

SBU: WILL UKRAINE'S
SECURITY SERVICE EVER
BECOME UKRAINIAN?

THE NEW LICENSING PROCEDURE FOR
IMPORTED MEDICINES WILL HELP OFFICIALS
MONOPOLIZE THE MARKET

WHO CONTROLS
ILLEGAL COAL MINING
IN THE DONBAS

тиждень

international edition

The Ukrainian Week

№ 5 (47) MARCH 2013

PUTIN AND THE CHILDREN

**Plummeting popularity and growing pressure from abroad
push Yanukovych to seize power using the Belarus scenario**



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
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The Prosecutor General's Office reportedly closes criminal proceedings against ex-Economy Minister Bohdan Danylyshyn, who has now been granted political asylum in the Czech Republic, based on the absence of corpus delicti



Eight Days of a Chipmunk's Life by Ivan Andrusiak makes it into the White Ravens 2013 annual catalogue of the best children's books in the world



The Higher Administrative Court revokes the mandate of Serhiy Vlasenko, opposition MP and member of Yulia Tymoshenko's defence team

A Failing Strategy

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On March 6, the Higher Administrative Court revoked the parliamentary mandate of Serhiy Vlasenko, leader of Yulia Tymoshenko's defence team in court. The decision was based on the fact that Vlasenko failed to cancel his lawyer's certificate in a timely manner. In the Court's opinion, he was thus combining his activity as an MP with commercial activity as a lawyer, which is illegal for MPs.

On the one hand, this precedent signals that the Presidential Administration has finally found a "yes-man" mechanism to pressure disloyal MPs, whose Constitutional immunity no longer entirely protects them. According to the Constitution, MPs vote for a decision to revoke their peer's mandate in parliament. However, legislators would not necessarily give this convenient decision, due to solidarity and fear that such a precedent could someday turn against part of the pro-presidential majority. Now, the regime no longer needs this parliamentary support as it already has control over three other decision-making components. The first is the parliamentary Procedure Committee. It decides whether individual MPs can combine certain positions. It is currently dominated by the Party of Regions and Communist Party members and chaired by the Party of Regions' Volodymyr Makeyenko. The second component is the speaker of the Verkhovna Rada,

who files requests to revoke an MP's mandate to the Higher Administrative Court. Currently, the speaker is the Party of Regions' Volodymyr Rybak. The third component is the Higher Administrative Court, which makes final decisions and is under the president's control. The verdict of the Higher Administrative Court does not have to be approved by parliament.

This scheme enables those in power to revoke quite a few mandates of opposition MPs. From UDAR's Vitaliy Klitschko, for instance, whose sports license is not suspended. Or Hennadiy Moskal, known for his sharp criticism, because he is listed as a lawyer in the Unified State Register of Lawyers. If necessary, interested parties can find such skeletons in the closets of many opposition MPs who were once involved in activities other than politics. The key to success is to find any fault, and then catch up on it, using the well-known scenario. Moreover, finding one is not too difficult since some opposition politicians feel surprisingly secure, even though they should have realized over the years of Yanukovich's presidency that they should always keep an eye out for pitfalls.

As a lawyer, Serhiy Vlasenko should have realized that his valid lawyer's certificate could be used as an official excuse to launch a case on charges of combining MP and commercial activities. He could have terminated the certificate a while ago. The same applies to

Hennadiy Moskal and Vitaliy Klitschko, as well as several other MPs. Once the mandate of a disloyal MP is revoked and he is stripped of Constitutional immunity, the Prosecutor General can take a closer look at his biography.

On the other hand, the Vlasenko case has a geopolitical flavour to it. According to *The Ukrainian Week's* sources, the Kremlin was seriously concerned with the outcome of the latest Ukraine-EU Summit. Putin instructed all authorities and diplomats to disrupt the signing of the Ukraine-EU Association Agreement at any cost. First and foremost, they should intensify efforts in European capitals. Plus, Vlasenko's revoked mandate looks very much like yet another attempt to add an extra reason for the EU to refuse to sign the Association Agreement with Ukraine. There is no reasonable explanation for the Vlasenko case after Yanukovich signed the document in Brussels undertaking, among other things, to solving the selective justice issue, other than an intentional provocation to focus the EU's attention on the fact that not only has the current situation not yet been resolved, but has reached an absurd level. Meanwhile, more and more appeals are coming up in the EU, demanding for the latter to refuse to sign the Association Agreement until Yulia Tymoshenko is released, as well as requests for personal sanctions against repre-

**The month
in history**



4 March 1849

Bukovyna is declared to be the separate crown land of the Austrian Empire



5 March 1953

Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin dies



6 March 1613

Zemsky sobor, the first Russian parliament, elects Mikhail Romanov as Moscow's tsar – the beginning of the Romanov Dynasty



French MPs send a petition to Brussels requesting a ban on oligarchs Rinat Akhmetov and Vadym Novynsky entering the EU



The opposition starts a series of public assemblies. The first one takes place in Kyiv

EBRD provides a EUR 300mn loan to Ukraine to upgrade its nuclear power plants to international safety standards



The Ukrainian women's team wins the world chess championship



sentatives and sponsors of the Yanukovich regime, such as the petition of 20 French MPs to the EU.

There is an assumption that the scheme to revoke Vlasenko's mandate was orchestrated by Andriy Portnov, who until recently, was one of the top officials responsible for legal matters in the Presidential Administration and often linked to Viktor Medvedchuk. The latter does not hide his efforts to disrupt European integration and promote Ukraine's joining the Customs Union. The latest proof was the protest of a handful of Ukrainians in Brussels against Ukraine's European integration during the Ukraine-EU Summit set up by Medvedchuk's Ukrainian Choice NGO for an episode on Russia TV channel. If the assumptions of Portnov's or Russia's influence on the case are true, there are two possible scenarios for what will happen to Vlasenko's MP mandate. One is that the power of the hierarchy that Yanukovich has built for himself is being used against him under his own nose. If Putin succeeds in disrupting the EU-Ukraine association without involving Yanukovich, he will have greater leverage to get what he wants from Ukraine's President in the gas integration talks. The other is that the provocation with Vlasenko was authorized by Yanukovich himself as he tries to urge the EU to refuse to sign the Association Agreement. This would allow him to continue his current balancing act. The latter would signal his big mistake as less likelihood for the signing of the Association Agreement because of the Vlasenko case or other similar actions would automatically give the Kremlin more leverage. ■

14 March 1923



The Conference of Entente Ambassadors decides to annex Eastern Galicia to Poland

15 March 1939



The Sejm in Khusť, declares the independence of Carpatho-Ukraine. Avhustyn Voloshyn is elected as its president

19 March 1917



The Celebration of Freedom, a rally with 100,000 participants demanding "Autonomy for Ukraine!" and "Free Ukraine in a Free Russia" takes place in Kyiv

Putin and the Children

Yanukovych could try to usurp power using the Belarus scenario to offset his plummeting popularity and growing pressure from abroad

Author:
Oles Oleksiyenko

The situation is getting worse for Viktor Yanukovych, both domestically and abroad. To prove this, the opposition keeps blocking parliament, the Family is failing to push through the decisions it needs, and legislators are reluctant to attend sessions even when the parliament is not blocked. Meanwhile, Yanukovych keeps losing the support of his core electorate (see survey results).

Simultaneously, both Russia and the EU are pressing Yanukovych to finally decide on Ukraine's integration vector this year. Blackmailing is not bringing the desired effect for Yanukovych & Co. Meanwhile, capitulation to Moscow will bring much more difficult consequences for Yanukovych today than in 2010. And, should Yanukovych make the first concession, it will definitely be treated as the sign of a thaw, triggering increased pressure on him to immediately enter the Customs Union. This pressure can already be seen. The Russian media has unfolded a wide-scale campaign to discredit Yanukovych in the eyes of his pro-Russian voters. One telling example was the recent Week News on Russia 1 TV channel: its main message was that Ukraine's economy will "collapse; the aviation and space sectors will disappear, while agriculture will be killed" if Ukraine signs the Association Agreement with the EU.

Given the recent developments, Putin is not only counting on Viktor Medvedchuk, but also on the Communists, who have much more influence than Medvedchuk does, since they are part of the parliamentary majority. Before the Ukraine-EU Summit, members of the Communist Party (CPU) started talking about a motion of non-confidence against Premier Azarov, and they would certainly find enough votes in the current parliament to succeed in this. As a

result, the country would destabilize further, as the government crisis would add to the one in parliament, where Yanukovych would have no majority without CPU support. However, after Yanukovych visited Putin and the likelihood of the signing of the deal to rent out Ukraine's gas transit system to Russia increased, the CPU has changed its stance: it is now talking more of the negative impact of destabilization and opposes the dissolution of parliament.

As a result, Yanukovych finds himself at a stalemate. On the one hand, with no support from the CPU he has no majority, even if temporary, to pass the decisions he needs. And he has no chance to get it from the opposition, unless it is about European integration. Nor does he have sufficient support to ratify the capitulation agreements with Russia on the gas transit system and the Customs Union in particular, because many self-nominated Party of Regions' MPs, and a number of its party-nominated members will not support this decision.

All that's left for Yanukovych in this situation is to watch further destabilization, intensified by the opposition as the presidential election draws closer, in order to show that the government has lost control of the situation and the support of the voters, or to sideline or dissolve parliament. Former Vice Speaker Mykola Tomenko has suggested a possible scenario to kick parliament out of the game, referring to sources within the government. According to Tomenko, the scheme is for the president to dissolve the effective parliament and postpone the decision to hold an early parliamentary election using phony excuses, such as the lack of funding or the like. This is probably why some pro-government media promote the idea that Ukraine does not need "such" a parliament, or the trouble it is causing to the country's development.

This may be yet another instrument of psychological pressure on

the opposition to make it stop the blocking of parliament without waiting until its requirements are fulfilled. However, a similar precedent already exists in Kyiv, as the prospect of the mayor and city council chairman election remains obscure. In theory, some of the president's spin doctors may indeed see this scenario as an effective way to remove the "parliament factor" until it becomes entirely loyal.

AN EXAMPLE TO FOLLOW

Thus, Yanukovych may use dissolution of parliament as a forced step, blaming it entirely on the opposition which "did not allow the legislative body to work properly", to call on people to amend the



Constitution, in order to prevent similar situations in the future. One scenario for this is to have the public vote for amendments to the Constitution, drafted by the Constitutional Assembly and finalized by the Presidential Administration, in a referendum. Another option is to draft a brand new Constitution, also advertising it as “public initiative”.

At this point, it is worth mentioning events from nearly twenty years ago, preceding the unlimited dictatorship of Alixander Lukashenka established in his fight against parliament by means of a national referendum. Moreover, they had much in common with what is currently happening in Ukraine. Elected in a completely free election in July 1994, Alixander Lukashenko, already prone to authoritarianism, quickly entered into a conflict with the parliament elected in the following year. It was then that the opposition had won a ma-

jority in the parliament, and the leader of the Agrarian Party, Semen Sharetskiy was elected speaker and began to support scenarios of Belarus’ development that ran counter to those of the president: continued market reform, rejection of closer ties with Russia and the consolidation of society around a national idea. One of the key issues that caused conflict was integration with Russia.

Lukashenka then relied on a referendum to amend the Constitution and change Belarus from a parliamentary-presidential republic into a presidential one. He justified this by “the unsuccessful efforts to mend constructive cooperation with parliament”, the need to put an end to “never-ending pointless political battles at the top and focus on the problems which are of the greatest concern among the population”. Is this not reminiscent of the rhetoric of Yanukovich and other representatives of “the party and the leadership” in modern-day Ukraine?

Identical appeals dominated issues regarding the correlation between Belorussian politics and economy: “The salvation for our country and the economy today, lies in a strong authority... Under a weak president, although talking about everyone’s general wellbeing, our home-grown liberals and shitocrats (a play on words – democrats as opposed to democrats – **Ed.**), will actually leave us with nothing in our own country”. Needless to say, opposition MPs attempted to react. They began to collect the required number of signatures to initiate impeachment procedures, but ultimately, the deepening confrontation was resolved by means of agreements with the help of mediators – MPs of the Russian State Duma, headed by the then speaker. The amicable agreement ensured that Belarusian MPs would not initiate an impeachment procedure before the referendum result is counted. According to a decision of the Constitutional Court, the latter was supposed to be of advisory nature.

The referendum predictably brought 70% for Lukashenka’s proposals. However, this result was attained through gross violations. 10 days prior to voting, the Head of the Central Election Commission (CEC) was removed from office by presidential decree. Virtually all

the air time for the referendum was the propaganda for Lukashenka. The latter expanded even to voting stations. Voting ballots were printed by the president’s Administrative Department and were delivered to polling stations, bypassing the CEC and Oblast Commissions which could not thus control their actual amount. On the day of the referendum, observers were simply not allowed into polling stations, and their requests for necessary information were refused. Finally, only 10 out of 18 elected CEC members without the Head of the Commission who had been relieved of duties shortly beforehand conducted the summing up and publication of the results. As a result, attendance was miraculous: only 59.5% had voted by 18:00, but by 22:00 – the figure had risen to 84.2%. In addition, more than 6% of the ballots were recognized invalid.

Naturally, Western countries and international organizations, including the OSCE, the Council of Europe and the EU did not recognize the results of this referendum, but Lukashenka merely expanded on his success. In spite of deals with the opposition and the Constitutional Court’s decision on advisory nature of the referendum results, he immediately decreed that they were mandatory, saying that the Constitutional Court “restricts the constitutional rights of citizens for participation in a referendum”. As a result, instead of the parliament elected a year earlier, a new parliament, comprised of two houses was established. Lukashenka appointed all lower house MPs, opting only for his supporters. As a result, only 110 of the 385 MPs elected in 1995 retained their mandates.

It appears that Yanukovich’s Presidential Administration has planned to further usurp power using the Belorussian model. The main risk here, though, is that Ukraine is not Belarus, and Yanukovich does not have the support that Lukashenka had in the mid-1990s. Despite a widespread opinion that referendum is a much easier way to pull through a necessary decision, the attempt to get the voters’ approval of making the current President even stronger is hardly promising. However, a referendum could prove more fruitful for Yanukovich if he includes some populist



points on the list, such as restricting the immunity of MPs.


The slew of the latest initiatives is designed to reinforce authoritarianism. Most of them have been prepared with the participation of Andriy Portnov or a group of Party of Regions MPs close to him. Valeriy Pysarenko submitted a resolution to the VR to speed up the work on draft amendments to the Constitution regarding the stripping of MPs of their immunity.

According to this amendment, "without the approval of the Verkhovna Rada, a Ukrainian MP cannot be detained or arrested until a court decision against him has come into effect". In light of the Vlasenko case, there are no doubts that if necessary, such decisions can be hastily approved and applied against any representative of the opposition or any MP disloyal to the regime. Obviously, the current parliament will not pass this draft law, since everyone is aware of the risk it entails – from pro-regime and CPU MPs to representatives of oligarchic groups in the PR itself. Therefore, Yanukovych may raise the issue of MPs reluctant to pass the immunity amendment in a referendum as this may be the only way for him to amend the Constitution.

By contrast, the Draft Law "On Amending Some Laws of Ukraine on National Security" proposed by the Cabinet of Ministers could well get the support of the PR's allies.

Under the amendments to the Draft Law "On the Legal Procedure During a State of Emergency", all that it takes to declare a state of emergency is a regular "violation in the functioning of important state facilities". The list of these is approved by the Cabinet of Ministers. This makes it easy for the authorities to create the necessary pretext for a state of emergency.

Government representatives are more often showing irritation with the incorrect focus of even national television media that are completely loyal to them. Azarov recently complained that instead of highlighting the 150th birthday of Academician Vernadsky, the mass media was focusing on current problems, and instead of popularizing the "improvement", their focus is on "scandal, scepticism and trivialities". "We all need to reflect on how to bring to an end the artificial escalation of negative frames of



Capitulation to Moscow will bring much more difficult consequences for Yanukovych today than in 2010

Putin is not only counting on Viktor Medvedchuk, but also on the Communists, who have much more influence than Medvedchuk does, since they are part of the parliamentary majority

mind, which significantly holds back the development of the country and the development of individuality," he concluded. Should the independent mass media expect increased censorship and pressure?

If it manages to get rid of the parliamentary opposition and gets the opportunity to declare a state of emergency under any excuse it sees fit, the Yanukovych regime is clearly expecting to strengthen its positions not only domestically, but also in negotiations with its foreign partners. Of course, the issue will not be about European integration, but as *The Ukrainian Week* has written on many occasions, this is not the Yanukovych regime's goal. Instead, a similar scenario will create favourable conditions for the further development of the Family model in Ukraine,

with the partial use of the Belorussian mould. If so, the next presidential election will be conducted in a completely new atmosphere. However, the very attempt to implement such a scenario will be proof of the objective drawing of Ukraine into the Kremlin's orbit, as was the case with Lukashenka's Belarus. Like Yanukovych, he also tried a balancing act between the EU and Russia, blackmailing them with his geopolitical orientation. However, he ultimately fell into Putin's clutches.

This does not mean that the opposition has to capitulate under the threat of the usurpation of power, should parliament be dissolved. Its key objective now is to select the most effective strategy to resist the scenario of the Belorussification of Ukraine. ■



Beware the Referendum in the Hands of a Tyrant

Author:
Andreas Gross,
leader of the
Socialist Group
in PACE

Direct democracy and its centrepiece — the referendum — seduce radical democrats as well as authoritarian politicians. Even dictators from Napoleon III to Hitler and Pinochet introduced people's votes and misused them for their dictatorships. Consequently, calling on citizens to go to and vote in a referendum is not a virtue in and of itself. A "plebiscite" can be misused as an instrument in bending power and democracy and a bad alternative to efforts to democratise democracy. In 1851, the French ruler Napoleon Bonaparte III organised a coup, dissolved parliament without any constitutional right to do so and asked the people to support this illegal act by allowing him to draft a new constitution. With this dictatorial move, he set in motion two ideas which later became part of the European political language: Bonapartism and plebiscites.

Bonapartism means the total control and centralisation of power in one man's hands without any checks and balances or separation of powers between an independent judiciary, press and parliament. Plebiscites are "referenda", people's votes, in which an authoritarian ruler invites the people to answer an often ambivalent, suggestive question, which he formulates himself. Using such plebiscites, a ruler bypasses and ignores his elected parliament and tries to claim direct legitimacy from the people. In this he is wrong, because he does not respect or follow parliament which has indeed been elected by the people and expresses their diversity and different interests. Although it was a French philosopher and mathematician, Condorcet, who in 1791 invented a way to enable citizens to participate more directly in writing laws and amending constitutions, the coup of Napoleon III 60 years later discredited the idea of referenda by showing that such popular votes in an authoritarian system could reinforce the interests of strong, undemocratic rulers against the real interests of the people.

Condorcet's original idea to design direct democracy and referenda as a way to democratise democracy in order to enable more freedom and serve as a buttress against authoritarianism was taken up in the 1860's by Swiss democrats and between 1890 and 1914 by US Populists and Progressives. These activists wanted to reform systems in which parliaments and legislatures were totally corrupted and occupied by business interests who sacrificed the will and the interests of the people for their own profit.

