via social-political paintings, Ukrainian landscapes or photographs, but also through cinematography.

Mr. Demutskiy was one of those artists for whom the art of cinematography was like a game, which did not require much effort. He worked with Oleksandr Dovzhenko on his first films, *Vasya the Reformer* and *Love's Berry*, followed in 1929 by *Arsenal*, which contains several brilliant scenes. For instance, a train speeding along without a driver, carrying World War I soldiers, who have lost their direction in the world due to an excess of freedoms, ends with a crash. This scene and subse-



quent crash were recreated in *Runaway Train*, a 1985 Hollywood film by Japanese cinematographer and screenwriter Akira Kurosawa and director Andron Konchalovskiy who had a high regard for Ukrainian poetic cinema.

SERHIY PARADZHANOV AND ANDRIY TARKOVSKY THOUGHT OF DANYLO DEMUTSKIY AS A GOD-GIVEN CAMERAMAN

Another of *Arsenal's* scenes depicts the death of one of the insurgent workers and his horses, rushing home to the native village through the winter steppes of Ukraine. The horses, urged on by

BIO

Danylo Demutskiy was born in 1893 into a noble family in the village of Okhmativ, Cherkasy Oblast. He graduated from a Kyiv grammar school and later from the law department of the Saint Volodymyr University. He worked as a photographer and was an employee of the *Vestnyk Fotohrafiyi* (Photography Herald) and *Solntse Rossiyi* (The Sun of Russia) magazines. Later he cooperated with Les Kurbas's Berezil theatre. In 1925 he received a golden medal for his photos at the International Exposition of Applied Art in Paris, started to work at the Odesa film studio as the manager of the photography workshop and shot his first films with Oleksandr Dovzhenko. In 1932 Demutskiy was arrested for the first time, then again in 1934 and deported to Tashkent, where he worked at the Uzbek newsreel studio. In 1937 he was arrested for the third time and imprisoned for 17 months. He returned to Kyiv in 1939. Demutskiy died in 1954 and was buried in the famous Baikove Cemetery in Kyiv.

the shouting of the people, suddenly respond with the words: "We hear you, we hear you, masters!" I have never seen anything like this horse race in any other films.

The film also shows the people greeting the Tsentralna Rada (Central Council). One scene that stands out is when an officer of the Ukrainian People's Republic decides not to kill a revolutionary worker after questioning, as this officer is educated and probably a Christian. Subsequently, the worker does not hesitate to kill his saviour. At that time, the events of the 1917s-1920s were viewed as a conflict and a tragedy of the Ukrainian and Russian revolutionary elements. Danylo Demutskiy was able to reflect this in his camera work.

POETIC EYE-GLASS

Demutskiy and Dovzhenko spent the summer of 1929 in the village of Yaresky, Poltava Oblast, filming *Earth*. It is difficult to say which of them could be considered the greater genius. Obviously the filmmaking process is usually dominated by the director, leaving the efforts of the camera man unnoticed. But *Earth* features a unique harmony between the great director and the great cameraman. For instance, the famous episode showing the desperate, naked heroine rushing all over the house in her tragic beauty was not only the result of Dovzhenko's efforts, but also those of Demutskiy.

In addition, Danylo invented an ad hoc ocular technology for his philosophical instrument, the camera, due to which, everything that appears on the screen seems to have come from a poetic dream, like some kind of internal language. Demutskiy's incredible exposition is a unique phenomenon in world cinema.

These works impressed the cinematographic community of the world at that time and they are still impressive today. In Woody Allen's *Manhattan* the main characters are having an impassioned argument. Suddenly, the viewers see the poster of the film which impressed them so much and caused the fight. It is *Earth*.

It was after this film that the drama began for Oleksandr Dovzhenko, drawing in his cameraman Demutskiy as well. Under the Sword of Damocles of Stalin's ter-

rors, they started to shoot a film entitled *Ivan* about soviet industrialization and the technological exploitation of the Dnipro River. In this film, the skillfully filmed industrial landscape is wonderfully integrated with the lyrical canvas of Ukraine's central river. Soviet director Sergei Eisenstein considered this filming to be the best landscape camerawork he had ever seen in world cinema.