THIS SHORT INSIGHT INTO THE HISTORY OF DIRECT DEMOCRACY MIGHT SERVE ALL THOSE UKRAINIAN DEMOCRATS WHO WANT TO PREVENT THE PLEBISCITAIRIAN AND BONAPARTISTIC SCENARIOS

In both countries, broad "people's movements" mobilised critics in such a way, that in just two years, in four referenda (Zurich, 1867-1869 and the new Governor of California, 1911) the people accepted totally revised constitutions giving citizens the ability to launch legislative and constitutional initiatives and referenda, mostly killing the power of the oligarchs in the parliaments of Switzerland and elected bodies on the United States' west coast.

But the design of direct democracy was carefully crafted and the lessons of Napoleon were learned. This means that parliament can never be sidelined or ignored by a referendum. Every constitutional change proposed in Switzerland by a citizens' initiative must be discussed and reflected upon by parliament before it goes to a referendum by the people. Another litmus-test for the quality of the design of direct democracy is that the amount of signatures

which must be gathered by citizens in order to ask for a vote, has to be small (2-3% of the electorate) in order to allow it to become a way to share the power, to control the established powers and to prevent referenda from becoming an instrument for those who already have too much financial, ad-

ministrative or economic power. And in every referenda-proposition citizens can only propose one constitutional change in order to prevent manipulation and incorrect interpretations from resulting after a referendum.

Other conditions necessary to ensure referenda serve freedom and allow the real participation of all citizens, not only the rich and powerful, concern the supervision of the signature-gathering process (the state must make certain that people only sign a petition once and that each signature is truly authentic) and the existence of an independent media, where an initiative can be discussed in an open manner and be argued from all sides in order to allow citizens to make up their minds in light of all possible relevant information.

This short insight into the history of direct democracy might serve all those Ukrainian democrats who want to prevent the new "referenda-law" from being used in a plebiscitairian and bonapartistic way. When one knows history, he or she is better able to prevent the worst from happening again in the present. Further, history might show how good ideas are misused by those who do not want to serve the people but would rather enrich their own financial and political interests. ■

Following in Lukashenka's Footsteps

Economic initiatives by the so-called "young reformers" confirm that the government is following a Belarusian model adjusted to fit the Family's interests

Author:
Oles Oleksiyenko

An idea has been promoted in the media lately that the current Premier Mykola Azarov and his Soviet economic management should be replaced with "young reformers" appointed by the Family in order to finally enact real reforms. However, these "reformers" have already demonstrated their preference for administrative-command methods. Shortly before former NBU Chair Serhiy Arbuzov joined the Cabinet of Ministers, his NBU team began promoting the notorious project to de-dollarize the economy and stabilize the hryvnia rate at the taxpayers' expense. There were talks of potential bans of foreign exchange

transactions, criminal liability for FX conversion beyond banks, restrictions on FX settlements and the like. After the shift in the Cabinet that made it more loyal to the Family, the focus on command economy increased compared to that in the previous

ers and boost import substitution, from privileges in loan issuance to buying more of their produce.

The government chose to sell more produce on the domestic market rather than search for ways to restructure the economy, which is currently uncompetitive on the global market. They are interested in modernization solely for the opportunity to increase domestic sales of steel and engineering sector products that are uncompetitive on the world market. "Ukraine needs over 300mn tons of metal products to upgrade and modernize its facilities," Azarov said proudly as he presented the programme. "So, domestic steelworks may end up with contracts for many years to come." As a result, though, growing competition on the global market and the need for Ukrainian steelwork holdings to plunge into an exhaustive struggle for international markets will be pushed to the sidelines.

While stating that "many enterprises are uncompetitive even in the domestic market" and "the growing demand for non-food goods is mostly satisfied through imports", government officials still suggest a number of manual privileges to protect Ukrainian enterprises from competition. These include non-tariff barriers to trade, such as "keeping medical products that do not meet established safety standards off the market". According to the programme, "the pharmaceutical sector has the potential to become the driver of the country's economy". This idea is based on just one fact


THE NEW PROGRAMME TO INTENSIFY ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT LEAVES THE IMPRESSION THAT THE REFORMERS ARE SET TO PRESERVE A SOVIET ECONOMY

government. The "State Programme to Intensify Economic Development in 2013-2014" passed by the Cabinet on February 27 nailed it down. Related to Arbuzov's appointment as Vice Premier, the new programme proves that his style has much more in common with the Soviet system than Azarov's does. The programme's priorities make it look like the reformers are set to preserve a Soviet economy and keep it viable manually using Belarus' experience.

The document is oriented at objectives quite separate from economic development and the supply of high quality, competitive goods and equipment to commercial consumers. Instead, it mostly focuses on the automatic provision of markets for current enterprises as they are. This means that they will not have to worry about upgrading their production facilities whatsoever. The programme also offers a wide range of government support to help national produc-

Uncompetitive reforms


Feigned reforms in 2010-2012 made the Ukrainian economy less competitive



Sources: NBU, Finance Ministry, State Statistics Committee

The vicious cycle of poverty

With its weak market, Ukraine lags far behind its neighbours in global rates. As a result, the economy remains obsolete, and the population poor



that "the pharmaceuticals market has grown 3.6 times over the past 10 years". The drop in the share of 20 Ukrainian pharmaceutical companies to 25.8% is left out of this statement, however. This is hardly surprising as it leaves room for attempts to divide the market manually (read more about the pharmaceutical industry and imports in Ukraine in Pills for the Greedy).

What matters most in the pharmaceutical sector is quality rather than the price. Clearly, no government support would be needed to urge people to buy medicine that is identical in quality to imports, yet at prices several times lower—if such products existed. Instead, the government has been restricting access to good quality imported medications while promoting their domestic versions, which are often worse for patients.

Another priority industry mentioned in the programme is engineering that embraces transportation, aircraft, ship, agricultural machinery and aerospace engineering. The programme lists the "employment of 21% (586,000) of the entire industrial workforce" and "3,500 kinds of machines and equipment" of the sector's current or potential output capacity

as its key features, yet leaves out the sector's competitiveness or the demand for its products on either the global or domestic market. Ukraine is importing machinery worth tens of billions of dollars, and domestic machinery cannot compete with it. Meanwhile, it exports over half of the total output of its engineering industry, with Russia buying the lion's share.

The plan for hi-tech aircraft and aerospace engineering industries is to increase "the production of airplanes in Ukraine to 20 units annually", "preserve at least 5,000 jobs in the aviation industry and adjacent sectors", and increase the output of the aerospace industry, now mostly export-oriented, by several million dollars. Meanwhile, questions regarding the developmental capacity and efficiency of these industries without government support remain open. In the current state, they will merely add to the burden on the economy, making real modernization much more challenging.

The key point in the young reformers' programme to boost the economy is essentially to put the interests of consumers and the prospects of the country aside, while focusing on providing enough orders to all avail-


able facilities—quite obsolete by global standards—in the industries controlled by oligarchs.

This resembles the economic policy employed by Belarusian President Alyaksandr Lukashenka for almost two decades now. Indeed, this approach helps maintain a relatively high "gross output" at facilities inherited from the Soviet era. Yet, it also makes the economy woefully uncompetitive. This explains the government's initiatives to raise import tariffs for a number of goods, which already put Ukraine on the verge of confrontation with its WTO partners. Thus, despite declarative reforms, the current Ukrainian authorities and big business owners, often typical red directors, will have no real incentives to upgrade their enterprises and compete for consumers.

Quite on the contrary, they will find it much easier to garner government support through loans under privileged conditions and public procurement contracts. For this, they will have to remain loyal to the regime and hand over shares of profitable assets to the Family. It is now clear that the authors of the economy-boosting programme are hardly looking ahead to international investors. Given the Belarusian model, this is only for the better as it keeps competitors away. ■

Crisis of investment

Aggravating business environment nudges investment down and hampers economic growth



Three Years of Promises



Education

"I guarantee that the share of government scholarships at state universities will be set at 75% by law"

Despite Yanukovych's guarantee, Art. 23.4 of the Law "On Higher Education" requires state and municipal universities to enroll at least 51% of the total number of students under the government scholarship scheme. On July 18, 2011, MPs Andriy Pavlovsky and Oleksandr Sochka registered an amendment to replace 51% with 75%. The Party of Regions voted it down on December 6, 2011.

"Reduction in the minimum mandatory number of students in secondary schools, which will save 2,000 village schools"

In fact, the number remained at "at least five" students in a secondary school grade, while the number of schools continued to fall: by 300 in 2010/2011, 400 in 2011/2012 and 200 in 2012/2013. This was not directly related to the worsening demographic situation: the number of students in 2012 was only 7,000 less than in the previous year, but 400 schools were closed.



Healthcare

"I will ensure a gradual increase in government funding for healthcare to the European level of 10% of GDP"

Health care funding was 3.6% in 2010, 3.4% in 2011 and 3.7% in 2012.

"I guarantee good quality free emergency medical assistance"

After Yanukovych signed the Law "On Emergency Medical Assistance", the reform of emergency medical assistance began on January 1, 2013. One of

the results of this "reform" is that it can now take up to an hour for an ambulance to get to patients suffering from high blood pressure.

"I will increase government control of the quality of medical services and medicines."

I will protect people from price fluctuations on the pharmaceutical market"

Meanwhile, many patients did not receive proper and timely treatment after authorities failed to purchase tuberculosis vaccines and hemophilia medication in a timely manner in 2011. In 2012, there was a shortage of antiretroviral therapy for HIV patients and drugs for children with cancer. On March 1, 2013, the Law "On Amending Some Laws of Ukraine on Licensing Imported Medicines and the Definition of the Term "Active Pharmaceutical Ingredient"" signed by the President came into effect, introducing the licensing of imported drugs. According to experts, this will result in the re-distribution of the pharmaceutical market and increase the price of good quality imported drugs.



Anti-corruption campaign

In October 2010, Yanukovych stated that "we will finally be able to conduct an effective state policy to fight the corruption, which is currently a threat to the country's national security"

The Law "On the Prevention of Corruption and Counteraction Against It", passed on April 7, 2011, introduces the mandatory reporting of expenditures exceeding UAH 150,000 by officials and their family members. As requested by Party of Regions MPs, the Constitutional Court later cancelled the requirement for officials to report their 2011 expenditures. Overall, the new anti-corruption law was never

really implemented in Ukraine. Among other things, the government does nothing to prevent corruption regarding land, courts, public procurement and more. In actual fact, corruption has reached a scale unseen over the past few years. As a result, Ukraine was 144th out of 176 countries in Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index in 2012.

In the three years of his presidency, Viktor Yanukovich has failed to meet his election promises. Instead, he has offered Ukraine a slew of large-scale pseudo reforms and virtual national projects

Pension reform

In December 2010, Yanukovich stated that pension reform is necessary to reduce the Pension Fund's annual deficit of "nearly UAH 60bn"

As a result, the retirement age for women was increased to 60, and the years of contributory service increased to 30 for women and 35 for men. However, this did not help the Pension Fund, as the government simultaneously raised pensions, primarily for the target pool of the Party of Regions' potential voters, before the 2012 parliamentary election. Thus, budget transfers to the Pension Fund hit UAH 64.5bn in 2012 and UAH 83.2bn in 2013. The trend is likely to intensify significantly in 2014, in view of the 2015 presidential election.



Expanded powers for local governments

"Local self-governance should become a reliable and solid foundation of popular rule. I support decentralization and the reform of budget distribution in favour of local governments"

The past three years have not seen a single law to expand the powers of local governments. On the contrary, Yanukovich signed the Law "On the Capital of Ukraine" which essentially took power away from the elected Mayor and handed it to the Head of the Kyiv City State Administration, who is appointed by the president. Budget distribution in favour of local self-government also failed. 95% of local budgets still survive on donations from the central budget. The "reform" only had an effect in Kyiv where the Party of Regions and Yanukovich took away 50% of individual income tax, i.e. nearly UAH 8bn annually, essentially turning it into another budget-supported region.



Military reform

"I guarantee the transfer to a volunteer military from 2011"

So far, Ukraine has neither a volunteer military, nor a clear strategy or deadline for creating one. Ex-Minister Dmytro Salamatin, forced into resignation in 2012, talked about 2017 as a possible deadline. Now, the Defence Ministry is talking about a gradual switch, whereby up to 7,000 volunteer soldiers will be enlisted by July 2013 at stage one; nearly 30,000 in July-December 2013 at stage two; and 3,000 more in 2014 at stages three and four. However, these are only promises so far.



"As a top priority, officers without homes will be provided with housing. I will introduce a procedure to provide accommodation for young officers within their first year of service"

According to experts, as of 2012, nearly 45,000 current army officers and 20,000 reserve and retired officers, Afghanistan veterans and families of soldiers killed while in service, had no housing. The 2013 budget provides UAH 12mn to build housing for the military.

The construction of housing

"The government should make a large contract for the construction of social housing. 10 million apartments for young people, public sector employees, poor families and the disabled will be built over the course of 10 years"

To meet this promise, the government should have built 300,000 new apartments over the past three years. Instead, the number of families waiting for social housing decreased from 11,000 in 2010 to 7,000 in 2011.



National Projects

The LNG Terminal

The construction of a liquid gas terminal on Ukraine's Black Sea coast



UAH 8bn



4 years



1 year left

As the project enters its third year, officials are still debating where to build it. The latest idea from Mykola Azarov – Turkey

Natural Energy

The construction of solar, wind and hydroelectric power stations



UAH 30bn



4 years



1 year left

Three years after the project was announced, it is still at the preparation stage

New Life

The opening of 27 new regional perinatal centres and the establishment of a perinatal support system



UAH 0.5bn



2 years, beginning in 2012



Should be completed in 2013

At the beginning of the project's final year, only slightly more than 30% of the planned perinatal centres were opened

The Danube Corridor

The construction of a new Odesa-Reni highway, canal and port to develop the transportation infrastructure in the Danube area



UAH 16bn



5 years to build the highway
7 years to build the port



2 years left for the highway
4 years left for the port

Three years after the project was announced, it is still at the preparation stage

Air Express

Express railway between Kyiv and Boryspil Airport



UAH 4.6bn



3 years



Should be completed in 2013

The plan was to finish the project this year. However, the authorities have only signed an agreement to open a credit line for the construction of the railway line. The loan is not yet used as planned

Affordable Housing

The construction of affordable housing



UAH 12bn



5 years



2 years left

Three years after it was launched, there are only promises that the construction "should be in spring"



Estimated funding



Deadline



Years before the deadline

In 2010, the then new government proudly presented ambitious national projects to provide visible improvements to the voters and the country overall within a short term. Vladyslav Kaskiv, as Chairman of the State Agency for Investment and National Project Management, was appointed to run national projects. The approaches and officials appointed to talk to the public about national projects immediately raised the suspicion that most of them would fail, while the funding that the government manages to allocate would land in the pockets of the right people. Indeed, as Viktor Yanukovych enters the fourth year of his presidency, "key" national projects are, for the most part, merely on paper, and very unlikely to be completed by the original deadlines.

Clean City

Waste recycling facilities



UAH 5bn 4 years 2 years left

The authorities are searching for investors as the project enters its third year

The City of the Future

Urban development strategies and attracting investment



n/a 10 years 7 years left

So far, only the strategy to develop Kyiv by 2025 has been approved. The City of the Future campaign promotes new projects aimed at attracting funding and investment, but to no avail

Good Quality Water

The construction of water purification facilities



UAH 4bn 6 years 3 years left

Three years into the project, officials are still "negotiating with potential investors"

Open World

4G Internet in secondary schools



UAH 5bn 4 years 1 year left

Officials are preparing to report the results of the pilot project

Olympic Hope 2022

The establishment of an infrastructure to host the 2022 Winter Olympics in Ukraine



UAH 80bn 5 years to finalize stage one objectives 2 years left

Three years into the project, only the feasibility study has been approved so far

Emergency Assistance

The creation of a network of regional dispatch services to work with GPS



UAH 0.4bn 2012–2014 2 year left

So far, only the name of the project's partner company is known. Meanwhile, a portion of the funding is already going to intermediary companies

Will Ukraine's Security Service Ever Become Ukrainian?

Author:
Ihor Losev

Security services are integral to a valid independent state. Their mission is to guarantee the state's security. They are often called special in Eastern Europe because that's what they are, authorized to walk a fine line between lawfulness and lawlessness for the sake of national interests. It is the nature of security services. As soon as they



BACKGROUND

FSB(U)

The SBU, Ukraine's Security Service, inherited its style from the Soviet KGB. It keeps playing into the hands of its Russian counterpart, the FSB and persecutes opposition members, as well as Ukrainian and foreign activists

The visible tip of the iceberg called the SBU is more often associated with scandals and a lack of professionalism than with facts of effective interference in processes that threaten Ukraine's national security. The most striking part is that the Ukrainian Security Service seems to see no absolutely no threats or unfriendliness from the Kremlin. Not only does it turn a blind eye to its Russian colleagues' anti-state activity on Ukrainian territory, but sometimes even backs up Moscow's spin doctors. Moreover, the SBU allows Russia's "secret agents" to feel free and relaxed in Ukraine – even kidnap people on its territory. Meanwhile, the SBU is searching for threats to national se-

curity among opposition members, human rights and other activists, who, for the most part, stand for national interests. This signals that the current SBU is an offspring of the KGB rather than the independent security service of a sovereign state. Moreover, their actions – or rather inactivity – give the impression that the SBU is playing along with Russia and its neo-imperialistic strategy. Or is it the lack of professionalism that makes the SBU overlook these intentions? It appears that Ukraine would now have a completely different security service if it had started to build the SBU from scratch rather than base it on the republican branch of the KGB twenty years ago.

SUSPICIOUSLY BIASED 2003



- Russia started building a dam to annex the Tuzla Spit, a Ukrainian island near Crimea, to its territory. As a result, it could have had territorial claims to Ukraine. The SBU failed to take any measures to prevent the provocation.

2004

- On 26 November 2004, the Luhansk Oblast Council passed a decision to create the South-Eastern Ukrainian Autonomous Republic. On 28 November, an All-Ukrai-

start to act within the limits of lawfulness, they turn into average law enforcement authorities, like the Interior Ministry, although the latter does not stick to the law closely, for instance, when it comes to sending cover agents into the criminal world.

Without understanding these details, any talks of security services are useless. Moreover, every state will do anything to rescue itself in the face of a threat to its existence, unless it is totally impotent, and therefore hopeless.

However, there is a striking difference between security services in democracies and totalitarian countries. The former are strictly accountable to the public and the parliament, acting under a close eye of free press and NGOs. The latter stand over society and the parliament, controlling everyone and accountable only to chiefs, führers, duces, caudillos, general secretaries and the like. In democracies, security services should stay away from internal political life, the competition among political parties and confrontations among politicians. Otherwise, they face heavy punishment. Totalitar-

ian, semi-totalitarian and authoritarian regimes use security services in clan conflicts, rigging pseudo elections, persecution of political competitors and the dissent, and for many other purposes. In such countries, this becomes their key function – a priority over national security. In some, such as modern Ukraine, they eventually turn into personal security services for a specific individual.

For centuries, secret services had reported to the government or the party. Only recently, in the Russian Federation, have they turned into a government themselves as another historical experiment after the previous one in 1917. Vladimir Putin is a professional chekist while his colleagues control virtually all key offices in the country. In this sense, Russia can be considered more of a chekist country than even the USSR was, because the crucial pillar on which the Soviet regime stood was the party, not the security service.