When *Ivan* was finished, in the spirit of the 1930s, a decision followed that the director and his cameraman had to be destroyed. Dovzhenko managed to escape from Ukraine to Moscow (a warrant for his arrest was already being prepared). But Demutskiy did not want to leave Ukraine, his native land, which was the source of his artistic life and creativity.

TORTURES AND FILMS

This was a personal catastrophe for Demutskiy. In 1932 he was ar-

rested for the first time, based on fabricated slander. 1934 saw a second arrest, based on the same fabricated charges of anti-soviet activity. He was then exiled to Central Asia, namely Tashkent. In time, he was able to find a job at an Uzbek newsreel studio, but was arrested for the third time in 1937. He then suffered cruel, sadistic interrogations and almost two years of imprisonment – the terrible and tragic experience of a soviet prisoner.

After his incarceration, he returned to Ukraine a broken and devastated man. But then the war began and he was forced to go to Central Asia once more.

In Tashkent he worked as a cameraman for an evacuated cinematographer from Moscow and made a considerable contribution to the establishment of Uzbek cinema. *The Adventures of Nasreddin* is his best work of that time. It is a brilliant film, humorous and

oriental, recounting the origins of the famous eastern character – a malicious parable about the absolute, supposedly ancient, rule of the local tyrants. This film became one of the most popular ones in soviet film distribution of that time.

Unfortunately, when Dovzhenko wrote a letter to Demutskiy, with an invitation to work together in Ukraine, nothing came of it. Danylo did not have another opportunity to shoot a single frame with the renowned Ukrainian director, though he hoped to do so, on his eventual return to Kyiv.

After the war Demutskiy was forced to shoot a propagandistic film entitled *Secret Agent*, directed by Boris Barnet, showing the heroism of soviet security officers, and a naval film entitled *Days of Peace* by Volodymyr Braun.

The Asian scenes from *Taras Shevchenko*, a film by Ihor Savchenko, was Demutskiy's only significant work at that time. It was a wonderful representation of the beauty of the local landscapes against a background of the unbearable soldiers' life. This film is the result of a deep understanding of Taras Shevchenko and of Demutskiy's own terrible personal experience as a prisoner. In 1952 the cinematographer was awarded the Stalin Prize (first degree) for this film.

Danylo Demutskiy died at too early an age in 1954, several months into the Khrushchev Thaw. He did not witness the subsequent successes of the Ukrainian avant-garde cinematographer from Paradzhanov to the Ilyenko brothers. The latter worshipped Demutskiy, while Paradzhanov and Andriy Tarkovsky thought of him as a God-given cameraman.

There are very different interpretations of the films made at the Oleksandr Dovzhenko film studio. There can be criticism regarding the semantics of these films, many elements can seem to be a falsification and soviet pathos, but there was no bad camera work in Kyiv at that time. Cameramen remembered Demutskiy. His very presence in Ukrainian and world cinematography encouraged them to work as hard as they could. ■

FILMS

1926 – *Vasia the Reformer; Fresh Wind; Love's Berry*

1927 – *Two Days; The Caprice of Catherine II; Forest Man*

1929 – *Arsenal*

1930 – *Earth*

1931 – *Fata Morgana*

1932 – *Ivan; On the Great Way*

1936 – *Kyrgyzstan*

1937 – *Spring Country*

1942 – *Blue Rocks*

1943 – *The Young Years, Nasreddin in Bukhara*

1945 – *Takhir and Zukhra*


1946 – *The Adventures of Nasreddin*

1947 – *Secret Agent*

1950 – *Days of Peace*

1951 – *Taras Shevchenko*

1953 – *The Cranberry Grove*



A Chronicle of Ev

For almost half a century Antanas Sutkas, the founder of the now world-famous Lithuanian school of photography, photographed the unattractive daily life of common people in his country

Interviewer:
Bohdan
Butkevych

Clearly, party organs did not approve. As a result, most of his photographs are still in archives. Yet, even those published were enough to create a black and white portrait of an epoch in the life of a nation and bring him worldwide recognition. Antanas Sutkas talked to *The Ukrainian Week* during his recent visit to Kyiv.

Photography is definitely art. At the same time, it is hugely popular unlike most of what people today call art. What would the world be without it? At the very least, we wouldn't have had the opportunity to watch films because the Lumière brothers wouldn't have been there. And the modern age would not be the same without cinema. In fact, a good photograph is the cornerstone of this eternal dispute, not an answer to the question.

Documentary photography is the most interesting niche for a true artist today. It allows you to create so-called social documents, or authentic ingots of an epoch in the life of a

given society. Actually, Ukraine has a strong school of street photography. Its representatives include Borys Mykhailov, Oleksandr Hliadelov, Oleksandr Chekmeniov, Oleksandr Liapin and many others. And it's no wonder: you have to take photographs of the streets in Ukraine because that's where different historical epochs and the past and reality, intersect. It is still possible to catch everything in Ukraine in one good shot.

It is often said that the accessibility of photo equipment is killing photography today. Indeed, we are living in an era of a consumer approach to photography. This is not surprising, as we generally live in a consumer society, with money being the key measure. As a result, photography and everything connected to it have become part to this general consumption process. But common people now have so many more opportunities. They can have photo rather than written diaries of their trips, which is more accurate and exciting than before.

Devaluation of the profession of photography is the real problem. I remember when I first encountered this sad trend. Once, a hotel owner I know, asked me to do an advertising poster and a photo-shoot of his staff. So, I made the poster and waited for the shoot. He never called back. I finally asked him, "When are we having the photo-shoot?" he said, "You know, we decided that it was better to buy two cheap digital cameras and take pics on our own rather than pay for your photo-shoot."

Photography should make humans more human. Once, during my lecture at a university, I asked students "What is art?" One gave a brilliant answer: "It's making humans more human." Photography is the same. It provokes feelings in people and affects them through these feelings. And through them, people can later change things for the better in their country and the world as a whole.

I have one rule: don't mess with the shot. There are many photographers who not only shoot,

PORTRAITS OF THE GRAY DAYS: Antanas Sutkus captured the life of average people in the USSR without decorations and ideological canopy



Everyday Life

but also try to affect what they shoot. One of my colleagues, for instance, used to shout out “Hey, give me an expression as if your mother died.” If you are unable to persuade people to be natural and express the feelings you need with your communication, appearance or sensitivity, just leave. Luckily, I’ve never had this sort of problem.

You have to love what you shoot. First and foremost, I mean that you should love people. Of course, you can make a career in hatred, particularly if you are a politician. But you have to be loving and decent if you are an artist. It’s very bad that so many people push these things to the background – both in art and in everyday life.

I have devoted my whole life to showing common people. A friend of mine who is a top official in the Lithuanian government once asked me if I wasn’t wary of shooting all these “lower-class people” and putting poorly dressed people on book-covers. To this day, I don’t know how to respond.

I never had the urge to shoot wars. I was a very sickly child, so spent a lot of time in hospitals during my childhood, where I saw pain, death and grief. I came

up with the following rule at an early age: don’t take a photograph of someone you can’t help. For me, a war photograph is like speculation on someone else’s suffering. Even worse, it’s often deceit about someone else’s pain that preaches violence.



PHOTO: YILIA POLUNINA

CLASSICS OF PHOTOGRAPHY: Antanas Sutkus began his career in photography as a high-school student in 1958. Today, his works are displayed in top photography museums and galleries of the world

Some say that you can save a hundred people by photographing one execution by firing squad. But let’s talk about how photographers normally get to an execution. It’s very simple. A huge media resource sends them there with a significant amount of money. They come to some dictator, bribe him or his underlings, and they kill people on camera. I’ve known cases when an execution was ordered. I don’t want to be too critical of many of my colleagues. There are many who go to hot spots with honourable intentions to prevent and protect others from experiencing the same terrible thing. But most of the time, it doesn’t work.