The Communist Party and the KGB shaped the solid basis of the totalitarian Communist dictatorship. KGB for the USSR was the same as Gestapo as

part of RSHA and SS were for the Nazi Germany. The special place and role of the KGB in the Soviet Union was supported by specific ideology, not widely and openly advertised yet omnipresent. The last Soviet KGB Chief Vadim Bakatin described this ideology as chekism: “Chekism was the constant unrestricted surveillance and violence over everyone who did not fit into the tough ideology of the Bolshevik party. It was the ideology of a security service

THE INTENTION TO UKRAINIZE THE KGB WAS A VERY BOLD IDEA GIVEN 70 YEARS OF ITS ANTI-UKRAINIAN CAMPAIGNS AND FOCUS ON MOSCOW AS PRIORITY

completely merged with that of the ruling party rather than the law.”

This leads to a question: is it possible to part with the totalitarian system, its nature and practice without leaving the KGB and its traditions behind?

»



nian Session of MPs and Local Council Deputies took place in Severodonetsk, Luhansk Oblast. The members openly spoke of separating south-eastern regions from Ukraine. The SBU did nothing to prevent this or hold the separatists liable.

2010

• In September, the then SBU Chief Valeriy Khoroshkovsky admitted that the SBU “is closer to the Russian FSB and Belarusian KGB... Many of our staff graduated from special academies in Moscow, Minsk and Kyiv. Most are graduates of the same training centres. We use similar mechanisms, instruments and methods. Western special services have different training, as you can well understand.”

2010–2013

• The SBU took no measures against Russian politicians and their pro-Kremlin colleagues in Ukraine who on many occasions have made public statements with claims regarding Ukraine’s territorial integrity, independence, and stability in a number of regions. It did not react to the Rusyn movement in Transcarpathia, actively promoted by the priests of the Moscow Patriarchate of Ukrainian Orthodox Church.

• In 2010, the SBU lifted the ban on the entry to Ukraine of Yuriy Luzhkov and other notorious Russian figures. After Luzhkov’s persona non grata status was cancelled, he once again made a series of statements with territorial claims. In early 2013, the Russian parliament’s Vice Speaker Vladimir Zhirinovskiy visited Kyiv. The SBU did not react to his statement in August 2011 that “Ukraine will become part of Russia as a “federal region””. In Ukraine, Zhirinovskiy said that he “recommended that Ukraine switches to Moscow time. Make Russian the only official language. Then every-



thing will be good.” No actions were taken in response to his interference in Ukraine’s internal affairs. It is the SBU that initiates bans on such persons entering Ukraine.

2012

• The Russian security service kidnapped Russian opposition activist Leonid Razvozhayev in Kyiv. The SBU says that it knew nothing of a foreign special operation taking place on Ukrainian territory.

• The SBU failed to prevent the conclusion of the Agreement on the LNG terminal construction between the Government Agency of Ukraine for Investment and National Project Management and Gas Natural SDG SA of Spain, signed on behalf of the latter by Jordi Sarda Bonvehí. It later emerged that he was a skiing instructor who had not been authorized by the Spanish party. According to one suggested scenario, this could have been a special operation by Russia’s special service as the Krem-

One reason for the failures to build modern democratic societies in the post-Soviet territory is that only the Baltic States, including Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, managed to split from chekism in terms of organization and ideology of their security services. In other countries, including Ukraine, the republican branches of the Soviet KGB simply transformed into what was presented as new security services. This was regardless of the fact that the Ukrainian branch of the Soviet KGB had initially been oriented at the violent elimination of "Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism" which in fact embraced Ukrainian statehood, any attempts to gain national sovereignty, as well as any unauthorized manifests of national identity. Thus, the Ukrainian branch of the KGB essentially served as the instrument of occupation and repression in Ukraine.

Could an agency like this possibly grow into a full-fledged security service of an independent state willing to protect national interests above all? "We work for the Union. There is no such thing as Ukraine in our work," said openly General Vitaliy Fedor-

chuk, the executioner of Ukrainian patriots and Chief of the Ukrainian SSR KGB appointed by Leonid Brezhnev in 1970 to discredit and remove Petro Shelest, First Secretary of the Ukrainian SSR Communist Party. The last Ukrainian KGB Chief, Russian-born General Halushko, left for Russia after Ukraine gained independent,

for their motherland, ruled democratic parties and enjoyed the reputation of "true Ukrainian intellectuals", acted strangely after 2000 when Vladimir Putin was elected as president. With what seemed to be long-standing reputation of patriots, these people all of a sudden started calling on Ukraine's federalization, a union with Russia, even dissolution in Russia; recommending Ukrainians to essentially play into the hands of the pro-Russian candidate by voting against all in the crucial election, or taking many other actions damaging to Ukraine's national interests.

The intention to Ukrainize the KGB was a very bold idea given 70 years of its anti-Ukrainian campaigns and focus on Moscow as priority. Ukrainization could have been successful with the three remaining fragments of the Soviet army – Kyiv, Prykarpattia and Odesa military districts, provided that there had been an effective government. Eventually, they could have transformed into a Ukrainian army. However, this failed because of ineffective governments and bizarre defence policy. Even so, Ukrainians still tend to trust the army defeated without a single shot by

THE FUTURE ADEQUATE UKRAINIAN GOVERNMENT WILL HAVE TO CREATE POWERFUL NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES, OTHERWISE UKRAINE'S SOVEREIGNTY WILL ALWAYS BE AT RISK

taking an archive, including data on the agents of the Ukrainian republican KGB branch, along to Moscow.

Apparently, among these were many written consents to "voluntary collaboration" with the KGB. Surprisingly, some Ukrainian activists who were in the People's Movement and other patriotic organizations, delivered passionate speeches

BACKGROUND

lin is not interested in the diversification of Ukraine's fuel supply sources.

THE WARS AGAINST THE OPPOSITION AND AVERAGE CITIZENS 2000

- The discovery of the Melnychenko tapes revealed that the president's office had long been bugged.
- Information surfaced of the SBU staff's proactive participation in a campaign to undermine the opposition and the persecution of independent press.
- In 2005, Hryhorii Omelchenko, head of the Georgiy Gongadze murder investigation committee, said



that the SBU had launched the Provocateur Operation to investigate the journalist in June 2000. This was based on information that Gongadze had allegedly received materials that could have been transferred abroad, leading to a negative impact on the country's image.

2004



- SBU General and foreign intelligence agent Valeriy Kravchenko stated on a Deutsche Welle radio programme that "SBU Chief, Ihor Smeshko and the Head of the General Intelligence Department, Oleh Syniarsky, both reporting to Kuchma,

instructed their agents to conduct the surveillance of opposition MPs and government members on the ministerial level and higher". Among other things, he mentioned that he had been instructed to supervise preparations for a forum arranged by Nasha Ukrayina (Our Ukraine), and conduct the surveillance of German reporters investigating the trafficking of organs and children in Kharkiv.

2010

- The SBU launched a criminal case against Ruslan Zabilyi, a historian and Director of the Lontsky Street Prison, a national memorial museum dedicated to the victims of occupational regimes. He was charged with "preparing to disclose classified information".



2010



- Under SBU instructions, the State Border Guard Service banned Nico Lange, Director of the Konrad Adenauer Foundation Office in Ukraine, from entering Ukraine when he arrived at the airport.

Later, the Prosecutor General's Office announced that the decision had allegedly been based on the violation of the 1974 Declaration on Principles of International Law on Friendly Rela-

Ukraine's government more than they trust the security service. What was possible with the military, though, is hardly so when it comes to transforming the security service, especially the successor of one in an ideology-overwhelmed state, such as the USSR, focusing on the prevention of Ukraine's independence as one of its key objectives.

Can this change for the opposite? Hardly so, since Soviet-trained people now teach at the SBU Academy. Many chekists – and they still like the title – see themselves as the opponents rather than advocates of the struggle for the independent Ukraine. Not surprising for the successors of the cheka, NKVD and KGB.

Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania built their security services from scratch. They did not reform the army of the Soviet Baltic military district. Instead, they asked the Soviet army out. After this, they went to set up their own national armies and security services. At least, this guarantees that their military forces and security agencies will not turn into the branches of the Russian ones stuffed with the agents of the Kremlin's influence.

The process was not easy, of course, as some recruited servants of the new local security services lacked professionalism. However, history remembers many effective intelligence and counterintelligence structures created by people who were not professional agents. CIA Director Allen Dulles did not have that much of professional experience when he started building strategic intelligence operations in his country. Reuven Shiloah organized Mossad in Israel without being a professional intelligence agent. Nor was his famous successor Isser Harel who oversaw the capture of SS Obersturmbannführer Otto Eichmann in Argentina. When it comes to security services, patriotism and devotion to one's country matter much more than professional skills that can be obtained over time.

The future adequate Ukrainian government will have to create powerful national security services, otherwise Ukraine's sovereignty will always be at risk. So far, the SBU is run by people whose biographies, earlier careers and views are connected to one foreign state that has never accepted Ukraine's independence. ■

tions and Cooperation among States in Accordance with the UN Charter that requires foreign citizens not to interfere with the country's internal affairs.



From 2010

- The number of reports on wiretapping, clandestine entry into apartments and other actions restricting the rights of Ukrainians by the SBU soared.

2011

- Several activists of the Patriot of Ukraine organization were arrested in Vasylykiv, a town in the Kyiv Oblast, after a leaflet threatening Yanukovich and explosives to blow up the Lenin monument were allegedly found at

the home of one of the activists. According to the arrested Patriot leaders, the provocative leaflets had been planted by the SBU.

2011



- Two Czech diplomats were expelled from Ukraine based on SBU materials. According to its data, they had uncovered the intelligence and reconnaissance activities of Defence Attaché Colonel Zdenek Kubicek (see photo) and military attaché Major Petra Novotna. The SBU stated that they "spied to collect classified technical and

political military information". Most experts, however, claim that this was done in response to the Czech Republic granting political asylum to Ukrainian opposition politician Bohdan Danylyshyn.

2012

- The SBU started persecuting people who bought mobile phones, key chains with mini cameras and watches, accusing them of the purchase, use and sale of special equipment for the unwarranted collection of information.



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
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Like Father, Like Son: the Propaganda and the Media

Based on a specific mindset, dependence, financial mechanisms, tactics and traditions, the Ukrainian press is closer to its genetic predecessors – Soviet party agitation and propaganda – rather than its modern counterparts in the world

Authors:
Serhiy Lytvynenko,
Ilko Maydachevsky



At year-end 2012, Kyiv saw numerous billboards advertising a mysterious newspaper that nobody could find. It continues to be published in a strange shadowy regime. This was symbolic: non-existent media is promoted on a massive scale while that which exists is totally ignored, as if it does not exist. A double phantom as the perfect image of the state of the Ukrainian press.

There is no mystery behind the phantom newspaper: a media holding is currently being established. It will soon own a daily tabloid with a Sunday supplement, a business daily, a website, a TV channel, and probably something else, all of them in Russian. Sources inside the potentially powerful entity claim that the funding is linked to First Vice Premier, Serhiy Arbusov. This is hardly surprising: as the future (sooner or later – the first option seeming more likely) premier and promoter of the Family's interests ascends to power, he thinks that he needs a mouthpiece of his own. The question is what it will be: the symbolic trappings of power and arrogance; a zoo or a slave theatre, or a potential tool of media influence? No matter what, it will definitely not be a business as a source of income, let alone something that serves either society or the press, as has been the case for hundreds of years west of the homeland of the Soviet *Truth* newspaper.

PHYSICIAN, HEAL THYSELF

"Why is the career of a journalist so short in Ukraine?" is the question – and observation – recently discussed on the net. Today, there are very few star journalists around who were the faces of the press and television 10-15 years ago. The rest switched to politics or business, or became discouraged and turned inward, as if this is some kind of hazardous industry. This is not the case in other countries: It takes Western journalists years to gain a name, reputation and circle of loyal consumers and fans which they don't lose, unless it's to a scandal. Being a reporter, columnist or political TV show host are all long-term careers. The online discussion led to a somewhat accurate explanation. The more professional a journalist is in Ukraine, the more internal pressure he/she faces as the practical effect of his/her publications are close to zero. They do not stop abuse and corruption, criminals are not punished, problems are not solved, and society does not become aware of them. Instead, it often accuses journalists of being paid by someone to say what the latter wants. Yet, deep inside, even the most cynical journalists still need some firm principles they can believe in to stay in good professional shape. Once these principles are threatened, they are followed by burnout.

In addition to all the flaws that Ukrainian society has failed to overcome in the two decades of independence, it is also to blame for the inefficiency of the press as a platform for the discussion of urgent issues. It has little trust and

social capital, and is stuck in obsolete mythology – be it patriotic or Soviet. The government does not provide efficient communication and feedback because it is busy with completely different tasks: servicing those in power. Meanwhile, the media are equally unprepared to fulfill their actual functions, among other things, because of their burdensome legacy.

The work of Ukrainian media is not based on either business competition, news or ideas. This comes partly from Ukraine's economy, in which monopolists have total control over the market and wipe out what is supposed to be a competitive environment. For this, they often use external resources coming from the media owners' other businesses in the best-case scenario, or else from abroad, and spread the necessary materials that play into the hands of those who support them. Thus, they turn into propaganda tools.

THE CARNAVAL GOES ON...

This vicious circle will remain unbroken as long as the press is treated as a promoter of ideas or opinions that are convenient for the government or media owners. Most Ukrainian journalists today qualify professionally as the descendants of those working on Soviet newspapers, magazines, radio and TV. They were called "the party soldiers".

The media should be equally critical to anyone who deserves criticism



Indeed, all press in the USSR, without exception, reported to the "agitation and propaganda department" of a relevant party authority and fulfilled its instructions. The entire collective experience of the party press is a relentless mockery of sound reason, dignity and truth. A comparison of academic programs at journalism faculties in universities today with those from 25 years ago shows how mentally similar they are. The same thing applies to those who call the tune: the smart suits of Ukraine's current elites still often hide the uniforms of one-time party and Komsomol directors. They see the mass media as a tool of influence and nothing more.

Propaganda, or its softer version, PR, is the key word to define the objectives of the TV channels, radio stations, newspapers and online resources controlled by oligarchs, the government and to a lesser extent, the opposition. Some may pretend to sabotage instructions, continue with creative endeavours, simulate the style and approaches of the real mass media, demonstrate a balance of opinions, and sometimes even fool the owners as they publish hidden advertisements, yet they are ultimately forced to fulfill the strategic tasks they are paid for. The few independent media in Ukraine are a minority and do not est-

ablish the rules.

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The other side of the barricades, i.e. consumers, are largely inert and skeptical. The level of Ukrainians' trust in the press is plummeting, as proved by sociological surveys. Part of the audience just accepts the tabloids without any analysis. Those who process information critically, always doubt the media, wondering who needs and orders the material they contain. This is true for everyone, from those in power to the opposition, intellectuals, representatives of liberal professions and students. Any forum discussing new publications confirms this. Equipped with their pragmatic approach to the "freedom of speech", politicians, media owners and journalists have entrenched the Soviet understanding of what mass media should do in society. Many Ukrainians also see the Fourth Estate as a pure form of propaganda or tabloids.

We have experienced this many times. *Ukrayinsky Tyzhden/The Ukrainian Week* has always tried to be the Fourth Estate and called things by their names. We published critical materials on current developments and figures, covering Yushchenko and Tymoshenko when they were in power; representatives of the Yanukovych regime, current opposition leaders, oligarchs, and civil activists aspiring to be opinion leaders. Those criticized and their supporters have yet to look at the essence of the criticism, preferring to accuse the publication of malicious attacks against those it does not like.

Quite a few pocket media on the local underdeveloped market have made efforts and used resources for the creation of idols, who have played or will play a destructive role in Ukrainian politics. Some of the best-known media-promoted idols include the "most discreet politician", Oleksandr Moroz; the "European-oriented entrepreneur" Petro Poroshenko; "Ukrainian patriot and great reformer" Viktor Yushchenko, to name but a few. *Ukrayinsky Tyzhden/The Ukrainian Week* has tried more than once to dispel these myths to prevent Ukrainian society from making yet another mistake by relying on such people. Before the 2010 presidential election, one of our issues had a cartoon of Yushchenko on the cover with a slogan that said "The Killer of Faith". At that time, some of his supporters, including many of our

readers, accused us of cooperation with the Party of Regions; others speculated about our links to Tymoshenko. Some called on our readership not to purchase the publication calling it anti-Ukrainian. History soon put everything into perspective.

It appears that history is repeating itself. Just like those in power, opposition elites do not understand what the real press is supposed to do. They only seem to be interested in the media as a platform for paid advertising or free promotion in independent publications. During and after the parliamentary election, we criticized the current regime, also pointed out the mistakes of opposition leaders, including Arseniy Yatseniuk, Vitali Klitschko, Oleksandr Turchynov, Andriy Kozhemiakin and others, hoping that constructive criticism will push them to make adequate conclusions and decisions that will benefit the Ukrainian majority. Instead, they claimed that an article criticizing Yatseniuk was ordered by Klitschko, one criticizing Klitschko – by Yatseniuk, and on Tiahnybok – by either one or the other. When asked for an interview once (*Ukrayinsky Tyzhden/The Ukrainian Week* has been trying to arrange this for some time now, without success), Yatseniuk refused point blank because "you (*Ukrayinsky Tyzhden/The Ukrainian Week* – Ed.) are working for the Party of Regions". Apparently, in the eyes of Yatseniuk, whoever dares to point out his shortcomings as a Batkivshchyna leader is almost certainly paid by the government. This view is also held by most other opposition politicians. "You don't inspire us (the opposition – Ed.)," Batkivshchyna's MP Lesia Orobets told our reporter during PACE's January session in Strasbourg. Would we look more constructive in their eyes and invigorate the opposition to heroic acts if we wrote of "Yatseniuk as the father of Fatherland-Batkivshchyna" in every issue? Or forgot to mention that Orobets, along with her



party colleague, Serhiy Sobolev, did not vote in favour of acknowledging Azerbaijani activists as political prisoners at the latest PACE session, even though a positive decision on it would have boosted Tymoshenko's and Lutsenko's chances of getting political prisoner status at the next PACE session in April.

The task of the mass media as the Fourth Estate is to push politicians and officials to solving social problems and focus on issues that are vital to the state. It is then up to legislators, the executive branch and NGOs to take the necessary decisions. The problem, however, is that a large part of civil society views the function of the media in the traditional Soviet way. For instance, NGOs interpreted *Ukrayinsky Tyzhden/The Ukrainian Week's* article on the decline of NGOs in Ukraine (see Issue 6(29) of April, 2012) as a paid one, although who could have ordered it? Who needs to ruin their reputation, given that none of them can really affect crucial decision-making, or prevent decisions that damage the nation's interests? Ultimately, none of the NGOs we mentioned acknowledged that today's NGOs have failed to grow into a fully-fledged basis for civil society – a critical factor that launched the renewal of post-communist countries in the early 1990s – those that are now EU member-states. Instead, the Institute of World Policy, the International Centre for Policy Studies and a number of other NGOs offered the number of events they organized as a counterargument to the criticism. However, what matters is the quality, not the quantity, while hardly any of the discussions, investigations or initiatives by Ukrainian NGOs have nudged the government or legislators to taking any specific decisions. The smoking ban in public places, lobbied by one NGO and eventually passed by parliament, is not really a good example: it ended with yet another corruption-spurring tax on cafes and restaurants, i.e. SMEs. While seeking the status of

influential players, NGOs have still not noticed the real challenges that are right in front of them and the nation: an economy monopolized by oligarchic groups; increasing Russian influence; the ousting of independent Ukrainian-language media from the market by big media holdings, among others; the domination of Russian-language media and books on the market, and so on.