Lithuania is a tiny country, therefore my generation is forced to be patriotic and take pictures of it. We simply had to save our national self-identity, so as not to be called “russkis”. That’s why, from the very start, I and all my colleagues of the Lithu-

anian school of photography, tried to reflect the life of our compatriots. It wasn’t even resistance, just the only form of creative existence that was possible at that time. At one time, I turned down many opportunities to leave my country. And I don’t feel sorry, because I would never take the photographs I did anywhere else in the world. Our entire generation had a sort of spiritual connection to the state. Every country has its own photo chroniclers who understand it better because they live in it and are part of it. I can go to a forgotten mountain hamlet one time, but a local photographer can be there a hundred times. Everyone should love and photograph the country he knows best.

The more totalitarian the society, the tighter the internal spring that forces an artist to create. And when you have freedom, albeit quasi-freedom, the motivation to photograph life is no less intense – it’s different. Look at how many truly great artists in the sphere of photography and any other art are being swallowed up by the advertising and manufacturing industry. Moreover, there is so much that claims to be art these days that it’s really hard to find true art. Worst of all, real life is not in fashion today, while the standards of TV soap operas are. Having said this, criticism of capitalism is getting in on the act as well. In other words, the spring is tightening again. Although not very popular here yet, this is the trend among Western artists. Even social photography will soon get its second wind. ■



FILMS

7 Films

to watch from
the 3rd Odesa
Film Festival

Author:

Yaroslav Pidhora-Hviazdovsky

**GAMER**

Ukraine, 2011

Director: Oleh Sentsov

Gamer is one of the most unexpected films at the festival. It is a debut feature film of an amateur with a degree in economics and entrepreneur who switched to filmmaking due to his interest in films. Amateurism is visible almost everywhere in the film shot on a digital camera held by hand, yet its documentary authenticity is what appeals to the audience (it mostly involved non-professional actors). *Gamer* is a story of a boy who plays computer games professionally. He skipped school as he got ready for the world championship. The film took several years to make. Shown at many festivals all over the world, it is now presented at home, in Odesa.

OXYGEN STARVATION

Ukraine, 1991

Director: Andriy Donchyk

The film is for people who are not familiar with Ukrainian cinematography of the 1990s, among others. Andriy Donchyk made a great film out of the great screenplay by Yuriy Andrukhovych. He presented a detailed and accurate image of the "joy" of serving in the soviet army with its inventive violence of *dedovshchina*, the abuse of young recruits by older soldiers, with the pathological stupidity of blindly following the army procedures. The film benefits from brilliant acting of Taras Denysenko as private, Viktor Stepanov as ensign and Oleksiy Horbunov as lieutenant. Show during the collapse of the Soviet Union, the film was not presented to a large audience.

EARTH

Ukraine (USSR), 1930

Director: Oleksandr Dovzhenko

One of the films Ukraine is proud of, the acclaimed *Earth* is among the 35 films restored by the National Dovzhenko Center this year. Unlike *The Potemkin Battleship* and *Metropolis* presented at Odesa film festivals in previous years, the demonstration of the technically upgraded *Earth* will be a world premier this time. DakhaBrakha will play the music for the film using folklore and ethnic motives in a post-modernistic manner. Thus, classics will be combined with modern times into a legacy of generations.

Events

From 16 August

22–25 August

24–26 August

**Future Shorts:
summer 2012**

**Kyiv movie theater
(19, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska,
Kyiv)**

This year's festival selection will present the best seven films from all over the world, including BAFTA-award winning *A Morning Stroll* from the UK; *We'll Become Oil*, an experimental film that comes close to video art from Romania; *Guest*, a Clermont-Ferrand-winning film from South Korea; a film about growing up entitled *Fireworks*, and *Notes on Biology*, a favourite of the SXSW festival from the USA. *Street Vendor Cinema* and the UK-produced *Tumult* about an encounter between Vikings and a group from a 21st century bus tour end the program.