If society does not see the mass media as a Fourth Estate, why would the government? As a result, there has been no adequate reaction to journalists' investigations of blatant scams for at least the last three years that would end in a prosecutor's inquiry or the firing of a civil servant, which is common practice in civilized countries. Society, be it a viewer or reader, doesn't even demand this, and where there is no demand, media owners do not feel obliged to invest in the costliest form of journalism; investigation, coverage by reporters or a proper analysis. Rewriting ready-made news from the Internet with pictures added here and there is a much cheaper option. Hence the conclusion: Ukrai-

nian journalism is inevitably degrading, pulling down the entire media market.

... BUT THE DOGS SHOULD CONTINUE TO BARK

"Journalism is the watchdog of democracy" says a well-known slogan. Indeed, the press is supposed to ring alarm bells, make a noise, spoil moods and raise inconvenient issues. Otherwise, it is only pre-

fessional the publication, the more unquestionable and exclusive the facts it uses. The more qualified the experts and deeper the analysis, the harder it is for society to turn a blind eye. Eventually, good journalism will be entrenched in collective consciousness.

The second priority is to believe that society needs objective information and well-grounded assessments, while weariness and burnout means capitulation - a wasted chance to change the country and the life of future generations - to all intents and purposes, treason. The media still play their healing role even in underdeveloped democracies. They tell smart, socially proactive and responsible people that there is still an undistorted system of coordinates, help them to develop their own perception of what is going on, and contribute to uniting the existing fragmented civil society. And sometimes they succeed: talking into the audience directly is often more encouraging than sales figures or viewing statistics online. The best compliment for a journalist is someone saying "You helped me to express what's on my mind." ■

THE TASK OF THE MASS MEDIA IS TO PUSH POLITICIANS AND OFFICIALS TO SOLVING ISSUES THAT ARE VITAL TO THE STATE

tending to be mass media. It has to keep barking, even if it risks sounding inadequate at times and has to pay for the risks.

So, what can a journalist, who is aware of this function, do when his efforts always prove insufficient or futile? The first priority is to raise his/her own professional standards and keep working on the knowledge and analysis of the issue he/she is covering. The more pro-



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Pills for the Greedy

Pretending to care for consumers, officials have pushed through a potentially corrupt scheme that will help them monopolize the pharmaceutical market

Author:
Bohdan Butkevych

Ukrainians have been gripped by panic in the last few weeks after news surfaced that pharmacies and hospitals could be facing a shortage of most drugs as a result of the introduction of a new procedure for licensing imported drugs, which was supposed to come into effect on March 1. This is because most vital drugs, including those used to treat cancer and tuberculosis, and even regular nose sprays, are imported. According to Premier Mykola Azarov, Ukraine imports 80% and produces only 20% of all the drugs it consumes. The government received numerous warnings about the possible panic the initiative could cause, including from the European Business Association (EBA), of which all leading foreign pharmaceutical companies are members. The Cabinet of Ministers has been reminded of a possible “uproar surrounding the potential disaster on the market”, and that “no foreign producer will be able to guarantee medicine supplies after March 1”. Doctors also sounded the alarm in the face of a deficit of medicine.

“We had a crazy flow of customers in the second half of February,” says Oleksandra, a pharmacist at a public pharmacy in one of Kyiv’s residential districts. “All pensioners, people on social subsidies, and simply old people buy their medicines here. They pan-

icked once they heard of the new licensing procedure, fearing that they would run out of drugs or that the price will skyrocket. It was insane: people waiting in huge lines every day, fighting for every type of pills.”

A TEMPORARY TRUCE?

Parliament passed Law No 5038-VI “On Licensing Individual Types of Activities”, including the import of pharmaceuticals, on July 4, 2012. It came into effect on August 2. However, two weeks prior to implementation on March 1, not a single importer knew how it would work, since a clear list of licensing requirements was only published after the Health Care Ministry issued relevant Directive No 143 on February 20, 2013.

The declared explanation as to why legislators wanted to pass the new law was out of concern for the people. “The main purpose is to have someone permanently responsible for the quality, efficiency and safety of drugs,” said Oleksiy Solovyov, Head of the State Pharmaceuticals Service of Ukraine. Thus, an importer must now be a resident of Ukraine, so that any conflicts regarding the quality of drugs can be solved within the country. This is supposed to improve consumer protection. One excuse for the new licensing procedure for imported pharmaceuticals is that all 27 EU member-states already have one and Ukraine needs a similar mechanism to keep fake or poor-quality drugs off its market. Moreover,



IN THE LINE FOR LIFE:
The new licensing procedure for imported drugs caused panic

UAH 21bn
worth of imported medicines was sold in Ukraine in 2012

The official fee for the license to import medicines is
UAH 1,147

8,000
out of
13,000
registered medicines in Ukraine are produced abroad

the new procedure aims to reduce the number of intermediaries between producers and final consumers, which should lower the cost of medicines, both domestic and imported. It appears to be an honourable motive, but the devil is in the details. The licensing requirements approved by the Health Care Ministry Directive contain numerous small provisions to make decisions on licensing entirely dependent on officials. Moreover, the State Pharmaceuticals Service is authorized to inspect the applicant’s compliance with procedural requirements within 10 days of the filing of an application. In addition, importers will need individual licenses for every medicine they want to resume selling in Ukraine.

A slew of new requirements was added on December 1, 2013, for example, the necessity of conducting lab research in Ukraine, having a direct contract with the relevant producer for the import of drugs, and so on. “These are innovations approved by the Cabinet of Ministers’ Resolution No. 112 dated February 13, 2013. It was made available to the public in an approved form, without prior public discussions,” says Krzysztof Siedlecki, CEO of Astellas Pharma Europe BV. “Apparently, this signals the further plans



PHOTO: PHL

of the government to introduce overlapping and other requirements that will once again create barriers in licensing importers at later stages.” “One provision in the procedure requires importers to have direct contact with producers,” says Borys Danevych, a Partner at the Danevych Law Firm. “However, some global producers have 50 production facilities, while their product is sold by just one company that owns the rights and registration certificate for the medicine. Importers don’t understand why they need extra approvals in Ukraine.” According to experts, the new rules will be impossible to comply with even for leading pharmaceutical companies. Moreover, representatives of several foreign producers have already announced that the changes will not affect average consumers. Apparently, the declarative goal of changes on the pharmaceutical market hides something other than concern for average Ukrainians.

LICENSE FOR A MONOPOLY

According to the State Pharmaceuticals Service, UAH 23bn worth of medicines was sold in Ukraine in 2012, of which UAH 21 was for imported drugs. So, the annual cash flow in this area is

over USD 10bn, making the market very attractive for government officials who have the leverage to control it. Therefore, the declared license fee of UAH 1,147 is just window dressing, while the real price, including kickbacks, is much higher. According to The Ukrainian Week’s sources, until recently, the introduction of one medicine onto the Ukrainian market cost nearly USD 50,000. From now on, given the new law, this amount will triple.

In fact, the new licensing procedure for imported drugs, coupled with an obsolete domestic pharmaceutical sector, which lags decades behind that in developed countries, could lead to the monopolization of the market by several players, assisted by the State Pharmaceuticals Service, giving its top management unrestricted power over the industry. *The Ukrainian Week* has learned from its sources at the Health Ministry that the procedure was lobbied by existing Ukrainian resident importers to prevent the import of drugs that bypass them and also to monopolize the market as much as possible.

“At one point, Mykhailo Chechetov (Party of Regions MP – Ed.) was personally responsible for the draft law in the Verkhovna Rada,” says Lesya Orobets. “Kosti-

ten statements about the positive impact of the licensing, how necessary it is and how it will not cause a shortage of drugs once in effect, etc. More tellingly, it was Premier Mykola Azarov who instructed him to “deal with delays in implementing the drug licensing procedure”. Translated from the language of bureaucracy, this means a green light for Hryshchenko’s version of the draft law over those of his influential “competitors”.

At one point, Raisa Bohatyriova opposed the law. Her son has interests in the pharmaceutical business and was involved in the recent public procurements scandal at the Health Ministry. Rumour has it that Bohatyriova desperately demanded for the law to be cancelled or postponed. The contentious issue was the license issuing body. Naturally, Bohatyriova wanted it to be the Health Ministry which she heads, while Hryshchenko demanded it to be the State Pharmaceuticals Service that reports directly to the premier. It appears that the latter was more persuasive.

“It is possible that lobbyists want to introduce a mechanism similar to that used on our car market through this law,” comments MP Lesya Orobets. “Whereby all components are imported into Ukraine and vehicles are assembled here, qualifying them as domestic production. Given Azarov’s stance, this is the idea for drugs, i.e. to import the raw materials and produce finished drugs domestically. This is supposed to make drugs less expensive. There is the added bonus of a good cover for the supposed development of the Ukrainian pharmaceutical industry.”

If implemented as planned, the process will likely take place at facilities controlled by a number of top officials who will end up with huge profits due to their monopoly position. No questions regarding the quality of the drugs will arise, since the above mentioned licensing procedure will only apply to imported drugs while the homeboys will have a green light. International companies can enter the market through traditional kickbacks. The only player whose interests the scheme ignores is the final consumer. ■

THE LICENSING REQUIREMENTS CONTAIN NUMEROUS SMALL PROVISIONS TO MAKE DECISIONS ON LICENSING ENTIRELY DEPENDENT ON OFFICIALS

A TRICKY MOVE FROM THE PREMIER:

Mykola Azarov said that the Cabinet of Ministers was going to introduce VAT for imported medicines at the meeting with distributors. This is the government’s way to facilitate domestic production of medicines

antyn Hryshchenko also played an important role. The Health Ministry’s stance, as represented by Raisa Bohatyriova, also says a lot. She initially categorically opposed the draft law, but is now fine with it. It appears that these people failed to agree on how to divide this new, very lucrative scam among themselves.”

Indeed, judging by the number of public statements made by Vice Premier Kostiantyn Hryshchenko, who in his position supposedly has nothing to do with the pharmaceutical industry, it is clear that he is related to it after all. In February alone, Hryshchenko made

Akhmetov, we are waiting for you!



Coal Wars

The shortsighted policy of the Donbas oligarchs has pushed miners to strike for their rights. Now the crucial questions are: who will lead the battle and whose interests will it promote?

Author:
Bohdan
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As miners stormed into a regional office of Rinat Akhmetov's DTEK company in Luhansk Oblast, they brought back the phantom of miners' strikes from the turbulent early 1990s. *The Ukrainian Week* went to the industrial Donbas to find out just how intense the current mood of discontent really is

PROTESTING JOB CUTS

On January 10, 2013, twenty members of the Sverdlovsk Independent Trade Union occupied the office of Kostiantyn Tiumikov,

director of the Red Partisan mine in Chervonopartyzansk, a town in Luhansk Oblast. They promised to deliver their demands to the mine's owner Rinat Akhmetov and Luhansk Oblast Governor Volodymyr Prystiuk and leave the office after they were fulfilled. One of their requests was the cancellation of a December 21, 2012 order by DTEK's CEO that would launch massive layoffs at Sverdlovantratsyt, a government-owned holding of five mines, including the Red Partisan. It has been a year since the new admin-

istration began planning large-scale workforce optimization. As a result of these changes, all miners are being forced to sign resignation letters with no date specified. The striking miners view their takeover of the director's office as a last resort in their struggle against the lawlessness of big capital holders.

The mine's owners reacted in a perfectly predictable manner: they described the incident as vandalism and called the police along with DTEK's security squads. On the night of January

10, 2013, the trade union members led by Kostiantyn Ilchenko were forced out of the office. While the owner claims that the strikers left after consenting to continue the dialogue in a lawful way, the strikers say they were forcibly removed by the police.

Local officials and trade union bosses immediately dismissed the protesters, calling them a handful of misfits that do not represent the majority of miners. Soviet agitprop-style comments from other miners followed. "This is a bandit trick that affected the whole staff of the mine," said Ivan Anokhin, a brigade supervisor at Red Partisan's Section 2. "Our brigade condemns them. We demand that such people do not work with us." Meanwhile, the web started buzzing with articles about strike leader Kostiantyn Ilchenko as a former gang criminal and a crook, or an agent of the Presidential Administration created to prevent the emergence of a disloyal trade union.

MINORITY DISSENT

Most of the region's mines are located in Sverdlov County in the far south of Luhansk Oblast. It is also a place where strong, cold winds blow all year round and tough, potentially explosive people live. After years of hazardous work, they take radical steps more readily than others.

The headquarters of Sverdlovsk Independent Trade Union is inconspicuously nestled in the town's suburbs. After a drive on hideous roads, we arrive just in time to visit the trade union committee meeting. Twenty people in a small room debate the current situation and ways to further the struggle for their rights. Kostiantyn Ilchenko does most of the speaking, while the rest nod in response to his encouraging slogans: "After the January 10 strike, the number of trade union members in Chervonopartyzansk has gone from 5 to 16. People are joining us. I can't say we have a crowd of candidates but there are some positive developments. Here is a wireman, and an entrepreneur – they are here to join our trade union. People are standing up, albeit slowly."

"We now have branches at Tsentrosoyuz (a mine in Komso-molsk, Luhansk Oblast – Ed.),



TRADE UNION GODFATHER: Kostiantyn Ilchenko, the head of the Sverdlovsk Independent Trade Union, is a controversial figure

and Odeska mine owned by Yuriy Boyko," says another trade union activist, head of the local biker club. "We've shaken off the slumber and are proud of it. People are coming to us voluntarily, like guerillas, because what mine owners and their bootlickers do is unspeakable." Protesters tell us about one mine where the supervisor throws a cigarette butt on the ground every time he inspects the place and makes the first miner he runs into pick it up and throw it into the trash bin. Whoever disobeys is fired immediately. This is all done to strip the employees of any glimmer of pride or will to struggle for their rights. Plants and mines routinely employ draconian measures to improve discipline. Bosses exploit a variety of excuses—some more legitimate than others—to reduce the workforce to a legal minimum.

This sounds bad enough to stir dissent, yet most people remain inert. I ask the activists why the majority of miners endure this quietly and stay away from any movements. "They are afraid and ignorant," is the answer, surprising as it may seem given the turbulent history of violent miners' strikes here in the 1990s. In 1997, for instance, a miner set

tired. After the soviet system collapsed, virtually everyone who could work found themselves cast away. Despair gave them strength. At that point, they were all employed at government-owned mines that ceased to operate and the payment of their wages was suspended. So they just came to get what they had earned. When private owners acquired the mines, people finally had jobs and at least a small income."

In fact, employees are an element of the ground capitalists stand on as they appreciate the opportunity to have a job. Moreover, the miners are willing to rally in support of their owners only to prevent delayed payment of whatever wages they receive. One example was a surge of popular support at Azot, a plant in Severodonetsk, in 2005 (when Yulia Tymoshenko as Premier attempted to nationalize the plant but the staff did not let government officials into the premises – Ed.).

The oligarchs, however, tilt the balance in their own favor with ongoing layoffs, increased working hours, discrimination and more. The rule here is to forget social rights and earn a living, or leave and 20 more people are waiting to fill the vacant position. In towns where there is no alternative employer apart from a mine or a plant, people have no choice. Yet, continued pressure will eventually crush even this illusion of stability. This may trigger the return of the explosive 1990s.

As we drive to Red Partisan with two activists, the mine whose strike had become an overnight sensation, we survey the shabby grey town of Chervonopartyzansk and its locals huddled around bus stops. When we finally reach the mine, an activist named Serhiy suggests that we ask every passer-by what he or she thinks of the trade union and why they are not joining it. A sturdy man of 55 is the first miner we run into. Embarrassed, he says that he has just a few years until retirement and does not want to stick out. "You're great, guys," the miner adds suddenly. "I support you, but my wage..." A few more miners we talk to after him offer the same answer. ■

THE RULE HERE IS TO FORGET SOCIAL RIGHTS AND EARN A LIVING, OR ELSE LOSE YOUR JOB

himself on fire in front of the Luhansk Oblast State Administration. A clash with Berkut, the special-purpose police squad, followed. Then the miners camped at the front entrance of the Administration building besieging the local government. They even had a pig called Hapochka after the then Deputy Head of the Oblast Administration. Finally, concerned with the looming escalation of violence, the central government put pressure on the local government and it gave in and paid the outstanding wages.

"The 1990s miners' movement abated because the local social structure has changed dramatically since then," says social scientist Andriy Strutynsky. "That rebellious generation is now re-



PHOTO: OLEKSANDR CHEKMENOV

“Miners have pretty decent wages now,” says Serhiy Lozovyi, an activist of the Independent Trade Union and a Red Partisan employee. “On some shifts, one can earn up to UAH 18-20,000 per month. If you talk too much, though, you’ll end up in a bad brigade, working hard for UAH 4,000; they’ll intimidate your family. So people are afraid to do anything because they have an illusion of stability. They all support us in words, though.”

Our last question is whether the activists trust their leader and the main target of the trade union’s opponents, Kostiantyn Ilchenko. “Of course, we do,” they reply. “He’s a feisty fellow. They pour so much dirt on him and he still goes on with his cause. He’s recently drawn a former Sverdlovsk Town Council deputy into our trade union even though they’d been enemies earlier.”

WHO WILL BENEFIT FROM THE PROTEST MOOD?

A spirit of protest is in the Donbas air, yet it is very likely to become a bargaining chip in the hands of oligarchs. “Social frustration with the policy of big enterprise owners which they manipulate in mutual score-settling and rivalry is a typical portrait of the region. Ukrainians, especially those in the Donbas, are very inert in terms of a bottom-up struggle for their rights. Conventional forms of self-organization, such as trade unions, are

UNHAPPY MINE:
The Red Partisan office recently occupied by protesting miners

completely under the control of either private owners or the state. The concept of self-organization is greatly discredited. Therefore, oligarchs are taking over all kinds of bottom-up initiatives or orchestrate them to suit their interests,” Luhansk-based political analyst Kostiantyn Skorkin claims. An ex-official of the Luhansk Oblast State Administration who used to monitor social protests and movements states confidently that the current escalation of miners’ dissent, including the Sverdlovsk Independent Trade Union, is linked to the war of several oligarchs over control of the coal mining industry. “Note that the miners do stand for their rights, no doubt about that. They are not contract fighters, but real

GENUINE BOTTOM-UP PROTESTS ARE EXPLOITED IN THE STRUGGLE BETWEEN OLD AND NEW OLIGARCH GROUPS

miners who work and live here,” says Oleksiy. “Yet, Ilchenko is a controversial figure. He used to lobby big businesses in the past and was linked to the so-called Yanakiyevo group. Clearly, this is all being done at the level of personal contacts, so it is next to impossible to catch anyone red-handed or prove anything. In the

past, Sverdlovskanratsyt and Rovenkyanratsyt had both been government-owned enterprises feeding a pile of private subcontractors owned by Ivan Avramov, Yuriy Ivaniushchenko’s man. Now the mines are part of the DTEK corporation owned by Akhmetov. The escalation of the protest movements at his mines plays into the hands of his competitors. Meanwhile, the protesters have legitimate cause for dissent as lay-offs continue and intensify.”