**Ethnovyr 2012**

**Ploshcha Rynok, the square
in front of the Town Hall
(downtown Lviv)**

The fifth international Ethnovyr folk festival invites musicians from many countries including the Czech Republic, Macedonia, France, Israel, India and Mexico, to Lviv. THE JATEROS, a folk festival from Spain; Polish music and dance band Jantar, and Vyaselle, a Belarussian dance group, will join them on stage. In addition to music and dancing, visitors will see such events as a folk art fair, workshops, friendship nights and tours.

**Ancient Medzhybizh 2012**

**Medzhybizh Fortress
(Medzhybizh, Khmelnytsk
Oblast)**

The historical and art festival will take place on the territory of the 16th century fortress, which is called upon to revive the medieval era times for a few days. Members of historical military clubs from different countries will recreate breathtaking medieval battles where every daredevil will have an opportunity to compete against knights. The audience will have to choose between the old crafts fair, medieval dance master classes and historical costume contests. Folk bands and a night firework show will add to the atmosphere.



THE SPARK OF LIFE/ LA CHISPA DE LA VIDA

Spain-France, 2011

Director: Alex de la Iglesia

A topical tragic farce about an accident with an unemployed man whose crippled body lures reporters, agents and paparazzi with cameras like vultures.



CAESAR MUST DIE/ CESARE DEVE MORIRE

Italy, 2012

Directors: Paolo Taviani,
Vittorio Taviani

A theater director stages Shakespeare's Julius Caesar in a prison with prisoners as actors. The play flows into life: the prisoners talk to each other in play lines on a walk, in the canteen or in their wards.



KILL ME PLEASE

Belgium, 2010

Director: Olias Barco

Funny, witty and often painfully realistic, the film shows a "clinics" or a private club where those willing to commit suicide are killed in the manner they pay for.



HAPPINESS

USA, 1998

Director: Tod Solondz

The wound on the body of Solondz, an American filmmaker, brings pain about everything from the lifestyle of average Americans, family problems and teenagers to immigrants and chauvinism.



29 August, 8 p.m.

KoЯn

**Stereo Plaza
(17, vul. Kikvidze, Kyiv)**

The leaders and founders of the nu metal style, with literally 20 years of experience, will rock Ukraine. KoЯn is a wild mix of grunge, funk, groove-metal, hip-hop and industrial music that attracts audiences numbering in the thousands to their gigs. Munky on guitar, Fieldy on bass, Jonathan Davis on vocals and Ray Luzier on drums will play songs from their latest album *The*

Path of Totality which band members call "future metal." In their 10th studio album, the band experiments with mixing dubstep and electronic elements into its meaty hard rock.



30 Aug. – 2 Sept.

Jazz Koktebel

**The Poet's House Garden
(vul. Naberezhna, Koktebel)**

For the 10th consecutive year, one of the most popular international jazz festivals has been bringing its audience the joy of good music. Well-known jazzmen, bands and performers all come to sunny Crimea to please the audience with never before heard improvisations, jazz experiments and performances. This year's list of performers includes Pur:Pur; Veronika Kozhukharova, Zorge Bjorn Berge, Pulcinella, Katia Chilly, and the Grammy award winning Lindgren with his Batucada Jazz.



31 Aug. – 9 Sept.

**Contemporary
Art Week 2012**


Downtown and suburbs (Lviv)

Art platforms for contemporary art week in Lviv will be located all over the city, turning it into a single space for art and inspiration. City streets and squares will host performances, photo and painting exhibitions, installations, plays, film festivals, lectures and workshops. Visual art, albeit oriented at visual perception, also makes people listen, inhale and feel it. The city will once again turn into one big art adventure seasoned with coffee flavour and the mouth-watering aroma of delicious food.


Eight Days Under the Surface

The Ukrainian Week travels to Ozerna Cave in Ternopil Oblast

Text and
photos author:
Vladyslav
Vozniuk



Western Prospect: a huge
gallery next to our camp.
We used it as our bedroom



Once back in the underground
base camp, some researchers
had fun making these
amazing fortresses from the
cave's clay

face

Ozerna or the Lake Cave, is a pearl of underground Ukraine. It lies under the fields near Strilkivtsi, a village in Borschiv County, Ternopil Oblast. Its name comes from the numerous crystal clear lakes hidden deep within it. Ozerna is one of the most beautiful speleological mazes in Ukraine, stretching 128 km. Living conditions during expeditions are next to extreme, as tourists have to carry their food and equipment on their backs. Wet things simply do not dry while hanging in the cave because of its 100% humidity, therefore clothes dry while being worn. The water in the underground lakes is quite hard and bitter, yet is drinkable when made as lemon tea. However, doctors do not recommend drinking it on a regular basis as the excessive amount of lime sulfur can cause kidney stones. We stayed at Koma, one of the underground camps. From our base, we went on long tours to the parts of the cave we found most interesting. We had to creep on all fours through the corridors above the water, crawling through piles of stones. Every part of the cave the flashlight catches through the darkness is made of one of the three basic materials here: lime, water or clay. Other than that, the caves are exhaustively dark and quiet. Perhaps, that was why the brain generated unusually colourful pictures in our dreams. When our tour was over, we surfaced after eight days of full isolation from the outside world. The surface hit us with the smell of ozone: it is certainly much more concentrated on the surface. Now, we have a whole year to look at the data we collected before our next tour. ■■



Visiting speleologists from Ufa, Russia: they researched a new part of the cave called Vedmezhyi, the Bear Zone, where bones of pre-historic animals have been found



A speleologist is crawling through the breaks in the walls over the underground lake in Perekhidny, or Transitional, one of the most difficult parts of the cave



Testing the water to finish the experiment which was started by a previous expedition in 2008



Lime crystals have been growing in the planet's depth for millions of years

Fleeing from Urban Slavery



Every year, dozens of Donetsk Oblast families flee to deserted villages to start new lives closer to nature

Author:
Natalia Kommodova

Eco-villagers believe that living in a safe environment and keeping the whole family healthy is possible even in the mine-polluted region of Donetsk.

AN ESCAPE FROM SLOW "SUICIDE"

Vira Palienko, a former businesswoman, lives in a non-electrified wattle-and-daub house with no indoor plumbing on the outskirts of Nyzhne Lozove, a deserted village near the town of Debaltseve in Donetsk Oblast. Before moving there, she had lived for 40 years in the mining town of Torez, working as engineer and later switching to business. Her current assets include a hectare of land with medicinal plants and a freshwater spring (**photo 3**). Vira and her husband, Yuriy, who worked at a utility service company for 20 years, set up their new homestead

named Chudyesnoye (Wonderful) in the eco-village. They support themselves by selling goat milk and cheese. People often travel 100km from Donetsk to purchase their healing herbal teas. The couple says that it is the favourable environment that makes everything grown in the village tastier and healthier and boosts the demand.

Sipping fresh milk at the Wonderful homestead, one feels like a real outdoorsman. The ubiquitous buzz of urban traffic is replaced by the singing of nightingales and the faint murmur of a stream. It is this same stream that serves as the couple's source of fresh water; they drink it unboiled and plunge into the freezing cold stream every morning to energize for the day.

Nyzhne Lozove, where the census lists less than 15 inhabitants, is a pleasant surprise amidst the smog-shrouded towns of Donetsk. 20-30km away from



PHOTO: NATALIA KOMMODOVA



PHOTO PROVIDED BY MYKOLA VORONIN

the nearest factories, it grows plenty of orchard fruit and vegetables, herbs and rare plants. Fieldstones often used as construction material are scattered around the village and often resemble cliffs, hence the name Skelevoye: Cliff Village.