Under another, more likely scenario suggested by an ex-official, MAKO, a corporation linked to Yanukovich’s son, has suddenly taken an interest in coal. Resistance from Akhmetov’s companies followed shortly after as the oligarch had already set up a full production cycle within his DTEK corporation. The conflict between the Family and Akhmetov is escalating – so far, in business, so Ilchenko and his trade union have popped up at just the right moment with their genuine bottom-up protests, exploited in the struggle between old and new oligarch groups. Meanwhile, the movement’s working-class members struggle with all their hearts for the right initiatives.

“Civic engagement in the Donbas is inseparable from the wealth grabbing that is taking place in the state once again as the new ‘Family’ players have entered the market,” says Kostiantyn Skorkin. “A distilled, truly popular protest is impossible; a brief insurrection is more likely. Any organized movement grows from organizations with leaders or sponsors, all with their own interests.”

So far, the miners’ movement is down to small groups of activists that are often controlled by puppet leaders. However, this may soon change. If thousands of miners join the protest campaign – and they may overnight – there will be no room for external control. Should this happen, the government is likely to use an old tactic to subdue the dissent: mass frustration will be channeled against a specific owner or official disloyal to those in power. Behind-the-scene games unfolding far beyond the miners’ towns may soon reveal the inconvenient scapegoat. ■



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Digging for Billions

Who runs the illegal coal business in the Donbas

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THE ILLEGAL MINES OF THE 1990s: Back then, miners would work in them just to feed their families. Quite often, entire families, including women and children, worked in kopanky

An old Zhyguli is taking me and my French colleagues from Donetsk to Zuiivka, a village near Khartsyzk. The radio is playing *Voyage Voyage*, a French pop song from the 80s. Rubbish dumps rise above the horizon. Coal-laden trucks pass by. “You want to see *kopanky*? (small illegal coalmines – Ed.). Just look around. They’re everywhere. Fifty emerged in our Zuiivka in just one year,” one-time miner Mykola points at yet another mini-mine. The *kopanka* looks like a small hole in the ground with a wooden frame reinforcing the entrance. “Many state-owned mines have closed down so the people who live in mining villages had to earn a living somehow. In the past, people went under the ground to survive. They used some of the coal to heat their homes, and sold the rest. It’s a well-organized business now.” We slow down several times to let trucks pass. “You must be wondering how this works, with the business being illegal and trucks go-

ing back and forth in broad daylight,” Mykola asks ironically. “Just a year ago, they transported coal at night. They don’t have to hide anymore.”

A bus overtakes us near Khartsyzk. It is taking workers to the mines. “Coal is only 10 metres under the ground even in the Donetsk suburbs, but it is of little use. The system is as follows: one supervisor runs five-six mines. He reports to a boss who controls several dozen, and so on up to the top,” says Volodia, another Zuiivka-born miner who worked in the mines for 30 years.

We drive by a huge quarry, one of the biggest open mines in the region. Our guides insist that we do not get out of the car with our camera. Trucks are being filled with coal on the other side of the quarry. One truck holds an average of 40t. The drivers we talk to say that they make 20 round-trips a day. One ton of coal from the *kopanky* costs around UAH 500 (USD 60), so the value of the coal transported in one truck is UAH 400,000 or nearly USD 50,000 per day. Overall, the 7m t of coal

mined in *kopanky* yearly accounts for 10% of total annual coal output in Ukraine.

Kopanky miners use primitive tools: spades and cables. The open quarry has modern equipment. According to mining machinery websites, the price of the cheapest excavator ranges from UAH 150,000 - 300,000, or USD 18,000 - 38,000. The rent of a good quality excavator is UAH 2,000 or about USD 250 per day. This cost is only affordable in industrial mining.

FEAR AND DANGER IN THE DONBAS

In the mid-90s, the local miners went down into *kopanky* only to feed their families. Today, the work is considered profitable by local standards, bringing in up to UAH 7,000 a month. The wage depends on the profit made by the bosses, but it is still higher than the average UAH 4,250 or slightly over USD 500 earned by miners. According to village residents, 70 of more than 3,000 locals work at *kopanky*. They refuse point blank to talk to the



press, not wishing to risk losing their jobs.

The higher than average income of kopanky miners is justified by the conditions they work in. Mining is considered to be one of the most hazardous jobs in Ukraine. According to the Job Safety and Emergencies Department of the Coal Industry Ministry, 4,000 people were injured and 155 killed in Ukrainian mines in 2011.

There are no available statistics for accidents in kopanky. Only the ones with several fatalities at the same time get noticed, such as the accident near Tulpan village in November. The cable of a cart bringing up four miners from a closed section of the mine broke, killing three. Just one survived.

"There are problems with safety measures at both private and state mines, but they are catastrophic at kopanky. The tunnels are too narrow, they are too close to the surface, and the earth can collapse at any time," says a rescuer, off-record. "Many professional miners work in kopanky. They know the risks but ignore the discipline. Colleagues won't allow them to light a cigarette in an operating mine because it can cause an explosion. In kopanky, everyone smokes."

Over the past year, Donetsk rescuers have started to get calls from kopanky on a regular basis. They do not complain: the main thing is to save lives. However, this could signal that someone is

backing the illegal mining. "Nobody wants trouble. If worse comes to worst, the victims have to say that their injuries have nothing to do with the work in kopanky. They could say that they were in a car accident," the rescuer explains.

Estonian filmmaker Marianna Kaat, the director of the *Auk Nr.8* documentary, showed how miners, including children and women, risk their lives in illegal mines. She filmed the life of a family of orphans in Snizhne, a town in the Donetsk Oblast, over a period of two years. Yuriy, 14, worked in a kopanka to support his two sisters. Presented in spring 2012, *Auk Nr.8* became popular in Europe and spread through

the truth" even though very few have access to the Internet there. After the film was shown, some kopanky were shut down in Snizhne, and Yura, the 14-year old miner who starred in it, was attacked by persons unknown, the locals add under their breath. For people in Zuivka, his experience is the key argument for not allowing journalists to take pictures and mention names. Quite a few feel threatened by coal speculators. Olha inherited a land plot from her mother who had worked in a kolkhoz. The kopanka next to her plot had been there for a while but extraction has now expanded to Olha's land. She was recommended to agree to the long-term lease of her land as soon as possible. "It was an offer that is impossible to refuse. They promised to pay me if I'm lucky. I'll agree, but only for the sake of my family's safety," she explains, her voice trembling.

Counter to the widespread opinion, that local residents don't mind having the kopanky in the neighbourhood, most do in fact. The income from coal comes virtually right from under their feet, yet the local budget gets zero funding. The mining ruins the landscape, making the land impossible to farm. However, farming is critical in villages where there are no jobs at all.

A WIN-WIN DEAL

"A few kopanky have been shut down, but the overall number »

IT LOOKS LIKE THE DAYS OF FAMILY MINES ARE ALMOST OVER IN THE DONBAS. THEY ARE TO BE REPLACED BY AN ERA OF KOPANKY CONTROLLED BY JUST ONE FAMILY

Ukraine on the Internet. Interfilm, the Ukrainian co-producer, as the copyright holder, did not allow it to be premiered in Ukraine. According to human rights advocates, this was because it was afraid of the government, which did not want to ruin Ukraine's reputation before Euro 2012. Now, virtually every local recommends the film "because it shows



has grown over the past four years,” says Oleksandr Ponomarenko who lives in Zuiivka. “The authorities, both local and regional, are involved. The police once invited TV companies to shoot the “shutdown operation” that involved several arrests. Two days later, the mining was back on track.” It was because of the ongoing struggle with the coal mafia that his father Mykola Ponomarenko, the then Zuiivka Mayor, died in prison. “He managed to close all the kopanky and the quarry, even though illegal mine owners offered him bribes and insisted that in anycase, everything was under the control of the local police,” Oleksandr adds. “In April 2011, someone finally snuck a bribe into his car. He

was arrested and allegedly died of a heart attack five months before the verdict.”

“State-owned mines that don’t meet their extraction quota buy cheap kopanky coal to make up the difference,” explains Mykhailo Volynets, Head of the Indepen-

ents either don’t know this or prefer not to know. Just add another UAH 500 of government subsidies, and the “unprofitable” mine will make up to UAH 1,000 on every ton of coal.”

In 2012, the government paid out UAH 9.9bn in subsidies to coal mines. The amount forecasted for 2013 is UAH 7.8bn.

“All that is needed to stop large-scale mining in kopanky is to make the directors of state-owned mining companies’ report where the coal comes from. The lack of transparency is the root of all evil,” comments Vitaliy Syzov, a journalist at Novosti Donbasa (The Donbas News), one of the few independent publications in the region, who is investigating this issue.

SOMEONE WHO EXTRACTS COAL TO SELL IT NEEDS “PROTECTION”

dent Trade Union of Miners of Ukraine. “In addition to subsidies from the government, owners resell the coal to thermal power stations. Kopanka coal costs nearly UAH 500 per ton, which is half that of state-owned mine coal. Cli-



OPINION

How Europe Got to Know About Kopanky

Author:
Denys Kazansky,
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I recently took a group of French TV reporters to Snizhne. They have reported from Ukraine many times before, but admit that nowhere is as dreadful as the Donbas. They compared the mining towns to Prypiat, the town contaminated by the Chornobyl disaster. While the latter stands uninhabited, the mining towns are home to hundreds of people, where every day of their lives is a misery. Snizhne is the Gordian knot of corruption that seems impossible to disentangle – or cut. The mayor of the Severny village, that is administratively part of Snizhne, Liubov Rozhko, was caught red-handed taking a bribe and could have ended up behind

bars if it hadn’t been for the surprisingly loyalty of the court, giving her a suspended sentence – rumour has it – for a bribe. Unauthorized coal mining in Snizhne involves everyone, even those campaigning against it. It emerged that the people who invited us to the town to report on the struggle against kopanky, work in them themselves. There is no other work in the town. Obviously, the small mines need to be legalized somehow, but this does not seem to suit those who earn huge profits in the business. Snizhne is a state within a state. Local mine businessmen do not care much about Kyiv, and the latter does not insist on it. During the latest Dialogue with the Country on TV, President Yanukovich essentially gave the green light to looting national minerals on air. “Go on digging little by little, what can

we do with you?” he said when asked about kopanky.

And they do. Only a few speak out against unrestricted stealing – mostly those uninvolved in coal mining or those facing pressure from kopanky owners wishing to mine under their land.

Coal can be found almost everywhere in Snizhne, so mining it without ruining someone’s garden is next to impossible. As they come to town, the French reporters witness the locals’ struggle against entrepreneur Rafael Tamazian, who bought a plot for a mine several metres away from buildings where people live. He is going to open a mine there, getting licenses and collecting signatures. According to his opponents, bribes are given for licenses; signatures are faked, and the new kopanka will ruin their

FAMILY BUSINESS

There are many rumours about who really controls the illegal business. When we tried to ask brigade supervisors who they work for, they derisively mentioned Viktor Yanukovich's older son Oleksandr and close ally Yuriy Ivaniushchenko. Over the past six months, two state-owned electricity providers, Donbasenergo and Tsentrenergo, have bought UAH 12bn-worth of coal from companies close to Oleksandr Yanukovich's circle. According to Mykola Volynok, Head of the Independent Trade Union of Donbas Miners, this coal comes from kopanky.

Several journalist investigations point out entities linked to Oleksandr Yanukovich that have al-

**KOPANKY
IN THE 2010s:**
Coal extraction
from "holes"
has become
routine illegal
business on an
industrial scale

ready taken dominant positions in the coal mining sector. Serhiy Kuziara, advisor to an ex-Energy and Coal Industry Minister, once admitted that he always "discussed the prospects of coal mining with the managers of the Donbas Settlement and Financial Centre (DRFTs) and MAKO", both companies controlled by the President's son. Last June, the Chairman of the State Property Fund, Oleksandr Riabchenko, announced that the government intends to privatize the mines – sell them for UAH 1 each with a list of requirements for investors attached. The Family's interest in this has already been noted. The current government keeps talking of plans to increase coal mining. This should reduce

Ukraine's dependence on Russian gas. In fact, this energy strategy boosts illegal coal mining in the Donbas. It has always had kopanky; their number multiplied in hard times, such as after WWII or in the mid-90s. Many of these were called family mines because they employed entire families; men, women and children who were small enough to get around the narrow tunnels. Neglected mining villages still have kopanky in backyards – for family needs. However, someone who extracts coal to sell it needs "protection". Now, it looks like the days of family mines are almost over in the Donbas. They are to be replaced by an era of kopanky controlled by just one Family. ■



homes. So far, there is only a guard's hut built hastily of wooden boards, and a hole with steam coming out of it. The guard is a woman who stays in the hut with no windows or light, and a pair of dogs. It makes me think of a Kusturica film. As I watch this, I realize that the European reporters cannot fully grasp the reality of mining towns. I realize how barbaric the daily life of 21st century Ukrainian mining towns appears, and how far it is from the standards of the civilized world.

A little farther into the woods, the locals show us another kopanka. This one is bigger. It's right next to the town cemetery. The coal is mined from underneath buried coffins. The locals fear that the buried will soon start falling into the pit and lament that the miners have no heart, digging under the graves of other miners, possibly their relatives. The names of the mine owners are no secret: one is Pidhornyi, former section head at the Severnaya mine, now closed; the other is

someone with the surname Kit from Makiyivka. This kopanka is now almost a mine. Bunkers to store coal and elevators are built on the ground. Under the storage roof, stands a truck that is noisily filled with the black gold. The mine employs both men and women, around 10 people per shift. This is a lot for a kopanka in the woods. The miners have occupied an abandoned hut nearby, turning it into their office, bathroom and a parking lot.

The shift is in full swing as we storm into the kopanka with TV cameras and a microphone, trying to talk to the workers in dirty uniforms and hard hats. They run away and start calling for their boss. Some recommend that we either get out, or be hurt. The reporters realize that nobody will talk to them and quickly pack their cameras back into the car.


The locals warn us that the woman from the hut has already called for help and that we should leave immediately, not stopping any-

where, because Rafik's people are already after us. One of the local activists gives us her homemade jam. As we pack everything into the car, I think that it's like a war. People meet us, reporters, like liberators or guerrillas, and see us off giving us food as if we were going to the front-line.

As we drove back, the future mine's director chased us in his car but stopped once we left the town. The foreign reporters did not stop to talk to him, having seen his aggressive maneuvers. The photo of his car was later posted on the Internet and the town police called him in for an interrogation to prevent an international scandal. He explained that he just wanted to show us his license to mine coal. The French TV channel aired the report several days after our adventures. It associated the kopanky to the family of President Yanukovich, ruining his reputation even more and showing the French audience how top Ukrainian officials earn their wealth.

Putin's Purges

Interpreting a sudden crackdown on extravagant officials



FOR senior members of the United Russia party it was like a scene from Mikhail Bulgakov's *The Master and Margarita*. They would have special affinity with Nikanor Ivanovich Bosoi, chairman of the tenants' association tricked by Woland (Satan in disguise). The roubles he gets from Woland's sidekick and stuffs into a ventilation shaft turn into dollars. Bosoi is arrested and put in a psychiatric ward, where he dreams of a bass voice booming from the sky: "Hand over your foreign currency!"

This time the voice asking for a handover of foreign bank accounts was President Vladimir Putin's. On February 12th he submitted a bill to the Duma banning officials and lawmakers from having foreign bank accounts or investing in foreign government debt. The draft also banned the ownership of property abroad, though this was subsequently changed to merely demanding its declaration.

A day later Vladimir Pekhtin, a founder of United Russia and head of the Duma's ethics committee, was revealed as the owner of an undeclared \$1.3m luxury apartment in Miami Beach. The details were

posted on the internet by Alexei Navalny, an opposition activist and blogger. Mr. Pekhtin brushed off these "unmerited accusations". "I practically have no property abroad," he insisted. Yet on February 20th, doubtless after hearing Mr Putin's voice, he resigned from the Duma. Even though he had done nothing wrong, he said, the scandal tainted the party and its interests must come above his own. Another United Russia deputy, Anatoly Lomakin, with an estimated fortune of \$1.2 billion, resigned "for health reasons". More deputies are on their way out, say press reports. State television showed pictures of Miami Beach apartments and talked of purges and a return of moral values.

In place of public denunciations and 1930s show trials, the "purged" Mr Pekhtin was greeted by standing ovations from his comrades who called him an example of morality. No proceedings were started against him and he could yet end up with a cushy job. Nevertheless, the purges signal a shift in Russia's politics.

Gleb Pavlovsky, a former Kremlin consultant, explains that, in the past, the nomenklatura were

Vladimir Pekhtin, a founder of United Russia and head of the Duma's ethics committee, was revealed as the owner of an undeclared \$1.3m luxury apartment in Miami Beach on February 20th, doubtless after hearing Mr Putin's voice, he resigned from the Duma

shielded from opponents' criticism and left to enjoy the fruits of their loyalty at home and abroad without interference from the top. Mr Pekhtin's resignation shows that this no longer holds true, but without explaining what the new rules are. This makes the elite nervous, which may be no bad thing from Mr. Putin's viewpoint.

The purges are not a concession to the opposition. Using Mr Navalny's information to its advantage has not stopped the Kremlin from throwing new accusations at him. Nor do they stem from a sudden conversion to the principle of democratic accountability. Rather, say Kremlinologists, they reflect Mr Putin's need to gain more legitimacy among voters and tighten his grip over an elite that likes to keep its assets and children in the West.

Behind the purges lies an assumption that the West is plotting against him and could exploit the private interests of Russian officials. Mr. Putin seems to see America's Magnitsky act, which threatens sanctions against Russian officials involved in human-rights abuses, as an attempt to control them. Hence his wish to "ring-fence" the elite from Western influence and gain more leverage.

But Mr. Putin's options are limited. Access to Western goods, services and property is a pillar of his system. Removing it could turn more of the elite against him. Random (and so far soft) purges, a ban on foreign bank accounts and anti-American hysteria may be mere half-measures, but even they may be too extreme. Alexei Venediktov, editor of *Echo Moskvy*, a radio station, comments that "Mr. Putin has tied an axe over the head of the elite. But being a cautious politician, he considers a threat of repression more effective than repression itself."

Repression is used against protesters but also on junior officials. In the past year over 800 cases have been opened into local officials, councillors and mayors. The highest-profile casualty so far was Anatoly Serdyukov, an ex-defence minister implicated in a procurement scandal. He was fired and humiliated on state television, but not arrested or charged. Whether he is now brought before the judges will show just how far Mr. Putin's purges go. ■

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A Prisoner of Conscience?