In fact, it was more than just nature's beauty and benefits that encouraged Vira to quit her profitable business and sell her spacious apartment in the city. She was attracted by the concept of self-reliant "kin estates" promoted by Siberian-born author Vladimir Megre in the 1990s. According to his theory, only an environmentally friendly lifestyle can save mankind from global catastrophe. To achieve this, people must leave their cities and settle down on a plot of land far from the pollution of factories, where they can grow their own trees and orchards and create a "loving environment" for their families.

"This is not a utopia," Vira explains. "It's real. Modern cities offer no conditions for harmonious and proper human development. We lack time for the most important things in life, such as self-cognition and the development of natural talents. As a result, we have degraded, lost the ability to survive outside the city and turned into urban slaves. Routine work that makes us physically and mentally ill, and the devaluation

of family and family ties are just a few drawbacks of modern urban life. My health has improved since I moved to the hamlet and quit my urban routine. My eyesight and sleep are much better now. Moreover, I have time and inspiration to work on my creative ideas," she happily told *The Ukrainian Week*.

RECRUITING NEIGHBOURS

Vira learned about Rassvet (Dawn), the eco-village in Nyzhne Lozove, from the Internet. She came to visit and fell in love with the place. Most downshifters-to-be pick a place for their hamlet, form a "core" of family members and friends, and start looking for like-minded neighbours in the web. 100 families is the best number for comfortable life in an eco-village. They prefer candidates who are ecologically-oriented, not



PHOTO: NATALIA KOMMOLOVA

just people who want to live close to nature. To expand their hamlets and share experience, Rassvet arranges festivals and celebrations every year. Eco-villagers (photo 4) from all over the country have been coming to Rassvet for four years now, while wary urban citizens come there merely to rest and look around.

Business owners, martial arts teachers, doctors, professors, builders and miners... Around 20 families from different towns in Donetsk Oblast and Kyiv decided to build their "kin estates" near Debaltseve in the early 2000s. After some bureaucratic snags, they got their legitimate one or two hectares per family from the local council, as provided by the Law on Individual Farming. For various reasons, though, only six families have settled on their land so far. Some bought abandoned village houses for peanuts and have been living there temporarily as they plant family orchards and woods around their homes, while others have yet to collect the courage or the cash to afford the move.

Rassvet is arranged as an autonomous self-governing social community where common issues are resolved at a community council. The villagers help each other out as neighbours, but every owner runs his or her household alone. Every household is free to decide »

ECO-VILLAGES AND COMMUNITIES

Eco-villagers do not belong to a particular religious group. They create their villages with no ideological basis and live according to environmentally friendly practices. They use the benefits of civilization and technology to save energy, build eco-homes, and do organic farming. They conduct open trainings where young eco-villagers are taught to survive in nature and build eco-homes. Communities are based on the concept of kin estates following the model first promoted in Russia by Vladimir Megre's series of books. They, too, have eco-friendly routines and eat only pure home-grown organic food, while also leaning toward ancient Rus household traditions and family order. They call themselves Anastasiyevtsy after Anastasiya, the protagonist in Vladimir Megre's series.



PHOTO: NATALIA KOMODOVA



PHOTO: NATALIA KOMODOVA

how environmentally friendly their home is based on what they think is necessary. Some, like Vira, do not use electricity or utilities and sleep outdoors during the summer, while others cannot survive without lights and a washing machine. Nobody will intervene or try to change their minds unless they harm the environment or their neighbours.

Eco-villagers have learned organic farming (**photo 1**) and various artisan crafts, such as apiculture and carpentry, as well as how to make clothes and footwear (**photo 2**). They also practice traditional medicine and employ family labour, and plan to open a school in the village to raise their children using their own innovative system.

GOODBYE, JUNK!

Eco-villagers have stopped producing garbage and that is the main difference between them and average rural people. They use natural materials, make pure organic products and save energy to minimize their impact on the environment. Moreover, they avoid having “junk thoughts” – what they describe as the problems that we create for ourselves, therefore we must clear our minds of negative thoughts and fears.

“We don’t plough the land, instead we co-exist with it in harmony and learn from it,” Vira explains. “10 years ago, our yard was a deserted ploughed patch. Then flowers and rare edible plants began to grow on it, and birds settled here.”

Most eco-villagers are vegetarians. They treated *The Ukrainian Week* to a tasty porridge made of nettle and a mix of herbs, and a vitamin cocktail of honey,



PHOTO: NATALIA KOMODOVA

linseeds and nettle. According to the eco-villagers, this diet guarantees long life and protects against diseases. Flour, oil and sugar are the only products they buy at a store 10 kilometers away.

Naturally, Vira’s home is no place for chemicals, plastic or polyethylene. She uses mustard powder or stinging nettle to wash greasy dishes while a lovage-leaf infusion adds shine to her gorgeous long hair. The locals go to bed with the sun and wake up at dawn. As close to the natural schedule as possible, this life is like a battery giving people powerful energy and strength. TVs here are replaced by books, guitars and meditation. However, the locals still use cell phones and the Internet to stay in touch with civilization. They say they do not reject some helpful human inventions. Celebrations are all environmentally-friendly here, including workshops in artisan crafts, team games, singing and dancing, with no alcohol or conventional overeating.

A BURROW WITH INTERNET ACCESS

At one celebration, *The Ukrainian Week* met a young family of “extreme” eco-villagers originally from Horlivka, a town in Donetsk Oblast known for its huge Stirol chemical plant.



Mykola and Vika Voronin (**photo 7**) created their “kin estate” called “Vedrussy” in the village of Batmanivka near Horlivka several years ago and started an amazing experiment. Two years ago, the couple spent seven months living in a burrow (**photo 6**) that was one meter high and two meters wide. They could not stand up inside but had a laptop connected to the web that they used to stay in

touch with the world and watch cartoons on winter nights, charging it at friends’ homes. The family subsisted on goat milk and food grown in their garden.

“We were curious about living in a place that provides for complete fusion with nature. Also, we wondered if we could survive in such conditions—and we did,” Mykola comments. Eventually, a fire forced the couple out of their shelter. As they tend to their two hectares of land, the Voronins are going to build a new eco-house. Meanwhile, they live in their parents’ home. Young eco-villagers claim that they live in a clean environment despite being close to a chemical plant.

Some regard them as strange or insane. It even took a while for their parents and family members to accept their lifestyle. Not surprisingly: both young people used to have a very decent life by generally accepted standards. Mykola, 32, holds a degree in ecology and physics from Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. Initially, his dream had been to run his own business. Later, he decided that it was ecology, not economics, that would save Ukraine from the crisis. Today, he is a “sun bard” singer-songwriter, forager and proactive civil activist. His wife Viktoria, 26, is a lawyer specializing in land law. She owned a private company before meeting



PHOTO PROVIDED BY MYKOLA VORONIN

Mykola. After falling in love with him, she quit her business and joined the Sun Singers Caravan that travels around singing their original songs. They have already hitchhiked across Ukraine, Russia and other post-soviet states. Today, they earn their living with their music. Mykola performs at gigs and produces his own CDs and books. Soon, the couple is going to adopt two eco-village children from Israel and have their own baby.

“We’re never short of money. Life gives us as much as we need. You can fill your life with wellbeing through your thoughts and will. The main thing is to shape your thoughts clearly and confidently,” Mykola notes.

He believes that people can save deserted and polluted land, as well as dying villages, by creating eco-villages there. Yet, experienced eco-villagers recommend that those willing to settle down close to nature first “try out” the lifestyle. Before buying hectares and starting an eco-home, they should live a month or two in their chosen place to get used to the land and make sure that they can handle the lifestyle. According to eco-villagers, some of their neighbours have failed the test. ■



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