Pavel Khodorkovsky speaks about how his father has become a symbol of political repression in Russia and why he poses a threat to Vladimir Putin

Pavel Khodorkovsky is the son of Mikhail Khodorkovsky – once Russia's richest man and owner of the world's fourth largest oil company and now an important political prisoner in Russia and personal enemy of President Vladimir Putin. Pavel, 27, has lived in New York since his father's arrest, remaining there with his wife and daughter after completing his studies. He upholds the causes promoted by the Open Russia Foundation aimed at developing civil society in Russia. Pavel has founded a company that implements energy-saving electricity meters that are connected to the Internet. He is sympathetic to the opposition and attends every event organized by Strategy 31 in New York. Despite calls urging him to return to Russia, he is staying abroad to avoid becoming another hostage in his father's case.

U.W.: Mikhail Khodorkovsky is being viewed as a moral authority in Russia today. When he was arrested back in 2003, the majority opinion was "He is an oligarch who has stolen a lot. It's the right thing to put him behind bars." Why has public opinion swayed so drastically since then?

I took part in the "NTV Men" programme, and a survey was taken at the end: 63% of the audience said Khodorkovsky should be

Interviewer:
Nataliya Gumenyuk,
Kyiv – New York



THE PRISON AND FREEDOM: Mikhail Khodorkovsky believes that developed civil society institutions can help Russians get rid of their pathological dependence on paternalist trust in a nice tsar

released immediately, 14% wanted to see him released if he pleaded guilty and 25% said his imprisonment was a fair punishment. This result is the direct opposite of what surveys showed 10 years ago.

It is, above all, a matter of time. A decade later, many people simply cannot remember who Khodorkovsky was before the arrest. They used to say: "Khodorkovsky's arrest was politically motivated but he is an oligarch, Russia's richest man." Khodorkovsky has moved into the category of a political prisoner and, moreover, a prisoner of consciousness recognized by Amnesty International. Public opinion shifted because of the absurdity of the charges presented during the second trial. The incriminating evidence in the first trial did not hold up. "Optimization of fiscal schemes" and "corporate taxation" confused many people. The stupidity of the second trial was obvious.

U.W.: What was this absurdity?

Khodorkovsky and Platon Lebedev were accused of having physically stolen 320 mn tonnes of oil. This is the entire volume of oil produced by Yukos and its subsidiaries over the time period referred to both in the first and second indictment. They were charged with having stolen the same oil on which, the court ruled, they had failed to pay sufficient taxes and thus had served a term in prison. How can

one fail to pay taxes on stolen goods? And the volume is unreal. Even a cursory examination of the case makes it clear to anyone that it was a frame-up.

U.W.: When and on what conditions can Mikhail Khodorkovsky be released?

My father has made two important decisions: not to appeal for parole in order to avoid wasting his own time and that of his attorneys and not to give false hope to his family. The administration of the prison colony where he is serving time will bring new charges against him for the smallest of trifles for the express purpose of making him ineligible for parole. The situation in Chita (where Khodorkovsky went on an open-ended hunger strike in May 2010. – **Ed.**) has proved that it is a matter of principle to keep Khodorkovsky from being released under any circumstances.

However, legislation on economic crimes has changed somewhat, and as a result the term was reduced from 13 to 11 years for my father and his partner Lebedev. So he expects to be released in late 2014. Of course, we demand his immediate release. But there is no reason to hope for this.

U.W.: In your opinion, what was your father imprisoned for?

For financing the opposition and because of a desire to take his company away from him. Someone convinced Putin that Khodorkovsky was dangerous in that he allegedly wanted to buy up the Duma and propel himself into the Prime Minister's seat. The imprisonment made it simpler to attack Yukos – a forced bankruptcy, sale and merger with Rosneft.

U.W.: How could a tough and pragmatic manager like Khodorkovsky have been so naïve?

He was certain he would win the trial if it was fair. He believed that Russia was beyond the point of no return and that laws were in effect. Now my father admits he was wrong and that he lacked wisdom in a desperate situation.

Regarding those who sided up with his opponents, many can be blamed. The trial was initiated by Igor Sechin (advisor to the president at the time and now presi-

dent of the government-owned Rosneft oil company. – Ed.) and Putin. The latter was also motivated by his personal dislike for my father that developed after a meeting in which the president personally asked him not to finance the opposition. But my father did not think that the head of state had the right to ask such things. It was about cutting off financing for the Communist Party. My father personally did not give money to Russia's Communist Party, but one of the Yukos managers did support the communists. So cutting off financing was not up to Khodorkovsky to decide. Putin took this explanation as disobedience, because in his structure subordinates cannot have their own political views.

U.W.: If your father is innocent and has been victimized by the system, how can you explain the fact that the Russian population supported the arrest and had a low opinion of Khodorkovsky?

It was just the first decade of a capitalist system. Post-Soviet people find it hard to believe that someone can earn a fortune purely because of his exceptional entrepreneurial gift. The idea promoted by the state that the oligarch was an enemy from which the population had to be protected resonated, in particular among those who were misfits in the system. It should be recognized that social security payments, welfare and many people's wages have recently been on the rise in Russia. So the thought that "someone is robbing Russia" has lost its poignancy.

U.W.: Doesn't it seem to you that people in Russia, and in Ukraine for that matter, have plenty of reasons to believe that oligarchs have indeed robbed their countries? Those who earned their first millions in the 1990s say they did not break any laws, but there were simply no laws in effect at the time. Was your father's business absolutely clean?

The biggest charge against Yukos was that it was purchased for next to nothing – the amount paid was far below the company's capitalization. You need to understand the risk my father and his partners were taking as they entered the oil business. In 1996, they bought Yu-

kos for US \$350mn at an auction. At the time, the company had debts amounting to US \$2bn, including US \$900mn in wage arrears. The state was bankrupt and could not offer any guarantees. Yukos could have been sold to foreigners, but Russia was reluctant to grant access to its natural resources to any foreigners. On their part, foreign companies were wary of taking risks in a politically unstable country. My father had the guts to do it and pulled the company out of debt. Considering that Yukos became the world's fourth richest oil company, its starting price was indeed small.

U.W.: Do you think that Putin is afraid of your father?

Of course he is. Otherwise he would not be keeping him behind bars. Putin has two equally big fear factors regarding Khodorkovsky. He believes that Khodorkovsky, if released, will become a unifying figure for the opposition. Even though my father is in prison, he spends most of his time maintaining dialogue with all the opposition leaders and tries to for-

THE YUKOS CASE IS STILL A PROBLEM FOR BOTH RUSSIA'S FOREIGN MINISTRY AND PUTIN PERSONALLY

mulate and describe an acceptable path of development for Russia so that it can cease to be a backward autocracy. Moreover, people involved in the case, such as Sechin and his team, who got their hands on Yukos are afraid that, if released, Khodorkovsky could affect the outcome of cases that involve other shareholders of the company and which are now in European courts. These are cases in the Energy Charter and the European Court of Human Rights. This also pertains to multimillion and multibillion suits against Rosneft and the Russian Federation in other institutions.

U.W.: 2013 marks 10 years since your father's arrest. The West continually speaks about his unfair verdict and the political motivation behind it, but this evidently has no effect. Doesn't it seem that even the toughest





PHOTO: KATIA PUGACHEVA

stance taken by the West does not mean a thing to the Russian authorities both in the case of your father and in other high-profile political cases, such as the one with Pussy Riot?

There are certain results. There is media and diplomatic pressure. The issue of Khodorkovsky, Lebedev and other political prisoners is constantly raised during all negotiations. The Yukos case is repeatedly mentioned by German Chancellor Angela Merkel. The European Parliament and the U.S. Department of State often raise it, too. The Russian side is again and again given to understand that the Yukos case is still a problem for both Russia's Foreign Ministry and Putin personally – it is an irritant. Of course, the West's reaction alone will not change the situation fundamentally. What matters more to the Presidential Administration is the image inside the country.

Another pressure factor is the Magnitsky Act, which also helps our cause. The Russian pro-government system is based on loyalty: bureaucrats consciously break laws and sign corrupt deals because as long as you are loyal, the state will cover you, and you can calmly purchase real estate abroad. As soon as these people are denied entrance to the United States and Great Britain and find themselves unable to open bank accounts, their motivation will be affected. Is it really worthwhile to participate in corrupt schemes? Another factor is linking the issues of specific people to diplomatic negotiations. If Russia needs to be forced to do anything, it can be told: we're cancelling our support for your anti-ballistic missile system (even if the USA is going to do it anyway) unless you review the Lebedev-Khodorkovsky case.

U.W.: What was the role of your father in increasing protest sentiments in Russia after the Duma election in December 2011?

The protests have a direct connection to the situation with political prisoners. The case of my father and Lebedev was a precedent. The government used the pattern of destroying Yukos to make further corporate raids. This practice soon expanded from large busi-

nesses to medium and small ones, and now it affects a great number of people. The Russians have experienced themselves – or through their acquaintances and close ones – how the system uses its justice system for its own benefit and how competing businesses take advantage of this. It has become clear how corruption and a lack of the rule of law make business inefficient. This is precisely the reason why people demand at rallies that political prisoners be released. Meanwhile, the number of arrests is growing.

U.W.: Can Khodorkovsky become a unifying figure for the opposition, and does he want to?

The best answer to this question was given in my father's book. Until his arrest he was building, as he put it, the necessary "blocks" for efficient democracy through his Open Russia programme. These blocks include civil society, independent journalism, educating a class of professional judges and providing education to help young people understand how a democracy functions. So if my father were free, I don't think he would pursue personal leadership. He would rather continue developing civil society. Khodorkovsky does not have an ambition to lead people to barricades. He had an offer to be elected to the Opposition Coordination Council. He turned it down because he cannot be truly useful there.

U.W.: Meanwhile, a lot of people mention Vaclav Havel, who also did not choose to be a leader. What he chose was, perhaps, the responsibility of a leader faced with a question: If not you, then who?

I view it differently. Russian society tends to uphold paternalistic values and believes in a good tsar. This is our biggest problem. A good tsar may easily turn into a bad one. Moreover, the operation of the entire state should not depend on one person. Our society has repeatedly made this mistake: we are looking for a leader with a positive programme. When we fail to find one, we lift our hands in dismay and complain that the opposition is not ready. In contrast, my father and I believe that progress must begin with efficient institutions. ■

Does a "Sorry" Make Sense?

Author:
Michael Binyon,
UK

On April 13, 1919, a large group of Indians protesting against British colonial rule gathered in Amritsar, the Sikh holy town in northern India. They were furious at the arrest of two of their leaders, and for 24 hours the city had been shaken by riots. At 5p.m., General Reginald Dyer marched into the square with 140 troops, most of them Gurkhas. All the exits were blocked. The troops were then ordered to open fire on the peaceful crowd. They went on shooting for about 10 minutes until all their ammunition ran out. Official estimates put the casualties at 379 killed and 1,200 injured. Indians believe the figure was far higher.

The British government was appalled. An inquiry was held, and Dyer was sacked. Winston Churchill, then Secretary of War, expressed his anger at Dyer's actions and said British rule in India had never been based on physical force alone. But Dyer was not punished. Thousands of British people, in India and in Britain, supported his action. The incident caused fury and revulsion among almost all Indians, and gave a massive boost to the struggle for independence. There was never any apology from Britain.

The Amritsar Massacre, as it has become known, has long been an emotional issue between Britain and India, and has overshadowed all subsequent British visits. When the Queen paid a state visit in 1997, she went to the city, laid a wreath in the garden of remembrance, removed her shoes and bowed her head for 30 seconds. But she did not say sorry. David Cameron has just returned from his second visit to India where he had hoped to bolster British trade and ties with Britain's former colony. He too went to Amritsar, laid a wreath and described the massacre as a "deeply shameful event in British history". Writing in the memorial book of condolence, he added: "We must never forget what happened here." But he did not offer a formal apol-



German Chancellor Willy Brandt drops to his knees in silent repentance for Nazi crimes at the commemoration of the Warsaw Ghetto victims (1970)

ogy, despite the clear wishes of his hosts. Should he have done?

Apologising for past events in history has become an explosive issue around the world. Should statesmen take personal responsibility for events that happened long before they were born? What difference does an apology make? Why do nations that feel wronged insist so strongly that their wounded pride will never be soothed until they hear the word "sorry"?

No country has apologised with such heartfelt intensity for its past history as Germany. From Chancellor Willy Brandt's famous and spontaneous kneeling in contrition at the site of the Warsaw Ghetto to the speeches of Germany's chancellors and Presidents on wartime anniversaries, Germany's leaders have again and again apologised for what Germans did

in the Second World War. But the country is alone among the Axis combatants. Italy has never fully acknowledged or apologised for its role as Hitler's ally. Since 1945, Austria has barely mentioned its commission of war crimes. And Japan has famously struggled to formulate various expressions of remorse for its wartime aggression that stop short of a full apology. Japanese spokesmen even suggested recently that the Emperor once used the word "sorry", only to be rebuked by Japanese language specialists who insisted that the word used could not be properly translated as "sorry".

Partly, this refusal to apologise is based on national pride. There is still a strong lobby in Japan that denies that Japanese soldiers committed any war crimes in China, that do not regret Japan's

attacks on other Asian nations and insist that the issue of war guilt was settled long ago when Japan offered compensation at the 1951 San Francisco peace treaty.

Partly also the refusal to utter the word sorry, especially to the Korean women enslaved as military prostitutes, is based on fears of lawsuits. Turkey has had to deal with a powerful Armenian lobby that is still pressing Ankara to admit that the killing of thousands of Armenians during the First World War was genocide. The more vehemently Turkey refuses, the more others take up the Armenian cause: the French parliament and the US Congress have both angered Turkey at their recognition of "genocide". The real issue today is the fear in Turkey and in Japan that a formal apology would open the floodgates to compensation claims by the victims or their descendants.

Paradoxically, however, more and more politicians are now issuing apologies over events for which they had no responsibility at all. Tony Blair apologised to the Irish people for Britain's failure to do more to relieve the starvation during the Irish Potato Famine in 1845; in 2006 he also apologised for Britain's role in the slave trade. In 2009 the US Senate passed a resolution formally apologising for slavery. But closer to today's affairs, Obama himself was sharply attacked last year by his presidential rival for what Mitt Romney called Obama's "apology" during a Middle East tour of US actions and policies in the region.

Years of awkward diplomatic manoeuvrings usually precede an apology for a nation's actions. Eastern Europe has seen plenty of examples. One of the most sensitive and bitterly contested events was the Soviet massacre of thousands of Polish officers at Katyn in 1940. For 50 years after that, Soviet leaders blamed Nazi Germany for the massacre and denied that Stalin had ordered the killings. This was a huge factor in the long-standing Polish hostility to Moscow after the Second World War. It was not until 1990 that Gorbachev admitted his country's guilt and handed over archive documents to the Poles. But Moscow has still never apologised for Stalin's other crimes - and its refusal to apologise for the terrible starva-

tion in Ukraine in the 1930s is a key factor still complicating relations between Russia and Ukraine.

Apologies, however, have often become the key factor in attempts to improve bad relations. But their significance is downgraded if the apology looks trivial, insincere or suggests political expediency. No one now expects a modern state to apologise for actions taken by rulers and armies centuries ago. Does Britain need to apologise for every atrocity - repression or military action - during the colonial period in India, Africa or the Middle East? What about the many battles fought between European countries - are they now all to be re-examined to see which side was "guilty" and should apologise? While it makes sense for politicians to apologise for their own mistakes, it is surely pointless for them to say sorry for the mistakes of others.

A confusion has arisen, however, between voicing an apology and admitting a wrong. Officials at the United Nations today freely admit that the UN was wrong not to authorise military action to protect the Muslims in the "safe haven" of Srebrenica, who were then massacred by Serb forces. But an apology to today's Bosnian Muslims by the current UN Secretary-General would not make them feel safer or diminish their anguish. The French state eventually freed Captain Alfred Dreyfus, the Jewish military official accused of spying for Germany, stripped him of his rank and imprisoned on Devil's Island in French Guiana in 1895. He was eventually freed, pardoned and reinstated in the French Army. But the state never apologised for his unjust conviction - and it was left to newspapers and prominent intellectuals to apologise for the climate of anti-Semitism that had led to his conviction.

Is it now harder for states to apologise than in the past? The pressure of events, the demand for "instant" news coverage and the tightening of legal liability laws mean that politicians are under ever greater pressure to say "sorry" but are in ever greater legal and financial danger if they do so. Maybe in future they will only apologise for events so distant in the past that no one can still remember what the original offence was. ■



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Liberated, Only to Be Sent into Battle

Battles for Ukraine went hand in hand with the irresponsible and merciless exploitation of the local population in the offensive operations of the Red Army

Author:
Liudmyla Rybchenko

Soviet mobilization efforts on the territory of Ukraine during the Second World War were part of the general Soviet enlistment campaign which, from the very start, was directed towards scoring victories by virtue of overwhelming quantity rather than quality, which would require working out an efficient strategy and training troops. Wartime enlistment campaigns swept across the Ukrainian SSR in two waves: The first one between 23 June 1941 and the complete German occupation of the republic in July 1942, while the second one, in 1943-45, was conducted when the Red Army was already advancing, the result of which was the re-occupation of the territory of Ukraine.

THE UKRAINIAN MOBILIZATION RESOURCE

The rapid advance of the German troops, negligence of Soviet military enlistment offices, chaos in Soviet government bodies, local defeatist sentiments and distrust for the ruling regime were all factors that gradually caused the disruption of Soviet mobilization efforts. In many central and eastern oblasts of Ukraine, less than half of the eligible men showed up at enlistment stations, while the process was, in essence, completely derailed in Western Ukraine. A large number of recruits failed to reach the military units they were assigned to. According to the Mobilization Directorate of the Red Army's General Staff, over two million men subject to military service and re-

cruits remained on the occupied territory of the USSR. Researchers' estimates are much higher – 5,631,000 men, including over three million in Ukraine.

Add to these the Red Army deserters from the front-line or soldiers who were surrounded, re-

leased Soviet POWs, young men who reached conscription age under German occupation, as well as older and sick men (their eligibility for conscription was determined by additional orders of the Soviet command in 1942-43.). These were the groups of potential conscripts

Over seven million residents of the Ukrainian SSR, or nearly a quarter the Soviet military forces, donned Red Army uniforms during the war

From
2.7-3
to
4 million

people were conscripted to the Red Army in Ukraine and sent away in 1943-45



for the second mobilization campaign when the Germans were already pulling out of Ukraine. At the time, the Red Army was in dire need of human resources. Everyone fit for military service was dispatched to the front-line from the entire Soviet Union. Women were mobilized to replace the rank and file and non-commissioned officers in air defence, air force, communications and support units. A new, much shorter list of disqualifying illnesses was approved. So-called "enemies of the people" and other "unreliable" categories of citizens were conscripted.

Conscription rules were also changed. A Supreme Command order from 9 February 1942 read: "Since the active army requires the timely replacement of human resources, but the trained military contingent is delayed due to transportation problems and is late coming to active units, the army's

Ukraine suffered
an estimated
**2.5-4
million**
casualties in the Sec-
ond World War

military councils are granted permission to replenish their human resources on their own during offensive operations." In this way, the advancing Red Army was given the power to conscript the newly "liberated" population.

At first glance, this order appears fairly liberal, because at the early stage of the German-Soviet war, Stalin condemned the Soviet citizens who had remained on occupied territories and called them the "traitors of the Fatherland". Now they had an opportunity to restore a legal status for themselves, join the Red Army, distinguish themselves in action and receive decorations. But a close look at the way mobilization was carried out in Ukraine reveals a stark contrast between official orders and their practical implementation.

"ATONING FOR GUILT WITH BLOOD"

It was the rule rather than the exception for poorly equipped and untrained recruits to be sent di-

house, conscripting everyone who was at home and those who had reached conscription age in the two years of occupation to our unit. Two rifle battalions were formed out of these recruits. These conscripts came out to defend their village in their own civilian clothes, armed with their own spades. Once the trenches were dug, they were given rifles, submachine guns and machine guns. Many of them died 10 km from their homes, near Hermannivska Slobidka where 132 men from our division were killed and 285 more were wounded on 27-28 December."

Mobilization targeted not only those who were eligible for conscription for the first time on "liberated" territories, but also former POWs, deserters and other categories of people. According to an order issued by Yefim Shchadenko, Head of the Chief Formation Directorate (Glavupravform), dated 10 March 1943, "all military servicemen who earlier surrendered themselves as POWs to the enemy without resistance, deserted from the Red Army and lived at their residential address on territories temporarily occupied by the Germans, found themselves under siege at their place of residence, stayed at home and have made no effort to join Red Army units must be immediately sent to penal units. The checking procedure and place for the rank and file and non-commissioned officers are determined by an order issued by the army's military councils and for medium and higher officers - by an order issued by front-line military councils. Only those against whom there is sufficient data to suspect that they are involved in anti-Soviet activities should be sent to special NKVD camps."

Former Soviet servicemen who had not cooperated with the German authorities on occupied territories were given one month in a penal company. Those who were elders or policemen under the Germans or collaborated with them in other ways were given two months. Former POWs or medium- and higher-ranking officers were also placed in disciplinary units - assault rifle battalions - and sent to the hottest spots on the front-line, together with penal units. The term of service in assault units was set at two months of fighting or until a person was

USING POORLY ARMED AND UNTRAINED RECRUITS IN OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS BECAME THE RULE

rectly into battle instead of first being trained in reserve regiments. Military units, divisions and even regiments also conscripted men without due regard for instructions sent from above. Shortly after the liberation of Ukraine, battles were fought with varied success and the situation on the front often required immediate reaction, so sending recruits into battle was sometimes a forced measure. However, it later became an integral part of planning and implementing strategic operations. The memoirs of former commanders and combat documents often mention that certain combat tasks were to be executed using the local population. Alexander Lebedintsev, a former infantry officer and head of the veterans' association of the 38th rifle division, described one such case in his memoirs: "We conscripted 72 men from the small village of Dolyna to our regiment alone. There were 13 men with the surname Kyianyts and nine each called Kyiashchenko and Pliut. Battalion commanders went from house to



GRIEF. A WOMAN OVER A DEAD BODY. PHOTO BY DMYTRO BALTERMAN'S

decorated for bravery or wounded for the first time. After that, personnel with good credentials could be appointed to commanding positions in field forces.

The fate of the youngest recruits, aged 17-19 was particularly tragic. Compared to their peers who lived in rural areas of the USSR, the young men in Ukraine who had survived the occupation not only saw their conscription age reduced but also faced much stricter requirement for transition from civilian to military conditions – they immediately found themselves on the front-line. After “liberation” they were mobilized by army-run conscription commissions, which sent them for selection and training to reserve rifle regiments. It later turned out that these regiments were unable to train them properly. Two weeks was not enough time for the young men to master even the basics of military craft. There were cases when they went into battle without even knowing how to use a rifle. So a directive was issued ordering recruits to be sent to reserve brigades in rear military districts rather than to army reserve regiments. As of 10 October 1943, the Central Front had mobilized and sent 2,000 recruits into battle born in 1926, and the South-Western Front – 7,000.

BLEEDING THE UPA DRY

When the Red Army entered Western Ukraine, the total mobilization of the local population became a burning issue, considering how active the nationalist underground and the UPA were in this region. Stalin's commanders believed that the population of Galicia and Volyn was insufficiently loyal to the Soviet authorities. In 1942, the People's Commissariat for Defence ordered for non-commissioned officers born in the western oblasts of Belarus and Ukraine and in Bessarabia and Northern Bukovyna to be weeded out of the army on ethnic grounds.

On the eve of the arrival of the Red Army in western regions, the Commander of the First Ukrainian Front, Nikolai Vatutin, asked Nikita Khrushchev, a member of the front's Military Council at the time, about mobilization. After attending a rally in the “liberated” city of Sarny, Khrushchev informed Stalin: “I have come to the conclusion that these people need

From the eye witness account of the Ukrainian writer, Anatoliy Dimarov:



“When the village was freed, all men aged 16-60 – everyone who had a leg and a hand (whether they were blind or deaf did not matter) – were conscripted into the army. We were ‘armed’ – given half a brick each – and told to ‘go and atone for your guilt with blood’, because we had been on occupied territories. They told us: You throw the bricks, and the Germans will think they are hand grenades! 500 of us were driven onto an ice-covered reservoir. There was a factory on the opposite bank and the Germans made gun slots in the wall surrounding it. The wall was three metres high. Try getting over it, not to mention running over the ice to reach it. The Germans let us come close and opened targeted fire. We could not turn back – behind us were the Smersh men with machine guns aimed at our backs... A mine exploded – I was contused once more and fell down. When I was picked up, still unconscious, and taken to the hospital, they could not pry that brick from my hand – I clung to it and it froze to my hand. As a true soldier, I did not leave my weapon behind in the field (laughs). Guys told us that only 15 of the 500 men survived! Near Izium, they sacrificed 10,000 such unarmed Ukrainian men! And they destroyed men across all of Ukraine in this way. No-one has written about this. I am the only one. The rest are keeping mum.”

to be conscripted to the Red Army according to standard procedure. The only thing is that unreliable men must be identified and filtered out with greater scrutiny, as well as agents who will most certainly be sent to us by the Germans through those OUN men, Banderites and Bulba followers. I believe that these people will do a good job fighting against the Germans.” After that, the State Committee for Defence issued the order “On Mobilizing Soviet Citizens in Regions of Western Ukraine and Western Belarus, Liberated from the German Invaders” which launched the conscription campaign there.

Men eligible for military service and conscripts aged 19-46 (born in 1898-1925) were conscripted in the “liberated” cities and villages. The locals did not exactly rush to conscription offices. People were tired of war and were looking forward to its end, wishing it would spare their families. Moreover, the first mobilization efforts revealed that the Ukrainian national liberation movement had a significant influence in the region. To disrupt Soviet mobilization, the command of UPA-North announced, among other things, its own conscription in Volyn and Polissia and issued a number of calls urging the locals to avoid Soviet conscription. Mobilization reports produced by conscription offices in the Volyn, Lviv and Drohobych oblasts often mentioned that recruits who were on

their way to assembly stations of Soviet conscription offices were either intercepted by “UPA bands” or fled to “nationalist bands” on their own.

Taking this into consideration, mobilization in Western Ukraine began to be viewed by the Soviet Command not only as a military necessity but also as one of the most important tools with which to fight the insurgents. The first thing the Soviets decided to do was to conscript “the most active male population”, aged under 30, and send them far away from their native land. Conscripts were dispatched to the rear and, after filtration and training, the most “politically reliable” were sent to combat units, while the rest were used in rear-based units and in construction.

Researchers have calculated that between 2.7-3mn and 4mn people were conscripted to the Red Army in Ukraine and sent away during the second wave of mobilization. A total of over seven million residents of the Ukrainian SSR, which is nearly 23% of the entire Soviet Armed Forces, donned Red Army uniforms during the war.

The front steamrolled across Ukraine twice and its lands were under hostile occupation. Thus, in addition to serious military and demographic significance, Soviet military mobilization efforts also had a political dimension. When the Red Army re-entered Ukraine, service-

THE SOVIET COMMAND VIEWED THE MOBILIZATION IN WESTERN UKRAINE AS A TOOL WITH WHICH TO FIGHT THE INSURGENTS

men who had lived on occupied territories faced extremely cruel forms of conscription and use in the army. These were sometimes carried out with no regard for any rules and instructions. On the one hand, the wrongful actions of the military regarding the local contingent were a result of the hardships experienced on the front as well as the Soviet practice of gaining victory at any human cost. On the other hand, they were a continuation of Stalin's policy against people who had stayed behind on occupied territories, including in Ukraine. ■

Inactivity Leads to Hell



Author:
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Pešek,
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The first quarter of this year has some remarkable dates. The way people, the media and politicians treat them is an interesting indicator of a society's moral and political state.

On January 30, 1933, a new chancellor came to power in Germany. This year, the German public and press spent the day quietly, treating the event as an insignificant episode in the chaos that reigned in the country at that time. In fact, when President Paul von Hindenburg appointed Adolf Hitler, the leader of the little known National Socialist Workers' Party, as Chancellor, no one expected him to be at the helm for long.

However, the political success of Nazism was laid in the very title of the party. The power of words like national, socialist and workers attracted people. Sprinkled with a concentrated cocktail of demagogy, social populism, promises of simple solutions to problems and cheap goulash, it brought success.

Chancellor Angela Merkel said recently at the opening of the *Berlin 1933: the Road to Dictatorship* exhibition: "The rise of Nazism was possible because both the elite and parts of German society took part in it, but primarily because most Germans tolerated the rise. The repressions and crushing of human rights that finally ended with World War II, as well as the inhuman crime called the Holocaust, were only possible because most of the population turned a blind eye to them and stayed quiet."

Meanwhile, there were a number of events in Ukraine to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Battle of Stalingrad. Once again, we saw portraits of Joseph Stalin and had the opportunity to marvel at the heroism of the Red Army soldiers. But wasn't it the rise of the Nazi totalitarian regime in 1933 that caused the death of hundreds of thousands people on the banks of the Volga in 1943? It would have made more sense to use the 80th anniversary of Hitler's rise to power to discover the cause of the National Socialist Party's success as a warning to contemporary societies. Totalitarianism knows how to fool people with slogans and promises.

March 5 is the 60th anniversary of Stalin's death. Just like Hitler, he based the success of the Soviet regime on the word "socialism", replaced nationalism with internationalism, presented the takeover of territories as a

proletarian revolution, and replaced the "solution of the Jewish issue" with the "continuous class war". Indeed, the Stalin regime was so effective that we still cannot entirely rid ourselves of it. For instance, the demagogy of politicians from the Communist Party of Ukraine is not only an echo of the past, but an attempt to return to Stalinism as a method of rule.

Hence the question: what is the difference between the situation in Ukraine and Germany when it comes to totalitarianism?

Germany already knows that the passivity of most of its citizens opened the door for Hitler. Meanwhile, Ukrainians still live with Bolshevik legends, even after 22 years of democracy. Clearly, the reason is not merely in the "I'm all right, Jack" attitude – it is much deeper.

**THE CURRENT POLITICAL
SITUATION IN UKRAINE IS BEST
DESCRIBED BY THE SLOGAN OF
WESTERN EUROPEAN
ENVIRONMENTALISTS:
"BE ACTIVE, OR YOU'LL BE
RADIOACTIVE!" THE UKRAINIAN
VERSION COULD READ
"INACTIVITY LEADS TO HELL"**

On February 23, for instance, many Ukrainians celebrated Protector of the Motherland Day, i.e. Soviet (Red) Army day. The government's attempts to celebrate it on another day proved futile. Ukrainian people continue to live with Communist totalitarian holidays and traditions. This proves that a large part of the population identifies itself with the former regime, opting for a passive position when

it comes to democratic values.

Can you imagine buses with Adolf Hitler's portrait on the side being driven around Germany before some holiday, or Mussolini supporters installing his bust in Rome? How would you feel if you saw a memorial plate for Martin Bormann on a building in the central street of Berlin where he used to live?

I don't think Ukrainians would like anything like that. Then, why do they allow the use of Communist symbols, such as the memorial plate to Communist Party Secretary Shcherbytsky in Kyiv, and why does the founder of the totalitarian state and regime Vladimir Ulianov still point the way to well-being in the squares of many Ukrainian cities? Why do Ukrainians allow others to spit in their faces? And how do they expect to get closer to Europe with such an approach?

I think that the current political situation in Ukraine is best described by the slogan of Western European environmentalists: "Be active, or you'll be radioactive!" The Ukrainian version could read "Inactivity leads to hell". ■

The Great Flood

Catastrophic floods during the last large-scale melting of glaciers shaped the contours of present-day Europe and created natural-climatic preconditions for the territory of modern Ukraine to become populated

Massive floods were part of the numerous natural disasters that befell mankind in the nearly three million years of its history. These global catastrophes are mentioned in the Holy Scriptures as the Great Flood in the story of Noah's Ark.

The era of floods which were truly catastrophic for Europe (including Ukraine), which was in close proximity to melting glaciers, can be identified as the period of the intense melting of the last glacier, 13,000-10,000 years ago, known as the late glacial epoch or the final phase of the Palaeolithic age.

THE HIDDEN RESOURCES OF THE LAST GLACIER

At the peak of freezing temperatures 20,000-17,000 years ago, large masses of water were bound by ice, and the level of the World Ocean dropped by 130m and that of the Black Sea by 100m. As a result, the shallow continental shelf which lay 100-130m deep (calculating from the present level of the ocean), became dry land. Shallow seas along the northern coast of Eurasia disappeared, while the northern coast of Siberia was hundreds of kilometres closer to the North Pole than it is now. At that time, the Bering Strait between Asia and North America did not exist. What is now the Bering Sea was the Beringia plain across which Asian people travelled to settle on the American continent 13,000-12,000 years ago.

After a significant drop in the ocean level, a plain, full of verdant vegetation sprawled between Britain and Scandinavia. It served as summer pasture for numerous herds of bison, moose,

Author:
Leonid
Zalizniak

wild horses, saigas (antelopes) and mammoths and as hunting grounds for the Cro-Magnon men of the Upper Palaeolith. From time to time, fishermen's


trawlers bring in not only antlers and mammoth bones from the bottom of the North Sea but also spearheads and harpoons used by hunters from the Ice Age.



The deep-water exploration of submerged continental slopes has revealed a clear coastline along their perimeter, 130m under the surface of present-time oceans, with characteristic beaches, dunes, bluffs, etc.

Rising temperatures in the late Ice Age caused frozen water to quickly melt. Huge masses of water poured into the World Ocean, significantly raising its level. Low-lying lands were sometimes flooded in a catastrophic fashion, even though the process lasted several millennia.

It is well known, that spring floods are caused by rapidly melting snow and ice accumu-



lated over several winter months. Imagine the scale of floods in the late phase of the Ice Age, when an ice crust, built up over the course of 20,000-30,000 years, turned into water! Great ice sheets melted, releasing powerful torrents of water.

Gigantic streaks of frontal moraines were formed along the southern edge of a glacier. These were tall ridges of rock and sediment that stretched for thousands of kilometres across northern Germany, Poland and Belarus to Russia and the upper Volga River. Numerous lakes, often creating entire cascades, were formed in them. When temperatures rose, the surface of a glacier would melt faster and vast masses of water overflowed the lakes, breaking dams in the form of moraines, flowing in ruinous torrents. As they moved along river valleys, they smashed and carried along everything that stood in their way.

Periods of ice melting were accompanied by catastrophic floods, colossal shifts and mud flows. Vast areas of the continental shelf were flooded due to rapidly rising ocean water, caused by the inrush of hundreds of thousands of cubic metres of ice water.

THE POLISSIA-DNIPRO FLOOD


The Prypiat lowland, through which the Prypiat River and its tributaries flow, is shaped like a saucer. The southeastern edge of this saucer was formed by ridges of Ice Age moraines in the area

The near-glacial Polissia Lake 13,000 years ago

where the Belarusian city of Mazyr is now located in the low Prypiat area. The moraines emerged at the peak of the Ice Age, around 250,000 years ago. Their ridges rise 30-50 metres above the surface of the lowland, blocking passage eastwards to the valley of the Dniro River, which carries its waters down to the Black Sea. It was this saucer-like depression with its natural moraine dam to the east, that helped the near-glacial Polissia Lake to emerge.

Throughout the 20th century, geologists — notably Kyiv-based geomorphologist Vasyly Pazynych

THE GREAT FLOOD CAUSED BY THE BURSTING POLISSIA LAKE 13,000 YEARS AGO HAD AN IMPACT ON WHAT IS NOW THE VALLEY OF THE DNIPRO RIVER



Flint arrowheads of the Swiderian culture found near Yurovychi


towards the end of the century — worked on the concept of the existence of this lake, the waters of which periodically burst into the Dniro valley. Proof of its continued existence, are the major deposits found by Belarusian scientists in the Prypiat basin. Dammed by the moraines, the lake discharged its waters to the west, into the Western Bug and Vistula basin. It accumulated colossal amounts of water (up to 400 cu km) from melting glaciers. The lake was formed and burst into the Dniro many times over during the Ice Age, »



THE DELUGE BY IVAN AIVAZOVSKY, 1864

Before the flood

The northern coast of the Black Sea 20,000-17,000 years ago (according to Fyodor Shcherbakov)



ruining the valley of the river down to its delta. The last burst took place 13,000 years ago, when intense melting caused the dam to burst and the Prypiat to flow through the breach.

This flood wreaked havoc with the valley and its inhabitants. A powerful blast of water thrust large masses of sand, gravel and clay through the breach near what is now the village of Yurovychi in the lower Prypiat area. Carrying this moraine debris, torrents of water rushed southwards along the valley of the Dniipro towards the Black Sea, levelling terraces and leaving behind thick sand deposits. Geomorphologists have found traces of this ruinous torrent in the topography of the Dniipro's valley.

A powerful mud flow from Polissia left behind several metres of sand in different areas, including a multi-kilometre stretch of sand deposits in the flood plain along the Dniipro's right bank, downstream of Kyiv.

Dating these disastrous floods that reached all the way to the Black Sea is possible thanks to archaeological finds located directly in the sand deposited by the floods. The breach, located 20km southeast of the Mozyr moraine ridge is of particular scientific interest. The waters of the lake made a 2.5-kilometre opening in the long, 40-metre high ridge through which the Prypiat now flows. Yurovychi is located directly at the entrance

to the breach. There is a raised sandbank in its vicinity, where a remarkable series of arrowheads of the Swiderian culture, made 11,000 years ago, were found. People were clearly able to live in the breach when the lake was no longer there, with only the Prypiat crossing what used to be its bed.

The grand flood caused 13,000 years ago by the bursting Polissia Lake was the last major natural factor that contributed to the formation of the current Dniipro valley on Ukraine's territory. The drainage of the Polissia Lake made the vast Prypiat and upper reaches of the Dniipro basins inhabitable.

THE BLACK SEA DELUGE

With the level of the Mediterranean Sea falling at the peak of freezing 20,000-17,000 years ago, it lost its connection to the Black Sea via the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. Coupled with a significant reduction in the influx of river waters, due to the dry and cold climate near glaciers, this factor brought down the level of the Black Sea by 100m, which, in its turn, led to the sea's desalination. Shallow patches of its bed along the coastline became exposed, forming the Black Sea shelf. The northwestern coastline of the freshwater Black Sea lay 200km to the south of Odesa. The Sea of Azov did not exist at the time, and the Don River flowed across what would later be its bed and

discharged into the freshwater Black Sea, south of the Kerch Peninsula. Lowlands stretched between the Crimea and what is now the mouth of the Danube, intersected by the valleys of the Danube, Dniester and Dniipro rivers. About 100km south of modern Odesa, the Dniester flowed into the Dniipro, the mouth of which was on almost the same latitude as Simferopol (see **Before the flood**).

The dry grassy steppes, where herds of bison, horses and other herbivores roamed in the late Ice Age, extended far to the south of the steppe area north of the current Black Sea, covering the entire territory of the Sea of Azov and the Gulf of Odesa. Along the edge of the Black Sea shelf, a coastline with characteristic bluffs, pebble, sand beaches, dunes, etc. was found at a depth of about 100 metres.

Towards the end of the Ice Age, floods like the one that swept across Polissia occurred throughout the territory adjoining glaciers in the Northern Hemisphere. Huge masses of ice water from vast frozen expanses in Scandinavia, Siberia and North America poured into the World Ocean, steadily raising its surface level. Lowlands along continental coastlines were flooded and turned into continental shelves.

Rapidly melting glaciers quickly filled the rivers of the Black Sea basin 15,000-10,000 years ago. Ice water from the Valdai glacier drained southwards along the Dniipro and the Don. The Danube carried masses of water from the eroding glaciers of the Alps and the Carpathians, and the Kuban from the Caucasus. Excess freshwater flowed over from the brimming Caspian basin along the Kuma-Manych Strait to the Black Sea, causing its level to rise erratically but continually during the Ice Age, thus gradually submerging its coastline areas.

Towards the end of the period, about 9,500 years ago, freshwater from the Black Sea began to spill over through the Bosphorus and the Dardanelles. The salty water of the Mediterranean Sea contributed to the gradual salination of the Black Sea, causing a layer of hydrogen

The drainage of the Polissia Lake in the late Palaeolithic age,

15,000-10,000

years ago, pumped

400

cu km of water into the Black Sea basin

sulphide to form on its bed. The erratically but continually rising level of the Black Sea in the late Ice Age caused the vast steppes north of the Black Sea and near the Sea of Azov to be covered by the water of what is now the Gulf of Odesa and the Sea of Azov.

The scenario under which the Black Sea level gradually rose was developed by Ukrainian and Russian scientists back in Soviet times. An alternative to it is the hypothesis of a catastrophic Black Sea deluge. It was proposed in 1993 during an international scientific expedition on the Aquanaut along the Black Sea shelf. The expedition was led by William Ryan and Walter Pitman of Columbia University, and their results were published in a book with the intriguing title *Noah's Flood* in 1999.

Supporters of the Black Sea deluge theory came to the conclusion that during the coldest period, 18,000 years ago, when the level of the World Ocean was much lower than today, there was a ridge of hills linking Europe and Asia where the Bosphorus is now. Ryan, Pitman and their followers believe that unlike the Mediterranean, the level of the Black Sea, which was isolated from the World Ocean, did not rise and was 150m lower than it is today.

While the Black Lake was allegedly drying up, like the Aral Sea in our day and age, ocean waters continued to rise consistently. Proponents of the Black Sea deluge suggest that about 7,600 years ago, waves from the Mediterranean reached the Bosphorus depression and spilled over in the form of a giant salty waterfall (according to various estimates, 100-150m high) into the freshwater Black Lake. According to this scenario, the flow of saltwater was so powerful, that the lake rose by 15cm a day, and the sea advanced into the lowlands of what is now the Gulf of Odesa at a rate of several kilometres per month. Two to three years later, the level of the Black Sea rose by at least 100m, flooding the lowlands along its western and particularly its northern coast.

The rapid salination of what was a freshwater lake with sea

water proved fatal to its flora and fauna. With all living organisms dying almost instantly, the bed was covered by a thick layer of dead organic matter. Because of a lack of oxygen, its decomposition caused the formation of hydrogen sulphide at great depths.

Despite its popularity, the dramatic concept of the Black Sea deluge has weak points, for which it has been criticized by specialists who favour the theory of gradual transgression. Among other things, it is hard to explain the shrinking of the Black Sea at the peak of glacier melting in the final phase of the Palaeolithic age 15,000-10,000 years ago, because the erosion of the Valdai, Alpine-Carpathian and Caucasian glaciers brought more water to the Danube, Dniester, Dnipro, Don and Kuban. The drainage of the Polissia Lake alone pumped about 400 cu km of water into the Black Sea basin. This is the reason why the level of the Black Sea did not drop in the final millennia of the Ice Age, as deluge theory proponents suggest, but, on the contrary, rose even faster than that of the World Ocean. This would have inevitably caused, first, the flooding of shelf areas along the coast and then the drainage of excess freshwater through the Bosphorus into the Mediterranean. In view of the above, the deluge hypothesis should be treated with caution.

Moreover, some of its supporters claim that the biblical story of the Great Flood describes the deluge of the Black Sea coast. The biblical testimony that "all the floodgates of the sky were opened, and rain fell on the earth for forty days and nights", appears to be more like monsoon rains on the coast of the Indian Ocean than a deluge in the temperate climate north of the Black Sea.

It has been suggested that Plato's mention of Atlantis suggest a Pontic civilization buried under the Black Sea. However, modern archaeology has found no evidence of any ancient culture at the bottom of the Gulf of Odesa. If the sea incursion advanced at several kilometres per month, as the deluge theory suggests, most of the population on



THE BLACK SEA AS SEEN FROM OUTER SPACE. Light-blue marks the areas that were submerged after the Ice Age

that territory was able to flee. However, no traces of societies that would have developed enough to have cities, a writing system and a state, have been found along the western and northern Black Sea coast.

Equally implausible is the hypothesis that Sumer in southern Mesopotamia was founded by the Pontic people who fled from the Black Sea deluge. They are claimed to have brought with them the legend of the Great Flood, leading to the Sumerian myth of Gilgamesh which later allegedly morphed into the biblical story of Noah's Ark. However, Mesopotamia had no need to import legends about catastrophic floods, having a rich history of them on its own annual large-scale flooding by the

MELTING GLACIERS RAPIDLY FILLED RIVERS IN THE BLACK SEA BASIN 15,000-10,000 YEARS AGO

Tigris and the Euphrates and the flooding of the Persian Gulf by the Indian Ocean.

Therefore, most contemporary scholars tend to reject the deluge theory in favour of the gradual incursion of the sea into low-lying coastal areas.

Accompanied by gigantic cataclysms, large-scale natural-climatic changes at the end of the Ice Age brought about the fairly warm climate that we are experiencing now and shaped the modern contours of Europe, putting natural preconditions in place for its northern part to be populated and laying the foundation for the ethno-cultural map of northern Eurasia. ■

To Live in Your Head



Zemfira became brand name many years ago. It has been living a life that is completely detached from the real person that made it. Perhaps, this is what her new album *To Live in Your Head* is about. Or, more spe-

cifically, about her reluctance to be a style icon, yet there are too many "buts" awaiting her on her road of permanent dissent. That is why the sixth album is very quiet in every sense, featuring a pure analog sound of instruments and arrange-

ments. The album has an intrinsically intimate and philosophic decadence that the mass audience does not really like or understand. Zemfira is no longer a scandal girl, a Kurt Cobain in a skirt. The motto of this record is in the dark phrase from the song *If only*: "I will have to die to change anything". Indeed, the record contains a lot of death, solitude and contemplation.

The most popular Russian rock singer/songwriter is obviously tired of the excessive experiments with electronics in her previous album *Thank You*. In her latest one, she returns to her original light rock sound, reflecting her love for Radiohead in many references to the band's mid-1990s music in her own songs. The reaction to this sudden return to her musical roots has been controversial. Many see such a Zemfira as a secondary, infantile and pretentious artist. Others say this is her most honest and timely creation: she managed to grasp the zeitgeist in the themes of her songs. The upcoming tour to promote the album, covering Kyiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv and Odesa, will probably explain the details.

Events

5 – 18 March

Primus Gallery

(16/5, vul. Lesi Ukrayinky, Lviv)

Graphic images by Roman Romanyshyn have won him recognition in Ukraine and abroad. Using a unique printmaking technique that combines etching, aquatint, Mezzotint and dry-point, he attracts even the savviest of art lovers. In addition to

graphics, the artist offers paintings, sculptures and gesso artwork, using an impressive variety of genres and art techniques. Perhaps, this is why his works are found in many museum and private collections all over the world.



19 March, 7 p.m.

Keiko Matsui

Ukrayina Palace
(103, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)

The renowned jazz pianist will perform her new show *The Best*, a collection of her best songs. Her new age style and unique jazz sound distinguish the Japanese pianist on the world's music stage. Keiko Matsui invests a virtuoso technique, as well as her intimate feelings and emotions into her music. Every time she hits a key, waves of emotion overwhelm the audience leaving it excited long after the show. Keiko Matsui talks of her music as the connection between her and the audience.

21 – 28 March

2013 Italian Film Week

Kyiv movie theatre

(19, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)

The downtown movie theatre will once again host the Italian Film Week. It offers a multi-style selection of five films from the country of Caesar, pasta, Fellini and Prada. The opening film is *Reality*, a drama about the life of Matteo Garrone, followed by *Chocolate Kisses* and *Sweet Life*, two films with similar titles yet different storylines.

The Continent, a drama by the well-known Emanuele Crialese, reveals the life of fishermen and immigrants, while the romantic comedy *All Saints' Day* will entertain the audience with a portion of Italian married life.





from alternative rock to trip hop and pop rock, in her music, and her sophisticated sensuality with a pinch of aggression that brought her fame. Today, she has the same charm, while her new songs have a lot of electronic details, the main accent being on the vocals, as always. In fact, the singing is the best part of 8 Seconds. Still, most tracks are so much of an experiment, that Yulia's long-time fans will only really like several tracks. The younger audience with no memories of the 1990s may like it better. But everyone should go to her gig to get some good drive and hear her old hits.

A Puzzling Comeback

After the peak of her popularity in the late 1990s, Yulia Lord disappeared from the music scene for a while, releasing just a few singles and a Christmas mini album with Yuri Hnatkovsky. Her disappearance was hardly a break artists take to restore their creative reserves. On the contrary, she must have spent the 14 years between her debut mini-record *Tanets Dush* (The Dance of Souls) and *8 Sekund* (8 Seconds), the latest record released in 2012, searching for a new sound and new quality to her music, espe-

cially arrangements. Expectations for this first feature album – and her widely anticipated comeback – were really high. The first impression of the LP is a noticeable difference between the live and studio versions of the tracks. It is not striking really, but it is often the tiny details that mean a lot, and this is the case here. The balance of rock and pop in the album, has a European feel to it, tilting more to the pop side. This experiment by Yulia Lord is unusual, albeit professional and sincere. Back in the 1990s, it was a fusion of different styles,



23 March, 7 p.m.

Madama Butterfly

National Opera House (50, vul. Volodymyrska, Kyiv)
Giacomo Puccini's opera in three acts, its libretto based on a short story about a geisha dramatized by David Belasco, is an intense emotional upheaval. Premiered at La Scala in Milan in 1904, the opera tells of a young geisha,

Cio-Cio San, who marries American navy lieutenant, Pinkerton, and has a son with him. Sincere in her feelings, she is looking forward to her husband's return. But unexpected dramatic twists in her life push Cio-Cio San to her dreadful irreversible final step.



23 March, 10 p.m.

MGZAVREBI

Tolstoy club (19, vul. Velyka Vasylkivska, Kyiv)
An amazing band, comprised of twelve talented musicians, brought together by a common vision of music, will play a gig in Ukraine. Critics describe them as the present and the future of bohemian Georgia, while their songs are a mix of traditional Georgian singing and the sound of folk instruments. The band has performed in Ukraine many times, winning the hearts of Ukrainians music fans, especially after it recorded *Qari Qris*, a song in Ukrainian and Georgian, with well-known Ukrainian band, TNMK.

24 March, 7 p.m.

Filo Machado

Tchaikovsky National Music Academy (1-3/11, vul. Horodetskoho, Kyiv)
The Brazilian music concert will shake Kyiv and fill the March night with the fiery bossanova tune created by renowned Brazilian-born singer, guitarist, percussionist and composer Filo Machado. He has recorded many great albums, played with popular musicians and was nominated for a Grammy in Latin American Jazz. Since beginning his music career, Filo Machado has travelled the world with gigs and he will shortly be bringing one to Ukraine.



Besieged by the Past

The Ukrainian Week peacefully “invades” the town of Zbarazh

Author:
Oleh Kotsarev

The tranquil Ternopil–Lanivtsi train stops and I jump out into a giant snow drift whose pristine white surface has completely concealed the rails and platforms of the Zbarazh train station. A memorial plaque announces that Symon Petliura once honoured this place with a personal visit. Zbarazh is starkly different from the standard historical towns of Galicia. Here, historical monuments, the spirit of the past, and old block apartments are not crammed together but are, rather, mixed in with the realities of other epochs. Everything in Zbarazh is interlaced, creating eclectic mon-

tages. Here is a woman sitting in a sleigh pulled by two horses and a foal against the background of trashy glamorous ads, shabby Soviet-era five story buildings and a somewhat pretentious post-Soviet drugstore. Nearby stands a factory – picturesquely ruined as if by a mini-bombardment and put up for sale – and, almost directly across the street from it, an old Jewish cemetery. A no less Zeitgeist-im-bued Catholic cemetery with statues, crosses and burial vaults is a stone’s throw away.

THE HUMAN FACTOR

In winter, the streets of Zbarazh are almost empty apart from a few central ones. Yet you might befriend a cute dog or adventurous cat that will be happy to guide you to the local castle. Here you also have a chance to meet Nadiyka Herbish, a young but already quite well known Ukrainian writer, who tells you a little about the modern human aspect of her home town. “There is a certain cultural life here: concerts (usually by the cas-

tle), exhibitions and historical reenactments. Some festivals attract representatives of the Goth subculture from all over Ukraine and abroad. There are also painters and sculptors here. In particular, wood carving has been a recent hit with tourists who come here in large numbers, especially from Poland. Naturally, the town does not have higher education institutions – only general and vocational schools. Jobs are pretty scarce. Unfortunately, many locals become migrant workers in Western Europe.” They are said to have significantly driven up local real estate prices with their investments.

THE OLD CENTRE

The Zbarazh synagogue, built in 1537, has undergone a sad metamorphosis. After a number of transformations and remodelling efforts it has emerged as one of the buildings of the local vodka distillery owned by a fairly well known brand.

The oldest church in town, the Orthodox Assumption Cathedral, has also had its share of trouble. The earliest written records of the church date back to the late 16th century. According to historians, in the 18th century it was turned into the Saint Joseph and Victoria

SOME NOTABLE NATIVES AND RESIDENTS OF ZBARAZH

Dmytro Kliachivsky, aka Klym Savur, the first UPA commander in Volhynia

Ida Fink, a Polish writer of Jewish background who wrote primarily about the Holocaust

Kazimierz Zipser, a Polish railway engineer who was the rector of Lviv Polytechnic Institute in the interbellum years

Jozef Wereszczynski, a 16th-century polemical writer who was also a Catholic bishop in Kyiv

Karol Kuryluk, a Polish journalist and publisher who published, among other things, the noted Lviv magazine *Sygnaly* (Signals)



Cathedral, which burned down soon thereafter. The building rose again as a monastery of the Trinitarian Order but was closed by the Austrian authorities by the end of the century. The building was later handed over to the Ukrainian community to be used as a church. This story is further proof that interdenominational Christian wars over church buildings are an old tradition in the Ukrainian lands rather than an apocalyptic sign of the “mad 1990s”. In any case, the building is now used by the Ukrainian Orthodox Church (Kyiv Patriarchate) and looks elegant and tidy.

The Greek Catholic Church of the Lord's Resurrection was also built in the 18th century thanks to donations from Mikolaj Potocki and Zbarazh native Hryhoriy Hymoniuk. It has been rebuilt multiple times over the course of time and now appears massive and not the least bit Baroque.

Located between these two churches are quaint old city blocks. Many buildings are, however, in very poor repair. Some others have been remodelled in a weird fashion. Typical Soviet buildings are interspersed among old ones, totally in line with Zbarazh's eclectic style.

However, the entire central part of town is dominated by the former Berdardine Monastery, specifically its grand Baroque-style Saint Anthony Cathedral. It too was constructed in the 18th century to a design by architect Johann Ganz. Devoid of plentiful decorations on the outside, the church nevertheless appears elegant and rich. After the fall of the Soviet regime it was handed back over to the local Roman Catholic commu-

nity whose population was decimated by earlier deportations and “population exchanges”. A chapel erected by the descendants of the Lemkos who were forcefully resettled here points to the Ukrainian dimension of this “exchange” and serves as a reminder of Operation Vistula. An original bell tower designed by the same architect stands out from the rest of the former monastery buildings. A church school and a gymnasium-type school operated in the monastery beginning in the 18th century, and it now houses a music school.

THE FINAL SPRINT

After crossing the narrow and rushing Hnizna River that weaves its way through town, I find myself on a hill leading to the castle. It is not very high but fairly steep. Sprawled over the hillside is an old park with an obelisk dedicated to Adam Mickiewicz, a World War II monument, and other sculptures. When I finally reach the top of the hill, the castle initially comes across as somehow insufficiently monumental and spectacular. But it withstood a Cossack siege, and there are plenty of nooks and crannies to be examined here. In the 2000s, the building was extensively renovated. It is now in good condition and figures prominently on postcards depicting Ternopil Oblast's many castles. However, the restoration effort has been less than perfect, especially in regards to the interior. This Renaissance palazzo in fortezza was designed by Italian architect Vincenzo Scamozzi in the 17th century, but the original design was later modified by Dutch military architect Henrik van Peene.

The castle now hosts various exhibitions of icons, furniture, embroideries and even musical instruments. A curious visitor will find plenty of replicas of old portraits, including those of the castle's numerous owners and their relatives – the Zbaraskis, the Wisniowieckis, the Poniatowskis, etc. The castle is not the only thing to see here: a relatively new and well-proportioned church with a slight Balkan flavour is perched atop a nearby hill. A large lake lies in the foothills below. In the Polish novel *With Fire and Sword* and the film of the same name, it witnesses the defence of Zbarazh besieged by the huge army of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. But in the snowy winter of 2013, nothing but the occasional fisherman disturbs its peace and quiet. ■

ZBARAZH

Zbarazh is a raion or county centre in Ternopil Oblast with a population of 14,000. The first written record of Zbarazh dates back to 1211. The first wooden castle was built here in the late 14th century by Dmytro Korybut. In 1463, the city was handed over to Vasyl Nesvitsky, who adopted the surname Zbarazky. In 1474, the Tatars burned the castle together with its defenders and ruined the rebuilt castle again in 1598. The citadel was moved to the location of the current castle in 1626–31. The Zbaraskis later yielded the town to the Wisniowieckis. The Cossacks besieged the castle during the Bohdan Khmelnytsky rebellion, and Jeremi Wisniowiecki, a notable historical figure, led the defence. The castle received reinforcements and held out, partly thanks to the fact that the Crimean khan demanded a truce from Khmelnytsky. The Siege of Zbarazh and the Battle of Zboriv resulted in the Treaty of Zboriv, which was not beneficial to Ukraine and lasted for only a short time.



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